1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
216 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
265 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279 (2, htlc_id, required),
281 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282 (0, session_priv, required),
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
294 session_priv: SecretKey,
295 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298 payment_id: PaymentId,
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
305 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
307 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
312 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
320 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
322 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
338 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
344 struct ReceiveError {
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
359 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 err: msgs::LightningError,
377 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
382 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
398 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
402 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
404 err: LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
413 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
418 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
421 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
428 log_level: Level::Warn,
431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
446 shutdown_finish: None,
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
465 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
472 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476 (0, amount_msat, required),
477 (2, payment_purpose, required),
478 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490 /// failed/claimed by the user.
492 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
495 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
499 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
511 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
512 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
513 /// need the counterparty node_id.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519 /// channel to continue normal operation.
521 /// In general this should be used rather than
522 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
526 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527 /// are regenerated on startup.
528 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
536 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
537 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
538 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
539 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
540 /// event can be generated.
541 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
542 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
543 /// operation of another channel.
545 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
546 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
547 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
548 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
550 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
551 event: events::Event,
552 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
556 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
557 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
558 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
559 (0, event, upgradable_required),
560 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
561 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
562 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
563 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
564 // downgrades to prior versions.
565 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
571 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
572 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
573 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
576 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
577 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
578 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
579 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
583 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
584 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
585 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
586 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
587 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
588 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
590 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
591 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
592 channel_id: [u8; 32],
593 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
598 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
600 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
601 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
602 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
603 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
609 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
613 /// State we hold per-peer.
614 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
615 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
617 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
618 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
619 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
621 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
622 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
624 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
625 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
627 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
628 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
630 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
631 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
632 latest_features: InitFeatures,
633 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
634 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
635 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
636 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
637 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
639 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
640 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
641 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
642 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
644 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
645 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
646 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
647 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
648 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
649 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
650 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
651 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
652 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
653 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
654 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
655 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
656 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
657 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
658 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
662 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
663 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
664 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
665 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
666 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
667 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
670 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
673 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
674 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
675 self.channel_by_id.len() +
676 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
677 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
680 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
681 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
682 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
683 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
684 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
688 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
689 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
691 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
694 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
695 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
696 struct PendingInboundPayment {
697 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
698 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
699 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
700 /// this payment being removed.
702 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
703 user_payment_id: u64,
704 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
705 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
706 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
709 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
710 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
711 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
712 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
713 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
714 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
715 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
716 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
718 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
719 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
727 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
729 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
730 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
731 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
736 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
737 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
738 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
739 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
740 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
741 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
742 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
743 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
744 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
746 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
747 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
749 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
750 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
751 $vis trait AChannelManager {
752 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
753 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
754 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
755 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
756 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
757 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
758 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
759 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
760 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
761 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
762 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
763 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
764 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
765 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
766 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
767 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
768 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
769 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
772 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
773 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
774 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
775 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
776 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
777 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
779 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
780 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
781 ES::Target: EntropySource,
782 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
783 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
784 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
788 type Watch = M::Target;
790 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
792 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
794 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
796 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
797 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
799 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
801 type Router = R::Target;
803 type Logger = L::Target;
805 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
808 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
809 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
811 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
812 /// to individual Channels.
814 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
815 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
816 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
817 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
819 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
820 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
821 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
822 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
823 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
824 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
825 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
827 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
828 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
829 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
831 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
832 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
833 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
834 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
835 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
837 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
838 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
839 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
840 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
842 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
843 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
844 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
846 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
847 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
848 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
849 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
850 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
852 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
853 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
854 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
855 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
856 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
857 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
858 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
859 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
862 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
863 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
864 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
865 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
866 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
870 // `total_consistency_lock`
872 // |__`forward_htlcs`
874 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
876 // |__`per_peer_state`
878 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
880 // | |__`claimable_payments`
882 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
888 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
890 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
894 // | |__`pending_events`
896 // | |__`pending_background_events`
898 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
900 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
901 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
902 ES::Target: EntropySource,
903 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
904 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
905 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
909 default_configuration: UserConfig,
910 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
911 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
917 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
919 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
921 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
922 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
924 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
925 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
926 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
927 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
929 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
930 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
932 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
933 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
934 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
935 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
936 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
937 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
938 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
939 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
941 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
943 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
944 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
946 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
948 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
949 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
950 /// and via the classic SCID.
952 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
953 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
955 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
957 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
959 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
960 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
961 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
964 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
966 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
967 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
969 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
970 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
972 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
973 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
974 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
975 /// active channel list on load.
977 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
978 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
980 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
982 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
983 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
984 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
986 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
987 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
988 /// the handling of the events.
990 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
991 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
994 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
995 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
996 /// would break backwards compatability.
997 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
998 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
999 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1001 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1002 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1004 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1006 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1007 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1008 /// confirmation depth.
1010 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1011 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1012 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1014 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1016 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1018 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1020 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1022 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1024 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1025 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1026 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1028 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1029 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1031 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1032 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1033 /// keeping additional state.
1034 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1036 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1037 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1038 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1039 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1041 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1042 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1044 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1045 /// are currently open with that peer.
1047 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1048 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1051 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1053 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1054 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1055 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1056 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1057 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1059 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1060 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1061 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1062 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1063 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1065 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1066 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1068 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1070 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1071 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1073 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1074 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1075 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1076 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1077 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1079 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1081 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1083 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1084 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1085 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1086 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1087 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1088 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1089 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1090 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1091 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1093 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1094 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1096 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1100 signer_provider: SP,
1105 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1107 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1108 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1109 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1110 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1111 pub struct ChainParameters {
1112 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1113 pub network: Network,
1115 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1117 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1118 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1121 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1128 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1129 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1130 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1131 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1132 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1133 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1135 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1136 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1137 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1138 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1139 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1141 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1142 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1145 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1146 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1147 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1148 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1150 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1151 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1152 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1153 _read_guard: read_guard,
1158 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1159 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1160 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1161 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1163 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1164 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1165 should_persist: persist_check,
1166 _read_guard: read_guard,
1171 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1172 fn drop(&mut self) {
1173 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1174 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1179 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1180 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1182 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1184 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1185 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1186 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1187 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1188 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1190 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1191 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1193 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1195 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1196 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1197 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1198 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1199 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1200 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1201 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1202 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1203 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1204 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1205 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1206 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1207 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1209 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1210 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1212 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1213 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1214 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1215 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1217 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1218 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1219 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1220 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1221 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1222 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1225 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1227 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1228 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1231 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1233 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1234 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1236 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1237 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1238 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1239 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1241 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1242 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1243 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1245 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1246 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1247 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1249 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1250 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1251 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1252 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1254 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1255 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1256 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1258 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1259 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1260 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1262 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1264 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1265 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1266 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1267 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1268 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1269 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1270 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1271 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1272 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1275 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1276 /// to better separate parameters.
1277 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1278 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1279 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1280 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1281 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1282 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1283 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1284 pub features: InitFeatures,
1285 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1286 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1287 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1289 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1291 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1292 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1293 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1294 /// payments to us through this channel.
1295 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1296 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1297 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1298 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1299 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1300 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1301 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1304 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1305 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1306 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1307 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1308 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1309 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1310 /// lifetime of the channel.
1311 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1312 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1313 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1314 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1315 /// our counterparty already.
1317 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1318 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1319 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1320 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1322 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1323 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1324 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1325 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1327 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1328 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1330 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1331 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1333 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1334 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1335 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1336 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1337 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1338 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1339 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1340 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1341 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1344 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1346 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1347 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1348 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1349 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1350 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1351 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1352 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1354 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1355 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1357 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1358 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1359 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1360 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1361 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1362 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1363 /// this value on chain.
1365 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1367 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1369 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1370 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1371 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1372 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1374 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1375 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1376 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1378 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1379 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1380 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1381 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1382 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1384 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1385 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1386 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1387 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1389 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1390 pub balance_msat: u64,
1391 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1392 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1393 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1394 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1396 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1398 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1399 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1400 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1401 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1402 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1403 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1404 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1405 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1407 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1408 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1409 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1410 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1411 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1412 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1413 /// route which is valid.
1414 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1415 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1416 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1417 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1418 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1419 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1421 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1422 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1423 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1424 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1425 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1426 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1427 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1428 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1429 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1431 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1433 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1434 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1435 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1436 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1437 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1439 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1440 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1441 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1442 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1443 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1444 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1445 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1447 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1448 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1449 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1450 pub is_outbound: bool,
1451 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1452 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1453 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1454 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1455 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1457 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1458 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1459 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1460 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1462 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1463 pub is_usable: bool,
1464 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1465 pub is_public: bool,
1466 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1467 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1468 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1469 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1470 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1471 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1473 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1474 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1477 impl ChannelDetails {
1478 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1479 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1480 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1482 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1483 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1484 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1485 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1488 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1489 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1490 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1492 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1493 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1494 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1495 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1498 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1499 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1501 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1502 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1503 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1505 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1506 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1507 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1508 features: latest_features,
1509 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1510 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1511 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1512 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1513 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1514 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1515 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1516 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1517 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1518 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1520 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1521 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1522 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1523 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1524 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1525 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1526 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1527 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1528 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1529 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1530 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1531 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1532 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1533 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1534 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1535 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1536 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1537 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1538 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1539 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1540 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1541 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1542 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1543 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1544 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1545 config: Some(context.config()),
1550 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1551 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1552 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1553 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1554 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1556 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1558 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1559 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1560 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1563 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1564 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1565 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1567 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1568 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1569 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1571 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1572 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1573 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1575 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1576 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1580 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1582 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1584 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1585 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1586 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1587 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1589 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1590 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1591 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1594 macro_rules! handle_error {
1595 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1596 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1597 // entering the macro.
1598 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1599 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1603 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1604 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1606 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1607 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1608 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1609 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1613 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1614 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1615 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1616 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1621 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1622 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1624 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1625 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1626 action: err.action.clone()
1630 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1631 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1632 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1633 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1638 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1643 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1646 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1647 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1648 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1654 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1655 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1656 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1657 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1658 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1659 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1661 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1662 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1663 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1664 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1665 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1667 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1668 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1670 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1674 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1675 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1676 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1678 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1679 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1681 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1682 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1684 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1685 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1686 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1687 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1688 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1689 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1693 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1695 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1696 // In any case, just close the channel.
1697 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1698 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1699 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1700 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1701 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1702 shutdown_res, None))
1708 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1709 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1713 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1715 $entry.remove_entry();
1723 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1724 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1728 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1730 $entry.remove_entry();
1738 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1739 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1743 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1745 $entry.remove_entry();
1753 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1754 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1756 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1757 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1763 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1764 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1765 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1766 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1767 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1769 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1770 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1771 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1772 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1773 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1774 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1775 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1776 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1777 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1778 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1783 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1784 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1785 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1786 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1787 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1788 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1789 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1790 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1791 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1793 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1798 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1799 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1800 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1801 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1802 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1803 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1804 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1805 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1806 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1808 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1813 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1814 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1815 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1816 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1817 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1818 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1819 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1820 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1821 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1822 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1823 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1825 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1826 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1827 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1833 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1834 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1836 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1837 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1838 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1839 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1840 updates.announcement_sigs);
1841 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1842 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1845 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1846 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1847 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1849 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1851 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1852 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1854 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1855 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1856 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1857 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1862 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1863 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1864 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1865 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1866 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1867 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1868 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1871 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1872 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1873 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1876 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1877 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1878 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1879 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1880 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1881 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1882 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1883 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1887 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1888 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1889 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1890 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1896 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1897 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1901 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1902 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1903 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1904 while !processed_all_events {
1905 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1909 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1912 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1913 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1914 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1916 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1917 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1918 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1920 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1921 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1922 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1923 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1927 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1928 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1929 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1930 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1933 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1935 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1936 $event_to_handle = event;
1938 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1939 post_event_actions.push(action);
1944 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1945 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1946 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1947 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1950 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1951 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1952 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1953 processed_all_events = false;
1956 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1957 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1963 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1965 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1966 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1967 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1968 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1969 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1970 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1974 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1976 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1977 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1979 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1981 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1982 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1983 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1986 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1987 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1988 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1989 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1990 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1991 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1992 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1993 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1995 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1996 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1997 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2002 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2004 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2005 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2006 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2007 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2008 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2009 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2010 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2011 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2013 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2016 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2017 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2019 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2021 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
2023 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2025 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2026 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2027 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2028 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2029 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2030 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2031 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2041 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2042 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2043 &self.default_configuration
2046 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2047 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2048 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2051 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2052 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2054 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2056 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2060 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2065 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2067 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2068 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2069 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2070 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2071 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2073 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2074 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2076 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2077 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2078 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2080 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2081 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2082 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2084 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2085 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2086 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2087 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2088 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2089 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2091 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2092 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2093 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2094 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2095 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2096 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2100 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2101 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2105 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2106 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2108 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2110 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2111 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2112 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2113 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2114 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2115 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2119 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2124 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2126 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2127 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2130 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2132 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2138 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2139 node_id: their_network_key,
2142 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2145 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2146 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2147 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2148 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2149 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2150 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2151 // the same channel.
2152 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2154 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2156 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2157 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2159 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2160 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2161 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2169 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2170 /// more information.
2171 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2172 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2173 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2174 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2175 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2176 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2177 // the same channel.
2178 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2180 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2181 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2182 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2183 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2184 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2185 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2186 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2187 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2190 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2191 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2192 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2195 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2196 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2197 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2205 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2206 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2208 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2209 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2211 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2212 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2213 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2214 // really wanted anyway.
2215 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2218 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2219 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2220 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2221 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2223 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2224 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2225 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2226 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2227 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2230 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2236 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2237 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2239 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2240 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2241 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2243 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2244 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2245 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2246 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2247 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2248 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2249 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2250 total_msat: *total_msat,
2253 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2254 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2256 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2257 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2259 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2264 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2265 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2266 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2267 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2268 Some(transaction) => {
2269 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2270 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2275 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2276 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2277 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2278 reason: closure_reason
2282 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2283 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2285 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2286 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2287 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2290 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2292 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2293 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2294 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2295 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2296 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2297 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2298 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2299 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2300 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2302 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2303 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2304 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2305 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2306 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2310 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2311 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2312 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2313 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2314 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2317 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2318 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2319 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2320 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2324 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2332 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2333 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2334 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2335 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2338 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2342 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2343 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2344 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2346 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2347 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2349 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2350 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2351 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2352 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2354 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2356 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2357 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2358 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2361 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2362 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2363 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2364 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2365 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2366 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2369 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2370 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2371 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2373 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2374 /// the channel being closed or not:
2375 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2376 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2377 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2378 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2379 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2380 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2381 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2383 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2384 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2385 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2386 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2388 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2390 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2391 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2392 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2395 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2396 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2397 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2398 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2399 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2400 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2404 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2405 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2406 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2407 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2408 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2409 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2410 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2411 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2413 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2414 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2415 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2416 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2417 // ignore the result here.
2418 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2422 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2423 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2424 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2425 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2427 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2428 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2429 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2432 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2433 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2435 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2437 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2438 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2439 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2440 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2441 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2442 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2443 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2444 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2445 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2446 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2447 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2448 // Prefunded channel has no update
2449 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2450 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2451 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2452 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2453 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2454 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2455 // Prefunded channel has no update
2456 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2458 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2461 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2462 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2463 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2468 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2471 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2473 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2474 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2476 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2477 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2479 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2480 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2482 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2493 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2494 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2495 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2497 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2498 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2499 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2502 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2503 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2504 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2506 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2507 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2508 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2509 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2510 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2513 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2514 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2515 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2516 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2517 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2521 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2522 /// local transaction(s).
2523 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2524 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2525 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2529 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2530 &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2531 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2532 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2533 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
2534 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2535 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2536 return Err(ReceiveError {
2537 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2539 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2542 // final_expiry_too_soon
2543 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2544 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2546 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2547 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2548 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2549 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2550 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2551 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2552 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2553 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2554 return Err(ReceiveError {
2555 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2556 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2559 if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
2560 (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
2561 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2563 return Err(ReceiveError {
2565 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2566 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2570 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2571 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2572 return Err(ReceiveError {
2573 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2574 err_data: Vec::new(),
2575 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2578 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2579 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2580 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2581 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2582 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2583 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2584 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2585 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2586 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2587 return Err(ReceiveError {
2588 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2589 err_data: Vec::new(),
2590 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2593 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2594 return Err(ReceiveError {
2595 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2596 err_data: Vec::new(),
2597 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2600 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2604 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2606 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2607 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2610 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2611 phantom_shared_secret,
2614 return Err(ReceiveError {
2615 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2616 err_data: Vec::new(),
2617 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2622 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2625 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2626 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2627 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2628 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2629 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2633 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2634 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2635 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2636 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2637 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2639 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2640 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2641 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2642 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2643 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2644 failure_code: $err_code,
2650 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2651 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2654 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2655 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2656 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2658 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2659 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2660 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2661 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2662 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2663 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2664 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2665 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2667 macro_rules! return_err {
2668 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2670 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2671 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2672 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2673 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2674 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2675 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2681 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2683 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2684 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2686 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2687 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2690 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2691 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2692 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2693 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2694 outgoing_cltv_value,
2697 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2698 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2699 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2701 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2702 // inbound channel's state.
2703 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2704 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2705 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2707 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2711 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2712 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2713 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2714 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2715 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2716 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2717 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2718 // phantom or an intercept.
2719 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2720 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2721 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2725 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2728 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2730 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2732 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2733 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2734 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2738 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2740 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2741 // have no consistency guarantees.
2742 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2746 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2747 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2748 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2749 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2750 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2752 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2753 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2754 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2755 // we don't have the channel here.
2756 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2758 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2760 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2761 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2762 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2763 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2764 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2765 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2766 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2767 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2768 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2769 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2770 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2772 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2775 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2776 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2778 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2779 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2783 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2784 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2785 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2786 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2788 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2795 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2796 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2797 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2798 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2799 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2800 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2802 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2803 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2805 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2806 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2807 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2808 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2809 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2810 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2811 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2812 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2813 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2814 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2820 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2821 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2822 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2823 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2825 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2826 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2828 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2829 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2830 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2832 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2833 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2834 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2835 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2836 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2837 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2838 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2842 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2844 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2847 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2848 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2849 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2850 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2851 macro_rules! return_err {
2852 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2854 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2855 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2856 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2857 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2858 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2859 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2865 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2867 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
2868 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
2871 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2872 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2873 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2874 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2875 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2877 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2880 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2881 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2882 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2884 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2885 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2886 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2889 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2890 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2891 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2892 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2896 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2897 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2898 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2901 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2902 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2903 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2904 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2905 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2906 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2912 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2913 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2914 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2916 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2917 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2918 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2920 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2921 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2922 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2923 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2924 return Err(LightningError {
2925 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2926 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2929 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2930 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2932 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2933 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2936 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2937 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2938 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2939 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2941 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2942 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2943 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2945 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2946 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2947 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2948 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2949 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2950 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2954 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2957 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2959 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2961 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2962 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2963 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2964 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2965 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2968 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2969 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2971 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
2972 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2973 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2974 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2975 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2976 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2977 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2978 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2980 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2981 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2982 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2984 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2986 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2993 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2994 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2995 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
2996 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3001 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3002 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3003 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3006 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3007 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3009 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3010 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3011 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3013 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3014 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3015 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3017 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3018 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3020 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3021 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3022 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3023 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3027 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3028 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3031 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3032 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3033 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3035 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3036 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3037 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3039 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3040 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3042 }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
3043 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3044 Some(monitor_update) => {
3045 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3046 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
3047 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3050 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
3051 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3052 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3053 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3054 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3055 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3056 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3057 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3063 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3064 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3065 // `channel_by_id` map.
3066 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3067 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3072 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3073 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3075 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3080 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3082 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3083 /// fields for more info.
3085 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3086 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3088 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3090 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3091 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3092 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3093 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3094 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3096 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3097 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3098 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3099 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3100 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3102 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3103 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3104 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3105 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3107 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3109 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3110 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3111 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3113 /// In general, a path may raise:
3114 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3115 /// node public key) is specified.
3116 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3117 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3119 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3120 /// relevant updates.
3122 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3123 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3124 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3126 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3127 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3128 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3129 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3130 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3131 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3132 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3134 self.pending_outbound_payments
3135 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3136 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3137 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3140 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3141 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3142 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3143 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3145 self.pending_outbound_payments
3146 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3147 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3148 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3149 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3153 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3154 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3156 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3157 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3158 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3162 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3163 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3164 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3168 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3169 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3173 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3174 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3175 /// retries are exhausted.
3177 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3178 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3180 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3181 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3182 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3184 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3185 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3187 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3188 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3189 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3191 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3194 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3195 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3196 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3197 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3198 /// never reach the recipient.
3200 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3201 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3203 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3204 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3206 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3207 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3208 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3210 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3211 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3212 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3215 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3216 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3218 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3221 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3222 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3223 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3225 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3226 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3227 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3228 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3231 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3232 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3233 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3234 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3235 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3237 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3238 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3239 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3242 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3245 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3246 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3249 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3250 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3251 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3252 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3253 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3255 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3256 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3258 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3259 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3260 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3262 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3264 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3265 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3266 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3267 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3268 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3269 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3270 } else { unreachable!(); });
3272 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3273 Err((chan, err)) => {
3274 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3275 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3277 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3278 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3279 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3285 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3287 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3288 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3293 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3294 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3297 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3299 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3302 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3303 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3304 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3313 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3314 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3315 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3319 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3321 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3322 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3324 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3325 /// across the p2p network.
3327 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3328 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3330 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3331 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3332 /// keys per-channel).
3334 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3335 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3336 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3338 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3339 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3340 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3342 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3343 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3344 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3345 /// for more details.
3347 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3348 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3349 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3352 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3353 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3354 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3355 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3360 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3361 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3362 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3363 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3364 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3365 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3366 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3367 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3371 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3372 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3373 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3374 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3378 let mut output_index = None;
3379 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3380 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3381 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3382 if output_index.is_some() {
3383 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3384 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3387 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3390 if output_index.is_none() {
3391 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3392 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3395 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3399 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3401 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3402 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3403 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3404 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3406 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3407 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3409 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3410 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3412 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3414 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3415 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3416 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3417 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3418 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3419 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3420 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3421 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3422 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3423 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3424 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3425 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3426 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3431 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3432 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3433 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3436 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3437 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3438 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3439 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3443 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3444 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3445 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3446 config.apply(config_update);
3447 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3450 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3451 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3452 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3454 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3462 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3464 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3465 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3466 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3467 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3469 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3470 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3472 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3473 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3475 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3477 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3478 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3479 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3480 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3481 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3482 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3483 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3484 pub fn update_channel_config(
3485 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3486 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3487 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3490 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3491 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3493 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3494 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3496 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3497 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3498 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3499 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3500 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3502 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3503 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3504 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3507 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3510 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3511 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3512 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3513 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3514 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3515 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3518 let next_hop_scid = {
3519 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3520 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3521 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3522 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3523 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3524 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3526 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3527 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3528 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3531 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3533 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3534 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3535 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3540 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3541 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3542 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3545 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3546 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3547 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3549 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3551 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3552 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3553 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3554 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3555 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3558 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3559 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3560 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3561 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3562 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3564 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3568 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3569 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3571 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3574 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3575 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3576 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3578 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3579 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3580 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3583 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3584 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3585 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3586 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3587 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3588 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3589 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3592 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3593 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3594 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3595 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3600 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3602 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3603 /// Will likely generate further events.
3604 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3607 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3608 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3609 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3611 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3612 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3614 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3615 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3616 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3618 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3619 match forward_info {
3620 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3621 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3622 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3623 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3624 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3627 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3628 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3629 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3631 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3632 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3633 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3634 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3635 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3636 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3639 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3640 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3642 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3645 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3646 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3652 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3653 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3655 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3659 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3660 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3662 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3666 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3667 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3668 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3669 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3670 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3672 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3673 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3674 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3675 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3676 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3678 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3680 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3681 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3685 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3686 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3687 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3688 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3690 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3691 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3697 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3700 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3703 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3704 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3705 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3706 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3707 // problem, not ours.
3713 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3714 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3716 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3721 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3722 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3723 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3728 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3730 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3734 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3735 match forward_info {
3736 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3737 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3738 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3739 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3740 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3744 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3745 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3746 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3747 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3748 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3749 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3750 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3752 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3753 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3754 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
3756 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3757 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3759 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3761 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3762 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3763 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3764 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3769 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3770 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3772 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3774 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3775 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3777 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3778 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3780 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3782 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3783 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3784 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3793 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3794 match forward_info {
3795 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3796 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3797 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3798 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3799 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3802 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3803 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3804 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3806 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3807 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3808 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3810 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3811 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3812 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3815 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3816 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3819 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3822 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3823 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3824 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3825 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3826 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3827 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3828 phantom_shared_secret,
3830 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3831 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3832 // if routing nodes overpay
3833 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3834 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3836 total_value_received: None,
3837 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3840 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3843 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3845 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3846 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3847 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3848 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3849 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3850 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3852 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3853 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3854 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3855 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3856 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3857 phantom_shared_secret,
3859 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3860 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3862 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3865 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3866 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3867 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3868 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3869 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3872 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3873 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3874 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3875 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3876 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3877 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3879 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3880 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3881 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3883 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3884 .entry(payment_hash)
3885 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3886 .or_insert_with(|| {
3887 committed_to_claimable = true;
3889 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3892 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3893 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3894 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3895 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3897 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3898 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3899 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3901 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3902 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3903 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3906 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3908 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3909 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3910 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3911 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3912 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3913 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3914 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3915 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3916 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3917 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3919 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3921 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3922 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3923 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3924 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3925 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3927 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3928 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3929 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3930 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3931 committed_to_claimable = true;
3933 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3934 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3935 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3936 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3937 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
3938 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
3939 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
3940 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
3941 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3942 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3946 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3947 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3948 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3949 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3950 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3952 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3954 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3955 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3957 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3958 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3959 committed_to_claimable = true;
3962 payment_claimable_generated
3966 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3967 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3968 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3969 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3970 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3971 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3972 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3973 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3975 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3976 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3977 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3978 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3979 Ok(result) => result,
3981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3982 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3985 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3986 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3987 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3988 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3989 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3990 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3993 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3994 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3995 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3997 check_total_value!(purpose);
3999 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4000 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4001 check_total_value!(purpose);
4005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4006 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4007 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4008 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4010 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4011 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4012 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4013 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4014 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4015 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4016 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4017 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4019 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4020 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4021 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4023 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4024 if payment_claimable_generated {
4025 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4031 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4032 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4040 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4041 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4042 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4043 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4045 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4046 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4048 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4050 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4051 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4052 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4054 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4056 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4057 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4058 events.append(&mut new_events);
4061 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4063 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4064 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4065 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4067 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4068 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4070 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4071 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4072 if background_events.is_empty() {
4073 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4076 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4078 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4079 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4080 // monitor updating completing.
4081 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4083 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4084 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4087 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4088 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4091 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4093 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4099 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4100 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4101 // however, ensure that.
4103 log_error!(self.logger,
4104 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4106 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4110 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4113 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4114 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4115 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4116 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4117 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4120 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4121 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4122 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4123 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4124 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4125 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4126 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4128 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4130 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4131 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4133 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4134 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4136 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
4137 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4141 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4142 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4143 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4144 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4145 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4146 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4147 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4149 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4151 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4152 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4153 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4154 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4155 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4156 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4157 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4165 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4167 /// This currently includes:
4168 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4169 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4170 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4172 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4173 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4174 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4176 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4177 /// estimate fetches.
4179 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4180 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4181 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4182 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4183 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4185 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4187 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4188 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4189 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4192 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4195 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4196 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4197 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4198 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4199 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4201 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4202 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4203 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4204 if needs_close { return false; }
4207 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4208 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4209 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4210 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4211 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4212 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4213 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4214 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4216 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4217 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4218 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4219 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4223 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4225 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4228 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4230 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4231 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4232 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4233 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4237 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4239 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4245 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4247 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4248 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4249 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4250 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4251 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4252 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4253 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4254 channel_id: *chan_id,
4255 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4263 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4264 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4269 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4270 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4271 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4272 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4273 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4274 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4275 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4276 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4277 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4278 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4279 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4281 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4282 // have no channels to the peer.
4283 let remove_entry = {
4284 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4285 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4288 entry.remove_entry();
4291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4296 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4297 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4298 // This should be unreachable
4299 debug_assert!(false);
4302 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4303 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4304 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4305 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4306 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4307 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4308 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4311 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4312 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4313 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4315 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4316 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4323 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4324 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4325 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4326 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4327 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4330 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4331 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4334 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4336 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4337 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4338 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4339 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4340 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4347 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4348 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4349 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4351 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4352 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4353 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4354 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4356 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4357 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4358 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4359 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4360 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4361 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4364 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4365 /// reason for the failure.
4367 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4368 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4369 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4371 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4372 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4373 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4374 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4375 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4376 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4377 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4382 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4383 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4384 match failure_code {
4385 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4386 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4387 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4388 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4389 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4390 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4395 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4396 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4398 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4400 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4401 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4402 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4403 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4404 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4405 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4406 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4408 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4410 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4411 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4413 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4418 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4419 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4420 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4421 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4422 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4423 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4424 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4425 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4426 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4427 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4429 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4430 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4431 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4432 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4434 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4435 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4436 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4437 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4438 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4442 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4443 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4444 // be surfaced to the user.
4445 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4446 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4447 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4449 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4450 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4451 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4453 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4454 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4456 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4460 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4463 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4464 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4465 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4470 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4471 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4472 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4473 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4474 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4475 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4476 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4477 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4478 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4481 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4482 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4483 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4486 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4487 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4488 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4490 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4491 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4492 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4493 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4494 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4496 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4498 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4500 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4501 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4502 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4503 push_forward_ev = true;
4505 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4507 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4510 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4513 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4514 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4515 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4516 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4517 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4518 failed_next_destination: destination,
4524 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4525 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4527 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4528 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4529 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4530 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4532 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4533 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4534 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4535 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4537 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4538 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4539 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4540 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4541 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4542 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4543 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4544 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4546 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4549 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4550 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4551 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4552 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4553 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4554 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4555 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4556 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4561 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4562 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4563 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4565 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4566 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4567 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4568 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4573 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4575 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4576 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4577 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4578 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4579 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4580 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4581 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4582 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4583 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4584 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4585 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4586 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4587 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4588 debug_assert!(false);
4592 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4594 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4595 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4596 debug_assert!(false);
4600 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4601 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4603 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4604 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4605 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4606 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4609 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4610 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4611 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4612 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4616 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4617 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4618 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4619 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4621 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4622 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4623 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4624 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4625 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4630 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4631 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4632 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4633 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4634 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4635 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4636 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4638 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4641 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4642 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4643 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4644 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4648 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4649 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4650 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4651 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4655 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4656 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4657 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4661 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4662 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4663 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4666 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4667 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4668 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4669 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4670 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4671 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4673 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4674 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4676 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4677 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4679 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4680 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4681 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4682 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4683 if let Err(e) = res {
4684 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4685 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4686 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4687 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4688 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4695 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4696 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4697 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4701 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4702 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4703 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4704 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4705 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4706 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4707 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4708 // again on restart.
4709 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4710 payment_preimage, update_res);
4712 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4713 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4714 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4715 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4716 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4717 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4721 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4722 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4725 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4727 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4728 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4730 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4731 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4732 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4733 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4734 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4735 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4736 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4739 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4740 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4742 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4743 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4744 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4745 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4747 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4751 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4752 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4753 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4759 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4760 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4761 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4764 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4765 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4767 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4768 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4769 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4770 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4771 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4775 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4776 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4778 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4779 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4780 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4787 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4788 /// update completion.
4789 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4790 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4791 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4792 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4793 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4794 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4796 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4797 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4798 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4799 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4800 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4801 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4803 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4805 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4806 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4807 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4808 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4811 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4812 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4814 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4815 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4816 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4821 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4822 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4823 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4824 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4829 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4830 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4831 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4832 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4833 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4838 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4842 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4848 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4849 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4850 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4854 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4855 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4856 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4862 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4863 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4865 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4866 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4868 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4869 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4870 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4871 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4872 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4877 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4878 let mut peer_state_lock;
4879 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4880 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4881 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4882 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4884 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4889 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4890 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4891 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4894 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4897 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4899 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4900 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4903 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4904 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4905 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4907 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4908 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4909 /// used to accept such channels.
4911 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4912 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4913 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4914 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4917 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4918 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4920 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4921 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4922 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4924 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4925 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4927 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4928 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4930 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4931 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4933 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4934 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4935 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4936 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4939 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4942 let peers_without_funded_channels =
4943 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
4944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4945 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4946 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4949 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
4950 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4952 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
4953 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4956 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4957 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4958 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4959 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4960 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4961 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4964 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4965 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4968 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4969 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4970 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4971 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4972 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4973 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4974 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4975 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4979 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4984 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4985 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4986 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4990 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4996 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4997 /// or 0-conf channels.
4999 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5000 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5001 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5002 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5003 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5004 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5006 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5007 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5008 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5009 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5010 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5011 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5012 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5016 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5019 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5020 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5022 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5023 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5024 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5025 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5026 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5027 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5029 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5032 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5033 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5034 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5037 num_unfunded_channels
5040 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5041 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5042 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5045 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5046 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5049 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5050 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5051 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5052 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5054 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5055 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5056 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5057 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5058 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5061 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5063 debug_assert!(false);
5064 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5066 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5067 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5069 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5070 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5071 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5072 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5073 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5074 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5076 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5077 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5078 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5081 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5082 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5083 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5084 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5085 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5088 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5089 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5090 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5093 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5094 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5098 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5099 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5101 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5102 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5104 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5105 if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5108 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5109 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5110 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5113 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5114 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5115 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5116 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5117 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5118 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5119 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5122 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5127 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5128 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5130 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5132 debug_assert!(false);
5133 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5137 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5139 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5140 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5142 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5145 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5146 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5147 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5148 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5149 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5151 user_channel_id: user_id,
5156 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5157 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5160 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5162 debug_assert!(false);
5163 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5168 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5169 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5170 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5171 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5173 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5174 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5175 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5176 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5177 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5178 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5179 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5181 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5185 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5188 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5189 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5190 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5193 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5195 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5196 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5197 funding_msg.channel_id))
5199 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5200 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5204 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5205 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5206 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5207 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5208 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5209 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5210 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5214 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5216 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5217 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5218 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5220 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5221 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5222 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5223 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5224 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5225 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5226 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5227 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5235 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5236 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5238 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5240 debug_assert!(false);
5241 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5244 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5245 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5246 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5248 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5249 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5250 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5251 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5252 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5253 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5254 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5255 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5256 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5257 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5266 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5267 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5268 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5270 debug_assert!(false);
5271 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5273 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5274 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5275 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5277 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5278 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5279 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5281 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5282 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5283 msg: announcement_sigs,
5285 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5286 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5287 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5288 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5289 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5290 // announcement_signatures.
5291 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5292 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5293 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5294 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5301 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5302 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5311 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5312 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5313 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5315 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5317 debug_assert!(false);
5318 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5322 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5325 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5326 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5327 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5328 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5331 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5332 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5333 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5334 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5336 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5337 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5338 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5339 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5340 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5341 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5346 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5347 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5348 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5349 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5350 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5357 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5358 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5359 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5360 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5366 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5368 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5370 debug_assert!(false);
5371 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5373 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5374 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5375 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5376 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5377 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5378 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5379 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5380 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5381 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5386 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5387 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5388 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5389 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5390 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5391 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5392 } else { (tx, None) }
5394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5397 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5398 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5399 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5401 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5402 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5405 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5409 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5414 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5415 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5416 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5417 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5419 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5420 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5421 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5422 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5424 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5426 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5428 debug_assert!(false);
5429 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5433 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5436 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5437 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5438 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5439 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5440 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5442 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5443 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5444 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5445 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5446 match pending_forward_info {
5447 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5448 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5449 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5450 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5452 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5453 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5454 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5455 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5456 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5459 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5461 _ => pending_forward_info
5464 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5466 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5471 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5472 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5474 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5476 debug_assert!(false);
5477 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5479 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5480 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5481 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5483 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5488 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5492 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5494 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5496 debug_assert!(false);
5497 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5501 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5503 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5510 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5511 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5512 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5514 debug_assert!(false);
5515 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5517 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5518 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5519 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5521 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5522 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5523 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5525 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5532 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5533 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5534 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5536 debug_assert!(false);
5537 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5539 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5540 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5541 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5542 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5543 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5544 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5545 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5546 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5547 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5548 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5549 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5557 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5558 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5559 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5560 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5561 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5562 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5563 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5564 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5565 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5566 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5567 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5569 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5570 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5572 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5573 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5574 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5576 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5577 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5580 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5581 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5583 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5584 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5585 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5586 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5587 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5588 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5589 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5590 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5591 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5594 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5595 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5598 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5599 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5600 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5601 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5602 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5603 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5604 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5607 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5608 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5609 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5614 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5615 // payments are being processed.
5616 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5617 push_forward_event = true;
5619 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5620 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5627 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5628 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5631 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5632 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5633 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5635 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5639 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5640 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5641 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5642 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5643 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5645 if !forward_ev_exists {
5646 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5648 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5653 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5654 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5655 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5656 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5657 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5658 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5659 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5661 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5662 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5663 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5664 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5665 channel_funding_outpoint,
5666 counterparty_node_id,
5671 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5672 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5674 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5676 debug_assert!(false);
5677 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5678 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5679 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5680 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5682 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5683 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5684 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5685 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5686 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5687 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5688 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5690 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5695 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5699 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5700 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5701 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5703 debug_assert!(false);
5704 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5708 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5710 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5717 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5719 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5721 debug_assert!(false);
5722 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5728 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5732 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5733 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5734 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5735 msg, &self.default_configuration
5737 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5738 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5739 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5747 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5748 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5749 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5750 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5752 // It's not a local channel
5753 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5757 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5758 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5759 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5761 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5762 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5763 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5765 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5766 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5767 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5768 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5769 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5770 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5774 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5775 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5776 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5777 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5779 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5780 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5785 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5788 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5790 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5795 debug_assert!(false);
5796 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5802 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5803 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5804 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5805 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5806 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5807 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5808 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5809 let mut channel_update = None;
5810 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5811 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5812 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5815 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5816 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5817 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5818 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5819 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5820 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5821 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5826 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5827 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5828 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5829 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5830 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5831 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5839 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5840 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5843 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5844 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5849 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5850 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5851 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5853 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5854 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5855 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5856 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5857 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5858 match monitor_event {
5859 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5860 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5862 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5864 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5865 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5866 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5867 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5870 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5871 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5872 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5873 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5875 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5876 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5877 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5878 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5881 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5883 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5884 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5885 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5886 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5887 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5888 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5889 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5890 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5891 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5895 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5896 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5898 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5900 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5901 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5902 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5903 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5904 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5911 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5912 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5918 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5919 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5922 has_pending_monitor_events
5925 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5926 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5927 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5929 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5931 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5934 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5935 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5936 /// update was applied.
5937 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5938 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5939 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5940 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5942 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5943 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5944 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5945 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5948 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5951 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5952 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5953 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5954 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5955 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5956 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5957 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5958 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5960 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5961 has_monitor_update = true;
5963 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5964 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5965 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5966 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5967 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5968 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5969 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5971 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5973 continue 'peer_loop;
5982 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5983 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5984 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5987 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5988 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5994 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5995 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5996 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5997 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5998 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5999 let mut has_update = false;
6001 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6003 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6006 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6007 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6008 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6009 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6010 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6012 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6013 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6016 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6017 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6018 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6019 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6020 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6025 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6027 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6028 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6029 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6035 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6036 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6044 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6045 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6051 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6052 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6054 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6055 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6056 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6057 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6058 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6059 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6060 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6061 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6062 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6063 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6064 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6065 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6066 assert!(should_broadcast);
6067 } else { unreachable!(); }
6068 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6069 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6070 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6073 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6077 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6080 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6081 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6083 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6084 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6085 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6086 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6088 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6090 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6091 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6095 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6096 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6098 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6100 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6101 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6103 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6104 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6105 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6106 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6107 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6108 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6109 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6110 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6111 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6112 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6113 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6116 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6117 /// stored external to LDK.
6119 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6120 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6121 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6123 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6124 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6127 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6128 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6129 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6130 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6132 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6133 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6134 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6135 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6136 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6138 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6139 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6140 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6141 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6142 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6144 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6145 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6147 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6148 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6152 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6153 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6155 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6157 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6158 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6160 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6161 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6162 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6163 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6164 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6165 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6166 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6169 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6170 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6172 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6173 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6174 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6177 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6178 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6180 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6181 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6182 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6183 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6185 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6186 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6187 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6188 Some(_) => continue,
6189 None => return scid_candidate
6194 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6196 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6197 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6199 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6200 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6201 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6205 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6206 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6207 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6209 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6210 /// times to get a unique scid.
6211 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6212 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6213 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6215 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6216 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6217 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6218 return scid_candidate
6222 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6223 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6224 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6225 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6227 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6228 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6229 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6230 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6231 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6232 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6233 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6234 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6243 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6244 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6245 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6246 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6247 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6251 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6252 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6253 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6254 events.push_back((event, None));
6258 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6259 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6260 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6264 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6265 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6269 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6270 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6273 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6274 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6275 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6276 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6277 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6278 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6280 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6281 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6282 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6283 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6285 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6286 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6287 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6288 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6290 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6294 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6295 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6296 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6297 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6298 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6299 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6300 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6304 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6305 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6306 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6307 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6308 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6309 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6310 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6311 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6312 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6314 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6316 if further_update_exists {
6317 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6323 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6327 log_debug!(self.logger,
6328 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6329 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6333 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6334 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6335 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6339 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6340 for action in actions {
6342 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6343 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6345 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6351 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6352 /// using the given event handler.
6354 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6355 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6359 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6363 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6365 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6366 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6367 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6368 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6369 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6374 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6375 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6376 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6377 /// is always placed next to each other.
6379 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6380 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6381 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6382 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6384 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6385 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6386 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6387 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6388 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6389 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6390 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6392 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6393 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6394 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6395 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6398 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6399 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6401 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6402 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6405 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6407 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6410 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6411 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6415 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6416 events.replace(pending_events);
6425 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6427 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6428 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6429 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6430 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6431 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6432 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6436 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6438 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6439 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6440 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6442 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6446 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6448 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6450 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6452 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6457 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6459 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6460 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6461 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6462 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6463 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6466 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6467 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6470 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6472 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6473 let new_height = height - 1;
6475 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6476 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6477 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6478 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6479 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6480 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6483 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6487 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6489 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6490 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6491 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6492 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6493 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6494 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6498 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6499 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6500 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6501 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6503 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6504 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6507 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6508 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6509 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6511 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6512 if height < last_best_block_height {
6513 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6514 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6518 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6519 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6520 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6521 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6523 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6524 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6526 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6527 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6528 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6530 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6532 macro_rules! max_time {
6533 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6535 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6536 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6537 // having an explicit local time source.
6538 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6539 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6540 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6541 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6542 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6548 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6549 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6550 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6551 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6555 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6556 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6557 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6560 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6561 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6562 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6569 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6571 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6572 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6573 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6574 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6575 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6576 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6577 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6582 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6584 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6585 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6586 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6587 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6588 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6589 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6593 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6594 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6596 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6597 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6598 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6599 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6600 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6602 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6603 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6606 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6609 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6610 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6611 let res = f(channel);
6612 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6613 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6614 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6615 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6616 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6618 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6619 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6620 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6622 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6623 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6624 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6629 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6634 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6635 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6638 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6639 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6641 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6642 msg: announcement_sigs,
6644 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6645 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6646 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6648 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6649 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6650 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6655 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6656 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6657 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6658 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6659 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6660 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6661 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6662 // is always consistent.
6663 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6664 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6665 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6666 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6667 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6670 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6671 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6672 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6673 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6674 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6675 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6676 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6680 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6681 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6683 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6684 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6685 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6686 data: reason_message,
6696 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6697 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6698 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6699 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6700 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6701 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6702 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6703 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6704 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6705 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6707 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6708 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6709 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6713 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6716 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6717 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6718 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6719 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6720 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6721 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6722 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6723 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6724 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6727 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6728 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6729 _ => unreachable!(),
6731 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6732 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6733 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6740 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6742 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6743 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6747 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6749 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6750 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6752 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6753 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6756 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6757 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6758 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6761 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6762 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6763 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6764 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6767 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6768 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6769 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6770 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6773 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6774 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6776 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6777 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6778 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6779 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6780 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6783 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6784 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6785 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6786 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6789 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6790 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6791 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6792 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6795 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6796 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6797 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6798 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6802 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6803 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6805 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6806 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6807 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6808 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6809 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6810 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6814 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6816 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6819 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6820 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6821 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6822 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6825 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6826 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6827 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6830 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6831 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6832 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6833 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6836 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6838 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6841 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6842 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6843 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6846 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6848 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6851 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6853 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6856 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6857 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6858 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6861 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6862 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6863 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6866 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6867 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6868 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6871 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6873 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6876 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6878 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6881 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6883 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6886 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6888 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6891 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6893 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6896 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6897 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6898 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6901 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6902 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6903 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6904 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6905 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6907 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6912 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6914 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6917 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6919 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6920 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6922 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6923 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6924 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6927 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6928 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6929 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6930 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6931 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6932 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6937 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6938 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6939 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6942 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6943 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6944 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6947 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6949 // V1 Channel Establishment
6950 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6951 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6952 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6953 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6954 // V2 Channel Establishment
6955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6956 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6957 // Common Channel Establishment
6958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6959 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6960 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6961 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6963 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6964 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6965 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6967 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6968 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6969 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6970 // Channel Operations
6971 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6972 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6973 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6974 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6975 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6976 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6978 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6979 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6980 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6981 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6982 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6983 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6984 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6985 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6986 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6989 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6990 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6991 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6992 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6995 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6997 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6999 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7000 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7004 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7005 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7006 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7012 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7013 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7014 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7015 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7016 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7017 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7020 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7021 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7023 if inbound_peer_limited {
7026 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7027 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7028 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7029 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7030 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7031 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7032 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7033 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7038 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7039 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7041 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7042 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7043 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7044 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7049 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7050 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7055 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7057 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7058 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7059 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7060 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7061 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7062 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7063 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7064 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7065 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7066 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7067 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7072 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7073 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7078 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7079 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7080 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7081 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7082 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7091 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7095 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7098 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7099 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7101 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7102 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7105 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7106 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7107 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7109 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7110 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7111 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7115 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7116 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7117 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7118 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7121 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7122 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7123 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7124 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7132 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7133 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7137 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7138 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7141 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7142 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7145 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7146 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7149 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7150 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7151 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7152 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7155 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7156 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7157 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7158 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7161 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7162 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7163 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7164 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7167 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7168 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7169 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7170 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7173 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7174 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7175 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7176 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7179 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7180 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7181 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7182 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7185 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7186 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7187 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7188 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7191 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7192 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7193 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7194 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7197 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7198 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7199 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7200 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7204 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7205 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7206 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7207 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7210 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7211 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7213 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7214 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7215 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7216 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7217 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7220 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7221 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7222 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7223 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7226 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7227 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7228 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7229 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7232 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7233 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7234 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7235 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7236 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7237 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7238 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7239 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7240 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7241 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7242 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7243 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7244 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7245 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7246 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7247 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7248 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7249 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7251 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7252 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7253 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7259 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7260 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7262 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7263 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7264 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7265 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7268 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7269 (2, node_id, required),
7270 (4, features, required),
7271 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7272 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7273 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7274 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7277 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7278 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7279 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7280 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7281 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7282 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7283 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7284 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7285 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7286 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7287 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7288 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7289 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7290 (7, self.config, option),
7291 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7292 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7293 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7294 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7295 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7296 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7297 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7298 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7299 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7300 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7301 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7302 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7303 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7304 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7305 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7306 (32, self.is_public, required),
7307 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7308 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7309 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7310 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7316 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7317 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7318 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7319 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7320 (2, channel_id, required),
7321 (3, channel_type, option),
7322 (4, counterparty, required),
7323 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7324 (6, funding_txo, option),
7325 (7, config, option),
7326 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7327 (9, confirmations, option),
7328 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7329 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7330 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7331 (16, balance_msat, required),
7332 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7333 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7334 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7335 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7336 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7337 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7338 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7339 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7340 (26, is_outbound, required),
7341 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7342 (30, is_usable, required),
7343 (32, is_public, required),
7344 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7345 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7346 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7347 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7350 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7351 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7352 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7353 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7354 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7358 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7360 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7361 outbound_scid_alias,
7365 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7366 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7368 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7369 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7370 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7371 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7372 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7373 confirmations_required,
7375 force_close_spend_delay,
7376 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7377 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7378 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7379 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7380 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7381 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7382 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7387 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7388 (2, channels, vec_type),
7389 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7390 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7393 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7395 (0, onion_packet, required),
7396 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7399 (0, payment_data, required),
7400 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7401 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7402 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7404 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7405 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7406 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7407 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7408 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7412 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7413 (0, routing, required),
7414 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7415 (4, payment_hash, required),
7416 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7417 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7418 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7419 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7423 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7424 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7426 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7428 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7429 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7430 reason.write(writer)?;
7432 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7433 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7436 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7437 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7438 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7439 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7446 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7447 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7448 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7452 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7453 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7454 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7458 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7459 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7460 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7461 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7462 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7465 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7466 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7467 // messages contained in the variants.
7468 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7469 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7470 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7472 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7473 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7474 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7475 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7476 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7479 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7481 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7482 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7483 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7485 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7490 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7495 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7496 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7497 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7498 (2, outpoint, required),
7499 (4, htlc_id, required),
7500 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7503 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7504 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7505 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7506 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7507 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7509 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7510 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7511 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7512 (2, self.value, required),
7513 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7514 (4, payment_data, option),
7515 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7516 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7517 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7518 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7524 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7525 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7526 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7527 (0, prev_hop, required),
7528 (1, total_msat, option),
7529 (2, value_ser, required),
7530 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7531 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7532 (5, total_value_received, option),
7533 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7534 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7535 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7537 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7538 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7539 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7541 if payment_data.is_some() {
7542 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7544 if total_msat.is_none() {
7545 total_msat = Some(value);
7547 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7550 if total_msat.is_none() {
7551 if payment_data.is_none() {
7552 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7554 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7556 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7560 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7563 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7564 total_value_received,
7565 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7567 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7568 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7573 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7574 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7575 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7578 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7579 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7580 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7581 let mut payment_id = None;
7582 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7583 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7584 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7585 (0, session_priv, required),
7586 (1, payment_id, option),
7587 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7588 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7589 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7590 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7592 if payment_id.is_none() {
7593 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7595 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7597 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7598 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7601 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7602 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7603 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7604 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7608 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7609 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7610 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7612 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7615 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7616 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7621 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7622 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7624 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7626 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7627 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7628 (0, session_priv, required),
7629 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7630 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7631 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7632 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7633 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7634 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7637 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7639 field.write(writer)?;
7646 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7647 (0, forward_info, required),
7648 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7649 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7650 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7651 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7654 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7656 (0, htlc_id, required),
7657 (2, err_packet, required),
7662 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7663 (0, payment_secret, required),
7664 (2, expiry_time, required),
7665 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7666 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7667 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7670 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7672 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7673 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7674 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7675 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7676 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7677 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7681 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7682 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7684 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7686 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7688 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7689 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7690 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7693 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7695 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7696 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7697 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7698 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7699 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7700 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7701 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7702 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7704 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7705 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7706 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7707 unfunded_channels += 1;
7712 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7714 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7715 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7717 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7718 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7719 channel.write(writer)?;
7726 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7727 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7728 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7729 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7730 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7731 for forward in pending_forwards {
7732 forward.write(writer)?;
7737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7739 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7740 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7741 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7743 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7744 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7745 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7746 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7747 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7748 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7749 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7750 htlc.write(writer)?;
7752 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7753 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7756 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7757 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7758 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7759 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7760 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7761 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7762 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7765 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7766 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7767 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7768 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7769 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7771 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7772 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7773 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7774 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7775 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7776 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7777 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7782 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7783 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7784 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7785 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7786 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7787 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7788 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7789 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7790 0u64.write(writer)?;
7792 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7793 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7794 event.write(writer)?;
7798 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7799 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7800 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7801 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7802 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7803 0u64.write(writer)?;
7805 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7806 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7807 // likely to be identical.
7808 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7809 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7811 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7812 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7813 hash.write(writer)?;
7814 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7817 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7818 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7819 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7820 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7821 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7824 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7825 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7827 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7828 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7829 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7830 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7833 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7834 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7838 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7839 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7840 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7842 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7843 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7844 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7850 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7851 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7852 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7853 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7856 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7857 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7858 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7859 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7860 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7863 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7864 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7865 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7866 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7867 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7868 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7869 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7870 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7871 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7872 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7873 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7874 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7881 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7882 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7883 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7884 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7887 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7888 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7889 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7890 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7891 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7892 // check that the event is sane here.
7893 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7894 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7895 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7896 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7902 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7903 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7904 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7905 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7906 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7907 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7910 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7911 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7912 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7913 events.push_back((ev, action));
7914 } else if action.is_some() {
7915 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7922 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7924 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7926 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7927 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7928 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7929 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7930 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7931 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7932 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7933 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7934 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7935 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7936 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7937 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7938 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7940 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7941 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7943 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7944 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7946 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7947 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7948 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7949 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7950 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7951 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7953 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7954 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7956 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7957 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7958 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7959 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7960 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7965 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7966 pub entropy_source: ES,
7968 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7969 pub node_signer: NS,
7971 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7972 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7974 pub signer_provider: SP,
7976 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7978 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7979 pub fee_estimator: F,
7980 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7982 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7983 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7984 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7985 pub chain_monitor: M,
7987 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7988 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7989 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7990 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7991 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7992 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7994 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7996 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7997 /// deserialization.
7999 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8000 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8001 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8003 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8004 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8006 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8007 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8008 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8009 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8011 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8014 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8015 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8018 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8019 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8021 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8022 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8023 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8024 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8025 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8026 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8030 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8031 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8032 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8033 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8034 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8036 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8037 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8042 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8043 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8044 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8045 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8047 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8048 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8049 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8050 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8051 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8052 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8056 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8057 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8058 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8062 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8063 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8065 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8066 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8067 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8068 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8069 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8070 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8074 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8075 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8077 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8078 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8079 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8081 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8083 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8084 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8085 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8086 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8087 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8088 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8089 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8090 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8091 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8092 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8094 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8095 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8096 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8097 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8098 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8099 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8100 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8101 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
8102 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8103 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8104 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8105 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8106 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8107 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8108 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8109 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8110 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8111 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8112 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8113 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8114 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8115 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8116 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8117 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8118 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8119 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8122 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8123 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8124 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8125 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8126 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8128 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8129 let mut found_htlc = false;
8130 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8131 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8134 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8135 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8136 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8137 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8138 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8139 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8140 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8141 log_info!(args.logger,
8142 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8143 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8144 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8148 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8149 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8150 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8151 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8152 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8153 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8155 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8156 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8158 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8160 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8161 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8164 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8165 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8166 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8170 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8171 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8172 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8173 // safely discard the channel.
8174 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8175 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8176 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8177 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8178 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8181 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8182 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8183 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8184 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8185 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8186 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8190 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8191 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8192 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8193 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8194 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8195 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8196 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8198 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8202 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8203 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8204 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8205 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8206 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8207 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8208 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8209 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8210 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8212 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8215 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8216 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8217 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8218 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8219 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8220 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8221 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8222 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8224 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8227 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8228 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8229 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8230 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8231 let peer_state = PeerState {
8232 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8233 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8234 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8235 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8236 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8237 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8238 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8239 is_connected: false,
8241 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8244 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8245 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8246 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8247 for _ in 0..event_count {
8248 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8249 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8254 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8255 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8256 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8258 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8259 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8260 // on-startup monitor updates.
8261 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8262 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8264 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8268 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8269 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8270 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8271 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8272 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.context.get_funding_txo() {
8273 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8274 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8275 pending_background_events.push(
8276 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8277 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8280 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8286 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8287 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8289 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8290 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8291 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8292 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8293 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8297 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8298 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8299 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8300 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8301 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8302 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8303 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8305 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8306 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8310 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8311 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8312 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8313 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8314 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8315 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8316 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8317 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8318 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8319 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8320 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8321 let mut events_override = None;
8322 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8323 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8324 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8325 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8326 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8327 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8328 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8329 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8330 (8, events_override, option),
8331 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8332 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8333 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8335 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8336 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8339 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8340 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8343 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8344 pending_events_read = events;
8347 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8348 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8351 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8352 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8353 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8354 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8355 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8356 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8358 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8360 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8361 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8362 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8366 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8367 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8368 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8369 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8370 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8371 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8372 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8374 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8375 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8376 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8377 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8378 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8379 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8380 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8383 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8384 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8385 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8386 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8388 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8389 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8390 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8393 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8394 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8395 retry_strategy: None,
8396 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8397 payment_params: None,
8398 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8399 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8400 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8401 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8402 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8403 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8404 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8405 total_msat: path_amt,
8406 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8408 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8409 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8414 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8416 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8417 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8418 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8419 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8421 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8422 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8423 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8424 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8425 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8426 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8427 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8428 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8429 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8430 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8431 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8436 !forwards.is_empty()
8438 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8439 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8440 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8441 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8442 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8443 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8444 intercepted_id != ev_id
8451 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8452 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8453 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8454 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8455 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8456 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8457 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8458 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8459 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8460 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8461 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8462 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8463 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8472 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8473 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8474 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8475 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8476 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8477 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8478 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8479 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8483 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8484 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8486 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8487 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8488 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8489 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8491 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8492 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8493 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8495 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8496 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8498 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8499 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8501 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8504 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8505 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8506 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8508 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8512 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8513 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8514 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8515 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8516 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8518 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8519 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8520 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8521 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8522 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8523 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8524 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8525 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8527 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8532 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8534 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8536 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8537 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8539 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8540 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8545 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8546 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8548 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8550 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8552 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8553 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8554 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8559 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8560 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8561 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8562 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8563 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8564 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8565 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8567 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8568 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8569 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8571 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8572 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8573 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8574 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8575 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8576 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8578 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8579 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8580 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8581 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8582 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8589 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8591 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8592 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8593 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8594 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8595 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8596 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8597 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8598 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8599 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8600 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8601 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8603 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8604 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8606 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8607 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8608 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8609 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8611 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8612 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8613 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8614 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8616 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8617 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8618 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8619 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8621 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8622 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8623 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8626 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8627 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8630 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8631 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8634 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8637 purpose: payment.purpose,
8638 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8644 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8645 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8646 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8647 for action in actions.iter() {
8648 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8649 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8650 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8652 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8653 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8654 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8655 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8660 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8662 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8663 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8667 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8669 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8670 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8671 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8672 router: args.router,
8674 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8676 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8677 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8678 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8679 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8681 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8682 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8683 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8684 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8685 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8686 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8688 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8693 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8695 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8697 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8698 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8699 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8700 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8701 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8702 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8703 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8705 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8706 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8707 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8709 logger: args.logger,
8710 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8713 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8714 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8715 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8716 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8717 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8720 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8721 //connection or two.
8723 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8729 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8730 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8731 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8732 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8733 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8734 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8735 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8736 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8737 use crate::ln::msgs;
8738 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8739 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8740 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8741 use crate::util::test_utils;
8742 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8743 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8746 fn test_notify_limits() {
8747 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8748 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8749 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8752 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8754 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8755 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8756 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8757 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8758 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8760 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8762 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8763 // to connect messages with new values
8764 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8765 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8766 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8767 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8768 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8769 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8771 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8772 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8773 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8774 // ... but the last node should not.
8775 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8776 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8777 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8778 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8780 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8781 // about the channel.
8782 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8783 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8784 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8786 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8788 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8789 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8790 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8791 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8792 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8793 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8795 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8796 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8797 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8799 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8800 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8801 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8802 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8803 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8804 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8806 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8807 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8808 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8809 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8810 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8811 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8812 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8813 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8815 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8816 // the channel info has updated.
8817 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8818 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8819 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8820 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8821 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8822 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8826 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8827 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8829 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8830 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8831 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8832 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8833 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8835 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8836 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8837 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8838 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8840 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8841 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8842 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8843 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8844 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8845 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8846 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8847 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8849 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8851 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8853 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8854 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8855 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8857 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8858 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8859 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8860 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8861 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8863 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8864 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8865 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8867 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8868 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8869 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8870 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8871 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8872 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8873 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8874 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8875 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8877 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8878 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8879 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8881 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8883 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8885 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8886 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8887 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8888 // lightning messages manually.
8889 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8890 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8893 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8894 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8895 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8897 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8898 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8900 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8901 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8903 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8904 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8905 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8907 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8908 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8909 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8911 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8913 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8915 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8916 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8919 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8920 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8921 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8922 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8924 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8925 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8926 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8927 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8932 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8933 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8934 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8935 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8940 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8941 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8942 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8943 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8950 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8951 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
8952 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
8955 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
8956 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8957 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8958 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8959 // fails as expected.
8960 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
8961 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
8962 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
8963 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
8964 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
8965 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
8966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8968 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
8969 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
8970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
8971 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8972 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8973 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8974 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8976 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8977 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8978 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8980 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8981 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8982 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
8983 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8985 let route = find_route(
8986 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8987 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8989 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8990 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8992 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8993 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8994 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8995 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8996 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8999 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9000 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9002 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9004 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9005 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9006 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9007 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9008 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9009 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9010 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9012 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9014 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9015 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9017 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9018 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9019 let route = find_route(
9020 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9021 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9023 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9024 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9026 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9028 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9029 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9030 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9032 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9033 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9034 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9035 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9037 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9039 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9040 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9041 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9043 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9044 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9047 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9048 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9049 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9050 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9051 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9052 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9053 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9054 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9055 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9057 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9058 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9060 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9061 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9062 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9063 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9065 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9067 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9068 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9069 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9071 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9072 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9073 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9074 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9076 let route = find_route(
9077 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9078 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9080 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9081 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9082 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9086 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9087 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9088 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9090 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9092 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9094 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9095 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9096 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9097 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9098 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9099 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9102 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9104 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9105 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9109 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9110 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9111 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9115 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9117 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9118 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9120 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9121 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9122 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9123 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9125 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9126 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9127 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9128 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9129 let route = find_route(
9130 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9131 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9134 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9135 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9136 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9137 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9138 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9139 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9142 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9143 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9144 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9145 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9146 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9147 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9148 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9150 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9154 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9155 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9156 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9157 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9158 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9162 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9164 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9165 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9167 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9168 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9169 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9170 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9172 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9173 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9174 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9175 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9176 let route = find_route(
9177 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9178 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9181 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9182 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9183 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9184 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9185 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9186 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9187 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9188 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9191 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9192 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9193 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9194 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9195 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9196 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9197 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9199 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9203 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9207 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9209 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9210 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9211 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9212 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9214 // Marshall an MPP route.
9215 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9216 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9217 route.paths.push(path);
9218 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9219 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9220 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9221 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9222 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9223 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9225 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9226 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9228 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9229 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9231 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9236 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9240 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9242 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9244 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9245 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9247 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9248 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9250 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9253 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9254 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9255 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9256 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9257 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9258 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9261 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9264 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9265 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9270 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9271 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9275 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9277 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9278 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9280 total_msat: 100_000,
9283 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9284 // payment verification fails as expected.
9285 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9286 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9287 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9288 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9290 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9294 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9295 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9299 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9300 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9301 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9302 // the channel is successfully closed.
9303 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9304 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9305 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9306 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9308 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9309 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9310 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9311 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9312 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9314 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9315 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9317 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9318 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9319 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9320 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9323 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9325 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9326 // as it has the funding transaction.
9327 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9328 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9329 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9332 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9334 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9336 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9338 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9339 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9340 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9342 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9345 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9346 // as it has the funding transaction.
9347 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9348 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9349 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9352 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9353 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9355 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9356 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9357 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9358 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9360 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9361 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9362 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9363 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9365 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9366 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9368 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9369 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9370 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9371 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9372 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9373 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9374 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9378 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9379 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9380 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9381 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9382 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9383 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9384 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9387 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9389 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9390 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9391 // closing transaction).
9392 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9393 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9394 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9396 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9397 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9398 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9399 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9400 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9403 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9405 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9407 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9408 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9409 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9411 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9413 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9414 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9417 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9418 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9419 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9422 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9423 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9424 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9427 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9429 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9430 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9432 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9433 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9435 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9436 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9441 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9442 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9443 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9444 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9445 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9446 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9447 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9448 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9451 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9452 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9453 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9455 // Test the API functions.
9456 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9458 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9460 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9462 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9464 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9466 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9468 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9472 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9473 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9479 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9481 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9482 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9484 let mut funding_tx = None;
9485 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9486 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9487 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9490 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9491 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9492 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9493 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9494 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9496 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9498 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9500 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9502 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9504 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9506 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9509 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9510 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9511 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9512 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9513 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9515 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9516 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9518 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9519 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9520 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9521 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9522 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9523 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9524 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9527 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9528 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9529 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9530 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9531 }, true).unwrap_err();
9533 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9534 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9535 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9536 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9537 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9538 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9539 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9541 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9542 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9544 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9545 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9546 }, true).unwrap_err();
9548 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9549 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9550 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9552 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9554 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9555 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9557 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9558 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9559 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9560 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9561 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9563 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9564 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9565 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9567 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9568 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9569 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9571 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9572 // "protected" and can connect again.
9573 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9574 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9575 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9577 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9579 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9581 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9582 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9586 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9587 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9591 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9593 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9595 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9596 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9598 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9599 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9600 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9601 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9604 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9606 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9607 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9608 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9610 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9611 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9612 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9614 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9615 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9616 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9617 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9621 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9622 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9623 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9626 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9627 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9631 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9634 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9636 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9637 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9638 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9639 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9640 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9641 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9644 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9645 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9647 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9648 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9652 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9653 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9656 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9657 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9658 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9659 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9660 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9662 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9665 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9666 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9667 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9668 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9674 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9675 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9677 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9678 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9679 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9681 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9682 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9686 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9690 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
9691 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
9692 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
9693 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
9694 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9695 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
9696 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
9697 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
9698 amt_to_forward: 100,
9699 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9700 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9701 keysend_preimage: None,
9702 payment_metadata: None,
9703 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9704 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9708 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
9709 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
9710 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
9711 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9712 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
9714 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
9715 } else { panic!(); }
9717 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
9718 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
9719 amt_to_forward: 100,
9720 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9721 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9722 keysend_preimage: None,
9723 payment_metadata: None,
9724 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9725 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9729 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9730 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
9735 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9736 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9737 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9738 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9739 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9740 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9741 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9742 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9743 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9747 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9748 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9749 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9751 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9752 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9754 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9755 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9760 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9761 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9763 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9764 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9766 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9770 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9771 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9772 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9773 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9774 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9775 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9776 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9777 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9779 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9780 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9781 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9783 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9784 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9785 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9786 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9789 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9790 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9793 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9794 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9795 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9797 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9798 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9799 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9800 ..Default::default()
9802 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9803 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9806 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9807 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9810 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9811 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9812 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9813 ..Default::default()
9815 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9816 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9817 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9820 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9821 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9828 use crate::chain::Listen;
9829 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9830 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9831 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9832 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9833 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9834 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9835 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9836 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9837 use crate::util::test_utils;
9838 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9840 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9841 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9842 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9844 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9846 use criterion::Criterion;
9848 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9849 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9850 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9851 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9852 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9853 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9854 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9856 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9857 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9859 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9860 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9862 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9864 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9867 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9868 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9871 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9872 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9873 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9875 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9877 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9878 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9879 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9880 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9881 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9883 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9884 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9886 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9887 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9888 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9889 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9891 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9893 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9895 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9896 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9897 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9898 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9899 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9901 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9903 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9905 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9906 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9908 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9909 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9911 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9912 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9913 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9916 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9917 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9918 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9920 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9921 } else { panic!(); }
9923 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9924 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9925 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9927 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9928 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9933 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9934 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9935 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9937 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9938 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9943 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9945 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9946 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9947 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9949 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9950 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9951 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9952 match msg_events[0] {
9953 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9954 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9955 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9959 match msg_events[1] {
9960 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9964 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9965 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9967 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9968 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9973 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9974 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9976 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9977 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9982 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9983 macro_rules! send_payment {
9984 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9985 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9986 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9987 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9988 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9990 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9991 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9993 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9994 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9995 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9996 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9997 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9998 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9999 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10000 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10001 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10002 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10003 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10006 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10007 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10008 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10010 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10011 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10012 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10013 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10014 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10016 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10019 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10020 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10021 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10022 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10024 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10028 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10029 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10030 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);