1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 use alloc::string::ToString;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
76 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
79 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
80 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
81 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
86 use util::logger::Logger;
88 use core::convert::TryInto;
91 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
94 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
95 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
96 // retrieve said payment type bits.
97 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
99 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
100 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
102 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
103 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
104 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
105 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
106 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
107 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
108 /// registered with LDK.
109 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
110 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
111 /// registered with LDK.
112 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
116 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
117 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
118 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
133 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
135 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
136 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
137 unknown => Err(unknown),
142 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
143 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
145 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
147 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
148 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
149 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
151 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
152 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
153 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
154 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
156 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
157 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
158 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
161 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
162 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
164 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
165 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
166 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
167 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
169 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
170 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
172 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
175 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
176 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
180 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
181 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
182 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
184 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
186 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
187 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
188 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
189 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
190 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
191 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
193 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
194 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
195 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
200 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
201 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
202 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
203 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
205 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
206 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
207 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
209 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
212 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
214 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
215 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
218 /// The metadata is constructed as:
219 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
220 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
222 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
223 /// match what was constructed.
225 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
226 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
227 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
228 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
230 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
231 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
232 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
235 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
236 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
237 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
239 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
241 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
242 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
244 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
245 where L::Target: Logger
247 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
249 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
250 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
251 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
252 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
253 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
254 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
255 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
257 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
259 let mut payment_preimage = None;
260 match payment_type_res {
261 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
262 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
263 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
264 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
265 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
266 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
270 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
271 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
272 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
273 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
274 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
279 Err(unknown_bits) => {
280 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
285 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
290 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
298 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
299 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
301 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
302 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
303 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
304 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
305 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
308 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
309 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
311 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
315 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
316 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
317 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
318 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
320 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
321 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
322 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
323 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
326 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
329 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
331 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
332 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
333 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
334 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
335 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
336 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
337 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
339 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
343 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
345 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
346 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
347 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
349 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
350 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
351 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
352 // before we forward it.
354 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
355 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
356 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
357 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
358 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
360 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
361 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
363 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
364 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
367 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
368 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
369 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
372 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
377 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
378 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
379 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
380 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
381 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
382 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
383 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
386 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
387 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
388 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
389 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
392 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
393 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
394 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
395 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
396 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
399 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
401 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
403 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
404 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
405 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
407 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
409 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
413 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
417 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
418 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
420 short_channel_id: u64,
422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
423 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
425 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
426 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
431 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
432 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
433 /// are part of the same payment.
434 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
435 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
436 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
439 struct ClaimableHTLC {
440 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
443 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
446 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
447 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
448 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
449 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
451 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
452 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
457 impl Readable for PaymentId {
458 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
459 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
463 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
464 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
465 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
466 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
467 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
470 session_priv: SecretKey,
471 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
472 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
473 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
474 payment_id: PaymentId,
475 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
476 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
479 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
480 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
481 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
483 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
485 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
487 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
490 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
491 payment_id.hash(hasher);
492 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
493 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
494 payment_params.hash(hasher);
501 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
504 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
505 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
506 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
507 payment_secret: None,
508 payment_params: None,
513 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
514 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
516 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
524 struct ReceiveError {
530 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
531 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
533 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
538 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
540 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
551 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
553 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
555 err: LightningError {
557 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
558 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
565 shutdown_finish: None,
569 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
571 err: LightningError {
573 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
576 shutdown_finish: None,
580 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
581 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
584 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
586 err: LightningError {
588 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
589 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
595 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
596 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
600 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
603 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
605 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
606 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
610 log_level: Level::Warn,
613 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
617 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
620 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
626 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
637 shutdown_finish: None,
642 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
643 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
644 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
645 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
646 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
648 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
649 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
650 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
651 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
652 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
653 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
654 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
656 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
660 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
661 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
662 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
663 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
664 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
665 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
666 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
667 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
669 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
670 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
671 /// and via the classic SCID.
673 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
674 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
675 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
676 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
677 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
678 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
679 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
681 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
682 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
683 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
684 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
687 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
688 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
689 /// quite some time lag.
690 enum BackgroundEvent {
691 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
692 /// commitment transaction.
693 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
696 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
697 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
699 latest_features: InitFeatures,
702 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
703 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
705 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
708 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
709 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
710 struct PendingInboundPayment {
711 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
712 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
713 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
714 /// this payment being removed.
716 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
717 user_payment_id: u64,
718 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
719 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
720 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
723 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
724 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
725 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
727 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
730 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
731 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
732 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
733 pending_amt_msat: u64,
734 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
735 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
736 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
738 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
739 starting_block_height: u32,
741 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
742 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
743 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
745 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
746 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
748 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
749 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
750 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
751 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
752 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
754 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
756 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
757 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
761 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
762 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
764 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
768 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
770 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
774 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
776 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
780 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
782 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
787 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
789 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
790 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
796 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
797 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
798 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
799 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
800 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
801 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
802 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
805 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
806 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
809 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
810 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
811 let our_payment_hash;
812 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
813 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
814 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
816 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
817 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
818 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
822 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
826 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
827 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
828 let remove_res = match self {
829 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
830 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
831 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
832 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
833 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
837 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
838 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
839 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
840 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
841 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
842 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
849 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
850 let insert_res = match self {
851 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
852 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
853 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
855 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
856 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
859 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
860 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
861 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
862 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
863 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
870 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
872 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
873 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
874 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
875 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
882 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
883 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
884 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
885 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
886 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
887 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
888 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
889 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
891 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
892 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
893 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
894 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
895 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
896 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
897 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
898 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
899 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
901 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
902 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
904 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
905 /// to individual Channels.
907 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
908 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
909 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
910 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
912 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
913 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
914 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
915 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
916 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
917 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
918 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
920 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
921 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
922 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
923 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
926 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
927 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
928 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
929 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
930 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
932 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
933 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
934 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
935 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
936 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
937 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
938 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
939 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
940 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
941 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
944 default_configuration: UserConfig,
945 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
951 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
953 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
954 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
956 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
957 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
958 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
959 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
961 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
962 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
963 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
964 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
965 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
966 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
968 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
969 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
970 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
971 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
972 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
973 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
974 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
975 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
977 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
979 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
980 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
982 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
983 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
984 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
985 /// active channel list on load.
986 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
988 our_network_key: SecretKey,
989 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
991 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
993 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
994 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
995 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
997 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
998 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1000 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
1001 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
1002 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
1004 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1005 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1006 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1007 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1009 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1010 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1011 /// are currently open with that peer.
1012 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1013 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1016 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1017 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1019 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1020 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1021 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1022 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1023 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1024 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1025 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1026 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1027 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1029 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1036 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1038 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1039 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1040 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1041 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1042 pub struct ChainParameters {
1043 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1044 pub network: Network,
1046 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1048 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1049 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1052 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1058 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1059 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1060 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1061 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1062 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1063 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1065 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1066 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1067 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1068 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1069 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1071 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1072 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1075 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1076 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1077 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1080 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1081 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1083 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1084 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1085 should_persist: persist_check,
1086 _read_guard: read_guard,
1091 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1092 fn drop(&mut self) {
1093 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1094 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1099 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1100 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1102 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1104 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1105 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1106 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1107 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1108 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1110 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1111 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1113 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1115 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1116 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1117 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1118 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1119 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1120 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1121 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1123 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1124 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1126 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1127 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1128 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1129 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1131 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1132 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1133 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1134 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1135 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1136 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1139 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1141 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1142 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1145 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1147 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1148 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1149 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1151 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1152 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1153 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1154 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1155 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1156 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1157 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1158 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1159 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1160 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1161 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1164 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1165 /// to better separate parameters.
1166 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1167 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1168 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1169 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1170 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1171 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1172 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1173 pub features: InitFeatures,
1174 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1175 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1176 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1178 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1180 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1181 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1182 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1183 /// payments to us through this channel.
1184 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1187 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1188 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1189 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1190 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1191 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1192 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1193 /// lifetime of the channel.
1194 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1195 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1196 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1197 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1198 /// our counterparty already.
1200 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1201 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1202 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1203 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1205 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1206 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1207 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1208 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1210 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1211 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1213 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1214 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1215 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1216 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1217 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1218 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1219 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1221 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1222 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1224 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1225 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1226 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1227 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1228 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1229 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1230 /// this value on chain.
1232 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1234 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1236 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1237 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1238 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1239 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1240 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1241 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1242 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1244 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1245 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1246 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1247 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1249 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1250 pub balance_msat: u64,
1251 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1252 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1253 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1254 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1256 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1258 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1259 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1260 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1261 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1262 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1263 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1264 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1265 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1266 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1268 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1269 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1270 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1271 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1272 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1273 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1274 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1275 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1276 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1278 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1280 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1281 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1282 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1283 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1284 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1285 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1286 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1287 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1288 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1290 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1291 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1292 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1293 pub is_outbound: bool,
1294 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1295 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1296 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1297 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1298 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1300 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1301 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1302 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1303 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1305 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1306 pub is_usable: bool,
1307 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1308 pub is_public: bool,
1311 impl ChannelDetails {
1312 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1313 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1314 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1316 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1317 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1318 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1319 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1323 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1324 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1325 /// states for more.
1326 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1327 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1328 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1329 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1330 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1331 ParameterError(APIError),
1332 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1333 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1334 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1335 /// payment in full.
1337 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1339 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1340 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1341 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1342 /// paths than the ones selected).
1343 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1344 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1345 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1346 /// in over-/re-payment.
1348 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1349 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1350 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1352 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1353 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1354 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1355 /// with the latest update_id.
1357 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1358 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1359 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1360 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1361 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1362 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1363 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1364 payment_id: PaymentId,
1368 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1370 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1372 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1373 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1374 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1375 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1377 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1378 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1379 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1382 macro_rules! handle_error {
1383 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1386 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1387 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1389 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1390 // entering the macro.
1391 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1392 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1395 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1397 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1398 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1399 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1400 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1404 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1405 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1406 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1407 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1412 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1413 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1415 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1416 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1417 action: err.action.clone()
1421 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1422 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1425 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1432 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1433 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1434 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1435 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1437 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1438 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1439 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1440 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1441 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1443 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1444 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1446 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1450 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1451 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1452 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1454 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1455 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1457 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1458 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1460 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1461 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1462 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1463 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1464 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1465 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1467 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1468 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1469 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1470 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1471 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1472 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1478 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1479 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1483 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1485 $entry.remove_entry();
1493 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1494 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1498 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1500 $entry.remove_entry();
1508 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1509 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1511 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1512 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1518 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1521 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1522 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1523 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1524 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1525 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1526 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1527 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1528 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1529 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1530 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1531 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1532 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1533 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1534 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1537 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1538 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1539 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1540 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1541 match $action_type {
1542 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1543 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1545 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1546 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1548 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1549 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1550 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1551 if !$resend_commitment {
1552 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1555 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1557 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1558 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1562 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1563 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1565 $entry.remove_entry();
1569 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1570 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1571 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1573 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1574 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1576 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1577 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1579 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1580 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1584 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1585 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1586 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1588 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1589 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1593 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1594 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1595 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1596 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1597 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1600 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1605 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1606 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1607 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1608 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1609 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1611 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1612 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1613 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1614 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1615 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1616 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1617 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1618 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1619 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1624 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1625 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1626 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1627 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1628 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1630 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1631 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1632 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1634 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1635 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1636 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1637 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1640 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1641 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1642 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1643 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1644 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1645 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1646 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1647 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1648 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1649 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1650 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1651 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1654 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1655 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1656 // before it should be allowed to.
1657 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1658 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1660 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1661 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1662 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1667 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1668 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1669 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1670 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1671 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1672 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1673 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1674 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1675 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1676 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1677 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1678 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1679 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1680 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1681 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1682 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1683 let mut order = $order;
1685 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1687 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1691 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1692 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1693 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1694 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1699 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1700 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1701 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1702 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1703 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1708 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1712 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1717 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1718 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1719 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1724 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1725 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1726 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1727 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1728 assert!(res.is_ok());
1731 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1735 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1736 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1737 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1739 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1741 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1742 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1747 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1748 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1749 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1750 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1751 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1754 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1756 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1757 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1759 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1761 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1763 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1764 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1765 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1766 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1767 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1768 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1769 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1770 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1772 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1773 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1774 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1778 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1780 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1781 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1782 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1783 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1784 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1785 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1787 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1788 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1789 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1791 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1792 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1795 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1796 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1798 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1799 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1801 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1803 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1804 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1805 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1806 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1814 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1815 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1816 &self.default_configuration
1819 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1820 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1821 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1824 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1825 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1827 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1829 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1833 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1838 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1840 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1841 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1842 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1843 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1844 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1847 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1848 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1850 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1851 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1852 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1854 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1855 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1856 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1857 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1858 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1859 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1861 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1862 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1863 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1864 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1865 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1866 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1870 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1871 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1872 Some(peer_state) => {
1873 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1874 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1875 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1876 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1877 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1878 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1879 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1883 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1888 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1891 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1893 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1894 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1895 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1897 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1898 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1899 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1904 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1907 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1910 node_id: their_network_key,
1913 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1916 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1917 let mut res = Vec::new();
1919 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1920 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1921 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1922 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1923 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1924 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1925 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1926 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1927 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1928 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1929 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1930 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1931 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1932 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1934 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1935 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1936 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1937 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1938 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1939 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1940 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1941 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1943 inbound_capacity_msat,
1944 outbound_capacity_msat,
1945 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1946 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1947 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1948 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1949 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1950 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1951 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1956 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1957 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1958 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1964 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1965 /// more information.
1966 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1967 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1970 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1971 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1973 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1974 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1976 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1977 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1978 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1979 // really wanted anyway.
1980 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1983 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1984 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1985 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1986 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1987 Some(transaction) => {
1988 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1992 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1993 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1994 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1995 reason: closure_reason
1999 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2000 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2002 let counterparty_node_id;
2003 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2004 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2007 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2009 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2011 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2012 Some(peer_state) => {
2013 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
2014 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2015 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
2017 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
2019 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2021 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2022 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
2023 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2024 let (result, is_permanent) =
2025 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
2027 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2033 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2034 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2038 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2039 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2040 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2041 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2045 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
2053 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2054 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2057 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
2061 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2062 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2063 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2065 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2066 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2068 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2069 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2070 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2071 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2073 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2075 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2076 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2077 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2078 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2079 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
2082 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2083 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2084 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2086 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2087 /// the channel being closed or not:
2088 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2089 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2090 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2091 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2092 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2093 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2094 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2096 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2098 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2099 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2100 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2101 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2102 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2106 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2107 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2108 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2109 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2110 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2112 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2113 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2114 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2115 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2116 // ignore the result here.
2117 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2121 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2122 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2123 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2125 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2126 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2127 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2128 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2129 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2130 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2133 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2134 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2135 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2138 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2140 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
2142 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2145 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2146 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2147 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2148 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2149 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2154 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2157 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2158 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2159 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2161 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2162 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2163 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2164 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2165 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2166 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2167 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2177 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2178 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2179 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2180 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2181 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2185 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2186 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2188 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2189 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2190 return Err(ReceiveError {
2191 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2193 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2196 // final_expiry_too_soon
2197 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2198 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2199 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2200 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2201 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2202 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2203 return Err(ReceiveError {
2205 err_data: Vec::new(),
2206 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2209 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2210 return Err(ReceiveError {
2212 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2213 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2217 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2218 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2219 return Err(ReceiveError {
2220 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2221 err_data: Vec::new(),
2222 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2225 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2226 return Err(ReceiveError {
2227 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2228 err_data: Vec::new(),
2229 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2232 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2233 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2234 return Err(ReceiveError {
2235 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2236 err_data: Vec::new(),
2237 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2239 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2240 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2242 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2243 phantom_shared_secret,
2245 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2246 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2247 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2248 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2249 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2250 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2251 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2252 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2253 return Err(ReceiveError {
2254 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2255 err_data: Vec::new(),
2256 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2260 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2262 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2265 return Err(ReceiveError {
2266 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2267 err_data: Vec::new(),
2268 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2273 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2276 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2277 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2278 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2282 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2283 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2284 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2286 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2287 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2288 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2289 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2290 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2291 failure_code: $err_code,
2292 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2297 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2298 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2301 let shared_secret = {
2302 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2303 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2307 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2308 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2309 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2310 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2311 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2312 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2313 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2314 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2317 let mut channel_state = None;
2318 macro_rules! return_err {
2319 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2321 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2322 if channel_state.is_none() {
2323 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2325 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2326 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2327 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2328 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2329 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2334 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2336 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2337 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2339 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2340 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2344 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2345 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2347 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2349 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2350 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2351 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2352 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2353 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2355 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2358 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2359 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2361 let blinding_factor = {
2362 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2363 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2364 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2365 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2368 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2370 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2372 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2375 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2376 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2379 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2380 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2381 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2382 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2383 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2387 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2388 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2389 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2392 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2393 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2394 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2395 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2400 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2401 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2402 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2403 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2404 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2405 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2406 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2407 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2408 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2409 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2410 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2412 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2415 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2418 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2420 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2421 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2422 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2423 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2424 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2425 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2426 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2428 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2429 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2430 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2431 // we don't have the channel here.
2432 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2434 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2436 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2437 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2438 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2439 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2440 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2441 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2442 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2444 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2445 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2447 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2448 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2449 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2450 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2451 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2453 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2454 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2456 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2457 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2459 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2460 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2461 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2462 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2463 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2464 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2466 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2467 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2469 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2470 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2471 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2472 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2473 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2474 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2475 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2476 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2477 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2478 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2484 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
2485 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2486 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2487 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2489 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2490 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2492 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2493 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2494 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2496 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2497 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2499 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2504 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2507 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2508 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2509 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2511 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2512 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2513 if !chan.should_announce() {
2514 return Err(LightningError {
2515 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2516 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2520 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2523 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2524 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2525 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2526 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2527 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2528 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2529 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2530 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2531 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2535 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2537 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2538 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2539 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2541 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2542 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2544 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2545 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2546 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2547 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2548 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2549 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2550 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2551 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2554 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2555 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2557 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2563 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2564 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2566 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2567 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2568 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2570 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2571 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2572 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2573 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2574 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2576 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2580 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2581 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2583 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2584 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2585 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2586 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2587 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2588 err: "Payment already completed"
2593 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2594 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2595 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2598 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2600 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2601 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2602 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2603 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2604 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2605 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2606 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2607 total_msat: total_value,
2609 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2613 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2614 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2616 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2617 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2619 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2620 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2622 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2623 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2625 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2626 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2628 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2629 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2630 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2631 channel_state, chan)
2633 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2634 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2635 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2636 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2637 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2638 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2639 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2640 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2641 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2642 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2644 insert_outbound_payment!();
2646 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2647 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2648 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2649 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2650 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2651 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2652 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2653 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2659 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2661 } else { unreachable!(); }
2665 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2666 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2668 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2673 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2675 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2676 /// fields for more info.
2678 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2679 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2680 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2681 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2682 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2683 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2685 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2687 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2688 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2689 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2691 /// In general, a path may raise:
2692 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2693 /// node public key) is specified.
2694 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2695 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2697 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2698 /// relevant updates.
2700 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2701 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2702 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2704 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2705 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2706 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2707 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2709 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2710 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2711 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2712 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2713 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2716 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2717 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2718 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2720 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2721 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2722 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2723 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2724 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2726 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2727 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2729 let mut total_value = 0;
2730 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2731 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2732 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2733 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2734 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2735 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2736 continue 'path_check;
2738 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2739 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2740 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2741 continue 'path_check;
2744 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2745 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2747 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2748 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2750 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2751 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2752 total_value = amt_msat;
2755 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2756 let mut results = Vec::new();
2757 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2758 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2760 let mut has_ok = false;
2761 let mut has_err = false;
2762 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2763 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2764 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2765 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2766 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2767 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2768 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2772 } else if res.is_err() {
2773 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2774 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2777 if has_err && has_ok {
2778 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2781 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2782 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2783 Some(RouteParameters {
2784 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2785 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2786 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2792 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2793 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2794 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2795 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2801 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2803 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2804 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2805 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2806 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2807 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2809 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2810 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2811 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2812 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2813 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2814 if path.len() == 0 {
2815 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2816 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2821 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2822 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2823 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2825 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2826 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2828 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2829 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2830 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2831 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2834 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2836 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2837 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2838 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2841 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2842 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2843 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2846 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2847 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2848 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2853 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2854 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2858 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2861 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2863 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2864 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2865 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2866 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2868 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2869 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2870 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2872 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2873 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2874 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2875 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2878 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2879 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2880 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2881 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2882 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2884 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2892 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2893 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2894 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2895 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2896 /// never reach the recipient.
2898 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2900 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2901 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2903 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2905 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2906 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2907 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2909 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2911 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2912 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2913 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2918 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2919 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2920 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2921 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2923 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2925 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2927 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2928 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2929 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2930 } else { unreachable!(); })
2933 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2935 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2936 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2939 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2940 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2945 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2946 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2947 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2950 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2952 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2962 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2963 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2964 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2968 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2970 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2971 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2973 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2974 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2976 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2977 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2978 /// keys per-channel).
2980 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2981 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2982 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2984 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2985 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2986 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2988 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2989 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2990 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2993 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2994 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2995 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2996 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3000 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3001 let mut output_index = None;
3002 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3003 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3004 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3005 if output_index.is_some() {
3006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3007 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3010 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3011 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3012 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3015 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3018 if output_index.is_none() {
3019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3020 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3023 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3028 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
3029 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
3030 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
3032 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
3035 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
3036 // smaller than 500:
3037 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
3039 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
3040 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
3041 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
3042 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
3043 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
3044 /// our network addresses.
3046 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
3047 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
3049 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
3050 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
3051 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
3052 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
3054 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
3056 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3057 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
3058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3060 if addresses.len() > 500 {
3061 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
3064 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
3065 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
3066 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
3068 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
3069 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3070 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
3071 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
3072 rgb, alias, addresses,
3073 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
3074 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3076 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3077 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3079 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3080 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3082 let mut announced_chans = false;
3083 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3084 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
3085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3087 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
3092 announced_chans = true;
3094 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
3095 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
3096 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
3100 if announced_chans {
3101 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
3102 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3103 signature: node_announce_sig,
3104 contents: announcement
3110 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3112 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3113 /// Will likely generate further events.
3114 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3115 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3117 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3118 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3119 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3120 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3122 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3123 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3125 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3126 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3127 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3128 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3130 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3131 match forward_info {
3132 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3133 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3134 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3135 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3136 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3138 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3139 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3140 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3141 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3142 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3143 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3144 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3146 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3147 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3153 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3154 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3155 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3156 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3157 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3158 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3161 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3163 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3164 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3165 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3166 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3167 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3169 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3171 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3172 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3176 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3177 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3178 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3179 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3185 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3188 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3191 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3192 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3193 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3194 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3195 // problem, not ours.
3202 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3203 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3204 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3205 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3206 match forward_info {
3207 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3208 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3210 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3211 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3213 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3214 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3215 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3216 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3217 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3218 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3219 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3221 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3223 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3226 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3228 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3229 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3230 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3236 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3238 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3239 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3240 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3241 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3242 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3243 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3244 // this channel currently :/.
3250 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3251 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3253 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3255 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3257 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3260 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3262 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3263 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3264 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3267 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3269 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3270 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3271 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3272 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3273 // messages when we can.
3274 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3275 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3276 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3283 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3284 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3287 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3288 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3289 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3290 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3291 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3292 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3294 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3295 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3296 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3297 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3298 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3300 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3302 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3306 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3307 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3310 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3311 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3312 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3313 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3314 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3315 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3316 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3317 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3318 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3320 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3328 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3329 match forward_info {
3330 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3331 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3332 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3333 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3334 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3335 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3336 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3337 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3339 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3342 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3343 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3344 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3345 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3346 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3348 phantom_shared_secret,
3350 value: amt_to_forward,
3355 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3357 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3358 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3359 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3361 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3362 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3363 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3364 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3365 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3366 phantom_shared_secret,
3368 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3373 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3374 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3375 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3376 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3377 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3378 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3379 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3381 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3385 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3386 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3387 total_value += htlc.value;
3388 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3389 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3390 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3392 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3393 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3395 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3397 _ => unreachable!(),
3400 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3402 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3403 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3404 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3405 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3406 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3408 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3409 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3410 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3414 payment_received_generated = true;
3416 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3417 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3419 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3421 payment_received_generated
3425 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3426 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3427 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3428 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3429 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3430 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3431 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3432 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3433 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3434 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3435 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3436 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3437 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3439 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3443 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3444 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3445 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3447 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3448 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3450 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3451 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3453 amt: amt_to_forward,
3454 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3458 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3459 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3467 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3470 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3471 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3474 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3475 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3476 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3477 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3478 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3479 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3480 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3482 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3483 if payment_received_generated {
3484 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3490 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3491 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3499 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3500 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3502 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3504 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3505 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3508 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3509 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3510 events.append(&mut new_events);
3513 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3515 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3516 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3518 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3519 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3520 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3521 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3522 if background_events.is_empty() {
3526 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3528 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3529 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3530 // monitor updating completing.
3531 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3538 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3539 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3540 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3541 self.process_background_events();
3544 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3545 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3546 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3547 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3549 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3550 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3552 if !chan.is_live() {
3553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3554 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3555 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3557 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3558 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3560 let mut retain_channel = true;
3561 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3564 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3565 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3569 let ret_err = match res {
3570 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3571 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3572 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3573 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3576 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3577 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3578 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3579 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3580 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3581 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3582 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3583 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3593 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3597 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3598 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3599 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3600 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3601 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3602 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3603 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3605 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3607 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3609 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3610 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3611 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3612 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3613 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3614 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3615 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3617 handle_errors.push(err);
3627 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3629 /// This currently includes:
3630 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3631 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3632 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3635 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3636 /// estimate fetches.
3637 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3638 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3639 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3640 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3642 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3644 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3648 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3649 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3650 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3651 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3652 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3653 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3655 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3657 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3659 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3660 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3661 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3662 if needs_close { return false; }
3665 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3666 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3667 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3668 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3669 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3670 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3671 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3672 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3676 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3677 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3679 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3680 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3681 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3685 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3686 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3695 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3696 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3702 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3703 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3704 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3705 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3706 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3707 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3710 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3711 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3712 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3713 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3714 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3715 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3716 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3717 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3719 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3720 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3726 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3727 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3729 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3731 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3732 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3733 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3734 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3735 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3736 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3737 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3739 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3741 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3742 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3744 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3749 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3750 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3751 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3752 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3753 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3754 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
3755 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3756 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3757 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3759 (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3760 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3761 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3763 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3764 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3765 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3766 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3767 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3771 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3772 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3773 // be surfaced to the user.
3774 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3775 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3777 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3778 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3779 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3781 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3785 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3787 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3789 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3790 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3791 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3792 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3793 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3794 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3795 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3796 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3797 Some(RouteParameters {
3798 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3799 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3800 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3803 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3804 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3805 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3807 rejected_by_dest: false,
3808 network_update: None,
3809 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3811 short_channel_id: None,
3818 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3819 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3821 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3827 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3834 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3835 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3836 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3837 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3838 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3839 /// still-available channels.
3840 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3841 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3842 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3843 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3846 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3847 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3848 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3850 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3851 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3852 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3853 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3854 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3855 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3856 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3857 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3858 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3861 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3862 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3865 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3866 all_paths_failed = true;
3867 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3868 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3870 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3876 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3879 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3880 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3881 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3882 Some(RouteParameters {
3883 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3884 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3885 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3888 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3890 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3891 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3893 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3895 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3896 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3897 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3898 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3899 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3900 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3901 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3902 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3909 error_code: onion_error_code,
3911 error_data: onion_error_data
3914 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3920 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3921 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3922 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3923 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3925 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3926 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3927 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3928 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3929 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3930 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3931 network_update: None,
3934 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3937 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3939 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3943 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3944 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3945 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3947 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3948 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3949 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3950 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3951 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3952 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3953 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3954 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3956 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3957 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3960 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3961 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3962 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3966 let mut forward_event = None;
3967 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3968 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3970 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3972 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3975 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3978 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3979 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3980 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3981 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3982 time_forwardable: time
3989 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3990 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3992 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3993 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3994 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3995 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3997 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3998 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
4000 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4001 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4002 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4003 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4004 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
4005 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4009 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4010 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4011 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
4012 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4014 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4015 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4016 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4017 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4019 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4020 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4021 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4022 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4023 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4025 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4026 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4027 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4033 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4034 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4035 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4037 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4038 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4039 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4040 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4041 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4042 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4043 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4045 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4046 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4047 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4048 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4049 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4050 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4051 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4052 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4054 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4055 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4056 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4057 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4058 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4059 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4061 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4066 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4067 // which were generated.
4068 channel_state.take();
4070 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4071 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4072 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4079 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4080 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4081 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4082 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4083 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4085 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4089 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4090 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4091 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4092 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4093 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4094 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4095 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4096 payment_preimage, e);
4097 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4098 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4099 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4100 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4103 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4104 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4105 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4106 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4107 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4108 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4109 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4110 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4111 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4112 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4118 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4120 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4123 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4124 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4125 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4126 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4127 payment_preimage, e);
4129 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4130 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4132 chan.remove_entry();
4134 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4137 } else { unreachable!(); }
4140 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4141 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4142 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4143 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4144 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4145 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4146 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4147 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4148 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4149 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4150 pending_events.push(
4151 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4153 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4158 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4166 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4168 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4169 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4170 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4171 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4172 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4173 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4174 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4175 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4176 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4177 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4178 pending_events.push(
4179 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4180 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4186 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4190 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4191 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4192 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4194 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4195 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4196 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4197 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4198 pending_events.push(
4199 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4207 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4215 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4216 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4217 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4218 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4219 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4220 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4221 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4224 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4225 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4226 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4227 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4228 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4231 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4232 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4233 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4234 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4235 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4236 payment_preimage, e);
4238 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4239 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4240 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4241 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4244 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4245 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4246 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4247 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4251 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4252 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4253 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4256 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4257 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4259 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4267 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4268 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4269 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4272 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4275 let chan_restoration_res;
4276 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4277 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4278 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4279 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4283 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4287 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4288 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4289 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4290 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4291 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4292 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4294 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4295 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4296 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4301 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4302 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4305 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4307 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4308 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4309 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4310 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4314 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4317 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4319 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4320 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4323 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4324 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4325 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4327 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4328 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4330 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4331 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4332 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4336 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4342 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4343 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4344 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4347 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4348 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4351 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4352 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4353 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4354 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4357 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4358 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4362 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4363 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4364 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4366 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4370 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4371 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4372 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4373 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4376 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4377 pending_events.push(
4378 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4379 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4380 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4381 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4382 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4383 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4388 entry.insert(channel);
4394 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4395 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4396 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4397 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4398 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4400 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4403 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4404 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4409 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4410 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4411 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4412 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4414 user_channel_id: user_id,
4419 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4420 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4421 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4422 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4423 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4424 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4426 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4429 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4434 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4435 // lock before watch_channel
4436 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4438 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4439 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4440 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4441 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4442 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4443 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4444 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4445 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4446 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4447 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4450 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4451 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4452 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4453 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4454 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4455 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4459 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4460 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4461 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4463 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4466 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4467 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4476 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4478 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4479 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4480 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4481 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4483 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4484 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4486 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4487 Ok(update) => update,
4488 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4490 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4491 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4492 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4493 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4494 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4495 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4496 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4497 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4507 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4508 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4512 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4513 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4514 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4515 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4517 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4520 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4521 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4522 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4523 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4524 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4525 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4526 msg: announcement_sigs,
4528 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4529 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4530 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4531 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4532 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4533 // announcement_signatures.
4534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4535 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4536 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4537 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4548 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4549 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4550 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4551 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4552 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4554 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4555 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4556 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4557 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4560 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4561 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4562 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4563 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4566 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4567 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4569 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4570 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4571 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4572 let (result, is_permanent) =
4573 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4575 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4581 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4582 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4583 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4593 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4594 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4597 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4601 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4602 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4603 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4604 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4605 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4606 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4607 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4608 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4610 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4611 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4613 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4618 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4619 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4620 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4621 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4622 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4623 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4624 } else { (tx, None) }
4626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4629 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4630 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4631 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4633 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4634 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4635 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4636 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4640 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4645 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4646 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4647 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4648 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4650 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4651 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4652 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4653 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4655 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4656 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4658 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4660 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4661 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4664 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4665 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4666 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4667 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4668 match pending_forward_info {
4669 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4670 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4671 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4672 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4674 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4676 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4677 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4678 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4681 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4683 _ => pending_forward_info
4686 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4693 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4694 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4695 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4696 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4697 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4699 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4702 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4707 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4711 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4712 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4713 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4714 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4716 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4717 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4719 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4726 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4727 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4728 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4729 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4731 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4732 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4734 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4735 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4736 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4738 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4745 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4746 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4747 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4750 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4753 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4754 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4755 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4756 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4757 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4758 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4759 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4764 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4765 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4767 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4768 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4769 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4771 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4772 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4773 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4774 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4775 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4776 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4777 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4778 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4780 commitment_signed: msg,
4786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4791 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4792 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4793 let mut forward_event = None;
4794 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4795 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4796 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4797 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4799 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4800 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4801 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4802 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4803 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4806 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4807 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4810 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4811 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4816 match forward_event {
4818 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4819 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4820 time_forwardable: time
4828 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4829 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4831 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4832 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4833 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4835 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4836 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4838 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4839 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4840 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4841 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4842 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4843 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4844 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4845 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4846 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4847 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4848 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4850 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4851 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4852 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4853 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4854 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4856 } else { unreachable!(); }
4859 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4860 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4861 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4865 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4866 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4867 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4868 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4869 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4874 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4876 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4877 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4879 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4880 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4882 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4883 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4890 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4891 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4892 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4895 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4898 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4900 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4905 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4906 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4907 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4909 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4911 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4912 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4914 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4915 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4919 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4920 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4921 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4922 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4923 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4931 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4932 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4933 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4935 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4936 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4938 // It's not a local channel
4939 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4942 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4944 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4945 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4946 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4947 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4948 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4949 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4951 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4953 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4954 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4955 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4956 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4958 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4963 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4966 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4967 let chan_restoration_res;
4968 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4969 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4972 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4974 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4977 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4978 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4979 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4980 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4981 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4982 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4983 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4984 let mut channel_update = None;
4985 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4987 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4990 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4991 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4992 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4993 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4994 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4995 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4996 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5001 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5002 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5003 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5004 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
5005 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5006 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5008 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5010 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5013 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5014 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
5016 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5017 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
5022 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5023 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5024 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5025 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5026 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5027 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5028 match monitor_event {
5029 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5030 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5032 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
5034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5035 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5038 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5039 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5040 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5042 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5043 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5044 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5045 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5046 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5047 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5048 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5052 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5053 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5055 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5057 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5058 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5059 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5060 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5061 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5066 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5067 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5072 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5073 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5076 has_pending_monitor_events
5079 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5080 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5081 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5083 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5084 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5087 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5088 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5089 /// update was applied.
5091 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5092 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5093 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5094 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5095 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5096 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5097 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5098 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5100 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5101 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5102 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5103 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5104 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5106 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5107 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5108 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5109 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5110 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
5112 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5113 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5114 has_monitor_update = true;
5115 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5116 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5117 if close_channel { return false; }
5119 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5120 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5121 updates: commitment_update,
5128 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5129 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5130 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5137 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5138 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5139 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5142 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5143 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5149 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5150 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5151 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5152 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5153 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5154 let mut has_update = false;
5156 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5157 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5158 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5159 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5160 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5162 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5163 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5164 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5165 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5167 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5168 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5171 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5172 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5173 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5174 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5175 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5180 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5182 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5183 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5184 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5190 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5191 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5198 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5199 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5205 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5206 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5208 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5209 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5210 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5211 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5212 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5213 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5214 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5215 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5216 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5217 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5218 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5219 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5220 assert!(should_broadcast);
5221 } else { unreachable!(); }
5222 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5224 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5228 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5229 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5231 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5232 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5235 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5238 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5239 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5241 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5242 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5243 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5244 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5245 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5246 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5247 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5248 // never fail a payment too early.
5249 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5251 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5254 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5259 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5262 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5263 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5265 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5266 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5267 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5269 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5271 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5272 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5276 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5277 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5279 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5281 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5282 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5283 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5284 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5285 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5286 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5289 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5290 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5292 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5295 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5297 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5299 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5300 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5301 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5302 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5303 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5306 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5307 /// stored external to LDK.
5309 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5310 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5311 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5313 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5314 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5317 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5318 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5319 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5320 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5322 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5323 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5324 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5325 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5326 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5328 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5329 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5330 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5331 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5332 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5334 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5335 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5337 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5338 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5342 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5343 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5345 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5347 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5348 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5349 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5350 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5353 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5354 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5356 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5359 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5361 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5363 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5364 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5367 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5368 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5370 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5371 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5372 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5375 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5376 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5378 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5379 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5380 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5381 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5383 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5384 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5385 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5392 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5394 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5395 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5397 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5398 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5399 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5403 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5404 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5405 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5406 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5407 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5412 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5413 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5417 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5418 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5422 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5423 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5424 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5425 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5426 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5429 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5430 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5431 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5432 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5434 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5435 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5436 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5437 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5440 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5441 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5443 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5444 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5447 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5448 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5449 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5451 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5452 events.replace(pending_events);
5461 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5463 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5464 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5465 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5466 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5469 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5471 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5472 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5474 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5475 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5476 /// restarting from an old state.
5477 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5478 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5479 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5481 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5482 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5483 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5484 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5487 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5488 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5489 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5492 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5493 handler.handle_event(&event);
5501 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5503 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5504 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5505 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5506 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5509 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5511 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5512 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5513 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5514 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5515 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5518 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5519 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5520 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5523 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5525 let new_height = height - 1;
5527 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5528 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5529 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5530 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5531 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5532 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5535 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5539 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5541 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5542 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5543 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5544 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5547 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5548 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5549 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5550 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5552 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5553 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5556 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5557 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5560 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5561 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5562 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5563 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5565 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5566 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5570 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5572 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5574 macro_rules! max_time {
5575 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5577 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5578 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5579 // having an explicit local time source.
5580 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5581 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5582 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5583 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5584 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5590 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5591 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5592 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5593 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5594 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5597 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5598 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5599 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5600 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5601 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5602 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5603 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5604 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5605 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5613 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5614 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5615 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5616 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5617 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5618 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5624 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5625 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5626 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5627 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5628 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5629 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5630 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5631 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5636 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5638 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5639 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5640 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5641 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5644 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5645 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5647 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5648 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5649 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5650 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5651 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5653 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5654 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5656 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5657 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5658 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5659 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5660 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5661 let res = f(channel);
5662 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5663 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5664 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5665 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5669 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5670 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5671 if channel.is_usable() {
5672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5673 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5675 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5683 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5685 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5686 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5687 msg: announcement_sigs,
5689 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5690 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5693 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5694 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5695 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5700 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5701 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5702 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5703 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5704 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5705 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5706 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5710 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5711 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5712 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5713 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5714 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5715 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5716 data: reason_message,
5724 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5725 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5726 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5727 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5728 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5729 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5730 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5731 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5732 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5733 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5734 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5735 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5736 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5741 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5746 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5748 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5749 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5753 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5754 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5755 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5758 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5759 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5760 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5761 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5764 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5765 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5767 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5768 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5771 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5772 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5773 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5774 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5775 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5779 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5780 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5781 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5782 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5786 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5787 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5788 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5789 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5790 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5791 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5794 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5795 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5796 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5799 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5801 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5804 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5806 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5809 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5810 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5811 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5814 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5816 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5819 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5820 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5821 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5824 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5826 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5829 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5831 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5834 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5836 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5839 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5841 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5844 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5846 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5849 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5851 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5854 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5856 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5859 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5861 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5864 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5865 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5866 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5869 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5870 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5871 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5874 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5879 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5881 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5884 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5886 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5887 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5889 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5890 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5891 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5892 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5893 if no_connection_possible {
5894 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5895 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5896 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5897 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5898 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5899 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5900 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5904 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5911 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5912 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5913 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5914 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5915 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5916 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5917 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5920 no_channels_remain = false;
5926 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5928 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5934 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5939 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5940 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5941 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5943 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5944 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5945 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5946 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5950 if no_channels_remain {
5951 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5954 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5955 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5959 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5960 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5965 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5966 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5968 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5969 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5973 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5978 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5980 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5981 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5982 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5983 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5984 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5985 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5986 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5990 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5991 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5992 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5998 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6001 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6004 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6005 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6006 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6007 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6008 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6013 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6014 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6015 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6016 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6019 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6020 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6021 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6029 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6030 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6035 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6036 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6037 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6038 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6039 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6040 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6043 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6046 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6052 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6053 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6058 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6059 let result = *guard;
6067 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6068 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6069 let current_time = Instant::now();
6071 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6072 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6077 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6078 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6079 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6080 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6081 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6083 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6084 let result = *guard;
6085 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6089 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6090 None => return result,
6096 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6098 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6099 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6100 *persistence_lock = true;
6101 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6106 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6107 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6109 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6110 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6111 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6112 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6115 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6116 (2, node_id, required),
6117 (4, features, required),
6118 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6119 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6122 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6123 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6124 (2, channel_id, required),
6125 (3, channel_type, option),
6126 (4, counterparty, required),
6127 (6, funding_txo, option),
6128 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6129 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6130 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6131 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6132 (16, balance_msat, required),
6133 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6134 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6135 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6136 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6137 (26, is_outbound, required),
6138 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
6139 (30, is_usable, required),
6140 (32, is_public, required),
6143 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6144 (2, channels, vec_type),
6145 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6146 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6149 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6151 (0, onion_packet, required),
6152 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6155 (0, payment_data, required),
6156 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6157 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6159 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6160 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6161 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6165 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6166 (0, routing, required),
6167 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6168 (4, payment_hash, required),
6169 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6170 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6174 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6175 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6177 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6179 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6180 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6181 reason.write(writer)?;
6183 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6184 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6187 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6188 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6189 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6190 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6197 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6198 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6199 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6202 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6203 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6204 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6205 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6209 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6210 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6211 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6212 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6213 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6216 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6217 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6218 // messages contained in the variants.
6219 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6220 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6221 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6223 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6224 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6225 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6226 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6227 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6230 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6231 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6232 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6233 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6234 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6236 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6241 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6246 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6247 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6248 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6249 (2, outpoint, required),
6250 (4, htlc_id, required),
6251 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6254 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6255 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6256 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6257 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6260 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6261 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6262 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6267 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6268 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6269 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6275 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6276 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6277 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6279 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6280 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6281 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6285 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6286 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6287 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6289 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6291 if payment_data.is_some() {
6292 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6294 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6297 if payment_data.is_none() {
6298 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6300 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6304 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6312 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6313 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6314 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6317 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6318 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6319 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6320 let mut payment_id = None;
6321 let mut payment_secret = None;
6322 let mut payment_params = None;
6323 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6324 (0, session_priv, required),
6325 (1, payment_id, option),
6326 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6327 (3, payment_secret, option),
6328 (4, path, vec_type),
6329 (5, payment_params, option),
6331 if payment_id.is_none() {
6332 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6334 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6336 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6337 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6338 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6339 path: path.unwrap(),
6340 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6345 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6346 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6351 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6352 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6354 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6356 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6357 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6358 (0, session_priv, required),
6359 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6360 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6361 (3, payment_secret, option),
6362 (4, path, vec_type),
6363 (5, payment_params, option),
6366 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6368 field.write(writer)?;
6375 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6376 (0, LightningError) => {
6380 (0, failure_code, required),
6381 (2, data, vec_type),
6385 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6387 (0, forward_info, required),
6388 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6389 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6390 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6393 (0, htlc_id, required),
6394 (2, err_packet, required),
6398 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6399 (0, payment_secret, required),
6400 (2, expiry_time, required),
6401 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6402 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6403 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6406 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6408 (0, session_privs, required),
6411 (0, session_privs, required),
6412 (1, payment_hash, option),
6415 (0, session_privs, required),
6416 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6417 (2, payment_hash, required),
6418 (4, payment_secret, option),
6419 (6, total_msat, required),
6420 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6421 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6424 (0, session_privs, required),
6425 (2, payment_hash, required),
6429 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6430 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6431 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6432 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6436 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6437 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6439 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6441 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6443 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6444 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6445 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6448 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6449 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6450 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6451 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6452 unfunded_channels += 1;
6455 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6456 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6457 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6458 channel.write(writer)?;
6462 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6463 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6464 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6465 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6466 for forward in pending_forwards {
6467 forward.write(writer)?;
6471 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6472 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6473 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6474 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6475 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6476 htlc.write(writer)?;
6480 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6481 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6482 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6483 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6484 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6485 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6488 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6489 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6490 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6491 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6492 for event in events.iter() {
6493 event.write(writer)?;
6496 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6497 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6498 for event in background_events.iter() {
6500 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6502 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6503 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6508 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6509 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6511 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6512 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6513 hash.write(writer)?;
6514 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6517 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6518 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6519 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6520 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6521 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6524 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6525 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6527 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6528 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6529 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6530 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6533 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6534 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6538 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6539 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6540 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6542 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6543 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6544 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6549 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6550 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6551 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6552 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6553 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6560 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6562 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6564 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6565 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6566 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6567 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6568 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6569 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6570 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6571 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6572 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6573 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6574 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6575 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6576 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6578 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6579 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6581 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6582 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6584 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6585 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6586 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6587 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6588 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6589 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6591 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6592 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6593 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6594 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6595 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6596 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6599 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6600 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6602 pub keys_manager: K,
6604 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6606 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6607 pub fee_estimator: F,
6608 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6610 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6611 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6612 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6613 pub chain_monitor: M,
6615 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6616 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6617 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6618 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6619 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6620 /// deserialization.
6622 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6623 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6624 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6626 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6627 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6629 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6630 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6631 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6632 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6634 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6637 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6638 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6641 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6642 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6643 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6644 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6645 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6646 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6649 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6650 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6651 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6652 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6653 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6655 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6656 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6661 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6662 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6663 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6664 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6665 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6666 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6667 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6668 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6671 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6672 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6673 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6677 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6678 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6679 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6680 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6681 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6685 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6686 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6688 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6689 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6690 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6692 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6694 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6695 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6696 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6697 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6698 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6699 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6700 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6701 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6702 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6703 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6704 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6705 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6706 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6707 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6708 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6709 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6710 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6711 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6712 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6713 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6714 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6715 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6716 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6717 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6718 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6719 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6720 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6721 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6722 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6723 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6724 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6725 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6726 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6727 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6728 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6729 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6730 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6731 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6732 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6735 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6736 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6737 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6739 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6742 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6743 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6744 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6745 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6746 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6747 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6751 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6752 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6753 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6754 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6758 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6759 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6760 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6761 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6762 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6763 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6764 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6765 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6766 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6768 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6771 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6772 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6773 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6774 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6776 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6777 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6778 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6780 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6783 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6784 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6785 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6786 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6787 let peer_state = PeerState {
6788 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6790 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6793 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6795 for _ in 0..event_count {
6796 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6797 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6801 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6802 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6803 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6804 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6805 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6806 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6807 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6808 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6812 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6814 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6815 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6816 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6817 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6821 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6822 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6824 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6826 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6827 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6828 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6832 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6834 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6835 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6836 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6838 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6840 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6841 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6845 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6846 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6847 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6848 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6849 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6850 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6851 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6852 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6853 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6854 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6856 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6857 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6860 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6861 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6862 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6863 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6864 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6865 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6867 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6869 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6870 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6871 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6872 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6873 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6874 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6875 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6877 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6878 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6879 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6880 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6881 if path.is_empty() {
6882 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6883 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6885 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6886 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6887 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6888 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6890 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6891 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6892 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6895 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6896 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6897 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6898 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6900 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6901 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6902 total_msat: path_amt,
6903 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6905 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6906 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6915 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6916 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6918 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6919 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6922 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6924 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6926 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6927 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6928 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6929 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6930 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6934 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6935 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6936 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6937 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6939 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6940 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6941 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6943 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6944 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6945 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6946 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6947 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6948 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6950 if chan.is_usable() {
6951 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6952 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6953 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6954 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6955 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6960 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6961 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6962 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6964 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6965 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6966 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6968 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6970 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6975 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6977 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6978 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6979 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6981 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6982 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6988 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6989 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6991 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6993 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6994 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6995 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6996 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6998 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6999 logger: args.logger,
7000 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7003 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7004 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7007 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7008 //connection or two.
7010 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7016 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7017 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7018 use core::time::Duration;
7019 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7020 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7021 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7022 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7023 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7024 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7026 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7027 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7028 use util::errors::APIError;
7029 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7030 use util::test_utils;
7031 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7033 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7035 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7036 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7038 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7041 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7042 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7044 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7045 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7046 thread::spawn(move || {
7048 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7049 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7050 *persistence_lock = true;
7053 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7059 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7060 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7062 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7065 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7070 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7072 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7075 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7082 fn test_notify_limits() {
7083 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7084 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7088 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7090 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7091 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7092 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7093 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7094 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7096 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7098 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7099 // to connect messages with new values
7100 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7101 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7102 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7103 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7105 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7106 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7107 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7108 // ... but the last node should not.
7109 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7110 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7111 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7112 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7114 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7115 // about the channel.
7116 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7117 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7118 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7120 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7122 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7123 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7124 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7125 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7126 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7127 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7129 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7130 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7131 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7133 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7134 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7135 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7136 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7137 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7138 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7140 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7141 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7142 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7143 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7144 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7145 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7146 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7147 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7149 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7150 // the channel info has updated.
7151 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7152 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7153 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7154 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7155 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7156 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7160 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7161 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7166 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7167 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7169 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7170 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7171 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7172 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7173 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7174 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7175 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7177 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7179 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7181 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7182 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7184 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7185 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7186 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7187 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7188 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7190 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7192 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7194 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7195 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7196 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7197 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7198 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7199 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7200 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7201 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7202 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7204 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7205 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7207 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7208 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7209 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7211 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7212 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7213 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7214 // lightning messages manually.
7215 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7217 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7218 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7219 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7221 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7222 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7224 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7225 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7227 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7228 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7229 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7231 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7232 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7233 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7235 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7237 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7239 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7240 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7243 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7244 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7245 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7246 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7248 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7249 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7250 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7251 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7256 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7257 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7258 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7259 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7264 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7265 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7266 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7267 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7274 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7275 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7276 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7277 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7278 // fails as expected.
7279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7282 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7283 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7284 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7285 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7287 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7288 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7289 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7291 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7292 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7293 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7294 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7295 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7297 let route = find_route(
7298 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7299 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7301 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7303 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7304 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7305 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7306 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7307 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7309 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7310 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7311 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7313 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7314 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7315 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7316 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7317 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7318 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7319 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7320 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7321 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7323 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7324 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7326 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7327 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7328 let route = find_route(
7329 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7330 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7332 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7334 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7335 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7336 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7337 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7338 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7340 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7341 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7342 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7344 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7346 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7347 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7348 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7350 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7351 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7352 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7354 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7355 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7356 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7357 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7358 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7359 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7361 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7362 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7364 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7365 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7369 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7370 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7371 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7372 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7373 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7374 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7375 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7377 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7378 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7379 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7380 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7382 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7383 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7384 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7385 final_value_msat: 10000,
7386 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7388 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7389 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7390 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7391 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7392 let route = find_route(
7393 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7394 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7397 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7398 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7399 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7402 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7403 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7404 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7405 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7406 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7407 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7408 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7410 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7414 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7415 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7419 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7421 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7422 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7423 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7424 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7426 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7427 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7428 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7429 final_value_msat: 10000,
7430 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7432 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7433 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7434 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7435 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7436 let route = find_route(
7437 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7438 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7441 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7442 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7443 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7444 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7447 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7448 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7449 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7450 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7451 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7452 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7453 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7455 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7459 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7460 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7461 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7462 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7463 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7465 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7466 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7467 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7468 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7470 // Marshall an MPP route.
7471 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7472 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7473 route.paths.push(path);
7474 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7475 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7476 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7477 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7478 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7479 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7481 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7482 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7483 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7484 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7489 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7490 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7491 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7492 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7493 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7494 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7496 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7497 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7499 total_msat: 100_000,
7502 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7503 // payment verification fails as expected.
7504 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7505 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7506 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7507 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7509 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7513 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7514 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7518 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7521 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7522 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7523 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7524 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7525 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7526 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7527 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7528 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7529 use util::test_utils;
7530 use util::config::UserConfig;
7531 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7533 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7534 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7535 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7537 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7541 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7542 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7543 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7544 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7545 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7546 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7547 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7552 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7553 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7556 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7557 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7558 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7560 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7561 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7563 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7564 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7566 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7567 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7569 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7570 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7571 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7572 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7573 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7575 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7577 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7579 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7580 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7581 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7582 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7583 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7585 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7587 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7589 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7590 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7591 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7592 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7593 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7596 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7597 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7598 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7600 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7601 } else { panic!(); }
7603 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7604 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7606 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7609 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7612 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7613 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7615 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7616 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7617 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7618 match msg_events[0] {
7619 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7620 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7621 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7625 match msg_events[1] {
7626 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7630 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7632 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7633 macro_rules! send_payment {
7634 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7635 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7636 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7637 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7638 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7639 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7640 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7641 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7642 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7643 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7645 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7646 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7648 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7649 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7651 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7652 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7653 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7654 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7655 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7656 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7657 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7658 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7660 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7661 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7662 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7664 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7665 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7666 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7667 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7668 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7670 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7673 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7674 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7675 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7676 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7678 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7683 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7684 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);