1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
80 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
81 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
82 crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
88 use crate::prelude::*;
90 use core::cell::RefCell;
92 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
93 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
94 use core::time::Duration;
97 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
98 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
99 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
101 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
103 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
104 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
105 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
107 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
108 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
109 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
110 // before we forward it.
112 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
113 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
114 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
115 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
116 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
118 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
121 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
122 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
124 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
125 /// do with the HTLC.
126 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
127 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
129 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
130 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
131 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
132 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
133 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
134 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
136 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
138 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
139 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
141 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
142 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
143 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
144 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
145 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
147 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
148 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
149 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
150 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
151 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
156 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
158 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
159 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
161 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
162 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
163 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
164 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
165 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
166 requires_blinded_error: bool,
168 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
169 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
170 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
172 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
173 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
175 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
176 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
177 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
178 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
179 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
180 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
181 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
183 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
184 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
185 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
186 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
188 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
189 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
190 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
192 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
193 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
194 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
198 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
199 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
200 pub struct BlindedForward {
201 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
202 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
203 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
204 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
205 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
206 /// the introduction node.
207 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
210 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
211 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
212 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
214 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
215 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
221 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
223 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
224 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
225 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
226 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
227 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
228 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
230 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
231 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
232 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
233 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
236 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
238 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
239 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
240 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
242 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
243 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
244 /// it along another path).
246 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
247 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
248 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
249 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
250 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
251 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
252 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
253 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
254 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
256 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
259 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
261 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
263 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
266 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
267 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
268 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
269 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
272 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
273 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
274 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
275 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
276 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
279 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
280 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
281 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
283 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
284 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
285 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
288 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
289 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
291 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
292 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
293 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
296 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
297 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
298 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
301 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
306 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
310 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
311 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
313 pub enum BlindedFailure {
314 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
315 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
316 FromIntroductionNode,
317 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
318 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
322 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
323 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
325 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
326 short_channel_id: u64,
327 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
329 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
330 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
331 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
332 channel_id: ChannelId,
334 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
335 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
340 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
342 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
343 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
344 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
346 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
347 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
350 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
351 struct ClaimableHTLC {
352 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
354 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
356 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
357 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
358 sender_intended_value: u64,
359 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
361 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
362 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
363 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
364 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
366 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
367 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
370 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
371 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
372 events::ClaimedHTLC {
373 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
374 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
375 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
376 value_msat: val.value,
377 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
382 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
383 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
385 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
386 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
387 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
390 /// Number of bytes in the id.
391 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
394 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
400 impl Readable for PaymentId {
401 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
402 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
407 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
408 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
409 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
413 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
415 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
416 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
417 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
419 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
420 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
425 impl Readable for InterceptId {
426 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
427 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
432 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
433 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
434 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
435 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
436 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
439 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
441 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
442 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
443 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
445 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
446 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
450 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
451 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
452 (0, short_channel_id, required),
453 (2, htlc_id, required),
455 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
456 (0, session_priv, required),
461 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
462 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
463 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
464 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
465 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
468 session_priv: SecretKey,
469 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
470 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
471 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
472 payment_id: PaymentId,
475 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
476 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
477 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
479 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
481 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
483 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
486 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
487 payment_id.hash(hasher);
488 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
494 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
496 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
497 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
498 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
499 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
500 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
501 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
505 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
506 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
507 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
508 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
509 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
510 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
512 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
518 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
519 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
521 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
522 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
523 pub enum FailureCode {
524 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
525 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
526 TemporaryNodeFailure,
527 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
528 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
529 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
530 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
531 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
532 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
533 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
534 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
535 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
536 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
538 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
539 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
540 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
543 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
544 fn into(self) -> u16 {
546 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
547 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
548 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
549 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
554 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
555 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
556 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
557 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
558 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
560 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
561 err: msgs::LightningError,
562 closes_channel: bool,
563 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
565 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
567 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
569 err: LightningError {
571 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
572 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
578 closes_channel: false,
579 shutdown_finish: None,
583 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
584 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
587 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
588 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
589 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
590 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
591 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
592 // commitment upon reconnecting.
593 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
595 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
598 err: LightningError { err, action },
599 closes_channel: true,
600 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
604 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
607 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
609 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
610 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
614 log_level: Level::Warn,
617 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
621 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
623 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
624 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
631 closes_channel: false,
632 shutdown_finish: None,
636 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
641 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
642 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
643 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
644 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
645 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
647 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
648 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
649 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
650 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
651 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
652 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
653 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
655 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
659 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
660 struct ClaimingPayment {
662 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
663 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
664 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
665 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
667 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
668 (0, amount_msat, required),
669 (2, payment_purpose, required),
670 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
671 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
672 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
675 struct ClaimablePayment {
676 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
677 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
678 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
681 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
682 struct ClaimablePayments {
683 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
684 /// failed/claimed by the user.
686 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
687 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
689 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
690 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
691 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
693 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
694 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
695 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
696 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
699 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
700 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
701 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
704 enum BackgroundEvent {
705 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
706 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
707 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
708 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
710 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
711 /// are regenerated on startup.
712 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
713 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
714 /// channel to continue normal operation.
716 /// In general this should be used rather than
717 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
718 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
719 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
724 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
725 funding_txo: OutPoint,
726 channel_id: ChannelId,
727 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
729 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
730 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
732 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
733 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
734 channel_id: ChannelId,
739 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
740 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
741 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
742 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
743 /// event can be generated.
744 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
745 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
746 /// operation of another channel.
748 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
749 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
750 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
751 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
753 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
754 event: events::Event,
755 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
757 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
758 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
759 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
761 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
762 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
763 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
764 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
765 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
767 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
768 /// stored for later processing.
769 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
770 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
771 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
772 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
773 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
777 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
778 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
779 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
780 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
781 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
782 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
783 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
784 (4, blocking_action, required),
785 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
786 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
787 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
789 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
790 (0, event, upgradable_required),
791 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
792 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
793 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
794 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
795 // downgrades to prior versions.
796 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
800 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
801 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
802 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
803 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
804 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
805 channel_id: ChannelId,
808 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
809 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
810 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
811 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
812 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
813 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
814 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
818 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
819 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
820 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
821 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
822 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
823 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
825 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
826 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
827 channel_id: ChannelId,
828 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
833 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
834 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
835 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
836 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
837 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
842 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
843 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
847 /// State we hold per-peer.
848 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
849 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
851 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
852 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
853 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
855 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
856 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
857 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
858 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
859 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
860 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
861 latest_features: InitFeatures,
862 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
863 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
864 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
865 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
866 /// user but which have not yet completed.
868 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
869 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
870 /// for a missing channel.
871 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
872 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
873 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
875 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
876 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
877 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
878 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
880 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
881 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
882 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
883 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
884 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
885 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
886 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
887 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
888 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
889 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
890 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
891 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
892 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
893 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
894 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
898 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
899 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
900 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
901 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
902 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
903 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
906 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
907 matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_))
909 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
910 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
913 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
914 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
915 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
918 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
919 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
920 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
921 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
925 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
926 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
927 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
928 /// The original OpenChannel message.
929 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
930 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
931 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
934 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
935 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
936 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
938 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
939 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
941 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
944 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
945 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
946 struct PendingInboundPayment {
947 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
948 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
949 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
950 /// this payment being removed.
952 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
953 user_payment_id: u64,
954 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
955 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
956 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
959 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
960 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
961 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
962 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
963 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
964 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
965 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
966 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
968 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
969 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
970 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
978 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
981 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
982 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
983 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
988 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
989 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
990 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
991 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
992 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
993 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
994 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
995 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
996 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
998 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
999 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1000 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1009 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1012 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1013 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1014 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1019 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1021 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1023 pub trait AChannelManager {
1024 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1025 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1026 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1027 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1028 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1029 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1030 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1031 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1032 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1033 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1034 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1035 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1036 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1037 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1038 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1039 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1040 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1041 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1042 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1043 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1045 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1047 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1049 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1051 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1053 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1055 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1057 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1058 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1059 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1062 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1063 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1065 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1066 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1067 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1068 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1069 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1070 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1074 type Watch = M::Target;
1076 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1078 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1080 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1082 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1083 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1085 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1087 type Router = R::Target;
1089 type Logger = L::Target;
1091 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1094 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1095 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1097 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1098 /// to individual Channels.
1100 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1101 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1102 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1103 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1105 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1106 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1107 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1108 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1109 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1110 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1111 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1112 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1113 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1115 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1116 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1117 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1119 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1120 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1121 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1122 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1123 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1125 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1126 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1127 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1128 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1130 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1131 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1132 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1134 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1135 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1136 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1137 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1138 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1140 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1141 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1142 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1143 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1144 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1145 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1146 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1147 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1150 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1151 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1152 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1153 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1154 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1158 // `pending_offers_messages`
1160 // `total_consistency_lock`
1162 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1164 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1166 // |__`per_peer_state`
1168 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1170 // |__`claimable_payments`
1172 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1176 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1178 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1180 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1184 // |__`pending_events`
1186 // |__`pending_background_events`
1188 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1190 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1191 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1192 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1193 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1194 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1199 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1200 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1201 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1207 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1209 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1211 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1212 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1214 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1215 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1216 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1217 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1219 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1222 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1223 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1224 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1225 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1226 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1227 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1228 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1229 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1231 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1233 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1234 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1236 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1238 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1239 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1240 /// and via the classic SCID.
1242 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1243 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1245 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1247 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1249 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1250 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1251 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1253 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1256 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1257 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1259 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1260 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1262 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1263 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1264 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1265 /// active channel list on load.
1267 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1268 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1270 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1272 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1273 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1274 /// the handling of the events.
1276 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1277 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1280 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1281 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1282 /// would break backwards compatability.
1283 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1284 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1285 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1287 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1289 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1291 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1293 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1295 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1296 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1297 /// confirmation depth.
1299 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1300 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1301 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1303 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1305 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1307 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1309 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1311 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1313 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1314 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1315 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1317 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1318 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1320 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1321 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1322 /// keeping additional state.
1323 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1325 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1326 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1327 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1328 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1330 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1331 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1333 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1334 /// are currently open with that peer.
1336 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1337 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1340 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1342 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1343 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1344 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1345 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1346 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1348 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1349 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1350 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1351 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1352 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1354 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1355 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1357 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1358 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1359 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1360 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1361 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1363 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1364 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1366 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1367 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1368 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1369 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1370 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1372 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1374 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1376 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1377 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1378 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1379 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1380 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1381 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1382 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1383 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1384 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1385 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1386 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1388 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1389 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1390 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1392 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1394 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1395 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1397 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1401 signer_provider: SP,
1406 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1408 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1409 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1410 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1411 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1412 pub struct ChainParameters {
1413 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1414 pub network: Network,
1416 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1418 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1419 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1426 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1427 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1430 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1431 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1432 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1433 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1434 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1435 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1437 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1438 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1439 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1440 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1441 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1442 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1444 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1445 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1448 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1449 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1450 /// events to handle.
1452 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1453 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1455 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1456 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1459 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1460 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1461 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1462 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1464 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1465 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1466 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1467 should_persist: move || {
1468 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1469 // processing and return that.
1470 let notify = persist_check();
1471 match (notify, force_notify) {
1472 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1473 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1474 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1475 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1476 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1479 _read_guard: read_guard,
1483 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1484 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1485 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1486 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1487 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1488 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1490 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1491 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1492 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1493 should_persist: persist_check,
1494 _read_guard: read_guard,
1499 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1500 fn drop(&mut self) {
1501 match (self.should_persist)() {
1502 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1503 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1504 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1506 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1507 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1508 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1513 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1514 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1516 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1518 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1519 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1520 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1521 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1522 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1524 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1525 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1527 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1529 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1530 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1531 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1532 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1533 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1534 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1535 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1536 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1537 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1538 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1539 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1540 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1541 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1543 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1544 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1546 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1547 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1548 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1549 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1551 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1552 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1553 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1554 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1555 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1556 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1558 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1560 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1561 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1563 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1565 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1566 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1568 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1569 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1570 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1572 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1573 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1574 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1576 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1577 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1578 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1579 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1581 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1582 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1583 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1585 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1586 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1587 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1589 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1590 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1591 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1592 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1593 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1594 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1595 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1596 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1597 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1598 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1599 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1602 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1603 /// to better separate parameters.
1604 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1605 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1606 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1607 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1608 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1609 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1610 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1611 pub features: InitFeatures,
1612 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1613 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1614 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1616 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1618 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1619 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1620 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1621 /// payments to us through this channel.
1622 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1623 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1624 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1625 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1626 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1627 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1628 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1631 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1632 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1633 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1634 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1635 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1636 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1637 /// lifetime of the channel.
1638 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1639 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1640 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1641 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1642 /// our counterparty already.
1643 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1644 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1646 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1647 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1648 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1649 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1651 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1652 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1654 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1655 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1657 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1658 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1659 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1660 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1661 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1662 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1663 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1664 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1665 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1668 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1670 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1671 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1672 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1673 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1674 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1675 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1676 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1678 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1679 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1681 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1682 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1683 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1684 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1685 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1686 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1687 /// this value on chain.
1689 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1691 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1693 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1694 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1695 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1696 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1697 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1698 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1699 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1701 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1702 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1703 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1704 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1705 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1706 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1708 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1709 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1710 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1711 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1712 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1714 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1715 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1716 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1717 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1719 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1720 pub balance_msat: u64,
1721 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1722 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1723 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1724 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1726 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1728 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1729 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1730 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1731 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1732 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1733 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1734 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1735 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1737 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1738 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1739 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1740 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1741 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1742 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1743 /// route which is valid.
1744 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1745 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1746 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1747 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1748 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1749 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1751 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1752 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1753 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1754 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1755 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1756 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1757 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1758 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1759 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1761 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1763 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1764 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1765 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1766 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1767 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1769 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1770 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1771 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1772 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1773 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1774 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1775 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1777 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1778 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1779 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1780 pub is_outbound: bool,
1781 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1782 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1783 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1784 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1785 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1787 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1788 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1789 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1790 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1791 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1792 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1793 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1795 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1796 pub is_usable: bool,
1797 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1798 pub is_public: bool,
1799 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1800 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1801 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1802 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1803 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1804 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1806 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1807 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1810 impl ChannelDetails {
1811 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1812 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1813 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1815 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1816 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1817 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1818 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1821 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1822 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1823 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1825 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1826 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1827 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1828 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1831 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1832 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1833 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1836 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1837 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1839 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1840 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1841 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1843 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1844 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1845 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1846 features: latest_features,
1847 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1848 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1849 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1850 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1851 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1852 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1853 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1854 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1855 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1856 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1858 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1859 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1860 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1861 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1862 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1863 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1864 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1865 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1866 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1867 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1868 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1869 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1870 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1871 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1872 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1873 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1874 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1875 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1876 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1877 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1878 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1879 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1880 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1881 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1882 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1883 config: Some(context.config()),
1884 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1889 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1890 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1891 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1892 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1893 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1894 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1895 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1896 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1897 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1899 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1901 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1902 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1904 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1905 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1906 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1907 /// to drop the channel.
1911 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1912 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1913 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1914 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1915 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1917 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1918 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1919 payment_id: PaymentId,
1921 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1923 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1924 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1925 payment_id: PaymentId,
1926 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1928 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1929 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1930 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1933 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1934 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1935 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1937 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1938 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1939 payment_id: PaymentId,
1940 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1941 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1942 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1944 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1945 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1946 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1948 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1949 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1950 payment_id: PaymentId,
1951 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1952 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1956 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1958 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1960 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1961 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1962 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1963 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1965 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1966 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1967 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1970 macro_rules! handle_error {
1971 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1972 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1973 // entering the macro.
1974 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1975 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1979 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1980 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1982 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1983 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1984 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1985 let logger = WithContext::from(
1986 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1988 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1990 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1991 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1992 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1997 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2000 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2002 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2003 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2004 action: err.action.clone()
2008 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2009 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2010 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2011 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2012 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2016 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2023 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2024 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2025 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2026 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2028 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2029 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2030 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2032 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2033 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2034 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2035 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2036 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2038 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2039 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2041 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2045 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2046 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2047 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2049 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2050 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2052 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2053 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2055 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2056 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2057 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2058 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2059 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2060 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2062 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2067 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2068 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2070 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2071 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2073 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2074 match $channel_phase {
2075 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2076 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2078 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2079 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2081 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2082 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2088 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2089 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2093 let key = *$entry.key();
2094 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2096 $entry.remove_entry();
2104 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2105 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2109 let key = *$entry.key();
2110 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2112 $entry.remove_entry();
2120 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2121 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2123 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2124 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2130 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2131 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2132 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2133 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2134 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2136 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2137 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2138 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2139 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2140 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2141 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2142 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2143 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2144 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2145 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2150 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2151 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2152 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2153 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2154 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2155 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2156 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2157 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2158 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2159 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2161 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2166 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2167 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2168 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2169 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2170 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2171 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2172 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2173 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2174 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2176 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2181 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2182 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2183 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2184 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2185 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2186 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2187 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2188 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2189 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2190 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2191 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2192 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2194 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2195 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2196 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2202 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2203 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2205 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2206 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2207 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2208 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2209 updates.announcement_sigs);
2210 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2211 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2214 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2215 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2216 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2217 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2219 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2220 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2221 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2222 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2223 let mut batch_completed = false;
2224 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2225 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2226 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2227 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2229 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2230 channel_state.2 = true;
2232 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2234 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2236 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2239 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2240 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2241 if batch_completed {
2242 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2243 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2244 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2245 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2246 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2247 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2248 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2249 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2250 chan.set_batch_ready();
2251 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2252 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2256 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2257 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2258 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2263 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2265 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2266 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2268 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2269 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2270 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2271 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2276 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2277 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2278 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2279 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2281 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2282 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2283 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2284 panic!("{}", err_str);
2286 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2287 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2288 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2291 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2297 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2298 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2299 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2301 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2302 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2303 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2304 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2305 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2306 // filter for uniqueness here.
2307 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2308 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2309 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2310 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2312 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2313 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2315 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2316 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2317 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2323 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2324 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2325 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2326 while !processed_all_events {
2327 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2334 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2335 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2336 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2338 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2339 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2340 result = $self.process_background_events();
2342 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2343 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2344 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2345 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2349 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2350 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2351 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2352 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2355 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2357 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2358 $event_to_handle = event;
2360 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2361 post_event_actions.push(action);
2366 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2367 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2368 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2369 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2370 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2371 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2374 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2375 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2376 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2377 processed_all_events = false;
2381 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2382 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2383 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2385 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2386 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2387 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2393 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2395 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2396 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2397 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2398 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2399 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2400 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2404 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2406 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2408 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2409 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2411 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2413 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2414 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2415 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2418 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2419 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2420 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2422 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2423 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2424 current_timestamp: u32,
2426 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2427 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2428 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2429 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2431 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2432 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2433 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2438 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2440 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2441 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2442 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2443 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2444 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2445 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2446 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2447 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2449 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2452 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2453 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2455 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2457 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2459 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2461 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2462 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2463 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2464 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2465 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2466 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2467 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2468 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2470 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2480 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2481 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2482 &self.default_configuration
2485 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2486 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2487 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2490 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2491 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2493 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2495 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2499 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2504 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2506 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2507 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2508 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2509 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2510 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2512 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2513 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2515 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2516 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2517 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2519 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2520 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2521 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2523 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2524 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2526 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2527 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2528 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2529 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2530 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2531 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2533 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2534 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2535 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2536 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2537 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2538 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2542 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2543 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2545 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2547 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2548 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2550 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2552 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2553 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2554 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2559 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2560 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2561 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2562 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2563 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2564 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2568 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2573 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2575 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2576 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2579 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2581 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2587 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2588 node_id: their_network_key,
2591 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2594 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2595 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2596 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2597 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2598 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2599 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2600 // the same channel.
2601 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2603 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2605 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2608 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2609 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2610 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2611 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2615 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2616 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2617 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2625 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2626 /// more information.
2627 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2628 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2629 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2630 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2631 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2632 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2633 // the same channel.
2634 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2636 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2637 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2638 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2641 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2642 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2643 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2651 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2652 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2654 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2655 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2657 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2658 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2659 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2660 // really wanted anyway.
2661 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2664 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2665 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2666 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2669 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2672 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2673 let context_to_details = |context| {
2674 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2676 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2678 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2679 .map(context_to_details)
2685 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2686 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2688 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2689 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2690 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2692 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2693 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2694 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2695 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2696 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2697 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2699 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2700 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2701 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2703 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2704 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2705 payment_id: *payment_id,
2706 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2707 total_msat: *total_msat,
2710 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2711 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2713 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2714 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2716 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2721 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2724 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2725 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2730 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2731 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2733 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2734 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2736 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2738 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2739 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2740 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2741 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2742 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2743 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2745 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2746 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2747 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2749 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2753 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2754 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2756 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2757 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2758 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2759 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2762 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2763 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2767 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2769 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2770 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2777 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2778 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2779 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2780 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2783 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2784 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2790 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2791 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2792 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2794 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2795 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2797 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2798 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2799 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2800 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2802 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2804 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2805 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2806 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2809 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2810 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2811 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2812 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2813 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2814 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2817 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2818 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2819 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2821 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2822 /// the channel being closed or not:
2823 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2824 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2825 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2826 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2827 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2828 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2829 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2831 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2832 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2833 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2834 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2836 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2838 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2839 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2840 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2843 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2844 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2845 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2846 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2847 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2850 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2851 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2852 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2853 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2854 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2857 let logger = WithContext::from(
2858 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2861 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2862 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2863 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2864 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2865 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2866 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2867 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2869 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2870 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2871 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2872 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2873 // ignore the result here.
2874 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2876 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2877 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2878 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2879 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2880 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2881 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2882 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2883 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2884 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2885 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2886 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2887 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2890 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2893 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2894 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2899 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2900 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2901 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2902 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2903 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2904 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2905 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2906 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2909 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2910 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2911 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2915 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2916 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2920 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2921 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2922 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2923 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2925 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2926 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2927 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2928 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2929 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2930 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2932 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2934 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2935 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2936 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2937 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2938 mem::drop(peer_state);
2939 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2941 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2942 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2943 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2945 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2946 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2947 // Unfunded channel has no update
2948 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2951 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2952 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2953 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2954 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2956 (None, *peer_node_id)
2958 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2961 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2962 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2963 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2965 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2966 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2967 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2968 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2969 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2975 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2978 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2979 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2980 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2981 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2983 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2984 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2985 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2986 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2987 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2988 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2989 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3000 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3001 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3002 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3004 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3005 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3006 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3009 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3010 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3011 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3013 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3014 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3015 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3016 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3017 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3020 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3021 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3022 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3023 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3024 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3028 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3029 /// local transaction(s).
3030 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3031 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3032 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3036 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3037 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3039 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3041 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3042 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3045 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3046 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3047 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3048 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3054 macro_rules! return_err {
3055 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3058 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3059 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3061 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3062 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3063 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3064 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3065 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3066 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3067 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3071 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3072 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3073 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3074 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3075 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3076 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3077 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3078 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3084 let NextPacketDetails {
3085 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3086 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3087 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3088 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3089 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3092 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3093 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3094 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3095 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3096 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3097 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3098 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3099 // phantom or an intercept.
3100 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3101 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3102 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3106 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3109 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3111 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3113 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3114 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3115 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3119 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3120 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3123 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3124 // have no consistency guarantees.
3125 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3129 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3130 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3131 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3132 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3133 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3135 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3136 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3137 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3138 // we don't have the channel here.
3139 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3141 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3143 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3144 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3145 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3146 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3147 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3148 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3149 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3150 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3151 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3152 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3153 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3155 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3158 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3159 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3161 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3162 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3169 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3171 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3172 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3174 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3175 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3176 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3177 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3178 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3180 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3181 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3187 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3188 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3189 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3190 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3192 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3193 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3195 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3196 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3197 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3199 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3200 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3201 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3202 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3203 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3204 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3205 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3209 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3211 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3214 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3215 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3216 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3217 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3218 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3219 macro_rules! return_err {
3220 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3222 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3223 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3224 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3225 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3226 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3227 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3228 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3229 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3230 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3234 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3235 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3236 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3237 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3238 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3244 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3246 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3247 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3248 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3249 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3252 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3253 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3254 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3255 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3256 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3258 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3261 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3262 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3263 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3264 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3265 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3271 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3272 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3273 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3275 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3276 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3277 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3279 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3280 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3281 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3282 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3283 return Err(LightningError {
3284 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3288 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3289 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3291 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3292 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3293 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3296 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3297 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3298 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3299 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3301 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3302 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3303 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3305 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3306 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3307 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3308 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3309 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3310 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3311 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3315 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3318 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3319 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3320 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3321 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3323 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3324 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3325 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3326 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3327 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3330 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3331 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3333 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3334 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3335 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3336 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3337 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3338 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3339 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3340 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3342 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3343 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3344 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3346 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3348 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3355 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3356 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3357 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3358 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3363 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3364 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3365 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3368 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3369 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3370 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3371 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3373 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3374 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3375 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3377 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3378 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3382 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3383 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3385 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3386 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3387 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3389 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3392 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3394 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3395 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3398 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3399 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3402 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3403 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3404 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3405 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3406 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3408 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3409 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3410 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3411 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3413 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3414 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3416 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3417 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3418 Some(monitor_update) => {
3419 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3421 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3422 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3423 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3424 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3425 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3426 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3427 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3435 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3438 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3439 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3440 // `channel_by_id` map.
3441 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3442 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3446 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3447 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3449 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3454 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3456 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3457 /// fields for more info.
3459 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3460 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3462 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3464 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3465 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3466 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3467 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3468 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3470 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3471 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3472 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3473 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3474 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3476 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3477 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3478 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3479 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3481 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3483 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3484 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3485 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3487 /// In general, a path may raise:
3488 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3489 /// node public key) is specified.
3490 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3491 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3492 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3493 /// relevant updates.
3495 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3496 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3497 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3499 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3500 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3501 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3502 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3503 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3504 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3505 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3506 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3508 self.pending_outbound_payments
3509 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3510 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3511 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3514 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3515 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3516 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3517 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3519 self.pending_outbound_payments
3520 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3521 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3522 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3523 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3527 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3528 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3530 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3531 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3532 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3536 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3537 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3538 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3542 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3543 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3546 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3547 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3549 self.pending_outbound_payments
3550 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3551 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3552 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3553 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3554 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3558 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3559 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3560 /// retries are exhausted.
3562 /// # Event Generation
3564 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3565 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3567 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3568 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3569 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3571 /// # Requested Invoices
3573 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3574 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3575 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3576 /// once the invoice has been received.
3578 /// # Restart Behavior
3580 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3581 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3582 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3584 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3585 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3590 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3591 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3592 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3593 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3594 /// never reach the recipient.
3596 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3597 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3599 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3600 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3602 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3603 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3606 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3607 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3608 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3611 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3612 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3614 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3617 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3618 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3619 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3621 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3622 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3623 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3624 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3627 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3628 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3629 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3630 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3631 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3633 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3634 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3635 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3638 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3641 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3642 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3645 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3646 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3648 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3649 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3650 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3651 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3652 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3653 let payment_params =
3654 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3656 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3658 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3661 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3662 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3664 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3665 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3666 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3667 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3669 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3670 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3671 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3672 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3673 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3674 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3675 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3676 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3677 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3678 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3680 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3681 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3682 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3683 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3687 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3689 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3690 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3693 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3695 let mut res = Vec::new();
3697 for mut path in route.paths {
3698 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3699 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3700 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3701 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3702 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3705 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3708 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3709 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3711 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3713 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3714 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3719 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3722 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3727 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3728 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3729 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3731 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3732 let used_liquidity =
3733 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3735 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3736 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3738 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3741 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3746 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3747 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3748 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3755 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3756 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3757 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3758 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3759 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3760 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3762 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3763 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3768 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3769 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3770 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3772 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3773 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3774 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3775 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3776 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3777 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3778 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3779 } else { unreachable!(); });
3781 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3782 Err((chan, err)) => {
3783 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3784 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3785 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3786 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3787 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3793 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3794 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3796 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3797 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3800 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3801 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3802 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3806 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3808 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3812 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3814 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3817 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3818 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3822 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3823 funding_txo, o.get()
3825 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3826 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3827 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3828 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3829 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3830 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3833 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3840 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3841 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3842 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3846 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3848 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3849 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3851 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3852 /// across the p2p network.
3854 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3855 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3857 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3858 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3859 /// keys per-channel).
3861 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3862 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3863 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3865 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3866 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3867 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3869 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3870 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3871 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3872 /// for more details.
3874 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3875 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3876 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3877 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3880 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3882 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3883 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3885 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3886 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3887 /// signature for each channel.
3889 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3890 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3892 let mut result = Ok(());
3894 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3895 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3896 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3897 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3898 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3903 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3904 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3905 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3909 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3910 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3911 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3912 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3913 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3914 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3915 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3916 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3918 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3919 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3924 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3925 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3926 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3927 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3931 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3932 match states.entry(txid) {
3933 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3934 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3935 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3939 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3942 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3943 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3944 temporary_channel_id,
3945 counterparty_node_id,
3946 funding_transaction.clone(),
3949 let mut output_index = None;
3950 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3951 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3952 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3953 if output_index.is_some() {
3954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3955 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3958 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3961 if output_index.is_none() {
3962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3963 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3966 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3967 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3968 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
3969 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
3970 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
3971 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3977 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3978 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3979 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3980 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3981 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3982 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3983 .into_iter().flatten()
3984 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3986 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3987 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3989 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3991 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3992 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3993 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3994 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3995 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3997 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3998 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3999 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4003 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4004 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4005 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4011 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4013 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4014 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4015 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4016 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4018 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4019 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4021 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4022 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4024 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4026 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4027 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4028 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4029 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4030 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4031 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4032 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4033 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4034 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4035 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4036 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4037 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4038 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4044 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4045 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4048 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4049 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4050 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4051 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4055 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4056 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4057 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4058 config.apply(config_update);
4059 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4062 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4063 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4064 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4065 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4066 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4067 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4074 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4075 debug_assert!(false);
4076 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4078 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4079 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4086 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4088 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4089 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4090 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4091 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4093 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4094 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4096 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4097 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4099 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4101 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4102 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4103 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4104 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4105 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4106 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4107 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4108 pub fn update_channel_config(
4109 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4110 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4111 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4114 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4115 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4117 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4118 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4120 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4121 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4122 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4123 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4124 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4126 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4127 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4128 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4131 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4134 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4135 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4136 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4137 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4138 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4139 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4140 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4142 let next_hop_scid = {
4143 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4144 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4145 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4146 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4147 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4148 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4149 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4150 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4151 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4152 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4155 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4157 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4158 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4159 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4162 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4163 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4164 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4165 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4166 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4173 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4174 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4175 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4178 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4179 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4180 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4181 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4184 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4186 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4187 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4188 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4189 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4190 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4193 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4194 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4195 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4196 payment.prev_channel_id,
4197 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4198 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4200 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4204 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4205 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4207 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4210 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4211 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4214 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4215 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4216 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4219 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4220 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4221 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4222 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4223 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4224 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4225 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4226 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4227 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4228 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4231 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4232 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4233 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4234 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4239 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4241 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4242 /// Will likely generate further events.
4243 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4246 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4247 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4248 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4250 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4251 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4253 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4254 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4255 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4256 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4258 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4259 match forward_info {
4260 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4261 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4262 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4263 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4264 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4267 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4268 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4269 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4270 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4272 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4273 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4274 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4275 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4276 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4277 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4278 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4279 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4280 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4283 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4284 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4286 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4289 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4290 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4296 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4297 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4299 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4303 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4304 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4306 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4310 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4311 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4312 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4313 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4314 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4315 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4316 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4319 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4320 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4321 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4322 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4323 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4325 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4327 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4328 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4332 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4333 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4334 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4335 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4336 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4337 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4339 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4340 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4346 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4349 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4352 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4353 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4354 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4355 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4356 // problem, not ours.
4362 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4363 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4364 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4366 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4370 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4372 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4373 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4374 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4377 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4378 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4379 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4380 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4381 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4382 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4383 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4384 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4385 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4386 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4387 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4388 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4389 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4392 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4393 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4394 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4395 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4396 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4397 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4398 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4399 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4400 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4401 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4402 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4404 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4405 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4406 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4407 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4408 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4409 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4412 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4413 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4414 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4417 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4418 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4420 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4422 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4423 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4424 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4425 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4431 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4432 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4434 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4435 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4436 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4438 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4439 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4440 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4441 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4443 Some((res, htlc_id))
4446 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4447 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4448 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4449 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4451 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4453 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4454 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4455 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4461 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4465 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4466 match forward_info {
4467 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4468 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4469 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4470 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4471 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4474 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4475 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4476 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4477 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4478 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4480 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4481 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4482 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4483 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4484 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4486 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4487 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4488 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4492 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4493 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4496 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4499 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4500 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4501 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4502 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4503 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4504 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4505 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4506 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4507 phantom_shared_secret,
4510 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4511 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4512 // if routing nodes overpay
4513 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4514 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4516 total_value_received: None,
4517 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4520 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4523 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4525 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4526 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4527 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4528 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4529 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4530 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4532 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4533 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4534 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4535 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4536 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4537 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4538 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4539 phantom_shared_secret,
4542 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4543 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4545 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4548 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4549 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4550 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4551 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4552 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4555 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4556 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4557 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4558 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4559 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4560 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4562 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4563 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4564 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4566 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4567 .entry(payment_hash)
4568 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4569 .or_insert_with(|| {
4570 committed_to_claimable = true;
4572 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4575 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4576 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4578 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4580 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4582 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4584 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4585 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4586 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4589 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4591 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4592 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4593 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4594 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4595 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4596 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4597 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4599 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4600 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4602 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4604 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4605 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4606 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4607 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4608 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4609 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4611 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4612 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4613 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4614 committed_to_claimable = true;
4616 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4617 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4618 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4619 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4620 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4621 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4622 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4623 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4624 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4628 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4629 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4630 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4631 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4632 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4634 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4636 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4637 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4639 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4640 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4641 committed_to_claimable = true;
4644 payment_claimable_generated
4648 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4649 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4650 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4651 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4652 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4653 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4654 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4655 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4657 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4658 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4659 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4660 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4661 Ok(result) => result,
4663 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4664 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4667 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4668 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4669 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4670 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4671 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4672 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4675 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4676 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4677 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4679 check_total_value!(purpose);
4681 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4682 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4683 check_total_value!(purpose);
4687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4688 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4689 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4690 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4692 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4693 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4694 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4695 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4696 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4697 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4698 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4699 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4701 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4702 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4703 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4705 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4706 if payment_claimable_generated {
4707 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4713 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4714 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4722 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4723 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4724 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4725 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4727 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4728 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4730 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4732 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4733 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4734 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4736 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4738 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4739 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4740 events.append(&mut new_events);
4743 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4745 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4746 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4747 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4749 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4751 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4752 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4753 if background_events.is_empty() {
4754 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4757 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4759 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4760 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4761 // monitor updating completing.
4762 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4764 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4765 let mut updated_chan = false;
4767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4768 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4771 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4773 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4774 updated_chan = true;
4775 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4776 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4778 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4786 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4787 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4790 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4792 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4795 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4796 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4798 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4799 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4800 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4801 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4802 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4808 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4811 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4812 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4813 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4814 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4815 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4818 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4819 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4821 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4823 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4824 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4825 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4826 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4827 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4829 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4831 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4832 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4833 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4834 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4836 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4837 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4839 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4840 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4844 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4845 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4846 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4847 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4848 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4849 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4850 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4852 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4853 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4856 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4857 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4859 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4860 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4862 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4867 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4868 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4876 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4878 /// This currently includes:
4879 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4880 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4881 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4883 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4884 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4885 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4886 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4887 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4888 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4889 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4890 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4892 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4893 /// estimate fetches.
4895 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4896 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4897 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4898 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4899 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4901 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4902 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4904 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4905 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4906 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4907 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4909 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4910 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4911 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4912 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4913 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4914 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4916 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4917 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4918 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4920 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4921 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4922 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4923 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4924 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4925 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4926 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4927 channel_id: *chan_id,
4928 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4940 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4943 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4944 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4945 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4947 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4948 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4953 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4954 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4956 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4957 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4958 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4959 if needs_close { return false; }
4962 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4963 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4964 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4965 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4966 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4967 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4968 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4969 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4971 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4972 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4973 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4974 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4978 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4980 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4983 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4985 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4986 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4987 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4988 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4992 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4994 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5000 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5002 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5003 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5004 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5005 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5006 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5007 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5008 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5009 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5010 channel_id: *chan_id,
5011 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5019 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5020 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5021 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5023 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5024 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5025 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5030 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5031 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5032 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5033 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5034 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5035 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5036 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5037 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5038 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5044 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5046 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5047 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5052 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5053 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5054 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5055 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5056 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5057 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5058 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5059 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5060 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5061 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5062 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5063 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5064 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5065 // have no channels to the peer.
5066 let remove_entry = {
5067 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5068 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5071 entry.remove_entry();
5074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5079 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5080 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5081 // This should be unreachable
5082 debug_assert!(false);
5085 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5086 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5087 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5088 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5089 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5090 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5091 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5094 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5095 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5096 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5098 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5099 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5106 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5107 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5108 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5109 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5110 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5113 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5114 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5117 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5118 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5121 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5122 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5123 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5124 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5125 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5126 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5127 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5130 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5131 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5134 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5135 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5136 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5137 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5138 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5145 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5146 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5147 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5149 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5150 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5151 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5152 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5154 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5155 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5156 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5157 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5158 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5159 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5162 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5163 /// reason for the failure.
5165 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5166 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5169 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5170 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5171 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5172 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5173 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5174 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5175 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5180 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5181 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5182 match failure_code {
5183 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5184 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5185 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5186 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5187 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5188 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5190 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5191 let fail_data = match data {
5192 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5195 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5200 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5201 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5203 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5205 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5206 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5207 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5208 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5209 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5210 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5211 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5213 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5215 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5216 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5218 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5223 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5224 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5225 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5226 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5227 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5228 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5229 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5230 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5231 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5232 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5234 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5235 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5236 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5237 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5239 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5240 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5241 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5242 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5243 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5247 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5248 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5249 // be surfaced to the user.
5250 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5251 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5252 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5254 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5255 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5256 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5259 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5261 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5262 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5264 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5265 debug_assert!(false);
5266 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5269 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5271 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5274 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5275 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5276 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5277 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5281 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5282 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5283 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5284 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5285 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5286 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5287 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5288 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5289 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5290 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5293 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5294 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5295 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5298 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5299 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5300 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5303 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5304 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5305 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5306 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5308 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5309 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5310 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5313 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5314 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5315 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5317 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5318 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5319 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5320 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5321 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5323 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5325 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5326 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5328 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5329 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5333 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5334 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5336 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5340 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5341 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5342 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5343 push_forward_ev = true;
5345 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5347 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5350 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5353 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5354 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5355 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5356 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5357 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5358 failed_next_destination: destination,
5364 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5365 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5367 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5368 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5369 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5370 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5372 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5373 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5374 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5375 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5377 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5378 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5379 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5381 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5382 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5383 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5384 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5385 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5386 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5387 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5388 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5389 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5392 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5393 /// even type numbers.
5397 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5398 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5400 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5401 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5402 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5405 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5406 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5411 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5412 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5413 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5414 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5415 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5416 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5417 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5418 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5423 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5424 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5425 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5426 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5427 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5429 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5430 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5431 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5435 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5436 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5437 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5438 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5439 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5440 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5441 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5442 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5443 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5444 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5445 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5454 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5456 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5457 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5458 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5459 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5460 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5461 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5462 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5463 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5464 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5466 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5467 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5468 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5469 debug_assert!(false);
5473 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5475 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5476 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5477 debug_assert!(false);
5481 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5482 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5484 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5485 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5486 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5487 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5490 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5491 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5492 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5493 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5497 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5498 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5499 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5500 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5501 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5502 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5503 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5506 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5507 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5508 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5509 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5510 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5511 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5516 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5517 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5518 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5519 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5520 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5521 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5522 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5524 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5527 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5528 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5529 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5530 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5534 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5535 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5536 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5537 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5539 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5540 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5541 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5542 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5544 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5545 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5546 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5547 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5551 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5552 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5553 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5557 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5558 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5559 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5562 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5565 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5566 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5567 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5568 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5569 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5572 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5573 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5574 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5576 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5579 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5580 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5582 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5583 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5584 // monitor update as a background event.
5585 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5586 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5587 counterparty_node_id,
5588 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5589 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5590 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5594 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5595 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5600 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5602 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5604 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5605 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5606 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5607 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5608 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5610 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5612 debug_assert!(false,
5613 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5616 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5617 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5618 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5619 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5620 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5622 let mut found_blocker = false;
5623 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5624 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5625 // which case we need to only remove the one
5626 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5627 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5628 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5629 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5631 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5634 debug_assert!(false);
5643 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5644 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5645 counterparty_node_id: None,
5646 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5649 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5653 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5654 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5655 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5656 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5657 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5658 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5659 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5660 // again on restart.
5661 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5662 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5663 payment_preimage, update_res);
5666 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5667 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5669 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5670 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5671 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5672 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5673 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5674 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5675 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5676 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5677 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5678 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5681 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5682 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5683 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5684 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5685 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5686 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5690 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5691 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5694 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5695 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5696 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5697 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId,
5700 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5701 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5702 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5703 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5704 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5706 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5707 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5708 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5710 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5711 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5714 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5715 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5716 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5717 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5718 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5720 let claiming_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5721 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5722 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5723 let chan_to_release =
5724 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5725 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5727 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5728 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5729 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5730 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5735 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5736 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5737 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5738 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5739 // in the background.
5740 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5741 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5742 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5743 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5745 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5746 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5747 funding_txo, update, ..
5749 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5750 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5751 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5752 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5754 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5760 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5761 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5762 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5764 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5765 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5767 monitor_update.updates[0],
5768 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5773 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5774 // immediately once we get going.
5775 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5778 *channel_id == claiming_channel_id,
5780 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5783 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5784 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5785 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5786 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5787 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5788 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5789 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5793 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5794 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5795 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5798 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5799 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5800 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5801 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5802 total_fee_earned_msat,
5803 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5804 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5805 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5806 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5809 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5813 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5814 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5815 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5821 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5822 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5823 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5826 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5827 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5828 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5829 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5831 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5833 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5834 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5835 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5837 payment_purpose: purpose,
5840 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5842 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5846 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5848 sender_intended_total_msat,
5852 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5853 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5855 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5856 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5857 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5860 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5861 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5863 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5864 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5865 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5866 downstream_channel_id,
5867 Some(blocking_action),
5874 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5875 /// update completion.
5876 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5877 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5878 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5879 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5880 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5881 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5882 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5883 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5884 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5885 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5886 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5887 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5888 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5889 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5891 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5893 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5894 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5895 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5896 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5899 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5900 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5902 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5903 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5904 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5909 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5910 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5911 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5912 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5917 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5918 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5919 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5920 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5921 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5926 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5930 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5936 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5937 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5938 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5942 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5943 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5944 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5950 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5951 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5953 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5954 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5956 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5957 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5958 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5959 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
5960 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5965 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5966 let mut peer_state_lock;
5967 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5968 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5969 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5970 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5972 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
5975 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5976 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5977 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5978 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5979 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5982 let remaining_in_flight =
5983 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5984 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5987 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5988 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5989 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5990 remaining_in_flight);
5991 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5994 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5997 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5999 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6000 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6003 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6004 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6005 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6007 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6008 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6009 /// used to accept such channels.
6011 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6012 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6013 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6014 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6017 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6018 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6020 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6021 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6022 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6024 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6025 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6027 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6028 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6030 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6031 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6033 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6034 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6035 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6036 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6039 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6041 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6044 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6045 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6047 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6049 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6050 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6052 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6054 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6056 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6058 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6059 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6060 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6062 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6063 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6064 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6065 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6066 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6067 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6068 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6069 let err_str = e.to_string();
6070 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6072 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6076 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6077 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6079 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6084 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6085 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6086 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6087 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6088 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6089 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6090 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6093 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6094 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6095 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6097 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6099 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6100 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6101 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6102 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6103 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6104 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6105 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6106 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6109 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6110 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6111 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6113 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6117 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6118 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6119 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6121 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6122 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6123 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6126 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6131 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6132 /// or 0-conf channels.
6134 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6135 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6136 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6137 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6138 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6139 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6141 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6142 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6143 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6144 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6145 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6146 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6147 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6151 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6154 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6155 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6157 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6158 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6160 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6161 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6162 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6163 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6164 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6166 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6169 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6170 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6171 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6174 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6175 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6180 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6183 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6184 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6185 // likely to be lost on restart!
6186 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6187 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6190 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6191 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6194 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6195 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6196 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6197 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6198 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6200 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6201 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6203 debug_assert!(false);
6204 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6209 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6210 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6211 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6212 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6213 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6214 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6216 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6217 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6218 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6221 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6222 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6224 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6225 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6228 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6229 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6234 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6235 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6236 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6237 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6239 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6241 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6242 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6243 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6244 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6245 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6246 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6249 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6250 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6251 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6256 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6257 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6258 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6259 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6260 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6261 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6262 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6270 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6271 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6272 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6274 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6275 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6278 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6279 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6281 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6282 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6283 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6285 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6289 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6290 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6291 // likely to be lost on restart!
6292 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6294 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6296 debug_assert!(false);
6297 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6301 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6303 match phase.get_mut() {
6304 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6305 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6306 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6309 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6313 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6316 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6317 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6318 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6319 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6320 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6322 user_channel_id: user_id,
6327 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6328 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6331 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6333 debug_assert!(false);
6334 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6339 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6340 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6341 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6342 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6343 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6345 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6346 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6347 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6348 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6349 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6350 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6351 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6352 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6353 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6357 Some(mut phase) => {
6358 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6359 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6360 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6362 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6365 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6367 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6368 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6369 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6370 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6371 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6372 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6374 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6375 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6376 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6379 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6381 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6384 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6385 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6387 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6389 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6390 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6391 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6392 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6393 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6395 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6396 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6397 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6398 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6399 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6400 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6401 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6406 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6407 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6408 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6410 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6414 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6415 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6416 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6424 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6425 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6427 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6429 debug_assert!(false);
6430 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6435 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6437 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6438 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6439 let logger = WithContext::from(
6441 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6442 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6445 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6447 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6448 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6449 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6450 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6451 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6452 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6453 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6454 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6455 } else { unreachable!(); }
6458 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6459 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6460 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6461 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6462 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6463 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6464 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6468 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6469 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6470 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6471 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6472 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6473 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6480 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6484 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6485 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6486 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6488 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6490 debug_assert!(false);
6491 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6495 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6496 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6497 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6498 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6499 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6500 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6501 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6502 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6503 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6504 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6505 msg: announcement_sigs,
6507 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6508 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6509 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6510 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6511 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6512 // announcement_signatures.
6513 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6514 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6515 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6516 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6523 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6524 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6529 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6530 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6534 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6539 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6540 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6541 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6544 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6546 debug_assert!(false);
6547 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6551 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6552 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6554 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6555 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6556 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6557 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6559 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6562 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6563 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6564 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6565 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6567 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6568 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6569 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6570 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6571 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6572 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6576 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6577 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6578 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6579 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6582 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6583 let context = phase.context_mut();
6584 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6585 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6586 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6587 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6594 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6595 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6596 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6597 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6599 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6600 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6606 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6608 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6610 debug_assert!(false);
6611 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6613 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6616 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6618 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6619 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6620 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6621 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6622 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6623 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6628 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6629 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6630 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6631 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6632 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6633 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6634 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6636 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6637 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6643 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6644 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6645 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6646 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6648 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6649 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6652 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6657 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6658 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6659 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6664 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6665 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6666 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6667 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6669 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6670 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6671 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6672 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6674 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6675 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6677 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6679 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6681 debug_assert!(false);
6682 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6684 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6685 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6686 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6688 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6689 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6690 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6691 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6692 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6693 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6695 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6697 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6698 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6699 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6700 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6701 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6702 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6703 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6704 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6708 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6709 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6710 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6711 match pending_forward_info {
6712 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6713 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6715 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6716 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6717 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6718 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6719 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6721 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6722 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6723 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6724 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6725 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6728 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6730 _ => pending_forward_info
6733 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6734 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6736 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6737 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6745 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6747 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6748 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6749 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6751 debug_assert!(false);
6752 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6756 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6758 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6759 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6760 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6761 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6763 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6765 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6766 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6767 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6769 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6770 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6771 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6772 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6773 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6774 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6775 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6778 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6779 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6785 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6786 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6787 funding_txo, msg.channel_id
6793 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6794 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6795 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6797 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6799 debug_assert!(false);
6800 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6804 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6806 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6807 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6809 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6810 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6818 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6819 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6820 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6822 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6824 debug_assert!(false);
6825 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6829 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6831 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6832 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6833 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6835 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6836 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6838 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6839 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6847 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6848 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6849 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6851 debug_assert!(false);
6852 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6854 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6855 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6856 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6858 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6859 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6860 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6861 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6862 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6863 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6864 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6868 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6869 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6877 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6878 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6879 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6880 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6881 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6882 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6883 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6884 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6885 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6886 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6887 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6889 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6890 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6892 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6893 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6894 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6895 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6896 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6897 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6900 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6901 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6903 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6904 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6905 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6907 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6908 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6909 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6910 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6911 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6914 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6915 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6918 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
6919 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6920 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6921 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6922 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6923 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6924 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
6925 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6926 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6927 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6928 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6931 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6932 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6933 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6938 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6939 // payments are being processed.
6940 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6941 push_forward_event = true;
6943 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6944 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6951 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6952 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6955 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6956 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6957 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6959 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6963 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6964 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6965 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6966 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6967 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6969 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6970 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6971 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6972 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6973 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6974 // real by taking more time.
6975 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6976 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6977 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6982 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6983 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6984 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6985 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6986 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6987 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6988 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6990 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6991 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6992 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6993 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6994 channel_funding_outpoint,
6996 counterparty_node_id,
7001 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7002 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7003 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7005 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7006 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7007 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7010 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7011 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7012 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7018 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7019 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7021 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7023 debug_assert!(false);
7024 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7025 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7026 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7027 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7029 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7030 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7031 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7032 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7033 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7034 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7035 *counterparty_node_id)
7037 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7038 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7039 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7040 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7041 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7042 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7043 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7047 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7048 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7051 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7054 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7058 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7060 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7062 debug_assert!(false);
7063 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7067 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7069 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7070 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7071 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7073 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7074 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7082 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7084 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7086 debug_assert!(false);
7087 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7091 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7093 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7094 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7098 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7099 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7100 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7101 msg, &self.default_configuration
7102 ), chan_phase_entry),
7103 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7104 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7105 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7108 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7109 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7117 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7118 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7119 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7120 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7122 // It's not a local channel
7123 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7126 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7127 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7128 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7129 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7131 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7132 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7133 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7135 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7136 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7137 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7138 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7139 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7140 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7141 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7143 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7145 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7146 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7147 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7148 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7150 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7151 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7152 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7153 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7156 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7160 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7161 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7166 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7169 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7171 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7172 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7176 debug_assert!(false);
7177 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7178 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7182 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7183 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7184 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7185 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7186 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7187 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7188 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7189 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7190 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7191 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7192 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7193 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7194 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7195 let mut channel_update = None;
7196 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7197 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7198 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7201 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7202 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7203 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7204 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7205 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7206 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7207 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7212 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7213 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7214 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7215 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7216 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7217 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7221 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7222 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7226 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7228 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7229 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7230 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7231 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7232 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7233 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7235 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7236 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7237 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7238 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7239 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7240 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7241 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7242 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7243 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7244 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7245 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7246 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7247 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7248 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7249 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7250 next_funding_txid: None,
7253 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7254 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7255 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7261 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7262 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7263 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7264 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7267 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7268 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7273 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7274 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7275 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7277 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7278 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7279 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7280 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7281 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7282 match monitor_event {
7283 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7284 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7285 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7286 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7287 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7288 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7289 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id);
7291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7292 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7293 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7294 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7297 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_funding_outpoint) => {
7298 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7299 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7301 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7302 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7303 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7304 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7307 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7309 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7310 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7312 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7313 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7314 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7315 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7316 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7322 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7323 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7324 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7332 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7333 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7339 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7340 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7343 has_pending_monitor_events
7346 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7347 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7348 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7350 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7352 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7355 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7356 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7357 /// update was applied.
7358 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7359 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7360 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7362 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7363 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7364 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7365 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7368 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7371 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7372 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7373 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7375 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7376 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7377 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7378 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7379 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7380 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7382 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7383 has_monitor_update = true;
7385 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7386 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7387 continue 'peer_loop;
7396 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7397 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7398 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7404 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7405 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7407 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7408 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7410 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7411 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7412 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7413 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7415 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7416 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7418 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7419 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7420 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7421 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7426 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7432 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7433 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7436 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7437 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7438 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7444 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7449 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7450 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7453 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7454 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7458 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7459 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7460 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7461 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7462 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7468 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7469 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7470 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7471 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7472 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7473 let mut has_update = false;
7474 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7478 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7479 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7480 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7481 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7482 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7484 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7485 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7486 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7487 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7488 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7490 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7491 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7494 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7495 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7496 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7498 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7499 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7500 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7501 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7502 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7507 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7508 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7509 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7515 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7516 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7521 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7527 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7528 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7531 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7532 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7538 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7539 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7541 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7542 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7543 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7544 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7545 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7546 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7547 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7548 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7549 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7550 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7551 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7552 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7553 assert!(should_broadcast);
7554 } else { unreachable!(); }
7555 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7556 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7557 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7560 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7564 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7565 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7566 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7570 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7571 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7572 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7573 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7574 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7576 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7580 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7585 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7587 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7589 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7590 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7591 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7592 &self, description: String
7593 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7594 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7595 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7596 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7597 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7599 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7600 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7601 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7603 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7609 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7610 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7614 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7615 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7617 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7618 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7619 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7622 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7623 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7624 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7626 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7627 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7631 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7632 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7633 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7634 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7635 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7637 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7641 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7642 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7647 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7648 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7649 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7651 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7653 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7654 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7655 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7656 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7657 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7658 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7659 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7660 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7661 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7662 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7663 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7664 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7666 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7667 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7668 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7670 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7671 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7674 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7675 self.pending_outbound_payments
7676 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7677 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7679 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7684 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7685 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7686 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7688 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7689 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7690 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7691 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7692 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7693 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7694 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7696 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7697 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7701 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7702 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7705 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7706 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7707 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7711 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7712 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7713 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7714 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7718 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7719 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7720 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7725 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7726 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7727 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7730 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7731 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7732 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7733 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7734 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7735 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7736 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7737 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7738 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7739 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7740 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7741 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7742 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7743 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7744 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7747 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7748 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7749 let builder = match quantity {
7751 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7753 let builder = match amount_msats {
7755 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7757 let builder = match payer_note {
7759 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7761 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7762 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7764 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7765 self.pending_outbound_payments
7766 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7767 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7769 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7771 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7772 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7773 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7774 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7775 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7778 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7780 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7781 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7782 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7783 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7784 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7785 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7786 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7787 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7788 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7790 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7797 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7800 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7801 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7802 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7806 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7807 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7808 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7809 /// received and no retries will be made.
7813 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7814 /// path for the invoice.
7816 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7817 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7818 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7819 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7820 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7822 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7823 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7825 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7826 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7827 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7828 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7830 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7831 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7832 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7834 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7835 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7836 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7838 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7839 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7840 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7842 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7843 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7844 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7846 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7847 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7848 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7849 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7850 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7853 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7855 for path in refund.paths() {
7856 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7857 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7858 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7859 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7861 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7867 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7871 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7874 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7875 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7877 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7878 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7879 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7880 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7882 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7884 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7885 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7889 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7890 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7892 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7894 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7895 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7897 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7898 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7899 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7900 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7901 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7902 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7903 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7904 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7905 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7906 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7907 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7910 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7911 /// stored external to LDK.
7913 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7914 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7915 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7917 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7918 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7921 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7922 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7923 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7924 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7926 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7927 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7928 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7929 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7930 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7932 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7933 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7934 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7935 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7936 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7938 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7939 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7941 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7942 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7946 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7947 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7949 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7951 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7952 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7954 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7955 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7956 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7957 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7958 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7959 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7960 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7963 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7964 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7966 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7967 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7968 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7971 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7973 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7974 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7975 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7976 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7978 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7980 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7981 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7982 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7985 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
7986 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7989 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7990 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7991 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7992 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7993 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7994 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7996 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7997 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7998 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7999 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8000 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8002 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8004 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8007 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8008 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8012 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8013 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8015 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8016 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8017 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8018 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8020 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8021 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8022 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8023 Some(_) => continue,
8024 None => return scid_candidate
8029 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8031 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8032 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8034 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8035 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8036 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8040 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8041 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8042 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8044 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8045 /// times to get a unique scid.
8046 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8047 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8048 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8050 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8051 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8052 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8053 return scid_candidate
8057 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8058 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8059 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8060 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8063 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8066 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8067 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8069 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8070 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8071 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8080 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8081 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8082 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8083 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8084 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8088 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8089 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8090 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8091 events.push_back((event, None));
8095 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8096 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8097 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8101 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8102 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8106 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8107 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8110 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8111 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8112 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8113 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8114 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8115 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8116 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8118 let logger = WithContext::from(
8119 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8123 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8124 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8125 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8126 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8127 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8128 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8129 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8131 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8135 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8136 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8137 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8138 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8139 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8140 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8145 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8147 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8148 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8149 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8150 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8152 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8153 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8154 if further_update_exists {
8155 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8160 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8167 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8168 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8174 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8175 for action in actions {
8177 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8178 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8180 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8186 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8187 /// using the given event handler.
8189 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8190 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8194 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8198 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8200 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8201 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8202 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8203 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8204 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8205 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8209 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8210 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8211 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8212 /// is always placed next to each other.
8214 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8215 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8216 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8217 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8219 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8220 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8221 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8222 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8223 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8224 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8225 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8227 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8228 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8229 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8230 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8233 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8234 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8236 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8237 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8240 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8241 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8242 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8243 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8245 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8246 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8250 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8251 events.replace(pending_events);
8260 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8262 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8263 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8264 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8265 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8266 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8267 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8271 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8273 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8274 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8275 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8277 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8281 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8283 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8284 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8285 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8286 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8287 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8292 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8294 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8295 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8296 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8297 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8298 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8301 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8302 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8305 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8306 let _persistence_guard =
8307 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8308 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8309 let new_height = height - 1;
8311 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8312 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8313 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8314 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8315 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8316 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8319 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8323 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8325 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8326 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8327 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8328 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8329 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8330 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8334 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8335 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8336 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8337 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8339 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8340 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8342 let _persistence_guard =
8343 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8344 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8345 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8346 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8348 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8349 if height < last_best_block_height {
8350 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8351 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8355 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8356 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8357 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8358 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8360 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8361 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8363 let _persistence_guard =
8364 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8365 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8366 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8368 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8370 macro_rules! max_time {
8371 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8373 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8374 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8375 // having an explicit local time source.
8376 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8377 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8378 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8379 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8380 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8386 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8387 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8388 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8389 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8393 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8394 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8395 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8398 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8399 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8400 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8401 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8402 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8403 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8410 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8411 let _persistence_guard =
8412 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8413 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8414 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8415 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8416 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8417 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8418 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8419 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8424 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8426 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8427 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8428 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8429 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8430 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8431 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8435 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8436 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8438 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8439 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8440 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8441 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8442 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8444 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8445 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8448 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8449 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8450 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8451 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8452 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8454 // Retain unfunded channels.
8455 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8456 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8457 let res = f(channel);
8458 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8459 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8460 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8461 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8462 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8464 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8465 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8466 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8467 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8468 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8469 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8470 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8471 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8476 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8481 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8482 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8485 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8486 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8487 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8488 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8489 msg: announcement_sigs,
8491 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8492 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8493 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8495 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8496 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8497 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8502 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8503 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8504 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8505 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8506 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8507 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8508 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8509 // is always consistent.
8510 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8511 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8512 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8513 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8514 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8517 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8518 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8519 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8520 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8521 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8522 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8523 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8524 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8528 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8529 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8530 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8531 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8532 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8533 data: reason_message,
8546 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8547 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8548 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8549 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8550 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8551 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8552 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8553 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8554 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8555 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8557 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8558 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8559 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8563 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8566 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8567 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8568 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8569 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8570 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8571 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8572 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8573 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8574 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8575 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8576 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8577 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8580 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8581 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8582 _ => unreachable!(),
8584 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8585 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8586 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8587 let logger = WithContext::from(
8588 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8590 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8596 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8598 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8599 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8603 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8604 /// may have events that need processing.
8606 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8607 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8609 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8610 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8611 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8612 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8615 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8616 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8617 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8620 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8621 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8622 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8625 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8626 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8627 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8628 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8631 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8632 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8633 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8634 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8637 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8638 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8640 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8641 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8642 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8643 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8644 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8647 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8648 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8649 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8650 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8653 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8654 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8655 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8656 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8659 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8660 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8661 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8662 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8665 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8666 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8667 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8668 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8672 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8673 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8675 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8676 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8677 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8678 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8679 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8680 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8684 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8685 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8686 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8687 // change to the contents.
8688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8689 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8690 let persist = match &res {
8691 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8692 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8693 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8695 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8697 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8702 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8703 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8704 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8705 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8708 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8709 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8710 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8711 // change to the contents.
8712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8713 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8714 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8718 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8719 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8720 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8721 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8724 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8726 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8729 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8731 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8734 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8735 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8736 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8737 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8738 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8740 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8741 let persist = match &res {
8742 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8743 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8745 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8750 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8751 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8752 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8753 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8756 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8757 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8758 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8759 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8762 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8763 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8764 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8765 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8768 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8769 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8770 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8771 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8774 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8776 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8779 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8781 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8784 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8785 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8786 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8787 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8789 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8790 let persist = match &res {
8791 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8792 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8793 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8795 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8800 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8801 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8802 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8805 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8806 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8807 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8808 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8810 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8811 let persist = match &res {
8812 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8813 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8814 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8816 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8821 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8822 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8823 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8824 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8826 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8827 let persist = match &res {
8828 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8829 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8830 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8832 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8837 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8838 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8839 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8842 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8843 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8844 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8847 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8848 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8849 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8850 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8852 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8853 let persist = match &res {
8854 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8855 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8856 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8858 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8863 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8865 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8868 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8869 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8870 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8873 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8878 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8880 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8881 let persist = match &res {
8882 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8883 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8884 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8886 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8891 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8893 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8894 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8895 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8898 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8899 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8900 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8902 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8905 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8906 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8907 let context = match phase {
8908 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8909 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8910 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8911 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8916 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
8917 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
8918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
8921 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
8922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8926 // Clean up for removal.
8927 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8928 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8931 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8932 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8933 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8934 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8936 // V1 Channel Establishment
8937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8940 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8941 // V2 Channel Establishment
8942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8943 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8944 // Common Channel Establishment
8945 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8946 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8948 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8950 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8951 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8952 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8953 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8954 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8956 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8957 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8959 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8960 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8961 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8963 // Channel Operations
8964 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8965 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8967 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8968 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8969 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8971 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8972 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8973 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8974 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8975 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8976 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8977 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8978 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8979 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8982 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8983 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8984 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8985 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8988 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8990 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8992 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8993 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8997 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8998 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8999 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9000 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9004 let mut res = Ok(());
9006 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9007 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9008 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9009 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9010 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9011 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9012 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9015 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9016 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9018 if inbound_peer_limited {
9020 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9022 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9023 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9024 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9025 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9026 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9027 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9028 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9029 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9034 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9035 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9037 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9038 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9039 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9040 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9043 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9046 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9047 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9052 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9055 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9056 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9057 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9058 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9060 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9062 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9063 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9064 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9065 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9066 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9070 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9072 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9073 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9077 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9078 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9079 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9080 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9081 debug_assert!(false);
9087 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9088 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9093 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9096 match &msg.data as &str {
9097 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9098 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9100 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9101 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9102 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9103 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9104 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9105 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9106 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9107 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9108 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9109 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9110 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9111 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9112 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9113 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9114 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9115 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9119 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9120 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9121 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9122 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9123 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9124 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9126 log_level: Level::Trace,
9136 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9137 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9138 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9139 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9140 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9141 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9143 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9144 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9145 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9146 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9148 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9149 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9150 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9154 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9156 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9157 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9158 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9159 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9160 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9161 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9162 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9163 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9171 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9172 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9176 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9177 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9180 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9181 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9184 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9185 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9188 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9189 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9190 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9191 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9194 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9195 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9196 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9197 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9200 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9201 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9202 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9203 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9206 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9207 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9208 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9209 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9212 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9213 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9214 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9215 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9218 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9219 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9220 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9221 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9224 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9225 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9226 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9227 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9230 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9231 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9232 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9233 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9236 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9237 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9238 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9239 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9243 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9244 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9246 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9247 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9248 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9249 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9250 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9251 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9255 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9256 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9257 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9260 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9261 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9264 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9265 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9267 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9268 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9270 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9271 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9275 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9276 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9277 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9279 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9281 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9282 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9286 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9287 amount_msats, payment_secret
9289 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9291 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9292 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9296 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9297 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9298 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9301 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9302 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9303 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9304 payment_paths, payment_hash
9306 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9307 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9308 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9310 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9311 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9312 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9315 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9316 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9317 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9318 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9319 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9321 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9322 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9324 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9325 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9326 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9327 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9329 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9330 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9334 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9335 Err(error) => Some(error),
9339 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9340 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9342 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9344 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9345 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9348 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9350 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9357 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9364 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9365 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9369 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9370 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9371 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9372 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9373 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9377 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9378 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9380 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9381 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9382 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9383 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9384 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9387 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9388 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9389 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9390 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9393 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9394 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9395 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9396 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9399 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9400 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9401 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9402 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9405 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9406 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9407 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9408 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9409 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9410 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9411 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9412 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9413 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9414 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9415 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9416 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9417 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9418 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9419 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9420 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9421 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9422 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9423 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9424 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9425 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9430 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9431 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9433 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9434 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9435 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9436 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9439 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9440 (2, node_id, required),
9441 (4, features, required),
9442 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9443 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9444 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9445 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9448 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9449 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9450 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9451 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9452 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9453 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9454 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9455 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9456 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9457 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9458 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9459 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9460 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9461 (7, self.config, option),
9462 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9463 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9464 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9465 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9466 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9467 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9468 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9469 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9470 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9471 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9472 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9473 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9474 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9475 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9476 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9477 (32, self.is_public, required),
9478 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9479 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9480 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9481 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9482 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9488 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9489 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9490 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9491 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9492 (2, channel_id, required),
9493 (3, channel_type, option),
9494 (4, counterparty, required),
9495 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9496 (6, funding_txo, option),
9497 (7, config, option),
9498 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9499 (9, confirmations, option),
9500 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9501 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9502 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9503 (16, balance_msat, required),
9504 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9505 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9506 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9507 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9508 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9509 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9510 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9511 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9512 (26, is_outbound, required),
9513 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9514 (30, is_usable, required),
9515 (32, is_public, required),
9516 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9517 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9518 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9519 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9520 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9523 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9524 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9525 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9526 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9527 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9531 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9533 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9534 outbound_scid_alias,
9538 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9539 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9541 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9542 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9543 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9544 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9545 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9546 confirmations_required,
9548 force_close_spend_delay,
9549 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9550 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9551 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9552 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9553 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9554 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9555 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9556 channel_shutdown_state,
9561 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9562 (2, channels, required_vec),
9563 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9564 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9567 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9568 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9569 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9572 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9574 (0, onion_packet, required),
9575 (1, blinded, option),
9576 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9579 (0, payment_data, required),
9580 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9581 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9582 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9583 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9584 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9586 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9587 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9588 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9589 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9590 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9591 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9595 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9596 (0, routing, required),
9597 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9598 (4, payment_hash, required),
9599 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9600 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9601 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9602 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9606 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9607 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9609 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9611 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9612 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9613 reason.write(writer)?;
9615 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9616 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9619 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9620 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9621 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9622 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9629 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9630 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9631 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9634 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9635 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9636 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9637 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9641 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9642 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9643 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9644 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9645 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9648 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9649 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9650 // messages contained in the variants.
9651 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9652 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9653 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9655 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9656 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9657 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9658 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9659 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9662 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9663 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9664 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9665 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9666 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9668 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9673 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9678 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9679 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9680 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9683 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9684 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9685 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9686 (2, outpoint, required),
9687 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9688 (4, htlc_id, required),
9689 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9690 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9691 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9692 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9693 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9696 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9697 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9698 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9699 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9700 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9702 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9703 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9704 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9705 (2, self.value, required),
9706 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9707 (4, payment_data, option),
9708 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9709 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9710 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9711 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9717 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9718 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9719 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9720 (0, prev_hop, required),
9721 (1, total_msat, option),
9722 (2, value_ser, required),
9723 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9724 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9725 (5, total_value_received, option),
9726 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9727 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9728 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9730 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9731 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9732 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9734 if payment_data.is_some() {
9735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9737 if total_msat.is_none() {
9738 total_msat = Some(value);
9740 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9743 if total_msat.is_none() {
9744 if payment_data.is_none() {
9745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9747 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9749 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9753 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9756 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9757 total_value_received,
9758 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9760 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9761 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9766 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9767 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9768 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9771 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9772 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9773 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9774 let mut payment_id = None;
9775 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9776 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9777 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9778 (0, session_priv, required),
9779 (1, payment_id, option),
9780 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9781 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9782 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9783 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9785 if payment_id.is_none() {
9786 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9788 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9790 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9791 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9792 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9794 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9795 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9796 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9797 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9801 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9802 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9803 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9805 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9808 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9809 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9814 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9815 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9817 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9819 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9820 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9821 (0, session_priv, required),
9822 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9823 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9824 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9825 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9826 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9827 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9830 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9832 field.write(writer)?;
9839 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9840 (0, forward_info, required),
9841 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9842 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9843 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9844 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9845 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
9846 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9847 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9850 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9851 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9852 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9854 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9858 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9859 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9860 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9861 (0, htlc_id, required),
9862 (2, err_packet, required),
9865 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9866 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9867 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9868 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9869 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9870 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9871 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9872 (0, htlc_id, required),
9873 (1, failure_code, required),
9874 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9875 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9883 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9884 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9885 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9887 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9889 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9890 (0, htlc_id, required),
9891 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9892 (2, err_packet, required),
9893 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9895 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9896 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9897 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9899 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9903 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9904 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9908 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9913 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9914 (0, payment_secret, required),
9915 (2, expiry_time, required),
9916 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9917 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9918 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9921 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9923 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9924 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9925 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9926 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9927 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9932 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9933 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9935 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9937 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9939 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9940 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9941 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9944 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9947 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9948 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9951 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9952 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9955 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9956 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9960 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9962 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9965 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9966 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9967 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9970 channel.write(writer)?;
9976 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9977 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9978 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9979 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9980 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9981 for forward in pending_forwards {
9982 forward.write(writer)?;
9987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9989 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9990 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9991 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9993 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9994 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9995 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9996 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9997 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9998 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9999 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10000 htlc.write(writer)?;
10002 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10003 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10006 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10007 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10008 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10009 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10010 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10011 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10012 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10015 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10016 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10017 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10018 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10019 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10021 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10022 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10023 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10024 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10025 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10026 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10027 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10032 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10033 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10034 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10035 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10036 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10037 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10038 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10039 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10040 0u64.write(writer)?;
10042 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10043 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10044 event.write(writer)?;
10048 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10049 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10050 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10051 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10052 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10053 0u64.write(writer)?;
10055 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10056 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10057 // likely to be identical.
10058 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10059 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10061 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10062 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10063 hash.write(writer)?;
10064 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10067 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10068 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10069 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10070 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10071 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10074 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10075 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10077 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10078 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10079 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10080 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10083 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10084 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10085 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10086 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10090 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10091 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10092 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10094 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10095 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10096 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10102 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10103 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10104 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10105 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10108 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10109 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10110 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10111 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10112 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10115 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10116 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10117 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10118 if !updates.is_empty() {
10119 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10120 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10125 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10126 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10127 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10128 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10129 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10130 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10131 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10132 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10133 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10134 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10135 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10136 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10137 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10144 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10145 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10146 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10147 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10150 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10151 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10152 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10153 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10154 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10155 // check that the event is sane here.
10156 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10157 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10158 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10159 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10165 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10166 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10167 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10168 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10169 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10170 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10173 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10174 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10175 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10176 events.push_back((ev, action));
10177 } else if action.is_some() {
10178 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10185 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10186 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10187 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10188 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10189 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10190 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10193 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10195 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10197 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10198 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10199 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10200 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10201 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10202 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10203 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10204 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10205 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10206 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10207 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10208 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10209 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10211 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10212 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10214 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10215 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10217 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10218 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10219 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10220 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10221 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10222 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10224 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10225 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10227 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10228 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10229 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10230 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10231 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10232 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10236 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10237 pub entropy_source: ES,
10239 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10240 pub node_signer: NS,
10242 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10243 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10245 pub signer_provider: SP,
10247 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10249 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10250 pub fee_estimator: F,
10251 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10253 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10254 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10255 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10256 pub chain_monitor: M,
10258 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10259 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10260 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10261 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10262 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10263 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10265 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10267 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10268 /// deserialization.
10270 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10271 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10272 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10274 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10275 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10277 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10278 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10279 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10280 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10282 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10285 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10286 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10289 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10290 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10292 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10293 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10294 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10295 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10296 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10297 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10301 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10302 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10303 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10304 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10305 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10307 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10308 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10309 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10315 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10316 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10317 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10318 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10320 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10321 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10322 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10323 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10324 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10325 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10329 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10330 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10331 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10335 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10336 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10338 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10339 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10340 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10341 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10342 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10343 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10347 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10348 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10350 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10351 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10352 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10354 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10356 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10357 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10358 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10359 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10360 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10361 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10362 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10363 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10364 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10365 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10366 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10368 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10369 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10370 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10371 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10372 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10373 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10374 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10375 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10376 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10377 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10378 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10379 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10380 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10381 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10382 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10384 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10385 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10386 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10388 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10389 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10390 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10392 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10393 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10394 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10396 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10397 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10398 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10400 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10401 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10402 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10405 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10406 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10407 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10408 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10409 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10410 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10411 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10412 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10414 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10415 let mut found_htlc = false;
10416 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10417 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10420 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10421 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10422 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10423 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10424 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10425 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10426 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10428 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10429 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10430 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10434 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10435 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10436 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10437 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10438 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10440 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10441 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10443 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10445 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10446 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10449 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10450 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10451 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10455 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10456 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10457 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10458 // safely discard the channel.
10459 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10460 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10461 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10462 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10463 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10464 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10465 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10466 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10469 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10470 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10471 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10472 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10473 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10474 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10478 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10479 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10480 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10481 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10482 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10484 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10485 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10486 counterparty_node_id: None,
10487 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10488 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10490 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10494 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10495 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10496 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10497 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10498 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10499 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10500 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10501 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10502 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10504 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10507 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10508 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10509 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10510 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10511 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10512 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10513 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10514 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10516 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10519 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10522 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10523 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10524 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10525 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10526 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10527 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10528 is_connected: false,
10532 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10533 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10534 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10535 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10536 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10537 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10538 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10539 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10542 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10543 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10544 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10545 for _ in 0..event_count {
10546 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10547 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10552 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10553 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10554 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10556 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10557 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10558 // on-startup monitor updates.
10559 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10560 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10562 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10566 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10567 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10569 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10570 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10571 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10572 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10573 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10577 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10578 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10579 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10580 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10581 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10582 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10583 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10585 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10586 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10590 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10591 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10592 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10593 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10594 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10595 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10596 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10597 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10598 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10599 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10600 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10601 let mut events_override = None;
10602 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10603 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10604 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10605 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10606 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10607 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10608 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10609 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10610 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10611 (8, events_override, option),
10612 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10613 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10614 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10615 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10617 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10618 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10621 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10622 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10625 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10626 pending_events_read = events;
10629 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10630 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10633 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10634 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10635 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10636 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10637 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10638 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10640 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10642 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10643 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10644 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10647 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10648 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10649 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10650 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10651 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10653 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10654 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10655 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10657 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10658 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10659 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10660 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10661 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10663 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10664 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10665 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10666 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10667 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10668 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10669 pending_background_events.push(
10670 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10671 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10672 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10673 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10674 update: update.clone(),
10677 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10678 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10679 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10680 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10681 pending_background_events.push(
10682 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10683 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10684 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10687 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10688 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10689 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10691 max_in_flight_update_id
10695 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10696 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10697 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10698 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10699 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10700 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10702 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10704 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10705 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10706 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10707 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10708 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10709 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10710 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10711 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10712 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10715 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10716 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10717 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10718 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10719 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10720 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10721 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10722 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10723 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10724 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10725 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10728 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10729 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10730 debug_assert!(false);
10731 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10736 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10737 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10738 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10739 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10740 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10741 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10742 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10743 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10744 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10745 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
10747 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10748 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10749 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10751 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10752 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
10753 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
10754 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10755 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10756 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10757 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10758 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10763 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10764 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10766 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10767 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10768 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10769 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10772 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10773 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10774 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10775 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10776 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10777 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10778 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10780 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10781 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10782 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10783 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10784 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10785 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10786 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10787 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10788 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10791 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10792 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10793 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10794 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10795 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10796 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10797 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10798 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10801 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10802 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10803 retry_strategy: None,
10804 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10805 payment_params: None,
10806 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
10807 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10808 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10809 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10810 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10811 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10812 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10813 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10814 total_msat: path_amt,
10815 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10816 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10818 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10819 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10824 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10825 match htlc_source {
10826 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10827 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10828 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10829 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10831 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10832 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10833 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10834 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10835 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10836 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10837 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10838 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10839 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10840 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10841 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
10846 !forwards.is_empty()
10848 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10849 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10850 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10851 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
10852 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10853 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10854 intercepted_id != ev_id
10861 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10862 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10863 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10864 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10865 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10866 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10867 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10868 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10869 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10870 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10871 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10873 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10874 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10875 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
10876 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10878 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10879 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10880 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10887 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10888 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10890 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10892 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10893 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10894 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10895 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10896 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10897 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10898 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10899 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10900 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10901 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
10904 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10905 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10906 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10907 // channel still live case here.
10911 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10912 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10917 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10918 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10919 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10920 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10921 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10922 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10923 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10924 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10928 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10929 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10931 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10932 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10933 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10934 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10936 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10937 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10938 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10940 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10941 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10943 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10944 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10946 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10949 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10950 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10951 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10953 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10957 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10958 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10959 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10960 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10961 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10963 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10964 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10965 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10966 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10967 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10968 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10969 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10970 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10972 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10973 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10977 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10979 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10981 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10982 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10984 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10985 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10990 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10991 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10993 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10995 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10997 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10998 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10999 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11000 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11004 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11005 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11006 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11007 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11008 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11009 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11010 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11011 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11012 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11014 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11015 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11016 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11018 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11019 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11020 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11021 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11022 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11023 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11025 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11026 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11027 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11028 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11029 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11030 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11034 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11035 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11036 debug_assert!(false);
11037 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11042 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11044 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11045 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11046 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11047 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11048 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11049 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11050 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11051 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11052 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11053 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11054 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11056 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11057 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11059 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11060 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11061 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11062 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11064 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11065 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11066 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11067 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11069 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11070 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11071 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11072 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11074 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11075 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11076 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11079 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11080 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11081 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11084 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11085 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11088 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11091 purpose: payment.purpose,
11092 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11093 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11094 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11100 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11101 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11102 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11103 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11104 for action in actions.iter() {
11105 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11106 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11107 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11109 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11111 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11112 blocked_channel_id);
11113 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11114 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11115 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11117 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11118 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11119 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11120 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11124 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11125 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11129 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11131 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11132 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11136 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11138 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11139 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11140 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11141 router: args.router,
11143 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11145 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11146 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11147 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11148 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11150 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11151 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11152 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11153 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11154 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11155 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11157 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11159 our_network_pubkey,
11162 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11164 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11166 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11167 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11168 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11169 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11170 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11172 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11173 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11175 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11177 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11179 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11180 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11181 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11183 logger: args.logger,
11184 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11187 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11188 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11189 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11190 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11191 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11194 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11195 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11196 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11197 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11198 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11199 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id);
11202 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11203 //connection or two.
11205 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11211 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11212 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11213 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11214 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11215 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11216 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11217 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11218 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11219 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11220 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11221 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11222 use crate::prelude::*;
11223 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11224 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11225 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11226 use crate::util::test_utils;
11227 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11228 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11231 fn test_notify_limits() {
11232 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11233 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11237 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11239 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11240 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11241 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11242 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11243 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11245 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11247 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11248 // to connect messages with new values
11249 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11250 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11251 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11252 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11253 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11254 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11256 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11257 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11258 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11259 // ... but the last node should not.
11260 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11261 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11262 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11263 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11265 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11266 // about the channel.
11267 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11268 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11269 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11271 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11273 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11274 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11275 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11276 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11277 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11278 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11280 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11281 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11282 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11284 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11285 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11286 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11287 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11288 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11289 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11291 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11292 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11293 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11294 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11295 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11296 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11297 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11298 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11300 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11301 // the channel info has updated.
11302 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11303 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11304 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11305 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11306 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11307 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11311 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11312 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11314 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11315 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11316 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11317 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11318 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11320 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11321 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11322 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11323 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11325 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11326 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11327 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11328 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11329 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11330 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11331 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11332 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11334 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11335 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11336 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11338 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11339 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11340 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11342 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11344 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11345 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11346 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11348 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11349 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11350 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11352 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11353 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11354 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11355 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11356 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11357 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11358 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11359 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11360 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11362 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11363 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11364 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11366 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11368 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11370 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11371 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11372 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11373 // lightning messages manually.
11374 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11375 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11378 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11379 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11380 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11383 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11384 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11386 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11387 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11389 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11390 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11391 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11393 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11394 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11395 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11397 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11399 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11401 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11402 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11405 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11406 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11407 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11410 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11411 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11412 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11413 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11418 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11419 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11420 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11421 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11428 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11429 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11430 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11433 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11434 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11435 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11436 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11437 // fails as expected.
11438 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11439 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11440 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11441 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11442 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11443 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11446 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11447 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11448 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11449 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11450 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11451 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11452 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11454 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11455 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11456 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11458 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11459 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11460 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11461 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11462 let route = find_route(
11463 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11464 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11466 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11467 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11469 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11470 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11471 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11472 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11473 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11475 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11476 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11477 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11478 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11479 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11481 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11482 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11483 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11484 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11485 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11486 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11487 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11488 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11489 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11491 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11492 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11494 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11495 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11496 let route = find_route(
11497 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11498 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11500 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11501 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11503 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11504 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11505 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11506 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11507 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11509 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11510 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11511 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11512 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11514 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11515 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11516 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11517 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11518 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11520 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11521 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11522 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11524 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11525 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11526 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11527 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11528 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11529 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11530 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11531 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11532 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11534 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11535 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11537 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11538 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11539 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11540 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11542 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11543 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11544 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11545 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11546 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11548 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11549 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11550 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11553 let route = find_route(
11554 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11555 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11557 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11558 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11559 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11561 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11562 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11563 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11564 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11565 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11567 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11568 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11569 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11571 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11572 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11573 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11574 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11575 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11576 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11577 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11578 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11579 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11581 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11582 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11586 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11587 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11588 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11594 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11595 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11597 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11598 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11599 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11600 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11601 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11602 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11603 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11604 let route = find_route(
11605 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11606 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11609 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11610 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11611 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11612 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11613 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11614 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11617 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11618 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11619 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11620 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11621 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11622 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11625 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11629 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11630 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11631 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11632 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11633 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11639 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11640 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11642 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11643 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11644 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11645 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11646 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11647 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11648 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11649 let route = find_route(
11650 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11651 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11654 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11655 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11656 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11657 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11658 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11659 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11660 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11661 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11664 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11665 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11666 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11667 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11668 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11669 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11672 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11676 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11680 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11682 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11683 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11684 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11685 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11687 // Marshall an MPP route.
11688 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11689 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11690 route.paths.push(path);
11691 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11692 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11693 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11694 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11695 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11696 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11698 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11699 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11701 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11702 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11704 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11709 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11715 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11717 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11718 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11720 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11721 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11723 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11726 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11727 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11728 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11729 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11730 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11731 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11734 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11737 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11738 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11743 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11744 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11750 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11751 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11753 total_msat: 100_000,
11756 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11757 // payment verification fails as expected.
11758 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11759 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11760 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11761 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11763 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11767 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11768 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11772 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11773 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11774 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11775 // the channel is successfully closed.
11776 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11777 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11778 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11779 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11781 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11782 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11783 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11784 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11785 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11787 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11788 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11790 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11791 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11792 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11793 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11796 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11798 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11799 // as it has the funding transaction.
11800 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11801 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11802 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11805 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11807 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11809 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11811 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11812 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11813 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11815 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11818 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11819 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11820 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11821 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11822 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11825 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11826 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11828 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11829 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11830 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11831 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11833 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11834 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11835 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11836 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11838 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11839 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11841 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11842 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11843 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11844 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11845 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11846 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11847 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11851 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11852 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11853 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11854 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11855 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11856 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11857 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11860 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11862 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11863 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11864 // closing transaction).
11865 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11866 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11867 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11869 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11870 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11871 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11872 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11873 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11876 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11878 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11880 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11881 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11882 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11884 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11886 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11887 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11890 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11891 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11892 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11895 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11896 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11897 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11900 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11901 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11902 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11905 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11906 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11907 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11910 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11912 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11913 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11915 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11916 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11918 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11919 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11924 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11925 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11926 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11927 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11928 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11929 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11930 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11931 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11934 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11935 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11936 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11938 // Test the API functions.
11939 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11941 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11943 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11945 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11947 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11949 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11951 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11955 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11956 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11957 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11958 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11959 // the given `channel_id`.
11960 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11961 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11962 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11963 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11965 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11968 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11970 // Test the API functions.
11971 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11973 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11975 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11977 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11979 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11981 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11985 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11986 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11987 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11990 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11992 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11994 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11995 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11997 let mut funding_tx = None;
11998 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11999 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12000 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12003 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12004 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12005 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12006 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12007 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12009 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12011 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12013 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12015 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12017 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12019 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12022 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12023 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12024 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12025 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12026 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12028 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12029 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12031 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12032 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12033 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12034 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12035 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12036 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12037 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12040 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12041 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12042 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12043 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12044 }, true).unwrap_err();
12046 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12047 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12048 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12049 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12050 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12051 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12052 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12054 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12055 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12057 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12058 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12059 }, true).unwrap_err();
12061 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12062 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12063 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12064 }, false).unwrap();
12065 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12067 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12068 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12070 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12071 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12072 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12073 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12074 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12076 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12077 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12078 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12080 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12081 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12082 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12084 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12085 // "protected" and can connect again.
12086 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12087 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12088 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12090 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12092 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12094 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12095 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12099 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12100 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12104 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12106 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12108 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12109 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12111 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12112 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12113 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12114 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12117 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12119 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12120 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12121 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12123 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12124 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12125 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12127 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12128 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12129 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12130 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12134 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12135 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12136 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12137 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12138 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12139 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12140 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12142 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12144 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12146 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12147 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12149 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12150 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12151 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12152 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12153 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12154 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12157 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12158 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12160 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12161 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12165 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12166 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12169 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12170 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12171 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12172 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12173 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12175 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12176 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12178 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12179 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12180 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12181 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12187 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12188 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12190 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12191 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12192 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12194 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12195 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12199 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12203 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12204 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12205 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12206 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12207 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12208 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12209 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12210 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12211 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12212 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12213 payment_metadata: None,
12214 keysend_preimage: None,
12215 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12216 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12218 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12220 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12221 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12222 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12223 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12224 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12225 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12226 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12228 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12229 } else { panic!(); }
12231 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12232 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12233 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12234 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12235 payment_metadata: None,
12236 keysend_preimage: None,
12237 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12238 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12240 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12242 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12243 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12244 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12245 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12249 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12250 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12251 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12252 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12253 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12255 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12256 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12257 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12258 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12259 payment_metadata: None,
12260 keysend_preimage: None,
12261 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12262 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12264 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12265 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12266 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12268 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12269 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12270 // is not satisfied.
12271 assert!(result.is_ok());
12275 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12276 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12277 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12278 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12279 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12281 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12282 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12285 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12286 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12287 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12288 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12290 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12291 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12293 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12294 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12295 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12296 match &msg_events[0] {
12297 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12298 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12300 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12301 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12302 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12308 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12309 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12311 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12312 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12315 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12319 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12320 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12321 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12322 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12325 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12326 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12327 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12331 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12332 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12333 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12335 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12336 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12338 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12339 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12344 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12345 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12347 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12348 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12350 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12351 // not have generated any events.
12352 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12356 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12357 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12358 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12359 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12360 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12361 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12362 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12363 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12365 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12366 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12369 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12370 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12371 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12372 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12375 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12376 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12379 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12380 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12381 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12383 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12384 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12385 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12386 ..Default::default()
12388 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12389 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12390 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12392 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12393 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12396 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12397 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12398 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12399 ..Default::default()
12401 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12402 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12403 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12406 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12407 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12410 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12411 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12412 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12413 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12414 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12417 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12418 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12419 ..Default::default()
12421 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12424 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12425 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12426 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12431 fn test_payment_display() {
12432 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12433 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12434 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12435 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12436 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12437 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12441 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12442 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12443 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12444 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12445 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12446 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12448 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12449 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12450 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12451 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12452 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12453 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12454 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12455 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12457 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12458 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12459 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12462 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12463 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12465 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12466 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12468 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12469 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12470 }, false).unwrap();
12471 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12472 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12473 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12475 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12477 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12478 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12479 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12480 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12481 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12482 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12483 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12484 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12485 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12486 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12487 } else { panic!() };
12488 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12489 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12490 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12491 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12493 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12495 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12496 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12497 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12502 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12503 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12504 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12505 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12508 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12509 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12510 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12512 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12513 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12515 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12516 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12519 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12520 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12521 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12523 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12527 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12528 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12529 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12531 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12536 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12537 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12538 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12539 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12541 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12542 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12543 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12545 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12547 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12548 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12549 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12550 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12552 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12553 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12555 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12561 use crate::chain::Listen;
12562 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12563 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12564 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12565 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12566 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12567 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12568 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12569 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12570 use crate::util::test_utils;
12571 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12573 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12574 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12575 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12576 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12578 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12580 use criterion::Criterion;
12582 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12583 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12584 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12585 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12586 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12587 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12588 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12590 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12591 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12593 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12594 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12596 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12598 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12601 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12602 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12605 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12606 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12607 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12609 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12610 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12612 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12613 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12614 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12615 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12616 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12618 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12619 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12620 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12622 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12623 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12624 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12625 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12627 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12628 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12629 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12631 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12632 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12633 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12634 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12635 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12637 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12638 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12639 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12641 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12642 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12644 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12645 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12646 }, false).unwrap();
12647 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12648 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12649 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12652 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12653 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12654 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12656 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12657 } else { panic!(); }
12659 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12660 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12661 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12662 match events_b[0] {
12663 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12664 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12669 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12670 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12671 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12672 match events_a[0] {
12673 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12674 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12679 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12681 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12682 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12683 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12685 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12686 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12687 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12688 match msg_events[0] {
12689 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12690 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12691 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12695 match msg_events[1] {
12696 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12700 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12701 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12702 match events_a[0] {
12703 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12704 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12709 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12710 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12711 match events_b[0] {
12712 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12713 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12718 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12719 macro_rules! send_payment {
12720 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12721 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12722 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12723 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12724 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12725 payment_count += 1;
12726 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12727 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12729 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12730 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12731 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12732 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12733 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12734 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12735 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12736 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12737 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12738 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12739 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12741 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12742 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12743 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12744 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12746 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12747 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12748 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12749 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12750 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12752 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12755 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12756 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12757 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12758 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12760 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12764 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12765 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12766 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);