1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1120 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1121 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1122 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1123 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1125 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1126 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1127 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1128 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1129 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1130 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1131 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1132 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1133 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1135 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1136 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1137 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1139 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1141 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1142 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1143 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1144 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1145 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1147 /// # DoS Mitigation
1149 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1150 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1151 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1152 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1154 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1155 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1156 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1160 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1161 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1162 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1163 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1164 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1166 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1167 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1168 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1169 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1170 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1171 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1172 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1173 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1176 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1177 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1178 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1179 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1180 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1184 // `pending_offers_messages`
1186 // `total_consistency_lock`
1188 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1190 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1192 // |__`per_peer_state`
1194 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1196 // |__`claimable_payments`
1198 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1202 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1204 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1206 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1210 // |__`pending_events`
1212 // |__`pending_background_events`
1214 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1216 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1217 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1218 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1219 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1220 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1221 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1225 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1226 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1227 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1233 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1235 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1237 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1238 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1240 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1241 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1242 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1243 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1245 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1246 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1248 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1249 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1250 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1251 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1252 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1253 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1254 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1255 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1257 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1259 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1260 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1262 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1264 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1265 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1266 /// and via the classic SCID.
1268 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1269 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1271 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1273 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1275 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1276 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1277 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1279 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1280 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1282 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1283 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1288 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1289 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1290 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1291 /// active channel list on load.
1293 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1294 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1296 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1298 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1299 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1300 /// the handling of the events.
1302 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1303 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1306 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1307 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1308 /// would break backwards compatability.
1309 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1310 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1311 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1313 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1315 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1317 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1319 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1321 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1322 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1323 /// confirmation depth.
1325 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1326 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1327 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1329 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1331 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1333 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1335 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1337 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1339 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1340 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1341 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1343 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1344 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1346 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1347 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1348 /// keeping additional state.
1349 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1351 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1352 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1353 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1354 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1356 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1357 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1359 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1360 /// are currently open with that peer.
1362 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1363 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1366 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1368 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1369 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1370 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1371 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1372 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1374 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1375 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1376 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1377 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1378 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1380 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1381 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1383 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1384 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1385 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1386 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1387 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1389 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1390 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1392 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1393 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1394 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1395 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1396 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1398 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1400 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1402 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1403 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1404 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1405 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1406 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1407 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1408 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1409 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1410 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1411 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1412 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1414 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1415 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1416 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1418 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1420 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1421 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1423 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1427 signer_provider: SP,
1432 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1434 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1435 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1436 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1437 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1438 pub struct ChainParameters {
1439 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1440 pub network: Network,
1442 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1444 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1445 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1448 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1452 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1453 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1456 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1457 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1458 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1459 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1460 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1461 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1463 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1464 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1465 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1466 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1467 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1468 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1470 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1471 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1474 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1475 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1476 /// events to handle.
1478 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1479 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1481 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1482 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1485 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1486 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1487 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1488 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1490 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1491 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1492 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1493 should_persist: move || {
1494 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1495 // processing and return that.
1496 let notify = persist_check();
1497 match (notify, force_notify) {
1498 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1499 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1500 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1501 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1502 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1505 _read_guard: read_guard,
1509 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1510 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1511 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1512 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1513 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1514 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1516 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1517 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1518 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1519 should_persist: persist_check,
1520 _read_guard: read_guard,
1525 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1526 fn drop(&mut self) {
1527 match (self.should_persist)() {
1528 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1529 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1530 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1532 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1533 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1534 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1539 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1540 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1542 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1544 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1545 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1546 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1547 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1548 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1550 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1551 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1553 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1555 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1556 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1557 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1558 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1559 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1560 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1561 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1562 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1563 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1564 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1565 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1566 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1567 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1569 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1570 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1572 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1573 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1574 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1575 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1577 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1578 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1579 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1580 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1581 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1582 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1584 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1586 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1587 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1589 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1591 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1592 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1594 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1595 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1596 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1598 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1599 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1600 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1602 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1603 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1604 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1605 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1607 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1608 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1609 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1611 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1612 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1613 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1615 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1616 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1617 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1618 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1619 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1620 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1621 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1622 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1623 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1624 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1625 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1628 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1629 /// to better separate parameters.
1630 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1631 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1632 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1633 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1634 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1635 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1636 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1637 pub features: InitFeatures,
1638 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1639 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1640 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1642 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1644 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1645 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1646 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1647 /// payments to us through this channel.
1648 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1649 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1650 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1651 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1652 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1653 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1654 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1657 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1658 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1659 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1660 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1661 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1662 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1663 /// lifetime of the channel.
1664 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1665 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1666 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1667 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1668 /// our counterparty already.
1669 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1670 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1672 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1673 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1674 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1675 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1677 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1678 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1680 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1681 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1683 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1684 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1685 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1686 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1687 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1688 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1689 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1690 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1691 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1694 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1696 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1697 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1698 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1699 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1700 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1701 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1702 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1704 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1705 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1707 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1708 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1709 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1710 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1711 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1712 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1713 /// this value on chain.
1715 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1717 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1719 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1720 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1721 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1722 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1723 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1724 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1725 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1727 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1728 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1729 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1730 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1731 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1732 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1734 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1735 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1736 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1737 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1738 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1740 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1741 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1742 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1743 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1745 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1746 pub balance_msat: u64,
1747 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1748 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1749 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1750 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1752 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1754 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1755 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1756 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1757 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1758 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1759 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1760 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1761 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1763 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1764 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1765 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1766 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1767 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1768 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1769 /// route which is valid.
1770 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1771 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1772 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1773 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1774 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1775 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1777 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1778 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1779 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1780 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1781 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1782 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1783 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1784 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1785 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1787 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1789 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1790 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1791 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1792 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1793 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1795 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1796 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1797 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1798 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1799 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1800 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1801 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1803 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1804 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1805 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1806 pub is_outbound: bool,
1807 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1808 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1809 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1810 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1811 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1813 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1814 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1815 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1816 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1817 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1818 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1819 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1821 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1822 pub is_usable: bool,
1823 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1824 pub is_public: bool,
1825 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1826 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1827 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1828 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1829 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1830 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1832 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1833 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1834 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1836 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1837 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1838 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1840 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1841 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1844 impl ChannelDetails {
1845 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1846 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1847 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1849 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1850 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1851 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1852 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1855 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1856 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1857 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1859 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1860 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1861 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1862 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1865 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1866 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1867 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1870 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1871 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1873 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1874 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1875 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1877 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1878 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1879 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1880 features: latest_features,
1881 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1882 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1883 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1884 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1885 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1886 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1887 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1888 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1889 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1890 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1892 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1893 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1894 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1895 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1896 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1897 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1898 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1899 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1900 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1901 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1902 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1903 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1904 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1905 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1906 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1907 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1908 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1909 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1910 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1911 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1912 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1913 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1914 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1915 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1916 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1917 config: Some(context.config()),
1918 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1919 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1920 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1925 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1926 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1927 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1928 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1929 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1930 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1931 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1932 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1933 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1935 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1937 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1938 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1940 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1941 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1942 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1943 /// to drop the channel.
1947 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1948 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1949 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1950 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1951 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1953 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1954 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1955 payment_id: PaymentId,
1957 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1959 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1960 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1961 payment_id: PaymentId,
1962 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1964 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1965 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1966 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1969 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1970 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1971 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1973 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1974 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1975 payment_id: PaymentId,
1976 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1977 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1978 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1980 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1981 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1982 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1984 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1985 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1986 payment_id: PaymentId,
1987 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1988 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1992 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1994 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1996 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1997 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1998 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1999 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2001 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2002 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2003 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2006 macro_rules! handle_error {
2007 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2008 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2009 // entering the macro.
2010 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2011 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2015 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2016 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2018 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2019 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2020 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2021 let logger = WithContext::from(
2022 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2024 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2026 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2027 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2028 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2033 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2036 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2038 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2039 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2040 action: err.action.clone()
2044 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2045 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2046 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2047 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2048 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2052 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2059 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2060 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2061 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2062 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2064 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2065 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2066 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2068 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2069 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2070 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2071 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2072 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2074 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2075 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2077 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2081 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2082 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2083 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2085 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2086 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2088 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2089 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2091 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2092 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2093 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2094 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2095 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2096 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2098 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2103 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2104 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2106 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2107 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2109 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2110 match $channel_phase {
2111 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2112 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2114 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2115 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2118 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2120 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2121 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2122 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2124 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2125 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2126 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2132 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2133 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2137 let key = *$entry.key();
2138 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2140 $entry.remove_entry();
2148 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2149 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2153 let key = *$entry.key();
2154 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2156 $entry.remove_entry();
2164 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2165 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2167 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2168 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2174 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2175 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2176 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2177 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2178 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2180 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2181 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2182 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2183 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2184 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2185 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2186 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2187 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2188 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2189 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2194 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2195 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2196 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2197 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2198 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2199 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2200 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2201 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2202 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2203 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2205 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2210 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2211 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2212 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2213 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2214 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2215 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2216 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2217 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2218 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2220 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2225 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2226 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2227 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2228 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2229 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2230 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2231 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2232 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2233 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2234 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2235 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2236 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2238 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2239 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2240 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2246 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2247 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2249 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2250 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2251 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2252 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2253 updates.announcement_sigs);
2254 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2255 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2258 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2259 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2260 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2261 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2263 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2264 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2265 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2266 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2267 let mut batch_completed = false;
2268 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2269 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2270 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2271 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2273 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2274 channel_state.2 = true;
2276 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2278 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2280 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2283 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2284 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2285 if batch_completed {
2286 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2287 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2288 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2289 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2290 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2291 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2292 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2293 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2294 chan.set_batch_ready();
2295 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2296 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2300 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2301 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2302 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2307 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2309 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2310 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2312 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2313 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2314 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2315 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2320 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2321 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2322 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2323 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2325 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2326 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2327 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2328 panic!("{}", err_str);
2330 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2331 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2332 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2335 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2341 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2342 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2343 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2345 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2346 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2347 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2348 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2349 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2350 // filter for uniqueness here.
2351 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2352 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2353 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2354 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2356 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2357 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2359 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2360 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2361 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2367 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2368 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2369 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2370 while !processed_all_events {
2371 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2378 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2379 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2380 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2382 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2383 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2384 result = $self.process_background_events();
2386 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2387 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2388 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2389 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2393 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2394 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2395 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2396 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2399 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2401 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2402 $event_to_handle = event;
2404 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2405 post_event_actions.push(action);
2410 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2411 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2412 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2413 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2414 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2415 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2418 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2419 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2420 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2421 processed_all_events = false;
2425 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2426 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2427 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2429 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2430 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2431 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2437 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2439 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2440 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2441 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2442 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2443 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2444 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2448 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2450 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2452 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2453 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2455 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2457 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2458 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2459 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2462 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2463 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2464 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2466 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2467 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2468 current_timestamp: u32,
2470 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2471 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2472 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2473 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2475 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2476 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2477 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2482 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2484 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2485 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2486 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2487 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2488 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2489 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2490 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2491 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2493 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2496 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2497 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2499 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2501 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2503 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2505 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2506 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2507 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2508 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2509 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2510 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2511 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2512 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2514 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2524 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2525 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2526 &self.default_configuration
2529 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2530 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2531 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2534 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2535 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2537 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2539 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2543 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2548 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2550 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2551 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2552 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2553 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2554 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2556 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2557 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2559 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2560 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2561 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2563 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2564 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2565 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2567 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2568 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2570 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2571 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2572 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2573 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2574 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2575 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2577 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2578 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2579 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2580 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2581 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2582 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2586 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2587 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2589 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2591 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2592 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2594 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2596 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2597 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2598 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2603 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2604 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2605 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2606 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2607 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2608 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2612 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2617 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2619 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2620 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2623 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2625 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2631 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2632 node_id: their_network_key,
2635 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2638 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2639 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2640 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2641 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2642 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2643 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2644 // the same channel.
2645 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2648 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2649 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2652 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2653 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2654 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2655 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2659 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2660 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2661 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2669 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2670 /// more information.
2671 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2672 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2673 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2674 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2675 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2676 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2677 // the same channel.
2678 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2680 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2682 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2683 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2684 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2685 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2686 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2687 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2695 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2696 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2698 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2699 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2701 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2702 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2703 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2704 // really wanted anyway.
2705 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2708 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2709 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2710 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2711 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2713 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2716 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2717 let context_to_details = |context| {
2718 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2720 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2722 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2723 .map(context_to_details)
2729 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2730 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2732 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2733 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2734 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2736 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2737 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2738 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2739 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2740 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2741 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2743 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2744 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2745 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2747 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2748 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2749 payment_id: *payment_id,
2750 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2751 total_msat: *total_msat,
2754 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2755 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2757 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2758 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2760 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2765 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2766 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2768 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2769 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2774 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2775 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2780 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2781 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2782 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2783 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2784 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2785 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2786 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2787 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2789 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2790 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2791 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2792 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2793 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2797 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2798 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2800 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2801 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2802 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2803 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2806 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2807 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2811 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2813 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2814 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2821 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2822 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2823 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2824 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2827 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2828 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2834 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2835 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2836 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2838 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2839 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2841 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2842 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2843 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2844 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2846 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2848 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2849 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2850 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2853 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2854 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2855 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2856 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2857 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2858 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2861 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2862 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2863 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2865 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2866 /// the channel being closed or not:
2867 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2868 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2869 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2870 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2871 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2872 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2873 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2875 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2876 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2877 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2878 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2880 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2882 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2883 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2884 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2887 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2888 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2889 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2890 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2891 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2894 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2895 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2896 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2897 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2898 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2901 let logger = WithContext::from(
2902 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2905 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2906 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2907 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2908 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2909 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2910 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2911 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2913 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2914 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2915 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2916 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2917 // ignore the result here.
2918 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2920 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2921 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2922 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2923 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2925 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2926 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2927 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2928 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2929 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2930 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2931 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2934 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2937 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2938 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2943 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2944 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2945 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2946 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2947 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2948 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2949 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2950 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2953 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2954 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2955 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2959 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2960 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2964 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2965 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2966 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2967 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2969 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2970 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2971 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2972 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2973 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2974 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2976 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2978 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2979 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2980 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2981 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2982 mem::drop(peer_state);
2983 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2985 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2986 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2987 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2989 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2990 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2991 // Unfunded channel has no update
2992 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2994 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
2995 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2996 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
2997 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2998 // Unfunded channel has no update
2999 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3002 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3003 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3004 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3005 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3007 (None, *peer_node_id)
3009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3012 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3013 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3014 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3015 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3016 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3017 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3018 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3019 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3020 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3026 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3029 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3031 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3032 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3034 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3035 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3037 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3038 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3039 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3040 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3051 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3052 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3053 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3055 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3056 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3057 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3060 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3061 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3062 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3064 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3065 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3066 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3067 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3068 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3071 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3072 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3073 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3074 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3075 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3079 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3080 /// local transaction(s).
3081 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3082 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3083 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3087 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3088 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3090 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3092 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3093 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3096 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3097 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3098 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3099 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3105 macro_rules! return_err {
3106 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3109 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3110 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3112 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3113 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3114 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3115 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3116 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3117 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3118 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3122 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3123 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3124 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3125 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3126 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3127 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3128 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3129 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3135 let NextPacketDetails {
3136 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3137 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3138 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3139 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3140 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3143 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3144 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3145 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3146 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3147 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3148 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3149 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3150 // phantom or an intercept.
3151 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3152 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3153 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3157 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3160 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3162 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3164 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3165 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3166 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3170 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3171 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3174 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3175 // have no consistency guarantees.
3176 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3180 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3181 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3182 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3183 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3184 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3186 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3187 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3188 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3189 // we don't have the channel here.
3190 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3192 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3194 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3195 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3196 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3197 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3198 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3199 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3200 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3201 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3202 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3203 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3204 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3206 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3209 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3210 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3212 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3213 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3220 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3222 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3223 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3225 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3226 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3227 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3228 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3229 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3231 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3232 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3238 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3239 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3240 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3241 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3243 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3244 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3246 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3247 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3248 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3250 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3251 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3252 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3253 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3254 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3255 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3256 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3260 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3262 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3265 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3266 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3267 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3268 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3269 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3270 macro_rules! return_err {
3271 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3273 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3274 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3275 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3276 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3277 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3278 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3279 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3280 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3281 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3285 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3286 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3287 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3288 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3289 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3295 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3297 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3298 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3299 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3300 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3303 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3304 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3305 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3306 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3307 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3309 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3312 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3313 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3314 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3315 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3316 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3322 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3323 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3324 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3326 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3327 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3328 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3330 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3331 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3332 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3333 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3334 return Err(LightningError {
3335 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3339 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3340 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3342 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3343 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3344 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3347 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3348 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3349 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3350 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3352 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3353 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3354 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3356 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3357 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3358 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3359 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3360 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3361 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3362 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3366 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3369 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3370 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3371 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3372 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3374 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3375 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3376 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3377 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3378 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3381 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3382 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3384 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3385 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3386 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3387 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3388 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3389 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3390 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3391 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3393 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3394 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3395 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3397 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3399 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3406 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3407 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3408 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3409 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3414 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3415 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3416 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3419 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3420 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3421 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3422 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3424 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3425 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3426 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3428 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3429 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3433 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3434 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3436 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3437 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3438 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3440 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3443 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3445 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3446 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3449 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3450 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3453 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3454 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3455 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3456 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3457 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3459 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3460 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3461 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3462 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3464 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3465 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3467 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3468 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3469 Some(monitor_update) => {
3470 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3472 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3473 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3474 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3475 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3476 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3477 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3478 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3486 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3489 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3490 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3491 // `channel_by_id` map.
3492 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3493 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3497 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3498 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3500 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3505 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3507 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3508 /// fields for more info.
3510 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3511 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3513 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3515 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3516 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3517 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3518 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3519 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3521 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3522 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3523 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3524 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3525 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3527 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3528 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3529 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3530 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3532 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3534 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3535 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3536 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3538 /// In general, a path may raise:
3539 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3540 /// node public key) is specified.
3541 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3542 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3543 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3544 /// relevant updates.
3546 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3547 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3548 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3550 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3551 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3552 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3553 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3554 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3555 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3556 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3557 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3559 self.pending_outbound_payments
3560 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3561 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3562 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3565 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3566 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3567 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3568 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3570 self.pending_outbound_payments
3571 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3572 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3573 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3574 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3578 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3579 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3582 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3583 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3587 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3588 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3589 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3593 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3594 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3597 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3598 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3600 self.pending_outbound_payments
3601 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3602 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3603 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3604 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3605 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3609 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3610 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3611 /// retries are exhausted.
3613 /// # Event Generation
3615 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3616 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3618 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3619 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3620 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3622 /// # Requested Invoices
3624 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3625 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3626 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3627 /// once the invoice has been received.
3629 /// # Restart Behavior
3631 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3632 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3633 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3635 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3636 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3637 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3638 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3641 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3642 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3643 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3644 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3645 /// never reach the recipient.
3647 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3648 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3650 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3651 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3653 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3654 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3655 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3657 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3658 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3659 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3662 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3663 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3665 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3668 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3669 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3670 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3672 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3673 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3674 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3675 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3678 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3679 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3680 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3681 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3682 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3684 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3685 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3686 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3689 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3692 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3693 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3696 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3697 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3699 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3700 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3701 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3702 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3703 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3704 let payment_params =
3705 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3707 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3709 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3712 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3713 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3715 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3716 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3717 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3718 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3720 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3721 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3722 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3723 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3724 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3725 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3726 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3727 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3728 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3729 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3731 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3732 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3733 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3734 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3738 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3740 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3741 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3744 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3746 let mut res = Vec::new();
3748 for mut path in route.paths {
3749 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3750 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3751 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3752 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3753 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3756 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3759 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3760 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3762 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3764 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3765 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3770 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3773 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3778 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3779 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3780 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3782 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3783 let used_liquidity =
3784 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3786 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3787 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3789 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3792 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3797 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3798 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3799 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3806 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3807 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3808 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3809 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3810 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3811 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3813 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3814 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3819 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3820 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3821 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3823 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3824 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3825 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3826 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3827 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3828 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3829 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3830 } else { unreachable!(); });
3832 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3833 Err((chan, err)) => {
3834 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3835 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3836 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3837 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3838 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3844 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3845 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3847 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3848 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3851 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3852 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3853 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3857 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3858 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3859 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3865 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3868 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3869 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3873 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3874 funding_txo, o.get()
3876 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3877 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3878 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3879 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3880 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3881 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3884 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3891 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3892 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3893 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3897 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3899 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3900 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3902 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3903 /// across the p2p network.
3905 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3906 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3908 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3909 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3910 /// keys per-channel).
3912 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3913 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3914 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3916 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3917 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3918 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3920 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3921 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3922 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3923 /// for more details.
3925 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3926 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3927 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3928 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3931 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3933 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3934 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3936 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3937 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3938 /// signature for each channel.
3940 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3941 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3943 let mut result = Ok(());
3945 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3946 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3947 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3948 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3949 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3954 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3955 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3956 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3960 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3961 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3962 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3963 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3964 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3965 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3966 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3967 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3969 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3970 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3975 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3976 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3977 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3978 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3982 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3983 match states.entry(txid) {
3984 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3985 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3986 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3990 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3993 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3994 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3995 temporary_channel_id,
3996 counterparty_node_id,
3997 funding_transaction.clone(),
4000 let mut output_index = None;
4001 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4002 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4003 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4004 if output_index.is_some() {
4005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4006 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4009 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4012 if output_index.is_none() {
4013 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4014 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4017 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4018 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4019 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4020 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4021 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4022 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4028 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4029 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4030 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4031 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4032 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4033 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4034 .into_iter().flatten()
4035 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4037 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4038 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4040 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4042 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4043 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4044 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4045 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4046 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4048 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4049 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4050 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4054 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4055 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4056 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4062 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4064 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4065 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4066 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4067 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4069 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4070 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4072 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4073 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4075 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4077 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4078 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4079 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4080 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4081 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4082 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4083 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4084 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4085 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4086 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4087 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4088 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4089 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4094 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4095 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4096 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4097 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4098 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4099 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4100 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4101 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4102 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4106 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4107 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4108 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4109 config.apply(config_update);
4110 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4113 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4114 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4115 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4116 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4117 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4118 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4125 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4126 debug_assert!(false);
4127 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4129 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4130 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4137 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4139 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4140 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4141 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4142 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4144 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4145 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4147 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4148 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4150 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4152 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4153 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4154 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4155 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4156 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4157 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4158 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4159 pub fn update_channel_config(
4160 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4161 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4162 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4165 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4166 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4168 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4169 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4171 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4172 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4173 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4174 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4175 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4177 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4178 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4179 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4182 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4185 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4186 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4187 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4188 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4189 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4190 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4193 let next_hop_scid = {
4194 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4195 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4196 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4198 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4199 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4200 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4201 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4202 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4203 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4206 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4208 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4209 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4210 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4213 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4214 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4215 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4216 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4217 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4224 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4225 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4226 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4229 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4230 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4231 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4232 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4235 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4237 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4238 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4239 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4240 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4241 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4244 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4245 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4246 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4247 payment.prev_channel_id,
4248 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4249 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4251 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4255 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4256 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4258 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4261 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4262 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4265 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4266 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4267 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4270 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4271 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4272 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4273 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4274 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4275 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4276 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4277 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4278 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4279 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4282 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4283 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4284 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4285 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4290 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4292 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4293 /// Will likely generate further events.
4294 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4297 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4298 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4299 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4301 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4302 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4304 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4305 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4306 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4307 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4309 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4310 match forward_info {
4311 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4312 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4313 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4314 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4315 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4318 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4319 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4320 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4321 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4323 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4324 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4325 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4326 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4327 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4328 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4329 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4330 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4331 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4334 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4335 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4337 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4340 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4341 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4347 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4348 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4350 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4354 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4355 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4357 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4361 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4362 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4363 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4364 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4365 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4366 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4367 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4370 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4371 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4372 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4373 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4374 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4376 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4378 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4379 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4383 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4384 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4385 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4386 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4387 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4388 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4390 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4391 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4397 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4400 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4403 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4404 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4405 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4406 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4407 // problem, not ours.
4413 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4414 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4415 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4417 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4421 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4423 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4424 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4425 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4430 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4431 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4432 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4433 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4434 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4435 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4436 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4437 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4438 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4439 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4440 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4443 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4444 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4445 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4446 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4447 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4448 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4449 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4450 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4451 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4452 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4453 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4455 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4456 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4457 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4458 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4459 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4460 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4463 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4464 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4465 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4468 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4469 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4471 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4473 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4474 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4475 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4476 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4482 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4483 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4485 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4486 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4487 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4489 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4490 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4491 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4492 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4494 Some((res, htlc_id))
4497 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4498 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4499 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4500 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4502 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4504 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4505 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4506 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4512 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4516 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4517 match forward_info {
4518 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4519 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4520 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4521 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4522 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4525 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4526 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4527 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4528 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4529 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4531 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4532 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4533 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4534 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4535 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4537 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4538 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4539 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4541 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4542 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4546 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4547 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4550 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4553 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4554 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4555 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4556 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4557 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4558 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4559 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4560 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4561 phantom_shared_secret,
4564 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4565 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4566 // if routing nodes overpay
4567 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4568 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4570 total_value_received: None,
4571 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4574 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4577 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4579 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4580 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4581 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4582 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4583 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4584 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4586 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4587 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4588 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4589 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4590 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4591 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4592 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4593 phantom_shared_secret,
4596 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4597 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4599 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4602 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4603 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4604 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4605 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4606 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4609 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4610 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4611 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4612 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4613 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4614 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4616 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4617 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4618 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4620 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4621 .entry(payment_hash)
4622 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4623 .or_insert_with(|| {
4624 committed_to_claimable = true;
4626 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4629 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4630 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4631 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4632 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4634 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4636 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4638 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4639 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4640 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4643 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4645 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4646 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4647 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4648 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4649 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4650 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4651 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4652 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4653 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4654 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4656 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4658 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4659 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4660 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4661 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4662 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4663 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4665 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4666 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4667 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4668 committed_to_claimable = true;
4670 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4671 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4672 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4673 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4674 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4675 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4676 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4677 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4678 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4682 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4683 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4684 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4685 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4686 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4688 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4690 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4691 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4693 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4694 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4695 committed_to_claimable = true;
4698 payment_claimable_generated
4702 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4703 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4704 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4705 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4706 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4707 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4708 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4709 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4711 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4712 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4713 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4714 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4715 Ok(result) => result,
4717 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4718 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4721 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4722 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4723 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4724 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4725 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4726 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4729 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4730 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4731 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4733 check_total_value!(purpose);
4735 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4736 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4737 check_total_value!(purpose);
4741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4742 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4744 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4746 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4747 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4748 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4749 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4750 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4751 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4752 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4753 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4755 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4756 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4757 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4759 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4760 if payment_claimable_generated {
4761 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4767 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4768 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4776 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4777 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4778 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4779 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4781 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4782 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4784 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4786 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4787 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4788 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4790 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4792 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4793 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4794 events.append(&mut new_events);
4797 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4799 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4800 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4801 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4803 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4805 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4806 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4807 if background_events.is_empty() {
4808 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4811 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4813 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4814 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4815 // monitor updating completing.
4816 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4818 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4819 let mut updated_chan = false;
4821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4822 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4823 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4824 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4825 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4827 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4828 updated_chan = true;
4829 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4830 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4832 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4840 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4841 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4844 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4845 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4846 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4847 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4849 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4850 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4852 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4853 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4854 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4855 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4856 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4862 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4865 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4866 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4867 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4868 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4869 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4872 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4873 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4875 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4877 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4878 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4879 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4881 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4882 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4883 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4884 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4886 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4887 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4889 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4890 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4894 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4895 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4896 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4897 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4898 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4899 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4900 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4902 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4903 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4906 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4909 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4910 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4912 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4917 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4918 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4926 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4928 /// This currently includes:
4929 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4930 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4931 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4933 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4934 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4935 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4936 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4937 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4938 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4939 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4940 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4942 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4943 /// estimate fetches.
4945 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4946 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4947 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4948 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4949 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4951 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4952 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4954 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4955 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4956 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4957 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4959 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4960 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4961 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4962 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4963 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4964 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4966 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4967 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4968 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4970 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4971 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4972 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4973 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4974 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4975 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4976 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4977 channel_id: *chan_id,
4978 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4990 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4993 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4994 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4995 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4997 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4998 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5003 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5004 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5006 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5007 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5008 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5009 if needs_close { return false; }
5012 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5013 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5014 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5015 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5016 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5017 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5018 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5019 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5021 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5022 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5023 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5024 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5028 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5030 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5033 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5035 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5036 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5037 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5038 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5042 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5044 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5050 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5052 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5053 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5054 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5055 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5056 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5057 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5058 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5059 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5060 channel_id: *chan_id,
5061 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5069 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5070 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5071 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5073 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5074 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5075 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5077 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5078 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5079 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5080 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5082 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5083 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5084 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5085 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5090 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5091 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5092 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5093 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5094 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5095 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5096 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5097 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5098 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5104 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5106 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5107 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5112 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5113 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5114 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5115 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5116 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5117 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5118 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5119 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5120 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5121 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5122 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5124 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5125 // have no channels to the peer.
5126 let remove_entry = {
5127 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5128 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5131 entry.remove_entry();
5134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5139 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5140 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5141 // This should be unreachable
5142 debug_assert!(false);
5145 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5146 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5147 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5148 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5149 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5150 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5151 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5154 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5155 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5156 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5158 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5159 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5166 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5167 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5168 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5169 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5170 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5173 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5174 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5177 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5178 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5181 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5182 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5183 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5184 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5185 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5186 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5187 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5190 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5191 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5194 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5195 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5196 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5197 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5198 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5205 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5206 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5207 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5209 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5210 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5211 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5212 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5214 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5215 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5216 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5217 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5218 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5219 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5222 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5223 /// reason for the failure.
5225 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5226 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5229 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5230 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5231 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5232 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5233 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5234 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5235 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5240 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5241 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5242 match failure_code {
5243 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5244 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5245 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5246 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5247 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5248 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5250 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5251 let fail_data = match data {
5252 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5255 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5260 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5261 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5263 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5265 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5266 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5267 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5268 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5269 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5270 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5271 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5273 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5275 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5276 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5278 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5283 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5284 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5285 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5286 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5287 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5288 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5289 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5290 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5291 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5292 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5294 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5295 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5296 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5297 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5299 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5300 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5301 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5302 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5303 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5307 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5308 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5309 // be surfaced to the user.
5310 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5311 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5312 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5314 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5315 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5316 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5317 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5318 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5319 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5321 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5322 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5324 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5325 debug_assert!(false);
5326 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5331 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5334 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5335 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5336 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5337 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5341 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5342 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5343 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5344 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5345 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5346 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5347 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5348 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5349 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5350 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5353 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5354 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5355 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5358 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5359 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5360 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5362 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5363 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5364 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5365 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5366 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5368 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5369 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5370 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5373 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5374 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5375 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5377 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5378 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5379 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5380 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5381 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5383 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5385 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5386 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5388 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5389 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5393 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5394 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5396 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5400 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5401 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5402 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5403 push_forward_ev = true;
5405 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5407 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5410 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5413 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5414 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5415 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5416 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5417 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5418 failed_next_destination: destination,
5424 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5425 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5427 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5428 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5429 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5430 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5432 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5433 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5434 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5435 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5437 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5438 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5439 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5441 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5442 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5443 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5444 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5445 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5446 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5447 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5448 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5449 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5452 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5453 /// even type numbers.
5457 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5458 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5460 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5461 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5462 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5465 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5466 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5468 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5471 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5472 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5473 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5474 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5475 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5476 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5477 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5478 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5483 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5484 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5485 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5486 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5487 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5489 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5490 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5491 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5495 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5496 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5497 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5498 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5499 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5500 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5501 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5502 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5503 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5504 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5505 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5514 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5516 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5517 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5518 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5519 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5520 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5521 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5522 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5523 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5524 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5526 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5527 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5528 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5529 debug_assert!(false);
5533 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5535 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5536 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5537 debug_assert!(false);
5541 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5542 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5544 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5545 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5546 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5547 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5550 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5551 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5552 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5553 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5557 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5558 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5559 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5560 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5561 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5562 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5563 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5566 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5567 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5568 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5569 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5570 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5571 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5576 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5577 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5578 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5579 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5580 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5581 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5582 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5584 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5587 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5588 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5589 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5590 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5594 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5595 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5596 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5597 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5599 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5600 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5601 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5602 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5604 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5605 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5606 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5607 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5610 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5611 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5612 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5613 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5617 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5618 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5619 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5622 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5623 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5624 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5625 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5626 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5627 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5628 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5629 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5632 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5633 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5634 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5636 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5639 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5640 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5642 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5643 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5644 // monitor update as a background event.
5645 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5646 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5647 counterparty_node_id,
5648 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5649 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5650 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5654 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5655 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5660 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5662 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5664 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5665 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5666 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5667 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5668 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5670 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5672 debug_assert!(false,
5673 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5676 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5677 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5678 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5679 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5680 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5682 let mut found_blocker = false;
5683 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5684 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5685 // which case we need to only remove the one
5686 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5687 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5688 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5689 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5691 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5694 debug_assert!(false);
5703 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5704 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5705 counterparty_node_id: None,
5706 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5709 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5713 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5714 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5715 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5716 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5717 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5718 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5719 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5720 // again on restart.
5721 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5722 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5723 payment_preimage, update_res);
5726 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5727 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5729 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5730 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5731 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5732 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5733 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5734 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5735 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5736 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5737 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5738 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5741 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5742 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5743 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5744 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5745 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5746 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5750 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5751 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5754 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5755 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5756 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5757 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5760 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5761 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5762 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5763 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5764 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5766 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5767 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5768 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5770 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5771 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5774 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5775 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5776 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5777 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5778 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5779 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5780 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5781 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5782 let chan_to_release =
5783 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5784 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5786 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5787 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5788 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5789 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5794 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5795 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5796 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5797 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5798 // in the background.
5799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5800 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5801 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5802 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5804 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5805 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5806 funding_txo, update, ..
5808 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5809 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5810 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5811 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5813 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5819 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5820 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5821 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5823 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5824 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5826 monitor_update.updates[0],
5827 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5832 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5833 // immediately once we get going.
5834 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5837 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5839 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5842 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5843 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5844 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5845 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5846 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5847 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5848 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5852 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5853 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5854 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5857 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5858 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5859 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5860 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5861 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5862 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5863 prev_user_channel_id,
5864 next_user_channel_id,
5865 total_fee_earned_msat,
5867 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5868 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5870 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5874 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5875 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5876 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5882 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5883 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5884 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5887 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5888 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5889 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5890 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5892 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5894 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5895 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5896 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5898 payment_purpose: purpose,
5901 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5903 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5907 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5909 sender_intended_total_msat,
5913 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5914 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5916 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5917 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5918 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5921 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5922 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5924 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5925 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5926 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5927 downstream_channel_id,
5928 Some(blocking_action),
5935 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5936 /// update completion.
5937 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5938 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5939 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5940 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5941 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5942 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5943 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5944 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5945 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5946 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5947 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5948 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5949 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5950 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5952 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5954 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5955 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5956 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5957 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5960 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5961 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5963 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5964 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5965 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5970 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5971 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5972 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5973 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5978 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5979 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5980 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5981 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5982 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5987 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5991 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5997 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5998 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5999 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6003 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6004 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6005 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6011 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6012 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6014 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6015 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6017 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6018 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6019 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6020 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6021 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6027 let mut peer_state_lock;
6028 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6029 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6030 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6033 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6036 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6037 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6038 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6039 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6040 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6043 let remaining_in_flight =
6044 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6045 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6048 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6049 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6050 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6051 remaining_in_flight);
6052 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6055 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6058 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6060 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6061 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6064 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6065 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6066 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6068 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6069 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6070 /// used to accept such channels.
6072 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6073 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6074 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6075 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6078 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6079 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6081 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6082 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6083 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6085 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6086 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6088 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6089 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6091 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6092 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6094 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6095 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6096 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6097 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6100 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6102 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6103 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6105 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6106 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6107 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6108 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6110 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6111 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6113 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6115 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6116 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6117 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6119 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6120 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6121 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6123 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6124 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6125 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6126 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6127 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6128 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6129 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6132 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6133 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6135 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6141 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6142 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6143 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6144 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6146 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6150 Ok(mut channel) => {
6152 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6153 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6154 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6155 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6156 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6161 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6162 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6163 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6165 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6167 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6168 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6169 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6170 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6171 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6172 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6173 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6174 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6177 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6178 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6179 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6181 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6185 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6186 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6187 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6189 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6190 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6191 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6194 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6201 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6202 /// or 0-conf channels.
6204 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6205 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6206 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6207 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6208 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6209 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6211 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6212 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6213 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6214 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6215 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6216 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6217 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6221 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6224 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6225 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6227 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6228 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6230 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6231 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6232 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6233 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6234 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6236 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6239 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6240 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6241 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6244 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6245 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6246 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6247 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6248 // included in the unfunded count.
6249 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6250 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6251 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6254 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6255 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6258 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6259 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6260 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6261 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6266 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6269 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6270 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6271 // likely to be lost on restart!
6272 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6273 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6274 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6277 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6279 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6282 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6283 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6284 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6285 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6286 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6291 debug_assert!(false);
6292 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6293 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6294 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6296 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6297 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6299 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6300 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6301 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6302 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6303 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6304 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6306 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6307 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6308 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6311 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6312 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6313 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6314 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6315 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6318 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6319 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6321 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6322 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6323 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6326 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6327 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6328 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6329 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6331 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6333 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6334 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6335 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6336 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6337 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6338 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6341 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6342 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6343 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6348 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6349 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6350 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6351 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6352 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6353 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6354 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6357 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6362 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6363 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6364 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6365 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6366 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6368 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6369 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6370 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6371 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6374 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6375 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6377 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6378 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6379 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6381 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6385 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6386 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6387 // likely to be lost on restart!
6388 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6389 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6390 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6392 debug_assert!(false);
6393 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6397 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6399 match phase.get_mut() {
6400 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6401 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6402 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6405 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6412 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6413 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6414 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6415 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6416 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6418 user_channel_id: user_id,
6423 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6424 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6427 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6429 debug_assert!(false);
6430 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6435 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6436 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6437 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6438 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6439 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6441 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6442 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6443 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6444 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6445 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6446 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6447 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6448 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6449 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6453 Some(mut phase) => {
6454 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6455 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6456 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6458 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6461 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6463 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6464 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6465 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6466 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6467 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6468 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6470 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6471 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6472 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6475 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6477 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6480 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6481 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6483 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6486 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6487 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6488 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6489 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6491 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6492 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6493 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6494 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6495 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6496 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6497 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6502 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6503 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6504 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6506 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6510 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6511 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6512 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6520 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6521 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6522 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6523 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6525 debug_assert!(false);
6526 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6529 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6530 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6531 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6533 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6534 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6535 let logger = WithContext::from(
6537 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6538 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6541 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6543 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6544 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6545 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6546 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6547 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6548 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6549 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6550 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6551 } else { unreachable!(); }
6554 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6555 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6556 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6557 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6558 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6559 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6560 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6564 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6565 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6566 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6567 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6568 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6569 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6580 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6581 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6582 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6583 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6584 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6586 debug_assert!(false);
6587 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6589 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6590 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6591 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6593 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6594 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6595 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6596 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6597 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6598 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6599 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6600 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6601 msg: announcement_sigs,
6603 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6604 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6605 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6606 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6607 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6608 // announcement_signatures.
6609 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6610 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6611 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6612 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6619 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6620 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6625 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6626 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6630 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6635 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6636 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6637 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6639 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6640 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6642 debug_assert!(false);
6643 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6645 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6646 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6647 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6648 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6650 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6651 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6652 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6653 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6655 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6658 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6659 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6660 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6661 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6663 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6664 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6665 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6666 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6667 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6668 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6672 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6673 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6674 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6675 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6678 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6679 let context = phase.context_mut();
6680 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6681 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6682 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6683 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6685 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6686 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6687 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6688 let context = phase.context_mut();
6689 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6690 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6691 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6695 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6698 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6699 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6700 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6701 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6703 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6704 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6710 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6711 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6712 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6714 debug_assert!(false);
6715 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6717 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6718 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6719 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6720 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6722 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6723 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6724 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6725 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6726 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6727 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6732 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6733 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6734 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6735 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6736 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6737 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6738 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6740 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6741 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6747 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6748 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6749 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6750 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6752 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6753 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6756 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6761 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6762 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6763 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6768 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6769 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6770 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6771 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6773 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6774 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6775 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6776 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6778 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6779 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6781 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6783 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6785 debug_assert!(false);
6786 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6788 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6789 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6792 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6793 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6794 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6795 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6796 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6797 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6799 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6801 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6802 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6803 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6804 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6805 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6806 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6807 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6808 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6812 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6813 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6814 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6815 match pending_forward_info {
6816 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6817 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6819 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6820 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6821 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6822 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6823 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6825 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6826 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6827 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6828 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6829 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6832 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6834 _ => pending_forward_info
6837 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6838 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6840 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6841 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6849 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6851 let next_user_channel_id;
6852 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6854 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6856 debug_assert!(false);
6857 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6859 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6861 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6862 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6863 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6864 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6865 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6866 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6868 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6870 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6871 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6872 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6874 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6875 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6876 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6877 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6878 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6879 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6880 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6881 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
6884 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6885 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6891 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6892 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6893 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
6899 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6900 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6901 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6903 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6905 debug_assert!(false);
6906 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6910 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6912 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6913 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6915 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6916 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6924 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6925 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6926 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6927 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6928 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6930 debug_assert!(false);
6931 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6933 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6934 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6935 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6937 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6938 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6939 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6941 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6942 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6944 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6945 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6953 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6954 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6955 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6957 debug_assert!(false);
6958 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6962 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6964 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6965 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6966 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6967 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6968 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6969 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6970 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6974 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6975 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6983 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6984 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6985 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6986 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6987 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6988 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6989 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6990 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6991 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6992 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6993 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6995 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6996 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6998 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6999 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7000 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7002 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7003 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7006 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7007 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7009 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7010 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7011 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7013 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7014 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7015 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7016 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7017 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7020 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7021 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7024 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7025 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7026 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7027 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7028 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7029 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7030 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7031 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7032 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7033 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7034 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7037 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7038 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7039 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7044 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7045 // payments are being processed.
7046 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7047 push_forward_event = true;
7049 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7050 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7057 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7058 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7061 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7062 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7063 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7065 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7069 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7070 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7071 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7072 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7073 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7075 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7076 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7077 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7078 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7079 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7080 // real by taking more time.
7081 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7082 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7083 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7088 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7089 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7090 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7091 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7092 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7093 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7094 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7096 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7097 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7098 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7099 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7100 channel_funding_outpoint,
7102 counterparty_node_id,
7107 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7108 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7109 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7111 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7112 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7113 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7116 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7117 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7118 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7124 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7125 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7126 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7127 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7129 debug_assert!(false);
7130 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7131 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7132 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7133 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7135 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7136 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7137 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7138 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7139 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7140 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7141 *counterparty_node_id)
7143 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7144 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7145 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7146 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7147 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7148 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7149 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7153 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7154 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7160 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7164 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7165 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7166 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7168 debug_assert!(false);
7169 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7173 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7175 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7176 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7177 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7179 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7180 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7183 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7188 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7190 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7192 debug_assert!(false);
7193 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7197 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7199 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7200 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7201 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7204 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7205 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7206 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7207 msg, &self.default_configuration
7208 ), chan_phase_entry),
7209 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7210 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7211 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7214 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7215 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7223 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7224 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7225 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7226 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7228 // It's not a local channel
7229 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7232 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7233 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7234 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7235 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7237 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7238 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7239 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7241 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7242 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7243 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7244 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7245 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7246 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7247 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7249 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7251 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7252 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7253 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7254 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7256 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7257 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7258 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7259 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7262 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7266 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7267 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7272 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7275 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7277 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7278 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7280 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7282 debug_assert!(false);
7283 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7284 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7288 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7291 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7293 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7294 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7295 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7296 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7297 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7298 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7299 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7300 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7301 let mut channel_update = None;
7302 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7303 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7304 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7307 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7308 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7309 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7310 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7311 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7312 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7313 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7318 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7319 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7320 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7321 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7322 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7323 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7327 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7328 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7332 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7334 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7335 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7336 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7337 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7338 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7339 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7341 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7342 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7343 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7344 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7345 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7346 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7347 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7348 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7349 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7350 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7351 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7352 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7353 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7354 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7355 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7356 next_funding_txid: None,
7359 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7360 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7361 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7367 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7368 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7369 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7370 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7373 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7374 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7379 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7380 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7381 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7383 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7384 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7385 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7386 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7387 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7388 match monitor_event {
7389 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7390 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7391 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7392 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7393 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7394 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7395 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7397 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7398 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7399 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7400 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7403 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7404 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7405 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7407 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7408 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7409 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7410 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7413 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7415 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7416 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7417 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7418 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7419 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7420 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7421 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7424 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7426 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7427 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7428 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7432 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7433 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7434 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7435 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7443 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7444 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7450 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7451 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7454 has_pending_monitor_events
7457 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7458 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7459 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7461 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7462 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7463 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7466 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7467 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7468 /// update was applied.
7469 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7470 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7471 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7473 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7474 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7475 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7476 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7478 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7479 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7482 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7483 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7484 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7486 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7487 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7488 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7489 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7490 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7491 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7493 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7494 has_monitor_update = true;
7496 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7497 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7498 continue 'peer_loop;
7507 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7508 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7509 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7515 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7516 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7518 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7519 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7521 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7522 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7523 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7526 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7527 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7529 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7530 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7531 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7532 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7537 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7543 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7544 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7547 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7548 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7549 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7555 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7559 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7560 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7561 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7564 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7565 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7569 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7572 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7573 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7579 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7580 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7581 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7582 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7583 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7584 let mut has_update = false;
7585 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7587 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7589 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7592 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7593 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7595 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7596 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7597 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7598 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7599 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7601 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7602 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7605 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7606 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7607 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7609 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7610 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7611 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7612 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7613 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7618 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7619 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7620 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7626 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7627 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7632 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7638 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7639 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7642 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7643 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7649 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7650 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7652 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7653 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7654 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7655 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7656 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7657 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7658 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7659 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7660 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7661 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7662 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7663 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7664 assert!(should_broadcast);
7665 } else { unreachable!(); }
7666 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7667 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7668 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7671 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7676 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7677 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7678 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7679 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7683 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7684 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7685 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7686 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7687 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7689 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7693 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7698 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7700 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7702 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7703 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7704 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7705 &$self, description: String
7706 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7707 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7708 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7709 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7710 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7712 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7713 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7714 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7716 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7723 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7724 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7725 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7729 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7730 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7732 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7733 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7734 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7737 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7738 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7739 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7741 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7742 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7746 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7747 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7748 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7749 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7750 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7752 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7756 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7757 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7762 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7763 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7764 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7766 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7768 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7769 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7770 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7771 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7772 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7773 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7774 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7775 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7776 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7777 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7778 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7779 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7781 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7782 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7783 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7785 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7786 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7789 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7791 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7792 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7793 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7794 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7796 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7802 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7804 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7805 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7806 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7807 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7808 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7809 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7813 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7814 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7815 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7816 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7819 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7821 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7823 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7824 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7825 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7827 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7828 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7829 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7830 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7831 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7832 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7833 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7835 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7836 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7840 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7841 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7844 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7845 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7846 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7850 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7851 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7852 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7853 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7857 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7858 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7859 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7864 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7865 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7866 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7867 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7870 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7871 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7872 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7873 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7874 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7875 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7876 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7877 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7878 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7879 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7880 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7881 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7882 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7883 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7884 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7886 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7887 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7889 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7891 let builder = match quantity {
7893 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7895 let builder = match amount_msats {
7897 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7899 let builder = match payer_note {
7901 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7903 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7904 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7908 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7909 self.pending_outbound_payments
7910 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7911 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7913 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7915 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7916 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7917 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7918 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7919 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7922 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7924 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7925 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7926 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7927 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7928 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7929 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7930 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7931 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7932 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7934 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7941 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7944 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7945 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7946 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7950 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7951 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7952 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7953 /// received and no retries will be made.
7958 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7959 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
7962 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7963 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7964 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7965 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7966 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7968 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7969 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7971 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
7972 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
7975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7977 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7978 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7979 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7980 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7982 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7983 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7984 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7986 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7987 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7988 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7990 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7991 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7992 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7994 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
7995 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7996 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7997 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7999 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8000 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8001 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8002 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8003 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8006 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8008 for path in refund.paths() {
8009 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8010 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8011 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8012 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8014 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8020 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8024 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8027 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8028 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8030 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8031 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8032 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8033 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8035 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8037 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8038 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8042 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8043 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8045 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8047 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8048 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8050 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8051 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8052 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8053 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8054 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8055 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8056 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8057 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8058 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8059 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8060 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8063 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8064 /// stored external to LDK.
8066 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8067 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8068 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8070 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8071 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8074 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8075 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8076 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8077 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8079 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8080 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8081 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8082 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8083 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8085 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8086 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8087 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8088 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8089 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8091 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8092 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8094 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8095 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8099 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8100 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8102 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8104 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8105 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8107 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8108 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8109 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8110 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8111 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8112 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8113 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8116 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8117 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8119 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8120 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8121 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8124 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8126 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8127 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8128 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8129 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8131 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8133 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8134 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8135 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8138 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8139 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8142 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8143 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8144 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8145 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8146 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8147 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8149 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8150 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8151 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8152 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8153 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8155 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8157 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8160 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8161 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8165 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8166 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8168 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8169 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8170 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8171 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8173 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8174 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8175 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8176 Some(_) => continue,
8177 None => return scid_candidate
8182 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8184 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8185 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8187 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8188 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8189 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8193 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8194 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8195 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8197 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8198 /// times to get a unique scid.
8199 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8200 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8201 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8203 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8204 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8205 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8206 return scid_candidate
8210 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8211 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8212 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8213 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8216 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8219 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8220 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8222 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8223 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8224 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8233 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8234 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8235 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8236 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8237 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8241 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8242 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8243 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8244 events.push_back((event, None));
8248 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8249 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8250 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8254 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8255 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8259 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8260 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8263 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8264 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8265 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8266 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8267 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8268 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8269 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8271 let logger = WithContext::from(
8272 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8276 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8277 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8278 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8279 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8280 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8281 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8282 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8284 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8288 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8289 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8290 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8291 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8292 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8293 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8298 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8300 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8301 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8302 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8303 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8305 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8306 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8307 if further_update_exists {
8308 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8313 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8320 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8321 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8327 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8328 for action in actions {
8330 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8331 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8333 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8339 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8340 /// using the given event handler.
8342 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8343 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8347 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8351 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8353 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8354 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8355 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8356 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8357 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8362 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8363 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8364 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8365 /// is always placed next to each other.
8367 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8368 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8369 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8370 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8372 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8373 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8374 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8375 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8376 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8377 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8378 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8380 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8381 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8382 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8383 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8386 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8387 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8389 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8390 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8393 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8395 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8398 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8399 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8403 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8404 events.replace(pending_events);
8413 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8415 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8416 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8417 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8418 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8419 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8420 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8424 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8426 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8427 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8428 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8430 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8434 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8436 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8437 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8438 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8439 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8440 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8441 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8445 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8447 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8448 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8449 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8450 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8451 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8454 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8455 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8458 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8459 let _persistence_guard =
8460 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8461 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8462 let new_height = height - 1;
8464 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8465 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8466 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8467 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8468 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8469 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8472 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8476 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8478 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8479 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8480 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8481 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8482 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8483 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8487 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8488 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8489 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8490 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8492 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8493 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8495 let _persistence_guard =
8496 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8497 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8498 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8499 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8501 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8502 if height < last_best_block_height {
8503 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8504 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8508 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8509 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8510 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8511 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8513 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8514 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8516 let _persistence_guard =
8517 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8518 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8519 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8521 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8523 macro_rules! max_time {
8524 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8526 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8527 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8528 // having an explicit local time source.
8529 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8530 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8531 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8532 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8533 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8539 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8540 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8541 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8542 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8546 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8547 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8548 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8551 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8552 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8553 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8554 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8555 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8556 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8563 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8564 let _persistence_guard =
8565 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8566 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8567 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8568 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8569 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8570 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8571 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8572 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8577 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8579 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8581 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8582 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8583 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8584 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8588 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8589 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8591 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8592 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8593 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8594 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8595 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8597 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8598 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8600 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8601 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8602 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8603 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8604 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8605 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8607 // Retain unfunded channels.
8608 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8609 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8610 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8611 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8612 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8613 let res = f(channel);
8614 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8615 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8616 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8617 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8618 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8620 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8621 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8622 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8623 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8624 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8625 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8626 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8627 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8632 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8637 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8638 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8641 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8642 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8643 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8644 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8645 msg: announcement_sigs,
8647 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8648 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8649 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8651 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8652 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8653 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8658 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8659 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8660 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8661 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8662 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8663 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8664 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8665 // is always consistent.
8666 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8667 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8668 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8669 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8670 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8673 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8674 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8675 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8676 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8677 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8678 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8679 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8684 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8685 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8686 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8687 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8688 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8689 data: reason_message,
8702 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8703 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8704 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8705 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8706 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8707 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8708 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8709 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8710 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8711 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8713 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8714 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8715 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8719 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8722 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8723 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8724 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8725 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8726 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8727 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8728 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8729 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8730 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8731 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8732 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8733 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8736 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8737 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8738 _ => unreachable!(),
8740 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8741 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8742 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8743 let logger = WithContext::from(
8744 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8746 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8752 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8754 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8755 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8759 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8760 /// may have events that need processing.
8762 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8763 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8765 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8766 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8767 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8768 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8771 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8772 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8773 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8776 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8777 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8778 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8781 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8782 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8783 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8784 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8787 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8788 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8789 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8790 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8793 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8794 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8796 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8797 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8798 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8799 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8800 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8803 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8804 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8805 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8806 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8809 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8810 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8811 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8812 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8815 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8816 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8817 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8818 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8821 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8822 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8823 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8824 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8828 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8829 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8831 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8832 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8833 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8834 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8835 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8836 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8840 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8841 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8842 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8843 // change to the contents.
8844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8845 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8846 let persist = match &res {
8847 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8848 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8849 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8851 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8853 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8858 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8859 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8860 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8861 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8864 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8865 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8866 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8867 // change to the contents.
8868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8869 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8870 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8874 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8875 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8876 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8877 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8880 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8882 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8885 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8887 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8890 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8891 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8892 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8893 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8894 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8896 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8897 let persist = match &res {
8898 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8899 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8901 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8906 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8907 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8908 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8909 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8912 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8913 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8914 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8915 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8918 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8919 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8920 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8921 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8924 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8925 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8926 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8927 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8930 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8932 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8935 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8937 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8940 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8941 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8942 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8943 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8945 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8946 let persist = match &res {
8947 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8948 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8949 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8951 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8956 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8958 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8961 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8962 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8963 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8964 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8966 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8967 let persist = match &res {
8968 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8969 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8970 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8972 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8977 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8978 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8979 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8980 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8982 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8983 let persist = match &res {
8984 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8985 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8986 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8988 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8993 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8995 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8998 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9000 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9003 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9004 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9005 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9006 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9008 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9009 let persist = match &res {
9010 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9011 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9012 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9014 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9019 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9021 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9024 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9025 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9026 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9029 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9034 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9035 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9036 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9037 let persist = match &res {
9038 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9039 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9040 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9042 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9047 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9049 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9050 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9051 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9054 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9055 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9056 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9058 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9059 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9060 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9061 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9062 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9063 let context = match phase {
9064 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9065 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9066 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9067 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9072 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9073 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9074 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9077 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9078 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9081 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9082 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9085 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9086 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9090 // Clean up for removal.
9091 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9092 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9095 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9096 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9097 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9098 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9100 // V1 Channel Establishment
9101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9103 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9105 // V2 Channel Establishment
9106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9108 // Common Channel Establishment
9109 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9110 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9114 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9115 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9116 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9117 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9118 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9119 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9120 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9121 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9122 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9125 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9126 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9127 // Channel Operations
9128 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9129 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9130 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9131 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9133 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9136 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9137 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9138 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9139 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9143 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9146 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9147 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9148 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9149 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9152 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9154 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9156 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9157 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9161 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9162 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9163 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9164 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9168 let mut res = Ok(());
9170 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9171 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9172 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9173 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9174 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9175 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9176 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9179 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9180 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9182 if inbound_peer_limited {
9184 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9186 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9187 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9188 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9189 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9190 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9191 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9192 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9193 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9198 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9199 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9201 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9202 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9203 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9204 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9207 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9210 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9211 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9216 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9218 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9219 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9220 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9221 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9222 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9224 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9226 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9227 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9228 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9229 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9230 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9234 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9235 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9236 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9237 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9241 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9242 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9243 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9244 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9245 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9246 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9250 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9251 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9252 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9253 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9254 debug_assert!(false);
9257 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9258 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9259 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9260 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9261 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9262 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9263 debug_assert!(false);
9269 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9270 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9275 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9276 match &msg.data as &str {
9277 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9278 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9280 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9281 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9282 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9283 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9284 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9285 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9286 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9287 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9288 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9290 || -> NotifyOption {
9291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9292 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9293 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9294 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9295 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9296 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9297 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9298 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9302 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9303 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9305 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9306 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9307 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9309 log_level: Level::Trace,
9312 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9313 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9314 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9316 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9327 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9328 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9329 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9330 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9331 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9332 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9333 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9334 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9335 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9336 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9337 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9339 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9340 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9341 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9345 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9347 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9348 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9349 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9351 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9352 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9353 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9354 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9355 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9361 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9362 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9363 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9364 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9365 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9371 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9372 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9373 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9377 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9378 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9382 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9383 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9386 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9387 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9390 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9391 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9394 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9395 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9396 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9397 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9400 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9401 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9402 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9403 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9406 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9407 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9408 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9409 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9412 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9413 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9414 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9415 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9418 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9419 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9420 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9421 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9424 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9425 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9426 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9427 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9430 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9431 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9432 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9433 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9436 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9437 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9438 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9439 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9442 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9443 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9444 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9445 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9449 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9450 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9452 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9453 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9454 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9455 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9456 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9457 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9461 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9462 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9463 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9466 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9467 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9470 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9471 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9473 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9474 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9476 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9477 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9481 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9482 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9483 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9485 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9487 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9488 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9492 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9493 amount_msats, payment_secret
9495 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9497 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9498 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9502 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9503 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9504 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9507 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9508 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9509 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9510 payment_paths, payment_hash
9512 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9513 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9514 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9516 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9517 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9518 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9519 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9520 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9523 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9524 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9525 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9526 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9527 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9529 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9530 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9531 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9532 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9533 .and_then(|invoice| {
9535 let mut invoice = invoice;
9536 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9537 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9539 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9540 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9541 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9543 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9544 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9549 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9550 Err(error) => Some(error),
9554 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9555 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9557 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9559 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9560 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9563 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9565 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9572 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9579 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9580 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9584 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9585 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9586 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9587 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9588 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9592 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9593 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9595 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9596 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9597 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9598 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9599 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9602 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9603 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9604 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9605 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9608 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9609 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9610 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9611 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9614 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9615 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9616 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9617 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9620 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9621 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9622 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9623 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9624 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9625 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9626 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9627 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9628 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9629 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9630 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9631 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9632 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9633 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9634 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9635 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9636 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9637 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9638 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9639 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9640 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9645 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9646 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9648 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9649 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9650 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9651 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9654 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9655 (2, node_id, required),
9656 (4, features, required),
9657 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9658 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9659 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9660 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9663 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9664 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9665 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9666 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9667 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9668 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9669 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9670 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9671 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9672 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9673 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9674 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9675 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9676 (7, self.config, option),
9677 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9678 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9679 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9680 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9681 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9682 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9683 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9684 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9685 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9686 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9687 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9688 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9689 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9690 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9691 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9692 (32, self.is_public, required),
9693 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9694 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9695 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9696 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9697 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9698 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9699 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9705 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9706 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9707 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9708 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9709 (2, channel_id, required),
9710 (3, channel_type, option),
9711 (4, counterparty, required),
9712 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9713 (6, funding_txo, option),
9714 (7, config, option),
9715 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9716 (9, confirmations, option),
9717 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9718 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9719 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9720 (16, balance_msat, required),
9721 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9722 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9723 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9724 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9725 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9726 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9727 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9728 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9729 (26, is_outbound, required),
9730 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9731 (30, is_usable, required),
9732 (32, is_public, required),
9733 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9734 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9735 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9736 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9737 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9738 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9739 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9742 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9743 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9744 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9745 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9746 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9750 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9752 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9753 outbound_scid_alias,
9757 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9758 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9760 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9761 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9762 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9763 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9764 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9765 confirmations_required,
9767 force_close_spend_delay,
9768 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9769 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9770 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9771 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9772 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9773 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9774 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9775 channel_shutdown_state,
9776 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9777 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9782 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9783 (2, channels, required_vec),
9784 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9785 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9788 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9789 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9790 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9793 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9795 (0, onion_packet, required),
9796 (1, blinded, option),
9797 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9800 (0, payment_data, required),
9801 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9802 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9803 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9804 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9805 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9807 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9808 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9809 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9810 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9811 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9812 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9813 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9817 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9818 (0, routing, required),
9819 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9820 (4, payment_hash, required),
9821 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9822 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9823 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9824 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9828 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9829 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9831 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9833 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9834 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9835 reason.write(writer)?;
9837 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9838 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9841 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9842 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9843 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9844 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9851 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9852 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9853 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9856 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9857 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9858 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9859 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9863 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9864 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9865 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9866 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9867 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9870 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9871 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9872 // messages contained in the variants.
9873 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9874 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9875 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9877 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9878 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9879 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9880 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9881 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9884 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9885 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9886 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9887 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9888 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9890 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9895 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9900 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9901 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9902 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9905 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9906 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9907 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9908 (2, outpoint, required),
9909 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9910 (4, htlc_id, required),
9911 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9912 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9913 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9914 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9915 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9918 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9919 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9920 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9921 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9922 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9924 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9925 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9926 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9927 (2, self.value, required),
9928 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9929 (4, payment_data, option),
9930 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9931 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9932 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9933 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9939 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9940 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9941 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9942 (0, prev_hop, required),
9943 (1, total_msat, option),
9944 (2, value_ser, required),
9945 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9946 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9947 (5, total_value_received, option),
9948 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9949 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9950 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9952 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9953 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9954 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9956 if payment_data.is_some() {
9957 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9959 if total_msat.is_none() {
9960 total_msat = Some(value);
9962 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9965 if total_msat.is_none() {
9966 if payment_data.is_none() {
9967 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9969 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9971 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9975 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9978 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9979 total_value_received,
9980 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9982 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9983 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9988 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9989 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9990 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9993 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9994 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9995 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9996 let mut payment_id = None;
9997 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9998 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9999 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10000 (0, session_priv, required),
10001 (1, payment_id, option),
10002 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10003 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10004 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10005 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10007 if payment_id.is_none() {
10008 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10010 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10012 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10013 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10016 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10017 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10018 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10019 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10023 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10024 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10025 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10027 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10030 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10031 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10036 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10037 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10039 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10040 0u8.write(writer)?;
10041 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10042 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10043 (0, session_priv, required),
10044 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10045 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10046 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10047 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10048 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10049 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10052 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10053 1u8.write(writer)?;
10054 field.write(writer)?;
10061 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10062 (0, forward_info, required),
10063 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10064 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10065 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10066 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10067 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10068 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10069 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10072 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10073 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10074 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10076 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10080 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10081 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10082 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10083 (0, htlc_id, required),
10084 (2, err_packet, required),
10087 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10088 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10089 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10090 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10091 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10092 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10093 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10094 (0, htlc_id, required),
10095 (1, failure_code, required),
10096 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10097 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10105 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10106 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10107 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10109 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10111 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10112 (0, htlc_id, required),
10113 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10114 (2, err_packet, required),
10115 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10117 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10118 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10119 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10121 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10125 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10126 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10130 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10135 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10136 (0, payment_secret, required),
10137 (2, expiry_time, required),
10138 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10139 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10140 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10143 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10145 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10146 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10147 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10148 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10149 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10150 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10154 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10155 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10157 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10159 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10161 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10162 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10163 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10166 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10168 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10169 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10170 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10173 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10174 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10177 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10178 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10182 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10184 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10185 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10186 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10187 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10188 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10189 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10192 channel.write(writer)?;
10198 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10199 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10200 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10201 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10202 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10203 for forward in pending_forwards {
10204 forward.write(writer)?;
10209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10211 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10212 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10213 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10215 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10216 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10217 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10218 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10219 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10220 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10221 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10222 htlc.write(writer)?;
10224 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10225 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10228 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10229 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10230 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10231 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10232 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10233 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10234 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10237 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10238 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10239 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10240 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10241 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10243 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10244 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10245 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10246 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10247 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10248 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10249 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10254 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10255 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10256 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10257 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10258 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10259 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10260 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10261 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10262 0u64.write(writer)?;
10264 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10265 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10266 event.write(writer)?;
10270 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10271 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10272 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10273 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10274 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10275 0u64.write(writer)?;
10277 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10278 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10279 // likely to be identical.
10280 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10281 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10283 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10284 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10285 hash.write(writer)?;
10286 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10289 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10290 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10291 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10292 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10293 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10296 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10297 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10299 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10300 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10301 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10302 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10305 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10306 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10307 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10308 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10312 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10313 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10314 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10316 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10317 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10318 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10324 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10325 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10326 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10327 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10330 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10331 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10332 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10333 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10334 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10337 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10338 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10339 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10340 if !updates.is_empty() {
10341 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10342 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10347 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10348 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10349 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10350 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10351 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10352 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10353 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10354 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10355 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10356 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10357 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10358 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10359 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10366 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10367 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10368 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10369 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10372 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10373 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10374 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10375 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10376 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10377 // check that the event is sane here.
10378 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10379 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10380 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10381 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10387 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10388 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10389 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10390 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10391 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10392 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10395 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10396 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10397 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10398 events.push_back((ev, action));
10399 } else if action.is_some() {
10400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10407 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10408 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10409 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10410 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10411 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10412 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10415 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10417 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10419 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10420 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10421 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10422 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10423 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10424 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10425 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10426 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10427 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10428 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10429 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10430 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10431 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10433 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10434 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10436 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10437 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10439 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10440 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10441 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10442 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10443 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10444 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10446 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10447 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10449 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10450 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10451 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10452 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10453 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10454 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10458 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10459 pub entropy_source: ES,
10461 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10462 pub node_signer: NS,
10464 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10465 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10467 pub signer_provider: SP,
10469 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10471 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10472 pub fee_estimator: F,
10473 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10475 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10476 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10477 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10478 pub chain_monitor: M,
10480 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10481 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10482 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10483 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10484 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10485 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10487 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10489 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10490 /// deserialization.
10492 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10493 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10494 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10496 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10497 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10499 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10500 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10501 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10502 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10504 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10507 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10508 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10511 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10512 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10514 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10515 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10516 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10517 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10518 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10519 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10523 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10524 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10525 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10526 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10527 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10529 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10530 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10531 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10537 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10538 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10539 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10540 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10542 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10543 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10544 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10545 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10546 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10547 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10551 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10552 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10553 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10557 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10558 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10560 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10561 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10562 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10563 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10564 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10565 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10569 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10570 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10572 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10573 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10574 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10576 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10578 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10579 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10580 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10581 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10582 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10583 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10584 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10585 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10586 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10587 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10588 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10590 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10591 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10592 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10593 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10594 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10595 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10596 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10597 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10598 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10599 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10600 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10601 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10602 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10603 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10604 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10606 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10607 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10608 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10610 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10611 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10612 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10614 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10615 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10616 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10618 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10619 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10622 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10623 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10624 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10627 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10628 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10629 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10630 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10631 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10632 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10633 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10634 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10636 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10637 let mut found_htlc = false;
10638 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10639 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10642 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10643 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10644 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10645 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10646 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10647 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10648 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10650 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10651 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10652 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10656 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10657 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10658 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10659 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10660 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10662 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10663 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10665 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10667 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10668 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10671 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10672 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10673 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10677 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10678 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10679 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10680 // safely discard the channel.
10681 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10682 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10683 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10684 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10685 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10686 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10687 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10688 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10691 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10692 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10693 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10694 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10695 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10696 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10700 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10701 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10702 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10703 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10704 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10706 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10707 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10708 counterparty_node_id: None,
10709 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10710 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10712 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10716 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10717 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10718 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10719 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10720 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10721 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10722 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10723 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10724 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10726 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10729 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10730 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10731 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10732 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10733 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10734 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10735 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10736 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10738 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10741 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10744 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10745 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10746 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10747 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10748 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10749 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10750 is_connected: false,
10754 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10755 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10756 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10757 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10758 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10759 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10760 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10761 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10764 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10765 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10766 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10767 for _ in 0..event_count {
10768 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10769 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10774 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10775 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10776 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10778 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10779 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10780 // on-startup monitor updates.
10781 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10782 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10784 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10788 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10789 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10791 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10792 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10793 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10794 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10795 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10799 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10800 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10801 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10802 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10803 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10804 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10805 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10807 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10808 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10812 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10813 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10814 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10815 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10816 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10817 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10818 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10819 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10820 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10821 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10822 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10823 let mut events_override = None;
10824 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10825 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10826 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10827 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10828 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10829 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10830 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10831 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10832 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10833 (8, events_override, option),
10834 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10835 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10836 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10837 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10839 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10840 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10843 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10844 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10847 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10848 pending_events_read = events;
10851 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10852 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10855 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10856 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10857 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10858 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10859 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10860 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10862 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10864 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10865 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10866 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10869 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10870 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10871 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10872 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10873 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10875 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10876 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10877 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10879 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10880 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10881 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10882 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10883 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10885 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10886 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10887 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10888 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10889 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10890 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10891 pending_background_events.push(
10892 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10893 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10894 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10895 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10896 update: update.clone(),
10899 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10900 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10901 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10902 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10903 pending_background_events.push(
10904 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10905 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10906 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10909 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10910 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10911 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10913 max_in_flight_update_id
10917 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10919 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10920 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10921 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10922 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10924 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10926 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10927 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10928 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10929 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10930 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10931 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10932 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10933 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10934 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10937 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10938 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10939 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10940 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10941 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10942 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10943 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10944 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10945 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10946 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10947 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10950 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10951 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10952 debug_assert!(false);
10953 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10958 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10959 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10960 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10961 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10962 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10963 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10964 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10965 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10966 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10967 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
10969 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10970 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10971 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10973 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10974 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
10975 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
10976 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10977 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10978 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10979 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10980 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10985 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10986 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10988 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10989 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10990 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10991 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10994 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10995 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10996 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10997 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10998 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10999 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11000 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11002 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11003 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11004 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11005 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11006 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11007 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11008 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11009 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11010 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11013 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11014 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11015 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11016 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11018 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11019 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11020 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11023 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11024 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11025 retry_strategy: None,
11026 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11027 payment_params: None,
11028 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11029 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11030 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11031 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11032 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11033 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11034 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11035 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11036 total_msat: path_amt,
11037 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11038 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11040 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11041 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11046 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11047 match htlc_source {
11048 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11049 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11050 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11051 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11053 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11054 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11055 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11056 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11057 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11058 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11059 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11060 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11061 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11062 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11063 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11068 !forwards.is_empty()
11070 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11071 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11072 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11073 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11074 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11075 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11076 intercepted_id != ev_id
11083 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11084 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11085 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11086 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11087 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11088 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11089 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11090 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11091 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11092 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11093 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11095 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11096 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11097 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11098 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11100 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11101 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11102 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11109 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11110 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11112 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11114 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11115 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11116 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11117 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11118 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11119 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11120 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11121 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11122 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11123 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11126 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11127 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11128 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11129 // channel still live case here.
11133 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11134 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11139 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11140 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11141 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11142 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11143 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11144 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11145 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11146 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11150 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11151 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11153 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11154 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11155 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11156 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11158 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11159 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11160 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11162 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11163 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11165 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11166 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11168 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11171 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11172 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11173 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11175 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11179 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11180 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11181 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11182 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11183 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11185 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11186 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11187 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11188 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11189 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11190 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11191 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11192 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11194 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11195 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11199 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11201 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11203 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11204 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11206 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11207 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11212 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11213 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11215 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11217 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11219 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11220 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11221 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11222 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11226 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11227 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11230 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11231 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11232 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11233 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11234 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11236 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11237 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11238 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11240 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11241 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11242 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11243 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11244 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11245 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11247 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11248 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11249 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11250 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11251 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11252 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11256 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11257 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11258 debug_assert!(false);
11259 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11264 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11266 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11267 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11268 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11269 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11270 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11271 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11272 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11273 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11274 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11275 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11276 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11278 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11279 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11281 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11282 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11283 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11284 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11286 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11287 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11288 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11289 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11291 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11292 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11293 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11294 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11296 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11297 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11298 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11301 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11302 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11303 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11306 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11307 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11310 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11313 purpose: payment.purpose,
11314 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11315 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11316 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11322 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11323 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11324 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11325 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11326 for action in actions.iter() {
11327 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11328 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11329 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11331 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11333 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11334 blocked_channel_id);
11335 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11336 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11337 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11339 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11340 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11341 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11342 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11346 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11347 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11351 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11353 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11354 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11358 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11360 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11361 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11362 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11363 router: args.router,
11365 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11367 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11368 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11369 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11370 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11372 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11373 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11374 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11375 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11376 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11377 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11379 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11381 our_network_pubkey,
11384 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11386 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11388 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11389 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11390 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11391 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11392 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11394 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11395 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11397 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11399 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11401 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11402 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11403 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11405 logger: args.logger,
11406 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11409 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11410 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11411 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11412 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11413 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11416 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11417 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11418 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11419 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11420 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11421 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11422 downstream_channel_id, None
11426 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11427 //connection or two.
11429 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11435 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11436 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11437 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11438 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11439 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11440 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11441 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11442 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11443 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11444 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11445 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11446 use crate::prelude::*;
11447 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11448 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11449 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11450 use crate::util::test_utils;
11451 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11452 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11455 fn test_notify_limits() {
11456 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11457 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11458 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11459 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11461 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11463 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11464 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11465 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11466 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11467 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11469 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11471 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11472 // to connect messages with new values
11473 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11474 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11475 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11476 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11477 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11478 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11480 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11482 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11483 // ... but the last node should not.
11484 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11485 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11486 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11487 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11489 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11490 // about the channel.
11491 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11492 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11493 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11495 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11497 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11498 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11499 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11500 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11501 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11502 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11504 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11505 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11506 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11508 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11509 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11510 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11511 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11512 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11513 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11515 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11516 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11517 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11518 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11519 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11520 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11521 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11522 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11524 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11525 // the channel info has updated.
11526 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11527 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11528 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11529 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11530 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11531 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11535 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11536 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11542 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11544 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11545 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11546 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11547 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11549 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11550 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11551 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11552 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11553 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11554 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11555 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11556 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11558 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11559 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11560 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11562 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11563 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11564 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11566 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11568 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11569 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11570 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11572 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11573 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11574 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11576 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11577 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11578 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11579 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11580 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11581 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11582 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11583 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11584 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11586 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11587 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11588 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11590 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11591 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11592 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11594 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11595 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11596 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11597 // lightning messages manually.
11598 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11599 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11602 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11603 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11604 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11605 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11607 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11608 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11610 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11611 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11613 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11614 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11615 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11617 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11618 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11619 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11621 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11623 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11625 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11626 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11629 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11630 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11631 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11634 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11635 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11636 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11637 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11642 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11643 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11644 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11645 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11652 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11653 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11654 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11657 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11658 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11659 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11660 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11661 // fails as expected.
11662 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11663 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11664 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11665 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11666 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11667 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11670 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11671 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11672 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11673 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11674 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11675 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11676 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11678 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11679 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11680 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11682 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11683 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11684 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11685 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11686 let route = find_route(
11687 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11688 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11690 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11691 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11693 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11695 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11696 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11697 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11699 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11700 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11701 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11702 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11703 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11705 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11706 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11707 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11708 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11709 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11710 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11712 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11713 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11715 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11716 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11718 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11719 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11720 let route = find_route(
11721 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11722 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11724 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11725 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11727 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11728 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11729 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11730 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11731 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11733 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11734 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11735 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11736 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11738 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11740 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11741 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11742 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11744 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11745 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11746 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11748 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11749 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11750 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11751 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11752 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11753 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11754 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11755 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11756 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11758 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11759 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11761 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11762 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11763 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11764 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11766 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11767 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11768 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11769 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11770 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11772 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11773 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11774 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11777 let route = find_route(
11778 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11779 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11781 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11782 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11783 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11785 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11786 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11787 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11788 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11789 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11791 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11792 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11793 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11795 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11796 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11797 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11798 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11799 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11800 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11801 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11802 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11803 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11805 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11806 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11810 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11811 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11812 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11813 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11814 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11815 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11816 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11818 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11819 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11821 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11822 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11823 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11824 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11825 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11826 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11827 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11828 let route = find_route(
11829 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11830 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11833 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11834 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11835 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11836 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11837 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11838 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11841 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11842 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11843 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11844 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11845 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11846 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11847 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11849 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11853 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11854 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11855 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11856 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11857 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11863 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11864 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11866 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11867 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11868 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11869 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11870 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11871 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11872 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11873 let route = find_route(
11874 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11875 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11878 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11879 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11880 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11881 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11882 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11883 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11884 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11885 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11888 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11889 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11890 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11891 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11892 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11893 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11894 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11896 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11900 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11904 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11906 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11907 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11908 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11909 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11911 // Marshall an MPP route.
11912 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11913 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11914 route.paths.push(path);
11915 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11916 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11917 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11918 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11919 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11920 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11922 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11923 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11925 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11926 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11928 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11933 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11934 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11935 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11936 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11937 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11939 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11941 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11942 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11944 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11945 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11947 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11950 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11951 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11952 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11953 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11954 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11955 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11958 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11961 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11962 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11967 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11968 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11969 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11970 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11971 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11972 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11974 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11975 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11977 total_msat: 100_000,
11980 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11981 // payment verification fails as expected.
11982 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11983 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11984 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11985 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11987 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11991 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11992 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11996 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11997 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11998 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11999 // the channel is successfully closed.
12000 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12003 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12005 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12006 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12007 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12008 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12009 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12011 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12012 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12014 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12015 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12016 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12017 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12020 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12022 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12023 // as it has the funding transaction.
12024 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12025 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12026 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12029 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12031 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12033 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12035 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12036 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12037 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12039 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12042 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12043 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12044 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12045 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12046 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12049 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12050 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12052 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12053 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12054 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12055 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12057 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12058 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12059 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12060 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12062 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12063 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12065 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12066 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12067 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12068 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12069 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12070 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12071 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12075 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12076 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12077 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12078 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12079 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12080 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12081 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12084 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12086 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12087 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12088 // closing transaction).
12089 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12090 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12091 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12093 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12094 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12095 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12096 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12097 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12100 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12102 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12104 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12105 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12106 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12108 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12110 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12111 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12114 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12115 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12116 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12119 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12120 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12121 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12124 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12125 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12126 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12129 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12130 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12131 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12134 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12136 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12137 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12139 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12140 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12142 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12143 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12148 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12149 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12150 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12151 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12152 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12153 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12154 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12155 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12158 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12159 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12160 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12162 // Test the API functions.
12163 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12165 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12167 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12169 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12171 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12173 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12175 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12179 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12180 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12181 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12182 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12183 // the given `channel_id`.
12184 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12185 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12186 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12187 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12189 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12192 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12194 // Test the API functions.
12195 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12197 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12199 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12201 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12203 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12205 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12209 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12210 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12214 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12216 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12218 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12219 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12221 let mut funding_tx = None;
12222 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12223 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12224 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12227 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12228 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12229 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12230 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12231 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12233 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12235 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12237 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12239 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12241 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12243 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12246 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12247 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12248 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12249 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12250 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12251 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12253 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12254 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12256 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12257 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12258 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12259 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12260 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12261 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12262 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12265 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12266 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12267 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12268 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12269 }, true).unwrap_err();
12271 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12272 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12273 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12274 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12275 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12276 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12277 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12279 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12280 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12282 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12283 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12284 }, true).unwrap_err();
12286 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12287 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12288 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12289 }, false).unwrap();
12290 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12292 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12293 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12295 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12296 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12297 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12298 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12299 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12301 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12302 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12303 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12305 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12306 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12307 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12309 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12310 // "protected" and can connect again.
12311 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12312 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12313 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12315 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12317 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12319 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12320 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12324 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12325 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12326 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12331 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12333 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12334 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12336 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12337 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12338 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12339 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12342 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12344 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12345 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12346 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12348 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12349 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12350 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12352 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12353 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12354 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12355 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12359 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12360 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12361 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12362 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12363 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12364 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12365 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12367 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12369 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12371 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12372 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12374 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12375 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12376 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12377 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12378 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12379 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12382 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12383 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12385 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12386 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12388 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12390 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12391 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12394 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12395 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12396 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12397 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12398 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12400 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12401 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12403 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12404 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12405 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12406 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12412 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12413 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12415 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12416 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12417 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12419 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12420 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12424 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12428 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12429 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12430 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12431 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12432 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12433 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12434 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12435 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12436 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12437 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12438 payment_metadata: None,
12439 keysend_preimage: None,
12440 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12441 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12443 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12445 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12446 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12447 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12448 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12449 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12450 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12451 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12453 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12454 } else { panic!(); }
12456 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12457 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12458 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12459 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12460 payment_metadata: None,
12461 keysend_preimage: None,
12462 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12463 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12465 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12467 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12468 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12469 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12470 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12474 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12475 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12476 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12477 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12478 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12480 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12481 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12482 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12483 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12484 payment_metadata: None,
12485 keysend_preimage: None,
12486 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12487 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12489 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12490 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12491 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12493 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12494 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12495 // is not satisfied.
12496 assert!(result.is_ok());
12500 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12501 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12502 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12503 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12504 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12506 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12507 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12512 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12513 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12516 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12518 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12519 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12520 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12521 match &msg_events[0] {
12522 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12523 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12525 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12526 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12527 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12533 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12534 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12536 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12537 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12538 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12540 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12544 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12545 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12546 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12547 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12550 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12551 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12552 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12553 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12554 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12556 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12557 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12558 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12560 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12561 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12563 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12564 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12569 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12570 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12572 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12573 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12575 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12576 // not have generated any events.
12577 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12581 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12582 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12583 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12584 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12585 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12587 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12588 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12590 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12591 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12594 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12595 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12596 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12597 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12600 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12601 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12604 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12605 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12606 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12608 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12609 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12610 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12611 ..Default::default()
12613 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12614 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12615 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12617 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12618 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12621 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12622 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12623 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12624 ..Default::default()
12626 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12628 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12629 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12631 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12632 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12635 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12636 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12637 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12638 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12639 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12642 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12643 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12644 ..Default::default()
12646 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12649 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12650 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12651 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12656 fn test_payment_display() {
12657 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12658 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12659 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12660 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12661 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12662 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12666 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12667 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12668 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12669 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12670 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12671 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12673 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12674 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12675 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12676 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12677 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12678 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12679 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12680 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12682 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12683 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12684 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12687 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12688 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12690 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12691 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12693 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12694 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12695 }, false).unwrap();
12696 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12697 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12698 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12700 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12702 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12703 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12704 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12705 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12706 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12707 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12708 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12709 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12710 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12711 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12712 } else { panic!() };
12713 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12714 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12715 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12716 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12718 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12720 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12721 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12722 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12727 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12728 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12729 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12730 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12733 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12734 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12735 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12737 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12738 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12740 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12741 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12744 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12745 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12746 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12748 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12752 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12753 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12754 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12756 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12761 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12762 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12763 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12764 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12766 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12767 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12768 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12770 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12772 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12773 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12774 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12775 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12777 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12778 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12780 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12786 use crate::chain::Listen;
12787 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12788 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12789 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12790 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12791 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12792 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12793 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12794 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12795 use crate::util::test_utils;
12796 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12798 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12799 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12800 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12801 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12803 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12805 use criterion::Criterion;
12807 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12808 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12809 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12810 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12811 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12812 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12813 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12815 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12816 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12818 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12819 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12821 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12823 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12826 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12827 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12830 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12831 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12832 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12834 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12835 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12837 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12838 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12839 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12840 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12841 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12843 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12844 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12845 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12847 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12848 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12849 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12850 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12852 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12853 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12854 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12856 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12857 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12858 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12859 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12860 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12862 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12863 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12864 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12866 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12867 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12869 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12870 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12871 }, false).unwrap();
12872 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12873 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12874 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12877 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12878 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12879 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12881 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12882 } else { panic!(); }
12884 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12885 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12886 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12887 match events_b[0] {
12888 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12889 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12891 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12894 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12895 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12896 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12897 match events_a[0] {
12898 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12899 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12904 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12906 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12907 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12908 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12910 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12911 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12912 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12913 match msg_events[0] {
12914 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12915 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12916 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12920 match msg_events[1] {
12921 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12925 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12926 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12927 match events_a[0] {
12928 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12929 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12934 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12935 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12936 match events_b[0] {
12937 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12938 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12943 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12944 macro_rules! send_payment {
12945 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12946 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12947 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12948 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12949 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12950 payment_count += 1;
12951 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12952 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12954 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12955 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12956 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12957 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12958 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12959 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12960 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12961 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12962 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12963 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12964 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12966 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12967 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12968 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12969 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12971 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12972 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12973 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12974 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12975 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12977 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12980 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12981 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12982 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12983 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12985 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12989 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12990 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12991 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);