1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
36 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
47 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
48 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
49 use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
50 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
51 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
52 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
53 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
57 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
58 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
61 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
62 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
63 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
64 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
65 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
67 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
68 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
69 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
70 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
71 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
72 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
73 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
74 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
75 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
76 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
77 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
78 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
79 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
81 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
83 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
84 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
85 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
86 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
87 crate::sign::KeysManager,
91 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
92 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
95 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
98 use crate::prelude::*;
100 use core::cell::RefCell;
102 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
103 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
104 use core::time::Duration;
105 use core::ops::Deref;
107 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
108 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
109 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
111 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
113 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
114 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
115 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
117 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
118 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
119 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
120 // before we forward it.
122 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
123 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
124 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
125 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
126 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
128 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
131 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
132 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
134 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
135 /// do with the HTLC.
136 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
137 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
139 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
140 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
141 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
142 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
143 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
144 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
146 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
148 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
149 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
151 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
152 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
153 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
154 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
155 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
157 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
158 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
159 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
160 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
161 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
162 /// blinded path was not used.
164 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
165 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
166 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
168 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
169 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
170 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
171 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
173 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
176 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
177 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
179 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
180 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
181 requires_blinded_error: bool,
183 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
184 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
185 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
187 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
188 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
190 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
191 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
192 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
194 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
195 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
196 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
198 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
199 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
200 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
201 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
203 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
204 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
205 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
207 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
208 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
209 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
210 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
211 requires_blinded_error: bool,
215 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
216 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
217 pub struct BlindedForward {
218 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
219 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
220 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
221 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
222 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
223 /// the introduction node.
224 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
227 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
228 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
229 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
231 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
232 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
233 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
239 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
243 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
244 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
245 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
246 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
248 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
249 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
250 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
251 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
252 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
254 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
256 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
257 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
258 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
260 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
261 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
262 /// it along another path).
264 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
265 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
266 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
267 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
268 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
269 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
270 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
271 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
272 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
274 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
277 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
279 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
281 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
286 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
287 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
290 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
291 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
292 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
293 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
294 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
297 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
298 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
299 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
301 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
302 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
303 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
306 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
307 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
309 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
310 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
311 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
314 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
315 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
316 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
319 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
324 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
328 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
329 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
330 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
331 pub enum BlindedFailure {
332 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
333 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334 FromIntroductionNode,
335 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
336 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
340 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
343 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
344 short_channel_id: u64,
345 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
348 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
349 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
350 channel_id: ChannelId,
352 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
353 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
358 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
360 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
361 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
362 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
364 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
365 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
368 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
369 struct ClaimableHTLC {
370 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
372 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
374 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
375 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
376 sender_intended_value: u64,
377 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
379 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
380 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
381 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
382 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
384 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
385 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
388 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
389 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
390 events::ClaimedHTLC {
391 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
392 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
393 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
394 value_msat: val.value,
395 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
400 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
401 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
403 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
404 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
405 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
408 /// Number of bytes in the id.
409 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
412 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
418 impl Readable for PaymentId {
419 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
420 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
425 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
426 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
427 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
431 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
433 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
434 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
435 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
437 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
443 impl Readable for InterceptId {
444 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
445 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
450 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
451 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
452 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
453 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
454 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
457 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
459 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
460 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
461 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
463 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
464 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
469 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
470 (0, short_channel_id, required),
471 (2, htlc_id, required),
473 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
474 (0, session_priv, required),
479 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
480 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
481 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
482 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
483 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
486 session_priv: SecretKey,
487 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
488 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
489 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
490 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
494 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
495 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
497 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
499 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
504 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
505 payment_id.hash(hasher);
506 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
512 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
514 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
515 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
516 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
517 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
518 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
519 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
523 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
524 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
525 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
526 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
527 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
528 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
530 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
536 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
537 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
539 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
540 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
541 pub enum FailureCode {
542 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
543 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
544 TemporaryNodeFailure,
545 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
546 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
547 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
548 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
549 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
550 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
551 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
552 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
553 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
554 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
556 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
557 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
558 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
561 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
562 fn into(self) -> u16 {
564 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
565 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
566 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
567 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
572 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
573 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
574 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
575 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
576 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
578 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
579 err: msgs::LightningError,
580 closes_channel: bool,
581 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
583 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
585 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
587 err: LightningError {
589 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
590 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
596 closes_channel: false,
597 shutdown_finish: None,
601 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
602 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
605 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
606 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
607 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
608 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
609 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
610 // commitment upon reconnecting.
611 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
613 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
616 err: LightningError { err, action },
617 closes_channel: true,
618 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
622 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
625 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
628 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
632 log_level: Level::Warn,
635 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
637 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
639 ChannelError::Close((msg, _reason)) => LightningError {
641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
642 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
649 closes_channel: false,
650 shutdown_finish: None,
654 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
659 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
660 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
661 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
662 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
663 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
665 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
666 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
667 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
668 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
669 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
670 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
671 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
673 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
677 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
678 struct ClaimingPayment {
680 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
681 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
682 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
683 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
684 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
686 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
687 (0, amount_msat, required),
688 (2, payment_purpose, required),
689 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
690 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
691 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
692 (9, onion_fields, option),
695 struct ClaimablePayment {
696 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
697 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
698 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
701 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
702 struct ClaimablePayments {
703 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
704 /// failed/claimed by the user.
706 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
707 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
709 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
710 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
711 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
713 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
714 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
715 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
716 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
719 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
720 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
721 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
722 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
724 enum BackgroundEvent {
725 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
726 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
727 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
728 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
730 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
731 /// are regenerated on startup.
732 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
733 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
734 /// channel to continue normal operation.
736 /// In general this should be used rather than
737 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
738 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
739 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
741 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
742 /// are regenerated on startup.
743 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 funding_txo: OutPoint,
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
749 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
750 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
752 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
753 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
754 channel_id: ChannelId,
759 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
760 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
761 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
762 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
763 /// event can be generated.
764 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
765 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
766 /// operation of another channel.
768 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
769 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
770 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
771 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
773 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
774 event: events::Event,
775 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
777 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
778 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
779 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
781 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
782 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
783 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
784 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
785 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
787 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
788 /// stored for later processing.
789 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
790 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
793 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
798 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
799 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
800 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
801 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
802 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
803 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
804 (4, blocking_action, required),
805 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
806 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
807 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
809 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
810 (0, event, upgradable_required),
811 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
812 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
813 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
814 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
815 // downgrades to prior versions.
816 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
820 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
821 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
822 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
823 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
825 channel_id: ChannelId,
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
829 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
830 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
831 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
832 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
833 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
834 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
838 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
839 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
840 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
841 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
843 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
845 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
847 channel_id: ChannelId,
848 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
853 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
854 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
855 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
856 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
857 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
862 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
863 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
867 /// State we hold per-peer.
868 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
871 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
872 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
873 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
875 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
876 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
877 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
878 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
879 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
880 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
881 latest_features: InitFeatures,
882 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
883 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
884 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
885 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
886 /// user but which have not yet completed.
888 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
889 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890 /// for a missing channel.
891 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
892 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
893 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
895 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
896 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
897 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
898 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
900 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
901 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
902 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
903 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
904 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
905 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
906 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
907 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
908 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
909 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
910 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
911 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
912 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
913 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
914 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
915 pub is_connected: bool,
918 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
919 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
920 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
921 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
922 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
923 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
926 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
928 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
929 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
930 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
931 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
932 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
933 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
936 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
937 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
940 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
941 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
942 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
945 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
946 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
947 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
948 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
952 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
953 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
954 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
955 /// The original OpenChannel message.
956 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
957 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
958 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
961 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
962 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
963 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
965 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
966 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
968 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
971 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
972 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
973 struct PendingInboundPayment {
974 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
975 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
976 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
977 /// this payment being removed.
979 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
980 user_payment_id: u64,
981 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
982 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
983 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
986 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
987 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
988 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
989 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
990 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
991 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
992 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
993 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
995 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
996 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
997 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1005 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1008 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1009 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1010 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1015 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1016 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1017 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1018 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1019 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1020 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1021 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1022 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1023 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1025 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1026 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1027 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1036 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1039 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1040 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1041 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1046 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1048 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1050 pub trait AChannelManager {
1051 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1052 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1053 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1054 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1055 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1056 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1057 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1058 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1059 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1060 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1061 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1062 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1063 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1064 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1065 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1066 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1067 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1068 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1069 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1070 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1071 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1072 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1073 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1074 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1075 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1076 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1077 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1078 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1079 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1080 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1081 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1082 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1083 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1084 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1085 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1086 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1090 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1092 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1094 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1095 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1096 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1097 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1101 type Watch = M::Target;
1103 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1105 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1107 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1109 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1110 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1112 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1114 type Router = R::Target;
1116 type Logger = L::Target;
1118 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1121 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1122 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1124 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1125 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1127 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1128 /// closing channels
1129 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1130 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1131 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1132 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1134 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1135 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1137 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1138 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1139 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1140 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1141 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1142 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1144 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1145 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1147 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1149 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1150 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1151 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1152 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1153 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1155 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1156 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1157 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1159 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1160 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1161 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1163 /// # Initialization
1165 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1166 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1167 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1168 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1169 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1172 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1173 /// use bitcoin::network::Network;
1174 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1175 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1176 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1177 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1178 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1179 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1181 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1184 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1185 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1186 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1187 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1189 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1191 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1192 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1193 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1194 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1196 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1197 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1198 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1199 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1200 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1201 /// # mut reader: R,
1202 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1203 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1204 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1205 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1208 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1209 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1210 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1211 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1214 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1215 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1216 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1217 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1218 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1220 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1221 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1223 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1226 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1227 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1228 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1236 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1237 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1238 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1239 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1240 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1241 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1242 /// as documented by those traits
1243 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1245 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1246 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1247 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1249 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1250 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1252 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1253 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1254 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1255 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1259 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1260 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1261 /// currently open channels.
1264 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1266 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1267 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1268 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1269 /// for details in channels {
1270 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1275 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1276 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1277 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1278 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1280 /// ## Opening Channels
1282 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1283 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1284 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1287 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1288 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1289 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1290 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1292 /// # trait Wallet {
1293 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1294 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1295 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1298 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1299 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1300 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1301 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1302 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1303 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1304 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1307 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1308 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1309 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1310 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1311 /// user_channel_id, ..
1313 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1314 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1315 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1317 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1318 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1320 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1321 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1324 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1325 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1327 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1328 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1331 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1332 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1333 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1341 /// ## Accepting Channels
1343 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1344 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1345 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1348 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1349 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1350 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1352 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1354 /// # unimplemented!()
1357 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1358 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1359 /// # let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
1360 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1361 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1362 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1363 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1364 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()
1366 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1367 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1372 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1373 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1374 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1376 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1377 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1386 /// ## Closing Channels
1388 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1389 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1390 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1391 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1392 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1395 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1396 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1397 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1398 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1400 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1401 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1403 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1404 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1405 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1406 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1409 /// // On the event processing thread
1410 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1411 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1412 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1413 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1423 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1424 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1425 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1426 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1427 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1430 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1431 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1432 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1433 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1435 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1437 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1438 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1439 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1440 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1441 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1442 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1444 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1445 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1446 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1449 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1450 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1452 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1453 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1454 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1455 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1456 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1458 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1459 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1462 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1465 /// // On the event processing thread
1466 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1467 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1468 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1469 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1470 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1471 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1473 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1474 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1476 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1477 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1478 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1479 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1484 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1485 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1486 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1494 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1495 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1498 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1499 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1500 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1501 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1503 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1504 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1505 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1507 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1508 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1509 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1510 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1511 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1512 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1514 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1515 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1518 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1519 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1521 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1523 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1524 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1525 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1531 /// // On the event processing thread
1532 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1533 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1534 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1541 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1543 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1544 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1545 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1546 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1547 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1548 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1551 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1552 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1553 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1555 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1556 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1557 /// # let absolute_expiry = None;
1558 /// let offer = channel_manager
1559 /// .create_offer_builder(absolute_expiry)?
1561 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1562 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1563 /// # let offer = builder
1564 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1565 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1567 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1569 /// // On the event processing thread
1570 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1571 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1572 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1573 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1574 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1576 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1577 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1582 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1583 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1592 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1593 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1594 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1597 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1598 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1599 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1601 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1602 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1603 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1605 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1606 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1607 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1608 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1610 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1611 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1614 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1615 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1617 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1619 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1623 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1625 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1627 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1631 /// // On the event processing thread
1632 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1633 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1634 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1635 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1642 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1644 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1645 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1646 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1647 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1650 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1651 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1652 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1653 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1655 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1656 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1657 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1658 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1659 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1660 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1661 /// let refund = channel_manager
1662 /// .create_refund_builder(
1663 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1666 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1667 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1668 /// # let refund = builder
1669 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1670 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1672 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1674 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1675 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1677 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1679 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1683 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1685 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1687 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1691 /// // On the event processing thread
1692 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1693 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1694 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1702 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1703 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1706 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1707 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1708 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1710 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1711 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1712 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1713 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1714 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1715 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1718 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1721 /// // On the event processing thread
1722 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1723 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1724 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1725 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1726 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1727 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1729 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1730 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1735 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1736 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1737 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1747 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1748 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1749 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1750 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1752 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1753 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1754 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1755 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1756 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1757 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1758 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1759 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1760 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1762 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1763 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1764 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1766 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1768 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1769 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1770 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1771 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1772 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1774 /// # DoS Mitigation
1776 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1777 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1778 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1779 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1781 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1782 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1783 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1787 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1788 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1789 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1790 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1791 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1793 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1794 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1795 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1796 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1797 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1798 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1799 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1800 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1801 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1802 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1803 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1804 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1805 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1806 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1807 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1808 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1809 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1810 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1811 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1812 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1813 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1814 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1815 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1816 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1817 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1818 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1819 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1820 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1821 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1822 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1823 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1824 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1825 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1826 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1827 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1828 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1829 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1830 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1831 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1832 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1835 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1836 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1837 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1838 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1839 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1843 // `pending_offers_messages`
1845 // `total_consistency_lock`
1847 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1849 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1851 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1853 // |__`per_peer_state`
1855 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1857 // |__`claimable_payments`
1859 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1863 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1865 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1867 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1871 // |__`pending_events`
1873 // |__`pending_background_events`
1875 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1877 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1878 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1879 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1880 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1881 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1882 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1886 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1887 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1888 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1894 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1896 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1898 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1899 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1901 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1902 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1903 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1904 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1906 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1907 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1909 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1910 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1911 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1912 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1913 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1914 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1915 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1916 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1918 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1920 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1921 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1923 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1925 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1926 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1927 /// and via the classic SCID.
1929 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1930 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1932 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1934 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1936 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1937 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1938 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1940 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1941 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1943 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1945 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1946 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1947 /// and via the classic SCID.
1949 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1950 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1952 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1953 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1955 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1956 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1958 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1959 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1961 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1962 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1963 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1964 /// active channel list on load.
1966 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1967 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1969 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1971 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1972 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1973 /// the handling of the events.
1975 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1976 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1979 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1980 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1981 /// would break backwards compatability.
1982 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1983 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1984 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1986 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1988 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1990 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1992 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1994 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1995 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1996 /// confirmation depth.
1998 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1999 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
2000 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
2002 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2004 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2006 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2008 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2010 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2012 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2013 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2014 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2016 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2017 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2019 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2020 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2021 /// keeping additional state.
2022 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2024 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2025 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2026 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2027 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2029 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2030 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2032 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2033 /// are currently open with that peer.
2035 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2036 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2039 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2041 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2042 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2043 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2044 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2045 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2047 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2048 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2049 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2050 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2051 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2053 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2054 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2056 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2057 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2058 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2059 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2060 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2062 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2063 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2065 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2066 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2067 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2068 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2069 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2071 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2073 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2075 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2076 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2077 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2078 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2079 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2080 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2081 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2082 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2083 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2084 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2085 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2087 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2088 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2089 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2091 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2093 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2094 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2096 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2098 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2099 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2103 signer_provider: SP,
2108 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2110 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2111 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2112 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2113 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2114 pub struct ChainParameters {
2115 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2116 pub network: Network,
2118 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2120 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2121 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2124 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2128 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2129 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2132 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2133 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2134 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2135 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2136 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2137 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2139 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2140 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2141 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2142 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2143 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2144 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2146 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2147 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2150 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2151 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2152 /// events to handle.
2154 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2155 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2157 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2158 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2161 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2162 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2163 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2164 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2166 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2167 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2168 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2169 should_persist: move || {
2170 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2171 // processing and return that.
2172 let notify = persist_check();
2173 match (notify, force_notify) {
2174 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2175 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2176 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2177 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2178 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2181 _read_guard: read_guard,
2185 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2186 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2187 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2188 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2189 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2190 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2192 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2193 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2194 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2195 should_persist: persist_check,
2196 _read_guard: read_guard,
2201 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2202 fn drop(&mut self) {
2203 match (self.should_persist)() {
2204 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2205 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2206 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2208 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2209 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2210 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2215 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2216 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2218 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2220 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2221 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2222 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2223 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2224 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2226 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2227 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2229 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2231 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2232 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2233 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2234 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2235 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2236 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2237 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2238 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2239 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2240 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2241 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2242 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2243 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2245 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2246 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2248 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2249 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2250 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2251 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2253 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2254 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2255 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2256 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2257 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2258 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2260 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2262 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2263 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2265 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2267 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2268 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2270 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2271 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2272 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2274 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2275 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2276 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2278 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2279 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2280 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2281 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2283 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2284 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2285 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2287 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2288 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2289 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2291 /// The maximum expiration from the current time where an [`Offer`] or [`Refund`] is considered
2292 /// short-lived, while anything with a greater expiration is considered long-lived.
2294 /// Using [`ChannelManager::create_offer_builder`] or [`ChannelManager::create_refund_builder`],
2295 /// will included a [`BlindedPath`] created using:
2296 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`] when short-lived, and
2297 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] when long-lived.
2299 /// Using compact [`BlindedPath`]s may provide better privacy as the [`MessageRouter`] could select
2300 /// more hops. However, since they use short channel ids instead of pubkeys, they are more likely to
2301 /// become invalid over time as channels are closed. Thus, they are only suitable for short-term use.
2302 pub const MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 60 * 24);
2304 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2305 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2306 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2307 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2308 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2310 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2311 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2312 payment_id: PaymentId,
2314 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2316 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2317 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2318 payment_id: PaymentId,
2319 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2321 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2322 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2323 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2326 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2327 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2328 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2330 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2331 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2332 payment_id: PaymentId,
2333 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2334 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2335 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2337 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2338 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2339 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2341 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2342 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2343 payment_id: PaymentId,
2344 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2345 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2349 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2351 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2353 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2354 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2355 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2356 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2358 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2359 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2360 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2363 macro_rules! handle_error {
2364 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2365 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2366 // entering the macro.
2367 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2368 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2372 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2373 let mut msg_event = None;
2375 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2376 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2377 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2378 let logger = WithContext::from(
2379 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2381 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2383 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2384 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2385 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2386 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2391 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2394 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2396 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2397 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2398 action: err.action.clone()
2402 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2403 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2404 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2405 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2406 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2410 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2417 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2418 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2419 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2420 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2422 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2423 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2424 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2426 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2427 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2428 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2429 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2430 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2432 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2433 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2435 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2439 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2440 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2441 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2443 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2444 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2446 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2447 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2449 ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) => {
2450 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2451 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2452 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2453 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2455 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2460 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2461 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2463 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2464 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2466 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2467 match $channel_phase {
2468 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2469 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2471 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2472 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2474 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2475 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2477 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2478 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2479 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2481 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2482 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2483 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2489 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2490 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2494 let key = *$entry.key();
2495 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2497 $entry.remove_entry();
2505 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2506 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2510 let key = *$entry.key();
2511 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2513 $entry.remove_entry();
2521 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2522 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2524 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2525 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2531 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2532 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2533 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2534 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2535 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2537 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2538 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2539 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2540 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2541 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2542 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2543 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2544 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2545 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2546 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2551 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2552 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2553 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2554 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2555 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2556 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2557 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2558 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2559 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2560 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2562 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2567 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2568 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2569 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2570 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2571 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2572 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2573 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2574 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2575 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2577 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2582 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2583 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2584 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2585 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2586 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2587 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2588 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2589 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2590 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2591 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2592 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2593 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2595 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2596 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2597 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2603 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2604 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2606 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2607 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2608 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2609 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2610 updates.announcement_sigs);
2611 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2612 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2615 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2616 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2617 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2618 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2620 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2621 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2622 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2623 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2624 let mut batch_completed = false;
2625 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2626 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2627 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2628 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2630 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2631 channel_state.2 = true;
2633 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2635 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2637 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2640 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2641 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2642 if batch_completed {
2643 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2644 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2645 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2646 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2647 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2648 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2649 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2650 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2651 chan.set_batch_ready();
2652 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2653 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2657 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2658 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2659 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2664 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2666 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2667 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2669 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2670 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2672 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2673 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2674 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2675 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2680 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2681 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2682 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2683 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2685 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2686 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2687 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2688 panic!("{}", err_str);
2690 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2691 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2692 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2695 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2701 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2702 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2703 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2705 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2706 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2707 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2708 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2709 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2710 // filter for uniqueness here.
2711 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2712 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2713 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2714 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2716 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2717 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2719 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2720 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2721 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2727 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2728 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2729 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2730 while !processed_all_events {
2731 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2738 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2739 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2740 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2742 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2743 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2744 result = $self.process_background_events();
2746 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2747 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2748 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2749 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2753 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2754 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2755 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2756 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2759 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2761 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2762 $event_to_handle = event;
2764 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2765 post_event_actions.push(action);
2770 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2771 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2772 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2773 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2774 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2775 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2778 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2779 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2780 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2781 processed_all_events = false;
2785 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2786 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2787 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2789 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2790 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2791 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2797 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2799 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2800 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2801 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2802 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2803 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2804 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2808 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2810 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2812 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2813 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2815 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2817 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2818 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2819 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2822 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2823 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2824 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2826 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2827 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2828 current_timestamp: u32,
2830 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2831 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2832 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2833 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2835 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2836 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2837 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2842 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2844 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2845 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2846 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2847 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2848 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2849 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2850 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2851 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2852 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2854 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2857 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2858 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2860 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2862 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2864 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2866 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2867 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2868 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2869 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2870 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2871 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2872 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2873 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2875 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2876 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2886 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2887 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2888 &self.default_configuration
2891 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2892 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2893 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2896 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2897 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2899 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2901 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2905 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2910 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2912 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2913 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2914 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2915 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2916 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2918 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2919 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2921 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2922 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2923 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2925 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2926 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2927 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2929 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2930 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2932 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2933 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2934 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2935 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2936 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2937 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2939 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2940 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2941 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2942 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2943 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2944 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2948 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2949 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2953 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2954 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2956 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2958 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2959 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2965 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2966 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2967 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2968 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2969 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2970 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2974 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2979 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2981 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2982 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2985 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2987 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2990 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2993 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2994 node_id: their_network_key,
2997 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3000 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3001 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3002 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3003 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3004 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3005 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3006 // the same channel.
3007 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3009 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3011 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3012 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3013 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3014 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3015 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3016 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3017 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3021 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3022 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3023 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3031 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3032 /// more information.
3033 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3034 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3035 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3036 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3037 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3038 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3039 // the same channel.
3040 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3042 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3044 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3045 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3046 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3047 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3048 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3049 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3057 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3058 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3060 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3061 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3063 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3064 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3065 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3066 // really wanted anyway.
3067 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3070 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3071 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3072 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3075 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3076 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3077 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3078 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3079 let context_to_details = |context| {
3080 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3082 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3084 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3085 .map(context_to_details)
3091 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3092 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3094 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3095 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3096 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3098 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3099 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3100 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3101 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3102 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3103 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3105 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3106 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3107 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3109 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3110 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3111 payment_id: *payment_id,
3112 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3113 total_msat: *total_msat,
3116 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3117 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3119 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3120 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3122 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3127 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3130 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3131 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3136 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3137 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3139 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3140 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3142 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3144 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3145 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3146 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3147 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3148 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3149 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3151 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3152 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3153 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3154 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3155 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3159 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3160 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3162 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3163 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3164 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3165 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3168 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3169 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3173 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3175 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3176 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3183 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3184 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3185 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3186 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3189 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3190 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3196 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3197 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3198 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3200 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3201 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3203 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3204 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3205 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3206 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3208 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3210 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3211 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3212 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3215 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3216 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3217 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3218 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3219 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3220 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3223 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3224 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3225 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3227 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3228 /// the channel being closed or not:
3229 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3230 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3231 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3232 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3233 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3234 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3235 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3237 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3238 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3239 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3240 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3242 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3244 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3245 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3246 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3249 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3250 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3251 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3252 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3253 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3256 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3257 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3258 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3259 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3260 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3263 let logger = WithContext::from(
3264 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3267 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3268 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3269 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3270 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3271 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3272 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3275 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3276 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3277 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3278 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3279 // ignore the result here.
3280 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3282 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3283 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3284 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3285 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3286 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3287 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3288 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3289 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3290 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3291 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3292 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3293 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3296 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3299 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3300 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3305 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3306 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3307 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3308 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3309 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3310 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3311 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3312 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3315 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3316 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3317 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3321 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3322 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3326 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3327 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3328 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3329 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3331 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3332 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3333 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3334 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3335 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3336 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3338 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3340 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3341 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3342 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3343 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3344 mem::drop(peer_state);
3345 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3347 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3348 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3349 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3351 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3352 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3353 // Unfunded channel has no update
3354 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3356 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3357 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3358 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3359 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3360 // Unfunded channel has no update
3361 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3364 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3365 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3366 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3367 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3369 (None, *peer_node_id)
3371 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3374 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3375 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3376 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3377 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3382 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3385 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool, error_message: String)
3386 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3388 log_debug!(self.logger,
3389 "Force-closing channel, The error message sent to the peer : {}", error_message);
3390 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3391 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3392 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3393 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3394 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3395 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3396 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3397 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: error_message }
3410 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s),
3411 /// rejecting new HTLCs.
3413 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing
3414 /// channels and should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3416 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id`
3417 /// isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3418 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3419 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3420 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, error_message)
3423 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3424 /// the latest local transaction(s).
3426 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3427 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3429 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3430 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3431 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3432 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3433 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3434 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3435 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, error_message)
3438 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3439 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3441 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3442 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3443 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3444 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3445 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3449 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3450 /// local transaction(s).
3452 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and
3453 /// should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3454 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3455 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3456 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3460 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3461 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3462 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3463 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3464 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3465 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3466 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3467 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3469 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3470 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3471 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3472 // we don't have the channel here.
3473 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3476 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3477 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3478 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3479 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3480 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3481 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3482 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3483 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3484 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3485 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3486 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3487 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3489 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3492 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3493 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3494 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3496 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3497 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3498 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3504 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3505 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3506 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3507 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3509 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3510 None => return None,
3511 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3513 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3514 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3515 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3520 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3521 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3524 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3528 fn can_forward_htlc(
3529 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3530 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3531 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3532 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3535 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3537 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3538 // intercept forward.
3539 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3540 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3541 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3543 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3548 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3549 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3550 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3552 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3553 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3555 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3561 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3562 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3563 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3564 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3565 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3566 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3567 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3568 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3569 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3570 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3572 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3573 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3575 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3576 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3577 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3579 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3580 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3581 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3582 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3583 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3584 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3585 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3587 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3591 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3592 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3594 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3595 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3596 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3597 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3598 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3599 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3600 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3604 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3605 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3607 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3609 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3610 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3611 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3612 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3613 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3617 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3618 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3620 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3622 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3623 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3626 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3627 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3628 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3629 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3632 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3633 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3634 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3635 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3636 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3637 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3638 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3642 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3645 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3646 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3647 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3648 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3649 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3650 macro_rules! return_err {
3651 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3653 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3654 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3655 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3656 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3657 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3658 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3659 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3660 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3661 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3665 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3666 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3667 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3668 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3669 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3675 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3677 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3678 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3679 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3680 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3683 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3684 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3685 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3686 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3687 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3689 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3692 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3693 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3694 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3695 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3696 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3702 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3703 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3704 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3706 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3707 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3708 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3710 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3711 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3712 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3713 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3714 return Err(LightningError {
3715 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3716 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3719 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3720 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3722 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3723 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3724 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3727 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3728 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3729 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3730 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3732 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3733 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3734 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3736 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3737 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3738 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3739 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3740 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3741 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3742 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3746 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3749 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3750 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3751 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3752 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3754 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3755 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3756 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3757 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3758 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3761 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3762 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3764 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3765 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3766 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3767 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3768 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3769 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3770 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3771 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3773 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3774 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3775 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3777 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3779 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3786 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3787 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3788 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3789 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
3790 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
3794 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3795 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3796 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3799 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3800 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3801 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3802 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3804 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3805 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3806 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3808 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3809 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3813 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3814 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3816 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3817 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3818 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3820 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3823 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
3825 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3826 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3829 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3830 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3831 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3832 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3833 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3834 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3835 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3836 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3837 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3839 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3840 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
3841 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3842 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3844 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3845 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3847 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3848 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3849 Some(monitor_update) => {
3850 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3852 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3853 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3854 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3855 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3856 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3857 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3858 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3866 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3869 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3870 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3871 // `channel_by_id` map.
3872 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3873 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3877 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3878 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3880 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3885 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3887 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3888 /// fields for more info.
3890 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3891 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3893 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3895 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3896 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3897 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3898 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3899 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3901 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3902 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3903 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3904 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3905 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3907 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3908 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3909 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3910 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3912 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3914 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3915 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3916 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3918 /// In general, a path may raise:
3919 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3920 /// node public key) is specified.
3921 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3922 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3923 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3924 /// relevant updates.
3926 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3927 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3928 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3930 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3931 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3932 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3933 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3934 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3935 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3936 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3937 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3939 self.pending_outbound_payments
3940 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3941 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3942 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3945 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3946 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3947 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3948 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3950 self.pending_outbound_payments
3951 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3952 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3953 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3954 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3958 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3959 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3961 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3962 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3963 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3967 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3968 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3969 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3973 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3974 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3977 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3978 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3979 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3980 self.pending_outbound_payments
3981 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3982 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3983 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3984 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3985 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3989 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3990 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3991 /// retries are exhausted.
3993 /// # Event Generation
3995 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3996 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3998 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3999 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4000 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4002 /// # Requested Invoices
4004 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4005 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4006 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4007 /// once the invoice has been received.
4009 /// # Restart Behavior
4011 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4012 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4013 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4015 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4016 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4018 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4021 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4022 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4023 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4024 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4025 /// never reach the recipient.
4027 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4028 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4030 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4031 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4033 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4034 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4035 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4037 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4038 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4039 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4042 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4043 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4045 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4048 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4049 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4050 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4052 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4053 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4054 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4055 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4058 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4059 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4060 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4061 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4062 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4064 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4065 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4066 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4069 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4072 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4073 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4076 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4077 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4079 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4080 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4081 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4082 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4083 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4084 let payment_params =
4085 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4087 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4089 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4092 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4093 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4095 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4096 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4097 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4098 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4100 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4101 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4102 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4103 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4104 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4105 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4106 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4107 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4108 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4109 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4111 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4112 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4113 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4114 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4118 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4120 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4121 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4124 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4126 let mut res = Vec::new();
4128 for mut path in route.paths {
4129 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4130 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4131 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4132 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4133 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4136 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4139 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4140 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4142 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4144 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4145 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4150 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4153 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4158 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4159 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4160 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4162 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4163 let used_liquidity =
4164 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4166 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4167 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4169 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4172 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4177 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4178 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4179 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4186 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4187 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4188 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4189 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4190 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4191 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4192 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4193 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4194 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4197 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4199 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4200 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4201 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4203 let err = if let ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) = $err {
4204 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4205 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4206 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4207 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4208 } else { unreachable!(); };
4210 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4211 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4212 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4215 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4216 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4218 let chan_err = ChannelError::close(err.to_owned());
4219 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4220 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4224 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4225 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4227 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4228 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4229 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4230 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4235 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4236 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4238 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4239 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4242 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4243 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4244 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4248 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4249 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4250 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4254 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4256 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4259 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4260 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4264 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4265 funding_txo, o.get()
4267 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4268 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4269 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4270 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4271 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4272 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4275 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4282 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4283 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4284 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4288 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4290 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4291 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4293 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4294 /// across the p2p network.
4296 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4297 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4299 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4300 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4301 /// keys per-channel).
4303 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4304 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4305 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4307 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4308 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4309 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4311 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4312 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4313 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4314 /// for more details.
4316 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4317 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4318 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4319 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4322 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4324 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4325 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4327 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4328 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4329 /// signature for each channel.
4331 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4332 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4334 let mut result = Ok(());
4336 if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
4337 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4338 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4339 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4340 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4345 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4346 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4347 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4351 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4352 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4353 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4354 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4355 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4356 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4357 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4358 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4360 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4361 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4366 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4367 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4368 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4369 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4373 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4374 match states.entry(txid) {
4375 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4376 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4377 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4381 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4384 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4385 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4386 temporary_channel_id,
4387 counterparty_node_id,
4388 funding_transaction.clone(),
4391 let mut output_index = None;
4392 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
4393 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4394 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4395 if output_index.is_some() {
4396 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4398 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4401 if output_index.is_none() {
4402 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4404 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4405 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4406 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4407 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4408 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4409 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4415 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4416 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4417 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4418 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4419 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4420 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4421 .into_iter().flatten()
4422 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4424 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4425 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4427 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4430 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4431 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4432 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4433 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4434 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4435 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4436 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4437 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4438 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4439 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4440 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4441 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4443 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4450 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4451 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4452 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4458 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4460 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4461 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4462 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4463 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4465 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4466 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4468 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4469 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4471 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4473 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4474 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4475 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4476 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4477 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4478 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4479 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4480 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4481 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4482 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4483 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4484 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4485 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4491 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4492 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4496 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4497 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4498 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4499 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4503 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4504 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4505 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4506 config.apply(config_update);
4507 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4510 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4511 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4512 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4513 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4514 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4515 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4516 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4523 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4524 debug_assert!(false);
4525 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4527 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4528 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4535 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4537 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4538 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4539 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4540 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4542 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4543 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4545 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4546 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4548 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4550 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4551 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4552 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4553 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4554 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4555 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4556 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4557 pub fn update_channel_config(
4558 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4559 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4560 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4563 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4564 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4566 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4567 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4569 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4570 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4571 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4572 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4573 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4575 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4576 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4577 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4580 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4583 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4584 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4585 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4586 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4587 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4588 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4591 let next_hop_scid = {
4592 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4593 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4594 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4597 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4598 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4599 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4600 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4601 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4604 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4606 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4607 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4608 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4611 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4612 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4613 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4614 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4615 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4622 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4623 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4624 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4627 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4628 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4629 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4630 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4633 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4635 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4636 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4637 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4638 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4639 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4642 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4643 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4644 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4645 payment.prev_channel_id,
4646 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4647 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4649 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4653 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4654 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4656 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4659 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4660 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4663 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4664 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4665 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4668 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4669 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4670 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4671 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4672 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4673 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4674 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4675 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4676 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4677 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4680 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4681 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4682 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4683 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4688 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4689 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4690 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4692 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4693 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4694 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4695 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4696 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4697 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4698 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4700 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4701 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4705 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4709 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4710 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4711 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4712 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4713 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4714 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4715 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4716 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4719 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4720 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4721 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4722 incoming_channel_details
4724 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4728 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4729 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4730 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4731 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4732 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4734 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4736 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4741 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4742 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4744 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4745 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4746 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
4747 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4748 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4752 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4753 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4754 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4755 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4760 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4761 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4762 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4764 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4765 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4768 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4769 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4772 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4773 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4774 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4775 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4777 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4778 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4779 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4781 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4782 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4787 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4788 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4789 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4791 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4792 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4794 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4795 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4796 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4801 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4802 // proposed to as a batch.
4803 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4804 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4805 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4806 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4807 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4808 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4809 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4810 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4812 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4813 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4814 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4815 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4818 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4819 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4820 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4821 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4827 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4829 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4830 /// Will likely generate further events.
4831 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4834 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4836 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4837 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4838 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4840 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4841 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4843 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4844 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4845 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4846 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4848 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4849 match forward_info {
4850 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4851 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4852 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4853 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4854 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4857 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4858 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4859 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
4860 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4862 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4863 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4864 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4865 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4866 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4867 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4868 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4869 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4870 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4873 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4874 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4876 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4879 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4880 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4886 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4887 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4889 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4893 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4894 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4896 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4900 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4901 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4902 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4903 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4904 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4905 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4906 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4909 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4910 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4911 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4912 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4913 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4915 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4917 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4918 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4922 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4923 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4924 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4925 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4926 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4927 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4929 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4930 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4936 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4939 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4942 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4943 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4944 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4945 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4946 // problem, not ours.
4952 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4953 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4954 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4956 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4960 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4962 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4963 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4964 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4969 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4970 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4971 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4972 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4973 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4974 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4975 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4976 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4977 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4978 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4979 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4982 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
4983 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4984 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4985 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4986 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4987 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4988 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4989 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4990 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4991 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4992 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4993 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4995 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4996 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4997 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4998 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4999 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5000 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5003 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5004 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5005 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5008 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5009 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5011 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5013 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5014 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5015 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5016 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5022 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5023 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5025 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5026 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5027 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5029 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5030 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5031 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5032 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5034 Some((res, htlc_id))
5037 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5038 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5039 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5040 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5042 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5044 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5045 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5046 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5052 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5056 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5057 match forward_info {
5058 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5059 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5060 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5061 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5062 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5065 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5066 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5067 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5068 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5069 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5070 requires_blinded_error: _
5072 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5073 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5074 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5075 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5076 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5078 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5079 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5080 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5082 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5083 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5087 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5088 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5091 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5094 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5095 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5096 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5097 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5098 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5099 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5100 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5101 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5102 phantom_shared_secret,
5105 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5106 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5107 // if routing nodes overpay
5108 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5109 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5111 total_value_received: None,
5112 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5115 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5118 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5120 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5121 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5122 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5123 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5124 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5125 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5127 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5128 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5129 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5130 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5131 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5132 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5133 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5134 phantom_shared_secret,
5137 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5138 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5140 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5143 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5144 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5145 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5146 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5147 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5150 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5151 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5152 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5153 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5154 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5155 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5156 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5158 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5159 .entry(payment_hash)
5160 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5161 .or_insert_with(|| {
5162 committed_to_claimable = true;
5164 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5167 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5168 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5170 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5172 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5174 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5176 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5177 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5178 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5181 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5183 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5184 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5185 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5186 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5187 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5188 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5189 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5191 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5192 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5194 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5196 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5197 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5198 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5199 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5200 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5203 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5204 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5205 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5206 committed_to_claimable = true;
5208 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5209 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5210 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5211 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5212 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5213 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5214 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5215 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5216 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5220 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5221 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5222 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5223 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5224 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5226 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5228 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5229 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5231 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5232 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5233 committed_to_claimable = true;
5236 payment_claimable_generated
5240 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5241 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5242 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5243 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5244 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5245 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5246 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5247 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5249 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5250 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5251 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5252 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5253 Ok(result) => result,
5255 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5256 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5259 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5260 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5261 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5262 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5263 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5264 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5267 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5269 payment_data.payment_secret,
5272 check_total_value!(purpose);
5274 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5275 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5276 check_total_value!(purpose);
5280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5281 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5283 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5285 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5286 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5288 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5289 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5290 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5291 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5292 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5294 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5295 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5296 payment_data.payment_secret,
5299 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5300 if payment_claimable_generated {
5301 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5307 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5308 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5316 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5317 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5318 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5319 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5321 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5322 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5324 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5326 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5327 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5328 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5330 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5332 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5333 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5334 events.append(&mut new_events);
5337 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5339 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5340 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5341 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5343 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5345 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5346 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5347 if background_events.is_empty() {
5348 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5351 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5353 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5354 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5355 // monitor updating completing.
5356 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5358 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5359 let mut updated_chan = false;
5361 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5362 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5365 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5367 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5368 updated_chan = true;
5369 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5370 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5372 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5380 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5381 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5384 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5386 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5387 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5389 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5390 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5392 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5393 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5394 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5395 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5396 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5402 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5405 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5406 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5407 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5408 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5409 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5412 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5413 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5415 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5417 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5418 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5419 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5421 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5422 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5423 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5424 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5426 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5427 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5429 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5430 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5434 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5435 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5436 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5437 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5438 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5439 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5440 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5442 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5443 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5446 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5449 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5450 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5452 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5457 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5458 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5466 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5468 /// This currently includes:
5469 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5470 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5471 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5473 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5474 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5475 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5476 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5477 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5478 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5479 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5480 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5482 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5483 /// estimate fetches.
5485 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5486 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5487 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5488 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5489 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5491 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5492 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5494 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5495 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5496 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5497 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5499 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5500 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5501 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5502 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5503 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5504 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5506 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5507 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5508 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5510 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5511 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5512 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5513 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5514 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5515 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5516 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5517 channel_id: *chan_id,
5518 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5530 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5533 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5534 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5535 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5537 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5538 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5543 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5544 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5546 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5547 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5548 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5549 if needs_close { return false; }
5552 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5553 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5554 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5555 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5556 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5557 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5558 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5559 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5561 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5562 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5563 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5564 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5565 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5569 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5571 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5574 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5576 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5577 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5578 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5579 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5580 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5584 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5586 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5592 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5594 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5595 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5596 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5597 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5598 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5599 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5600 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5601 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5602 channel_id: *chan_id,
5603 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5611 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5612 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5613 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5615 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5616 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5617 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5619 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5620 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5621 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5622 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5624 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5625 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5626 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5627 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5632 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5633 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5634 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5635 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5636 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5637 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5638 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5639 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5640 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5646 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5648 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5649 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5654 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5655 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5656 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5657 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5658 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5659 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5660 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5661 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5662 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5663 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5664 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5665 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5666 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5667 // have no channels to the peer.
5668 let remove_entry = {
5669 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5670 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5673 entry.remove_entry();
5676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5681 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5682 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5683 // This should be unreachable
5684 debug_assert!(false);
5687 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5688 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5689 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5690 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5691 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5692 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5693 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5696 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5697 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5698 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5700 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5701 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5708 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5709 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5710 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5711 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5712 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5715 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5716 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5719 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5720 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5723 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5724 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5725 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5726 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5727 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5728 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5729 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5732 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5733 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5736 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5737 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5738 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5739 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5740 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5747 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5748 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5749 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5751 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5752 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5753 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5754 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5756 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5757 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5758 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5759 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5760 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5761 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5764 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5765 /// reason for the failure.
5767 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5768 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5771 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5772 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5773 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5774 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5775 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5776 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5777 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5782 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5783 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5784 match failure_code {
5785 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5786 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5787 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5788 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5789 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5790 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5792 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5793 let fail_data = match data {
5794 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5797 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5802 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5803 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5805 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5807 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5808 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5809 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5810 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5811 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5812 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5813 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5815 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5817 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5818 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5820 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5825 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5826 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5827 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5828 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5829 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5830 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5831 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5832 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5833 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5834 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5836 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5837 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5838 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5839 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5841 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5842 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5843 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5844 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5845 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5849 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5850 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5851 // be surfaced to the user.
5852 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5853 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5854 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5856 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5858 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5859 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5861 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5862 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5863 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5864 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5866 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5867 debug_assert!(false);
5868 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5873 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5876 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5877 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5878 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5879 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5883 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5884 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5885 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5888 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5889 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5890 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5891 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5892 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5893 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5894 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5895 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5896 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5897 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5900 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5901 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5902 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5905 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5906 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5907 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5908 let mut push_forward_event;
5910 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5911 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5912 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5913 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5915 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5916 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5917 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5920 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
5921 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5922 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5924 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5925 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5926 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5927 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5928 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5930 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5932 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5933 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5935 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5936 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5940 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5941 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5943 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5947 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
5948 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5949 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5950 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5952 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5955 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5958 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5959 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5960 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5961 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5962 failed_next_destination: destination,
5969 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5970 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5972 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5973 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5974 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5975 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5977 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5978 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5979 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5980 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5982 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5983 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5984 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5986 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5987 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5988 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5989 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5990 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5991 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5992 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5993 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5994 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5997 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5998 /// even type numbers.
6002 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6003 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6005 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6006 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6007 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6010 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6011 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6016 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6017 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6018 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6019 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6020 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6021 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6022 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6023 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6028 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
6029 .entry(payment_hash)
6031 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6032 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6035 .or_insert_with(|| {
6036 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6037 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6039 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6040 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6043 sender_intended_value,
6044 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6048 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6049 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6050 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6051 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6052 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6053 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6054 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6055 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6056 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6057 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6058 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6067 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6069 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6070 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6071 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6072 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6073 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6074 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6075 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6076 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6077 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6079 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6080 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6081 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6082 debug_assert!(false);
6086 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6088 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6089 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6090 debug_assert!(false);
6094 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6095 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6097 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6098 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6099 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6100 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6103 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6104 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6105 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6106 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6110 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6111 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6112 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6113 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6114 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6115 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6116 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6119 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6120 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6121 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6122 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id), Some(payment_hash));
6123 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6124 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6129 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6130 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6131 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6132 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6133 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6134 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6135 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6137 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6140 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6141 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6142 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6143 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6147 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6148 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6149 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6150 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6152 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6153 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6154 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6155 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6157 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6158 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6159 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6160 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6164 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6165 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6166 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6170 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6171 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6172 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6175 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6176 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6177 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6178 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6179 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6180 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6181 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6182 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6185 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6186 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6187 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6189 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6192 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6193 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6195 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6196 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6197 // monitor update as a background event.
6198 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6199 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6200 counterparty_node_id,
6201 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6202 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6203 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6207 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6208 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6213 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6215 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6217 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6218 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6219 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6220 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6221 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6223 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6225 debug_assert!(false,
6226 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6229 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6230 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6231 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6232 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6233 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6235 let mut found_blocker = false;
6236 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6237 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6238 // which case we need to only remove the one
6239 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6240 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6241 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6242 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6244 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6247 debug_assert!(false);
6256 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6257 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6258 counterparty_node_id: None,
6259 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6262 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6266 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6267 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6268 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6269 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6270 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6271 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6272 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6273 // again on restart.
6274 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6275 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6276 payment_preimage, update_res);
6279 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6280 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6282 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6283 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6284 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6285 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6286 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6287 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6288 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6289 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6290 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6291 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6294 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6295 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6296 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6297 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6298 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6299 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6303 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6304 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6307 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6308 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6309 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6310 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6314 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6315 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6316 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6317 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6319 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6320 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6321 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6323 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6324 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6327 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6328 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6329 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6330 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6332 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6333 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6334 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6335 let chan_to_release =
6336 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6337 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6339 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6340 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6341 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6342 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6347 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6348 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6349 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6350 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6351 // in the background.
6352 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6353 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6354 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6355 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6357 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6358 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6359 funding_txo, update, ..
6361 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6362 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6363 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6364 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6366 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6372 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6373 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6374 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6376 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6377 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6379 monitor_update.updates[0],
6380 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6385 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6386 // immediately once we get going.
6387 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6390 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6392 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6395 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6396 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6397 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6398 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6399 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6400 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6401 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6405 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6406 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6407 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6410 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6411 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6412 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6413 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6414 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6415 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6416 prev_user_channel_id,
6417 next_user_channel_id,
6418 total_fee_earned_msat,
6420 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6421 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6423 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6427 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6428 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6429 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6435 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6436 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6437 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6440 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6441 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6442 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6443 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6445 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6447 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6448 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6449 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6451 payment_purpose: purpose,
6454 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6457 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6461 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6463 sender_intended_total_msat,
6468 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6469 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6471 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6472 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6473 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6476 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6477 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6479 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6480 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6481 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6482 downstream_channel_id,
6483 Some(blocking_action),
6490 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6491 /// update completion.
6492 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6493 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6494 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6495 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6496 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6497 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6498 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6499 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6500 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6501 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6502 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6503 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6504 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6505 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6506 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6507 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6509 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6510 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6512 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6513 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6514 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6515 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6517 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6518 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6519 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6522 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6523 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6525 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6526 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6527 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6532 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6533 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6534 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6535 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6540 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6541 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6542 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6543 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6544 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6549 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6553 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6559 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6560 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6561 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6565 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6566 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6567 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6570 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6573 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6574 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6576 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6577 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6579 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6580 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6581 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6582 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6583 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6589 let mut peer_state_lock;
6590 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6591 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6592 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6593 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6595 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6598 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6599 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6600 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6601 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6602 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6605 let remaining_in_flight =
6606 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6607 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6610 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6611 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6612 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6613 remaining_in_flight);
6614 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6617 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6620 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6622 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6623 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6626 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6627 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6628 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6630 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6631 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6632 /// used to accept such channels.
6634 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6635 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6636 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6637 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6640 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6641 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6643 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6644 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6645 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6647 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6648 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6650 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6651 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6653 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6654 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6656 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6657 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6658 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6659 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6662 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6664 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6667 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6668 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6670 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6672 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6673 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6675 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6677 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6678 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6679 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6681 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6682 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6683 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6685 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6686 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6687 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6688 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6689 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6690 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6691 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6694 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6695 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6697 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6703 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6704 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6705 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6706 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6708 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6712 Ok(mut channel) => {
6714 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6715 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6716 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6717 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6718 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6719 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6720 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6723 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6724 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6725 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6727 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6729 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6730 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6731 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6732 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6733 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6734 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6735 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6736 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6739 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6740 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6741 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6743 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6747 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6748 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6749 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6751 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6752 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6753 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6756 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6763 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6764 /// or 0-conf channels.
6766 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6767 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6768 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6769 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6770 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6771 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6773 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6774 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6775 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6776 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6777 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6778 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6779 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6783 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6786 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6787 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6789 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6790 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6792 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6793 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6794 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6795 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6796 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6798 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6801 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6802 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6803 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6806 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6807 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6808 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6809 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6810 // included in the unfunded count.
6811 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6812 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6813 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6816 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6817 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6820 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6821 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6822 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6823 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6828 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6831 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6832 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6833 // likely to be lost on restart!
6834 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6835 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6836 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6839 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6840 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6841 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6844 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6845 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6846 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6847 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6848 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6851 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6853 debug_assert!(false);
6854 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6855 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6856 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6858 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6859 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6861 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6862 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6863 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6864 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6865 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6866 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6868 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6869 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6870 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6873 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6874 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6875 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6876 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6877 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6880 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6881 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6884 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6885 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6888 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6889 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6890 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6891 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6893 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6895 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6896 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6897 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6898 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6899 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6900 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6903 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6904 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6905 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6910 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6911 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6912 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6913 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6914 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6915 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6916 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6919 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6924 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6925 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6927 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6928 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6930 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6931 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6932 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6933 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6936 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6937 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6939 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6940 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6941 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6943 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6947 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6948 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6949 // likely to be lost on restart!
6950 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6952 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6954 debug_assert!(false);
6955 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6957 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6958 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6959 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6961 match phase.get_mut() {
6962 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6963 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6964 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6967 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6974 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6975 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6976 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6977 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6978 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6980 user_channel_id: user_id,
6985 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6986 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6989 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6991 debug_assert!(false);
6992 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6995 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6996 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6997 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6998 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6999 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7000 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
7001 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7003 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7004 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7005 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7006 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7007 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7008 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7009 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7010 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7011 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7015 Some(mut phase) => {
7016 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7017 let err = ChannelError::close(err_msg);
7018 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7020 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7023 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7025 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7026 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7027 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7028 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7029 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7030 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7032 let err = ChannelError::close($err.to_owned());
7033 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7034 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7037 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7039 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7042 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7043 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7045 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7047 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7048 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7049 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7050 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7051 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7053 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7054 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7055 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7056 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7057 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7058 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7059 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7064 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7065 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7066 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7068 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7072 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7073 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7074 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7082 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7083 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7084 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7085 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7087 debug_assert!(false);
7088 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7093 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7095 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7096 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7097 let logger = WithContext::from(
7099 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7100 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7104 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7106 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7107 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7108 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7109 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7110 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7111 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7112 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7113 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7114 } else { unreachable!(); }
7117 let e = ChannelError::close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7118 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7119 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7120 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7121 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7122 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7123 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7127 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7128 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7129 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7130 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7131 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7132 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7136 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7143 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7144 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7145 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7146 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7147 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7149 debug_assert!(false);
7150 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7152 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7154 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7155 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7156 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7157 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7158 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7159 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7160 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7161 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7162 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7163 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7164 msg: announcement_sigs,
7166 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7167 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7168 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7169 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7170 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7171 // announcement_signatures.
7172 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7173 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7174 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7175 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7182 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7183 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7188 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7189 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7193 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7198 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7199 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7200 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7203 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7205 debug_assert!(false);
7206 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7208 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7209 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7210 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7211 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7213 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7214 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7215 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7216 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7218 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7221 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7222 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7223 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7224 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7226 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7227 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7228 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7229 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7230 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7231 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7235 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7236 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7237 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7238 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7241 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7242 let context = phase.context_mut();
7243 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7244 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7245 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7246 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7248 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7249 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7250 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7251 let context = phase.context_mut();
7252 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7253 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7254 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7258 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7261 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7262 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7263 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7264 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7266 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7267 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7273 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7275 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7277 debug_assert!(false);
7278 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7280 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7283 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7285 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7286 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7287 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7288 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7289 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7290 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7295 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7296 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7297 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7298 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7299 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7300 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7301 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7303 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7304 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7310 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7311 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7312 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7313 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7315 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7316 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7317 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7318 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7323 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7324 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7325 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7330 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7331 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7332 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7333 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7335 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7336 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7337 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7338 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7340 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7341 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7343 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7344 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7345 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7347 debug_assert!(false);
7348 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7350 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7351 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7352 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7354 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7355 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7356 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7357 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7358 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7359 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7361 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7363 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7364 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7365 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7366 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7367 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7368 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7369 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7370 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7371 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7372 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7373 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7374 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7378 match pending_forward_info {
7379 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7380 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7382 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7383 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7384 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7385 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7386 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7388 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7389 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7390 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7391 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7392 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7395 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7401 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7403 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7404 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7412 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7414 let next_user_channel_id;
7415 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7417 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7419 debug_assert!(false);
7420 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7422 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7423 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7424 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7426 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7427 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7428 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7429 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7431 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7433 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7434 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7435 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7437 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7438 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7439 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7440 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7441 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7442 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7443 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7444 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7447 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7448 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7454 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7455 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7456 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7462 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7463 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7464 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7466 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7468 debug_assert!(false);
7469 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7471 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7472 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7473 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7475 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7476 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7478 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7479 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7487 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7488 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7489 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7491 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7493 debug_assert!(false);
7494 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7496 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7497 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7498 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7500 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7501 let chan_err = ChannelError::close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7502 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7504 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7505 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7507 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7508 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7516 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7518 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7520 debug_assert!(false);
7521 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7523 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7524 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7525 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7526 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7527 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7528 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7529 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7530 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7531 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7532 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7533 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7537 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7538 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7545 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7546 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7547 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7548 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7549 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7550 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7554 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7558 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7559 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7560 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7564 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7565 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7566 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7567 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7568 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7569 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7570 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7571 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7572 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7573 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7574 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7576 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7577 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7579 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7580 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7581 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7582 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7584 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7585 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7588 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7589 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7591 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7592 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7593 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7595 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7596 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7597 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7598 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7599 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7602 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7603 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7606 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7607 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7608 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7609 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7610 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7611 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7612 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7613 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7614 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7615 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7616 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7619 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7620 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7621 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7626 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7627 // payments are being processed.
7628 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7629 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7630 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7637 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7638 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7641 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7642 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7643 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7649 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7650 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7651 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7652 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7653 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7655 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7656 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7657 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7658 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7659 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7660 // real by taking more time.
7661 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7662 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7663 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7668 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7669 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7670 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7671 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7672 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7673 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7674 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7676 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7677 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7678 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7679 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7680 channel_funding_outpoint,
7682 counterparty_node_id,
7687 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7688 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7689 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7692 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7693 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7696 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7697 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7698 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7704 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7705 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7706 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7707 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7709 debug_assert!(false);
7710 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7711 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7713 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7715 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7716 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7717 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7718 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7719 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7720 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7721 *counterparty_node_id)
7723 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7724 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7725 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7726 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7727 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7728 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7729 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7733 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7734 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7740 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7744 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7746 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7748 debug_assert!(false);
7749 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7753 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7755 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7756 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7757 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7759 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7760 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7768 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7770 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7772 debug_assert!(false);
7773 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7777 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7779 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7780 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7781 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7785 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7786 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7787 msg, &self.default_configuration
7788 ), chan_phase_entry),
7789 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7790 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7791 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7794 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7795 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7803 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7804 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7805 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7806 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7808 // It's not a local channel
7809 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7813 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7814 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7815 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7817 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7818 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7819 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7821 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7822 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7823 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7824 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7825 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7826 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7827 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7829 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7831 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7832 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7833 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7834 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7836 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7837 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7838 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7839 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7842 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7846 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7847 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7852 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7855 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7856 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7859 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7861 debug_assert!(false);
7862 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7863 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7867 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
7868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7870 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7872 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7873 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7874 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7875 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7876 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7877 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7878 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7879 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7880 let mut channel_update = None;
7881 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7882 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7883 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7886 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7887 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7888 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7889 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7890 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7891 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7892 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7897 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7898 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7899 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7900 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7901 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7902 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7903 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7904 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7908 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7909 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7913 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7915 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7916 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7917 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7918 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7919 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7920 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7922 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7923 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7924 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7925 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7926 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7927 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7928 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7929 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7930 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7931 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7932 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7933 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7934 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7935 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7936 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7937 next_funding_txid: None,
7940 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7941 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7942 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7948 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7949 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7951 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7954 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7955 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7956 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7958 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7959 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7960 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7961 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7962 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7963 match monitor_event {
7964 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7965 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
7966 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7967 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7968 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7969 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7970 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7972 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7973 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7974 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7975 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7978 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7979 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7980 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7982 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7983 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7984 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7985 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7988 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7990 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7993 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7994 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7995 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7996 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7999 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8001 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8003 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8004 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8008 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8009 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8010 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8011 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8019 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8020 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8026 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8027 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8030 has_pending_monitor_events
8033 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8034 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8035 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8037 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8039 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8042 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8043 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8044 /// update was applied.
8045 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8046 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8047 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8049 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8050 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8051 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8052 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8055 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8057 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8058 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8059 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8060 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8062 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8063 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8064 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8065 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8066 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8067 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8069 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8070 has_monitor_update = true;
8072 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8073 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8074 continue 'peer_loop;
8083 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8084 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8085 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8091 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8092 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8094 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8095 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8097 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8098 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8099 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8102 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8103 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8105 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8106 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8107 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8108 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8113 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8114 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8119 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8120 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8123 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8124 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8125 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8131 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8135 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8136 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8137 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8138 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8139 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8140 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8141 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8145 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8146 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8147 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8148 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8149 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8155 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8156 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8157 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8158 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8159 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8160 let mut has_update = false;
8161 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8165 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8168 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8169 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8171 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8172 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8173 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8174 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8175 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8177 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8178 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8181 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8182 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8183 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8185 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8186 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8187 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8188 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8189 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8190 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8195 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8196 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8197 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8203 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8204 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8209 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8215 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8216 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8219 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8220 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8226 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8227 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8229 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8230 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8231 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8232 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8233 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8234 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8235 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8236 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8237 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8238 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8239 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8240 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8241 assert!(should_broadcast);
8242 } else { unreachable!(); }
8243 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8244 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8245 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8248 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8253 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8254 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8255 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer's
8256 /// expiration will be `absolute_expiry` if `Some`, otherwise it will not expire.
8260 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer based on the given
8261 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8262 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8263 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8265 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8269 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8274 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8276 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8277 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8278 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8279 &$self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8280 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8281 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8282 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8283 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8284 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8286 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8287 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8288 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8289 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8291 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8294 let builder = match absolute_expiry {
8296 Some(absolute_expiry) => builder.absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry),
8303 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8304 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8305 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8309 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8310 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8312 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8313 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8314 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8317 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8318 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8319 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8321 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8322 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8326 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund based on the given
8327 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8328 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8329 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8331 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8335 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8336 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8341 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8342 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8343 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8345 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8346 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8347 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8348 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8349 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8350 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8351 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8352 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8353 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8354 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8355 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8356 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8358 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(Some(absolute_expiry))
8359 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8360 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8361 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8363 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8364 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8367 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8369 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8370 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8371 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8372 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8374 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8380 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8382 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8383 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8384 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8385 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8386 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8387 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8391 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8392 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8393 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8394 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8397 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8399 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8401 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8402 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8403 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8405 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8406 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8407 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8408 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8409 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8410 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8411 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8413 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8414 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8418 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8419 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8422 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8423 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8424 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8428 /// For payer privacy, uses a derived payer id and uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`]
8429 /// to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path. For further privacy implications, see the
8430 /// docs of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements [`MessageRouter`].
8434 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8435 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8436 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8441 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8442 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8443 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8444 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8447 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8448 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8449 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8450 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8451 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8452 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8453 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8454 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8455 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8456 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8457 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8458 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8459 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8460 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8461 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8463 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8464 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8466 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8468 let builder = match quantity {
8470 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8472 let builder = match amount_msats {
8474 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8476 let builder = match payer_note {
8478 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8480 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8481 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8485 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8486 self.pending_outbound_payments
8487 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8488 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8490 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8492 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8493 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8494 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8495 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8496 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8497 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8498 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8499 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8500 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8501 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8502 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8504 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8506 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8507 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8508 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8509 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8512 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8514 debug_assert!(false);
8515 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8521 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8524 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8525 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8526 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8530 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8531 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8532 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8533 /// received and no retries will be made.
8538 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8539 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8542 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8543 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8544 &self, refund: &Refund
8545 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8546 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8547 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8548 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8550 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8551 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8553 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8554 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8559 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8560 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8561 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8562 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8563 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8565 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8567 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8568 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8569 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8571 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8572 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8573 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8575 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8576 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8577 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8579 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8580 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8581 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8582 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8584 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8585 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8586 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8587 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8588 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8591 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8593 for path in refund.paths() {
8594 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8595 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8596 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8597 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8599 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8605 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8609 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8612 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8613 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8615 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8616 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8617 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8619 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8621 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8622 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8626 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8627 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8629 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8631 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8632 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8634 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8635 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8636 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8637 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8638 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8639 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8640 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8641 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8642 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8643 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8646 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8647 /// stored external to LDK.
8649 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8650 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8651 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8653 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8654 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8657 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8658 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8659 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8660 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8662 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8663 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8664 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8665 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8666 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8668 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8669 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8670 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8671 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8672 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8674 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8675 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8677 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8678 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8682 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8683 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8685 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8687 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8688 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8690 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8691 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8692 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8693 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8694 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8695 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8696 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8699 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8700 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8702 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8703 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8704 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8707 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter`] based on the path's intended
8710 /// Whether or not the path is compact depends on whether the path is short-lived or long-lived,
8711 /// respectively, based on the given `absolute_expiry` as seconds since the Unix epoch. See
8712 /// [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`].
8713 fn create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(
8714 &self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8715 ) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8716 let now = self.duration_since_epoch();
8717 let max_short_lived_absolute_expiry = now.saturating_add(MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY);
8719 if absolute_expiry.unwrap_or(Duration::MAX) <= max_short_lived_absolute_expiry {
8720 self.create_compact_blinded_path()
8722 self.create_blinded_path()
8726 pub(super) fn duration_since_epoch(&self) -> Duration {
8727 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8728 let now = Duration::from_secs(
8729 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8731 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8732 let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
8733 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
8734 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
8739 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8741 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8742 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8743 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8744 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8746 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8748 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8749 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8750 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8751 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8752 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8755 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8756 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8759 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`].
8761 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8762 fn create_compact_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8763 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8764 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8766 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8768 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8769 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8770 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8771 .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
8773 short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
8775 .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
8776 .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
8777 .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
8779 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8782 .create_compact_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8783 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8786 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8787 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8788 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8789 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8790 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8791 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8793 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8794 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8795 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8796 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8797 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8799 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8801 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8805 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8806 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8810 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8811 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8813 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8814 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8815 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8816 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8818 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8819 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8820 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8821 Some(_) => continue,
8822 None => return scid_candidate
8827 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8829 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8830 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8832 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8833 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8834 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8838 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8839 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8840 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8842 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8843 /// times to get a unique scid.
8844 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8845 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8846 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8848 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8849 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8850 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8851 return scid_candidate
8855 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8856 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8857 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8858 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8861 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8862 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8863 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8864 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8865 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8867 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8868 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8869 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8878 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8879 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8880 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8881 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8882 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8886 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8887 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8888 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8889 events.push_back((event, None));
8893 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8894 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8895 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8899 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8900 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8904 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8905 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8908 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8909 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8910 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8911 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8912 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8913 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8914 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8916 let logger = WithContext::from(
8917 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
8920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8921 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8922 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8923 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8924 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8925 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8926 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8927 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8929 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8933 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8934 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8935 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8936 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8937 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8938 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8943 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8945 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8946 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8947 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8948 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8950 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8951 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8952 if further_update_exists {
8953 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8958 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8965 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8966 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8972 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8973 for action in actions {
8975 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8976 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8978 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8984 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8985 /// using the given event handler.
8987 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8988 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8992 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8996 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8998 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8999 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9000 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9001 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9002 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9003 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9007 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9008 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9009 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9010 /// is always placed next to each other.
9012 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9013 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9014 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9015 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9017 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9018 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9019 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9020 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9021 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9022 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9023 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9025 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9026 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9027 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9028 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9031 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9032 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9034 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9035 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9038 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9039 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9041 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9042 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9043 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9044 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9045 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9047 if peer_state.is_connected {
9048 is_any_peer_connected = true
9052 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9053 if is_any_peer_connected {
9054 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9055 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9058 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9059 events.replace(pending_events);
9068 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9070 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9071 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9072 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9073 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9074 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9075 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9079 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9081 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9082 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9083 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9085 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9091 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9092 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9093 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9094 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9095 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9100 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9102 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9103 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9104 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9105 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9106 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9109 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9110 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9113 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9114 let _persistence_guard =
9115 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9116 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9117 let new_height = height - 1;
9119 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9120 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9121 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9122 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9123 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9124 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9127 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9131 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9133 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9134 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9135 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9136 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9137 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9138 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9142 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9143 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9144 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9145 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9147 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9148 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9150 let _persistence_guard =
9151 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9152 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9153 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9154 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9156 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9157 if height < last_best_block_height {
9158 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9159 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9163 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9164 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9165 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9166 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9168 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9169 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9171 let _persistence_guard =
9172 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9173 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9174 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9176 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9178 macro_rules! max_time {
9179 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9181 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9182 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9183 // having an explicit local time source.
9184 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9185 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9186 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9187 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9188 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9194 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9195 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9196 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9197 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9201 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9202 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9203 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9204 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9205 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9206 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9207 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9208 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9209 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9210 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9211 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9218 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9219 let _persistence_guard =
9220 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9221 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9222 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9223 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9224 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9225 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9226 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9227 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9232 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9234 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9235 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9236 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9237 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9238 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9239 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9243 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9244 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9246 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9247 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9248 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9249 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9250 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9252 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9253 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9255 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9256 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9259 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9261 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9263 // Retain unfunded channels.
9264 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9265 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9266 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9267 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9268 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9269 let res = f(channel);
9270 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9271 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9272 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9273 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9274 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9276 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9277 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9278 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9279 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9280 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9281 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9282 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9283 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9288 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9293 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9294 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9297 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9298 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9299 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9300 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9301 msg: announcement_sigs,
9303 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9304 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9305 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9307 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9308 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9309 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9314 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9315 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9316 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9317 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9318 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9319 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9320 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9321 // is always consistent.
9322 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9323 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9324 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9325 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9326 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9329 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9330 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9331 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9332 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9333 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9334 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9335 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9336 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9337 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9341 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9342 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9343 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9344 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9345 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9346 data: reason_message,
9359 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9360 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9361 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9362 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9363 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9364 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9365 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9366 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9367 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9368 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9370 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9371 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9372 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9376 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9379 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9380 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9381 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9382 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9383 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9384 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9385 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9386 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9387 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9388 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9389 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9390 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9393 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9394 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9395 _ => unreachable!(),
9397 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9398 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9399 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9400 let logger = WithContext::from(
9401 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9403 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9409 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9411 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9412 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9416 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9417 /// may have events that need processing.
9419 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9420 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9422 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9423 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9424 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9425 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9428 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9430 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9431 /// indicates this should be checked.
9432 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9433 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9436 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9437 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9438 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9441 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9442 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9443 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9444 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9447 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9448 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9449 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9450 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9453 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9454 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9456 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9457 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9458 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9459 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9460 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9463 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9464 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9465 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9466 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9469 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9470 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9471 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9472 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9475 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9476 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9477 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9478 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9481 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9482 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9483 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9484 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9488 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9489 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9491 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9492 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9493 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9494 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9495 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9496 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9500 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9501 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9502 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9503 // change to the contents.
9504 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9505 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9506 let persist = match &res {
9507 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9508 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9509 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9511 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9513 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9518 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9519 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9520 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9521 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9524 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9525 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9526 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9527 // change to the contents.
9528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9529 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9530 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9534 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9535 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9536 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9537 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9540 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9542 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9545 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9546 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9547 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9550 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9551 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9552 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9553 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9554 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9556 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9557 let persist = match &res {
9558 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9559 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9561 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9566 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9567 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9568 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9569 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9573 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9574 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9575 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9576 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9580 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9581 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9582 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9583 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9587 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9588 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9589 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9590 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9593 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9595 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9598 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9600 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9603 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9604 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9605 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9606 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9608 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9609 let persist = match &res {
9610 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9611 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9612 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9614 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9619 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9621 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9624 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9625 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9626 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9627 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9629 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9630 let persist = match &res {
9631 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9632 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9633 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9635 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9640 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9641 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9642 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9643 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9644 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9645 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9646 let persist = match &res {
9647 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9648 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9649 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9651 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9656 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9657 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9658 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9661 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9663 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9666 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9667 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9668 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9669 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9671 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9672 let persist = match &res {
9673 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9674 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9675 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9677 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9682 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9684 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9687 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9688 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9689 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9692 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9697 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9699 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9700 let persist = match &res {
9701 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9702 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9703 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9705 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9710 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9712 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9713 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9714 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9717 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9718 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9719 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9721 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9724 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9725 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9726 let context = match phase {
9727 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9728 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9729 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9730 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9735 // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
9736 // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
9737 // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
9738 // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
9739 // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
9741 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
9742 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
9743 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9744 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9747 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9748 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9751 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9752 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9756 // Clean up for removal.
9757 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9758 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9761 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9762 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9763 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9764 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9766 // V1 Channel Establishment
9767 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9768 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9769 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9770 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9771 // V2 Channel Establishment
9772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9773 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9774 // Common Channel Establishment
9775 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9776 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9778 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9780 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9783 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9784 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9785 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9786 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9787 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9788 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9791 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9792 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9793 // Channel Operations
9794 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9795 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9796 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9797 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9798 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9799 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9801 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9802 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9803 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9804 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9805 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9806 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9809 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9810 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9811 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9813 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9817 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9818 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9819 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9820 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9823 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9825 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9827 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9828 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9832 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9833 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
9834 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9835 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9839 let mut res = Ok(());
9841 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9842 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9843 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9844 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9845 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9846 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9847 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9850 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9851 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9853 if inbound_peer_limited {
9855 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9857 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9858 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9859 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9860 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9861 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9862 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9863 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9864 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9868 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9869 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9870 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9872 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9873 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9874 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9875 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9878 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9881 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9882 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9887 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9890 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9893 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9895 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9897 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9898 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9899 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9900 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9901 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9905 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9906 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9907 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9908 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9912 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9913 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9915 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9916 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9917 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9922 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9923 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9924 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9925 debug_assert!(false);
9928 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9929 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9930 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9931 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9932 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9933 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9934 debug_assert!(false);
9940 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9941 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9946 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9947 match &msg.data as &str {
9948 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9949 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9951 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9952 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9953 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9954 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9955 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9956 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9957 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9958 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9959 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9961 || -> NotifyOption {
9962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9963 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9964 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9965 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9966 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9967 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9968 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9969 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9973 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9974 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9975 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9976 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9977 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9978 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9980 log_level: Level::Trace,
9983 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9984 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9985 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9987 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9998 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9999 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10001 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10002 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10005 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10006 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10007 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10008 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10010 for channel_id in channel_ids {
10011 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10012 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10016 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10018 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10019 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10023 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10024 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10025 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10026 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10032 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10033 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10034 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10035 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10036 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10042 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10043 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10044 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10048 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10049 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10053 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10054 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10057 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10058 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10061 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10062 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10065 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10066 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10067 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10068 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10071 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10072 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10073 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10074 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10077 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10078 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10079 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10080 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10083 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10084 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10085 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10086 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10089 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10090 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10091 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10092 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10095 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10096 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10097 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10098 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10101 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10102 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10103 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10104 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10107 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10108 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10109 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10110 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10113 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10114 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10115 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10116 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10120 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10121 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10123 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10124 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10125 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10126 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10127 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10128 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10132 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10133 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10134 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10137 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10138 let responder = match responder {
10139 Some(responder) => responder,
10140 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10142 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10145 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10146 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10148 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10149 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10151 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10152 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10156 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10157 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10158 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10160 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10162 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10163 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10167 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10168 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10169 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10171 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10172 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10174 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10176 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10177 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10181 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10182 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10183 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10186 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10187 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10188 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10189 payment_paths, payment_hash
10191 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10192 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10193 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10196 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10197 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10198 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10200 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10201 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10202 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10203 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10204 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10207 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10208 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10209 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10210 .and_then(|invoice| {
10212 let mut invoice = invoice;
10214 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10215 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10217 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10222 Ok(invoice) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10223 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10226 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10227 let response = invoice
10228 .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10229 .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10230 .and_then(|payment_id| {
10231 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10232 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10233 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10235 self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10238 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10243 match (responder, response) {
10244 (Some(responder), Err(e)) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10245 (None, Err(_)) => {
10248 "A response was generated, but there is no reply_path specified for sending the response."
10250 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10252 _ => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10255 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10256 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10257 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10262 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10263 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10267 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10268 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10270 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10271 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10272 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10273 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10274 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10279 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10280 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10284 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10285 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10286 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10287 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10288 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10292 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10293 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10295 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10296 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10297 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10298 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10299 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10302 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10303 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10304 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10305 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10308 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10309 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10310 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10311 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10314 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10315 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10316 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10317 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10320 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10321 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10322 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10323 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10324 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10325 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10326 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10327 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10328 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10329 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10330 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10331 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10332 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10333 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10334 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10335 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10336 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10337 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10338 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10339 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10340 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10345 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10346 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10348 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10349 (2, channels, required_vec),
10350 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10351 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10354 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10355 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10356 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10359 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10361 (0, onion_packet, required),
10362 (1, blinded, option),
10363 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10366 (0, payment_data, required),
10367 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10368 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10369 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10370 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10371 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10372 (9, payment_context, option),
10374 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10375 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10376 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10377 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10378 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10379 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10380 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10384 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10385 (0, routing, required),
10386 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10387 (4, payment_hash, required),
10388 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10389 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10390 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10391 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10395 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10396 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10398 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10399 0u8.write(writer)?;
10400 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10401 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10402 reason.write(writer)?;
10404 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10405 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10407 1u8.write(writer)?;
10408 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10409 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10410 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10411 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10418 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10419 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10420 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10423 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10424 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10425 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10426 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10430 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10431 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10432 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10433 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10434 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10437 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10438 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10439 // messages contained in the variants.
10440 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10441 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10442 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10444 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10445 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10446 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10447 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10448 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10451 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10452 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10453 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10454 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10455 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10457 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10462 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10467 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10468 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10469 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10472 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10473 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10474 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10475 (2, outpoint, required),
10476 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10477 (4, htlc_id, required),
10478 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10479 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10480 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10481 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10482 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10485 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10486 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10487 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10488 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10489 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10491 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10493 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10494 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10495 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10496 (2, self.value, required),
10497 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10498 (4, payment_data, option),
10499 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10500 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10501 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10502 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10508 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10509 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10510 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10511 (0, prev_hop, required),
10512 (1, total_msat, option),
10513 (2, value_ser, required),
10514 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10515 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10516 (5, total_value_received, option),
10517 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10518 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10519 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10521 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10522 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10523 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10525 if payment_data.is_some() {
10526 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10528 if total_msat.is_none() {
10529 total_msat = Some(value);
10531 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10534 if total_msat.is_none() {
10535 if payment_data.is_none() {
10536 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10538 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10540 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10544 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10547 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10548 total_value_received,
10549 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10551 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10552 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10557 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10558 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10559 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10562 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10563 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10564 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10565 let mut payment_id = None;
10566 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10567 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10568 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10569 (0, session_priv, required),
10570 (1, payment_id, option),
10571 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10572 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10573 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10574 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10576 if payment_id.is_none() {
10577 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10579 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10581 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10582 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10585 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10586 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10587 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10588 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10592 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10593 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10594 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10596 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10599 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10600 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10605 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10606 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10608 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10609 0u8.write(writer)?;
10610 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10611 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10612 (0, session_priv, required),
10613 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10614 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10615 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10616 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10617 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10618 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10621 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10622 1u8.write(writer)?;
10623 field.write(writer)?;
10630 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10631 (0, forward_info, required),
10632 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10633 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10634 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10635 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10636 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10637 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10638 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10641 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10642 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10643 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10645 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10649 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10650 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10651 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10652 (0, htlc_id, required),
10653 (2, err_packet, required),
10656 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10657 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10658 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10659 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10660 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10661 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10662 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10663 (0, htlc_id, required),
10664 (1, failure_code, required),
10665 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10666 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10674 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10675 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10676 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10678 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10680 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10681 (0, htlc_id, required),
10682 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10683 (2, err_packet, required),
10684 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10686 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10687 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10688 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10690 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10694 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10695 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10699 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10704 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10705 (0, payment_secret, required),
10706 (2, expiry_time, required),
10707 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10708 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10709 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10712 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10714 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10715 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10716 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10717 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10718 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10719 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10723 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10724 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10726 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10728 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10730 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10731 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10732 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10735 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10737 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10739 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10740 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10741 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10742 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10743 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10744 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10747 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10748 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10752 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10754 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10757 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10758 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10759 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10762 channel.write(writer)?;
10768 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10769 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10770 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10771 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10772 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10773 for forward in pending_forwards {
10774 forward.write(writer)?;
10779 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10780 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10781 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10782 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10785 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10786 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10787 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10789 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10790 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10791 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10792 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10793 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10794 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10795 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10796 htlc.write(writer)?;
10798 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10799 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10802 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10803 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10804 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10805 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10806 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10807 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10808 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10811 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10812 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10813 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10814 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10815 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10817 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10818 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10819 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10820 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10821 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10822 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10823 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10828 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10829 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10830 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10831 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10832 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10833 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10834 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10835 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10836 0u64.write(writer)?;
10838 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10839 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10840 event.write(writer)?;
10844 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10845 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10846 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10847 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10848 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10849 0u64.write(writer)?;
10851 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10852 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10853 // likely to be identical.
10854 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10855 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10857 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10858 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10859 hash.write(writer)?;
10860 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10863 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10864 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10865 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10866 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10867 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10870 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10871 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10873 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10874 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10875 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10876 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10879 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10880 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10881 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10882 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10886 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10887 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10888 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10890 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10891 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10892 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10898 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10899 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10900 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10901 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10904 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10905 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10906 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10907 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10908 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10911 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10912 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10913 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10914 if !updates.is_empty() {
10915 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10916 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10921 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10922 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10923 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10924 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10925 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10926 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10927 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10928 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10929 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10930 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10931 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10932 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10933 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10934 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10941 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10942 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10943 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10944 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10947 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10948 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10949 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10950 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10951 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10952 // check that the event is sane here.
10953 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10954 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10955 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10956 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10962 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10963 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10964 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10965 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10966 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10967 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10970 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10971 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10972 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10973 events.push_back((ev, action));
10974 } else if action.is_some() {
10975 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10982 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10984 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10986 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10987 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10988 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10989 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10990 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10991 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10992 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10993 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10994 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10995 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10996 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10997 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10998 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11000 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11001 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11003 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11004 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11006 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11007 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11008 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11009 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11010 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11011 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11013 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11014 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11016 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11017 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11018 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11019 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11020 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11021 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11025 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11026 pub entropy_source: ES,
11028 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11029 pub node_signer: NS,
11031 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11032 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11034 pub signer_provider: SP,
11036 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11038 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11039 pub fee_estimator: F,
11040 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11042 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11043 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11044 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11045 pub chain_monitor: M,
11047 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11048 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11049 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11050 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11051 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11052 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11054 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11056 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11057 /// deserialization.
11059 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11060 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11061 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11063 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11064 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11066 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11067 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11068 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11069 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11071 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11074 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11075 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11078 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11079 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11081 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11082 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11083 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11084 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11085 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11086 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11090 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11091 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11092 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11093 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11094 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11096 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11097 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11098 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11104 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11105 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11106 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11107 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11109 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11110 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11111 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11112 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11113 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11114 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11118 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11119 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11120 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11124 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11125 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11127 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11128 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11129 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11130 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11131 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11132 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11136 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11137 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11139 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11140 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11141 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11143 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11145 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11146 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11147 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11148 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11149 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11150 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11151 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11152 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11153 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11154 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11155 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11157 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11158 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11159 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11160 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11161 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11162 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11163 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11164 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11165 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11166 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11167 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11168 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11169 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11170 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11171 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11173 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11174 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11175 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11177 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11178 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11179 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11181 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11182 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11183 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11185 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11186 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11189 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11190 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11191 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11194 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11195 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11196 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11197 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11198 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11199 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11200 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11201 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11203 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11204 let mut found_htlc = false;
11205 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11206 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11209 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11210 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11211 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11212 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11213 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11214 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11215 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11216 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11218 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11219 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11220 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11224 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11225 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11226 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11227 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11228 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11229 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11231 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11232 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11234 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11236 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11237 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11239 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11240 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11241 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11242 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11246 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11247 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11248 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11249 // safely discard the channel.
11250 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11251 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11252 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11253 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11254 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11255 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11256 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11257 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11260 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11261 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11262 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11263 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11264 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11265 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11269 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11270 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11271 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11272 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11273 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11275 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11276 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11277 counterparty_node_id: None,
11278 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11279 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11281 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11285 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11286 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11287 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11288 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11289 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11290 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11291 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11292 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11293 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11295 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11298 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11299 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11300 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11301 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11302 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11303 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11304 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11305 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11307 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11310 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11313 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11314 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11315 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11316 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11317 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11318 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11319 is_connected: false,
11323 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11324 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11325 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11326 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11327 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11328 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11329 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11330 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11333 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11334 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11335 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11336 for _ in 0..event_count {
11337 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11338 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11343 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11344 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11345 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11347 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11348 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11349 // on-startup monitor updates.
11350 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11351 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11353 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11357 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11358 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11360 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11361 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11362 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11363 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11364 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11368 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11369 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11370 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11371 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11372 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11373 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11374 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11376 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11377 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11381 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11382 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11383 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11384 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11385 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11386 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11387 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11388 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11389 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11390 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11391 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11392 let mut events_override = None;
11393 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11394 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11395 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11396 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11397 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11398 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11399 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11400 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11401 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11402 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11403 (8, events_override, option),
11404 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11405 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11406 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11407 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11408 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11410 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11411 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11412 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11415 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11416 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11419 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11420 pending_events_read = events;
11423 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11424 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11427 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11428 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11429 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11430 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11431 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11432 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11434 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11436 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11437 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11438 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11441 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11442 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11443 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11444 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11445 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11447 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11448 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11449 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11451 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11452 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11453 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11454 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11455 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11457 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11458 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11459 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11460 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11461 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11462 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11463 pending_background_events.push(
11464 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11465 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11466 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11467 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11468 update: update.clone(),
11471 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11472 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11473 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11474 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11475 pending_background_events.push(
11476 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11477 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11478 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11481 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11482 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11483 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11485 max_in_flight_update_id
11489 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11492 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11493 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11494 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11496 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11498 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11499 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11500 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11501 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11502 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11503 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11504 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11505 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11506 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11509 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11510 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11511 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11512 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11513 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11514 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11515 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11516 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11517 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11518 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11519 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11522 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11523 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11524 debug_assert!(false);
11525 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11530 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11531 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11532 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11533 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11534 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11535 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11536 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11537 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11538 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11539 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11541 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11542 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11543 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11545 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11546 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11547 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11548 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11549 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11550 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11551 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11552 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11553 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11558 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11559 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11561 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11562 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11563 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11564 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11567 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11568 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11569 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11570 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11571 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11572 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11573 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11575 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11576 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11577 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11578 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11579 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11580 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11581 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11582 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11586 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11587 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11588 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11589 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11591 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11592 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11593 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11596 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11597 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11598 retry_strategy: None,
11599 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11600 payment_params: None,
11601 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11602 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11603 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11604 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11605 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11606 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11607 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11608 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11609 total_msat: path_amt,
11610 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11611 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11613 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11614 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11619 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11620 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11621 match htlc_source {
11622 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11623 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11624 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11625 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11627 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11628 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11629 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11630 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11631 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11632 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11633 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11634 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11635 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11637 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11638 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11642 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11644 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11645 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11646 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11647 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11648 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11649 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11654 !forwards.is_empty()
11656 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11657 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11658 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11659 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11660 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11661 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11662 intercepted_id != ev_id
11669 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11670 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11671 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11672 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11673 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11674 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11675 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11676 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11677 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11678 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11679 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11681 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11682 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11683 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11684 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11686 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11687 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11688 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11695 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11696 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11698 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11700 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11701 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11702 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11703 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11704 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11705 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11706 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11707 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11708 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11709 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11712 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11713 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11714 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11715 // channel still live case here.
11719 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11720 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11725 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11726 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11727 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11728 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11729 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11730 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11731 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11732 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11736 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11737 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11739 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11740 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11741 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11742 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11744 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11745 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11746 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11748 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11749 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11751 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11752 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11754 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11757 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11758 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11759 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11761 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11765 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11766 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11767 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11768 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11769 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11771 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11772 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11773 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11774 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
11775 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11776 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11777 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11778 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11780 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11781 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11785 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11787 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11789 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11790 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11792 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11793 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11798 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11799 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11801 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11803 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11805 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11806 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11807 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11808 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11812 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11813 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11816 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11817 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11818 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11819 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11820 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11822 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11823 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11824 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11826 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11827 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11828 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11829 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11830 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11831 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11833 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11834 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11835 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11836 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11837 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11838 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11842 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11843 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11844 debug_assert!(false);
11845 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11850 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11852 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11853 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11854 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11855 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11856 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11857 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11858 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11859 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11860 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11861 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11862 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11864 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11865 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11867 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11868 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11869 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11870 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11872 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11873 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11874 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11875 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11877 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11878 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11879 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11880 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11882 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11883 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11884 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11887 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11888 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
11889 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11892 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11893 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11896 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11899 purpose: payment.purpose,
11900 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11901 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11902 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11903 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
11909 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11910 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11911 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11912 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
11913 for action in actions.iter() {
11914 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11915 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11916 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11918 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11920 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11921 blocked_channel_id);
11922 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11923 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11924 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11926 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11927 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11928 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11929 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11933 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11934 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11938 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11940 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11941 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11945 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11947 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11948 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11949 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11950 router: args.router,
11952 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11954 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11955 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11956 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11957 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11959 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11960 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
11961 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11962 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11963 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11964 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11965 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11967 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11969 our_network_pubkey,
11972 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11974 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11976 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11977 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11978 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11979 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11980 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11982 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11983 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11985 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11987 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11989 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11991 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11992 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11993 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11995 logger: args.logger,
11996 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11999 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12000 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12001 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12002 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12003 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12006 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12007 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12008 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12009 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12010 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12011 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12012 downstream_channel_id, None
12016 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12017 //connection or two.
12019 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12025 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12026 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12027 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12028 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12029 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12030 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12031 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12032 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12033 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12034 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12035 use crate::prelude::*;
12036 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12037 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12038 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12039 use crate::util::test_utils;
12040 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12041 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12044 fn test_notify_limits() {
12045 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12046 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12050 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12052 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12053 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12054 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12055 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12056 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12058 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12060 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12061 // to connect messages with new values
12062 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12063 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12064 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12065 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12066 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12067 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12069 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12070 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12071 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12072 // ... but the last node should not.
12073 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12074 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12075 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12076 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12078 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12079 // about the channel.
12080 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12081 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12082 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12084 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12086 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12087 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12088 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12089 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12090 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12091 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12093 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12094 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12095 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12097 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12098 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12099 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12100 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12101 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12102 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12104 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12105 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12106 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12107 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12108 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12109 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12110 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12111 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12113 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12114 // the channel info has updated.
12115 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12116 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12117 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12118 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12119 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12120 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12124 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12125 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12127 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12128 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12129 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12130 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12131 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12133 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12134 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12135 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12136 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12138 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12139 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12140 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12141 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12142 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12143 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12144 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12145 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12147 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12148 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12149 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12151 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12152 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12153 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12155 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12156 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12157 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12158 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12159 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12161 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12165 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12166 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12167 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12168 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12169 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12170 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12171 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12172 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12173 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12175 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12176 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12177 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12179 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12181 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12183 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12184 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12185 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12186 // lightning messages manually.
12187 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12188 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12191 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12192 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12193 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12194 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12196 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12197 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12199 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12200 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12202 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12203 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12204 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12206 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12207 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12208 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12210 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12212 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12214 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12215 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12218 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12219 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12220 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12223 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12224 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12225 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12226 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12231 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12232 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12233 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12234 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12241 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12242 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12243 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12246 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12247 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12248 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12249 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12250 // fails as expected.
12251 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12252 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12253 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12254 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12255 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12256 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12257 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12258 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12259 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12260 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12262 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12263 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12264 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12265 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12267 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12268 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12269 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12271 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12272 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12273 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12274 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12275 let route = find_route(
12276 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12277 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12279 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12280 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12282 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12284 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12285 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12286 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12288 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12289 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12290 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12291 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12292 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12294 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12295 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12296 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12297 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12298 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12299 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12300 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12301 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12302 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12304 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12305 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12307 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12308 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12309 let route = find_route(
12310 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12311 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12313 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12314 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12316 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12317 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12318 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12319 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12320 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12322 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12323 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12324 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12325 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12327 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12329 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12330 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12331 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12333 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12334 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12337 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12338 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12339 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12340 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12341 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12342 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12343 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12344 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12345 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12347 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12348 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12350 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12351 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12352 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12353 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12355 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12356 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12357 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12358 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12359 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12361 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12362 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12363 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12366 let route = find_route(
12367 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12368 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12370 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12371 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12372 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12374 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12376 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12377 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12378 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12380 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12381 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12382 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12384 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12385 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12386 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12387 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12388 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12389 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12390 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12391 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12392 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12394 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12395 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12399 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12400 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12401 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12402 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12403 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12405 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12407 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12408 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12410 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12411 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12412 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12413 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12414 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12415 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12416 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12417 let route = find_route(
12418 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12419 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12422 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12423 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12424 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12425 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12426 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12427 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12430 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12431 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12432 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12433 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12434 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12435 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12436 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12438 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12442 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12443 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12444 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12445 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12446 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12447 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12448 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12449 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12450 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12452 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12453 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12455 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12456 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12457 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12458 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12459 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12460 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12461 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12462 let route = find_route(
12463 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12464 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12467 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12468 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12469 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12470 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12471 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12472 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12473 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12474 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12477 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12478 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12479 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12480 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12481 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12482 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12483 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12485 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12489 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12490 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12491 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12492 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12493 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12495 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12496 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12497 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12498 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12500 // Marshall an MPP route.
12501 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12502 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12503 route.paths.push(path);
12504 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12505 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12506 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12507 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12508 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12509 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12511 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12512 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12514 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12515 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12517 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12522 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12526 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12528 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12530 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12532 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12534 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12535 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12536 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12539 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12540 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12541 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12544 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12545 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12546 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12548 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12549 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12551 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12552 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12554 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12555 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12556 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12558 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12559 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12560 }, false).unwrap();
12562 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12563 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12564 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12565 match &node_0_events[0] {
12566 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12570 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12571 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12572 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12577 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12578 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12581 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12583 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12585 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12586 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12587 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12588 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
12589 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12591 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12594 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12595 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12596 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12597 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12598 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12599 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12602 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12605 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12606 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12611 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12612 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12616 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12618 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12619 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12621 total_msat: 100_000,
12624 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12625 // payment verification fails as expected.
12626 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12627 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12628 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12629 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12631 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12635 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12636 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12640 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12641 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12642 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12643 // the channel is successfully closed.
12644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12649 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12650 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12651 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12652 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12653 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12655 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12656 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12658 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12659 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12660 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12661 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12664 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12666 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12667 // as it has the funding transaction.
12668 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12669 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12670 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12673 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12675 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12677 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12679 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12680 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12681 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12683 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12686 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12687 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12688 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12689 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12690 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12693 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12694 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12696 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12697 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12698 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12699 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12701 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12702 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12703 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12704 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12706 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12707 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12709 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12710 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12711 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12712 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12713 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12714 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12715 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12719 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12720 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12721 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12722 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12723 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12724 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12725 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12728 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12730 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12731 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12732 // closing transaction).
12733 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12734 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12735 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12737 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12738 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12739 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12740 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12741 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12744 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12746 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12748 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12749 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12750 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12752 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12754 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12755 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12758 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12759 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12760 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12763 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12764 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12765 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12768 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12769 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12770 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12773 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12774 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12775 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12778 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12780 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12781 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12783 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12784 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12786 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12787 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12792 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12793 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12794 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12795 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12796 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12797 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12798 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12799 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12802 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12803 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12804 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12805 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12807 // Test the API functions.
12808 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12810 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12812 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12814 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12816 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12818 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12820 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12824 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12825 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12826 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12827 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12828 // the given `channel_id`.
12829 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12830 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12831 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12832 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12834 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12837 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12838 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12840 // Test the API functions.
12841 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12843 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12845 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12847 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12849 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12851 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12855 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12856 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12862 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12864 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12865 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12867 let mut funding_tx = None;
12868 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12869 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12870 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12873 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12874 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12875 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12876 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12877 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12879 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12881 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12883 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12885 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12887 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12889 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12892 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12893 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12894 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12895 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12896 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12897 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12899 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12900 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12902 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12903 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12904 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12905 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12906 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12907 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12908 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12911 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12912 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12913 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12914 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12915 }, true).unwrap_err();
12917 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12918 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12919 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12920 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12921 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12922 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12923 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12925 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12926 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12928 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12929 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12930 }, true).unwrap_err();
12932 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12933 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12934 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12935 }, false).unwrap();
12936 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12938 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12939 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12941 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12942 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12943 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12944 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12945 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12947 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12948 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12949 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12951 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12952 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12953 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12955 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12956 // "protected" and can connect again.
12957 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12958 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12959 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12961 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12963 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12965 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12966 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12970 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12971 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12972 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12973 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12974 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12975 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12977 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12979 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12980 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12982 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12983 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12984 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12985 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12988 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12990 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12991 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12992 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12994 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12995 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12996 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12998 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12999 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13000 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13001 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13005 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13006 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13007 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13010 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13011 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13013 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13015 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13017 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13018 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13020 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13021 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13022 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13023 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13024 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13025 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13028 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13029 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13031 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13032 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13036 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13037 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13040 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13041 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13042 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13043 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13044 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13046 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13047 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13049 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13050 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13051 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13052 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13056 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13058 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13059 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13061 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13062 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13063 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13065 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13066 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13070 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13074 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13075 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13076 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13077 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13078 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13079 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13080 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13081 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13082 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13083 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13084 payment_metadata: None,
13085 keysend_preimage: None,
13086 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13087 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13089 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13091 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13092 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13093 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13094 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13095 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13096 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13097 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13099 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13100 } else { panic!(); }
13102 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13103 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13104 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13105 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13106 payment_metadata: None,
13107 keysend_preimage: None,
13108 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13109 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13111 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13113 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13114 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13115 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13116 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13120 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13121 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13122 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13123 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13124 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13126 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13127 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13128 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13129 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13130 payment_metadata: None,
13131 keysend_preimage: None,
13132 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13133 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13135 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13136 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13137 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13139 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13140 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13141 // is not satisfied.
13142 assert!(result.is_ok());
13146 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13147 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13148 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13149 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13150 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13152 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13153 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13158 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13159 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13161 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13162 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13164 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13166 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13167 match &msg_events[0] {
13168 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13169 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13171 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13172 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13173 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13179 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13180 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13182 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13183 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13186 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13190 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13191 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13192 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13193 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13194 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13195 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13196 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13197 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13198 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13200 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13201 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13203 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13204 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13205 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13207 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13208 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13210 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13211 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13216 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13217 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13219 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13220 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13222 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13223 // not have generated any events.
13224 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13228 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13229 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13230 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13231 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13232 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13233 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13234 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13235 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13237 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13238 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13239 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13241 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13242 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13243 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13244 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13247 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13248 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13251 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13252 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13253 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13255 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13256 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13257 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13258 ..Default::default()
13260 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13261 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13262 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13264 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13265 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13268 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13269 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13270 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13271 ..Default::default()
13273 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13274 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13275 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13276 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13278 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13279 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13282 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13283 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13284 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13285 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13286 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13289 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13290 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13291 ..Default::default()
13293 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13296 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13297 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13303 fn test_payment_display() {
13304 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13305 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13306 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13307 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13308 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13309 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13313 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13314 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13315 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13316 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13317 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13318 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13319 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13321 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13322 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13323 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13324 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13325 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13326 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13327 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13328 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13330 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13331 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13332 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13335 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13336 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13338 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13339 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13341 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13342 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13343 }, false).unwrap();
13344 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13345 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13346 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13348 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13350 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13351 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13352 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13353 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13354 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13355 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13356 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13357 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13358 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13359 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13360 } else { panic!() };
13361 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13362 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13363 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13364 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13366 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13368 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13369 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13370 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13375 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13376 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13377 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13378 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13381 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13382 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13383 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13385 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13386 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13388 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13389 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13392 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13393 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13394 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13396 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13400 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13401 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13402 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13404 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13409 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13410 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13411 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13412 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13414 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13415 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13416 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13418 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13420 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13421 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13422 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13423 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13425 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13426 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13428 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13434 use crate::chain::Listen;
13435 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13436 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13437 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13438 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13439 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13440 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13441 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13442 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13443 use crate::util::test_utils;
13444 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13446 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
13447 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13448 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13449 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13450 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13451 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
13453 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13455 use criterion::Criterion;
13457 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13458 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13459 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13460 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13461 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13462 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13463 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13465 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13466 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13468 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13469 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13471 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13473 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13476 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13477 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13480 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13481 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13482 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13484 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13485 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13487 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13488 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13489 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13490 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13491 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13493 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13494 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13495 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13497 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13498 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13499 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13500 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13502 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13503 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13504 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13506 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13507 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13508 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13509 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13510 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13512 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13513 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13514 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13516 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13517 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13519 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13520 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13521 }, false).unwrap();
13522 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13523 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13524 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13527 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13528 tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13529 value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
13531 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13532 } else { panic!(); }
13534 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13535 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13536 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13537 match events_b[0] {
13538 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13539 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13541 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13544 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13545 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13546 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13547 match events_a[0] {
13548 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13549 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13551 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13554 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13556 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13557 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13558 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13560 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13561 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13562 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13563 match msg_events[0] {
13564 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13565 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13566 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13570 match msg_events[1] {
13571 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13575 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13576 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13577 match events_a[0] {
13578 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13579 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13584 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13585 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13586 match events_b[0] {
13587 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13588 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13593 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13594 macro_rules! send_payment {
13595 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13596 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13597 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13598 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13599 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13600 payment_count += 1;
13601 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13602 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13604 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13605 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13606 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13607 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13608 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13609 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13610 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13611 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13612 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13613 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13614 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13616 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13617 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13618 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13619 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13621 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13622 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13623 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13624 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13625 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13627 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13630 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13631 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13632 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13633 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13635 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13639 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13640 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13641 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);