1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
239 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242 session_priv: SecretKey,
243 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
244 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
246 payment_id: PaymentId,
247 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
248 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
249 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
250 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
252 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
255 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
256 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
257 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
261 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
266 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
267 payment_id.hash(hasher);
268 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
269 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
270 payment_params.hash(hasher);
275 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
278 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
279 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
281 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
282 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
283 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
284 payment_secret: None,
285 payment_params: None,
290 struct ReceiveError {
296 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
297 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
299 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
300 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
301 pub enum FailureCode {
302 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
303 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
304 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
305 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
306 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
307 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
308 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
309 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
310 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
311 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
312 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
315 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
317 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
318 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
319 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
320 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
321 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
323 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
324 err: msgs::LightningError,
325 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
326 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
328 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
330 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 shutdown_finish: None,
346 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
348 err: LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
353 shutdown_finish: None,
357 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
358 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
361 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
363 err: LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
373 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
377 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
380 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
382 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
383 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
387 log_level: Level::Warn,
390 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
394 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
397 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 shutdown_finish: None,
410 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
411 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
412 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
413 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
414 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
416 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
417 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
418 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
419 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
420 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
421 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
422 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
424 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
428 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
429 struct ClaimingPayment {
431 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
432 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
434 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
435 (0, amount_msat, required),
436 (2, payment_purpose, required),
437 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
440 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
441 struct ClaimablePayments {
442 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
443 /// failed/claimed by the user.
445 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
446 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
448 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
449 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
450 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
452 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
453 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
454 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
455 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
458 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
459 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
460 /// quite some time lag.
461 enum BackgroundEvent {
462 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
463 /// commitment transaction.
464 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
467 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
468 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
469 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
470 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
471 /// event can be generated.
472 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
473 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
474 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
477 /// State we hold per-peer.
478 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
479 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
481 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
482 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
484 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
485 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
486 latest_features: InitFeatures,
487 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
488 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
489 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
490 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
491 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
492 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
496 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
497 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
499 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
502 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
503 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
504 struct PendingInboundPayment {
505 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
506 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
507 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
508 /// this payment being removed.
510 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
511 user_payment_id: u64,
512 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
513 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
514 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
517 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
518 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
519 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
520 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
521 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
522 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
523 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
525 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
526 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
534 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
536 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
541 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
542 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
543 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
544 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
545 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
546 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
547 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
548 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
550 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
551 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
553 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
554 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
556 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
557 /// to individual Channels.
559 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
560 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
561 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
562 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
564 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
565 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
566 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
567 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
568 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
569 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
570 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
572 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
573 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
574 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
575 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
578 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
579 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
580 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
581 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
582 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
584 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
585 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
586 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
587 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
588 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
591 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
592 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
593 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
594 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
595 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
599 // `total_consistency_lock`
601 // |__`forward_htlcs`
603 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
605 // |__`per_peer_state`
607 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
609 // | |__`claimable_payments`
611 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
617 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
619 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
623 // | |__`pending_events`
625 // | |__`pending_background_events`
627 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
629 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
630 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
631 ES::Target: EntropySource,
632 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
633 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
638 default_configuration: UserConfig,
639 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
640 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
646 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
648 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
650 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
651 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
653 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
654 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
655 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
656 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
658 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
659 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
661 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
662 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
663 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
664 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
665 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
666 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
667 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
668 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
670 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
672 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
673 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
675 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
677 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
678 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
679 /// and via the classic SCID.
681 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
682 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
684 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
686 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
688 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
689 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
690 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
692 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
693 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
695 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
696 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
698 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
699 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
701 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
702 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
703 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
704 /// active channel list on load.
706 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
707 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
709 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
711 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
712 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
713 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
715 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
716 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
717 /// the handling of the events.
719 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
720 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
723 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
724 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
725 /// would break backwards compatability.
726 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
727 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
728 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
731 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
733 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
735 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
736 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
737 /// confirmation depth.
739 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
740 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
741 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
743 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
745 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
747 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
749 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
751 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
753 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
754 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
755 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
757 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
758 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
760 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
761 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
762 /// keeping additional state.
763 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
765 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
766 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
767 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
768 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
770 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
771 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
773 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
774 /// are currently open with that peer.
776 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
777 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
780 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
782 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
783 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
784 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
785 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
786 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
788 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
789 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
790 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
791 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
792 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
793 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
794 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
795 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
796 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
797 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
798 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
800 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
809 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
811 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
812 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
813 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
814 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
815 pub struct ChainParameters {
816 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
817 pub network: Network,
819 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
821 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
822 pub best_block: BestBlock,
825 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
831 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
832 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
833 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
834 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
835 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
836 /// updates are ready for persistence).
838 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
839 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
840 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
841 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
842 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
844 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
845 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
848 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
849 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
850 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
853 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
854 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
856 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
857 persistence_notifier: notifier,
858 should_persist: persist_check,
859 _read_guard: read_guard,
864 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
866 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
867 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
872 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
873 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
875 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
877 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
878 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
879 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
880 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
881 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
883 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
884 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
886 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
888 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
889 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
890 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
891 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
892 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
893 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
894 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
895 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
896 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
897 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
898 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
899 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
900 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
902 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
903 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
905 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
906 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
907 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
908 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
910 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
911 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
912 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
913 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
914 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
915 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
918 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
920 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
921 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
924 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
926 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
927 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
929 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
930 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
931 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
932 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
934 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
935 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
936 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
937 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
938 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
939 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
940 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
941 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
942 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
943 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
944 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
947 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
948 /// to better separate parameters.
949 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
950 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
951 /// The node_id of our counterparty
952 pub node_id: PublicKey,
953 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
954 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
955 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
956 pub features: InitFeatures,
957 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
958 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
959 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
961 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
963 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
964 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
965 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
966 /// payments to us through this channel.
967 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
968 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
969 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
970 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
971 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
972 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
973 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
976 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
977 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
978 pub struct ChannelDetails {
979 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
980 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
981 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
982 /// lifetime of the channel.
983 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
984 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
985 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
986 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
987 /// our counterparty already.
989 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
990 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
991 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
992 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
994 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
995 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
996 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
997 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
999 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1000 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1002 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1003 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1005 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1006 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1007 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1008 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1009 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1010 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1011 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1012 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1013 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1016 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1018 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1019 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1020 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1021 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1022 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1023 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1024 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1026 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1027 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1029 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1030 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1031 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1032 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1033 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1034 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1035 /// this value on chain.
1037 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1039 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1041 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1042 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1043 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1044 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1046 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1047 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1048 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1049 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1051 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1052 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1053 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1054 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1056 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1057 pub balance_msat: u64,
1058 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1059 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1060 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1061 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1063 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1065 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1066 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1067 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1068 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1069 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1070 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1071 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1072 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1074 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1075 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1076 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1077 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1078 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1079 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1080 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1082 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1083 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1084 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1085 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1086 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1087 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1088 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1089 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1090 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1092 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1094 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1095 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1096 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1097 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1098 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1100 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1101 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1102 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1103 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1104 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1105 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1106 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1108 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1109 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1110 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1111 pub is_outbound: bool,
1112 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1113 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1114 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1115 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1116 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1118 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1119 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1120 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1121 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1123 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1124 pub is_usable: bool,
1125 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1126 pub is_public: bool,
1127 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1128 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1129 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1130 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1131 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1132 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1134 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1135 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1138 impl ChannelDetails {
1139 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1140 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1141 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1143 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1144 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1145 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1146 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1149 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1150 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1151 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1153 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1154 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1155 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1156 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1160 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1161 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1162 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1163 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1164 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1166 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1168 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1169 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1170 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1173 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1174 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1175 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1177 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1178 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1179 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1181 /// After a payment is explicitly abandoned by calling [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it
1182 /// is marked as abandoned until an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated. A payment could also
1183 /// be marked as abandoned if pathfinding fails repeatedly or retries have been exhausted.
1185 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1186 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1190 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1192 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1194 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1195 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1196 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1197 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1199 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1200 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1201 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1204 macro_rules! handle_error {
1205 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1208 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1209 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
1211 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1212 // entering the macro.
1213 debug_assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1214 debug_assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
1217 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1219 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1220 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1221 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1222 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1226 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1227 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1228 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1229 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1234 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1235 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1237 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1238 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1239 action: err.action.clone()
1243 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1244 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1245 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1246 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1247 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1251 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1258 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1259 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1260 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1261 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1262 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1263 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1265 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1266 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1267 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1268 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1269 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1271 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1272 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1274 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1278 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1279 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1280 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1282 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1283 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1285 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1286 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1288 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1289 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1290 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1291 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1292 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1293 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1299 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1300 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1304 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1306 $entry.remove_entry();
1314 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1315 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1319 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1321 $entry.remove_entry();
1329 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1330 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1332 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1333 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1339 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1340 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1342 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1343 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1344 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1345 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1346 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1347 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1348 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1349 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1350 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1351 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1352 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1353 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1354 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1355 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1358 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1359 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1360 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1361 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1362 match $action_type {
1363 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1364 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1366 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1367 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1369 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1370 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1371 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1372 if !$resend_commitment {
1373 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1376 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1378 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1379 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1381 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1386 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1387 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1389 $entry.remove_entry();
1393 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1394 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1395 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1397 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1398 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1400 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1401 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1403 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1404 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1406 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1407 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1411 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1412 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1413 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1414 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1415 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1417 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1418 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1419 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1420 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1421 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1422 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1423 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1424 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1425 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1426 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1431 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1432 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1433 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1435 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1436 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1437 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1438 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1439 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1440 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1443 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1448 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1450 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1451 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1452 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1453 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1454 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1455 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1459 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1461 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1462 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1464 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1466 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1467 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1468 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1469 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1470 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1471 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1472 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1473 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1475 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1476 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1477 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1482 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1484 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1485 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1486 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1487 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1488 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1489 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1490 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1491 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1493 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1496 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1497 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1499 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1501 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1503 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1505 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1506 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1507 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1508 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1518 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1519 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1520 &self.default_configuration
1523 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1524 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1525 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1528 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1529 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1531 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1533 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1537 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1542 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1544 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1545 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1546 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1547 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1548 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1550 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1551 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1553 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1554 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1555 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1557 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1558 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1559 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1560 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1561 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1562 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1564 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1565 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1566 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1567 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1568 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1569 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1573 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1574 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1576 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1578 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1579 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1581 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1583 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1584 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1585 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1586 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1587 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1588 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1592 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1597 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1599 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1600 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1603 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1605 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1608 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1611 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1612 node_id: their_network_key,
1615 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1618 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1619 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1620 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1621 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1622 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1623 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1624 // the same channel.
1625 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1627 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1629 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1630 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1632 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1633 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1634 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1635 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1636 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1637 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1638 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1639 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1640 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1641 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1642 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1643 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1644 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1645 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1646 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1647 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1648 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1649 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1650 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1652 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1653 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1654 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1655 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1656 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1657 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1658 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1659 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1660 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1661 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1662 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1663 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1664 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1665 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1666 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1667 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1668 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1669 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1670 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1671 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1672 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1673 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1674 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1675 config: Some(channel.config()),
1683 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1684 /// more information.
1685 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1686 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1689 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1690 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1692 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1693 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1696 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1697 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1698 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1699 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1700 // really wanted anyway.
1701 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1704 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1705 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1707 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1708 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1709 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider retrying the payment.
1711 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1712 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1713 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1714 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1715 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1716 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1717 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1718 total_msat: *total_msat,
1721 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1722 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1724 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1725 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1727 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1732 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1733 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1734 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1735 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1736 Some(transaction) => {
1737 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1741 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1742 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1743 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1744 reason: closure_reason
1748 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1749 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1751 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1752 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1755 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1756 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1760 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1762 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1763 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1765 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1766 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1767 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1768 let (result, is_permanent) =
1769 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1771 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1776 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1777 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1781 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1782 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1783 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1788 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1796 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1797 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1798 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1799 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1802 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1806 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1807 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1808 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1810 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1811 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1813 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1814 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1815 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1816 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1818 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1820 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1821 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1822 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1823 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1824 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1827 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1828 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1829 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1831 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1832 /// the channel being closed or not:
1833 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1834 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1835 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1836 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1837 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1838 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1839 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1841 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1843 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1844 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1845 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1846 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1847 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1851 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1852 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1853 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1854 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1855 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1856 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1857 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1858 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1860 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1861 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1862 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1863 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1864 // ignore the result here.
1865 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1869 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1870 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1871 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1872 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1874 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1875 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1879 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1880 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1881 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1883 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1885 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1887 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1890 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1891 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1892 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1893 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1894 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1899 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1902 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1904 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1905 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1907 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1908 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1909 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1910 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1911 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1912 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1913 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1924 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1925 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1926 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1928 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1929 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1930 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1933 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1934 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1935 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1937 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1938 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1939 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1940 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1941 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1944 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1945 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1946 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1947 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1948 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1952 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1953 /// local transaction(s).
1954 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1955 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1956 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1960 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1961 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1963 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1964 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1965 return Err(ReceiveError {
1966 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1968 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1971 // final_expiry_too_soon
1972 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1973 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1975 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1976 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1977 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1978 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1979 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1980 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1981 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1982 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1983 return Err(ReceiveError {
1984 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1985 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1988 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1989 return Err(ReceiveError {
1991 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1992 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1996 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1997 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1998 return Err(ReceiveError {
1999 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2000 err_data: Vec::new(),
2001 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2004 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2005 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2006 return Err(ReceiveError {
2007 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2008 err_data: Vec::new(),
2009 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2011 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2012 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2014 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2015 phantom_shared_secret,
2017 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2018 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2019 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2020 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2021 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2022 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2023 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2024 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2025 return Err(ReceiveError {
2026 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2027 err_data: Vec::new(),
2028 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2032 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2034 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2037 return Err(ReceiveError {
2038 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2039 err_data: Vec::new(),
2040 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2045 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2048 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2049 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2050 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2051 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2055 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2056 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2057 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2059 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2060 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2061 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2062 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2063 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2064 failure_code: $err_code,
2070 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2071 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2074 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2075 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2076 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2078 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2079 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2080 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2081 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2082 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2083 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2084 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2085 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2087 macro_rules! return_err {
2088 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2090 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2091 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2092 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2093 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2094 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2095 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2101 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2103 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2104 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2106 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2107 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2111 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2112 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2114 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2116 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2117 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2118 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2119 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2120 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2122 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2125 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2126 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2127 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2129 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2130 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2131 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2134 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2135 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2136 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2137 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2141 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2142 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2143 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2146 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2147 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2148 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2149 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2150 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2155 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2156 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2157 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2158 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2159 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2160 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2161 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2162 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2163 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2164 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2165 // phantom or an intercept.
2166 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2167 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2168 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2172 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2175 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2177 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2178 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2179 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2180 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2181 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2183 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2184 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2185 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2187 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2188 // have no consistency guarantees.
2189 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2193 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2194 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2195 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2196 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2197 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2199 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2200 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2201 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2202 // we don't have the channel here.
2203 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2205 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2207 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2208 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2209 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2210 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2211 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2212 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2213 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2215 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2216 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2218 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2219 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2223 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2224 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2225 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2226 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2228 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2235 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2236 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2237 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2238 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2239 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2240 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2242 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2243 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2245 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2246 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2247 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2248 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2249 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2250 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2251 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2252 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2253 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2254 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2260 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2261 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2262 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2263 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2265 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2266 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2268 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2269 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2270 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2272 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2273 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2274 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2275 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2276 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2277 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2278 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2282 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2287 pending_forward_info
2290 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2291 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2292 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2294 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2295 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2296 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2297 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2298 if !chan.should_announce() {
2299 return Err(LightningError {
2300 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2304 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2305 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2307 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2308 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2311 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2312 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2313 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2314 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2316 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2317 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2318 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2319 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2320 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2321 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2322 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2326 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2328 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2330 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2332 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2333 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2335 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2336 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2337 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2338 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2339 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2340 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2341 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2342 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2344 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2345 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2346 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2348 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2350 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2356 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2357 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2359 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2360 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2362 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2363 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2364 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2365 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2366 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2368 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2372 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2373 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2374 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2375 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2378 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2379 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2380 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2383 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2385 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2386 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2388 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2389 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2391 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2392 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2394 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2395 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2396 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2399 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2400 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2401 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2403 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2404 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2406 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2407 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2408 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2409 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2410 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2411 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2412 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2413 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2414 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2415 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2417 _ => unreachable!(),
2420 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2421 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2422 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2423 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2424 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2425 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2426 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2427 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2436 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2437 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2438 // `channel_by_id` map.
2439 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2440 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2445 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2446 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2448 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2453 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2455 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2456 /// fields for more info.
2458 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2459 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2461 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2463 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2464 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2465 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2466 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2469 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2470 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2471 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2472 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2473 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2475 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2476 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2477 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2478 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2480 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2482 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2483 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2484 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2486 /// In general, a path may raise:
2487 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2488 /// node public key) is specified.
2489 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2490 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2492 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2493 /// relevant updates.
2495 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2496 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2497 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2499 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2501 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2502 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2503 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2504 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2505 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2507 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2508 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2509 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2511 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2512 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2513 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2514 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2515 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2516 self.pending_outbound_payments
2517 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2518 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2519 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2522 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2523 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2524 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2525 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2526 self.pending_outbound_payments
2527 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2528 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2529 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2530 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2531 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2535 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2536 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2537 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2538 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2539 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2543 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2544 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2545 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2549 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2551 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2552 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2553 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2554 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2555 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2557 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2558 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2559 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2560 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2561 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2562 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2563 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2566 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2568 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2569 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2570 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2572 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2573 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2574 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2576 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2577 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2578 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2579 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2580 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2582 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2583 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2584 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2585 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2586 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2588 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2589 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2593 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2594 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2595 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2596 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2597 /// never reach the recipient.
2599 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2600 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2602 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2603 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2605 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2607 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2608 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2609 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2610 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2611 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2613 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2614 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2617 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2618 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2619 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2620 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2621 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2622 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2623 self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2625 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2626 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2629 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2630 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2631 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2632 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2633 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2634 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2635 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2636 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2639 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2642 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2643 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2646 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2647 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2648 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2649 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2650 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2651 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2652 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2653 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2655 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2656 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2659 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2661 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2663 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2664 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2665 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2666 } else { unreachable!(); })
2669 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2672 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2673 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2676 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2677 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2682 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2683 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2686 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2688 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2691 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2692 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2693 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2702 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2703 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2704 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2708 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2710 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2711 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2713 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2714 /// across the p2p network.
2716 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2717 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2719 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2720 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2721 /// keys per-channel).
2723 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2724 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2725 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2727 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2728 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2729 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2731 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2732 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2733 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2734 /// for more details.
2736 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2737 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2738 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2741 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2742 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2743 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2744 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2749 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2750 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2751 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2752 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2753 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2754 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2755 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2759 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2760 let mut output_index = None;
2761 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2762 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2763 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2764 if output_index.is_some() {
2765 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2766 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2769 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2771 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2774 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2777 if output_index.is_none() {
2778 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2779 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2782 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2786 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2788 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2789 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2790 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2791 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2793 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2794 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2796 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2797 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2799 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2801 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2802 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2803 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2804 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2805 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2806 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2807 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2808 pub fn update_channel_config(
2809 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2810 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2811 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2812 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2813 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2817 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2818 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2821 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2822 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2823 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2824 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2825 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2826 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2827 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2828 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2832 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2833 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2834 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2837 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2838 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2839 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2840 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2841 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2849 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2850 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2852 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2853 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2855 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2856 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2857 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2858 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2859 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2861 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2862 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2864 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2867 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2868 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2869 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2870 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2871 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2874 let next_hop_scid = {
2875 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2876 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2877 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2878 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2879 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2880 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2882 if !chan.is_usable() {
2883 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2884 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2887 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2889 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2890 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2895 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2896 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2897 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2900 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2901 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2902 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2904 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2906 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2907 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2910 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2911 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2912 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2913 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2914 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2916 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2920 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2921 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2923 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2926 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2927 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2930 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2931 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2932 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2935 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2936 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2937 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2938 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2939 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2940 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2941 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2944 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2945 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2946 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2947 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2952 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2954 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2955 /// Will likely generate further events.
2956 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2959 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2960 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2961 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2963 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2964 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2966 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2967 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2968 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2970 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2971 match forward_info {
2972 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2973 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2974 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2975 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2976 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2979 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2980 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2981 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2983 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2984 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2985 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2986 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2987 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2988 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2991 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2992 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2994 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2997 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2998 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3004 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3005 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3007 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3011 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3012 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3014 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3018 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3019 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3020 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3021 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3022 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3024 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3025 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3026 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3027 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3028 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3030 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3032 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3033 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3037 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3038 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3039 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3040 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3046 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3049 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3052 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3053 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3054 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3055 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3056 // problem, not ours.
3062 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3063 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3065 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3069 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3070 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3071 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3072 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3077 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3079 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3083 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3084 match forward_info {
3085 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3086 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3087 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3088 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3089 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3092 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3093 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3094 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3095 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3096 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3097 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3098 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3099 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3101 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3102 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3103 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3105 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3108 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3110 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3111 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3112 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3113 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3118 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3119 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3121 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3122 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3123 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3124 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3126 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3129 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3131 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3132 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3133 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3142 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3143 match forward_info {
3144 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3145 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3146 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3147 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3150 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3151 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3152 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3153 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3155 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3156 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3158 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3161 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3162 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3163 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3164 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3165 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3166 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3167 phantom_shared_secret,
3169 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3171 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3176 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3177 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3178 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3179 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3180 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3182 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3183 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3184 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3185 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3187 phantom_shared_secret,
3189 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3190 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3194 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3195 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3196 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3197 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3198 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3201 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3202 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3203 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3205 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3206 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3207 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3210 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3211 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3212 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3215 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3216 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3217 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3218 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3220 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3224 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3225 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3226 total_value += htlc.value;
3227 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3228 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3229 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3231 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3232 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3234 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3236 _ => unreachable!(),
3239 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3241 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3242 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3243 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3244 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3245 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3246 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3247 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3250 amount_msat: total_value,
3251 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3252 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3254 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3256 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3257 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3259 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3261 payment_claimable_generated
3265 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3266 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3267 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3268 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3269 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3270 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3271 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3272 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3274 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3275 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3276 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3277 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3278 Ok(result) => result,
3280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3281 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3285 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3286 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3287 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3288 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3289 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3290 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3294 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3296 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3297 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3298 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3299 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3302 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3304 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3305 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3306 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3307 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3308 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3310 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3312 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3313 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3317 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3318 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3325 if payment_data.is_none() {
3326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3327 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3330 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3331 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3333 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3334 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3336 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3337 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3339 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3340 if payment_claimable_generated {
3341 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3347 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3348 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3356 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3357 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3358 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3359 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3360 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3362 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3363 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3365 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3367 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3368 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3369 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3371 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3373 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3374 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3375 events.append(&mut new_events);
3378 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3380 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3381 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3383 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3384 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3385 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3386 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3387 if background_events.is_empty() {
3391 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3393 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3394 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3395 // monitor updating completing.
3396 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3403 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3404 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3405 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3406 self.process_background_events();
3409 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3410 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3411 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3412 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3414 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3415 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3417 if !chan.is_live() {
3418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3419 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3420 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3423 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3425 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3426 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3430 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3431 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3432 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3433 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3434 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3435 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3436 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3438 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3441 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3444 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3445 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3446 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3454 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3456 /// This currently includes:
3457 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3458 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3459 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3461 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3462 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3463 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3465 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3466 /// estimate fetches.
3467 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3468 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3469 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3470 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3472 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3474 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3475 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3476 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3478 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3479 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3482 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3483 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3484 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3485 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3486 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3488 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3489 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3490 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3491 if needs_close { return false; }
3494 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3495 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3496 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3497 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3498 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3499 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3500 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3501 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3505 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3506 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3508 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3509 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3510 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3514 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3515 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3520 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3524 let peer_should_be_removed = !peer_state.is_connected && peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 0;
3525 if peer_should_be_removed {
3526 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3531 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3532 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3533 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3534 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3535 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3536 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3537 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3538 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3539 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3540 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3541 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3542 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3543 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3544 // have no channels to the peer.
3545 let remove_entry = {
3546 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3547 !peer_state.is_connected && peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 0
3550 entry.remove_entry();
3553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3558 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3559 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3560 // This should be unreachable
3561 debug_assert!(false);
3564 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3565 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3566 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3567 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3569 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3570 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3571 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3573 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3580 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3581 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3582 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3583 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3584 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3587 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3588 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3591 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3593 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3594 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3595 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3596 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3597 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3604 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3605 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3606 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3608 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3609 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3610 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3611 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3613 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3614 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3615 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3616 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3617 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3621 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3622 /// reason for the failure.
3624 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3625 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3628 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3629 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3630 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3631 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3632 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3633 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3634 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3639 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3640 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3641 match failure_code {
3642 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3643 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3644 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3645 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3646 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3647 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3652 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3653 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3655 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3657 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3658 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3659 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3660 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3661 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3662 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3663 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3665 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3667 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3668 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3670 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3675 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3676 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3677 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3678 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3679 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3680 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3681 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3682 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3683 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3684 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3686 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3687 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3688 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3689 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3691 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3692 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3693 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3694 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3695 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3699 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3700 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3701 // be surfaced to the user.
3702 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3703 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3704 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3706 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3707 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3708 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3709 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3710 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3711 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3713 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3717 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3720 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3721 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3722 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3723 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3727 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3728 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3729 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3730 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
3732 // Ensure that the peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this
3734 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3735 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3736 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock aquired would.
3737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3738 for (_, peer) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3739 debug_assert!(peer.try_lock().is_ok());
3743 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3744 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3745 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3748 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3749 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3750 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3752 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3753 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3755 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3757 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3759 let mut forward_event = None;
3760 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3761 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3762 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3764 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3766 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3769 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3772 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3773 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3774 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3775 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3776 time_forwardable: time
3779 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3780 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3781 failed_next_destination: destination,
3787 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3788 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3790 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3791 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3792 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3794 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3795 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3796 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3797 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3799 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3800 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3801 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3802 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3803 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3804 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3805 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3810 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3811 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3812 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3813 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3814 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3815 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3816 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3817 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3822 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3823 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3824 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3826 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3827 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3828 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3829 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3834 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3836 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3837 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3838 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3839 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3840 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3842 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3843 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3845 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3846 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3847 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3848 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3849 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3851 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3852 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3853 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3854 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3856 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3857 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3858 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3865 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3866 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3871 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3872 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3874 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3879 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3880 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3881 debug_assert!(false);
3886 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3887 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3888 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3889 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3890 if sources.len() != 1 {
3891 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3892 debug_assert!(false);
3898 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3900 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3901 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3902 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3903 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3906 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3907 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3908 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3909 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3913 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3914 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3915 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3916 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3918 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3919 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3920 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3921 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3922 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3927 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3928 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3929 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3930 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3931 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3932 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3933 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3935 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3938 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3939 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3940 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3941 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3945 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3946 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3947 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3948 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3951 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3953 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3954 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3958 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
3959 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
3960 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
3964 if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id))
3966 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3967 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3968 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3969 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3970 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3971 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3973 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3974 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3975 payment_preimage, e);
3976 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3977 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3978 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3979 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3980 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3983 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3984 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3985 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3986 peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3987 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3988 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3989 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3990 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3991 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3992 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3998 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3999 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4000 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4006 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4007 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4008 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4010 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4011 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4012 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4013 // again on restart.
4014 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4015 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4016 payment_preimage, e);
4019 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4021 chan.remove_entry();
4023 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4024 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4025 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4026 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4030 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4031 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4032 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4036 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4037 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4038 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4039 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4040 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4041 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4042 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4043 // again on restart.
4044 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4045 payment_preimage, update_res);
4047 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4048 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4049 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4050 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4051 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4052 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4053 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4054 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4059 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4060 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4063 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4065 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4066 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4068 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4069 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4070 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4071 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4072 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4073 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4074 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4077 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4078 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4080 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4082 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4088 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4089 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4090 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4096 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4097 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4098 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4101 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4102 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4104 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4105 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4106 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4107 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4108 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4112 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4113 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4119 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4120 /// update completion.
4121 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4122 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4123 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4124 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4125 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4126 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4127 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4129 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4130 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4131 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4132 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4135 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4136 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4138 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4139 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4140 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4145 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4147 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4148 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4149 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4150 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4155 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4156 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4157 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4158 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4159 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4164 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4168 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4174 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4175 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4176 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4182 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4186 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4187 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4188 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4190 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4191 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4192 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4193 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4194 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4200 let mut peer_state_lock;
4201 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4202 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4203 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4204 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4206 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4211 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4215 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4216 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4217 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4218 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4219 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4220 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4222 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4223 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4224 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4229 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4230 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4231 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4234 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4236 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4237 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4239 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4240 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4241 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4242 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4246 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4248 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4249 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4252 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4253 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4254 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4256 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4257 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4258 /// used to accept such channels.
4260 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4261 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4262 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4263 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4266 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4267 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4269 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4270 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4271 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4273 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4274 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4276 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4277 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4279 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4280 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4282 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4283 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4284 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4285 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4288 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4292 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4293 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4296 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4298 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4299 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4302 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4303 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4304 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4305 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4306 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4307 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4310 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4311 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4312 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4315 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4316 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4317 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4321 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4327 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4328 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4329 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4332 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4333 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4336 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4337 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4338 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4340 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4341 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4342 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4344 debug_assert!(false);
4345 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4347 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4348 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4349 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4350 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4351 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4354 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4355 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4359 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4361 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4362 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4365 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4366 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4369 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4370 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4371 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4374 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4375 pending_events.push(
4376 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4377 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4378 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4379 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4380 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4381 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4386 entry.insert(channel);
4392 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4393 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4395 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4397 debug_assert!(false);
4398 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4402 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4403 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4404 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4405 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4410 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4411 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4412 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4413 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4414 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4416 user_channel_id: user_id,
4421 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4423 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4425 debug_assert!(false);
4426 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4428 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4429 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4432 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4434 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4436 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4439 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4440 // lock before watch_channel
4441 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4442 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4443 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4444 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4445 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4446 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4447 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4448 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4449 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4450 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4451 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4452 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4453 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4455 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4456 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4457 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4458 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4459 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4460 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4461 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4464 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4465 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4466 // the channel above.
4467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4469 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4471 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4474 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4475 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4478 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4479 funding_msg.channel_id))
4481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4482 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4485 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4486 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4489 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4490 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4498 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4500 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4501 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4502 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4504 debug_assert!(false);
4505 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4508 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4509 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4510 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4512 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4513 Ok(update) => update,
4514 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4516 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4517 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4519 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4520 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4521 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4522 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4523 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4524 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4525 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4531 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4532 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4539 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4540 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4544 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4545 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4546 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4548 debug_assert!(false);
4549 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4551 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4552 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4553 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4555 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4556 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4557 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4558 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4559 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4560 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4561 msg: announcement_sigs,
4563 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4564 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4565 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4566 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4567 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4568 // announcement_signatures.
4569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4570 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4571 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4572 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4578 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4582 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4586 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4587 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4588 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4589 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4590 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4592 debug_assert!(false);
4593 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4597 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4600 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4601 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4602 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4603 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4606 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4607 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4609 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4610 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4611 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4612 let (result, is_permanent) =
4613 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4615 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4620 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4621 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4622 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4632 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4633 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4634 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4635 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4638 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4642 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4643 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4644 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4646 debug_assert!(false);
4647 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4649 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4652 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4654 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4655 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4656 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4657 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4662 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4663 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4664 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4665 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4666 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4667 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4668 } else { (tx, None) }
4670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4673 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4674 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4675 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4677 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4678 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4681 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4685 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4690 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4691 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4692 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4693 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4695 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4696 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4697 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4698 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4700 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4702 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4704 debug_assert!(false);
4705 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4707 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4709 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4712 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4713 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4714 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4715 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4716 match pending_forward_info {
4717 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4718 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4719 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4720 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4722 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4723 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4724 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4725 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4726 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4729 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4731 _ => pending_forward_info
4734 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4736 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4741 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4742 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4744 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4746 debug_assert!(false);
4747 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4751 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4753 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4758 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4762 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4764 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4766 debug_assert!(false);
4767 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4771 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4773 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4780 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4782 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4784 debug_assert!(false);
4785 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4789 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4791 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4792 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4793 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4795 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4802 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4803 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4804 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4806 debug_assert!(false);
4807 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4809 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4810 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4811 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4813 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4814 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4815 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4816 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4817 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4818 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4819 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4824 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4825 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4829 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4830 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4831 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4833 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4834 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4835 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4836 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4837 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4838 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4839 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4840 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4842 commitment_signed: msg,
4848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4853 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4854 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4855 let mut forward_event = None;
4856 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4857 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4858 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4859 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4860 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4861 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4862 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4863 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4865 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4866 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4868 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4869 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4870 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4872 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4873 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4876 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4877 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4879 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4880 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4881 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4883 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4884 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4885 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4886 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4887 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4890 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4891 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4894 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4895 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4896 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4897 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4898 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4899 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4900 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4903 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4904 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4905 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4910 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4911 // payments are being processed.
4912 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4913 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4915 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4916 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4923 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4927 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4928 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4929 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4932 match forward_event {
4934 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4935 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4936 time_forwardable: time
4944 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4945 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4948 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4950 debug_assert!(false);
4951 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4953 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4954 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4955 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4957 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4958 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4959 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4960 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4961 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4962 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4963 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4964 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4965 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4966 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4967 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4968 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4970 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4971 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4972 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4973 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4974 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4975 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4977 } else { unreachable!(); }
4979 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4980 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4981 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4985 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4986 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4987 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4988 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4989 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4990 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4995 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4997 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4998 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5000 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5001 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5002 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5004 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5005 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5012 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5014 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5016 debug_assert!(false);
5017 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5019 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5020 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5021 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5023 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5030 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5031 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5032 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5034 debug_assert!(false);
5035 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5039 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5041 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5042 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5045 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5046 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5047 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5048 msg, &self.default_configuration
5050 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5051 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5052 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5055 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5060 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5061 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5062 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5063 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5065 // It's not a local channel
5066 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5069 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5070 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5071 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5072 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5074 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5075 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5076 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5077 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5078 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5079 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5080 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5081 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5082 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5083 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5085 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5087 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5088 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5089 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5090 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5092 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5093 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5098 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5101 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5103 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5104 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5106 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5108 debug_assert!(false);
5109 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5111 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5112 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5113 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5115 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5116 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5117 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5118 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5119 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5120 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5121 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5122 let mut channel_update = None;
5123 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5124 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5125 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5128 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5129 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5130 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5131 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5132 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5133 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5134 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5139 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5140 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5141 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5142 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5143 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5144 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5152 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5153 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5156 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5157 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5162 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5163 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5164 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5165 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5166 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5167 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5168 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5169 match monitor_event {
5170 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5171 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5172 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5173 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5176 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5177 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5178 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5181 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5182 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5183 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5184 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5186 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5187 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5188 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5189 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5192 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5194 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5197 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5198 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5199 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5200 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5201 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5202 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5206 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5207 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5209 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5211 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5212 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5213 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5214 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5215 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5222 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5223 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5229 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5230 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5233 has_pending_monitor_events
5236 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5237 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5238 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5240 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5241 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5244 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5245 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5246 /// update was applied.
5247 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5248 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5249 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5250 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5252 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5254 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5255 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5257 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5258 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5259 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5260 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5261 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5263 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5265 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5268 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5269 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5270 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5271 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5272 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5273 updates: commitment_update,
5277 has_monitor_update = true;
5278 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5279 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5280 if close_channel { return false; }
5287 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5288 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5289 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5297 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5298 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5299 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5302 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5303 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5309 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5310 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5311 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5312 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5313 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5314 let mut has_update = false;
5316 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5318 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5319 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5320 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5321 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5322 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5323 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5324 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5325 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5327 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5328 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5331 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5332 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5333 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5334 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5335 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5340 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5342 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5343 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5344 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5350 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5351 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5359 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5360 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5366 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5367 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5369 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5370 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5371 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5372 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5373 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5374 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5375 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5376 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5377 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5378 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5379 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5380 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5381 assert!(should_broadcast);
5382 } else { unreachable!(); }
5383 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5385 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5389 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5390 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5392 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5393 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5396 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5398 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5399 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5400 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5401 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5402 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5403 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5404 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5405 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5406 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5407 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5408 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5409 // never fail a payment too early.
5410 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5412 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5420 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5423 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5424 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5426 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5427 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5428 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5430 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5432 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5433 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5437 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5438 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5440 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5442 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5443 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5445 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5446 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5447 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5448 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5449 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5450 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5451 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5452 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5453 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5456 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5457 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5459 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5462 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5464 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5466 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5467 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5468 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5469 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5470 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5473 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5474 /// stored external to LDK.
5476 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5477 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5478 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5480 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5481 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5484 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5485 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5486 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5487 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5489 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5490 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5491 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5492 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5493 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5495 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5496 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5497 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5498 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5499 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5501 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5502 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5504 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5505 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5509 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5510 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5512 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5514 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5515 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5517 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5518 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5519 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5520 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5521 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5522 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5523 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5526 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5527 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5529 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5532 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5534 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5536 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5537 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5540 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5541 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5543 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5544 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5545 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5548 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5549 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5551 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5552 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5553 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5554 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5556 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5557 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5558 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5559 Some(_) => continue,
5560 None => return scid_candidate
5565 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5567 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5568 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5570 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5571 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5572 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5576 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5577 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5578 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5580 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5581 /// times to get a unique scid.
5582 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5583 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5584 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5586 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5587 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5588 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5589 return scid_candidate
5593 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5594 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5595 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5596 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5599 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5600 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5601 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5602 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5603 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5604 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5605 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5614 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5615 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5616 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5617 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5618 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5622 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5623 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5624 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5629 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5630 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5631 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5635 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5636 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5640 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5641 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5644 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5645 /// using the given event handler.
5647 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5648 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5651 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5652 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5653 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5655 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5657 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5658 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5659 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5660 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5663 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5664 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5665 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5668 for event in pending_events {
5669 handler(event).await;
5672 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5673 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5678 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5680 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5681 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5682 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5683 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5684 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5685 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5689 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5690 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5691 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5692 /// is always placed next to each other.
5694 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5695 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5696 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5697 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5699 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5700 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5701 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5702 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5703 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5704 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5705 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5707 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5708 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5709 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5710 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5713 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5714 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5716 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5717 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5720 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5722 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5725 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5726 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5730 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5731 events.replace(pending_events);
5740 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5742 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5743 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5744 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5745 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5746 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5747 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5751 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5753 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5754 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5755 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5756 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5757 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5759 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5760 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5761 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5762 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5765 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5766 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5767 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5770 for event in pending_events {
5771 handler.handle_event(event);
5779 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5781 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5782 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5783 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5784 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5785 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5786 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5790 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5792 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5793 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5794 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5795 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5796 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5799 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5800 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5803 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5805 let new_height = height - 1;
5807 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5808 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5809 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5810 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5811 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5812 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5815 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5819 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5821 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5823 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5824 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5825 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5826 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5830 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5831 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5832 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5833 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5835 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5836 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5838 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5839 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5840 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5842 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5843 if height < last_best_block_height {
5844 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5845 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5849 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5850 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5851 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5852 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5854 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5855 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5857 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5859 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5861 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5863 macro_rules! max_time {
5864 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5866 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5867 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5868 // having an explicit local time source.
5869 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5870 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5871 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5872 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5873 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5879 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5880 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5881 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5882 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5886 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5887 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5888 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5891 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5892 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5893 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5900 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5902 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5903 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5904 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5905 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5906 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5907 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5912 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5914 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5915 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5916 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5917 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5918 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5919 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5923 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5924 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5926 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5927 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5928 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5929 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5930 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5932 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5933 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5936 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5939 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5940 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5941 let res = f(channel);
5942 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5943 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5944 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5945 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5946 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5948 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5949 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5950 if channel.is_usable() {
5951 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5952 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5953 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5954 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5959 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5963 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5965 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5967 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5968 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5969 msg: announcement_sigs,
5971 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5972 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5973 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5975 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5976 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5977 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5982 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5983 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5984 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5985 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5986 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5987 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5988 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5989 // is always consistent.
5990 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5991 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5992 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5993 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5994 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5997 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5998 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5999 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6000 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6001 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6003 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6007 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6008 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6009 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6010 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6011 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6012 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6013 data: reason_message,
6023 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6024 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6025 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6026 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6027 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6028 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6029 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6030 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6031 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6032 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6034 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6035 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6036 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6040 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6043 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6044 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6045 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6046 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6047 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6048 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6049 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6050 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6051 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6054 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6055 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6056 _ => unreachable!(),
6058 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6059 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6060 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6061 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6067 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6069 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6070 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6074 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6075 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6076 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6077 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6079 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6081 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6082 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6083 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6084 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6085 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6086 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6089 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6090 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6091 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6093 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6094 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6095 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6096 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6099 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6100 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6101 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6102 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6103 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6106 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6107 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6108 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6111 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6112 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6113 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6114 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6117 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6118 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6119 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6120 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6123 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6124 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6126 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6127 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6128 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6129 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6130 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6133 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6134 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6135 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6136 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6139 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6140 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6141 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6142 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6145 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6146 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6147 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6148 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6152 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6153 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6155 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6156 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6157 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6158 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6159 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6164 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6166 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6169 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6171 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6174 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6176 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6179 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6181 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6184 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6186 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6189 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6191 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6194 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6196 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6199 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6201 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6204 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6206 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6209 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6211 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6214 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6216 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6219 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6221 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6224 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6225 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6226 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6229 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6230 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6231 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6234 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6239 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6240 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6241 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6244 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6249 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6254 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6256 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6257 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6258 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6260 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6261 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6262 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6265 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6266 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6267 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6268 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6269 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6270 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6273 no_channels_remain = false;
6277 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6282 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6283 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6285 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6291 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6292 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6294 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6301 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6302 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6305 if no_channels_remain {
6306 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6308 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6310 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6311 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6315 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6316 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6317 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6321 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6323 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6326 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6327 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6329 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6330 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6331 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6332 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6337 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6338 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6339 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6340 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6347 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6348 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6349 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6350 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6351 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6352 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6353 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6354 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6355 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6356 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6360 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6361 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6362 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6367 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6368 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6369 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6370 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6371 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6380 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6384 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6387 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6388 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6389 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6390 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6391 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6392 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6393 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6394 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6396 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6397 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6398 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6402 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6404 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6405 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6408 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6409 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6410 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6411 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6419 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6420 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6424 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6425 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6428 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6429 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6433 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6434 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6435 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6436 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6439 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6440 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6442 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6443 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6444 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6445 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6446 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6449 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6450 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6451 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6452 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6455 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6456 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6457 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6458 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6461 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6462 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6463 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6464 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6465 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6466 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6467 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6468 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6469 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6470 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6471 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6472 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6473 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6474 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6475 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6476 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6477 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6478 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6480 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6481 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6482 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6488 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6489 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6491 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6492 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6493 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6494 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6497 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6498 (2, node_id, required),
6499 (4, features, required),
6500 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6501 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6502 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6503 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6506 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6507 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6508 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6509 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6510 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6511 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6512 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6513 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6514 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6515 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6516 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6517 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6518 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6519 (7, self.config, option),
6520 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6521 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6522 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6523 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6524 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6525 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6526 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6527 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6528 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6529 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6530 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6531 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6532 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6533 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6534 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6535 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6536 (32, self.is_public, required),
6537 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6538 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6539 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6545 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6546 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6547 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6548 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6549 (2, channel_id, required),
6550 (3, channel_type, option),
6551 (4, counterparty, required),
6552 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6553 (6, funding_txo, option),
6554 (7, config, option),
6555 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6556 (9, confirmations, option),
6557 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6558 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6559 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6560 (16, balance_msat, required),
6561 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6562 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6563 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6564 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6565 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6566 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6567 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6568 (26, is_outbound, required),
6569 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6570 (30, is_usable, required),
6571 (32, is_public, required),
6572 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6573 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6574 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6577 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6578 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6579 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6580 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6581 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6585 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6587 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6588 outbound_scid_alias,
6592 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6593 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6595 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6596 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6597 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6598 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6599 confirmations_required,
6601 force_close_spend_delay,
6602 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6603 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6604 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6605 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6606 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6607 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6612 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6613 (2, channels, vec_type),
6614 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6615 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6618 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6620 (0, onion_packet, required),
6621 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6624 (0, payment_data, required),
6625 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6626 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6628 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6629 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6630 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6634 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6635 (0, routing, required),
6636 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6637 (4, payment_hash, required),
6638 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6639 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6640 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6644 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6645 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6647 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6649 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6650 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6651 reason.write(writer)?;
6653 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6654 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6657 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6658 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6659 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6660 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6667 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6668 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6669 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6672 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6673 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6674 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6675 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6679 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6680 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6681 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6682 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6683 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6686 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6687 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6688 // messages contained in the variants.
6689 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6690 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6691 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6693 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6694 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6695 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6696 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6697 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6700 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6701 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6702 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6703 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6704 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6706 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6711 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6716 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6717 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6718 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6719 (2, outpoint, required),
6720 (4, htlc_id, required),
6721 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6724 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6725 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6726 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6727 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6728 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6730 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6731 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6732 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6733 (2, self.value, required),
6734 (4, payment_data, option),
6735 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6736 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6742 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6743 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6744 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6746 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6747 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6748 let mut total_msat = None;
6749 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6750 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6751 (0, prev_hop, required),
6752 (1, total_msat, option),
6753 (2, value, required),
6754 (4, payment_data, option),
6755 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6756 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6758 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6760 if payment_data.is_some() {
6761 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6763 if total_msat.is_none() {
6764 total_msat = Some(value);
6766 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6769 if total_msat.is_none() {
6770 if payment_data.is_none() {
6771 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6773 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6775 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6779 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6782 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6789 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6790 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6791 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6795 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6796 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6797 let mut payment_id = None;
6798 let mut payment_secret = None;
6799 let mut payment_params = None;
6800 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6801 (0, session_priv, required),
6802 (1, payment_id, option),
6803 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6804 (3, payment_secret, option),
6805 (4, path, vec_type),
6806 (5, payment_params, option),
6808 if payment_id.is_none() {
6809 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6811 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6813 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6814 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6815 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6816 path: path.unwrap(),
6817 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6822 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6823 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6828 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6829 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6831 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6833 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6834 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6835 (0, session_priv, required),
6836 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6837 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6838 (3, payment_secret, option),
6839 (4, *path, vec_type),
6840 (5, payment_params, option),
6843 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6845 field.write(writer)?;
6852 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6853 (0, forward_info, required),
6854 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6855 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6856 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6857 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6860 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6862 (0, htlc_id, required),
6863 (2, err_packet, required),
6868 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6869 (0, payment_secret, required),
6870 (2, expiry_time, required),
6871 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6872 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6873 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6876 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6878 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6879 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6880 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6881 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6882 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6883 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6887 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6888 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6890 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6892 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6894 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6895 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6896 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6900 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6901 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6902 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6903 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6906 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6907 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6908 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6909 unfunded_channels += 1;
6914 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6916 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6917 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6919 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6920 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6921 channel.write(writer)?;
6928 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6929 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6930 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6931 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6932 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6933 for forward in pending_forwards {
6934 forward.write(writer)?;
6939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6941 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6942 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6943 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6945 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6946 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6947 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6948 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6949 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6950 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6951 htlc.write(writer)?;
6953 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6956 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6957 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6958 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6959 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6960 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6963 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6964 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6965 for event in events.iter() {
6966 event.write(writer)?;
6969 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6970 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6971 for event in background_events.iter() {
6973 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6975 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6976 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6981 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6982 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6983 // likely to be identical.
6984 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6985 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6987 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6988 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6989 hash.write(writer)?;
6990 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6993 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6994 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6995 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6996 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6997 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7000 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7001 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7003 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7004 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7005 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7006 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7009 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7010 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7014 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7015 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7016 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7018 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7019 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7020 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7026 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7027 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7028 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7029 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7032 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7033 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7034 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7035 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7036 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7038 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7041 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7042 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7043 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7044 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7045 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7046 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7047 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7048 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7049 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7056 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7058 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7060 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7061 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7062 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7063 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7064 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7065 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7066 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7067 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7068 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7069 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7070 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7071 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7072 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7074 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7075 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7077 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7078 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7080 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7081 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7082 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7083 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7084 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7085 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7087 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7088 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7090 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7091 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7092 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7093 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7094 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7099 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7100 pub entropy_source: ES,
7102 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7103 pub node_signer: NS,
7105 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7106 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7108 pub signer_provider: SP,
7110 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7112 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7113 pub fee_estimator: F,
7114 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7116 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7117 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7118 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7119 pub chain_monitor: M,
7121 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7122 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7123 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7124 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7125 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7126 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7128 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7130 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7131 /// deserialization.
7133 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7134 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7135 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7137 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7138 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7140 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7141 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7142 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7143 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7145 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7148 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7149 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7152 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7153 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7155 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7156 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7157 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7158 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7159 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7164 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7165 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7166 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7167 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7168 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7170 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7171 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7176 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7177 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7178 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7179 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7181 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7183 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7184 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7185 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7190 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7191 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7192 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7196 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7197 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7199 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7200 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7201 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7202 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7203 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7204 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7208 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7209 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7211 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7212 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7215 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7217 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7218 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7219 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7220 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7221 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7222 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7223 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7224 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7225 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7227 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7228 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7229 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7230 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7231 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7232 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7233 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7234 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7235 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7236 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7237 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7238 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7239 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7240 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7241 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7242 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7243 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7244 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7245 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7246 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7247 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7248 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7249 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7250 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7251 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7252 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7253 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7254 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7255 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7256 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7257 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7258 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7260 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7261 let mut found_htlc = false;
7262 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7263 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7266 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7267 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7268 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7269 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7270 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7271 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7272 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7273 log_info!(args.logger,
7274 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7275 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7276 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7280 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7281 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7282 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7284 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7285 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7287 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7289 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7290 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7293 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7294 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7295 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7299 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7300 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7301 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7302 // safely discard the channel.
7303 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7304 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7305 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7306 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7307 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7310 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7311 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7312 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7313 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7314 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7319 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7320 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7321 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7322 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7326 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7327 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7329 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7330 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7333 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7334 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7336 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7339 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7341 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7342 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7345 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7346 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7348 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7351 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7353 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7354 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7355 let peer_state = PeerState {
7356 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7357 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7358 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7359 is_connected: false,
7361 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7364 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7366 for _ in 0..event_count {
7367 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7368 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7373 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7375 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7376 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7377 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7378 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7382 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7383 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7385 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7386 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7387 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7388 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7389 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7393 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7394 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7395 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7396 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7397 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7398 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7399 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7401 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7402 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7406 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7407 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7408 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7409 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7410 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7411 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7412 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7413 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7414 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7415 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7416 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7417 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7418 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7419 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7420 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7421 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7422 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7423 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7425 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7426 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7429 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7430 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7433 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7434 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7435 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7436 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7437 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7438 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7440 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7442 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7443 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7444 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7445 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7446 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7447 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7448 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7450 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7451 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7452 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7453 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7454 if path.is_empty() {
7455 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7456 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7458 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7459 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7460 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7461 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7463 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7464 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7465 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7468 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7469 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7470 retry_strategy: None,
7471 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7472 payment_params: None,
7473 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7474 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7476 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7477 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7478 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7479 total_msat: path_amt,
7480 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7482 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7483 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7488 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7489 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7490 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7491 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7492 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7494 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7495 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7496 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7497 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7498 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7499 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7500 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7501 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7502 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7503 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7504 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7509 !forwards.is_empty()
7511 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7512 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7513 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7514 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7515 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7516 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7517 intercepted_id != ev_id
7529 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7530 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7531 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7532 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7533 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7534 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7535 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7536 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7540 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7541 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7543 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7544 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7545 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7548 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7549 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7552 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7553 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7554 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7555 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7558 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7559 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7560 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7561 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7562 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7563 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7564 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7565 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7567 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7572 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7574 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7576 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7577 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7579 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7583 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7584 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7586 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7587 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7590 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7592 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7594 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7595 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7596 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7597 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7601 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7602 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7603 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7604 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7605 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7606 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7607 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7609 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7610 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7611 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7613 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7614 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7615 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7616 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7617 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7618 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7620 if chan.is_usable() {
7621 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7622 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7623 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7624 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7625 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7631 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7633 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7634 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7635 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7636 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7637 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7638 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7639 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7640 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7641 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7642 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7643 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7645 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7646 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7648 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7649 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7650 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7651 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7653 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7654 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7655 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7656 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7658 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7659 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7660 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7661 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7663 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7664 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7665 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7668 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7669 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7672 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7673 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7676 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7679 purpose: payment_purpose,
7680 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7686 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7688 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7689 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7690 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7691 router: args.router,
7693 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7695 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7696 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7697 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7698 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7700 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7701 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7702 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7703 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7704 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7705 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7707 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7712 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7714 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7716 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7717 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7718 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7719 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7721 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7722 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7723 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7725 logger: args.logger,
7726 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7729 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7730 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7731 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7732 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7733 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7736 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7737 //connection or two.
7739 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7745 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7746 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7747 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7748 use core::time::Duration;
7749 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7750 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7751 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7752 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7753 use crate::ln::msgs;
7754 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7755 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7756 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7757 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7758 use crate::util::test_utils;
7759 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7760 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7763 fn test_notify_limits() {
7764 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7765 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7769 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7771 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7772 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7773 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7774 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7775 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7777 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7779 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7780 // to connect messages with new values
7781 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7782 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7783 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7784 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7786 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7787 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7788 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7789 // ... but the last node should not.
7790 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7791 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7792 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7793 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7795 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7796 // about the channel.
7797 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7798 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7799 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7801 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7803 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7804 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7805 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7806 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7807 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7808 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7810 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7811 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7812 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7814 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7815 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7816 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7817 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7818 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7819 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7821 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7822 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7823 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7824 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7825 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7826 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7827 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7828 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7830 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7831 // the channel info has updated.
7832 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7833 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7834 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7835 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7836 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7837 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7841 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7842 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7844 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7845 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7846 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7847 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7848 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7850 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7851 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7852 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7853 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7855 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7856 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7857 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7858 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7859 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7860 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7862 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7863 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7864 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7866 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7867 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7869 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7870 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7871 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7872 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7873 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7875 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7876 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7877 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7879 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7880 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7881 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7882 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7883 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7884 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7885 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7886 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7887 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7889 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7890 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7892 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7894 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7896 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7897 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7898 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7899 // lightning messages manually.
7900 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7901 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7904 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7905 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7906 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7908 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7909 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7911 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7912 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7914 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7915 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7916 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7918 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7920 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7922 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7924 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7926 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7927 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7930 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7931 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7932 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7933 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7935 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7936 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7937 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7938 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7943 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7944 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7945 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7946 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7948 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7951 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7952 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7953 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7954 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7961 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7962 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7963 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7964 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7965 // fails as expected.
7966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7968 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7969 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7970 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7971 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7972 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7974 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7975 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7976 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7978 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7979 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7980 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
7981 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7982 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7984 let route = find_route(
7985 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7986 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7988 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7990 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7992 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7993 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7994 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7996 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7997 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7998 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7999 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8000 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8002 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8003 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8004 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8005 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8006 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8007 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8009 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8010 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8012 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8013 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8015 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8016 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8017 let route = find_route(
8018 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8019 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8021 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8023 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8024 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8025 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8026 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8027 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8029 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8030 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8031 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8033 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8034 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8035 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8036 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8037 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8040 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8041 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8043 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8044 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8045 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8046 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8047 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8048 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8049 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8050 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8051 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8053 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8054 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8058 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8059 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8060 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8064 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8066 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8067 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8069 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8070 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8071 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8072 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8073 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8075 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8076 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8077 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8078 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8079 let route = find_route(
8080 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8081 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8084 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8085 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8086 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8087 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8090 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8091 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8092 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8093 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8094 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8095 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8098 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8102 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8103 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8109 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8110 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8112 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8113 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8114 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8115 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8116 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8118 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8119 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8120 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8121 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8122 let route = find_route(
8123 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8124 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8127 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8128 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8129 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8130 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8131 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8134 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8135 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8136 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8137 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8138 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8139 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8140 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8142 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8146 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8150 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8152 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8153 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8154 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8155 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8157 // Marshall an MPP route.
8158 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8159 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8160 route.paths.push(path);
8161 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8162 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8163 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8164 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8165 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8166 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8168 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8169 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8170 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8171 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8176 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8180 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8182 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8184 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8185 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8187 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8188 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8190 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8193 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8194 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8195 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8196 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8197 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8198 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8201 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8204 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8205 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8210 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8211 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8217 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8218 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8220 total_msat: 100_000,
8223 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8224 // payment verification fails as expected.
8225 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8226 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8227 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8228 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8230 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8234 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8235 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8239 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8240 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8241 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8242 // the channel is successfully closed.
8243 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8244 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8245 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8246 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8248 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8249 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8250 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8251 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8252 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8254 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8255 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8257 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8258 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8259 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8260 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8263 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8265 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8266 // as it has the funding transaction.
8267 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8268 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8269 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8271 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8274 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8276 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8278 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8279 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8280 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8282 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8283 // as it has the funding transaction.
8284 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8285 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8286 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8289 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8290 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8292 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8293 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8294 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8296 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8297 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8298 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8299 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8301 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8302 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8304 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8305 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8306 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8307 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8308 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8309 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8310 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8312 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8313 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8314 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8315 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8316 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8317 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8318 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8321 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8323 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8324 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8325 // closing transaction).
8326 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8327 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8328 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8330 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8331 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8332 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8333 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8334 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8337 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8339 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8341 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8342 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8343 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8345 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8347 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8348 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8351 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8352 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8353 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8356 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8357 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8358 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8361 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8363 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8364 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8366 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8367 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8369 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8370 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8375 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8376 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8377 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8378 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8379 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8380 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8381 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8385 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8386 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8387 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8389 // Test the API functions.
8390 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8392 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8394 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8396 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8398 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8400 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8402 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8407 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8408 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8409 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8410 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8411 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8412 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8413 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8414 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8415 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8417 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8419 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8420 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8421 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8423 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8424 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8426 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8427 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8432 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8433 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8435 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8436 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8438 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8442 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8444 use crate::chain::Listen;
8445 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8446 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8447 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8448 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8449 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8450 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8451 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8452 use crate::util::test_utils;
8453 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8454 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8456 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8457 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8458 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8460 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8464 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8465 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8466 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8467 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8468 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8469 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8470 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8471 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8476 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8477 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8480 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8481 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8482 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8484 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8485 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8487 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8488 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8489 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8490 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8492 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8493 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8495 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8496 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8497 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8498 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8500 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8502 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8504 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8505 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8506 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8507 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8508 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8510 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8512 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8514 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8515 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8516 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8517 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8518 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8521 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8522 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8523 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8525 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8526 } else { panic!(); }
8528 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8529 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8531 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8534 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8537 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8538 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8540 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8541 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8542 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8543 match msg_events[0] {
8544 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8545 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8546 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8550 match msg_events[1] {
8551 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8555 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8556 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8558 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8559 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8564 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8565 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8567 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8568 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8573 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8575 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8576 macro_rules! send_payment {
8577 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8578 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8579 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8580 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8581 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8582 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8583 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8584 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8585 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8586 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8588 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8589 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8591 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8592 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8594 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8595 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8596 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8597 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8598 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8599 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8600 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8601 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8603 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8604 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8605 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8606 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8608 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8609 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8610 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8611 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8612 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8614 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8617 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8618 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8619 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8620 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8622 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8627 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8628 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);