1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually
78 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
84 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo,
85 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
86 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
87 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
88 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
93 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
94 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
97 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
100 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
101 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
104 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
106 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
108 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
112 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
116 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
117 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
118 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
119 short_channel_id: u64,
121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 struct ClaimableHTLC {
125 src: HTLCPreviousHopData,
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
130 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
132 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
133 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
136 session_priv: SecretKey,
137 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
138 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
139 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
144 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
145 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
147 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
148 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
153 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
154 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
156 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
164 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
165 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
166 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
167 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
168 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
169 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
171 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
173 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
174 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
175 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
176 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
177 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
179 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
180 err: msgs::LightningError,
181 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
183 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
185 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
187 err: LightningError {
189 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192 data: err.to_string()
196 shutdown_finish: None,
200 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
202 err: LightningError {
204 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
206 shutdown_finish: None,
210 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
211 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
214 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
216 err: LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
221 data: err.to_string()
225 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
229 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
232 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
234 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
236 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
238 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
239 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
241 data: msg.to_string()
245 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
250 data: msg.to_string()
255 shutdown_finish: None,
260 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
261 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
262 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
263 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
264 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
266 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
267 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
268 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
269 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
270 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
271 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
272 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
274 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
278 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
279 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
280 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
281 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
282 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
283 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
284 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
285 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
286 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
287 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking things that
288 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
289 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
290 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
292 /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to
294 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<[u8; 32]>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
295 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
296 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
297 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
300 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
301 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
303 latest_features: InitFeatures,
306 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
307 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
309 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
310 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
311 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
312 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
313 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
314 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
316 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
317 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
318 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
319 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
320 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
321 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
322 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
324 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
325 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
327 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
328 /// to individual Channels.
330 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
331 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
332 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
333 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
335 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
336 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
337 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
338 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
339 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
340 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
341 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
343 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
344 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
345 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
346 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
349 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
350 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
351 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
352 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
353 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
355 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
356 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
357 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
358 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
359 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
360 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
361 default_configuration: UserConfig,
362 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
363 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
365 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
368 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
370 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
371 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
372 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
375 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
377 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
378 our_network_key: SecretKey,
380 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
382 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
383 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
384 /// are currently open with that peer.
385 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
386 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
388 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
390 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
391 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
392 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
393 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
394 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
396 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
401 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
402 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
403 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
404 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
405 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
407 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
408 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
409 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
410 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
411 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
412 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
413 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
415 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
416 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
417 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
418 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
419 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
420 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
423 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
425 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
426 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
429 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
431 macro_rules! secp_call {
432 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
435 Err(_) => return Err($err),
440 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
441 pub struct ChannelDetails {
442 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
443 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
444 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
445 /// lifetime of the channel.
446 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
447 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
448 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
449 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
450 /// The node_id of our counterparty
451 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
452 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
453 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
454 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
455 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
456 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
457 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
458 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
460 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
461 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
462 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
463 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
464 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
465 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
466 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
467 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
468 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
469 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
470 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
471 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
472 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
476 macro_rules! handle_error {
477 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
480 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
481 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
482 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
483 if let Some(update) = update_option {
484 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
489 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
490 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
491 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
492 // Return error in case higher-API need one
499 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
500 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
503 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
504 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
506 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
507 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
508 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
509 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
510 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
512 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
514 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
519 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
520 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
523 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
524 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
526 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
527 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
528 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
529 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
530 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
534 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
535 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
536 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
537 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
538 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
540 if let Some(update) = update {
541 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
543 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
544 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
545 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
546 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
547 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
548 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
552 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
553 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
554 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
556 shutdown_res.0.clear();
557 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
563 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
564 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
565 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
567 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
569 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
570 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
571 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
572 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
573 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
575 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
576 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
577 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
578 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
579 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
580 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
581 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
582 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
583 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
584 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
587 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
588 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
589 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
590 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
592 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
593 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
595 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
596 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
598 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
599 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
600 if !$resend_commitment {
601 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
604 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
606 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
607 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
613 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
614 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
615 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
617 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
618 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
622 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
623 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
624 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
625 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
626 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
629 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
634 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
635 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
637 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
638 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
640 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
642 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
644 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
645 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
647 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
648 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
649 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
650 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
651 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
653 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
654 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
656 let res = ChannelManager {
657 default_configuration: config.clone(),
658 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
659 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
663 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
664 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
667 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
668 by_id: HashMap::new(),
669 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
670 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
671 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
672 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
674 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
676 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
678 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
680 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
681 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
691 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
693 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
694 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
695 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
696 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
698 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
699 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
701 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
702 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
703 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
704 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
705 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
708 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
709 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
711 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
712 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
713 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
715 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
716 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
718 panic!("RNG is bad???");
721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
723 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
724 node_id: their_network_key,
730 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
731 let mut res = Vec::new();
733 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
734 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
735 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
736 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
737 res.push(ChannelDetails {
738 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
739 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
740 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
741 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
742 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
743 inbound_capacity_msat,
744 outbound_capacity_msat,
745 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
746 is_live: channel.is_live(),
750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
751 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
752 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
753 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
759 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
760 /// more information.
761 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
762 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
765 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
766 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
768 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
769 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
770 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
771 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
772 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
773 // really wanted anyway.
774 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
777 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
778 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
779 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
781 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
782 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
783 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
785 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
786 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
787 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
788 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
790 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
791 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
792 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
795 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
796 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
797 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
799 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
800 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
805 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
806 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
808 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
809 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
814 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
815 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
825 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
826 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
827 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
828 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
829 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
831 for tx in local_txn {
832 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
833 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
837 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
838 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
839 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
840 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
845 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
846 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
847 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
854 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
855 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
856 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
857 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
858 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
864 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
865 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
866 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
867 for chan in self.list_channels() {
868 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
872 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
873 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
874 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
876 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
877 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
878 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
879 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
880 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
881 failure_code: $err_code,
882 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
887 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
888 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
891 let shared_secret = {
892 let mut arr = [0; 32];
893 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
896 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
898 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
899 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
900 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
901 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
902 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
903 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
904 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
905 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
908 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
909 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
910 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
911 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
912 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
915 let mut channel_state = None;
916 macro_rules! return_err {
917 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
919 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
920 if channel_state.is_none() {
921 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
923 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
924 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
925 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
926 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
927 })), channel_state.unwrap());
932 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
933 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
934 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
935 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
937 let error_code = match err {
938 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
939 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
940 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
941 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
942 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
944 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
947 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
948 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
949 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
956 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
959 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
960 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
961 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
962 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
963 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
964 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
965 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
966 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
967 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
968 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
969 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
970 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
974 // final_expiry_too_soon
975 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
976 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
978 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
979 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
980 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
982 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
983 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
984 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
987 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
988 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
989 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
990 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
993 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
994 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
995 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
996 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
998 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
999 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { payment_data },
1000 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1001 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1002 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1003 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1006 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1007 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1008 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1010 // Check two things:
1011 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1012 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1013 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1015 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1017 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1018 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1019 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1021 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1023 let blinding_factor = {
1024 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1025 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1026 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1027 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1030 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1032 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1034 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1037 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1038 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1041 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1042 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1043 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1044 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1045 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1049 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1050 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1051 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1052 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1054 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1055 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1056 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1057 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1061 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1062 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref type_data, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1063 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here (which is
1064 // important as various things later assume we are a ::Receive if short_channel_id is
1066 if let &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = type_data {
1067 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1068 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1069 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1070 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1072 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1074 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1075 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1077 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1078 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1079 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1080 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1081 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1082 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1083 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1085 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1086 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1088 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1089 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1090 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1092 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1093 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1095 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1096 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1097 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1098 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1100 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1101 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1106 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1107 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1108 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1109 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1111 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1112 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1114 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1115 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1117 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1119 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1124 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1127 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1128 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1129 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1130 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1131 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1135 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1137 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1138 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1139 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1140 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1141 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1142 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1143 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1144 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1145 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1146 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1149 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1150 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1152 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1158 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1160 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1161 /// fields for more info.
1163 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1164 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1165 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1166 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1167 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1168 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1170 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1172 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1173 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1174 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1175 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1176 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1177 /// relevant updates.
1179 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1180 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1181 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1182 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1183 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1185 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1186 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1187 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1188 /// must not contain multiple paths as otherwise the multipath data cannot be sent.
1189 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the basic_mpp feature bit
1190 /// set (either as required or as available).
1191 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<&[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1192 if route.paths.len() < 1 || route.paths.len() > 1 {
1193 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "We currently don't support MPP, and we need at least one path"});
1195 if route.paths[0].len() < 1 || route.paths[0].len() > 20 {
1196 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1198 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1199 for (idx, hop) in route.paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
1200 if idx != route.paths[0].len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1201 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1205 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1207 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1209 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv),
1210 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1211 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1212 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1213 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route had too large size once"});
1215 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1217 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1219 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1220 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1222 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.paths[0].first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1223 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1224 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1227 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1228 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1230 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey {
1231 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1233 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1234 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1236 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1237 path: route.paths[0].clone(),
1238 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1239 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1240 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1242 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1243 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1244 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1245 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1246 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1247 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1248 // something else in case we will resend later!
1249 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1252 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1253 node_id: route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey,
1254 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1255 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1256 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1257 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1258 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1266 } else { unreachable!(); }
1270 match handle_error!(self, err, route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1271 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1272 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1276 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1278 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1279 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1281 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1283 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1284 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1285 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1286 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1288 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1289 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1290 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1292 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1293 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1294 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1295 } else { unreachable!(); })
1300 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1301 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1302 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1304 Err(_) => { return; }
1307 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1308 // lock before add_update_monitor
1309 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1311 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1313 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1314 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1315 Err(_) => { return; },
1316 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1320 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1321 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1322 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1323 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1325 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1330 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1331 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1332 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1335 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1337 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1345 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1346 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1348 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1350 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1352 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1353 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1355 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1356 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1357 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1358 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1359 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1363 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1364 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event.
1366 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias a printable human-readable string to describe this node to
1367 /// humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1369 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1370 /// incoming connections.
1371 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: msgs::NetAddressSet) {
1372 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1374 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1375 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1376 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1377 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1379 addresses: addresses.to_vec(),
1380 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1381 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1383 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1385 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1386 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1387 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1388 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1389 contents: announcement
1394 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1396 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1397 /// Will likely generate further events.
1398 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1399 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1401 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1402 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1403 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1405 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1408 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1409 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1410 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1411 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1413 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1414 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1415 match forward_info {
1416 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1417 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1418 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1419 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1420 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1422 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1423 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: Vec::new() }
1426 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1427 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1428 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1429 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1430 // problem, not ours.
1437 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1438 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1439 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1440 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1441 match forward_info {
1442 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1443 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1445 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1446 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1447 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1448 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1449 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1450 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1452 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1454 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1455 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1457 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1459 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1460 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1461 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1467 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1469 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1470 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1471 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1472 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1473 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1474 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1475 // this channel currently :/.
1481 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1482 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1484 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1485 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1486 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1488 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1489 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1491 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1493 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1494 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1495 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1498 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1500 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1501 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1502 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1503 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1504 // messages when we can.
1505 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1506 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1507 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1514 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1515 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1518 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1519 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1520 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1521 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1522 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1523 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1525 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1526 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1527 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1528 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1529 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1531 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1533 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1535 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1536 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1537 Err(_) => { continue; },
1541 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1542 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1545 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1546 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1547 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1548 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1549 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1550 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1551 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1553 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1561 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1562 match forward_info {
1563 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1564 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { payment_data },
1565 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1566 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1567 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1568 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1569 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1572 let mut total_value = 0;
1573 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1574 Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None }))
1575 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1576 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1578 value: amt_to_forward,
1579 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1581 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1582 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1583 total_value += htlc.value;
1584 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1585 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1587 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1589 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1590 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1591 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1592 short_channel_id: htlc.src.short_channel_id,
1593 htlc_id: htlc.src.htlc_id,
1594 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.src.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1596 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() }
1599 } else if total_value >= data.total_msat {
1600 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1601 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1602 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1607 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1608 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1609 payment_secret: None,
1610 amt: amt_to_forward,
1614 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1615 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1617 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1618 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1626 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1627 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1630 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1631 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1632 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1633 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1637 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1638 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1639 events.append(&mut new_events);
1642 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1643 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1644 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1646 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1647 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1648 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1649 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1650 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1651 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1652 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1653 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1654 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1659 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1661 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1662 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1667 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1668 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1669 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1670 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1671 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1672 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>) -> bool {
1673 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1675 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1676 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1677 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1678 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1679 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1681 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), payment_hash,
1682 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() });
1688 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1689 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1690 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1691 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1692 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1693 /// still-available channels.
1694 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1695 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1696 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1697 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1700 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1701 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1702 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1703 match &onion_error {
1704 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1706 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1708 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1709 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1710 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1711 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1712 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1713 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1714 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1719 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1720 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1721 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1722 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1724 error_code: onion_error_code
1728 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1732 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1733 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1734 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1735 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1737 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1738 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1739 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1740 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1741 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1742 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1744 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1750 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1751 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1752 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1753 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1754 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1755 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1757 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1758 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1759 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1763 let mut forward_event = None;
1764 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1765 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1767 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1769 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1772 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1775 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1776 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1777 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1778 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1779 time_forwardable: time
1786 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1787 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1788 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1790 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1791 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1792 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1793 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1794 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1795 /// motivated attackers.
1797 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1798 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1799 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1801 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1803 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1804 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1805 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1806 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1807 let passes_value = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1808 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1809 if data.total_msat == expected_amount { true } else { false }
1811 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1815 let mut one_claimed = false;
1816 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1817 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1818 if !passes_value && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2) {
1819 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1820 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1821 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1822 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1823 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), &payment_hash,
1824 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1826 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), payment_preimage);
1833 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1834 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1836 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1837 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1838 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1839 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1843 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1844 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1845 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1847 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1848 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1850 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1851 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1852 // why it's missing.
1857 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1858 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1859 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1860 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1861 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1862 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1863 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1864 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1866 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1870 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1871 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1872 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1873 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1874 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1875 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1876 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1877 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1885 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1886 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1887 //TODO: Do something with e?
1891 } else { unreachable!(); }
1897 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1900 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1901 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1902 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1905 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1906 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1908 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1909 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1910 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1911 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1912 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1913 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1916 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1917 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1918 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1919 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1920 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1921 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1922 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1923 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1925 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1926 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1927 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1928 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1929 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1930 // on-chain confirmations.
1931 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1932 // should be written.
1933 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1934 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1936 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1937 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1938 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1944 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1947 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1948 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1949 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1951 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1953 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1954 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1955 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1956 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1961 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1962 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1963 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1964 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1965 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1970 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1974 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1979 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1980 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1981 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1982 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1985 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1986 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1987 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1990 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1991 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1992 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1993 msg: announcement_sigs,
1996 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2004 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2006 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2007 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2009 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2011 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2012 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2016 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2017 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2021 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
2022 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2023 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2024 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2025 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2028 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2029 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2030 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2032 entry.insert(channel);
2038 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2039 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2040 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2042 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2044 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2047 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2048 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2053 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2054 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2055 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2056 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2057 output_script: output_script,
2058 user_channel_id: user_id,
2063 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2064 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2065 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2066 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2067 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2069 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2072 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2077 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2078 // lock before add_update_monitor
2079 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2081 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2082 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2083 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2084 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2085 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2086 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
2088 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2089 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2090 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2091 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2092 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2093 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2097 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2098 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2099 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2104 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2105 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2114 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2115 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2116 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2117 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2118 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2119 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2120 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2121 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2123 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2124 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2125 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2127 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2132 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2133 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2134 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2135 user_channel_id: user_id,
2140 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2141 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2142 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2143 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2145 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2148 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2149 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2150 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2151 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2152 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2153 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2154 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2155 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2156 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2157 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2158 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2159 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2160 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2161 msg: announcement_sigs,
2166 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2170 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2171 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2172 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2173 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2175 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2177 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2178 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2180 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2181 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2182 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2183 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2187 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2188 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2189 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2193 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2194 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2195 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2197 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2198 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2203 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2204 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2206 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2207 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2208 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2209 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2217 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2218 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2219 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2221 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2223 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2224 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2226 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2227 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2228 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2229 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2234 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2235 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2236 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2237 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2238 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2239 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2240 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2242 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2243 } else { (tx, None) }
2245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2248 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2249 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2250 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2252 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2253 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2254 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2255 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2263 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2264 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2265 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2266 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2268 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2269 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2270 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2271 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2273 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2274 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2276 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2278 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2279 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2281 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2282 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2283 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2284 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2285 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2286 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2287 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2288 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2289 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2290 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2291 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2292 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2293 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2294 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2296 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2297 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2298 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2299 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2303 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2304 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2305 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2306 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2307 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2308 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2313 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2320 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2321 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2323 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2324 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2325 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2326 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2327 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2329 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2334 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2338 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2339 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2340 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2341 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2342 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2343 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2344 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2346 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2348 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2353 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2354 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2355 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2356 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2358 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2359 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2361 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2362 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2364 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2367 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2371 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2372 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2373 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2374 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2376 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2377 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2379 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2380 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2381 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2382 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2383 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2385 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2386 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2387 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2389 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2390 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2391 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2392 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2393 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2394 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2395 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2396 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2398 commitment_signed: msg,
2402 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2403 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2404 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2415 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2416 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2417 let mut forward_event = None;
2418 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2419 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2420 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2421 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2423 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2424 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.type_data {
2425 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2426 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { .. } => 0,
2428 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2429 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2432 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2437 match forward_event {
2439 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2440 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2441 time_forwardable: time
2449 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2450 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2453 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2455 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2458 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2459 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2460 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2461 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2462 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2463 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2464 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2466 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2469 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2470 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2471 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2475 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2476 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2477 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2481 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2486 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2487 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2489 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2494 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2495 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2496 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2499 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2500 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2502 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2509 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2510 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2511 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2513 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2515 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2518 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2519 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2522 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2523 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2524 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2526 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2527 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2528 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2529 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2530 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2533 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2535 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2536 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2537 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2538 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2539 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2540 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2541 contents: announcement,
2543 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2551 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2552 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2553 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2555 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2557 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2558 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2560 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2561 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2562 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2563 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2564 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2565 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2566 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2567 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2568 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2570 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2571 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2573 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2574 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2577 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2578 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2579 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2583 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2584 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2585 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2586 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2591 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2592 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2593 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2594 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2600 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2604 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2609 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2610 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2611 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2621 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2622 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2623 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2624 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2626 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2627 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2628 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2630 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2631 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2633 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2636 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2637 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2639 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2640 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2642 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2643 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2645 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2646 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2647 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2649 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2652 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2653 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2654 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2655 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2656 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2657 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2658 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2659 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2669 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2670 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2671 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2676 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2677 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2678 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2679 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2680 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2682 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2683 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2684 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2685 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2686 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2688 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2689 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2694 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2695 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2696 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2701 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2702 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2703 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2704 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2705 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2707 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2708 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2709 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2710 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2711 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2713 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2719 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2720 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2721 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2726 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2727 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2728 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2729 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2730 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2731 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2733 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2734 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2735 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2736 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2737 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2738 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2739 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2740 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2741 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2742 msg: funding_locked,
2744 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2745 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2746 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2747 msg: announcement_sigs,
2750 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2751 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2752 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2753 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2754 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2758 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2759 for tx in txn_matched {
2760 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2761 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2762 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2763 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2764 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2766 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2767 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2768 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2769 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2770 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2780 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2781 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2782 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2784 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2785 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2786 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2787 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2788 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2789 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2790 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2799 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2800 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2802 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2803 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2806 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2807 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2808 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2809 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2811 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2812 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2813 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2814 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2815 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2816 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2817 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2818 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2820 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2821 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2822 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2832 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2833 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2835 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2836 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2840 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2841 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2842 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2843 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2845 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2846 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2850 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2851 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2852 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2854 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2855 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2859 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2860 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2861 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2863 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2864 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2868 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2869 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2870 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2872 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2873 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2877 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2878 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2879 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2881 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2882 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2886 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2887 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2888 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2890 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2891 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2895 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2896 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2897 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2899 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2900 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2904 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2905 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2906 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2908 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2909 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2913 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2914 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2915 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2917 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2918 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2922 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2923 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2924 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2926 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2927 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2931 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2932 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2933 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2935 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2936 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2940 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2941 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2942 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2944 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2945 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2949 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2950 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2951 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2953 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2954 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2958 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2959 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2960 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2967 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2968 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2969 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2971 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2972 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2976 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2977 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2978 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2980 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2981 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2985 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2986 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2987 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2988 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2989 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2991 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2992 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2993 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2994 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2995 if no_connection_possible {
2996 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2997 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2998 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2999 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3000 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3002 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
3003 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3004 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3014 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3015 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3016 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3017 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3018 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3019 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3020 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3021 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3023 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3024 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3025 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3029 no_channels_remain = false;
3035 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3038 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3039 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3042 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3043 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3045 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3046 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3047 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3048 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3049 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3050 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3051 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3052 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3056 if no_channels_remain {
3057 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3060 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3061 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3063 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3064 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3070 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3071 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3073 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3076 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3077 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3079 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3080 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3084 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3089 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3090 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3091 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3092 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3093 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3094 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3095 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3096 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3097 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3101 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3102 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3103 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3109 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3112 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3113 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3115 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3116 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3117 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3118 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3122 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3127 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3128 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3130 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3131 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3132 match &self.type_data {
3133 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3135 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3136 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3138 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { ref payment_data } => {
3140 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3143 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3144 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3145 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3146 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3151 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCInfo {
3152 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3153 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3154 type_data: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3155 0u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
3156 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3157 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3159 1u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive {
3160 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3162 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3164 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3165 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3166 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3167 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3172 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3173 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3175 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3177 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3179 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3181 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3188 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3189 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3190 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3191 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3192 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3193 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3198 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3201 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3203 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3205 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3207 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3214 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3215 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3216 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3217 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3218 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3219 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3224 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3227 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3230 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3231 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3233 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3235 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3237 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3239 path.write(writer)?;
3240 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3241 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3248 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3249 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3250 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3251 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3252 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3253 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3254 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3255 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3257 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3262 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3263 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3265 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3269 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3271 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3272 data.write(writer)?;
3279 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3280 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3281 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3282 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3283 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3284 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3285 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3287 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3292 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3293 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3295 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3297 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3298 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3299 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3301 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3303 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3304 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3311 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3312 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3313 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3314 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3315 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3316 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3317 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3319 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3320 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3321 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3323 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3328 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3329 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3330 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3332 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3333 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3335 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3336 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3337 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3339 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3340 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3341 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3342 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3343 unfunded_channels += 1;
3346 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3347 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3348 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3349 channel.write(writer)?;
3353 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3354 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3355 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3356 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3357 for forward in pending_forwards {
3358 forward.write(writer)?;
3362 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3363 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3364 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3365 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3366 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3367 htlc.src.write(writer)?;
3368 htlc.value.write(writer)?;
3369 htlc.payment_data.write(writer)?;
3373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3374 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3375 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3376 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3377 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3378 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3381 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3387 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3389 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3391 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3392 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3393 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3394 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3395 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3396 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3397 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3398 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3399 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3400 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3401 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3402 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3403 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3404 /// deserialization.
3405 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3407 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3409 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3410 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3411 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3413 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3414 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3415 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3418 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3419 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3420 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3421 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3422 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3423 /// deserialization.
3424 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3425 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3426 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3427 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3429 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3430 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3432 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3433 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3434 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3435 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3437 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3439 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3442 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3443 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3444 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3445 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3446 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3447 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3450 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3451 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3452 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3454 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3456 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3457 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3458 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3459 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3460 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3461 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3462 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3463 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3466 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3467 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3468 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3469 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3470 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3471 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3472 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3473 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3474 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3476 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3477 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3479 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3482 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3486 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3487 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3488 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3492 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3493 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3494 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3495 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3496 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3497 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3498 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3499 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3501 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3504 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3505 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3506 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3507 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3508 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3509 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3510 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3511 previous_hops.push(ClaimableHTLC {
3512 src: Readable::read(reader)?,
3513 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3514 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3517 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3520 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3521 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3522 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3523 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3524 let peer_state = PeerState {
3525 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3527 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3530 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3532 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3534 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3535 monitor: args.monitor,
3536 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3538 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3539 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3540 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3542 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3547 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3549 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3551 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3553 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3555 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3556 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3557 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3558 logger: args.logger,
3559 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3562 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3563 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3564 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3565 //connection or two.
3568 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))