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Merge pull request #3018 from jkczyz/2024-04-optional-description
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::msgs;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 #[cfg(test)]
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 use {
80         crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
81         crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
82         crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
83         crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
84         crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 };
86 #[cfg(c_bindings)]
87 use {
88         crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
89         crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 };
91
92 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
93
94 use crate::io;
95 use crate::prelude::*;
96 use core::{cmp, mem};
97 use core::cell::RefCell;
98 use crate::io::Read;
99 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
100 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
101 use core::time::Duration;
102 use core::ops::Deref;
103
104 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
105 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
106 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
107
108 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
109 //
110 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
111 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
112 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
113 //
114 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
115 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
116 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
117 // before we forward it.
118 //
119 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
120 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
121 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
122 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
123 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
124
125 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
128 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
129         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
130         Forward {
131                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
132                 /// do with the HTLC.
133                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
134                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
135                 ///
136                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
137                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
138                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
139                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
140                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
141                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
142         },
143         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
144         ///
145         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
146         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
147         Receive {
148                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
149                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
150                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
151                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
152                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
153                 ///
154                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
157                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
158                 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
159                 /// blinded path was not used.
160                 ///
161                 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
162                 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
163                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
164                 ///
165                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
166                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
167                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
168                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
169                 /// instructions.
170                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
171                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
172                 ///
173                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
174                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
175                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
176                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
177                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
178                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
179         },
180         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
181         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
182         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
183         ReceiveKeysend {
184                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
185                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
186                 ///
187                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
188                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
189                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
191                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
192                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
193                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
194                 ///
195                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
196                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
197                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
198                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
199                 ///
200                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
201                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
202                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
203                 ///
204                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
205                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
206                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
207                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
208                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
209         },
210 }
211
212 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
213 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
214 pub struct BlindedForward {
215         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
216         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
217         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
218         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
219         /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
220         /// the introduction node.
221         pub failure: BlindedFailure,
222 }
223
224 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
225         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
226         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
227                 match self {
228                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
229                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
230                         Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
231                         _ => None,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
237 /// should go next.
238 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
239 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
240 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
241         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
242         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
243         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
244         ///
245         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
246         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
247         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
248         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
250         ///
251         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
252         /// versions.
253         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
254         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
255         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
256         ///
257         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
258         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
259         /// it along another path).
260         ///
261         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
262         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
263         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
264         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
265         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
266         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
267         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
268         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
269         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
270         ///
271         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
272         /// HTLC.
273         ///
274         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
275         ///
276         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
277         /// shoulder them.
278         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
279 }
280
281 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
282 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
283         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
284         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
285 }
286
287 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
288 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
289 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
290         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
291         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
292 }
293
294 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
295 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
296         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
297
298         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
299         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
300         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
301         // HTLCs.
302         //
303         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
304         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
305         prev_htlc_id: u64,
306         prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
307         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
308         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
309 }
310
311 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
312 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
313         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
314         FailHTLC {
315                 htlc_id: u64,
316                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317         },
318         FailMalformedHTLC {
319                 htlc_id: u64,
320                 failure_code: u16,
321                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
322         },
323 }
324
325 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
326 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
327 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
328 pub enum BlindedFailure {
329         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
330         /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
331         FromIntroductionNode,
332         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
333         /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334         FromBlindedNode,
335 }
336
337 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
338 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
340         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
341         short_channel_id: u64,
342         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
343         htlc_id: u64,
344         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
345         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
346         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
347         channel_id: ChannelId,
348
349         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
350         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351         outpoint: OutPoint,
352 }
353
354 enum OnionPayload {
355         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
356         Invoice {
357                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
358                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
359                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
360         },
361         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
362         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
363 }
364
365 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
366 struct ClaimableHTLC {
367         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
368         cltv_expiry: u32,
369         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
370         value: u64,
371         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
372         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
373         sender_intended_value: u64,
374         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
375         timer_ticks: u8,
376         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
377         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
378         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
379         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
380         total_msat: u64,
381         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
382         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
383 }
384
385 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
386         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
387                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
388                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
389                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
390                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
391                         value_msat: val.value,
392                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393                 }
394         }
395 }
396
397 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
398 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
399 ///
400 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
401 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
402 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
403
404 impl PaymentId {
405         /// Number of bytes in the id.
406         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
407 }
408
409 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
410         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411                 self.0.write(w)
412         }
413 }
414
415 impl Readable for PaymentId {
416         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
417                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
419         }
420 }
421
422 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
423         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
424                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
425         }
426 }
427
428 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
429 ///
430 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
431 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
432 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
433
434 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
435         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436                 self.0.write(w)
437         }
438 }
439
440 impl Readable for InterceptId {
441         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
442                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
444         }
445 }
446
447 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
448 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
449 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
450         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
451         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
452 }
453 impl SentHTLCId {
454         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
455                 match source {
456                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
457                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
458                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
459                         },
460                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
461                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
462                 }
463         }
464 }
465 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
466         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
467                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
468                 (2, htlc_id, required),
469         },
470         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
471                 (0, session_priv, required),
472         };
473 );
474
475
476 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
477 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
478 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
479 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
480         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
481         OutboundRoute {
482                 path: Path,
483                 session_priv: SecretKey,
484                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
485                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
486                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
487                 payment_id: PaymentId,
488         },
489 }
490 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
491 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
492         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
493                 match self {
494                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
495                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
496                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
497                         },
498                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
499                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
500                                 path.hash(hasher);
501                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
502                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
503                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
504                         },
505                 }
506         }
507 }
508 impl HTLCSource {
509         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
510         #[cfg(test)]
511         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
512                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
513                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
514                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
515                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
516                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
517                 }
518         }
519
520         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
521         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
522         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
523         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
524                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
525                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
526                 } else {
527                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
528                         true
529                 }
530         }
531 }
532
533 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
534 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
535 ///
536 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
537 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
538 pub enum FailureCode {
539         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
540         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
541         TemporaryNodeFailure,
542         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
543         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
544         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
545         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
546         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
547         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
548         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
549         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
550         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
551         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
552         ///
553         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
554         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
555         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
556 }
557
558 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
559     fn into(self) -> u16 {
560                 match self {
561                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
562                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
563                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
564                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565                 }
566         }
567 }
568
569 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
570 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
571 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
572 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
573 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
574
575 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
576         err: msgs::LightningError,
577         closes_channel: bool,
578         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
579 }
580 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
581         #[inline]
582         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
583                 Self {
584                         err: LightningError {
585                                 err: err.clone(),
586                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
587                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
588                                                 channel_id,
589                                                 data: err
590                                         },
591                                 },
592                         },
593                         closes_channel: false,
594                         shutdown_finish: None,
595                 }
596         }
597         #[inline]
598         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
599                 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
600         }
601         #[inline]
602         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
603                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
604                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
605                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
606                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
607                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
608                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
609                 } else {
610                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
611                 };
612                 Self {
613                         err: LightningError { err, action },
614                         closes_channel: true,
615                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
616                 }
617         }
618         #[inline]
619         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
620                 Self {
621                         err: match err {
622                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
623                                         err: msg.clone(),
624                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
625                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
626                                                         channel_id,
627                                                         data: msg
628                                                 },
629                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
630                                         },
631                                 },
632                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
633                                         err: msg,
634                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
635                                 },
636                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
637                                         err: msg.clone(),
638                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
639                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
640                                                         channel_id,
641                                                         data: msg
642                                                 },
643                                         },
644                                 },
645                         },
646                         closes_channel: false,
647                         shutdown_finish: None,
648                 }
649         }
650
651         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652                 self.closes_channel
653         }
654 }
655
656 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
657 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
658 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
659 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
660 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
661
662 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
663 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
664 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
665 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
666 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
667 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
668         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
669         CommitmentFirst,
670         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
671         RevokeAndACKFirst,
672 }
673
674 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
675 struct ClaimingPayment {
676         amount_msat: u64,
677         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
678         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
679         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
680         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
681 }
682 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
683         (0, amount_msat, required),
684         (2, payment_purpose, required),
685         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
686         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
687         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
688 });
689
690 struct ClaimablePayment {
691         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
692         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
693         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
694 }
695
696 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
697 struct ClaimablePayments {
698         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
699         /// failed/claimed by the user.
700         ///
701         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
702         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
703         ///
704         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
705         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
706         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
707
708         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
709         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
710         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
711         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
712 }
713
714 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
715 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
716 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
717 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
718 #[derive(Debug)]
719 enum BackgroundEvent {
720         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
721         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
722         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
723         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
724         ///
725         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
726         /// are regenerated on startup.
727         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
728         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
729         /// channel to continue normal operation.
730         ///
731         /// In general this should be used rather than
732         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
733         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
734         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
735         ///
736         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
737         /// are regenerated on startup.
738         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
739                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
740                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
741                 channel_id: ChannelId,
742                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
743         },
744         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
745         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
746         /// on a channel.
747         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
748                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
749                 channel_id: ChannelId,
750         },
751 }
752
753 #[derive(Debug)]
754 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
755         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
756         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
757         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
758         /// event can be generated.
759         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
760         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
761         /// operation of another channel.
762         ///
763         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
764         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
765         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
766         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
767         /// outbound edge.
768         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
769                 event: events::Event,
770                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
771         },
772         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
773         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
774         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
775         ///
776         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
777         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
778         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
779         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
780         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
781         ///
782         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
783         /// stored for later processing.
784         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
785                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
786                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
787                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
788                 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
789         },
790 }
791
792 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
793         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
794         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
795         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
796         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
797                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
798                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
799                 (4, blocking_action, required),
800                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
801                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
802                 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
803         },
804         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
805                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
806                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
807                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
808                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
809                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
810                 // downgrades to prior versions.
811                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
812         },
813 );
814
815 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
816 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
817         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
818                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
819                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
820                 channel_id: ChannelId,
821         },
822 }
823 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
824         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
825                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
826                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
827                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
828                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
829                 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
830         };
831 );
832
833 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
834 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
835 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
836 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
837         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
838         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
839         /// durably to disk.
840         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
841                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
842                 channel_id: ChannelId,
843                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844                 htlc_id: u64,
845         },
846 }
847
848 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
849         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
850                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
851                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
852                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853                 }
854         }
855 }
856
857 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
858         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
859 ;);
860
861
862 /// State we hold per-peer.
863 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
864         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
865         ///
866         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
867         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
868         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
869         ///
870         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
871         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
872         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
873         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
874         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
875         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
876         latest_features: InitFeatures,
877         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
878         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
879         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
880         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
881         /// user but which have not yet completed.
882         ///
883         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
884         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
885         /// for a missing channel.
886         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
887         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
888         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
889         ///
890         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
891         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
892         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
893         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
894         ///
895         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
896         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
897         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
898         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
899         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
900         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
901         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
902         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
903         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
904         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
905         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
906         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
907         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
908         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
909         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
910         pub is_connected: bool,
911 }
912
913 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
914         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
915         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
916         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
917         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
918                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
919                         return false
920                 }
921                 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
922                         match phase {
923                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
924                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
925                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
926                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
927                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
928                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
929                         }
930                 )
931                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
932                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
933         }
934
935         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
936         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
937                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
938         }
939
940         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
941         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
942                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
943                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
944         }
945 }
946
947 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
948 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
949 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
950         /// The original OpenChannel message.
951         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
952         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
953         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
954 }
955
956 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
957 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
958 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
959
960 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
961 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
962 ///
963 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
964 /// here.
965 ///
966 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
967 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
968 struct PendingInboundPayment {
969         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
970         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
971         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
972         /// this payment being removed.
973         expiry_time: u64,
974         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
975         user_payment_id: u64,
976         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
977         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
978         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
979 }
980
981 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
982 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
983 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
984 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
985 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
986 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
987 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
988 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
989 ///
990 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
991 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
992 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
993         Arc<M>,
994         Arc<T>,
995         Arc<KeysManager>,
996         Arc<KeysManager>,
997         Arc<KeysManager>,
998         Arc<F>,
999         Arc<DefaultRouter<
1000                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1001                 Arc<L>,
1002                 Arc<KeysManager>,
1003                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1004                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1005                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006         >>,
1007         Arc<L>
1008 >;
1009
1010 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1011 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1012 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1013 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1014 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1015 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1016 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1017 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1018 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1019 ///
1020 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1021 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1022 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1023         ChannelManager<
1024                 &'a M,
1025                 &'b T,
1026                 &'c KeysManager,
1027                 &'c KeysManager,
1028                 &'c KeysManager,
1029                 &'d F,
1030                 &'e DefaultRouter<
1031                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1032                         &'g L,
1033                         &'c KeysManager,
1034                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1035                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1036                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037                 >,
1038                 &'g L
1039         >;
1040
1041 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1042 ///
1043 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1044 /// languages.
1045 pub trait AChannelManager {
1046         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1047         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1048         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1049         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1050         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1051         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1052         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1053         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1054         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1055         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1056         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1057         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1058         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1059         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1060         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1061         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1062         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1063         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1064         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1065         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1066         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1067         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1068         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1069         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1070         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1071         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1072         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1073         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1074         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1075         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1076         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1077         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1078         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1079         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1080         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1081         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1082 }
1083
1084 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1085 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1086 where
1087         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1088         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1089         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1090         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1091         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1092         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1093         R::Target: Router,
1094         L::Target: Logger,
1095 {
1096         type Watch = M::Target;
1097         type M = M;
1098         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1099         type T = T;
1100         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1101         type ES = ES;
1102         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1103         type NS = NS;
1104         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1105         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1106         type SP = SP;
1107         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1108         type F = F;
1109         type Router = R::Target;
1110         type R = R;
1111         type Logger = L::Target;
1112         type L = L;
1113         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1114 }
1115
1116 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1117 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1118 ///
1119 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1120 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1121 ///   channel
1122 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1123 ///   closing channels
1124 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1125 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1126 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1127 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1128 ///   timely manner
1129 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1130 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1131 ///
1132 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1133 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1134 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1135 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1136 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1137 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1138 ///
1139 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1140 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1141 ///
1142 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1143 ///
1144 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1145 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1146 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1147 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1148 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1149 ///
1150 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1151 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1152 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1153 ///
1154 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1155 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1156 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1157 ///
1158 /// # Initialization
1159 ///
1160 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1161 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1162 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1163 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1164 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1165 ///
1166 /// ```
1167 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1168 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1169 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1170 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1171 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1172 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1173 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1174 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1175 ///
1176 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1177 /// # fn example<
1178 /// #     'a,
1179 /// #     L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1180 /// #     ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1181 /// #     S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1182 /// #     SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1183 /// #     SP: Sized,
1184 /// #     R: lightning::io::Read,
1185 /// # >(
1186 /// #     fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1187 /// #     chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1188 /// #     tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1189 /// #     router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1190 /// #     logger: &L,
1191 /// #     entropy_source: &ES,
1192 /// #     node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1193 /// #     signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1194 /// #     best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1195 /// #     current_timestamp: u32,
1196 /// #     mut reader: R,
1197 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1198 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1199 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1200 ///     network: Network::Bitcoin,
1201 ///     best_block,
1202 /// };
1203 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1204 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1205 ///     fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1206 ///     signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1207 /// );
1208 ///
1209 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1210 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1211 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1212 ///     entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1213 ///     router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1214 /// );
1215 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1216 ///     <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1217 ///
1218 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1219 /// // ...
1220 ///
1221 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1222 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1223 ///     chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1224 /// }
1225 /// # Ok(())
1226 /// # }
1227 /// ```
1228 ///
1229 /// # Operation
1230 ///
1231 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1232 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1233 ///   called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1234 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1235 ///   (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1236 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1237 ///   as documented by those traits
1238 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1239 ///   every minute
1240 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1241 ///   [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1242 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1243 ///
1244 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1245 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1246 ///
1247 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1248 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1249 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1250 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1251 ///
1252 /// # Channels
1253 ///
1254 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1255 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1256 /// currently open channels.
1257 ///
1258 /// ```
1259 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1260 /// #
1261 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1262 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1263 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1264 /// for details in channels {
1265 ///     println!("{:?}", details);
1266 /// }
1267 /// # }
1268 /// ```
1269 ///
1270 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1271 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1272 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1273 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1274 ///
1275 /// ## Opening Channels
1276 ///
1277 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1278 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1279 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1280 ///
1281 /// ```
1282 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1283 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1284 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1285 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1286 /// #
1287 /// # trait Wallet {
1288 /// #     fn create_funding_transaction(
1289 /// #         &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1290 /// #     ) -> Transaction;
1291 /// # }
1292 /// #
1293 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1294 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1295 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1296 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1297 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1298 ///     Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1299 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1300 /// }
1301 ///
1302 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1303 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1304 ///     Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1305 ///         temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1306 ///         user_channel_id, ..
1307 ///     } => {
1308 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1309 ///         let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1310 ///             channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1311 ///         );
1312 ///         match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1313 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1314 ///         ) {
1315 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1316 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1317 ///         }
1318 ///     },
1319 ///     Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1320 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1321 ///         println!(
1322 ///             "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1323 ///             former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1324 ///         );
1325 ///     },
1326 ///     Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1327 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1328 ///         println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1329 ///     },
1330 ///     // ...
1331 /// #     _ => {},
1332 /// });
1333 /// # }
1334 /// ```
1335 ///
1336 /// ## Accepting Channels
1337 ///
1338 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1339 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1340 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1341 ///
1342 /// ```
1343 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1344 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1345 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1346 /// #
1347 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1348 /// #     // ...
1349 /// #     unimplemented!()
1350 /// # }
1351 /// #
1352 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1353 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1354 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1355 ///     Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, ..  } => {
1356 ///         if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1357 ///             match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1358 ///                 &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1359 ///             ) {
1360 ///                 Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1361 ///                 Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1362 ///             }
1363 ///             return;
1364 ///         }
1365 ///
1366 ///         let user_channel_id = 43;
1367 ///         match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1368 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1369 ///         ) {
1370 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1371 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1372 ///         }
1373 ///     },
1374 ///     // ...
1375 /// #     _ => {},
1376 /// });
1377 /// # }
1378 /// ```
1379 ///
1380 /// ## Closing Channels
1381 ///
1382 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1383 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1384 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1385 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1386 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1387 ///
1388 /// ```
1389 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1390 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1391 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1392 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1393 /// #
1394 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1395 /// #     channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1396 /// # ) {
1397 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1398 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1399 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1400 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1401 /// }
1402 ///
1403 /// // On the event processing thread
1404 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1405 ///     Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, ..  } => {
1406 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1407 ///         println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1408 ///     },
1409 ///     // ...
1410 /// #     _ => {},
1411 /// });
1412 /// # }
1413 /// ```
1414 ///
1415 /// # Payments
1416 ///
1417 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1418 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1419 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1420 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1421 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1422 /// HTLCs.
1423 ///
1424 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1425 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1426 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1427 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1428 ///
1429 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1430 ///
1431 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1432 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1433 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1434 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1435 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1436 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1437 ///
1438 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1439 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1440 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1441 ///
1442 /// ```
1443 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1444 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1445 /// #
1446 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1447 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1448 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1449 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1450 ///     Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1451 /// ) {
1452 ///     Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1453 ///         println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1454 ///         payment_hash
1455 ///     },
1456 ///     Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1457 /// };
1458 ///
1459 /// // On the event processing thread
1460 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1461 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1462 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1463 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1464 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1465 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1466 ///         },
1467 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1468 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1469 ///         },
1470 ///         PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1471 ///             assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1472 ///             println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1473 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1474 ///         },
1475 ///         // ...
1476 /// #         _ => {},
1477 ///     },
1478 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1479 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1480 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1481 ///     },
1482 ///     // ...
1483 /// #     _ => {},
1484 /// });
1485 /// # }
1486 /// ```
1487 ///
1488 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1489 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1490 ///
1491 /// ```
1492 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1493 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1494 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1495 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1496 /// #
1497 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1498 /// #     channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1499 /// #     route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1500 /// # ) {
1501 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1502 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1503 /// //     payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1504 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1505 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1506 ///     payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1507 /// ) {
1508 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1509 ///     Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1510 /// }
1511 ///
1512 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1513 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1514 /// assert!(
1515 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1516 ///         details,
1517 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1518 ///             payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1519 ///             payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1520 ///             ..
1521 ///         }
1522 ///     )).is_some()
1523 /// );
1524 ///
1525 /// // On the event processing thread
1526 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1527 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1528 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1529 ///     // ...
1530 /// #     _ => {},
1531 /// });
1532 /// # }
1533 /// ```
1534 ///
1535 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1536 ///
1537 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1538 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1539 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1540 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1541 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1542 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1543 ///
1544 /// ```
1545 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1546 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1547 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1548 /// #
1549 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1550 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1551 /// let offer = channel_manager
1552 ///     .create_offer_builder()?
1553 /// # ;
1554 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1555 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1556 /// # let offer = builder
1557 ///     .description("coffee".to_string())
1558 ///     .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1559 ///     .build()?;
1560 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1561 ///
1562 /// // On the event processing thread
1563 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1564 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1565 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1566 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1567 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1568 ///         },
1569 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1570 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1571 ///         },
1572 ///         // ...
1573 /// #         _ => {},
1574 ///     },
1575 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1576 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1577 ///     },
1578 ///     // ...
1579 /// #     _ => {},
1580 /// });
1581 /// # Ok(())
1582 /// # }
1583 /// ```
1584 ///
1585 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1586 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1587 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1588 ///
1589 /// ```
1590 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1591 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1592 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1593 /// #
1594 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1595 /// #     channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1596 /// #     payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1597 /// # ) {
1598 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1599 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1600 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1601 ///     offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1602 /// ) {
1603 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1604 ///     Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1605 /// }
1606 ///
1607 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1608 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1609 /// assert!(
1610 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1611 ///         details,
1612 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1613 ///     )).is_some()
1614 /// );
1615 ///
1616 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1617 /// assert!(
1618 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1619 ///         details,
1620 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1621 ///     )).is_some()
1622 /// );
1623 ///
1624 /// // On the event processing thread
1625 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1626 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1627 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1628 ///     Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1629 ///     // ...
1630 /// #     _ => {},
1631 /// });
1632 /// # }
1633 /// ```
1634 ///
1635 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1636 ///
1637 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1638 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1639 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1640 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1641 ///
1642 /// ```
1643 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1644 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1645 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1646 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1647 /// #
1648 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1649 /// #     channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1650 /// #     max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1651 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1652 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1653 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1654 /// let refund = channel_manager
1655 ///     .create_refund_builder(
1656 ///         amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1657 ///     )?
1658 /// # ;
1659 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1660 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1661 /// # let refund = builder
1662 ///     .description("coffee".to_string())
1663 ///     .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1664 ///     .build()?;
1665 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1666 ///
1667 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1668 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1669 /// assert!(
1670 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1671 ///         details,
1672 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1673 ///     )).is_some()
1674 /// );
1675 ///
1676 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1677 /// assert!(
1678 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1679 ///         details,
1680 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1681 ///     )).is_some()
1682 /// );
1683 ///
1684 /// // On the event processing thread
1685 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1686 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1687 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1688 ///     // ...
1689 /// #     _ => {},
1690 /// });
1691 /// # Ok(())
1692 /// # }
1693 /// ```
1694 ///
1695 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1696 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1697 ///
1698 /// ```
1699 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1700 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1701 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1702 /// #
1703 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1704 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1705 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1706 ///     Ok(invoice) => {
1707 ///         let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1708 ///         println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1709 ///         payment_hash
1710 ///     },
1711 ///     Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1712 /// };
1713 ///
1714 /// // On the event processing thread
1715 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1716 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1717 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1718 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1719 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1720 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1721 ///         },
1722 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1723 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1724 ///             },
1725 ///         // ...
1726 /// #         _ => {},
1727 ///     },
1728 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1729 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1730 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1731 ///     },
1732 ///     // ...
1733 /// #     _ => {},
1734 /// });
1735 /// # }
1736 /// ```
1737 ///
1738 /// # Persistence
1739 ///
1740 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1741 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1742 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1743 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1744 ///
1745 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1746 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1747 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1748 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1749 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1750 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1751 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1752 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1753 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1754 ///
1755 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1756 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1757 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1758 ///
1759 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1760 ///
1761 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1762 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1763 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1764 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1765 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1766 ///
1767 /// # DoS Mitigation
1768 ///
1769 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1770 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1771 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1772 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1773 ///
1774 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1775 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1776 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1777 ///
1778 /// # Type Aliases
1779 ///
1780 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1781 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1782 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1783 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1784 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1785 ///
1786 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1787 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1788 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1789 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1790 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1791 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1792 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1793 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1794 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1795 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1796 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1797 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1798 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1799 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1800 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1801 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1802 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1803 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1804 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1805 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1806 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1807 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1808 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1809 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1810 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1811 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1812 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1813 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1814 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1815 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1816 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1817 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1818 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1819 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1820 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1821 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1822 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1823 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1824 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1825 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1826 //
1827 // Lock order:
1828 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1829 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1830 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1831 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1832 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1833 //
1834 // Lock order tree:
1835 //
1836 // `pending_offers_messages`
1837 //
1838 // `total_consistency_lock`
1839 //  |
1840 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1841 //  |   |
1842 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1843 //  |
1844 //  |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1845 //  |
1846 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1847 //      |
1848 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1849 //          |
1850 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1851 //          |
1852 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1853 //              |
1854 //              |__`peer_state`
1855 //                  |
1856 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1857 //                  |
1858 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1859 //                  |
1860 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1861 //                  |
1862 //                  |__`best_block`
1863 //                  |
1864 //                  |__`pending_events`
1865 //                      |
1866 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1867 //
1868 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1869 where
1870         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1871         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1872         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1873         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1874         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1875         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1876         R::Target: Router,
1877         L::Target: Logger,
1878 {
1879         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1880         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1881         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1882         chain_monitor: M,
1883         tx_broadcaster: T,
1884         #[allow(unused)]
1885         router: R,
1886
1887         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1888         #[cfg(test)]
1889         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1890         #[cfg(not(test))]
1891         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1892         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1893
1894         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1895         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1896         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1897         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1898         ///
1899         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1900         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1901
1902         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1903         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1904         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1905         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1906         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1907         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1908         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1909         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1910         ///
1911         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1912         ///
1913         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1914         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1915
1916         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1917         ///
1918         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1919         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1920         /// and via the classic SCID.
1921         ///
1922         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1923         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1924         ///
1925         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1926         #[cfg(test)]
1927         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1928         #[cfg(not(test))]
1929         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1930         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1931         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1932         ///
1933         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1934         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1935
1936         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1937         ///
1938         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1939         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1940         /// and via the classic SCID.
1941         ///
1942         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1943         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1944         ///
1945         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1946         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1947
1948         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1949         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1950         ///
1951         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1952         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1953
1954         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1955         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1956         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1957         /// active channel list on load.
1958         ///
1959         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1960         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1961
1962         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1963         ///
1964         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1965         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1966         /// the handling of the events.
1967         ///
1968         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1969         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1970         ///
1971         /// TODO:
1972         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1973         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1974         /// would break backwards compatability.
1975         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1976         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1977         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1978         ///
1979         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1980         #[cfg(not(test))]
1981         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1982         #[cfg(test)]
1983         pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1984
1985         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1986         ///
1987         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1988         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1989         /// confirmation depth.
1990         ///
1991         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1992         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1993         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1994         ///
1995         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1996         #[cfg(test)]
1997         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1998         #[cfg(not(test))]
1999         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2000
2001         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2002
2003         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2004
2005         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2006         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2007         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2008         ///
2009         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2010         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2011
2012         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2013         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2014         /// keeping additional state.
2015         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2016
2017         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2018         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2019         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2020         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2021
2022         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2023         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2024         ///
2025         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2026         /// are currently open with that peer.
2027         ///
2028         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2029         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2030         /// channels.
2031         ///
2032         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2033         ///
2034         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2035         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2036         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2037         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2038         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2039
2040         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2041         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2042         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2043         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2044         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2045         ///
2046         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2047         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2048         ///
2049         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2050         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2051         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2052         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2053         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2054
2055         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2056         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2057
2058         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2059         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2060         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2061         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2062         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2063         ///
2064         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2065         ///
2066         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2067         ///
2068         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2069         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2070         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2071         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2072         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2073         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2074         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2075         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2076         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2077         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2078         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2079         ///
2080         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2081         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2082         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2083
2084         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2085
2086         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2087         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2088
2089         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2090
2091         /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2092         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2093
2094         entropy_source: ES,
2095         node_signer: NS,
2096         signer_provider: SP,
2097
2098         logger: L,
2099 }
2100
2101 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2102 ///
2103 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2104 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2105 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2106 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2107 pub struct ChainParameters {
2108         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2109         pub network: Network,
2110
2111         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2112         ///
2113         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2114         pub best_block: BestBlock,
2115 }
2116
2117 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2118 #[must_use]
2119 enum NotifyOption {
2120         DoPersist,
2121         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2122         SkipPersistNoEvents,
2123 }
2124
2125 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2126 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2127 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2128 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2129 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2130 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2131 ///
2132 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2133 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2134 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2135 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2136         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2137         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2138         should_persist: F,
2139         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2140         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2141 }
2142
2143 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2144         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2145         /// events to handle.
2146         ///
2147         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2148         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2149         /// isn't ideal.
2150         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2151                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2152         }
2153
2154         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2155         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2156                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2157                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2158
2159                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2160                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2161                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2162                         should_persist: move || {
2163                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2164                                 // processing and return that.
2165                                 let notify = persist_check();
2166                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
2167                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2168                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2169                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2170                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2171                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2172                                 }
2173                         },
2174                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2175                 }
2176         }
2177
2178         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2179         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2180         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2181         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2182         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2183                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2184
2185                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2186                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2187                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2188                         should_persist: persist_check,
2189                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2190                 }
2191         }
2192 }
2193
2194 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2195         fn drop(&mut self) {
2196                 match (self.should_persist)() {
2197                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2198                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2199                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2200                         },
2201                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2202                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2203                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2204                 }
2205         }
2206 }
2207
2208 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2209 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2210 ///
2211 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2212 ///
2213 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2214 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2215 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2216 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2217 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2218
2219 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2220 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2221 ///
2222 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2223 ///
2224 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2225 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2226 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2227 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2228 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2229 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2230 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2231 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2232 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2233 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2234 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2235 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2236 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2237
2238 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2239 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2240 /// this value.
2241 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2242 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2243 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2244 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2245
2246 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2247 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2248 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2249 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2250 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2251 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2252 #[allow(dead_code)]
2253 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2254
2255 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2256 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2257 #[allow(dead_code)]
2258 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2259
2260 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2261 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2262
2263 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2264 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2265 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2266
2267 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2268 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2269 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2270
2271 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2272 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2273 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2274 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2275
2276 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2277 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2278 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2279
2280 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2281 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2282 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2283
2284 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2285 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2286 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2287         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2288         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2289         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2290         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2291         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2292         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2293         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2294         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2295 }
2296
2297 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2298 /// to better separate parameters.
2299 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2300 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2301         /// The node_id of our counterparty
2302         pub node_id: PublicKey,
2303         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2304         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2305         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2306         pub features: InitFeatures,
2307         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2308         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2309         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2310         ///
2311         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2312         ///
2313         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2314         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2315         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2316         /// payments to us through this channel.
2317         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2318         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2319         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2320         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2321         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2322         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2323         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2324 }
2325
2326 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2327 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2328 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2329         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2330         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2331         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2332         /// lifetime of the channel.
2333         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2334         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2335         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2336         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2337         /// our counterparty already.
2338         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2339         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2340         ///
2341         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2342         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2343         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2344         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2345         ///
2346         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2347         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2348         ///
2349         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2350         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2351         ///
2352         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2353         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2354         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2355         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2356         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2357         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2358         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2359         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2360         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2361         /// `Some(0)`).
2362         ///
2363         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2364         ///
2365         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2366         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2367         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2368         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2369         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2370         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2371         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2372         ///
2373         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2374         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2375         ///
2376         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2377         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2378         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2379         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2380         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2381         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2382         /// this value on chain.
2383         ///
2384         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2385         ///
2386         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2387         ///
2388         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2389         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2390         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2391         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2392         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2393         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
2394         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2395         ///
2396         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2397         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2398         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2399         pub user_channel_id: u128,
2400         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2401         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2402         ///
2403         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2404         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2405         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2406         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2407         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2408         ///
2409         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2410         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2411         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2412         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2413         ///
2414         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2415         pub balance_msat: u64,
2416         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2417         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2418         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2419         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2420         ///
2421         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2422         ///
2423         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2424         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2425         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2426         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2427         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2428         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2429         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2430         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2431         ///
2432         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2433         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2434         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2435         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2436         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2437         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2438         /// route which is valid.
2439         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2440         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2441         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2442         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2443         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2444         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2445         ///
2446         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2447         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2448         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2449         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2450         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2451         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2452         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2453         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2454         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2455         ///
2456         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2457         ///
2458         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2459         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2460         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2461         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2462         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2463         ///
2464         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2465         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2466         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2467         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2468         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2469         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2470         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2471         ///
2472         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2473         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2474         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2475         pub is_outbound: bool,
2476         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2477         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2478         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2479         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2480         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2481         ///
2482         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2483         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2484         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2485         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2486         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2487         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2488         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2489         ///
2490         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2491         pub is_usable: bool,
2492         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2493         pub is_public: bool,
2494         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2495         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2496         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2497         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2498         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2499         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2500         ///
2501         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2502         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2503         /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2504         ///
2505         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2506         pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2507         /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2508         ///
2509         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2510         pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2511 }
2512
2513 impl ChannelDetails {
2514         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2515         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2516         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2517         ///
2518         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2519         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2520         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2521                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2522         }
2523
2524         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2525         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2526         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2527         ///
2528         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2529         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2530         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2531                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2532         }
2533
2534         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2535                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2536                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2537         ) -> Self
2538         where
2539                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2540                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2541         {
2542                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2543                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2544                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2545                 ChannelDetails {
2546                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2547                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2548                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2549                                 features: latest_features,
2550                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2551                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2552                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2553                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2554                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2555                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2556                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2557                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2558                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2559                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2560                         },
2561                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2562                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2563                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2564                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2565                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2566                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2567                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2568                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2569                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2570                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2571                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2572                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2573                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2574                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2575                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2576                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2577                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2578                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2579                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2580                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2581                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2582                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
2583                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
2584                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2585                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2586                         config: Some(context.config()),
2587                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2588                         pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2589                         pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2590                 }
2591         }
2592 }
2593
2594 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2595 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2596 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2597 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2598 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2599 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2600 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2601 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2602         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2603         NotShuttingDown,
2604         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2605         ShutdownInitiated,
2606         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2607         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2608         ResolvingHTLCs,
2609         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2610         NegotiatingClosingFee,
2611         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2612         /// to drop the channel.
2613         ShutdownComplete,
2614 }
2615
2616 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2617 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2618 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2619 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2620         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2621         AwaitingInvoice {
2622                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2623                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2624                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2625         },
2626         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2627         Pending {
2628                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2629                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2630                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2631                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2632                 /// abandoned.
2633                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2634                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2635                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2636                 total_msat: u64,
2637         },
2638         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2639         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2640         /// payment is removed from tracking.
2641         Fulfilled {
2642                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2643                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2644                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2645                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2646                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2647                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2648         },
2649         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2650         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2651         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2652         Abandoned {
2653                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2654                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2655                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2656                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2657                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2658         },
2659 }
2660
2661 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2662 ///
2663 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2664 #[derive(Clone)]
2665 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2666         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2667         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2668         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2669         /// route hints.
2670         pub phantom_scid: u64,
2671         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2672         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2673 }
2674
2675 macro_rules! handle_error {
2676         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2677                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2678                 // entering the macro.
2679                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2680                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2681
2682                 match $internal {
2683                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2684                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2685                                 let mut msg_event = None;
2686
2687                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2688                                         let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2689                                         let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2690                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
2691                                                 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2692                                         );
2693                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2694
2695                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2696                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
2697                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2698                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2699                                                         msg: update
2700                                                 });
2701                                         }
2702                                 } else {
2703                                         log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2704                                 }
2705
2706                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2707                                 } else {
2708                                         msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2709                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2710                                                 action: err.action.clone()
2711                                         });
2712                                 }
2713
2714                                 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2715                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2716                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2717                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2718                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2719                                         }
2720                                 }
2721
2722                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2723                                 Err(err)
2724                         },
2725                 }
2726         } };
2727 }
2728
2729 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2730         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2731                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2732                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2733                 }
2734                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2735                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2736                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2737                 } else {
2738                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2739                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2740                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2741                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2742                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2743                         // stage.
2744                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2745                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2746                 }
2747                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2748         }}
2749 }
2750
2751 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2752 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2753         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2754                 match $err {
2755                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2756                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2757                         },
2758                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2759                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2760                         },
2761                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2762                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2763                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2764                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2765                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2766                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2767                                 let err =
2768                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2769                                 (true, err)
2770                         },
2771                 }
2772         };
2773         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2774                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2775         };
2776         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2777                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2778         };
2779         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2780                 match $channel_phase {
2781                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2782                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2783                         },
2784                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2785                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2786                         },
2787                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2788                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2789                         },
2790                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2791                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2792                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2793                         },
2794                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2795                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2796                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2797                         },
2798                 }
2799         };
2800 }
2801
2802 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2803         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2804                 match $res {
2805                         Ok(res) => res,
2806                         Err(e) => {
2807                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2808                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2809                                 if drop {
2810                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2811                                 }
2812                                 break Err(res);
2813                         }
2814                 }
2815         }
2816 }
2817
2818 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2819         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2820                 match $res {
2821                         Ok(res) => res,
2822                         Err(e) => {
2823                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2824                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2825                                 if drop {
2826                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2827                                 }
2828                                 return Err(res);
2829                         }
2830                 }
2831         }
2832 }
2833
2834 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2835         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2836                 {
2837                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2838                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2839                         channel
2840                 }
2841         }
2842 }
2843
2844 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2845         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2846                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2847                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2848                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2849                 });
2850                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2851                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2852                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2853                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2854                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2855                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2856                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2857                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2858                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2859                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2860                 }
2861         }}
2862 }
2863
2864 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2865         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2866                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2867                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2868                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2869                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2870                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2871                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2872                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2873                                 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2874                         }, None));
2875                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2876                 }
2877         }
2878 }
2879
2880 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2881         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2882                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2883                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2884                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2885                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2886                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2887                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2888                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2889                         }, None));
2890                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2891                 }
2892         }
2893 }
2894
2895 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2896         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2897                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2898                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2899                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2900                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2901                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2902                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2903                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2904                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2905                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2906                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2907                         // now.
2908                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2909                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2910                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2911                                         msg,
2912                                 })
2913                         } else { None }
2914                 } else { None };
2915
2916                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2917                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2918
2919                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2920                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2921                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2922                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2923                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2924                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2925                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2926                 }
2927
2928                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2929                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2930                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2931                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2932
2933                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2934                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2935                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2936                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2937                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2938                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2939                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2940                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2941                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2942                                 ));
2943                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2944                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2945                                 } else {
2946                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2947                                 }
2948                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2949                         } else {
2950                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2951                         }
2952
2953                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2954                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2955                         if batch_completed {
2956                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2957                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2959                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2960                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2961                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2962                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2963                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2964                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2965                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2966                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2967                                                 }
2968                                         }
2969                                 }
2970                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2971                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2972                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2973                                 }
2974                         }
2975                 }
2976
2977                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2978
2979                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2980                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2981                 }
2982                 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2983                         $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2984                 }
2985                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2986                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2987                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2988                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2989                 }
2990         } }
2991 }
2992
2993 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2994         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2995                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2996                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2997                 match $update_res {
2998                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2999                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
3000                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
3001                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
3002                         },
3003                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
3004                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
3005                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
3006                                 false
3007                         },
3008                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3009                                 $completed;
3010                                 true
3011                         },
3012                 }
3013         } };
3014         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3015                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3016                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3017         };
3018         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3019                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3020                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3021                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3022                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3023                 // filter for uniqueness here.
3024                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3025                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3026                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3027                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3028                         });
3029                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3030                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3031                         {
3032                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3033                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3034                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3035                                 }
3036                         })
3037         } };
3038 }
3039
3040 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3041         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3042                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3043                 while !processed_all_events {
3044                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3045                                 return;
3046                         }
3047
3048                         let mut result;
3049
3050                         {
3051                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3052                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3053                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3054
3055                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3056                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3057                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
3058
3059                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3060                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3061                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3062                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3063                                 }
3064                         }
3065
3066                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3067                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
3068                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3069                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3070                         }
3071
3072                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3073
3074                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3075                                 $event_to_handle = event;
3076                                 $handle_event;
3077                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3078                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
3079                                 }
3080                         }
3081
3082                         {
3083                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3084                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3085                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3086                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3087                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3088                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3089                         }
3090
3091                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3092                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3093                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3094                                 processed_all_events = false;
3095                         }
3096
3097                         match result {
3098                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3099                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3100                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3101                                 },
3102                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3103                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3104                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3105                         }
3106                 }
3107         }
3108 }
3109
3110 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3111 where
3112         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3113         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3114         ES::Target: EntropySource,
3115         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3116         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3117         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3118         R::Target: Router,
3119         L::Target: Logger,
3120 {
3121         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3122         ///
3123         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3124         ///
3125         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3126         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3127         ///
3128         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3129         ///
3130         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3131         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3132         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3133         /// more details.
3134         ///
3135         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3136         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3137         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3138         pub fn new(
3139                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3140                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3141                 current_timestamp: u32,
3142         ) -> Self {
3143                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3144                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3145                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3146                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3147                 ChannelManager {
3148                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
3149                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3150                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3151                         chain_monitor,
3152                         tx_broadcaster,
3153                         router,
3154
3155                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3156
3157                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3158                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3159                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3160                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3161                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3162                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3163                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3164                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3165                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3166
3167                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3168                         secp_ctx,
3169
3170                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3171                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3172
3173                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3174
3175                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3176
3177                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3178
3179                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3180                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3181                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3182                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3183                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3184                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3185                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3186                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3187
3188                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3189                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3190
3191                         entropy_source,
3192                         node_signer,
3193                         signer_provider,
3194
3195                         logger,
3196                 }
3197         }
3198
3199         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3200         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3201                 &self.default_configuration
3202         }
3203
3204         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3205                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3206                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3207                 let mut i = 0;
3208                 loop {
3209                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3210                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3211                         } else {
3212                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3213                         }
3214                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3215                                 break;
3216                         }
3217                         i += 1;
3218                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3219                 }
3220                 outbound_scid_alias
3221         }
3222
3223         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3224         ///
3225         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3226         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3227         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3228         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3229         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3230         ///
3231         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3232         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3233         ///
3234         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3235         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3236         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3237         ///
3238         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3239         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3240         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3241         ///
3242         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3243         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3244         ///
3245         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3246         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3247         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3248         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3249         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3250         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3251         ///
3252         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3253         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3254         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3255         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3256                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3257                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3258                 }
3259
3260                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3261                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3262                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3263
3264                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3265
3266                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3267                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3268
3269                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3270
3271                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3272                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3273                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3274                         }
3275                 }
3276
3277                 let channel = {
3278                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3279                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3280                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3281                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3282                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3283                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3284                         {
3285                                 Ok(res) => res,
3286                                 Err(e) => {
3287                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3288                                         return Err(e);
3289                                 },
3290                         }
3291                 };
3292                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3293
3294                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3295                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3296                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3297                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
3298                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3299                                 } else {
3300                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
3301                                 }
3302                         },
3303                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3304                 }
3305
3306                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3307                         node_id: their_network_key,
3308                         msg: res,
3309                 });
3310                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3311         }
3312
3313         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3314                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3315                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3316                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3317                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3318                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3319                 // the same channel.
3320                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3321                 {
3322                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3323                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3324                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3325                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3326                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3327                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3328                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3329                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3330                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3331                                                 _ => None,
3332                                         })
3333                                         .filter(f)
3334                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3335                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3336                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3337                                         })
3338                                 );
3339                         }
3340                 }
3341                 res
3342         }
3343
3344         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3345         /// more information.
3346         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3347                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3348                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3349                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3350                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3351                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3352                 // the same channel.
3353                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3354                 {
3355                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3356                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3357                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3358                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3359                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3360                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3361                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3362                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3363                                         res.push(details);
3364                                 }
3365                         }
3366                 }
3367                 res
3368         }
3369
3370         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3371         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3372         ///
3373         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3374         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3375         /// are.
3376         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3377                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3378                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3379                 // really wanted anyway.
3380                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3381         }
3382
3383         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3384         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3385                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3386                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3387
3388                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3389                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3390                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3391                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3392                         let context_to_details = |context| {
3393                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3394                         };
3395                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
3396                                 .iter()
3397                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3398                                 .map(context_to_details)
3399                                 .collect();
3400                 }
3401                 vec![]
3402         }
3403
3404         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3405         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3406         ///
3407         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3408         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3409         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3410         ///
3411         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3412         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3413                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3414                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3415                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3416                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3417                                 },
3418                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3419                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3420                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3421                                 },
3422                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3423                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3424                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
3425                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3426                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
3427                                         })
3428                                 },
3429                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3430                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3431                                 },
3432                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3433                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3434                                 },
3435                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3436                         })
3437                         .collect()
3438         }
3439
3440         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3441                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3442
3443                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3444                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3445
3446                 {
3447                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3448
3449                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3450                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3451
3452                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3453                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3454
3455                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3456                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3457                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3458                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3459                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3460                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3461                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3462                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3463
3464                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3465                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3466                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3467                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3468                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3469                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
3470                                                 });
3471
3472                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3473                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3474
3475                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3476                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3477                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3478                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3479                                                 }
3480                                         } else {
3481                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3482                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3483                                         }
3484                                 },
3485                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3486                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3487                                                 err: format!(
3488                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3489                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3490                                                 )
3491                                         });
3492                                 },
3493                         }
3494                 }
3495
3496                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3497                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3498                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3499                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3500                 }
3501
3502                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3503                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3504                 }
3505
3506                 Ok(())
3507         }
3508
3509         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3510         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3511         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3512         ///
3513         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3514         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3515         ///    fee estimate.
3516         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3517         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3518         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3519         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3520         ///
3521         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3522         ///
3523         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3524         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3525         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3526         /// channel.
3527         ///
3528         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3529         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3530         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3531         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3532         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3533                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3534         }
3535
3536         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3537         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3538         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3539         ///
3540         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3541         /// the channel being closed or not:
3542         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3543         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3544         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3545         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3546         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3547         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3548         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3549         ///
3550         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3551         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3552         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3553         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3554         ///
3555         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3556         ///
3557         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3558         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3559         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3560         /// channel.
3561         ///
3562         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3563         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3564         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3565         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3566                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3567         }
3568
3569         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3570                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3571                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3572                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3573                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3574                 }
3575
3576                 let logger = WithContext::from(
3577                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3578                 );
3579
3580                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3581                         shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3582                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3583                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3584                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3585                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3586                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3587                 }
3588                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3589                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3590                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3591                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3592                         // ignore the result here.
3593                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3594                 }
3595                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3596                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3597                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3598                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3599                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3600                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3601                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3602                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3603                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3604                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3605                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3606                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3607                                         }
3608                                 }
3609                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3610                         }
3611                         debug_assert!(
3612                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3613                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3614                         );
3615                 }
3616
3617                 {
3618                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3619                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3620                                 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3621                                 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3622                                 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3623                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3624                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3625                                 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3626                         }, None));
3627
3628                         if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3629                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3630                                         channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3631                                 }, None));
3632                         }
3633                 }
3634                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3635                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3636                 }
3637         }
3638
3639         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3640         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3641         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3642         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3643                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3644                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3645                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3646                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3647                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3648                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3649                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3650                         } else {
3651                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3652                         };
3653                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3654                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3655                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3656                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3657                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
3658                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3659                                 match chan_phase {
3660                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3661                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3662                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3663                                         },
3664                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3665                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3666                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3667                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3668                                         },
3669                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3670                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3671                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3672                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3673                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3674                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3675                                         },
3676                                 }
3677                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3678                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3679                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3680                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3681                                 // events anyway.
3682                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
3683                         } else {
3684                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3685                         }
3686                 };
3687                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3688                         // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3689                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3690                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3691                                 msg: update
3692                         });
3693                 }
3694
3695                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3696         }
3697
3698         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3699                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3700                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3701                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3702                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3703                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3704                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3705                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3706                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3707                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3708                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3709                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3710                                                         },
3711                                                 }
3712                                         );
3713                                 }
3714                                 Ok(())
3715                         },
3716                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3717                 }
3718         }
3719
3720         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3721         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3722         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3723         /// channel.
3724         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3725         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3726                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3727         }
3728
3729         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3730         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3731         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3732         ///
3733         /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3734         /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3735         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3736         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3737                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3738         }
3739
3740         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3741         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3742         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3743                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3744                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3745                 }
3746         }
3747
3748         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3749         /// local transaction(s).
3750         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3751                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3752                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3753                 }
3754         }
3755
3756         fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3757                 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3758         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3759                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3760                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3761                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3762                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3763                         return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3764                 }
3765                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3766                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3767                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3768                         // we don't have the channel here.
3769                         return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3770                 }
3771
3772                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3773                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3774                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3775                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3776                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3777                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3778                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3779                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3780                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3781                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3782                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3783                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3784                         } else {
3785                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3786                         }
3787                 }
3788                 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3789                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3790                         return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3791                 }
3792                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3793                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3794                         return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3795                 }
3796
3797                 Ok(())
3798         }
3799
3800         /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3801         /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3802         fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3803                 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3804         ) -> Option<X> {
3805                 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3806                         None => return None,
3807                         Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3808                 };
3809                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3810                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3811                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3812                         return None;
3813                 }
3814                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3815                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3816                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3817                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3818                 ) {
3819                         None => None,
3820                         Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3821                 }
3822         }
3823
3824         fn can_forward_htlc(
3825                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3826         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3827                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3828                         self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3829                 }) {
3830                         Some(Ok(())) => {},
3831                         Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3832                         None => {
3833                                 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3834                                 // intercept forward.
3835                                 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3836                                         fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3837                                         fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3838                                 {} else {
3839                                         return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3840                                 }
3841                         }
3842                 }
3843
3844                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3845                 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3846                         cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3847                 ) {
3848                         let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3849                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3850                         }).flatten();
3851                         return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3852                 }
3853
3854                 Ok(())
3855         }
3856
3857         fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3858                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3859                 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3860                 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3861         ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3862                 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3863                 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3864                         let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3865                         if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3866                                 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3867                         }
3868                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3869                                 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3870                         }
3871                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3872                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3873                                 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3874                         }
3875                         (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3876                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3877                         chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3878                 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3879                         // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3880                         // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3881                         // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3882                         // instead.
3883                         err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3884                 }
3885
3886                 log_info!(
3887                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3888                         "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3889                 );
3890                 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3891                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3892                         return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3893                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3894                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3895                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3896                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3897                         });
3898                 }
3899
3900                 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3901                         (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3902                 } else {
3903                         (err_code, &res.0[..])
3904                 };
3905                 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3906                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3907                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3908                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3909                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3910                 })
3911         }
3912
3913         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3914                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3915         ) -> Result<
3916                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3917         > {
3918                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3919                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3920                 )?;
3921
3922                 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3923                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3924                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3925                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3926                 };
3927
3928                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3929                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3930                 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3931                         let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3932                         self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3933                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3934                                 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3935                         )
3936                 })?;
3937
3938                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3939         }
3940
3941         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3942                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3943                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3944                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3945         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3946                 macro_rules! return_err {
3947                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3948                                 {
3949                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3950                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3951                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3952                                                 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3953                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3954                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3955                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3956                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3957                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3958                                                         }
3959                                                 ))
3960                                         }
3961                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3962                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3963                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3964                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3965                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3966                                         }));
3967                                 }
3968                         }
3969                 }
3970                 match decoded_hop {
3971                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3972                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3973                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3974                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3975                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3976                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3977                                 {
3978                                         Ok(info) => {
3979                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3980                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3981                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3982                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3983                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3984                                         },
3985                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3986                                 }
3987                         },
3988                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3989                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3990                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3991                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3992                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3993                                 }
3994                         }
3995                 }
3996         }
3997
3998         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3999         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
4000         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
4001         ///
4002         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
4003         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
4004         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4005         ///
4006         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4007         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4008         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4009                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4010                         return Err(LightningError {
4011                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4012                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4013                         });
4014                 }
4015                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4016                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4017                 }
4018                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4019                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4020                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4021         }
4022
4023         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4024         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4025         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4026         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4027         ///
4028         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4029         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4030         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4031         ///
4032         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4033         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4034         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4035                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4036                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4037                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4038                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4039                         Some(id) => id,
4040                 };
4041
4042                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4043         }
4044
4045         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4046                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4047                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4048                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4049
4050                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4051                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4052                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4053                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4054                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4055                 };
4056
4057                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4058                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4059                         short_channel_id,
4060                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4061                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4062                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4063                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4064                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4065                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4066                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4067                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4068                 };
4069                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4070                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4071                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4072                 // channel.
4073                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4074
4075                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4076                         signature: sig,
4077                         contents: unsigned
4078                 })
4079         }
4080
4081         #[cfg(test)]
4082         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4083                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4084                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4085                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4086                         session_priv_bytes
4087                 })
4088         }
4089
4090         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4091                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4092                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4093                         session_priv_bytes
4094                 } = args;
4095                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4096                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4097                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4098                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4099
4100                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4101                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4102                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4103                 ).map_err(|e| {
4104                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4105                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4106                         e
4107                 })?;
4108
4109                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4110                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4111                                 None => {
4112                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4113                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4114                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4115                                 },
4116                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4117                         };
4118
4119                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4120                         log_trace!(logger,
4121                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4122                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4123
4124                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4125                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4126                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4127                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4128                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4129                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4130                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4131                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4132                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4133                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4134                                                 }
4135                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4136                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4137                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4138                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4139                                                                 path: path.clone(),
4140                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4141                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4142                                                                 payment_id,
4143                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4144                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4145                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
4146                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4147                                                                         false => {
4148                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4149                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4150                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4151                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4152                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4153                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4154                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4155                                                                         },
4156                                                                         true => {},
4157                                                                 }
4158                                                         },
4159                                                         None => {},
4160                                                 }
4161                                         },
4162                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4163                                 };
4164                         } else {
4165                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4166                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4167                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
4168                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4169                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4170                         }
4171                         return Ok(());
4172                 };
4173                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4174                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4175                         Err(e) => {
4176                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4177                         },
4178                 }
4179         }
4180
4181         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4182         ///
4183         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4184         /// fields for more info.
4185         ///
4186         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4187         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4188         ///
4189         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4190         ///
4191         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4192         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4193         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4194         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4195         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4196         ///
4197         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4198         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4199         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4200         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4201         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4202         ///
4203         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4204         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4205         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4206         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4207         ///
4208         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4209         ///
4210         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4211         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4212         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4213         ///
4214         /// In general, a path may raise:
4215         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4216         ///    node public key) is specified.
4217         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4218         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4219         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4220         ///    relevant updates.
4221         ///
4222         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4223         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4224         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4225         ///
4226         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4227         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4228         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4229         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4230         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4231         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4232         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4233                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4234                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4235                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4236                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4237                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4238                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4239         }
4240
4241         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4242         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4243         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4244                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4245                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4246                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4247                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4248                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4249                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4250                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4251         }
4252
4253         #[cfg(test)]
4254         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4255                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4256                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4257                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4258                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4259                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4260         }
4261
4262         #[cfg(test)]
4263         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4264                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4265                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4266         }
4267
4268         #[cfg(test)]
4269         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4270                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4271         }
4272
4273         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4274                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4275                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4276                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4277                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4278                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4279                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4280                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4281                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4282                         )
4283         }
4284
4285         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4286         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4287         /// retries are exhausted.
4288         ///
4289         /// # Event Generation
4290         ///
4291         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4292         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4293         ///
4294         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4295         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4296         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4297         ///
4298         /// # Requested Invoices
4299         ///
4300         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4301         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4302         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4303         /// once the invoice has been received.
4304         ///
4305         /// # Restart Behavior
4306         ///
4307         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4308         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4309         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4310         ///
4311         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4312         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4313                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4314                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4315         }
4316
4317         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4318         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4319         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4320         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4321         /// never reach the recipient.
4322         ///
4323         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4324         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4325         ///
4326         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4327         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4328         ///
4329         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4330         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4331                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4332                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4333                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4334                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4335                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4336         }
4337
4338         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4339         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4340         ///
4341         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4342         /// payments.
4343         ///
4344         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4345         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4346                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4347                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4348                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4349                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4350                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4351                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4352         }
4353
4354         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4355         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4356         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4357         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4358                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4359                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4360                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4361                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4362                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4363         }
4364
4365         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4366         /// payment probe.
4367         #[cfg(test)]
4368         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4369                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4370         }
4371
4372         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4373         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4374         ///
4375         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4376         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4377                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4378                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4379         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4380                 let payment_params =
4381                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4382
4383                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4384
4385                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4386         }
4387
4388         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4389         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4390         ///
4391         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4392         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4393         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4394         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4395         ///
4396         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4397         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4398         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4399         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4400         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4401         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4402         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4403                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4404         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4405                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4406
4407                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4408                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4409                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4410                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4411
4412                 let route = self
4413                         .router
4414                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4415                         .map_err(|e| {
4416                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4417                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4418                         })?;
4419
4420                 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4421
4422                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4423
4424                 for mut path in route.paths {
4425                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4426                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4427                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4428                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4429                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4430                                         break;
4431                                 } else {
4432                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4433                                         log_debug!(
4434                                                 self.logger,
4435                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4436                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4437                                         );
4438                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4439                                         path.hops.pop();
4440                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4441                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4442                                         }
4443                                 }
4444                         }
4445
4446                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4447                                 log_debug!(
4448                                         self.logger,
4449                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4450                                 );
4451                                 continue;
4452                         }
4453
4454                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4455                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4456                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4457                                 }) {
4458                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4459                                         let used_liquidity =
4460                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4461
4462                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4463                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4464                                         {
4465                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4466                                                 continue;
4467                                         } else {
4468                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4469                                         }
4470                                 }
4471                         }
4472
4473                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4474                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4475                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4476                         })?);
4477                 }
4478
4479                 Ok(res)
4480         }
4481
4482         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4483         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4484         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4485                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4486                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4487         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4488                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4489                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4490                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4491
4492                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4493                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4494                 let funding_txo;
4495                 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4496                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4497                                 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4498                                         let counterparty;
4499                                         let err = if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = $err {
4500                                                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4501                                                 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4502                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4503                                                 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4504                                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4505                                         } else { unreachable!(); };
4506
4507                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4508                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4509                                         let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4510                                         Err($api_err)
4511                                 } } }
4512                                 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4513                                         Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4514                                         Err(err) => {
4515                                                 let chan_err = ChannelError::Close(err.to_owned());
4516                                                 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4517                                                 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4518                                         },
4519                                 }
4520
4521                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4522                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4523                                 match funding_res {
4524                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4525                                         Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4526                                                 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4527                                                 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4528                                         }
4529                                 }
4530                         },
4531                         Some(phase) => {
4532                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4533                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4534                                         err: format!(
4535                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4536                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4537                                 })
4538                         },
4539                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4540                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4541                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4542                                 }),
4543                 };
4544
4545                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4546                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4547                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4548                                 msg,
4549                         });
4550                 }
4551                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4552                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4553                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4554                         },
4555                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4556                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4557                                 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4558                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4559                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4560                                                 let err = format!(
4561                                                         "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4562                                                         funding_txo, o.get()
4563                                                 );
4564                                                 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4565                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4566                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4567                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4568                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4569                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4570                                         }
4571                                 }
4572                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4573                         }
4574                 }
4575                 Ok(())
4576         }
4577
4578         #[cfg(test)]
4579         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4580                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4581                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4582                 })
4583         }
4584
4585         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4586         ///
4587         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4588         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4589         ///
4590         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4591         /// across the p2p network.
4592         ///
4593         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4594         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4595         ///
4596         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4597         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4598         /// keys per-channel).
4599         ///
4600         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4601         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4602         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4603         ///
4604         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4605         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4606         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4607         ///
4608         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4609         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4610         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4611         /// for more details.
4612         ///
4613         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4614         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4615         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4616                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4617         }
4618
4619         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4620         ///
4621         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4622         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4623         ///
4624         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4625         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4626         /// signature for each channel.
4627         ///
4628         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4629         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4630                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4631                 let mut result = Ok(());
4632
4633                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4634                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4635                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4636                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4637                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4638                                         }));
4639                                 }
4640                         }
4641                 }
4642                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4643                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4644                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4645                         }));
4646                 }
4647                 {
4648                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4649                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4650                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4651                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4652                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4653                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4654                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4655                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4656                         {
4657                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4658                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4659                                 }));
4660                         }
4661                 }
4662
4663                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4664                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4665                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4666                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4667                 } else {
4668                         None
4669                 };
4670                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4671                         match states.entry(txid) {
4672                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4673                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4674                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4675                                         }));
4676                                         None
4677                                 },
4678                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4679                         }
4680                 });
4681                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4682                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4683                                 temporary_channel_id,
4684                                 counterparty_node_id,
4685                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
4686                                 is_batch_funding,
4687                                 |chan, tx| {
4688                                         let mut output_index = None;
4689                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4690                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4691                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4692                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
4693                                                                 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4694                                                         }
4695                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4696                                                 }
4697                                         }
4698                                         if output_index.is_none() {
4699                                                 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4700                                         }
4701                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4702                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4703                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4704                                                 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4705                                                 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4706                                                 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4707                                         }
4708                                         Ok(outpoint)
4709                                 })
4710                         );
4711                 }
4712                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4713                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4714                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4715                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4716                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4717                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4718                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4719                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4720                         );
4721                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4722                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4723                         );
4724                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4725                         {
4726                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4727                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4728                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4729                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4730                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4731                                                 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4732                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4733                                                         let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4734                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4735                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4736                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4737                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4738                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4739                                                                                 channel_id,
4740                                                                                 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4741                                                                         }
4742                                                                 },
4743                                                         });
4744                                                 });
4745                                 }
4746                         }
4747                         mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4748                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4749                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4750                         }
4751                 }
4752                 result
4753         }
4754
4755         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4756         ///
4757         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4758         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4759         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4760         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4761         ///
4762         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4763         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4764         ///
4765         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4766         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4767         ///
4768         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4769         ///
4770         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4771         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4772         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4773         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4774         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4775         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4776         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4777         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4778                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4779         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4780                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4781                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4782                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4783                         });
4784                 }
4785
4786                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4787                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4788                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4789                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4790                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4791                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4792
4793                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4794                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4795                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4796                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4797                                 });
4798                         };
4799                 }
4800                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4801                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4802                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4803                                 config.apply(config_update);
4804                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4805                                         continue;
4806                                 }
4807                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4808                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4809                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4810                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4811                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4812                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4813                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4814                                                         msg,
4815                                                 });
4816                                         }
4817                                 }
4818                                 continue;
4819                         } else {
4820                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4821                                 debug_assert!(false);
4822                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4823                                         err: format!(
4824                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4825                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4826                                 });
4827                         };
4828                 }
4829                 Ok(())
4830         }
4831
4832         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4833         ///
4834         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4835         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4836         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4837         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4838         ///
4839         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4840         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4841         ///
4842         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4843         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4844         ///
4845         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4846         ///
4847         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4848         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4849         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4850         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4851         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4852         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4853         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4854         pub fn update_channel_config(
4855                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4856         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4857                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4858         }
4859
4860         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4861         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4862         ///
4863         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4864         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4865         ///
4866         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4867         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4868         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4869         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4870         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4871         ///
4872         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4873         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4874         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4875         /// than expected.
4876         ///
4877         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4878         /// backwards.
4879         ///
4880         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4881         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4882         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4883         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4884         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4885         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4886                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4887
4888                 let next_hop_scid = {
4889                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4890                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4891                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4892                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4893                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4894                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4895                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4896                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4897                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4898                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4899                                                 })
4900                                         }
4901                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4902                                 },
4903                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4904                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4905                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4906                                 }),
4907                                 None => {
4908                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4909                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4910                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4911                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4912                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4913                                                 err: error
4914                                         })
4915                                 }
4916                         }
4917                 };
4918
4919                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4920                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4921                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4922                         })?;
4923
4924                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4925                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4926                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4927                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4928                                 }
4929                         },
4930                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4931                 };
4932                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4933                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4934                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4935                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4936                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4937                 };
4938
4939                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4940                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4941                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4942                         payment.prev_channel_id,
4943                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4944                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4945                 )];
4946                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4947                 Ok(())
4948         }
4949
4950         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4951         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4952         ///
4953         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4954         /// backwards.
4955         ///
4956         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4957         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4958                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4959
4960                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4961                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4962                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4963                         })?;
4964
4965                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4966                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4967                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4968                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4969                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4970                                 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4971                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4972                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4973                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4974                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4975                         });
4976
4977                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4978                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4979                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4980                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4981
4982                 Ok(())
4983         }
4984
4985         fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4986                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4987                 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4988
4989                 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4990                         if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4991                                 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4992                                         Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4993                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4994                                                         node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4995                                                         channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4996                                                 },
4997                                         None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4998                                                 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4999                                         },
5000                                 }
5001                         } else {
5002                                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
5003                         }
5004                 };
5005
5006                 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
5007                         let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5008                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5009                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
5010                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
5011                                 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
5012                                 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
5013                                 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
5014                         });
5015                         let (
5016                                 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
5017                                 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
5018                          ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
5019                                 incoming_channel_details
5020                         } else {
5021                                 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5022                                 continue;
5023                         };
5024
5025                         let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5026                         let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5027                         for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5028                                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5029                                         &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5030                                 ) {
5031                                         Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5032                                         Err(htlc_fail) => {
5033                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5034                                                 continue;
5035                                         },
5036                                 };
5037
5038                                 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5039                                 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5040
5041                                 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5042                                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5043                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5044                                         chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5045                                                 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5046                                         )
5047                                 }) {
5048                                         Some(Ok(_)) => {},
5049                                         Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5050                                                 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5051                                                         self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5052                                                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5053                                                         }).flatten()
5054                                                 } else {
5055                                                         None
5056                                                 };
5057                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5058                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5059                                                         outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5060                                                 );
5061                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5062                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5063                                                 continue;
5064                                         },
5065                                         // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5066                                         None => continue 'outer_loop,
5067                                 }
5068
5069                                 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5070                                 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5071                                         if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5072                                                 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5073                                         ) {
5074                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5075                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5076                                                         chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5077                                                 );
5078                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5079                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5080                                                 continue;
5081                                         }
5082                                 }
5083
5084                                 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5085                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5086                                         incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5087                                 ) {
5088                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5089                                                 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5090                                         },
5091                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5092                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5093                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5094                                         },
5095                                 }
5096                         }
5097
5098                         // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5099                         // proposed to as a batch.
5100                         let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5101                                 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5102                         self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5103                         for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5104                                 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5105                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5106                                                 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5107                                                 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5108                                         },
5109                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5110                                                 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5111                                                 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5112                                                 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5113                                         },
5114                                 };
5115                                 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5116                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5117                                         prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5118                                         failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5119                                 }, None));
5120                         }
5121                 }
5122         }
5123
5124         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5125         ///
5126         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5127         /// Will likely generate further events.
5128         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5129                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5130
5131                 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5132
5133                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5134                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5135                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5136                 {
5137                         let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5138                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5139
5140                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5141                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5142                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5143                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5144                                                 () => {
5145                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5146                                                                 match forward_info {
5147                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5148                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5149                                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5150                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5151                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5152                                                                                 }
5153                                                                         }) => {
5154                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5155                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5156                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
5157                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5158
5159                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5160                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5161                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5162                                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5163                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5164                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5165                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5166                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5167                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5168                                                                                                 });
5169
5170                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5171                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5172                                                                                                 } else {
5173                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5174                                                                                                 };
5175
5176                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5177                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5178                                                                                                         reason
5179                                                                                                 ));
5180                                                                                                 continue;
5181                                                                                         }
5182                                                                                 }
5183                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5184                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5185                                                                                                 {
5186                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5187                                                                                                 }
5188                                                                                         }
5189                                                                                 }
5190                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5191                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5192                                                                                                 {
5193                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5194                                                                                                 }
5195                                                                                         }
5196                                                                                 }
5197                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5198                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5199                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5200                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5201                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5202                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5203                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5204                                                                                                 ) {
5205                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
5206                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5207                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5208                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5209                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5210                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5211                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
5212                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5213                                                                                                         },
5214                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5215                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5216                                                                                                         },
5217                                                                                                 };
5218                                                                                                 match next_hop {
5219                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5220                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5221                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5222                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5223                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5224                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5225                                                                                                                 {
5226                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5227                                                                                                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5228                                                                                                                 }
5229                                                                                                         },
5230                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
5231                                                                                                 }
5232                                                                                         } else {
5233                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5234                                                                                         }
5235                                                                                 } else {
5236                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5237                                                                                 }
5238                                                                         },
5239                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5240                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5241                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5242                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5243                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
5244                                                                         }
5245                                                                 }
5246                                                         }
5247                                                 }
5248                                         }
5249                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5250                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5251                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5252                                                 None => {
5253                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5254                                                         continue;
5255                                                 }
5256                                         };
5257                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5258                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5259                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5260                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5261                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5262                                                 continue;
5263                                         }
5264                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5265                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5266                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5267                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5268                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5269                                                         let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5270                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5271                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5272                                                                         prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5273                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5274                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5275                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
5276                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5277                                                                         },
5278                                                                 }) => {
5279                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5280                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5281                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5282                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5283                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5284                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5285                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5286                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5287                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5288                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5289                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5290                                                                         });
5291                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5292                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5293                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5294                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5295                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5296                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5297                                                                                 ).ok()
5298                                                                         });
5299                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5300                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5301                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5302                                                                                 &&logger)
5303                                                                         {
5304                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5305                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5306                                                                                 } else {
5307                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5308                                                                                 }
5309                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5310                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5311                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5312                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5313                                                                                 ));
5314                                                                                 continue;
5315                                                                         }
5316                                                                         None
5317                                                                 },
5318                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5319                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5320                                                                 },
5321                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5322                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5323                                                                         Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5324                                                                 },
5325                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5326                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5327                                                                         let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5328                                                                                 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5329                                                                         );
5330                                                                         Some((res, htlc_id))
5331                                                                 },
5332                                                         };
5333                                                         if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5334                                                                 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5335                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5336                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5337                                                                         } else {
5338                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5339                                                                         }
5340                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5341                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5342                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5343                                                                         continue;
5344                                                                 }
5345                                                         }
5346                                                 }
5347                                         } else {
5348                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5349                                                 continue;
5350                                         }
5351                                 } else {
5352                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5353                                                 match forward_info {
5354                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5355                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5356                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5357                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5358                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5359                                                                 }
5360                                                         }) => {
5361                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5362                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5363                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5364                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5365                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5366                                                                                 requires_blinded_error: _
5367                                                                         } => {
5368                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5369                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5370                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5371                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5372                                                                                         Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5373                                                                         },
5374                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5375                                                                                 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5376                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5377                                                                         } => {
5378                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5379                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5380                                                                                         payment_metadata,
5381                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
5382                                                                                 };
5383                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5384                                                                                         payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5385                                                                         },
5386                                                                         _ => {
5387                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5388                                                                         }
5389                                                                 };
5390                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5391                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5392                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5393                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5394                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5395                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5396                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5397                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5398                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5399                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5400                                                                         },
5401                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5402                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5403                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
5404                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5405                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5406                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
5407                                                                         total_value_received: None,
5408                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5409                                                                         cltv_expiry,
5410                                                                         onion_payload,
5411                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5412                                                                 };
5413
5414                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5415
5416                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5417                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5418                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5419                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5420                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5421                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5422                                                                                 );
5423                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5424                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5425                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5426                                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5427                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5428                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5429                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5430                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5431                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5432                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
5433                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5434                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5435                                                                                 ));
5436                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5437                                                                         }
5438                                                                 }
5439                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5440                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5441                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5442                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5443                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5444                                                                 }
5445
5446                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5447                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
5448                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5449                                                                                 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5450                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5451                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5452                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5453                                                                                 }
5454                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5455                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
5456                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5457                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
5458                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5459                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
5460                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5461                                                                                                 }
5462                                                                                         });
5463                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5464                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5465                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5466                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5467                                                                                 }
5468                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5469                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5470                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5471                                                                                 }
5472                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5473                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5474                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5475                                                                                         }
5476                                                                                 } else {
5477                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5478                                                                                 }
5479                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5480                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5481                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5482                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5483                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5484                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5485                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5486                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5487                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5488                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5489                                                                                         }
5490                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5491                                                                                 }
5492                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5493                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5494                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5495                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5496                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5497                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5498                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
5499                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5500                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5501                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5502                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5503                                                                                         }
5504                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5505                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5506                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5507                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5508                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5509                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5510                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5511                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5512                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5513                                                                                                 payment_hash,
5514                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
5515                                                                                                 amount_msat,
5516                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5517                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5518                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5519                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5520                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5521                                                                                         }, None));
5522                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
5523                                                                                 } else {
5524                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5525                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5526                                                                                         // MPP parts.
5527                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5528                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5529                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5530                                                                                         }
5531                                                                                 }
5532                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
5533                                                                         }}
5534                                                                 }
5535
5536                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5537                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5538                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5539                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5540                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5541                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5542                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5543                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5544                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5545                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5546                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5547                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5548                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5549                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
5550                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
5551                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5552                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5553                                                                                                         }
5554                                                                                                 };
5555                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5556                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5557                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5558                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5559                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5560                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5561                                                                                                         }
5562                                                                                                 }
5563                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5564                                                                                                         payment_preimage,
5565                                                                                                         payment_data.payment_secret,
5566                                                                                                         payment_context,
5567                                                                                                 );
5568                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5569                                                                                         },
5570                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5571                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5572                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5573                                                                                         }
5574                                                                                 }
5575                                                                         },
5576                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5577                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5578                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5579                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5580                                                                                 }
5581                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5582                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5583                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5584                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5585                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5586                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5587                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5588                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5589                                                                                 } else {
5590                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5591                                                                                                 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5592                                                                                                 payment_data.payment_secret,
5593                                                                                                 payment_context,
5594                                                                                         );
5595                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5596                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
5597                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5598                                                                                         }
5599                                                                                 }
5600                                                                         },
5601                                                                 };
5602                                                         },
5603                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5604                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5605                                                         }
5606                                                 }
5607                                         }
5608                                 }
5609                         }
5610                 }
5611
5612                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5613                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5614                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5615                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5616
5617                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5618                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5619                 }
5620                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5621
5622                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5623                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5624                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5625                 // network stack.
5626                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5627
5628                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5629                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5630                 events.append(&mut new_events);
5631         }
5632
5633         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5634         ///
5635         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5636         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5637                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5638
5639                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5640
5641                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5642                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5643                 if background_events.is_empty() {
5644                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5645                 }
5646
5647                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5648                         match event {
5649                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5650                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5651                                         // monitor updating completing.
5652                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5653                                 },
5654                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5655                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
5656                                         {
5657                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5658                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5659                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5660                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5661                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5662                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5663                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5664                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
5665                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5666                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5667                                                                         } else {
5668                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5669                                                                         }
5670                                                                 },
5671                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5672                                                         }
5673                                                 }
5674                                         }
5675                                         if !updated_chan {
5676                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5677                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5678                                         }
5679                                 },
5680                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5681                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5682                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5683                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5684                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5685                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5686                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5687                                                 } else {
5688                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5689                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5690                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5691                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5692                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5693                                                 }
5694                                         }
5695                                 },
5696                         }
5697                 }
5698                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5699         }
5700
5701         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5702         /// Process background events, for functional testing
5703         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5704                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5705                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5706         }
5707
5708         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5709                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5710
5711                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5712
5713                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5714                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5715                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5716                 }
5717                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5718                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5719                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5720                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5721                 }
5722                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5723                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5724
5725                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5726                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5727         }
5728
5729         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5730         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5731         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5732         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5733         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5734         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5735                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5736                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5737
5738                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5739                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5740
5741                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5742                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5743                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5744                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5745                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5746                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5747                                 ) {
5748                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5749                                                 anchor_feerate
5750                                         } else {
5751                                                 non_anchor_feerate
5752                                         };
5753                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5754                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5755                                 }
5756                         }
5757
5758                         should_persist
5759                 });
5760         }
5761
5762         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5763         ///
5764         /// This currently includes:
5765         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5766         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5767         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5768         ///    the channel.
5769         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5770         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5771         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5772         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5773         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5774         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5775         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5776         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
5777         ///
5778         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5779         /// estimate fetches.
5780         ///
5781         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5782         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5783         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5784                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5785                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5786
5787                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5788                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5789
5790                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5791                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5792                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5793                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5794
5795                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5796                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5797                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5798                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5799                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5800                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5801                         | {
5802                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5803                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5804                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5805                                         log_error!(logger,
5806                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5807                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5808                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5809                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5810                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5811                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5812                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5813                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5814                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5815                                                         },
5816                                                 },
5817                                         });
5818                                         false
5819                                 } else {
5820                                         true
5821                                 }
5822                         };
5823
5824                         {
5825                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5826                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5827                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5828                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5829                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5830                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5831                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5832                                                 match phase {
5833                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5834                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5835                                                                         anchor_feerate
5836                                                                 } else {
5837                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
5838                                                                 };
5839                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5840                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5841
5842                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5843                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5844                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5845                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
5846                                                                 }
5847
5848                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5849                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5850                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5851                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5852                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5853                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5854                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5855                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5856                                                                                 n += 1;
5857                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5858                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5859                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5860                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5861                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5862                                                                                                         msg: update
5863                                                                                                 });
5864                                                                                         }
5865                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5866                                                                                 } else {
5867                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5868                                                                                 }
5869                                                                         },
5870                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5871                                                                                 n += 1;
5872                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5873                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5874                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5875                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5876                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5877                                                                                                         msg: update
5878                                                                                                 });
5879                                                                                         }
5880                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5881                                                                                 } else {
5882                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5883                                                                                 }
5884                                                                         },
5885                                                                         _ => {},
5886                                                                 }
5887
5888                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5889
5890                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5891                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5892                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5893                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5894                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5895                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5896                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5897                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5898                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5899                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5900                                                                                         },
5901                                                                                 },
5902                                                                         });
5903                                                                 }
5904
5905                                                                 true
5906                                                         },
5907                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5908                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5909                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5910                                                         },
5911                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5912                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5913                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5914                                                         },
5915                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5916                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5917                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5918                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5919                                                         },
5920                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5921                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5922                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5923                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5924                                                         },
5925                                                 }
5926                                         });
5927
5928                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5929                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5930                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5931                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5932                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5933                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5934                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5935                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5936                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5937                                                                         },
5938                                                                 }
5939                                                         );
5940                                                 }
5941                                         }
5942                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5943
5944                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5945                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5946                                         }
5947                                 }
5948                         }
5949
5950                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5951                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5952                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5953                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5954                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5955                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5956                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5957                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5958                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5959                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5960                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5961                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5962                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5963                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5964                                                         let remove_entry = {
5965                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5966                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5967                                                         };
5968                                                         if remove_entry {
5969                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5970                                                         }
5971                                                 },
5972                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5973                                         }
5974                                 }
5975                         }
5976
5977                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5978                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5979                                         // This should be unreachable
5980                                         debug_assert!(false);
5981                                         return false;
5982                                 }
5983                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5984                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5985                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5986                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5987                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5988                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5989                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5990                                         {
5991                                                 return true;
5992                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5993                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5994                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5995                                         }) {
5996                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5997                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5998                                                 return false;
5999                                         }
6000                                 }
6001                                 true
6002                         });
6003
6004                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
6005                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
6006                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
6007                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
6008                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6009                         }
6010
6011                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6012                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6013                         }
6014
6015                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
6016                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6017                         }
6018
6019                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6020                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
6021                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
6022                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
6023                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
6024                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6025                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6026                         );
6027
6028                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6029                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6030                         );
6031
6032                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6033                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6034                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6035                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6036                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6037                         }
6038
6039                         should_persist
6040                 });
6041         }
6042
6043         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6044         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6045         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6046         ///
6047         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6048         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6049         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6050         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6051         ///
6052         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6053         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6054         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6055         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6056         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6057                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6058         }
6059
6060         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6061         /// reason for the failure.
6062         ///
6063         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6064         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6065                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6066
6067                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6068                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6069                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6070                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6071                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6072                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6073                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6074                         }
6075                 }
6076         }
6077
6078         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6079         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6080                 match failure_code {
6081                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6082                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6083                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6084                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6085                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6086                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6087                         },
6088                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6089                                 let fail_data = match data {
6090                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6091                                         None => Vec::new(),
6092                                 };
6093                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6094                         }
6095                 }
6096         }
6097
6098         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6099         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6100         ///
6101         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6102         /// forwarding
6103         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6104                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6105                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6106                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6107                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6108                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6109                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6110                 } else {
6111                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6112                 };
6113                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6114                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6115                 } else {
6116                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6117                 }
6118         }
6119
6120
6121         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6122         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6123         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6124                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6125                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6126                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6127                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6128                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6129                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6130                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6131                         }
6132                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6133                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6134                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6135                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6136                 } else {
6137                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6138                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6139                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6140                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6141                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6142                 }
6143         }
6144
6145         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6146         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6147         // be surfaced to the user.
6148         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6149                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6150                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6151         ) {
6152                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6153                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6154                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6155                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6156                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6157                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6158                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6159                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6160                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6161                                                 } else {
6162                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6163                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6164                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6165                                                 }
6166                                         },
6167                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6168                                 }
6169                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6170                 };
6171
6172                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6173                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6174                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6175                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6176                 }
6177         }
6178
6179         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6180                 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6181                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6182         }
6183
6184         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6185         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6186         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6187                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6188                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6189                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6190                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6191                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6192                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6193                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6194                 }
6195
6196                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6197                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6198                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6199                 //timer handling.
6200
6201                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6202                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6203                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6204                 let mut push_forward_event;
6205                 match source {
6206                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6207                                 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6208                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6209                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6210                         },
6211                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6212                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6213                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6214                         }) => {
6215                                 log_trace!(
6216                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6217                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6218                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6219                                 );
6220                                 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6221                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6222                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6223                                                 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6224                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6225                                                 );
6226                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6227                                         },
6228                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6229                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6230                                                         htlc_id: *htlc_id,
6231                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6232                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6233                                                 }
6234                                         },
6235                                         None => {
6236                                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6237                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6238                                                 );
6239                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6240                                         }
6241                                 };
6242
6243                                 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6244                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6245                                 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6246                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6247                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6248                                                 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6249                                         },
6250                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6251                                                 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6252                                         }
6253                                 }
6254                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6255                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6256                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6257                                         prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6258                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
6259                                 }, None));
6260                         },
6261                 }
6262                 push_forward_event
6263         }
6264
6265         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6266         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6267         ///
6268         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6269         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6270         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6271         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6272         ///
6273         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6274         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6275         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6276         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6277         ///
6278         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6279         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6280         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6281         ///
6282         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6283         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6284         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6285         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6286         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6287         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6288         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6289         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6290                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6291         }
6292
6293         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6294         /// even type numbers.
6295         ///
6296         /// # Note
6297         ///
6298         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6299         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6300         ///
6301         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6302         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6303                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6304         }
6305
6306         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6307                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6308
6309                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6310
6311                 let mut sources = {
6312                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6313                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6314                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6315                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6316                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6317                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6318                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6319                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6320                                                 break;
6321                                         }
6322                                 }
6323
6324                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6325                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6326                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6327                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6328                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6329                                 });
6330                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6331                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6332                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6333                                                 &payment_hash);
6334                                 }
6335
6336                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6337                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6338                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6339                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6340                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6341                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6342                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6343                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6344                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6345                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6346                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6347                                                 }
6348                                                 return;
6349                                         }
6350                                 }
6351
6352                                 payment.htlcs
6353                         } else { return; }
6354                 };
6355                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6356
6357                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6358                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6359                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6360                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6361                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6362                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6363                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6364                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6365                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6366                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6367                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6368                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6369                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6370                                 debug_assert!(false);
6371                                 valid_mpp = false;
6372                                 break;
6373                         }
6374                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6375
6376                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6377                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6378                                 debug_assert!(false);
6379                                 valid_mpp = false;
6380                                 break;
6381                         }
6382                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6383                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6384                 }
6385                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6386                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6387                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6388                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6389                         return;
6390                 }
6391                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6392                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6393                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6394                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6395                         return;
6396                 }
6397                 if valid_mpp {
6398                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6399                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6400                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6401                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6402                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6403                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6404                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6405                                         }
6406                                 ) {
6407                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6408                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6409                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6410                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6411                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6412                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6413                                 }
6414                         }
6415                 }
6416                 if !valid_mpp {
6417                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6418                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6419                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6420                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6421                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6422                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6423                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6424                         }
6425                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6426                 }
6427
6428                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6429                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6430                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6431                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6432                 }
6433         }
6434
6435         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6436                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6437         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6438                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6439
6440                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6441                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6442                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6443                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6444
6445                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6446                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6447                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6448                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6449
6450                 {
6451                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6452                         let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6453                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6454                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6455                                 None => None
6456                         };
6457
6458                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6459                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6460                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6461                         ).unwrap_or(None);
6462
6463                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6464                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6465                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6466                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6467                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6468                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6469                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6470                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6471
6472                                                 match fulfill_res {
6473                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6474                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6475                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6476                                                                                 chan_id, action);
6477                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6478                                                                 }
6479                                                                 if !during_init {
6480                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6481                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6482                                                                 } else {
6483                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6484                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6485                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
6486                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6487                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6488                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
6489                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6490                                                                                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6491                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
6492                                                                                 });
6493                                                                 }
6494                                                         }
6495                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6496                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6497                                                                         action
6498                                                                 } else {
6499                                                                         return Ok(());
6500                                                                 };
6501                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6502
6503                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6504                                                                         chan_id, action);
6505                                                                 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6506                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6507                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6508                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6509                                                                         blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6510                                                                 } = action {
6511                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6512                                                                 } else {
6513                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
6514                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6515                                                                         return Ok(());
6516                                                                 };
6517                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6518                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6519                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6520                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6521                                                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6522                                                                         {
6523                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
6524                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6525                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6526                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
6527                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6528                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6529                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6530                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6531                                                                                 });
6532                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6533                                                                         }
6534                                                                 } else {
6535                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6536                                                                 }
6537                                                         }
6538                                                 }
6539                                         }
6540                                         return Ok(());
6541                                 }
6542                         }
6543                 }
6544                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6545                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6546                         counterparty_node_id: None,
6547                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6548                                 payment_preimage,
6549                         }],
6550                         channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6551                 };
6552
6553                 if !during_init {
6554                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6555                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6556                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6557                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6558                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6559                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6560                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6561                                 // again on restart.
6562                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6563                                         "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6564                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
6565                         }
6566                 } else {
6567                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6568                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6569                         // event.
6570                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6571                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6572                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6573                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6574                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6575                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6576                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6577                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6578                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6579                                         prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6580                                 )));
6581                 }
6582                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6583                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6584                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6585                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6586                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6587                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6588                 Ok(())
6589         }
6590
6591         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6592                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6593         }
6594
6595         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6596                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6597                 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6598                 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6599         ) {
6600                 match source {
6601                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6602                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6603                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6604                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6605                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6606                                 }
6607                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6608                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6609                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6610                                 };
6611                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6612                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6613                                         &self.logger);
6614                         },
6615                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6616                                 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6617                                 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6618                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6619                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6620                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6621                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6622                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6623                                                 let chan_to_release =
6624                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6625                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6626                                                         } else {
6627                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6628                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6629                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6630                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6631                                                                 // closed.
6632                                                                 None
6633                                                         };
6634
6635                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6636                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6637                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6638                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6639                                                         // in the background.
6640                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6641                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6642                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6643                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6644                                                                         match ev {
6645                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6646                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6647                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
6648                                                                                 } => {
6649                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6650                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6651                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6652                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6653                                                                                                         } = upd {
6654                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6655                                                                                                         } else { false }
6656                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
6657                                                                                                 true
6658                                                                                         } else { false }
6659                                                                                 },
6660                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6661                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6662                                                                                         (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6663                                                                                 ) => {
6664                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6665                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6666                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
6667                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
6668                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6669                                                                                                 ));
6670                                                                                                 true
6671                                                                                         } else { false }
6672                                                                                 },
6673                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6674                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
6675                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6676                                                                                         channel_id, ..
6677                                                                                 } =>
6678                                                                                         *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6679                                                                         }
6680                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6681                                                         }
6682                                                         None
6683                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6684                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6685                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6686                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6687                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6688                                                                         downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6689                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6690                                                                 })
6691                                                         } else { None }
6692                                                 } else {
6693                                                         let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6694                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6695                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6696                                                                 } else { None }
6697                                                         } else { None };
6698                                                         debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6699                                                                 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6700                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6701                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6702                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6703                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6704                                                                         prev_user_channel_id,
6705                                                                         next_user_channel_id,
6706                                                                         total_fee_earned_msat,
6707                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6708                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6709                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6710                                                                 },
6711                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6712                                                         })
6713                                                 }
6714                                         });
6715                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6716                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6717                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6718                                 }
6719                         },
6720                 }
6721         }
6722
6723         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6724         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6725                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6726         }
6727
6728         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6729                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6730                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6731                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6732
6733                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6734                         match action {
6735                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6736                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6737                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6738                                                 amount_msat,
6739                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
6740                                                 receiver_node_id,
6741                                                 htlcs,
6742                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6743                                         }) = payment {
6744                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6745                                                         payment_hash,
6746                                                         purpose,
6747                                                         amount_msat,
6748                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6749                                                         htlcs,
6750                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
6751                                                 }, None));
6752                                         }
6753                                 },
6754                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6755                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6756                                 } => {
6757                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6758                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6759                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6760                                         }
6761                                 },
6762                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6763                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6764                                 } => {
6765                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6766                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6767                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6768                                                 downstream_channel_id,
6769                                                 Some(blocking_action),
6770                                         );
6771                                 },
6772                         }
6773                 }
6774         }
6775
6776         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6777         /// update completion.
6778         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6779                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6780                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6781                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6782                 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6783                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6784         -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6785                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6786                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6787                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
6788                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6789                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6790                         pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6791                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6792                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6793                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6794
6795                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6796                 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6797
6798                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6799                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6800                         htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6801                                 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6802                 }
6803                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6804                 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6805                         decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6806                 }
6807
6808                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6809                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6810                 }
6811                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6812                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6813                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6814                                 msg,
6815                         });
6816                 }
6817
6818                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6819                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6820                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6821                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6822                                         updates: update,
6823                                 });
6824                         }
6825                 } }
6826                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6827                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6828                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6829                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6830                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
6831                                 });
6832                         }
6833                 } }
6834                 match order {
6835                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6836                                 handle_cs!();
6837                                 handle_raa!();
6838                         },
6839                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6840                                 handle_raa!();
6841                                 handle_cs!();
6842                         },
6843                 }
6844
6845                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6846                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6847                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6848                 }
6849
6850                 {
6851                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6852                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6853                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6854                 }
6855
6856                 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6857         }
6858
6859         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6860                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6861
6862                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6863                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6864                         None => {
6865                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6866                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6867                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6868                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6869                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6870                                         None => return,
6871                                 }
6872                         }
6873                 };
6874                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6875                 let mut peer_state_lock;
6876                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6877                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6878                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6879                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6880                 let channel =
6881                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6882                                 chan
6883                         } else {
6884                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6885                                         .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6886                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6887                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6888                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6889                                 return;
6890                         };
6891                 let remaining_in_flight =
6892                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6893                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6894                                 pending.len()
6895                         } else { 0 };
6896                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6897                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6898                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6899                         remaining_in_flight);
6900                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6901                         return;
6902                 }
6903                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6904         }
6905
6906         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6907         ///
6908         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6909         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6910         /// the channel.
6911         ///
6912         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6913         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6914         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6915         ///
6916         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6917         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6918         /// used to accept such channels.
6919         ///
6920         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6921         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6922         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6923                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6924         }
6925
6926         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6927         /// it as confirmed immediately.
6928         ///
6929         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6930         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6931         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6932         ///
6933         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6934         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6935         ///
6936         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6937         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6938         ///
6939         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6940         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6941         ///
6942         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6943         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6944         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6945                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6946         }
6947
6948         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6949
6950                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6951                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6952
6953                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6954                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6955                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6956                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6957                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6958                         let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6959                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6960
6961                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6962                 })?;
6963                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6964                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6965                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6966
6967                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6968                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6969                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6970                 // succeed.
6971                 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6972                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6973                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6974                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6975                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6976                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6977                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6978                         },
6979                         _ => {
6980                                 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6981                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6982
6983                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6984                         }
6985                 };
6986
6987                 match res {
6988                         Err(err) => {
6989                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6990                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6991                                 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6992                                         Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6993                                         Err(e) => {
6994                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6995                                         },
6996                                 }
6997                         }
6998                         Ok(mut channel) => {
6999                                 if accept_0conf {
7000                                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
7001                                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
7002                                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
7003                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7004                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7005                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7006                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
7007                                                 }
7008                                         };
7009                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7010                                         let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
7011                                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7012
7013                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7014                                 } else {
7015                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7016                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7017                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7018                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
7019                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7020                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7021                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7022                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
7023                                                         }
7024                                                 };
7025                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7026                                                 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7027                                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7028
7029                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7030                                         }
7031                                 }
7032
7033                                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7034                                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7035                                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7036
7037                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7038                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7039                                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7040                                 });
7041
7042                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7043
7044                                 Ok(())
7045                         },
7046                 }
7047         }
7048
7049         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7050         /// or 0-conf channels.
7051         ///
7052         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7053         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7054         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7055         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7056                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7057                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7058                 {
7059                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7060                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7061                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7062                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7063                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7064                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7065                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7066                                 }
7067                         }
7068                 }
7069                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7070         }
7071
7072         fn unfunded_channel_count(
7073                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7074         ) -> usize {
7075                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7076                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7077                         match phase {
7078                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7079                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7080                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7081                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7082                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7083                                         {
7084                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7085                                         }
7086                                 },
7087                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7088                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7089                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7090                                         }
7091                                 },
7092                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7093                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7094                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7095                                         // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7096                                         // included in the unfunded count.
7097                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7098                                                 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7099                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7100                                         }
7101                                 },
7102                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7103                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7104                                         continue;
7105                                 },
7106                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7107                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7108                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7109                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7110                                         continue;
7111                                 }
7112                         }
7113                 }
7114                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7115         }
7116
7117         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7118                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7119                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7120                 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7121                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7122                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7123                 }
7124
7125                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7126                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7127                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7128                 }
7129
7130                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7131                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7132                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7133                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7134                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7135
7136                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7137                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7138                     .ok_or_else(|| {
7139                                 debug_assert!(false);
7140                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7141                                         format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7142                                         msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7143                         })?;
7144                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7145                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7146
7147                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7148                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7149                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7150                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7151                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7152                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7153                 {
7154                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7155                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7156                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7157                 }
7158
7159                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7160                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7161                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7162                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7163                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7164                 }
7165
7166                 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7167                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7168                 if channel_exists {
7169                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7170                                 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7171                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7172                 }
7173
7174                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7175                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7176                         let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7177                                         &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7178                                 ).map_err(|e|
7179                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7180                                 )?;
7181                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7182                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7183                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7184                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7185                                 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7186                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7187                                 channel_type,
7188                         }, None));
7189                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7190                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7191                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7192                         });
7193                         return Ok(());
7194                 }
7195
7196                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7197                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7198                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7199                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7200                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7201                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7202                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7203                 {
7204                         Err(e) => {
7205                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7206                         },
7207                         Ok(res) => res
7208                 };
7209
7210                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7211                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7212                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7213                                 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7214                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7215                 }
7216                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7217                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7218                                 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7219                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7220                 }
7221
7222                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7223                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7224
7225                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7226                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7227                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7228                 });
7229                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7230                 Ok(())
7231         }
7232
7233         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7234                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7235                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7236                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7237                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7238                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7239                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7240                                         debug_assert!(false);
7241                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7242                                 })?;
7243                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7244                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7245                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7246                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7247                                         match phase.get_mut() {
7248                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7249                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7250                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7251                                                 },
7252                                                 _ => {
7253                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7254                                                 }
7255                                         }
7256                                 },
7257                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7258                         }
7259                 };
7260                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7261                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7262                         temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7263                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7264                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
7265                         output_script,
7266                         user_channel_id: user_id,
7267                 }, None));
7268                 Ok(())
7269         }
7270
7271         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7272                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7273
7274                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7275                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7276                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7277                                 debug_assert!(false);
7278                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7279                         })?;
7280
7281                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7282                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7283                 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7284                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7285                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7286                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7287                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7288                                                 Ok(res) => res,
7289                                                 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7290                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7291                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7292                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7293                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7294                                                         // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7295                                                         // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7296                                                         // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7297                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7298                                                 },
7299                                         }
7300                                 },
7301                                 Some(mut phase) => {
7302                                         let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7303                                         let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7304                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7305                                 },
7306                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7307                         };
7308
7309                 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7310
7311                 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7312                         // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7313                         // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7314                         // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7315                         // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7316                         // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7317                         // on the channel.
7318                         let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7319                         chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7320                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7321                 } } }
7322
7323                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7324                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7325                                 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7326                         },
7327                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7328                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7329                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7330                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7331                                                 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7332                                         },
7333                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7334                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7335                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7336                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7337                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7338
7339                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7340                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7341                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7342                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
7343                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7344                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7345                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7346                                                                         msg,
7347                                                                 });
7348                                                         }
7349
7350                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7351                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7352                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7353                                                         } else {
7354                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7355                                                         }
7356                                                         Ok(())
7357                                                 } else {
7358                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7359                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7360                                                         fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7361                                                 }
7362                                         }
7363                                 }
7364                         }
7365                 }
7366         }
7367
7368         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7369                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7370                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7371                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7372                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7373                                 debug_assert!(false);
7374                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7375                         })?;
7376
7377                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7378                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7379                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7380                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7381                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7382                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7383                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
7384                                                 &self.logger,
7385                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7386                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7387                                         );
7388                                         let res =
7389                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7390                                         match res {
7391                                                 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7392                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7393                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7394                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7395                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7396                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7397                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7398                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7399                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7400                                                                 Ok(())
7401                                                         } else {
7402                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7403                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7404                                                                 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7405                                                                 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7406                                                                 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7407                                                                 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7408                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7409                                                         }
7410                                                 },
7411                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
7412                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7413                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7414                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7415                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7416                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7417                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7418                                                 }
7419                                         }
7420                                 } else {
7421                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7422                                 }
7423                         },
7424                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7425                 }
7426         }
7427
7428         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7429                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7430                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7431                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7432                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7433                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7434                                 debug_assert!(false);
7435                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7436                         })?;
7437                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7438                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7439                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7440                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7441                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7442                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7443                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7444                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7445                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7446                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7447                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7448                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7449                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
7450                                                 });
7451                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7452                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7453                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7454                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7455                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7456                                                 // announcement_signatures.
7457                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7458                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7459                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7460                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7461                                                                 msg,
7462                                                         });
7463                                                 }
7464                                         }
7465
7466                                         {
7467                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7468                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7469                                         }
7470
7471                                         Ok(())
7472                                 } else {
7473                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7474                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7475                                 }
7476                         },
7477                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7478                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7479                         }
7480                 }
7481         }
7482
7483         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7484                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7485                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7486                 {
7487                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7488                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7489                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7490                                         debug_assert!(false);
7491                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7492                                 })?;
7493                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7494                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7495                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7496                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7497                                 match phase {
7498                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7499                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7500                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7501                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7502                                                                 msg.channel_id,
7503                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7504                                                 }
7505
7506                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7507                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7508                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7509                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7510
7511                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7512                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7513                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7514                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7515                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7516                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7517                                                                 msg,
7518                                                         });
7519                                                 }
7520                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7521                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7522                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7523                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7524                                                 }
7525                                         },
7526                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7527                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7528                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7529                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7530                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7531                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7532                                         },
7533                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7534                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7535                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7536                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7537                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7538                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7539                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7540                                         },
7541                                 }
7542                         } else {
7543                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7544                         }
7545                 }
7546                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7547                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7548                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7549                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7550                 }
7551                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7552                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7553                 }
7554
7555                 Ok(())
7556         }
7557
7558         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7559                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7560                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7561                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7562                                 debug_assert!(false);
7563                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7564                         })?;
7565                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7566                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7567                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7568                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7569                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7570                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7571                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7572                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7573                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7574                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7575                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7576                                                                 msg,
7577                                                         });
7578                                                 }
7579                                                 if tx.is_some() {
7580                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7581                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7582                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7583                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7584                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7585                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7586                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7587                                         } else {
7588                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7589                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7590                                         }
7591                                 },
7592                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7593                         }
7594                 };
7595                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7596                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7597                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7598                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7599                 }
7600                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7601                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7602                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7603                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7604                                         msg: update
7605                                 });
7606                         }
7607                 }
7608                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7609                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7610                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7611                 }
7612                 Ok(())
7613         }
7614
7615         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7616                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7617                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7618                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7619                 //
7620                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7621                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7622                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7623                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7624
7625                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7626                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7627
7628                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7629                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7630                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7631                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7632                                 debug_assert!(false);
7633                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7634                         })?;
7635                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7636                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7637                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7638                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7639                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7640                                         let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7641                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7642                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7643                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7644                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7645                                                         ),
7646                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7647                                         };
7648                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7649                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7650                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7651                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7652                                         if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7653                                                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7654                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7655                                                                 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7656                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7657                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7658                                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7659                                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7660                                                                 }
7661                                                         ))
7662                                                 } else {
7663                                                         match pending_forward_info {
7664                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7665                                                                         ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7666                                                                 }) => {
7667                                                                         let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7668                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7669                                                                         } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7670                                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7671                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7672                                                                         } else {
7673                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7674                                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7675                                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7676                                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7677                                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7678                                                                                 reason
7679                                                                         };
7680                                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7681                                                                 },
7682                                                                 _ => {},
7683                                                         }
7684                                                 }
7685                                         }
7686                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7687                                 } else {
7688                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7689                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7690                                 }
7691                         },
7692                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7693                 }
7694                 Ok(())
7695         }
7696
7697         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7698                 let funding_txo;
7699                 let next_user_channel_id;
7700                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7701                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7702                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7703                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7704                                         debug_assert!(false);
7705                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7706                                 })?;
7707                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7708                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7709                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7710                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7711                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7712                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7713                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7714                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7715                                                         log_trace!(logger,
7716                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7717                                                                 msg.channel_id);
7718                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7719                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7720                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7721                                                 }
7722                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7723                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7724                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7725                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7726                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7727                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7728                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7729                                                 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7730                                                 res
7731                                         } else {
7732                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7733                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7734                                         }
7735                                 },
7736                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7737                         }
7738                 };
7739                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7740                         Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7741                         funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7742                 );
7743
7744                 Ok(())
7745         }
7746
7747         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7748                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7749                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7750                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7751                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7752                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7753                                 debug_assert!(false);
7754                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7755                         })?;
7756                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7757                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7758                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7759                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7760                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7761                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7762                                 } else {
7763                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7764                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7765                                 }
7766                         },
7767                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7768                 }
7769                 Ok(())
7770         }
7771
7772         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7773                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7774                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7775                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7776                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7777                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7778                                 debug_assert!(false);
7779                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7780                         })?;
7781                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7782                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7783                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7784                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7785                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7786                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7787                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7788                                 }
7789                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7790                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7791                                 } else {
7792                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7793                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7794                                 }
7795                                 Ok(())
7796                         },
7797                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7798                 }
7799         }
7800
7801         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7802                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7803                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7804                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7805                                 debug_assert!(false);
7806                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7807                         })?;
7808                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7809                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7810                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7811                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7812                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7813                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7814                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7815                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7816                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7817                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7818                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7819                                         }
7820                                         Ok(())
7821                                 } else {
7822                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7823                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7824                                 }
7825                         },
7826                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7827                 }
7828         }
7829
7830         fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7831                 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7832                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7833                 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7834                 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7835                 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7836                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7837                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7838                 }
7839                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7840         }
7841
7842         #[inline]
7843         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7844                 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7845                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7846         }
7847
7848         #[inline]
7849         fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7850                 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7851                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7852                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7853                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7854                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7855                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7856                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7857                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7858                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7859                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7860                                         };
7861                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7862                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7863
7864                                         let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7865                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7866                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7867                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7868                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7869                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7870                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7871                                                 },
7872                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7873                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7874                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7875                                                         {
7876                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7877                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7878                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7879                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7880                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7881                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7882                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7883                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7884                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7885                                                                                         intercept_id
7886                                                                                 }, None));
7887                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7888                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7889                                                                         },
7890                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7891                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7892                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7893                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7894                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7895                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7896                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7897                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7898                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7899                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7900                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
7901                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7902                                                                                 });
7903
7904                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7905                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7906                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7907                                                                                 ));
7908                                                                         }
7909                                                                 }
7910                                                         } else {
7911                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7912                                                                 // payments are being processed.
7913                                                                 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7914                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7915                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7916                                                         }
7917                                                 }
7918                                         }
7919                                 }
7920                         }
7921
7922                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7923                                 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7924                         }
7925
7926                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7927                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7928                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7929                         }
7930                 }
7931                 push_forward_event
7932         }
7933
7934         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7935                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7936                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7937                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7938                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7939                 ).count();
7940                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7941                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7942                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7943                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7944                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7945                 // real by taking more time.
7946                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7947                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7948                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7949                         }, None));
7950                 }
7951         }
7952
7953         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7954         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7955         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7956         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7957         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7958                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7959                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7960         ) -> bool {
7961                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7962                         .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7963                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7964                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7965                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
7966                                 channel_id,
7967                                 counterparty_node_id,
7968                         })
7969                 })
7970         }
7971
7972         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7973         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7974                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7975         ) -> bool {
7976                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7977                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7978                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7979                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7980
7981                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7982                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7983                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7984                         }
7985                 }
7986                 false
7987         }
7988
7989         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7990                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7991                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7992                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7993                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7994                                         debug_assert!(false);
7995                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7996                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7997                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7998                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7999                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8000                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8001                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8002                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8003                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
8004                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
8005                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
8006                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
8007                                                 } else { false };
8008                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
8009                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
8010                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
8011                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
8012                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
8013                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
8014                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8015                                                 }
8016                                                 htlcs_to_fail
8017                                         } else {
8018                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8019                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8020                                         }
8021                                 },
8022                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8023                         }
8024                 };
8025                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8026                 Ok(())
8027         }
8028
8029         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8030                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8031                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8032                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8033                                 debug_assert!(false);
8034                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8035                         })?;
8036                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8037                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8038                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8039                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8040                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8041                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8042                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8043                                 } else {
8044                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8045                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8046                                 }
8047                         },
8048                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8049                 }
8050                 Ok(())
8051         }
8052
8053         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8054                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8055                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8056                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8057                                 debug_assert!(false);
8058                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8059                         })?;
8060                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8061                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8062                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8063                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8064                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8065                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8066                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8067                                         }
8068
8069                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8070                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8071                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8072                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
8073                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
8074                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8075                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8076                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8077                                         });
8078                                 } else {
8079                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8080                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8081                                 }
8082                         },
8083                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8084                 }
8085                 Ok(())
8086         }
8087
8088         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8089         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8090                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8091                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8092                         None => {
8093                                 // It's not a local channel
8094                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8095                         }
8096                 };
8097                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8098                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8099                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8100                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8101                 }
8102                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8103                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8104                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8105                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8106                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8107                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8108                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8109                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8110                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8111                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8112                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8113                                                 }
8114                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8115                                         }
8116                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8117                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8118                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8119                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8120                                         } else {
8121                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8122                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8123                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8124                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8125                                                 // persisting.
8126                                                 if !did_change {
8127                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8128                                                 }
8129                                         }
8130                                 } else {
8131                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8132                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8133                                 }
8134                         },
8135                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8136                 }
8137                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8138         }
8139
8140         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8141                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8142                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8143
8144                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8145                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
8146                                         debug_assert!(false);
8147                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8148                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8149                                                 msg.channel_id
8150                                         )
8151                                 })?;
8152                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
8153                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8154                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8155                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8156                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8157                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8158                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8159                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8160                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8161                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8162                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8163                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8164                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8165                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
8166                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8167                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8168                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8169                                                                 msg,
8170                                                         });
8171                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8172                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8173                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8174                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
8175                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8176                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8177                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8178                                                                         msg,
8179                                                                 });
8180                                                         }
8181                                                 }
8182                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8183                                                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8184                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8185                                                         Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8186                                                 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8187                                                 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8188                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8189                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8190                                                 }
8191                                                 need_lnd_workaround
8192                                         } else {
8193                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8194                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8195                                         }
8196                                 },
8197                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8198                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8199                                                 msg.channel_id);
8200                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8201                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8202                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8203                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8204                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8205                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8206                                         //
8207                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8208                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8209                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8210                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8211                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8212                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8213                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8214                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8215                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8216                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8217                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8218                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8219                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8220                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8221                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8222                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
8223                                                 },
8224                                         });
8225                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8226                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8227                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8228                                         )
8229                                 }
8230                         }
8231                 };
8232
8233                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8234                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8235                 }
8236                 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8237         }
8238
8239         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8240         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8241                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8242
8243                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8244                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8245                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8246                 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8247                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8248                                 match monitor_event {
8249                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8250                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8251                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8252                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8253                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8254                                                                 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8255                                                                 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8256                                                 } else {
8257                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8258                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8259                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8260                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8261                                                 }
8262                                         },
8263                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8264                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8265                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8266                                                         None => {
8267                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8268                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8269                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8270                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8271                                                         }
8272                                                 };
8273                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8274                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8275                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8276                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8277                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8278                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8279                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8280                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8281                                                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8282                                                                                         reason
8283                                                                                 } else {
8284                                                                                         ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8285                                                                                 };
8286                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8287                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8288                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8289                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8290                                                                                                 msg: update
8291                                                                                         });
8292                                                                                 }
8293                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8294                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8295                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8296                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8297                                                                                         },
8298                                                                                 });
8299                                                                         }
8300                                                                 }
8301                                                         }
8302                                                 }
8303                                         },
8304                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8305                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8306                                         },
8307                                 }
8308                         }
8309                 }
8310
8311                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8312                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8313                 }
8314
8315                 has_pending_monitor_events
8316         }
8317
8318         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8319         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8320         /// update events as a separate process method here.
8321         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
8322         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8323                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8324                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8325         }
8326
8327         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8328         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8329         /// update was applied.
8330         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8331                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8332                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8333
8334                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8335                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8336                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8337                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8338                 'peer_loop: loop {
8339                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8340                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8341                                 'chan_loop: loop {
8342                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8343                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8344                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8345                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8346                                         ) {
8347                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8348                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8349                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8350                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8351                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8352                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8353                                                 }
8354                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8355                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
8356
8357                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8358                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8359                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
8360                                                 }
8361                                         }
8362                                         break 'chan_loop;
8363                                 }
8364                         }
8365                         break 'peer_loop;
8366                 }
8367
8368                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8369                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8370                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8371                 }
8372
8373                 has_update
8374         }
8375
8376         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8377         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8378         ///
8379         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8380         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8381         ///
8382         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8383         #[cfg(async_signing)]
8384         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8385                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8386
8387                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8388                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8389                         match phase {
8390                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8391                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8392                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8393                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8394                                                         node_id,
8395                                                         updates,
8396                                                 });
8397                                         }
8398                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8399                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8400                                                         node_id,
8401                                                         msg,
8402                                                 });
8403                                         }
8404                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8405                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8406                                         }
8407                                 }
8408                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8409                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8410                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8411                                                         node_id,
8412                                                         msg,
8413                                                 });
8414                                         }
8415                                 }
8416                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8417                         }
8418                 };
8419
8420                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8421                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8422                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8423                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8424                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8425                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8426                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8427                                 }
8428                         }
8429                 } else {
8430                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8431                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8432                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8433                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8434                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8435                                 }
8436                         }
8437                 }
8438         }
8439
8440         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8441         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8442         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8443         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8444                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8445                 let mut has_update = false;
8446                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8447                 {
8448                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8449
8450                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8451                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8452                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8453                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8454                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8455                                         match phase {
8456                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8457                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8458                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8459                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8460                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8461                                                                                 has_update = true;
8462                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8463                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8464                                                                                 });
8465                                                                         }
8466                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8467                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8468                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8469                                                                         }
8470                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8471                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8472                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8473                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8474                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8475                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8476                                                                                                 msg: update
8477                                                                                         });
8478                                                                                 }
8479
8480                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8481                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8482                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8483                                                                                 false
8484                                                                         } else { true }
8485                                                                 },
8486                                                                 Err(e) => {
8487                                                                         has_update = true;
8488                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8489                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8490                                                                         !close_channel
8491                                                                 }
8492                                                         }
8493                                                 },
8494                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8495                                         }
8496                                 });
8497                         }
8498                 }
8499
8500                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8501                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8502                 }
8503
8504                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8505                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8506                 }
8507
8508                 has_update
8509         }
8510
8511         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8512         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8513         /// Channel object.
8514         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8515                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8516                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8517                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8518                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
8519                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8520                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8521                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8522                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8523                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8524                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8525                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8526                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
8527                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
8528                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8529                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8530                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8531                                         });
8532                         }
8533                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8534                 }
8535         }
8536 }
8537
8538 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8539         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8540         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8541         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8542         ///
8543         /// # Privacy
8544         ///
8545         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8546         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8547         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8548         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8549         /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8550         ///
8551         /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8552         ///
8553         /// # Limitations
8554         ///
8555         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8556         /// reply path.
8557         ///
8558         /// # Errors
8559         ///
8560         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8561         ///
8562         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8563         ///
8564         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8565         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8566         pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8567                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8568                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8569                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8570                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8571
8572                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8573                 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8574                         node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8575                 )
8576                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8577                         .path(path);
8578
8579                 Ok(builder.into())
8580         }
8581 } }
8582
8583 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8584         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8585         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8586         ///
8587         /// # Payment
8588         ///
8589         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8590         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8591         ///
8592         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8593         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8594         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8595         /// expired.
8596         ///
8597         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8598         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8599         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8600         ///
8601         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8602         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8603         ///
8604         /// # Privacy
8605         ///
8606         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8607         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8608         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8609         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8610         /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8611         ///
8612         /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8613         ///
8614         /// # Limitations
8615         ///
8616         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8617         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8618         ///
8619         /// # Errors
8620         ///
8621         /// Errors if:
8622         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8623         /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8624         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8625         ///
8626         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8627         ///
8628         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8629         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8630         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8631         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8632         pub fn create_refund_builder(
8633                 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8634                 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8635         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8636                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8637                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8638                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8639                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8640
8641                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8642                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8643                         node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8644                 )?
8645                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8646                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8647                         .path(path);
8648
8649                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8650
8651                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8652                 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8653                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8654                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8655                         )
8656                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8657
8658                 Ok(builder.into())
8659         }
8660 } }
8661
8662 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8663 where
8664         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8665         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8666         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8667         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8668         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8669         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8670         R::Target: Router,
8671         L::Target: Logger,
8672 {
8673         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8674         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8675         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8676         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8677
8678         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8679         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8680         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8681         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8682
8683         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8684         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8685         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8686         ///
8687         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8688         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8689         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8690         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8691         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8692         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8693         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8694         ///
8695         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8696         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8697         ///
8698         /// # Payment
8699         ///
8700         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8701         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8702         /// been sent.
8703         ///
8704         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8705         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8706         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8707         ///
8708         /// # Privacy
8709         ///
8710         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8711         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8712         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8713         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8714         ///
8715         /// # Limitations
8716         ///
8717         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8718         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8719         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8720         ///
8721         /// # Errors
8722         ///
8723         /// Errors if:
8724         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8725         /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8726         /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8727         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8728         ///   request.
8729         ///
8730         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8731         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8732         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8733         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8734         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8735         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8736         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8737         pub fn pay_for_offer(
8738                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8739                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8740                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8741         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8742                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8743                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8744                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8745
8746                 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8747                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8748                         .into();
8749                 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8750
8751                 let builder = match quantity {
8752                         None => builder,
8753                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8754                 };
8755                 let builder = match amount_msats {
8756                         None => builder,
8757                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8758                 };
8759                 let builder = match payer_note {
8760                         None => builder,
8761                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8762                 };
8763                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8764                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8765
8766                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8767
8768                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8769                 self.pending_outbound_payments
8770                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8771                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8772                         )
8773                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8774
8775                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8776                 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8777                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8778                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8779                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8780                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8781                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8782                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8783                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8784                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8785                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8786                                 );
8787                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8788                         }
8789                 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8790                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8791                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8792                                 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8793                                 Some(reply_path),
8794                         );
8795                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8796                 } else {
8797                         debug_assert!(false);
8798                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8799                 }
8800
8801                 Ok(())
8802         }
8803
8804         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8805         /// message.
8806         ///
8807         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8808         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8809         /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8810         ///
8811         /// # Limitations
8812         ///
8813         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8814         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8815         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8816         /// received and no retries will be made.
8817         ///
8818         /// # Errors
8819         ///
8820         /// Errors if:
8821         /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8822         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8823         ///   the invoice.
8824         ///
8825         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8826         pub fn request_refund_payment(
8827                 &self, refund: &Refund
8828         ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8829                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8830                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8831                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8832
8833                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8834                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8835
8836                 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8837                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8838                 }
8839
8840                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8841
8842                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8843                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8844                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8845                                 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8846                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8847                                 )
8848                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8849
8850                                 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8851                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8852                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8853                                 )?;
8854                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8855                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8856                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8857                                 );
8858                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8859                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8860                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8861                                 )?;
8862                                 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8863                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8864                                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8865                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8866
8867                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8868                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8869                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8870                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8871                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8872                                                 Some(reply_path),
8873                                         );
8874                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8875                                 } else {
8876                                         for path in refund.paths() {
8877                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8878                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8879                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8880                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8881                                                 );
8882                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8883                                         }
8884                                 }
8885
8886                                 Ok(invoice)
8887                         },
8888                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8889                 }
8890         }
8891
8892         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8893         /// to pay us.
8894         ///
8895         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8896         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8897         ///
8898         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8899         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8900         /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8901         ///
8902         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8903         ///
8904         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8905         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8906         ///
8907         /// # Note
8908         ///
8909         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8910         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8911         ///
8912         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8913         ///
8914         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8915         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8916         ///
8917         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8918         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8919         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8920         /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8921         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8922         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8923                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8924                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8925                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8926                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8927         }
8928
8929         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8930         /// stored external to LDK.
8931         ///
8932         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8933         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8934         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8935         ///
8936         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8937         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8938         /// payments.
8939         ///
8940         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8941         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8942         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8943         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8944         ///
8945         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8946         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8947         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8948         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8949         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8950         ///
8951         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8952         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8953         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8954         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8955         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8956         ///
8957         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8958         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8959         ///
8960         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8961         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8962         ///
8963         /// # Note
8964         ///
8965         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8966         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8967         ///
8968         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8969         ///
8970         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8971         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8972         ///
8973         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8974         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8975         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8976                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8977                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8978                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8979                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
8980         }
8981
8982         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8983         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8984         ///
8985         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8986         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8987                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8988         }
8989
8990         /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8991         ///
8992         /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8993         fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8994                 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8995                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8996
8997                 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8998                         .iter()
8999                         .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
9000                         .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
9001                         .collect::<Vec<_>>();
9002
9003                 self.router
9004                         .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
9005                         .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
9006         }
9007
9008         /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
9009         /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
9010         fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
9011                 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
9012         ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
9013                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9014
9015                 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
9016                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
9017                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
9018                         + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
9019                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
9020                         payment_secret,
9021                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
9022                                 max_cltv_expiry,
9023                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
9024                         },
9025                         payment_context,
9026                 };
9027                 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9028                         payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9029                 )
9030         }
9031
9032         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9033         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9034         ///
9035         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9036         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9037                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9038                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9039                 loop {
9040                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9041                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9042                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9043                                 Some(_) => continue,
9044                                 None => return scid_candidate
9045                         }
9046                 }
9047         }
9048
9049         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9050         ///
9051         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9052         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9053                 PhantomRouteHints {
9054                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9055                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9056                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9057                 }
9058         }
9059
9060         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9061         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9062         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9063         ///
9064         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9065         /// times to get a unique scid.
9066         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9067                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9068                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9069                 loop {
9070                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9071                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9072                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9073                         return scid_candidate
9074                 }
9075         }
9076
9077         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9078         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9079         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9080                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9081
9082                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9083                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9084                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9085                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9086                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9087                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9088                         ) {
9089                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9090                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9091                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9092                                         }
9093                                 }
9094                         }
9095                 }
9096
9097                 inflight_htlcs
9098         }
9099
9100         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9101         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9102                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9103                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9104                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9105                 events.into_inner()
9106         }
9107
9108         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9109         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9110                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9111                 events.push_back((event, None));
9112         }
9113
9114         #[cfg(test)]
9115         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9116                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9117                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9118         }
9119
9120         #[cfg(test)]
9121         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9122                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9123         }
9124
9125         #[cfg(test)]
9126         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9127                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9128         }
9129
9130         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9131         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9132         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9133         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9134         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9135                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9136                 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9137
9138                 let logger = WithContext::from(
9139                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
9140                 );
9141                 loop {
9142                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9143                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9144                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9145                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9146                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9147                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9148                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9149                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9150                                         {
9151                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9152                                         }
9153                                 }
9154
9155                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9156                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9157                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9158                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9159                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9160                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9161                                                 &channel_id);
9162                                         break;
9163                                 }
9164
9165                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9166                                         channel_id) {
9167                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9168                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9169                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9170                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9171                                                                 channel_id);
9172                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9173                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9174                                                         if further_update_exists {
9175                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9176                                                                 // top of the loop.
9177                                                                 continue;
9178                                                         }
9179                                                 } else {
9180                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9181                                                                 channel_id);
9182                                                 }
9183                                         }
9184                                 }
9185                         } else {
9186                                 log_debug!(logger,
9187                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9188                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9189                         }
9190                         break;
9191                 }
9192         }
9193
9194         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9195                 for action in actions {
9196                         match action {
9197                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9198                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9199                                 } => {
9200                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9201                                 }
9202                         }
9203                 }
9204         }
9205
9206         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9207         /// using the given event handler.
9208         ///
9209         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9210         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9211                 &self, handler: H
9212         ) {
9213                 let mut ev;
9214                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9215         }
9216 }
9217
9218 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9219 where
9220         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9221         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9222         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9223         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9224         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9225         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9226         R::Target: Router,
9227         L::Target: Logger,
9228 {
9229         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9230         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9231         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9232         /// is always placed next to each other.
9233         ///
9234         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9235         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9236         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9237         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9238         ///
9239         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9240         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9241         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9242         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9243                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9244                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9245                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9246
9247                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9248                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9249                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9250                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9251                         }
9252
9253                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9254                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9255                         }
9256                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9257                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9258                         }
9259
9260                         let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9261                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9262                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9263                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9264                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9265                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9266                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9267                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9268                                 }
9269                                 if peer_state.is_connected {
9270                                         is_any_peer_connected = true
9271                                 }
9272                         }
9273
9274                         // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9275                         if is_any_peer_connected {
9276                                 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9277                                 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9278                         }
9279
9280                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9281                                 events.replace(pending_events);
9282                         }
9283
9284                         result
9285                 });
9286                 events.into_inner()
9287         }
9288 }
9289
9290 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9291 where
9292         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9293         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9294         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9295         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9296         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9297         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9298         R::Target: Router,
9299         L::Target: Logger,
9300 {
9301         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9302         ///
9303         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9304         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9305         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9306                 let mut ev;
9307                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9308         }
9309 }
9310
9311 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9312 where
9313         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9314         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9315         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9316         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9317         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9318         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9319         R::Target: Router,
9320         L::Target: Logger,
9321 {
9322         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9323                 {
9324                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9325                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9326                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9327                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9328                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9329                 }
9330
9331                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9332                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9333         }
9334
9335         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9336                 let _persistence_guard =
9337                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9338                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9339                 let new_height = height - 1;
9340                 {
9341                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9342                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9343                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9344                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9345                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9346                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9347                 }
9348
9349                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9350         }
9351 }
9352
9353 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9354 where
9355         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9356         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9357         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9358         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9359         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9360         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9361         R::Target: Router,
9362         L::Target: Logger,
9363 {
9364         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9365                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9366                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9367                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9368
9369                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9370                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9371
9372                 let _persistence_guard =
9373                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9374                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9375                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9376                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9377
9378                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9379                 if height < last_best_block_height {
9380                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9381                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9382                 }
9383         }
9384
9385         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9386                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9387                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9388                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9389
9390                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9391                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9392
9393                 let _persistence_guard =
9394                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9395                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9396                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9397
9398                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9399
9400                 macro_rules! max_time {
9401                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
9402                                 loop {
9403                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9404                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9405                                         // having an explicit local time source.
9406                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9407                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9408                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9409                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9410                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9411                                                 break;
9412                                         }
9413                                 }
9414                         }
9415                 }
9416                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9417                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9418                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9419                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9420                 });
9421         }
9422
9423         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9424                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9425                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9426                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9427                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9428                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9429                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9430                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9431                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9432                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9433                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9434                                 }
9435                         }
9436                 }
9437                 res
9438         }
9439
9440         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9441                 let _persistence_guard =
9442                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9443                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9444                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9445                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9446                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9447                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9448                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9449                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9450                 });
9451         }
9452 }
9453
9454 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9455 where
9456         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9457         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9458         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9459         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9460         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9461         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9462         R::Target: Router,
9463         L::Target: Logger,
9464 {
9465         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9466         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9467         /// the function.
9468         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9469                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9470                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9471                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9472                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9473
9474                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9475                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9476                 {
9477                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9478                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9479                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9480                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9481                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9482
9483                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9484                                         match phase {
9485                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
9486                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9487                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9488                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9489                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9490                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9491                                                         let res = f(channel);
9492                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9493                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9494                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9495                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9496                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9497                                                                 }
9498                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9499                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9500                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9501                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
9502                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9503                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9504                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9505                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9506                                                                                                 msg,
9507                                                                                         });
9508                                                                                 }
9509                                                                         } else {
9510                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9511                                                                         }
9512                                                                 }
9513
9514                                                                 {
9515                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9516                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9517                                                                 }
9518
9519                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9520                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9521                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9522                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9523                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
9524                                                                         });
9525                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9526                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9527                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9528                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
9529                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9530                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9531                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9532                                                                                         });
9533                                                                                 }
9534                                                                         }
9535                                                                 }
9536                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9537                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9538                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9539                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9540                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9541                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9542                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9543                                                                                 // is always consistent.
9544                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9545                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9546                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9547                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9548                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9549                                                                         }
9550                                                                 }
9551                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9552                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9553                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9554                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9555                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9556                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9557                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9558                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9559                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9560                                                                                 msg: update
9561                                                                         });
9562                                                                 }
9563                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9564                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9565                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9566                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9567                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9568                                                                                         data: reason_message,
9569                                                                                 })
9570                                                                         },
9571                                                                 });
9572                                                                 return false;
9573                                                         }
9574                                                         true
9575                                                 }
9576                                         }
9577                                 });
9578                         }
9579                 }
9580
9581                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9582                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9583                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9584                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9585                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9586                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9587                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9588                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9589                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9590                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9591
9592                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9593                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9594                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9595                                                 false
9596                                         } else { true }
9597                                 });
9598                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9599                         });
9600
9601                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9602                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9603                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9604                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9605                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9606                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9607                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9608                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9609                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9610                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9611                                                 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9612                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9613                                         });
9614
9615                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9616                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9617                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
9618                                         };
9619                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9620                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9621                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9622                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
9623                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9624                                         );
9625                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9626                                         false
9627                                 } else { true }
9628                         });
9629                 }
9630
9631                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9632
9633                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9634                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9635                 }
9636         }
9637
9638         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9639         /// may have events that need processing.
9640         ///
9641         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9642         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9643         ///
9644         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9645         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9646         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9647                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9648         }
9649
9650         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9651         ///
9652         /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9653         /// indicates this should be checked.
9654         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9655                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9656         }
9657
9658         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9659         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9660                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9661         }
9662
9663         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9664         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9665         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9666                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9667         }
9668
9669         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9670         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9671         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9672                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9673         }
9674
9675         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9676         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9677         ///
9678         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9679         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9680         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9681         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9682                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9683         }
9684
9685         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9686         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9687         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9688                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9689         }
9690
9691         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9692         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9693         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9694                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9695         }
9696
9697         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9698         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9699         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9700                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9701         }
9702
9703         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9704         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9705         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9706                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9707         }
9708 }
9709
9710 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9711         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9712 where
9713         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9714         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9715         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9716         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9717         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9718         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9719         R::Target: Router,
9720         L::Target: Logger,
9721 {
9722         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9723                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9724                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9725                 // change to the contents.
9726                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9727                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9728                         let persist = match &res {
9729                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9730                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9731                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
9732                                 },
9733                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9734                         };
9735                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9736                         persist
9737                 });
9738         }
9739
9740         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9741                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9742                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9743                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9744         }
9745
9746         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9747                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9748                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9749                 // change to the contents.
9750                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9751                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9752                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9753                 });
9754         }
9755
9756         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9757                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9758                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9759                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9760         }
9761
9762         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9763                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9764                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9765         }
9766
9767         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9768                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9769                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9770         }
9771
9772         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9773                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9774                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9775                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9776                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9777                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9778                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9779                         let persist = match &res {
9780                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9781                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9782                         };
9783                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9784                         persist
9785                 });
9786         }
9787
9788         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9789                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9790                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9791                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9792         }
9793
9794         #[cfg(splicing)]
9795         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9796                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9797                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9798                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9799         }
9800
9801         #[cfg(splicing)]
9802         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9803                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9804                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9805                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9806         }
9807
9808         #[cfg(splicing)]
9809         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9810                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9811                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9812                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9813         }
9814
9815         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9816                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9817                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9818         }
9819
9820         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9821                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9822                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9823         }
9824
9825         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9826                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9827                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9828                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9829                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9830                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9831                         let persist = match &res {
9832                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9833                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9834                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9835                         };
9836                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9837                         persist
9838                 });
9839         }
9840
9841         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9842                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9843                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9844         }
9845
9846         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9847                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9848                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9849                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9850                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9851                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9852                         let persist = match &res {
9853                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9854                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9855                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9856                         };
9857                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9858                         persist
9859                 });
9860         }
9861
9862         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9863                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9864                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9865                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9866                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9867                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9868                         let persist = match &res {
9869                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9870                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9871                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9872                         };
9873                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9874                         persist
9875                 });
9876         }
9877
9878         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9879                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9880                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9881         }
9882
9883         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9884                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9885                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9886         }
9887
9888         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9889                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9890                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9891                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9892                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9893                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9894                         let persist = match &res {
9895                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9896                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9897                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9898                         };
9899                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9900                         persist
9901                 });
9902         }
9903
9904         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9905                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9906                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9907         }
9908
9909         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9910                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9911                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9912                                 persist
9913                         } else {
9914                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9915                         }
9916                 });
9917         }
9918
9919         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9920                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9921                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9922                         let persist = match &res {
9923                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9924                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9925                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9926                         };
9927                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9928                         persist
9929                 });
9930         }
9931
9932         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9933                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9934                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9935                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9936                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9937                 let remove_peer = {
9938                         log_debug!(
9939                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9940                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9941                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9942                         );
9943                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9944                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9945                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9946                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9947                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9948                                         let context = match phase {
9949                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9950                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9951                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9952                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9953                                                                 return true;
9954                                                         }
9955                                                         &mut chan.context
9956                                                 },
9957                                                 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9958                                                 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9959                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9960                                                         return true;
9961                                                 },
9962                                                 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9963                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9964                                                         &mut chan.context
9965                                                 },
9966                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9967                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9968                                                         &mut chan.context
9969                                                 },
9970                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9971                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9972                                                         &mut chan.context
9973                                                 },
9974                                         };
9975                                         // Clean up for removal.
9976                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9977                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9978                                         false
9979                                 });
9980                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9981                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9982                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9983                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9984                                         match msg {
9985                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
9986                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9987                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9988                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9989                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9990                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
9991                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9992                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9993                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
9994                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9995                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9996                                                 // Quiescence
9997                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9998                                                 // Splicing
9999                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
10000                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
10001                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
10002                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
10003                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
10004                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
10005                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
10006                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
10007                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
10008                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
10009                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
10010                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
10011                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
10012                                                 // Channel Operations
10013                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
10014                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
10015                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
10016                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
10017                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
10018                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
10019                                                 // Gossip
10020                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
10021                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10022                                                 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
10023                                                 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
10024                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
10025                                                         debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
10026                                                         false
10027                                                 },
10028                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10029                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
10030                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10031                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10032                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10033                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10034                                         }
10035                                 });
10036                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10037                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10038                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10039                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10040                 };
10041                 if remove_peer {
10042                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10043                 }
10044                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10045
10046                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10047                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10048                 }
10049         }
10050
10051         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10052                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
10053                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10054                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10055                         return Err(());
10056                 }
10057
10058                 let mut res = Ok(());
10059
10060                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10061                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10062                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10063                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10064                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10065                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10066                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10067
10068                         {
10069                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10070                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10071                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10072                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
10073                                                         res = Err(());
10074                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10075                                                 }
10076                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10077                                                         channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10078                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10079                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10080                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10081                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10082                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10083                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10084                                                         is_connected: true,
10085                                                 }));
10086                                         },
10087                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10088                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10089                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10090
10091                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10092                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10093                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10094                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10095                                                 {
10096                                                         res = Err(());
10097                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10098                                                 }
10099
10100                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10101                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10102                                         },
10103                                 }
10104                         }
10105
10106                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10107
10108                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10109                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10110                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10111                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10112                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10113
10114                                 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10115                                         match phase {
10116                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10117                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
10118                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10119                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10120                                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10121                                                         });
10122                                                 }
10123
10124                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10125                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10126                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10127                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10128                                                         });
10129                                                 }
10130
10131                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10132                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10133                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10134                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10135                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10136                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10137                                                         });
10138                                                 },
10139
10140                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10141                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10142                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10143                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10144                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10145                                                 }
10146
10147                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10148                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10149                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10150                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10151                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10152                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10153                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10154                                                 },
10155                                         }
10156                                 }
10157                         }
10158
10159                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10160                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10161                 });
10162                 res
10163         }
10164
10165         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10166                 match &msg.data as &str {
10167                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10168                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
10169                         {
10170                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10171                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10172                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10173                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10174                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10175                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10176                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10177                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10178                                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10179                                                 self,
10180                                                 || -> NotifyOption {
10181                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10182                                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10183                                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10184                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10185                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10186                                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10187                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10188                                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10189                                                                                 msg,
10190                                                                         });
10191                                                                 }
10192                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10193                                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10194                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10195                                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10196                                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10197                                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10198                                                                                 },
10199                                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
10200                                                                         }
10201                                                                 });
10202                                                                 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10203                                                                 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10204                                                                 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10205                                                         }
10206                                                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10207                                                 }
10208                                         );
10209                                 }
10210                                 return;
10211                         }
10212                         _ => {}
10213                 }
10214
10215                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10216
10217                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10218                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10219                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10220                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10221                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10222                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10223                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10224                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10225                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10226                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10227                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10228                         };
10229                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
10230                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10231                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10232                         }
10233                 } else {
10234                         {
10235                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10236                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10237                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10238                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10239                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10240                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10241                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10242                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10243                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10244                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10245                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10246                                                                 msg,
10247                                                         });
10248                                                         return;
10249                                                 }
10250                                         },
10251                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10252                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10253                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10254                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10255                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10256                                                                 msg,
10257                                                         });
10258                                                         return;
10259                                                 }
10260                                         },
10261                                         None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10262                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10263                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10264                                 }
10265                         }
10266
10267                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10268                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10269                 }
10270         }
10271
10272         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10273                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10274         }
10275
10276         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10277                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10278         }
10279
10280         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10281                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10282         }
10283
10284         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10285                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10286                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10287                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10288         }
10289
10290         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10291                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10292                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10293                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10294         }
10295
10296         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10297                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10298                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10299                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10300         }
10301
10302         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10303                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10304                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10305                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10306         }
10307
10308         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10309                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10310                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10311                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10312         }
10313
10314         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10315                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10316                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10317                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10318         }
10319
10320         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10321                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10322                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10323                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10324         }
10325
10326         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10327                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10328                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10329                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10330         }
10331
10332         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10333                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10334                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10335                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10336         }
10337 }
10338
10339 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10340 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10341 where
10342         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10343         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10344         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10345         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10346         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10347         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10348         R::Target: Router,
10349         L::Target: Logger,
10350 {
10351         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10352                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10353                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10354
10355                 match message {
10356                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10357                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10358                                         &invoice_request
10359                                 ) {
10360                                         Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10361                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10362                                 };
10363                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10364                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10365                                         Err(()) => {
10366                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10367                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10368                                         },
10369                                 };
10370
10371                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10372                                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10373                                         Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10374                                 ) {
10375                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10376                                         Err(()) => {
10377                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10378                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10379                                         },
10380                                 };
10381
10382                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10383                                         offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10384                                         invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10385                                 });
10386                                 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10387                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10388                                 ) {
10389                                         Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10390                                         Err(()) => {
10391                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10392                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10393                                         },
10394                                 };
10395
10396                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10397                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10398                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10399                                 );
10400
10401                                 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10402                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10403                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10404                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash
10405                                         );
10406                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10407                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10408                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10409                                         );
10410                                         builder
10411                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10412                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10413                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10414                                 } else {
10415                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10416                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10417                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10418                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10419                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10420                                         );
10421                                         builder
10422                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10423                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10424                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10425                                                 .and_then(|invoice| {
10426                                                         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
10427                                                         let mut invoice = invoice;
10428                                                         invoice
10429                                                                 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10430                                                                         self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10431                                                                 )
10432                                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10433                                                 })
10434                                 };
10435
10436                                 match response {
10437                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10438                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10439                                 }
10440                         },
10441                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10442                                 let response = invoice
10443                                         .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10444                                         .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10445                                         .and_then(|payment_id| {
10446                                                 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10447                                                 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10448                                                         Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10449                                                 } else {
10450                                                         self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10451                                                                 .map_err(|e| {
10452                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10453                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10454                                                                 })
10455                                                 }
10456                                         });
10457
10458                                 match response {
10459                                         Ok(()) => None,
10460                                         Err(e) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10461                                 }
10462                         },
10463                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10464                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10465                                 None
10466                         },
10467                 }
10468         }
10469
10470         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10471                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10472         }
10473 }
10474
10475 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10476 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10477 where
10478         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10479         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10480         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10481         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10482         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10483         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10484         R::Target: Router,
10485         L::Target: Logger,
10486 {
10487         fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10488                 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10489         }
10490 }
10491
10492 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10493 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10494 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10495         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10496         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10497         node_features
10498 }
10499
10500 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10501 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10502 ///
10503 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10504 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10505 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10506 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10507         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10508 }
10509
10510 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10511 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10512 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10513         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10514 }
10515
10516 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10517 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10518 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10519         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10520 }
10521
10522 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10523 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10524 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10525         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10526 }
10527
10528 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10529 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10530 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10531         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10532         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10533         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10534         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10535         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10536         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10537         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10538         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10539         features.set_payment_secret_required();
10540         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10541         features.set_wumbo_optional();
10542         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10543         features.set_channel_type_optional();
10544         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10545         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10546         features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10547         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10548                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10549         }
10550         features
10551 }
10552
10553 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10554 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10555
10556 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10557         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10558         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10559         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10560 });
10561
10562 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10563         (2, node_id, required),
10564         (4, features, required),
10565         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10566         (8, forwarding_info, option),
10567         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10568         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10569 });
10570
10571 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10572         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10573                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10574                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10575                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10576                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10577                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10578                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10579                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
10580                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
10581                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
10582                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10583                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10584                         (7, self.config, option),
10585                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10586                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
10587                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10588                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10589                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10590                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10591                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10592                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10593                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10594                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10595                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10596                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10597                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10598                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10599                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
10600                         (32, self.is_public, required),
10601                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10602                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10603                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10604                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10605                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10606                         (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10607                         (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10608                 });
10609                 Ok(())
10610         }
10611 }
10612
10613 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10614         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10615                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10616                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10617                         (2, channel_id, required),
10618                         (3, channel_type, option),
10619                         (4, counterparty, required),
10620                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10621                         (6, funding_txo, option),
10622                         (7, config, option),
10623                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
10624                         (9, confirmations, option),
10625                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10626                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10627                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10628                         (16, balance_msat, required),
10629                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10630                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10631                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10632                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10633                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10634                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10635                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
10636                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10637                         (26, is_outbound, required),
10638                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10639                         (30, is_usable, required),
10640                         (32, is_public, required),
10641                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10642                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10643                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10644                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10645                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10646                         (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10647                         (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10648                 });
10649
10650                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10651                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10652                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10653                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10654                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10655
10656                 Ok(Self {
10657                         inbound_scid_alias,
10658                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10659                         channel_type,
10660                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10661                         outbound_scid_alias,
10662                         funding_txo,
10663                         config,
10664                         short_channel_id,
10665                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10666                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10667                         user_channel_id,
10668                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10669                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10670                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10671                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10672                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10673                         confirmations_required,
10674                         confirmations,
10675                         force_close_spend_delay,
10676                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10677                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10678                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10679                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10680                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10681                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10682                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10683                         channel_shutdown_state,
10684                         pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10685                         pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10686                 })
10687         }
10688 }
10689
10690 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10691         (2, channels, required_vec),
10692         (4, phantom_scid, required),
10693         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10694 });
10695
10696 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10697         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10698         (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10699 });
10700
10701 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10702         (0, Forward) => {
10703                 (0, onion_packet, required),
10704                 (1, blinded, option),
10705                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10706         },
10707         (1, Receive) => {
10708                 (0, payment_data, required),
10709                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10710                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10711                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10712                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10713                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10714                 (9, payment_context, option),
10715         },
10716         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10717                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10718                 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10719                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10720                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10721                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10722                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10723         },
10724 ;);
10725
10726 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10727         (0, routing, required),
10728         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10729         (4, payment_hash, required),
10730         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10731         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10732         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10733         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10734 });
10735
10736
10737 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10738         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10739                 match self {
10740                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10741                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10742                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10743                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10744                                 reason.write(writer)?;
10745                         },
10746                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10747                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10748                         }) => {
10749                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10750                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10751                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10752                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10753                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10754                         },
10755                 }
10756                 Ok(())
10757         }
10758 }
10759
10760 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10761         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10762                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10763                 match id {
10764                         0 => {
10765                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10766                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10767                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10768                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10769                                 }))
10770                         },
10771                         1 => {
10772                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10773                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10774                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10775                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10776                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10777                                 }))
10778                         },
10779                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10780                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10781                         // messages contained in the variants.
10782                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10783                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10784                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10785                         2 => {
10786                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10787                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10788                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10789                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10790                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10791                         },
10792                         3 => {
10793                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10794                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10795                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10796                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10797                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10798                         },
10799                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10800                 }
10801         }
10802 }
10803
10804 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10805         (0, Forward),
10806         (1, Fail),
10807 );
10808
10809 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10810         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10811         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10812 );
10813
10814 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10815         (0, short_channel_id, required),
10816         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10817         (2, outpoint, required),
10818         (3, blinded_failure, option),
10819         (4, htlc_id, required),
10820         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10821         (7, user_channel_id, option),
10822         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10823         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10824         (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10825 });
10826
10827 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10828         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10829                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10830                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10831                                 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10832                         },
10833                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10834                 };
10835                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10836                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10837                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
10838                         (2, self.value, required),
10839                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10840                         (4, payment_data, option),
10841                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10842                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10843                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10844                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10845                 });
10846                 Ok(())
10847         }
10848 }
10849
10850 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10851         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10852                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10853                         (0, prev_hop, required),
10854                         (1, total_msat, option),
10855                         (2, value_ser, required),
10856                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10857                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10858                         (5, total_value_received, option),
10859                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10860                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10861                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10862                 });
10863                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10864                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10865                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10866                         Some(p) => {
10867                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
10868                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10869                                 }
10870                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10871                                         total_msat = Some(value);
10872                                 }
10873                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10874                         },
10875                         None => {
10876                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10877                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
10878                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10879                                         }
10880                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10881                                 }
10882                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10883                         },
10884                 };
10885                 Ok(Self {
10886                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10887                         timer_ticks: 0,
10888                         value,
10889                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10890                         total_value_received,
10891                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10892                         onion_payload,
10893                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10894                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10895                 })
10896         }
10897 }
10898
10899 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10900         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10901                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10902                 match id {
10903                         0 => {
10904                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10905                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10906                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10907                                 let mut payment_id = None;
10908                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10909                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10910                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10911                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10912                                         (1, payment_id, option),
10913                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10914                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10915                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10916                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
10917                                 });
10918                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
10919                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10920                                         // instead.
10921                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10922                                 }
10923                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10924                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10925                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10926                                 }
10927                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10928                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10929                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10930                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10931                                                 }
10932                                         }
10933                                 }
10934                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10935                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10936                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
10937                                         path,
10938                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10939                                 })
10940                         }
10941                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10942                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10943                 }
10944         }
10945 }
10946
10947 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10948         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10949                 match self {
10950                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10951                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10952                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10953                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10954                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10955                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10956                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10957                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10958                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10959                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10960                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10961                                  });
10962                         }
10963                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10964                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10965                                 field.write(writer)?;
10966                         }
10967                 }
10968                 Ok(())
10969         }
10970 }
10971
10972 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10973         (0, forward_info, required),
10974         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10975         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10976         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10977         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10978         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10979         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10980         (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10981 });
10982
10983 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10984         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10985                 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10986                 match self {
10987                         Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10988                                 0u8.write(w)?;
10989                                 info.write(w)?;
10990                         },
10991                         Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10992                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10993                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10994                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10995                                         (2, err_packet, required),
10996                                 });
10997                         },
10998                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10999                                 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
11000                                 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
11001                                 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
11002                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
11003                                 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
11004                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
11005                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11006                                         (1, failure_code, required),
11007                                         (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
11008                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
11009                                 });
11010                         },
11011                 }
11012                 Ok(())
11013         }
11014 }
11015
11016 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11017         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11018                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
11019                 Ok(match id {
11020                         0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
11021                         1 => {
11022                                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
11023                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11024                                         (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
11025                                         (2, err_packet, required),
11026                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
11027                                 });
11028                                 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
11029                                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
11030                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11031                                                 failure_code,
11032                                                 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
11033                                         }
11034                                 } else {
11035                                         Self::FailHTLC {
11036                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11037                                                 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11038                                         }
11039                                 }
11040                         },
11041                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11042                 })
11043         }
11044 }
11045
11046 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11047         (0, payment_secret, required),
11048         (2, expiry_time, required),
11049         (4, user_payment_id, required),
11050         (6, payment_preimage, required),
11051         (8, min_value_msat, required),
11052 });
11053
11054 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11055 where
11056         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11057         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11058         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11059         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11060         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11061         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11062         R::Target: Router,
11063         L::Target: Logger,
11064 {
11065         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11066                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11067
11068                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11069
11070                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11071                 {
11072                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11073                         best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11074                         best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11075                 }
11076
11077                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11078
11079                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11080                 {
11081                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11082                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11083                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11084                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11085                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11086                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
11087                                 }
11088
11089                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11090                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11091                                 ).count();
11092                         }
11093
11094                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11095
11096                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11097                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11098                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11099                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11100                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11101                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11102                                         } else { None }
11103                                 ) {
11104                                         channel.write(writer)?;
11105                                 }
11106                         }
11107                 }
11108
11109                 {
11110                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11111                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11112                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11113                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11114                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11115                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
11116                                         forward.write(writer)?;
11117                                 }
11118                         }
11119                 }
11120
11121                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11122                 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11123                 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11124                         decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11125                 }
11126
11127                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11128                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11129                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11130
11131                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11132                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11133                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11134                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11135                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11136                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11137                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11138                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
11139                         }
11140                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11141                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11142                 }
11143
11144                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11145                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11146                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11147                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11148                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11149                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
11150                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11151                 }
11152
11153                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11154                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11155                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11156                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11157                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11158                         // no channels.
11159                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11160                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11161                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11162                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11163                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11164                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11165                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11166                                 }
11167                         }
11168                 }
11169
11170                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11171                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11172                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11173                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11174                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11175                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11176                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11177                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
11178                         0u64.write(writer)?;
11179                 } else {
11180                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11181                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11182                                 event.write(writer)?;
11183                         }
11184                 }
11185
11186                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11187                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11188                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11189                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11190                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11191                 0u64.write(writer)?;
11192
11193                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11194                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11195                 // likely to be identical.
11196                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11197                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11198
11199                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11200                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11201                         hash.write(writer)?;
11202                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11203                 }
11204
11205                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11206                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11207                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11208                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11209                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11210                         }
11211                 }
11212                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11213                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11214                         match outbound {
11215                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11216                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11217                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11218                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11219                                         }
11220                                 }
11221                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11222                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11223                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11224                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11225                         }
11226                 }
11227
11228                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11229                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11230                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11231                         match outbound {
11232                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11233                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11234                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11235                                 },
11236                                 _ => {},
11237                         }
11238                 }
11239
11240                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11241                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11242                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11243                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11244                 }
11245
11246                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11247                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11248                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11249                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11250                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
11251                 }
11252
11253                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11254                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11255                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11256                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
11257                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11258                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11259                                 }
11260                         }
11261                 }
11262
11263                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11264                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11265                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11266                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11267                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11268                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11269                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11270                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11271                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11272                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11273                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11274                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11275                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11276                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11277                 });
11278
11279                 Ok(())
11280         }
11281 }
11282
11283 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11284         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11285                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11286                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11287                         event.write(w)?;
11288                         action.write(w)?;
11289                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11290                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11291                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11292                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11293                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11294                                 // check that the event is sane here.
11295                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11296                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11297                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11298                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11299                         }
11300                 }
11301                 Ok(())
11302         }
11303 }
11304 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11305         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11306                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11307                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11308                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11309                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11310                         len) as usize);
11311                 for _ in 0..len {
11312                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11313                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11314                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11315                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
11316                         } else if action.is_some() {
11317                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11318                         }
11319                 }
11320                 Ok(events)
11321         }
11322 }
11323
11324 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11325         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11326         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11327         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11328         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11329         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11330 );
11331
11332 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11333 ///
11334 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11335 /// is:
11336 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11337 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11338 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11339 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11340 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11341 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11342 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11343 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11344 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11345 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11346 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11347 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11348 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11349 ///    the next step.
11350 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11351 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11352 ///
11353 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11354 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11355 ///
11356 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11357 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11358 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11359 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11360 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11361 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11362 ///
11363 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11364 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11365 where
11366         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11367         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11368         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11369         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11370         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11371         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11372         R::Target: Router,
11373         L::Target: Logger,
11374 {
11375         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11376         pub entropy_source: ES,
11377
11378         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11379         pub node_signer: NS,
11380
11381         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11382         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11383         /// signing data.
11384         pub signer_provider: SP,
11385
11386         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11387         ///
11388         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11389         pub fee_estimator: F,
11390         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11391         ///
11392         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11393         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11394         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11395         pub chain_monitor: M,
11396
11397         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11398         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11399         /// force-closed during deserialization.
11400         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11401         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11402         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11403         ///
11404         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11405         pub router: R,
11406         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11407         /// deserialization.
11408         pub logger: L,
11409         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11410         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11411         pub default_config: UserConfig,
11412
11413         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11414         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11415         ///
11416         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11417         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11418         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11419         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11420         ///
11421         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11422         /// this struct.
11423         ///
11424         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11425         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11426 }
11427
11428 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11429                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11430 where
11431         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11432         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11433         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11434         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11435         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11436         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11437         R::Target: Router,
11438         L::Target: Logger,
11439 {
11440         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11441         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11442         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11443         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11444                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11445                 Self {
11446                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11447                         channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11448                                 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11449                         ),
11450                 }
11451         }
11452 }
11453
11454 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11455 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11456 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11457         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11458 where
11459         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11460         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11461         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11462         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11463         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11464         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11465         R::Target: Router,
11466         L::Target: Logger,
11467 {
11468         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11469                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11470                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11471         }
11472 }
11473
11474 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11475         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11476 where
11477         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11478         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11479         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11480         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11481         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11482         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11483         R::Target: Router,
11484         L::Target: Logger,
11485 {
11486         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11487                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11488
11489                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11490                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11491                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11492
11493                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11494
11495                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11496                 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11497                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11498                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11499                 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11500                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11501                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11502                 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11503                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11504                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11505                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11506                         ))?;
11507                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11508                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11509                         funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11510                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11511                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11512                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11513                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11514                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11515                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11516                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11517                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11518                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11519                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11520                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11521                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11522                                         }
11523                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11524                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11525                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11526                                         }
11527                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11528                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11529                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11530                                         }
11531                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11532                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11533                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11534                                         }
11535                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11536                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11537                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11538                                         }
11539                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11540                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11541                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11542                                                 });
11543                                         }
11544                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11545                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11546                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11547                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11548                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11549                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11550                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11551                                                 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11552                                         }, None));
11553                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11554                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
11555                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11556                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11557                                                 }
11558                                                 if !found_htlc {
11559                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11560                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11561                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11562                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11563                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11564                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11565                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11566                                                         log_info!(logger,
11567                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11568                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11569                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11570                                                 }
11571                                         }
11572                                 } else {
11573                                         channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11574                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11575                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11576                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11577                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11578                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11579                                         }
11580                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11581                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11582                                         }
11583                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11584                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11585                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11586                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11587                                                 },
11588                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11589                                                         let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11590                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11591                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
11592                                                 }
11593                                         }
11594                                 }
11595                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11596                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11597                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11598                                 // safely discard the channel.
11599                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11600                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11601                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11602                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11603                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11604                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11605                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11606                                         channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11607                                 }, None));
11608                         } else {
11609                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11610                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11611                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11612                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11613                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11614                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11615                         }
11616                 }
11617
11618                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11619                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11620                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11621                                 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11622                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11623                                         &channel_id);
11624                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11625                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11626                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
11627                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11628                                         channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11629                                 };
11630                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11631                         }
11632                 }
11633
11634                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11635                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11636                 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11637                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11638                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11639                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11640                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11641                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11642                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11643                         }
11644                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11645                 }
11646
11647                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11648                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11649                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11650                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11651                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11652                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11653                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11654                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11655                         }
11656                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11657                 }
11658
11659                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11660                         PeerState {
11661                                 channel_by_id,
11662                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11663                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11664                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11665                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11666                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11667                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11668                                 is_connected: false,
11669                         }
11670                 };
11671
11672                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11673                 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11674                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11675                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11676                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11677                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11678                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11679                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11680                 }
11681
11682                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11683                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11684                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11685                 for _ in 0..event_count {
11686                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11687                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11688                                 None => continue,
11689                         }
11690                 }
11691
11692                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11693                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11694                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11695                                 0 => {
11696                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11697                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11698                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
11699                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11700                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11701                                 }
11702                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11703                         }
11704                 }
11705
11706                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11707                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11708
11709                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11710                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11711                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11712                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11713                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11714                         }
11715                 }
11716
11717                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11718                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11719                         hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11720                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11721                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11722                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11723                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11724                         };
11725                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11726                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11727                         };
11728                 }
11729
11730                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11731                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11732                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11733                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11734                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11735                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11736                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11737                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11738                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11739                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11740                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11741                 let mut events_override = None;
11742                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11743                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11744                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11745                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11746                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11747                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11748                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11749                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11750                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11751                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11752                         (8, events_override, option),
11753                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11754                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11755                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11756                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11757                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11758                 });
11759                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11760                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11761                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11762                 }
11763
11764                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11765                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11766                 }
11767
11768                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11769                         pending_events_read = events;
11770                 }
11771
11772                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11773                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11774                 }
11775
11776                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11777                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11778                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11779                         let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11780                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11781                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11782                         }
11783                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11784                 }
11785                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11786                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11787                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11788                 };
11789
11790                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11791                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11792                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11793                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11794                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11795                 //
11796                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11797                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11798                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11799                 //
11800                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11801                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11802                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11803                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11804                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11805                         ) => { {
11806                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11807                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11808                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11809                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11810                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11811                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11812                                         pending_background_events.push(
11813                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11814                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11815                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11816                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11817                                                         update: update.clone(),
11818                                                 });
11819                                 }
11820                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11821                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11822                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11823                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11824                                         pending_background_events.push(
11825                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11826                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11827                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11828                                                 });
11829                                 }
11830                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11831                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11832                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11833                                 }
11834                                 max_in_flight_update_id
11835                         } }
11836                 }
11837
11838                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11839                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11840                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11841                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11842                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11843                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11844
11845                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11846                                         // discarded.
11847                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11848                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11849                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11850                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11851                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11852                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11853                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11854                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11855                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11856                                                 }
11857                                         }
11858                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11859                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11860                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11861                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11862                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11863                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11864                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11865                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11866                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11867                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11868                                                 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11869                                         }
11870                                 } else {
11871                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11872                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11873                                         debug_assert!(false);
11874                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11875                                 }
11876                         }
11877                 }
11878
11879                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11880                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11881                                 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11882                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11883                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11884                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11885                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11886                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11887                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11888                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11889                                         });
11890                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11891                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11892                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11893                                 } else {
11894                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11895                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11896                                                 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11897                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11898                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11899                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11900                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11901                                         log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11902                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11903                                 }
11904                         }
11905                 }
11906
11907                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11908                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11909
11910                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11911                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11912                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11913                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11914
11915                 {
11916                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11917                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11918                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11919                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11920                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11921                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11922                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11923                         // 0.0.102+
11924                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11925                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11926                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11927                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11928                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11929                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11930                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
11931                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11932                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11933                                                         }
11934
11935                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11936                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11937                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11938                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11939                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11940                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11941                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11942                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11943                                                                 },
11944                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11945                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11946                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11947                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
11948                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11949                                                                                 payment_params: None,
11950                                                                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11951                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11952                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11953                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11954                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11955                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11956                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11957                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11958                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
11959                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11960                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11961                                                                         });
11962                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11963                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11964                                                                 }
11965                                                         }
11966                                                 }
11967                                         }
11968                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11969                                                 match htlc_source {
11970                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11971                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11972                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11973                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11974                                                                 };
11975                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11976                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11977                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11978                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11979                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11980                                                                 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11981                                                                         update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11982                                                                                 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11983                                                                                         update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11984                                                                                 if matches {
11985                                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11986                                                                                                 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11987                                                                                 }
11988                                                                                 !matches
11989                                                                         });
11990                                                                         !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11991                                                                 });
11992                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11993                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
11994                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11995                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11996                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11997                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11998                                                                                                 false
11999                                                                                         } else { true }
12000                                                                                 } else { true }
12001                                                                         });
12002                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
12003                                                                 });
12004                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
12005                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
12006                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12007                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12008                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
12009                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
12010                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
12011                                                                                         } else { true }
12012                                                                                 });
12013                                                                                 false
12014                                                                         } else { true }
12015                                                                 });
12016                                                         },
12017                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
12018                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
12019                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
12020                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
12021                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
12022                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
12023                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
12024                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
12025                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
12026                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
12027                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
12028                                                                         let compl_action =
12029                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
12030                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
12031                                                                                         channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
12032                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
12033                                                                                 };
12034                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
12035                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
12036                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
12037                                                                 }
12038                                                         },
12039                                                 }
12040                                         }
12041                                 }
12042
12043                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12044                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12045                                 // payments.
12046                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12047                                         .into_iter()
12048                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12049                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12050                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12051                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12052                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12053                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12054                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12055                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12056                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12057                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12058                                                         } else { None }
12059                                                 } else {
12060                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12061                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12062                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12063                                                         // channel still live case here.
12064                                                         None
12065                                                 }
12066                                         });
12067                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12068                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12069                                 }
12070                         }
12071                 }
12072
12073                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12074                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12075                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12076                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12077                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12078                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12079                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12080                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12081                         }, None));
12082                 }
12083
12084                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12085                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12086
12087                 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12088                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12089                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12090                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12091                         }
12092                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12093                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12094                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12095                                 }
12096                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12097                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12098                                 {
12099                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12100                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12101                                         });
12102                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12103                                 }
12104                         } else {
12105                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12106                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12107                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12108                                         });
12109                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12110                                 }
12111                         }
12112                 } else {
12113                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12114                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12115                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12116                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12117                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12118                                 }
12119                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12120                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
12121                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12122                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
12123                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12124                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12125                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12126                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12127                                                                                 Err(()) => {
12128                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12129                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12130                                                                                 }
12131                                                                         }
12132                                                                 },
12133                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12134                                                         }
12135                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12136                                         },
12137                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12138                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12139                                 };
12140                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12141                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12142                                 });
12143                         }
12144                 }
12145
12146                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12147                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12148
12149                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12150                         Ok(key) => key,
12151                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12152                 };
12153                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12154                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12155                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12156                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12157                         }
12158                 }
12159
12160                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12161                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12162                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12163                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12164                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12165                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12166                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
12167                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12168                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12169                                                 loop {
12170                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12171                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12172                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12173                                                 }
12174                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12175                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12176                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12177                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12178                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12179                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12180                                         }
12181                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
12182                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12183                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12184                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12185                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12186                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12187                                                 }
12188                                         }
12189                                 } else {
12190                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12191                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12192                                         debug_assert!(false);
12193                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12194                                 }
12195                         }
12196                 }
12197
12198                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12199
12200                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12201                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12202                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12203                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12204                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12205                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12206                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12207                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12208                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12209                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12210                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12211                                         }
12212                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12213                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12214
12215                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12216                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12217                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12218                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12219                                                 //
12220                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12221                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12222                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12223                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12224                                                 // reason to.
12225                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12226                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12227                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12228                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12229                                                 // restart.
12230                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12231                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12232                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12233                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12234                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12235                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12236                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
12237                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12238                                                         }
12239                                                 }
12240                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12241                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12242                                                 }
12243                                         }
12244                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12245                                                 receiver_node_id,
12246                                                 payment_hash,
12247                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
12248                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12249                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12250                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12251                                         }, None));
12252                                 }
12253                         }
12254                 }
12255
12256                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12257                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12258                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12259                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
12260                                         for action in actions.iter() {
12261                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12262                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12263                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12264                                                 } = action {
12265                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12266                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
12267                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12268                                                                         blocked_channel_id);
12269                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12270                                                                         .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12271                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12272                                                         } else {
12273                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12274                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12275                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12276                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12277                                                                 // anymore.
12278                                                         }
12279                                                 }
12280                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12281                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12282                                                 }
12283                                         }
12284                                 }
12285                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12286                         } else {
12287                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12288                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12289                         }
12290                 }
12291
12292                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12293                         chain_hash,
12294                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12295                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12296                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12297                         router: args.router,
12298
12299                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12300
12301                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12302                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12303                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12304                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12305
12306                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12307                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12308                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12309                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12310                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12311                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12312                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12313
12314                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12315
12316                         our_network_pubkey,
12317                         secp_ctx,
12318
12319                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12320
12321                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12322
12323                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12324                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12325                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12326                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12327                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12328
12329                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12330                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12331
12332                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12333
12334                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12335
12336                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12337
12338                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12339                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
12340                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12341
12342                         logger: args.logger,
12343                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
12344                 };
12345
12346                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12347                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12348                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12349                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12350                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12351                 }
12352
12353                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12354                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12355                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12356                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12357                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12358                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12359                                 downstream_channel_id, None
12360                         );
12361                 }
12362
12363                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12364                 //connection or two.
12365
12366                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12367         }
12368 }
12369
12370 #[cfg(test)]
12371 mod tests {
12372         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12373         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12374         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12375         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12376         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12377         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12378         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
12379         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12380         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12381         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12382         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12383         use crate::prelude::*;
12384         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12385         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12386         use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12387         use crate::util::test_utils;
12388         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12389         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12390
12391         #[test]
12392         fn test_notify_limits() {
12393                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12394                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12395                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12396                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12397                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12398                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12399
12400                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12401                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12402                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12403                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12404                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12405
12406                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12407
12408                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12409                 // to connect messages with new values
12410                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12411                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12412                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12413                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12414                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12415                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12416
12417                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12418                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12419                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12420                 // ... but the last node should not.
12421                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12422                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12423                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12424                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12425
12426                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12427                 // about the channel.
12428                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12429                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12430                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12431
12432                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12433                 // parties.
12434                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12435                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12436                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12437                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12438                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12439                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12440
12441                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12442                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12443                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12444
12445                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12446                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12447                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12448                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12449                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12450                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12451
12452                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12453                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12454                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12455                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12456                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12457                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12458                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12459                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12460
12461                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12462                 // the channel info has updated.
12463                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12464                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12465                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12466                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12467                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12468                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12469         }
12470
12471         #[test]
12472         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12473                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12474                 // expected.
12475                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12476                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12477                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12478                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12479                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12480
12481                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12482                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12483                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12484                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12485
12486                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12487                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12488                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12489                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12490                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12491                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12492                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12493                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12495                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12496                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12497                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12498
12499                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12500                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12501                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12502                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12503                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12504                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12505                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12506                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12507                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12508                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12509                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12510                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12511                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12512                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12513                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12514                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12515                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12516                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12517                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12518                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12519                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12520                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12521                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12522
12523                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12524                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12525                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12526                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12527                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12528                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12529                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12530
12531                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12532                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12533                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12534                 // lightning messages manually.
12535                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12536                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12537                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12538
12539                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12540                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12541                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12542                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12543                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12544                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12545                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12547                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12548                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12549                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12550                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12551                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12552                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12553                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12554                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12555                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12556                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12557                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12558                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12559                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12560                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12561                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12562                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12563                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12564                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12565
12566                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12567                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12568                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12569                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12570                 match events[0] {
12571                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12572                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12573                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12574                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12575                         },
12576                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12577                 }
12578                 match events[1] {
12579                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12580                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12581                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12582                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12583                         },
12584                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12585                 }
12586         }
12587
12588         #[test]
12589         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12590                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12591                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12592         }
12593
12594         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12595                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12596                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12597                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12598                 //      fails as expected.
12599                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12600                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12601                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12602                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12603                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12604                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12605                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12606                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12607                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12608                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12609                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12610                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12611                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12612                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12613                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12614
12615                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12616                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12617                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12618
12619                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12620                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12621                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12622                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12623                 let route = find_route(
12624                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12625                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12626                 ).unwrap();
12627                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12628                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12629                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12630                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12631                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12632                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12633                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12634                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12635                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12636                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12637                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12638                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12639                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12640                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12641                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12642                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12643                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12644                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12645                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12646                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12647                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12648                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12649                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12650                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12651
12652                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12653                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12654
12655                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12656                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12657                 let route = find_route(
12658                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12659                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12660                 ).unwrap();
12661                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12662                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12663                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12664                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12665                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12666                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12667                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12668                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12669
12670                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12671                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12672                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12673                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12674                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12675                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12676                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12677                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12678                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12679                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12680                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12681                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12682                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12683                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12684                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12685                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12686                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12687                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12688                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12689                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12690                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12691                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12692                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12693                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12694
12695                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12696                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12697
12698                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12699                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12700                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12701                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12702                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12703                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12704                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12705                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12706                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12707                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12708
12709                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12710                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12711                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12712                         100_000
12713                 );
12714                 let route = find_route(
12715                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12716                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12717                 ).unwrap();
12718                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12719                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12720                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12721                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12722                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12723                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12724                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12725                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12726                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12728                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12729                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12730                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12731                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12732                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12733                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12734                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12735                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12736                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12737                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12738                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12739                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12740                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12741
12742                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12743                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12744         }
12745
12746         #[test]
12747         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12748                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12749                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12750                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12751                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12752                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12753                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12754
12755                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12756                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12757
12758                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12759                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12760                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12761                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12762                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12763                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12764                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12765                 let route = find_route(
12766                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12767                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12768                 ).unwrap();
12769
12770                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12771                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12772                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12773                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12774                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12775                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12776                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12777
12778                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12779                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12780                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12781                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12782                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12783                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12784                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12785
12786                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12787         }
12788
12789         #[test]
12790         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12791                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12792                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12793                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12794                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12795                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12796                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12797                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12798                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12799
12800                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12801                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12802
12803                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12804                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12805                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12806                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12807                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12808                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12809                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12810                 let route = find_route(
12811                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12812                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12813                 ).unwrap();
12814
12815                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12816                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12817                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12818                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12819                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12820                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12821                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12822                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12823                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12824
12825                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12826                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12827                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12828                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12829                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12830                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12831                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12832
12833                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12834         }
12835
12836         #[test]
12837         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12838                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12839                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12840                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12841                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12842
12843                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12844                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12845                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12846                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12847
12848                 // Marshall an MPP route.
12849                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12850                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12851                 route.paths.push(path);
12852                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12853                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12854                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12855                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12856                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12857                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12858
12859                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12860                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12861                 .unwrap_err() {
12862                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12863                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12864                         },
12865                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12866                 }
12867         }
12868
12869         #[test]
12870         fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12871                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12872                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12873                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12874                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12875
12876                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12877
12878                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12879                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12880                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12881
12882                 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12883                 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12884                 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12885
12886                 {
12887                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12888                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12889                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12890                 }
12891
12892                 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12893                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12894                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12895
12896                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12897                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12898
12899                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12900                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12901
12902                 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12903                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12904                         features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12905                 }, true).unwrap();
12906                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12907                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12908                 }, false).unwrap();
12909
12910                 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12911                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12912                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12913                 match &node_0_events[0] {
12914                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12915                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12916                 }
12917                 {
12918                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12919                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12920                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12921                 }
12922         }
12923
12924         #[test]
12925         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12926                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12927                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12928                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12929                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12930
12931                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12932
12933                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12934                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12935
12936                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12937                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12938                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12939                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12940
12941                 {
12942                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12943                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12944                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12945                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12946                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12947                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12948                 }
12949
12950                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12951
12952                 {
12953                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12954                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12955                 }
12956         }
12957
12958         #[test]
12959         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12960                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12961                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12962                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12963                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12964                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12965
12966                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12967                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12968                         payment_secret,
12969                         total_msat: 100_000,
12970                 };
12971
12972                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12973                 // payment verification fails as expected.
12974                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12975                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12976                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12977                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12978                         Err(()) => {
12979                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12980                         }
12981                 }
12982
12983                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12984                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12985         }
12986
12987         #[test]
12988         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12989                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12990                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12991                 // the channel is successfully closed.
12992                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12993                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12994                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12995                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12996
12997                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12998                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12999                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
13000                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13001                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13002
13003                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
13004                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
13005                 {
13006                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
13007                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
13008                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13009                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13010                 }
13011
13012                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13013                 {
13014                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
13015                         // as it has the funding transaction.
13016                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13017                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13018                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13019                 }
13020
13021                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13022
13023                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13024
13025                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13026                 {
13027                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13028                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13029                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13030                 }
13031                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13032
13033                 {
13034                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
13035                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
13036                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13037                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13038                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13039                 }
13040                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13041                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13042                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13043                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13044                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13045                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13046                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13047                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13048
13049                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13050                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13051                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13052                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13053
13054                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13055                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13056                 {
13057                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13058                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13059                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13060                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13061                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13062                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13063                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13064                 }
13065
13066                 {
13067                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13068                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13069                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13070                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13071                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13072                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13073                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13074                 }
13075
13076                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13077                 {
13078                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13079                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13080                         // closing transaction).
13081                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13082                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13083                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13084
13085                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13086                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13087                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13088                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13089                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13090                 }
13091
13092                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13093
13094                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13095                 {
13096                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13097                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13098                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13099                 }
13100                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13101
13102                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13103                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13104         }
13105
13106         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13107                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13108                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13109         }
13110
13111         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13112                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13113                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13114         }
13115
13116         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13117                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13118                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13119         }
13120
13121         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13122                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13123                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13124         }
13125
13126         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13127                 match res_err {
13128                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13129                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13130                         },
13131                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13132                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13133                         },
13134                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13135                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13136                 }
13137         }
13138
13139         #[test]
13140         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13141                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13142                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13143                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13144                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13145                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13146                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13147                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13148
13149                 // Dummy values
13150                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13151                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13152                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13153
13154                 // Test the API functions.
13155                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13156
13157                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13158
13159                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13160
13161                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13162
13163                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13164
13165                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13166
13167                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13168         }
13169
13170         #[test]
13171         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13172                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13173                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13174                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13175                 // the given `channel_id`.
13176                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13177                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13178                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13179                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13180
13181                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13182
13183                 // Dummy values
13184                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13185
13186                 // Test the API functions.
13187                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13188
13189                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13190
13191                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13192
13193                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13194
13195                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13196
13197                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13198         }
13199
13200         #[test]
13201         fn test_connection_limiting() {
13202                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13203                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13204                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13205                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13206                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13207
13208                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13209
13210                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13211                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13212
13213                 let mut funding_tx = None;
13214                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13215                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13216                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13217
13218                         if idx == 0 {
13219                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13220                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13221                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13222                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13223                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13224
13225                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13226                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13227                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13228
13229                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13230
13231                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13232                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13233                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13234                         }
13235                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13236                 }
13237
13238                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13239                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13240                         &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13241                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13242                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13243                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13244
13245                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13246                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13247                 // limit.
13248                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13249                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13250                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13251                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13252                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13253                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13254                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13255                         }, true).unwrap();
13256                 }
13257                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13258                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13259                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13260                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13261                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13262
13263                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13264                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13265                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13266                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13267                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13268                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13269                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13270                 }
13271                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13272                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13273                 }, true).unwrap();
13274                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13275                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13276                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13277
13278                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13279                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13280                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13281                 }, false).unwrap();
13282                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13283
13284                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13285                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13286                 // open channels.
13287                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13288                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13289                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13290                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13291                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13292                 }
13293                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13294                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13295                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13296
13297                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13298                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13299                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13300
13301                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13302                 // "protected" and can connect again.
13303                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13304                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13305                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13306                 }, true).unwrap();
13307                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13308
13309                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13310                 // last_random_pk.
13311                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13312                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13313         }
13314
13315         #[test]
13316         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13317                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13318                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13319                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13320                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13321                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13322
13323                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13324
13325                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13326                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13327
13328                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13329                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13330                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13331                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13332                 }
13333
13334                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13335                 // rejected.
13336                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13337                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13338                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13339
13340                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13341                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13342                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13343
13344                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13345                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13346                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13347                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13348         }
13349
13350         #[test]
13351         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13352                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13353                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13354                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13355                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13356                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13357                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13358                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13359                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13360
13361                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13362
13363                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13364                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13365
13366                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13367                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13368                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13369                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13370                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13371                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13372                         }, true).unwrap();
13373
13374                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13375                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13376                         match events[0] {
13377                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13378                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13379                                 }
13380                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13381                         }
13382                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13383                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13384                 }
13385
13386                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13387                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13388                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13389                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13390                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13391                 }, true).unwrap();
13392                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13393                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13394                 match events[0] {
13395                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13396                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13397                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13398                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13399                                         _ => panic!(),
13400                                 }
13401                         }
13402                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13403                 }
13404                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13405                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13406
13407                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13408                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13409                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13410                 match events[0] {
13411                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13412                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13413                         }
13414                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13415                 }
13416                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13417         }
13418
13419         #[test]
13420         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13421                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13422                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13423                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13424                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13425                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13426                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13427                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13428                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13429                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13430                         payment_metadata: None,
13431                         keysend_preimage: None,
13432                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13433                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13434                         }),
13435                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13436                 };
13437                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13438                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13439                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13440                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13441                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13442                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13443                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13444                 {
13445                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13446                 } else { panic!(); }
13447
13448                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13449                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13450                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13451                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13452                         payment_metadata: None,
13453                         keysend_preimage: None,
13454                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13455                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13456                         }),
13457                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13458                 };
13459                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13460                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13461                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13462                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13463         }
13464
13465         #[test]
13466         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13467                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13468                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13469                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13470                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13471
13472                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13473                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13474                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13475                         cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13476                         payment_metadata: None,
13477                         keysend_preimage: None,
13478                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13479                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13480                         }),
13481                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13482                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13483                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13484
13485                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13486                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13487                 // is not satisfied.
13488                 assert!(result.is_ok());
13489         }
13490
13491         #[test]
13492         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13493                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13494                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13495                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13496                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13497
13498                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13499                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13500
13501                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13502                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13503                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13504                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13505                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13506
13507                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13508                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13509
13510                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13511                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13512                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13513                 match &msg_events[0] {
13514                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13515                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13516                                 match action {
13517                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13518                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13519                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13520                                 }
13521                         }
13522                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13523                 }
13524
13525                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13526                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13527                 match events[0] {
13528                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13529                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13530                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13531                 }
13532                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13533         }
13534
13535         #[test]
13536         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13537                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13538                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13539                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13540                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13541                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13542                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13543                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13544                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13545                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13546                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13547
13548                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13549                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13550                 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13551
13552                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13553                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13554                 match events[0] {
13555                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13556                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13557                         }
13558                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13559                 }
13560
13561                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13562                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13563
13564                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13565                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13566
13567                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13568                 // not have generated any events.
13569                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13570         }
13571
13572         #[test]
13573         fn test_update_channel_config() {
13574                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13575                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13576                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13577                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13578                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13579                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13580                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13581
13582                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13583                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13584                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13585
13586                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13587                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13588                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13589                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13590                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13591                 match &events[0] {
13592                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13593                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13594                 }
13595
13596                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13597                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13598                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13599
13600                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13601                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13602                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13603                         ..Default::default()
13604                 }).unwrap();
13605                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13606                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13607                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13608                 match &events[0] {
13609                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13610                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13611                 }
13612
13613                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13614                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13615                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13616                         ..Default::default()
13617                 }).unwrap();
13618                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13619                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13620                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13621                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13622                 match &events[0] {
13623                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13624                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13625                 }
13626
13627                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13628                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13629                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13630                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13631                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13632                 assert!(
13633                         matches!(
13634                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13635                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13636                                         ..Default::default()
13637                                 }),
13638                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13639                         )
13640                 );
13641                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13642                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13643                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13644                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13645         }
13646
13647         #[test]
13648         fn test_payment_display() {
13649                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13650                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13651                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13652                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13653                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13654                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13655         }
13656
13657         #[test]
13658         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13659                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13660                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13661                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13662                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13663                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13664
13665                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13666                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13667                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13668                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13669                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13670                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13671                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13672                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13673                 {
13674                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13675                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13676                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13677                 }
13678
13679                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13680                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13681                 // their side.
13682                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13683                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13684                 }, true).unwrap();
13685                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13686                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13687                 }, false).unwrap();
13688                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13689                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13690                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13691                 );
13692                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13693
13694                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13695                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13696                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13697                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13698                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13699                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13700                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13701                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13702                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13703                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13704                 } else { panic!() };
13705                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13706                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13707                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13708                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13709                 };
13710                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13711                 {
13712                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13713                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13714                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13715                 }
13716         }
13717
13718         #[test]
13719         fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13720                 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13721                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13722                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13723                 let persister;
13724                 let chain_monitor;
13725                 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13726                 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13727                 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13728
13729                 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13730                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13731                 };
13732                 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13733                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13734                 };
13735
13736                 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13737                         if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13738                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13739                         } else {
13740                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13741                         }
13742                 }).collect();
13743
13744                 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13745                         if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13746                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13747                         } else {
13748                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13749                         }
13750                 }).collect();
13751
13752
13753                 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13754                 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13755                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13756                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13757
13758                 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13759                 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13760                 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13761
13762                 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13763
13764                 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13765                 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13766                         let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13767                         assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13768                 }
13769                 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13770                 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13771
13772                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13773         }
13774 }
13775
13776 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
13777 pub mod bench {
13778         use crate::chain::Listen;
13779         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13780         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13781         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13782         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13783         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13784         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13785         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13786         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13787         use crate::util::test_utils;
13788         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13789
13790         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13791         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13792         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13793         use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13794
13795         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13796
13797         use criterion::Criterion;
13798
13799         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13800                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13801                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13802                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13803                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13804                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13805                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13806
13807         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13808                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13809         }
13810         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13811                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13812                 #[inline]
13813                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13814                 #[inline]
13815                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13816         }
13817
13818         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13819                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13820         }
13821
13822         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13823                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13824                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13825                 // calls per node.
13826                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13827                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13828
13829                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13830                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13831                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13832                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13833                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13834
13835                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13836                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13837                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13838
13839                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13840                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13841                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13842                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13843                         network,
13844                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13845                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13846                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13847
13848                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13849                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13850                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13851                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13852                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13853                         network,
13854                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13855                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13856                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13857
13858                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13859                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13860                 }, true).unwrap();
13861                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13862                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13863                 }, false).unwrap();
13864                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13865                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13866                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13867
13868                 let tx;
13869                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13870                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13871                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13872                         }]};
13873                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13874                 } else { panic!(); }
13875
13876                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13877                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13878                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13879                 match events_b[0] {
13880                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13881                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13882                         },
13883                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13884                 }
13885
13886                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13887                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13888                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13889                 match events_a[0] {
13890                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13891                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13892                         },
13893                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13894                 }
13895
13896                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13897
13898                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13899                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13900                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13901
13902                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13903                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13904                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13905                 match msg_events[0] {
13906                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13907                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13908                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13909                         },
13910                         _ => panic!(),
13911                 }
13912                 match msg_events[1] {
13913                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13914                         _ => panic!(),
13915                 }
13916
13917                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13918                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13919                 match events_a[0] {
13920                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13921                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13922                         },
13923                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13924                 }
13925
13926                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13927                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13928                 match events_b[0] {
13929                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13930                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13931                         },
13932                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13933                 }
13934
13935                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13936                 macro_rules! send_payment {
13937                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13938                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13939                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13940                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13941                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13942                                 payment_count += 1;
13943                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13944                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13945
13946                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13947                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13948                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13949                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13950                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13951                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13952                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13953                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13954                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13955                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13956                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13957
13958                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13959                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13960                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13961                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13962
13963                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13964                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13965                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13966                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13967                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13968                                         },
13969                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13970                                 }
13971
13972                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13973                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13974                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13975                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13976
13977                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13978                         }
13979                 }
13980
13981                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13982                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13983                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
13984                 }));
13985         }
13986 }