1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
22 use bitcoin::bech32::{Base32Len, FromBase32, ToBase32, WriteBase32, u5};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
29 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
32 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
33 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
37 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
38 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
44 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
45 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
47 // construct one themselves.
48 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
49 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
50 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
51 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
53 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
55 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
56 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
57 use util::config::UserConfig;
58 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
59 use util::{byte_utils, events};
60 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
61 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
62 use util::logger::Logger;
63 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
67 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use std::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
105 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
106 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
107 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
108 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
109 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
110 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
111 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
114 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
115 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
116 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
117 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
120 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
123 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
124 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
127 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
129 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
131 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
132 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
133 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
135 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
137 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
141 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
145 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
146 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
147 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
148 short_channel_id: u64,
150 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
152 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
153 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
157 struct ClaimableHTLC {
158 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
169 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
170 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
173 session_priv: SecretKey,
174 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
175 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
176 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
181 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
182 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
184 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
190 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
191 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
193 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
201 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
202 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
203 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
204 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
205 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
206 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
207 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
208 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
209 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
210 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
211 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
212 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
214 impl FromBase32 for PaymentSecret {
215 type Err = bech32::Error;
217 fn from_base32(field_data: &[u5]) -> Result<PaymentSecret, bech32::Error> {
218 if field_data.len() != 52 {
219 return Err(bech32::Error::InvalidLength)
221 let data_bytes = Vec::<u8>::from_base32(field_data)?;
222 let mut payment_secret = [0; 32];
223 payment_secret.copy_from_slice(&data_bytes);
224 Ok(PaymentSecret(payment_secret))
229 impl ToBase32 for PaymentSecret {
230 fn write_base32<W: WriteBase32>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), <W as WriteBase32>::Err> {
231 (&self.0[..]).write_base32(writer)
235 impl Base32Len for PaymentSecret {
236 fn base32_len(&self) -> usize {
241 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
243 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
244 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
245 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
246 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
247 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
249 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
250 err: msgs::LightningError,
251 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
253 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
255 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
257 err: LightningError {
259 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
260 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
266 shutdown_finish: None,
270 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
272 err: LightningError {
274 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
276 shutdown_finish: None,
280 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
281 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
284 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
286 err: LightningError {
288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
289 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
295 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
299 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
302 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
306 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
308 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
309 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
315 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
318 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
325 shutdown_finish: None,
330 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
331 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
332 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
333 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
334 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
336 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
337 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
338 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
339 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
340 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
341 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
342 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
344 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
348 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
349 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
350 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
351 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
352 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
353 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
354 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
355 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
356 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
357 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
358 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
359 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
361 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
362 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
363 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
364 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
367 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
368 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
369 /// quite some time lag.
370 enum BackgroundEvent {
371 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
372 /// commitment transaction.
373 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
376 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
377 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
379 latest_features: InitFeatures,
382 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
383 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
385 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
387 struct PendingInboundPayment {
388 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
389 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
390 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
391 /// this payment being removed.
393 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
394 user_payment_id: u64,
395 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
396 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
397 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
400 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
401 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
402 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
403 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
404 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
405 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
406 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
407 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
409 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
410 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
411 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
412 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
413 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
414 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
415 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
416 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
417 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
419 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
420 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
422 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
423 /// to individual Channels.
425 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
426 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
427 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
428 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
430 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
431 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
432 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
433 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
434 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
435 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
436 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
438 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
439 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
440 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
441 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
444 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
445 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
446 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
447 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
448 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
450 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
451 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
452 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
453 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
454 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
455 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
456 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
457 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
458 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
459 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
462 default_configuration: UserConfig,
463 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
469 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
471 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
472 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
474 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
475 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
476 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
477 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
479 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
480 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
481 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
482 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
483 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
484 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
486 our_network_key: SecretKey,
487 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
489 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
490 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
491 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
493 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
494 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
495 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
496 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
498 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
499 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
500 /// are currently open with that peer.
501 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
502 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
504 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
506 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
507 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
508 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
509 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
510 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
511 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
512 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
513 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
514 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
516 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
523 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
525 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
526 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
527 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
528 pub struct ChainParameters {
529 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
530 pub network: Network,
532 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
534 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
535 pub best_block: BestBlock,
538 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
539 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
540 pub struct BestBlock {
541 block_hash: BlockHash,
546 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
547 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
549 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
554 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
555 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
556 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
559 /// Returns the best block hash.
560 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
562 /// Returns the best block height.
563 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
566 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
567 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
568 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
569 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
570 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
571 /// updates are ready for persistence).
572 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
573 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
574 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
575 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
578 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
579 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
580 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
583 persistence_notifier: notifier,
584 _read_guard: read_guard,
589 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
591 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
595 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
596 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
598 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
600 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
601 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
602 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
603 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
604 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
606 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
607 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
609 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
611 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
612 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
613 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
614 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
615 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
616 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
617 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
619 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
620 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
622 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
624 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
625 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
626 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
627 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
628 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
629 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
632 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
634 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
635 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
638 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
640 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
642 pub struct ChannelDetails {
643 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
644 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
645 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
646 /// lifetime of the channel.
647 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
648 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
649 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
650 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
651 /// The node_id of our counterparty
652 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
653 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
654 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
655 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
656 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
657 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
658 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
661 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
662 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
663 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
664 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
665 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
666 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
667 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
668 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
669 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
670 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
671 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
672 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
673 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
676 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
677 /// payments to us through this channel.
678 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
681 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
682 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
684 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
685 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
686 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
687 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
688 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
689 ParameterError(APIError),
690 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
691 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
692 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
695 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
697 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
698 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
699 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
700 /// paths than the ones selected).
701 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
702 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
703 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
704 /// in over-/re-payment.
706 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
707 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
708 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
710 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
711 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
712 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
713 /// with the latest update_id.
714 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
717 macro_rules! handle_error {
718 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
721 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
725 // entering the macro.
726 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
729 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
731 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
732 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
733 if let Some(update) = update_option {
734 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
740 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
741 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
743 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
744 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
745 action: err.action.clone()
749 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
750 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
753 // Return error in case higher-API need one
760 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
761 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
764 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
765 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
767 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
768 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
769 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
770 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
771 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
773 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
775 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
780 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
781 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
784 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
787 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
788 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
789 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
790 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
791 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
793 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
795 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
796 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
797 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
798 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
799 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
801 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
802 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
808 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
809 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
810 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
812 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
814 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
815 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
816 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
817 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
818 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
820 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
821 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
822 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
823 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
824 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
825 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
826 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
827 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
828 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
829 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
832 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
833 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
834 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
835 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
837 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
838 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
840 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
841 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
843 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
844 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
845 if !$resend_commitment {
846 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
849 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
851 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
852 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
858 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
859 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
860 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
862 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
863 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
867 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
868 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
869 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
870 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
871 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
874 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
879 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
880 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
881 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
882 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
883 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
886 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
888 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
889 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
891 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
893 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
895 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
896 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
897 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
898 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
899 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
900 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
903 default_configuration: config.clone(),
904 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
905 fee_estimator: fee_est,
909 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
911 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
912 by_id: HashMap::new(),
913 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
914 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
915 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
916 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
918 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
920 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
921 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
924 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
925 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
927 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
929 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
930 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
931 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
932 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
940 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
941 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
942 &self.default_configuration
945 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
947 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
948 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
949 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
950 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
951 /// otherwise ignored.
953 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
954 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
956 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
957 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
958 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
959 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
963 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
964 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
965 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
968 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
969 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
971 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
972 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
974 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
977 panic!("RNG is bad???");
980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
983 node_id: their_network_key,
989 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
990 let mut res = Vec::new();
992 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
993 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
994 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
995 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
996 res.push(ChannelDetails {
997 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
998 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
999 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1000 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1001 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1002 inbound_capacity_msat,
1003 outbound_capacity_msat,
1004 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1005 is_live: channel.is_live(),
1006 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1011 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1012 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1013 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1019 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1020 /// more information.
1021 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1022 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1025 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1026 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1028 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
1029 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
1030 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1031 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1032 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1033 // really wanted anyway.
1034 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1037 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1038 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1039 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1041 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1042 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1045 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1046 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1047 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1048 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1050 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1051 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1052 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1055 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1056 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1057 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1059 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1060 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1065 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1066 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1068 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1069 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1074 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1075 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1076 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1085 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1086 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1087 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1088 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1089 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1091 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1092 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1093 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1094 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1095 // ignore the result here.
1096 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1100 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1102 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1103 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1104 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1105 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1106 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1107 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1110 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1111 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1113 chan.remove_entry().1
1115 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1118 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1119 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1120 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1121 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1122 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1127 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1130 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1131 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1132 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1134 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1135 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1136 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1137 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1138 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1139 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1140 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1150 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1151 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1152 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1153 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1154 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1158 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1159 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1160 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1162 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1163 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1164 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1165 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1166 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1167 failure_code: $err_code,
1168 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1173 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1174 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1177 let shared_secret = {
1178 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1179 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1182 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1184 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1185 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1186 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1187 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1188 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1189 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1190 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1191 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1194 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1195 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1196 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1197 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1198 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1201 let mut channel_state = None;
1202 macro_rules! return_err {
1203 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1205 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1206 if channel_state.is_none() {
1207 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1209 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1210 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1211 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1212 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1213 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1218 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1219 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1220 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1221 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1223 let error_code = match err {
1224 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1225 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1226 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1227 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1228 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1230 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1233 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1234 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1235 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1242 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1245 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1246 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1247 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1248 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1249 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1250 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1251 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1252 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1253 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1254 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1255 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1256 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1260 // final_expiry_too_soon
1261 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1262 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1263 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1264 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1265 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1266 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1268 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1269 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1270 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1272 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1273 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1274 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1277 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1278 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1279 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1280 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1283 if payment_data.is_none() {
1284 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1287 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1288 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1289 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1290 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1292 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1293 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1294 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1295 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1297 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1298 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1299 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1300 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1303 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1304 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1305 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1307 // Check two things:
1308 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1309 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1310 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1312 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1314 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1315 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1316 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1318 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1320 let blinding_factor = {
1321 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1322 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1323 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1324 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1327 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1329 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1331 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1334 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1335 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1338 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1339 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1340 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1341 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1342 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1346 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1347 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1348 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1351 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1352 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1353 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1354 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1358 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1359 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1360 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1361 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1362 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1363 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1364 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1365 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1366 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1367 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1369 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1371 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1372 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1374 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1375 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1376 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1377 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1378 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1379 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1380 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1382 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1383 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1385 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1386 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1387 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1389 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1390 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1392 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1393 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1394 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1395 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1396 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1398 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1399 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1401 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1402 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1403 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1404 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1410 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1411 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1412 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1413 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1415 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1416 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1418 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1419 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1420 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1422 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1424 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1429 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1432 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1433 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1434 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1435 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1436 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1440 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1442 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1443 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1445 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1446 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1447 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1448 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1449 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1450 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1451 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1452 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1455 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1456 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1458 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1464 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1465 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1467 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1468 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1470 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1471 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1472 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1473 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1474 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1476 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1480 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1481 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1482 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1483 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1484 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1487 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1488 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1490 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1491 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1493 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1494 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1496 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1498 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1499 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1500 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1502 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1503 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1504 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1505 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1506 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1507 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1508 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1509 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1510 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1513 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1514 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1515 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1516 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1517 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1518 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1519 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1527 } else { unreachable!(); }
1531 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1532 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1534 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1539 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1541 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1542 /// fields for more info.
1544 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1545 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1546 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1547 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1548 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1549 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1551 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1553 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1554 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1555 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1557 /// In general, a path may raise:
1558 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1559 /// node public key) is specified.
1560 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1561 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1563 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1564 /// relevant updates.
1566 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1567 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1568 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1570 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1571 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1572 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1573 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1575 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1576 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1577 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1578 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1579 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1580 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1582 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1583 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1584 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1585 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1586 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1588 let mut total_value = 0;
1589 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1590 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1591 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1592 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1593 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1594 continue 'path_check;
1596 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1597 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1598 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1599 continue 'path_check;
1602 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1603 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1605 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1606 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1609 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1610 let mut results = Vec::new();
1611 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1612 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1614 let mut has_ok = false;
1615 let mut has_err = false;
1616 for res in results.iter() {
1617 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1618 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1619 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1620 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1627 if has_err && has_ok {
1628 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1630 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1636 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1637 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1638 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1639 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1641 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1643 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1645 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1646 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1647 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1648 } else { unreachable!(); })
1651 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1653 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1654 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1657 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1658 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1663 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1664 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1665 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1668 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1670 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1672 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1680 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1681 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1682 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1686 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1688 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1689 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1691 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1693 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1694 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1695 /// keys per-channel).
1697 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1698 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1699 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1701 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1702 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1703 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1704 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1707 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1708 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1710 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1714 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1715 let mut output_index = None;
1716 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1717 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1718 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1719 if output_index.is_some() {
1720 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1721 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1724 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1725 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1726 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1729 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1732 if output_index.is_none() {
1733 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1734 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1737 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1741 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1742 if !chan.should_announce() {
1743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1747 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1749 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1751 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1752 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1754 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1755 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1756 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1757 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1758 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1763 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1764 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1765 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1767 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1770 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1771 // smaller than 500:
1772 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1774 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1775 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1776 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1778 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1779 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1781 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1782 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1783 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1784 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1786 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1787 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1790 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1791 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1794 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1795 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1796 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1797 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1798 rgb, alias, addresses,
1799 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1800 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1802 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1804 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1805 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1806 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1807 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1808 contents: announcement
1813 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1815 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1816 /// Will likely generate further events.
1817 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1820 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1821 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1822 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1824 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1825 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1827 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1828 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1829 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1830 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1832 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1833 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1834 match forward_info {
1835 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1836 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1837 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1838 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1839 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1840 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1841 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1843 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1844 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1847 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1848 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1849 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1850 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1851 // problem, not ours.
1858 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1859 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1860 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1861 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1862 match forward_info {
1863 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1864 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1866 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1867 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1868 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1869 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1870 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1871 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1872 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1873 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1875 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1877 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1878 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1880 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1882 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1883 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1884 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1890 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1892 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1893 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1894 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1895 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1896 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1897 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1898 // this channel currently :/.
1904 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1905 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1907 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1908 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1909 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1911 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1912 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1914 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1916 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1917 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1918 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1921 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1923 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1924 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1925 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1926 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1927 // messages when we can.
1928 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1929 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1930 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1937 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1938 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1941 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1942 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1943 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1944 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1945 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1946 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1948 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1950 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1951 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1952 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1954 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1956 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1958 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1962 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1963 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1966 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1967 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1968 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1969 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1970 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1971 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1972 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1974 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1982 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1983 match forward_info {
1984 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1985 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1986 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1987 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1988 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
1989 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
1990 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1991 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1992 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1993 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1995 value: amt_to_forward,
1996 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1997 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2000 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2002 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2003 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2004 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2006 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2007 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2008 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2009 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2010 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2012 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2017 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2018 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2019 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2020 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2021 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2022 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2023 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2024 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2027 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2030 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2032 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2033 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2035 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2036 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2038 let mut total_value = 0;
2039 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2040 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2041 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2042 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2043 total_value += htlc.value;
2044 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2045 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2046 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2047 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2049 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2051 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2052 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2053 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2054 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2057 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2058 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2060 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2061 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2063 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2065 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2066 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2068 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2070 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2071 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2078 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2079 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2081 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2082 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2090 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2091 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2094 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2095 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2098 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2099 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2100 events.append(&mut new_events);
2103 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2105 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2106 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2108 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2109 fn process_background_events(&self) {
2110 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2111 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2112 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2114 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2115 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2116 // monitor updating completing.
2117 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2123 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2124 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2125 self.process_background_events();
2128 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2129 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2130 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2132 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2134 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2135 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2137 self.process_background_events();
2139 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2140 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2141 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2142 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2143 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2144 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2149 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2151 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2152 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2157 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2158 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2159 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2160 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2161 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2162 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2165 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2166 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2167 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2168 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2169 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2170 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2171 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2172 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2173 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2174 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2175 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2181 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2182 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2183 // be surfaced to the user.
2184 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2185 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2187 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2188 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2189 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2191 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2192 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2194 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2199 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2200 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2201 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2203 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2204 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2205 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2207 rejected_by_dest: false,
2219 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2220 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2221 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2222 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2223 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2224 /// still-available channels.
2225 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2226 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2227 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2228 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2231 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2232 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2233 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2235 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2237 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2238 match &onion_error {
2239 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2241 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2243 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2244 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2245 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2246 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2247 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2248 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2249 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2254 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2255 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2256 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2257 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2259 error_code: onion_error_code,
2261 error_data: onion_error_data
2265 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2271 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2272 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2273 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2274 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2276 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2277 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2278 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2279 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2280 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2281 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2283 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2285 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2291 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2292 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2293 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2294 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2295 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2296 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2298 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2299 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2300 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2304 let mut forward_event = None;
2305 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2306 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2308 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2309 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2310 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2313 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2316 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2317 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2318 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2319 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2320 time_forwardable: time
2327 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2328 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2329 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2331 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2332 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2333 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2334 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2336 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2338 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2339 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2340 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2341 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2343 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2345 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2346 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2347 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2348 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2350 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2351 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2352 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2353 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2355 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2356 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2357 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2358 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2359 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2361 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2362 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2363 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2369 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2370 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2371 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2373 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2374 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2375 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2376 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2377 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2378 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2379 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2381 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2383 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2384 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2385 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2386 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2387 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2388 } else { errs.push(e); }
2390 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2391 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2396 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2397 // which were generated.
2398 channel_state.take();
2400 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2401 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2402 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2409 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2410 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2411 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2412 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2413 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2419 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2420 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2421 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2422 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2423 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2424 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2425 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2426 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2428 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2432 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2433 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2434 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2435 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2436 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2437 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2438 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2439 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2448 // TODO: Do something with e?
2449 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2450 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2451 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2452 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2453 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2454 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2455 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2459 } else { unreachable!(); }
2462 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2464 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2465 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2466 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2467 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2471 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2472 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2473 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2476 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2477 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2478 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2479 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2482 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2483 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2484 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2485 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2486 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2487 payment_preimage, e);
2491 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2493 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2494 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2495 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2501 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2502 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2503 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2506 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2507 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2510 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2511 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2513 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2514 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2515 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2516 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2518 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2519 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2520 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2521 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2522 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2523 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2524 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2525 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2526 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2529 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2530 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2531 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2532 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2535 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2536 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2537 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2538 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2539 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2543 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2547 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2548 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2549 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2551 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2553 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2554 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2555 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2556 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2561 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2562 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2563 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2564 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2565 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2570 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2574 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2579 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2580 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2582 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2583 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2584 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2587 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2588 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2589 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2590 msg: announcement_sigs,
2593 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2597 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2599 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2600 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2602 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2604 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2605 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2609 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2610 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2611 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2614 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2615 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2616 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2617 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2618 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2621 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2622 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2623 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2625 entry.insert(channel);
2631 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2632 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2633 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2634 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2635 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2637 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2640 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2641 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2646 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2647 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2648 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2649 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2651 user_channel_id: user_id,
2656 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2657 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2658 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2659 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2660 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2661 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2663 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2664 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2666 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2671 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2672 // lock before watch_channel
2673 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2675 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2676 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2677 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2678 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2679 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2680 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2681 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2682 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2683 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2684 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2685 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2687 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2688 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2689 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2690 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2691 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2692 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2696 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2697 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2698 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2703 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2704 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2713 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2715 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2716 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2717 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2718 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2720 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2721 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2723 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2724 Ok(update) => update,
2725 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2727 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2728 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2732 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2735 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2739 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2740 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2741 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2742 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2744 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2745 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2747 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2748 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2750 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2751 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2752 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2753 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2754 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2755 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2756 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2757 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2758 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2759 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2760 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2761 msg: announcement_sigs,
2766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2770 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2771 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2772 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2773 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2775 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2777 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2778 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2780 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2781 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2783 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2787 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2788 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2789 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2793 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2794 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2795 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2797 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2798 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2803 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2804 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2806 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2807 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2808 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2817 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2818 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2819 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2820 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2821 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2823 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2824 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2826 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2827 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2828 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2829 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2834 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2835 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2836 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2837 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2838 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2839 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2840 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2842 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2843 } else { (tx, None) }
2845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2848 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2850 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2852 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2853 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2854 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2863 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2864 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2865 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2866 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2868 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2869 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2870 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2871 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2873 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2874 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2876 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2878 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2882 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2883 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2884 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2885 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2886 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2887 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2888 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2889 match pending_forward_info {
2890 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2891 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2892 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2893 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2894 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2895 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2896 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2900 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2901 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2902 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2903 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2904 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2905 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2906 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2907 // no problem just calling this
2908 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2909 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2911 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2912 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2913 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2916 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2918 _ => pending_forward_info
2921 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2928 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2929 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2931 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2932 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2934 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2935 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2937 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2939 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2942 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2946 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2947 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2948 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2949 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2951 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2952 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2954 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2956 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2961 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2962 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2964 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2966 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2967 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2969 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2970 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2971 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2973 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2980 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2981 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2982 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2983 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2985 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2986 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2988 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2989 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2990 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2991 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2992 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2993 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2994 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2999 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3000 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3001 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3003 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3004 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3005 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3007 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3008 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3009 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3010 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3011 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3012 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3013 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3014 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3016 commitment_signed: msg,
3020 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3021 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3022 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3033 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3034 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3035 let mut forward_event = None;
3036 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3037 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3038 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3039 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3041 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3042 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3043 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3044 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3047 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3048 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3051 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3052 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3057 match forward_event {
3059 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3060 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3061 time_forwardable: time
3069 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3070 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3072 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3073 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3074 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3076 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3077 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3079 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3080 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3081 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3082 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3083 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3084 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3085 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3086 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3088 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3090 } else { unreachable!(); }
3093 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3094 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3095 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3099 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3100 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3101 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3105 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3110 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3112 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3113 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3114 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3116 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3123 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3124 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3125 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3128 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3129 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3131 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3138 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3139 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3140 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3142 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3144 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3147 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3151 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3152 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3153 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3155 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3156 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3158 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3159 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3160 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3161 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3163 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3164 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3167 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3168 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3174 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3176 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3177 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3178 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3179 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3180 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3181 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3182 contents: announcement,
3184 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3187 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3192 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3193 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3194 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3195 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3196 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3198 // It's not a local channel
3202 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3204 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3205 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3206 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3208 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3215 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3216 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3217 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3219 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3221 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3222 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3224 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3225 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3226 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3227 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3228 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3229 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3230 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3231 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3232 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3233 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3234 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3235 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3236 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3238 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3239 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3241 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3242 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3245 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3246 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3247 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3251 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3252 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3254 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3259 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3260 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3262 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3268 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3272 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3277 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3278 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3279 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3285 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3289 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3290 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3291 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3292 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3293 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3295 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3296 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3297 let counterparty_node_id;
3298 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3299 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3300 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3302 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3304 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3305 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3306 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3308 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3309 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3311 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3312 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3314 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3315 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3316 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3318 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3322 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3323 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3324 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3325 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3326 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3327 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3328 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3338 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3339 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3340 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3344 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3345 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3346 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3348 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3349 match monitor_event {
3350 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3351 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3353 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3356 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3359 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3360 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3361 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3362 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3363 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3364 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3365 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3366 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3367 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3369 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3370 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3371 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3376 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3377 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3378 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3387 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3388 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3392 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3393 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3395 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3396 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3397 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3398 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3399 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3400 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3401 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3402 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3403 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3404 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3405 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3406 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3407 assert!(should_broadcast);
3408 } else { unreachable!(); }
3409 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3411 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3415 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3416 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3418 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3421 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3422 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3424 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3425 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3426 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3427 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3428 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3429 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3430 // never fail a payment too early.
3431 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3433 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3441 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3444 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3445 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3447 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3448 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3449 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3451 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3453 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3454 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3455 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3456 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3457 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3458 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3459 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3462 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3463 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3466 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3467 /// stored external to LDK.
3469 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3470 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3471 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3473 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3474 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3476 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3477 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3478 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3479 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3480 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3482 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3483 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3484 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3485 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3487 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3488 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3489 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3490 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 7,200 secs as a default validity time for
3491 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3493 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3494 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3495 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3496 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3497 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3499 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3500 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3501 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3503 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3505 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3506 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3508 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3509 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3510 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3511 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3512 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3516 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3517 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3518 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3519 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3520 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3523 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3524 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3525 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3526 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3528 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3529 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3530 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3535 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3536 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3537 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3538 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3539 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3542 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3543 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3544 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3545 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3547 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3548 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3549 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3554 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3556 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3557 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3558 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3559 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3562 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3564 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3565 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3566 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3567 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3568 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3571 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3572 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3573 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3576 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3578 let new_height = height - 1;
3580 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3581 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3582 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3583 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3584 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3585 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3588 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3592 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3594 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3595 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3596 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3597 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3600 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3601 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3602 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3603 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3605 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3606 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3609 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3612 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3613 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3614 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3615 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3617 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3618 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3622 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3624 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3626 macro_rules! max_time {
3627 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3629 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3630 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3631 // having an explicit local time source.
3632 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3633 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3634 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3635 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3636 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3642 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3643 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3644 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3645 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3646 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3650 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3651 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3652 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3653 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3654 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3655 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3661 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3663 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3664 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3665 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3666 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3667 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3668 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3673 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3675 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3676 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3677 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3678 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3681 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3682 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3684 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3685 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3686 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3687 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3688 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3690 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3691 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3693 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3694 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3695 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3696 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3697 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3698 let res = f(channel);
3699 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3700 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3701 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3702 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3703 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3707 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3708 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3709 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3710 msg: funding_locked,
3712 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3714 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3715 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3716 msg: announcement_sigs,
3719 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3721 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3723 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3724 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3725 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3727 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3728 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3729 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3730 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3731 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3735 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3736 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3737 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3744 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3745 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3746 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3747 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3748 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3749 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3750 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3751 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3752 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3753 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3754 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3755 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3756 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3761 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3766 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3768 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3769 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3773 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3774 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3775 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3777 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3778 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3779 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3780 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3783 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3784 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3786 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3787 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3790 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3791 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3792 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3793 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3794 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3799 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
3800 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3801 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3802 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3803 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3804 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3807 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3809 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3812 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3814 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3817 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3819 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3822 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3823 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3824 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3827 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3829 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3832 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3834 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3837 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3838 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3839 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3842 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3843 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3844 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3847 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3848 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3849 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3852 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3854 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3857 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3859 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3862 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3864 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3867 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3869 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3872 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3874 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3877 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3879 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3882 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3884 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3887 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3889 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3892 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3893 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3894 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3895 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3896 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3899 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3900 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3901 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3902 if no_connection_possible {
3903 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3904 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3905 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3906 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3907 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3909 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3910 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3911 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3921 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3922 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3923 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3924 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3925 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3926 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3927 // reestablish logic.
3928 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3929 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3930 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3931 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3932 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3934 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3935 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3936 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3940 no_channels_remain = false;
3946 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3948 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3949 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3950 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3951 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3952 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3953 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3954 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3956 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3957 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3959 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3960 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3961 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3962 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3963 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3964 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3965 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3970 if no_channels_remain {
3971 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3974 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3975 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3977 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3978 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3979 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3984 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3985 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3990 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3991 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3993 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3994 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3998 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4005 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4006 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4007 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4008 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4009 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4010 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4011 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4015 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4016 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4017 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4023 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4026 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4029 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4030 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4031 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4032 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4033 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4037 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4038 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4043 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4044 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4045 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4046 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4047 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4048 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4051 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4054 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4060 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4061 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4062 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4063 let result = *guard;
4071 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4072 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4073 let current_time = Instant::now();
4075 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4076 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4077 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4078 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4079 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4080 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4081 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4083 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4084 let result = *guard;
4085 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4089 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4090 None => return result,
4096 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4098 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4099 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4100 *persistence_lock = true;
4101 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4106 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4107 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4109 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4111 match &self.routing {
4112 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
4114 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4115 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4117 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
4119 payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4120 payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4121 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4124 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
4125 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4126 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
4127 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
4132 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4133 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
4134 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
4135 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
4136 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4137 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4138 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4140 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4141 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4142 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4143 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4145 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4147 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4149 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4150 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4151 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
4152 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4157 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4158 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4160 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
4162 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4164 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
4166 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4173 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4174 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
4175 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4176 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4177 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4178 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4183 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4184 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4186 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4188 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4190 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4192 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4199 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4200 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4201 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4202 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4203 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4204 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4209 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4213 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4216 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4218 self.prev_hop.write(writer)?;
4219 self.value.write(writer)?;
4220 self.payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4221 self.payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4222 self.cltv_expiry.write(writer)
4226 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4227 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4229 prev_hop: Readable::read(reader)?,
4230 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4231 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4232 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4233 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4235 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4240 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4241 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4243 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4245 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4247 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4249 path.write(writer)?;
4250 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4251 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4258 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4259 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4260 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4261 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4262 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4263 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4264 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4265 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4267 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4272 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4275 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4279 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4281 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4282 data.write(writer)?;
4289 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4290 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4291 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4292 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4293 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4294 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4295 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4297 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4302 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4303 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4305 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4307 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4308 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4309 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4310 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4312 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4314 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4315 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4322 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4323 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4324 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4325 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4326 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4327 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4328 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4329 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4331 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4332 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4333 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4335 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4340 impl_writeable!(PendingInboundPayment, 0, {
4348 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4349 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4350 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4351 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4352 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4355 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4356 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4358 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4359 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4361 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4363 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4364 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4365 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4368 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4369 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4370 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4371 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4372 unfunded_channels += 1;
4375 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4376 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4377 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4378 channel.write(writer)?;
4382 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4383 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4384 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4385 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4386 for forward in pending_forwards {
4387 forward.write(writer)?;
4391 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4392 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4393 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4394 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4395 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4396 htlc.write(writer)?;
4400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4401 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4402 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4403 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4404 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4405 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4408 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4409 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4410 for event in events.iter() {
4411 event.write(writer)?;
4414 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4415 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4416 for event in background_events.iter() {
4418 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4420 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4421 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4426 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4427 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4429 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4430 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4431 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4432 hash.write(writer)?;
4433 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4440 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4442 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4444 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4445 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4446 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4447 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4448 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4449 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4450 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4451 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4452 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4453 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4454 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4456 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4457 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4459 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4460 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4461 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4462 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4463 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4464 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4465 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4466 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4467 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4468 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4469 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4472 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4473 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4475 pub keys_manager: K,
4477 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4479 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4480 pub fee_estimator: F,
4481 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4483 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4484 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4485 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4486 pub chain_monitor: M,
4488 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4489 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4490 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4491 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4492 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4493 /// deserialization.
4495 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4496 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4497 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4499 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4500 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4502 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4503 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4504 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4505 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4507 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4510 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4511 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4514 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4515 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4516 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4517 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4518 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4519 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4522 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4523 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4524 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4525 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4526 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4528 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4529 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4534 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4535 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4536 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4537 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4538 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4539 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4540 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4541 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4544 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4545 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4546 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4550 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4551 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4552 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4553 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4554 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4555 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4558 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4559 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4560 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4561 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4562 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4565 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4566 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4567 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4569 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4571 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4572 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4573 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4574 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4575 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4576 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4577 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4578 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4579 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4580 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4581 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4582 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4583 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4584 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4585 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4586 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4587 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4588 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4589 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4590 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4591 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4592 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4593 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4595 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4596 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4598 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4601 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4605 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4606 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4607 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4611 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4612 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4613 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4614 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4615 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4616 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4617 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4618 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4619 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4621 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4624 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4625 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4626 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4627 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4628 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4629 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4630 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4631 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4633 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4636 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4637 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4638 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4639 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4640 let peer_state = PeerState {
4641 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4643 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4646 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4647 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4648 for _ in 0..event_count {
4649 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4650 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4655 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4656 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4657 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4658 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4659 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4660 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4664 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4665 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4667 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4668 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4669 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4670 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4671 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4675 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4676 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4678 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4680 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4681 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4682 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4684 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4686 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4691 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4693 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4695 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4696 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4699 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4700 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4702 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4704 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4705 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4706 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4707 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4709 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4710 logger: args.logger,
4711 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4714 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4715 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4718 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4719 //connection or two.
4721 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4727 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4729 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4731 use std::time::Duration;
4734 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4735 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4736 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4738 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4739 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4740 thread::spawn(move || {
4742 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4743 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4744 *persistence_lock = true;
4747 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4753 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4754 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4756 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4759 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4764 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4766 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4769 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4776 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4779 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4780 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4781 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4782 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4783 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4784 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4785 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4786 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4787 use routing::router::get_route;
4788 use util::test_utils;
4789 use util::config::UserConfig;
4790 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4792 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4793 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4794 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4796 use std::sync::Mutex;
4800 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4801 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4802 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4803 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4804 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4805 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4806 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4811 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4812 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4815 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4816 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4817 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4819 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4820 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4822 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4823 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4825 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4826 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4828 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4829 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4830 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4831 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4832 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4834 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4836 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4838 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4839 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4840 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4841 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4842 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4844 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4846 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4848 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4849 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4850 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4853 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4854 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4855 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4857 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4858 } else { panic!(); }
4860 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4861 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4863 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4866 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4869 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4870 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4872 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4873 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4875 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4877 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
4878 macro_rules! send_payment {
4879 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4880 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4881 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
4882 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4884 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4885 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
4887 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4888 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
4890 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
4891 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4892 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4893 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4894 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4895 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4896 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4897 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4899 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4900 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
4901 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4903 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4904 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4905 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4906 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4907 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4909 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4912 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4913 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4914 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4915 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4917 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4922 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4923 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);