1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
239 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242 session_priv: SecretKey,
243 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
244 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
246 payment_id: PaymentId,
247 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
248 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
251 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
252 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
253 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
255 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
257 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
259 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
262 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
263 payment_id.hash(hasher);
264 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
265 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
266 payment_params.hash(hasher);
271 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
274 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
277 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
278 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
279 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
280 payment_secret: None,
281 payment_params: None,
286 struct ReceiveError {
292 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
293 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
295 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
296 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
297 pub enum FailureCode {
298 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
299 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
300 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
301 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
302 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
303 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
304 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
305 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
306 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
307 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
308 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
311 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
313 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
314 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
315 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
316 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
317 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
319 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
320 err: msgs::LightningError,
321 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
322 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
324 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
326 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
328 err: LightningError {
330 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
331 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
338 shutdown_finish: None,
342 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
344 err: LightningError {
346 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
349 shutdown_finish: None,
353 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
354 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
357 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
359 err: LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
362 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
368 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
369 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
373 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
376 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
379 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
383 log_level: Level::Warn,
386 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
388 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
390 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
393 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
401 shutdown_finish: None,
406 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
407 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
408 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
409 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
410 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
412 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
413 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
414 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
415 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
416 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
417 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
418 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
420 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
424 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
425 struct ClaimingPayment {
427 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
428 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
430 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
431 (0, amount_msat, required),
432 (2, payment_purpose, required),
433 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
436 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
437 struct ClaimablePayments {
438 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
439 /// failed/claimed by the user.
441 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
442 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
444 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
445 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
446 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
448 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
449 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
450 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
451 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
454 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
455 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
456 /// quite some time lag.
457 enum BackgroundEvent {
458 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
459 /// commitment transaction.
460 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
463 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
464 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
465 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
466 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
467 /// event can be generated.
468 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
469 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
470 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
473 /// State we hold per-peer.
474 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
475 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
477 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
478 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
480 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
481 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
482 latest_features: InitFeatures,
483 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
484 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
485 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
488 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
489 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
491 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
494 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
495 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
496 struct PendingInboundPayment {
497 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
498 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
499 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
500 /// this payment being removed.
502 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
503 user_payment_id: u64,
504 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
505 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
506 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
509 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
510 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
511 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
512 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
513 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
514 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
515 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
517 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
518 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
526 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
528 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
533 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
534 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
535 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
536 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
537 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
538 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
539 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
540 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
542 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
543 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
545 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
546 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
548 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
549 /// to individual Channels.
551 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
552 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
553 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
554 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
556 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
557 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
558 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
559 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
560 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
561 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
562 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
564 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
565 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
566 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
567 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
570 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
571 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
572 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
573 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
574 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
576 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
577 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
578 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
579 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
580 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
583 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
584 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
585 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
586 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
587 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
591 // `total_consistency_lock`
593 // |__`forward_htlcs`
595 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
597 // |__`per_peer_state`
599 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
601 // | |__`claimable_payments`
603 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
609 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
611 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
615 // | |__`pending_events`
617 // | |__`pending_background_events`
619 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
621 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
622 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
623 ES::Target: EntropySource,
624 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
625 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
626 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
630 default_configuration: UserConfig,
631 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
632 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
638 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
640 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
642 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
643 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
645 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
646 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
647 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
648 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
650 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
651 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
653 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
654 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
655 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
656 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
657 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
658 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
659 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
660 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
662 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
664 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
665 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
667 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
669 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
670 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
671 /// and via the classic SCID.
673 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
674 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
676 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
678 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
680 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
681 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
682 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
684 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
685 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
687 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
688 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
690 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
691 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
693 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
694 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
695 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
696 /// active channel list on load.
698 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
699 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
701 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
703 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
704 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
705 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
707 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
708 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
709 /// the handling of the events.
711 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
712 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
715 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
716 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
717 /// would break backwards compatability.
718 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
719 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
720 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
725 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
727 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
728 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
729 /// confirmation depth.
731 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
732 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
733 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
735 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
737 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
739 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
741 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
743 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
745 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
746 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
747 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
749 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
750 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
752 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
753 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
754 /// keeping additional state.
755 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
757 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
758 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
759 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
760 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
762 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
763 /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
766 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
767 /// are currently open with that peer.
769 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
770 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
773 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
775 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
776 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
777 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
778 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
779 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
781 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
782 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
783 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
784 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
785 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
786 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
787 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
788 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
789 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
790 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
791 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
793 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
802 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
804 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
805 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
806 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
807 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
808 pub struct ChainParameters {
809 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
810 pub network: Network,
812 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
814 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
815 pub best_block: BestBlock,
818 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
824 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
825 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
826 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
827 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
828 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
829 /// updates are ready for persistence).
831 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
832 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
833 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
834 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
835 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
837 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
838 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
841 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
842 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
843 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
846 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
847 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
849 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
850 persistence_notifier: notifier,
851 should_persist: persist_check,
852 _read_guard: read_guard,
857 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
859 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
860 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
865 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
866 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
868 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
870 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
871 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
872 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
873 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
874 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
876 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
877 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
879 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
881 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
882 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
883 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
884 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
885 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
886 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
887 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
888 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
889 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
890 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
891 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
892 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
893 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
895 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
896 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
898 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
899 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
900 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
901 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
903 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
904 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
905 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
906 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
907 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
908 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
911 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
913 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
914 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
917 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
919 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
920 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
922 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
923 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
924 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
925 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
927 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
928 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
929 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
930 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
931 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
932 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
933 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
934 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
935 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
936 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
937 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
940 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
941 /// to better separate parameters.
942 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
943 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
944 /// The node_id of our counterparty
945 pub node_id: PublicKey,
946 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
947 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
948 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
949 pub features: InitFeatures,
950 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
951 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
952 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
954 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
956 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
957 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
958 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
959 /// payments to us through this channel.
960 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
961 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
962 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
963 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
964 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
965 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
966 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
969 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
970 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
971 pub struct ChannelDetails {
972 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
973 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
974 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
975 /// lifetime of the channel.
976 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
977 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
978 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
979 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
980 /// our counterparty already.
982 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
983 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
984 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
985 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
987 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
988 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
989 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
990 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
992 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
993 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
995 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
996 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
998 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
999 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1000 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1001 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1002 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1003 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1004 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1005 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1006 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1009 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1011 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1012 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1013 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1014 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1015 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1016 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1017 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1019 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1020 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1022 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1023 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1024 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1025 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1026 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1027 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1028 /// this value on chain.
1030 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1032 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1034 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1035 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1036 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1037 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1039 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1040 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1041 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1042 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1044 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1045 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1046 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1047 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1049 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1050 pub balance_msat: u64,
1051 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1052 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1053 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1054 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1056 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1058 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1059 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1060 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1061 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1062 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1063 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1064 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1065 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1067 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1068 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1069 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1070 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1071 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1072 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1073 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1075 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1076 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1077 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1078 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1079 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1080 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1081 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1082 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1083 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1085 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1087 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1088 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1089 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1090 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1091 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1093 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1094 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1095 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1096 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1097 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1098 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1099 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1101 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1102 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1103 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1104 pub is_outbound: bool,
1105 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1106 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1107 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1108 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1109 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1111 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1112 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1113 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1114 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1116 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1117 pub is_usable: bool,
1118 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1119 pub is_public: bool,
1120 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1121 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1122 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1123 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1124 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1125 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1127 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1128 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1131 impl ChannelDetails {
1132 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1133 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1134 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1136 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1137 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1138 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1139 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1142 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1143 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1144 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1146 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1147 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1148 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1149 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1153 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1155 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1157 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1158 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1159 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1160 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1162 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1163 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1164 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1167 macro_rules! handle_error {
1168 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1171 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1172 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
1174 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1175 // entering the macro.
1176 debug_assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1177 debug_assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
1180 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1182 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1183 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1184 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1185 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1189 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1190 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1191 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1192 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1197 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1198 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1200 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1201 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1202 action: err.action.clone()
1206 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1207 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1208 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1209 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1210 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1212 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
1214 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1215 // This shouldn't occour in tests unless an unkown counterparty_node_id
1216 // has been passed to our message handling functions.
1217 let expected_error_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", $counterparty_node_id);
1219 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1220 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { ref channel_id, ref data }
1223 assert_eq!(*data, expected_error_str);
1224 if let Some((err_channel_id, _user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1225 debug_assert_eq!(*channel_id, err_channel_id);
1228 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Unexpected event"),
1234 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1241 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1242 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1243 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1244 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1245 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1246 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1248 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1249 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1250 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1251 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1252 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1254 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1255 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1257 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1261 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1262 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1263 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1265 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1266 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1268 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1269 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1271 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1272 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1273 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1274 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1275 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1276 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1282 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1283 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1287 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1289 $entry.remove_entry();
1297 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1298 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1302 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1304 $entry.remove_entry();
1312 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1313 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1315 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1316 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1322 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1323 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1325 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1326 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1327 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1328 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1329 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1330 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1331 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1332 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1333 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1334 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1335 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1336 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1337 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1338 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1341 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1342 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1343 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1344 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1345 match $action_type {
1346 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1347 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1349 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1350 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1352 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1353 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1354 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1355 if !$resend_commitment {
1356 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1359 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1361 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1362 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1364 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1369 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1370 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1372 $entry.remove_entry();
1376 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1377 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1378 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1380 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1381 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1383 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1384 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1386 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1387 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1389 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1390 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1394 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1395 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1396 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1397 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1398 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1400 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1401 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1402 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1403 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1404 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1405 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1406 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1407 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1408 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1409 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1414 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1415 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1416 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1418 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1419 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1420 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1421 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1422 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1423 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1426 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1431 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1433 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1434 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1435 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1436 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1437 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1438 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1442 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1444 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1445 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1447 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1449 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1450 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1451 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1452 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1453 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1454 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1455 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1456 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1458 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1459 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1460 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1465 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1467 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1468 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1469 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1470 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1471 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1472 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1473 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1474 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1476 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1479 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1480 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1482 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1484 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1486 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1488 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1489 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1490 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1491 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1501 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1502 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1503 &self.default_configuration
1506 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1507 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1508 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1511 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1512 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1514 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1516 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1520 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1525 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1527 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1528 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1529 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1530 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1531 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1533 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1534 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1536 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1537 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1538 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1540 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1541 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1542 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1543 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1544 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1545 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1547 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1548 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1549 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1550 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1551 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1552 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1556 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1557 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1559 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1561 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key);
1562 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) });
1566 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1568 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1569 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1570 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1571 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1572 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1573 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1577 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1582 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1584 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1585 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1588 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1590 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1596 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1597 node_id: their_network_key,
1600 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1603 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1604 let mut res = Vec::new();
1605 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1606 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1607 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1608 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1609 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1610 // the same channel.
1611 res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1613 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1614 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1615 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1616 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1617 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1618 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1619 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1620 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1621 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1622 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1623 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1624 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1625 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1626 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1627 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1628 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1629 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1630 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1631 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1632 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1633 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1634 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1635 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1636 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1638 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1639 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1640 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1641 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1642 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1643 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1644 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1645 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1646 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1647 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1648 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1649 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1650 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1651 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1652 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1653 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1654 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1655 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1656 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1657 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1658 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1659 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1660 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1661 config: Some(channel.config()),
1669 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1670 /// more information.
1671 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1672 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1675 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1676 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1678 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1679 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1682 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1683 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1684 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1685 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1686 // really wanted anyway.
1687 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1690 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1691 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1692 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1693 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1694 Some(transaction) => {
1695 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1699 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1700 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1701 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1702 reason: closure_reason
1706 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1709 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1710 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1711 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1713 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
1714 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1715 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
1718 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1719 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1720 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1722 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1723 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1725 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1726 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1727 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1728 let (result, is_permanent) =
1729 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1731 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1736 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1737 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1741 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1742 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1743 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1744 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1748 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1756 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1757 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1758 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1759 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1762 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1766 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1767 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1768 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1770 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1771 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1773 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1774 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1775 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1776 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1778 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1780 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1781 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1782 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1783 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1784 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1787 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1788 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1789 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1791 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1792 /// the channel being closed or not:
1793 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1794 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1795 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1796 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1797 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1798 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1799 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1801 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1803 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1804 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1805 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1806 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1807 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1811 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1812 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1813 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1814 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1815 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1816 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1817 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1818 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1820 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1821 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1822 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1823 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1824 // ignore the result here.
1825 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1829 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1830 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1831 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1832 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1833 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1834 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id);
1836 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1837 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
1839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1841 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1842 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1843 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1845 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1847 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1849 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1852 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1853 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1854 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1855 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1856 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1861 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1864 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1865 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1866 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1867 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1869 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1870 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1871 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1872 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1873 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1874 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1875 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1886 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1887 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1888 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1890 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1891 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1892 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1895 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1896 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1897 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1899 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1900 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1901 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1902 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1903 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1906 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1907 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1908 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1909 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1910 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1914 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1915 /// local transaction(s).
1916 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1917 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1918 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1922 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1923 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1925 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1926 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1927 return Err(ReceiveError {
1928 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1930 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1933 // final_expiry_too_soon
1934 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1935 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1937 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1938 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1939 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1940 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1941 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1942 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1943 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1944 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1945 return Err(ReceiveError {
1946 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1947 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1950 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1951 return Err(ReceiveError {
1953 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1954 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1958 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1959 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1960 return Err(ReceiveError {
1961 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1962 err_data: Vec::new(),
1963 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1966 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1967 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1968 return Err(ReceiveError {
1969 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1970 err_data: Vec::new(),
1971 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1973 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1974 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1976 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1977 phantom_shared_secret,
1979 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1980 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1981 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1982 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1983 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1984 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1985 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1986 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1987 return Err(ReceiveError {
1988 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1989 err_data: Vec::new(),
1990 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1994 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1996 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1999 return Err(ReceiveError {
2000 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2001 err_data: Vec::new(),
2002 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2007 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2010 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2011 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2012 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2013 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2017 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2018 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2019 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2021 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2022 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2023 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2024 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2025 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2026 failure_code: $err_code,
2032 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2033 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2036 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2037 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2038 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2040 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2041 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2042 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2043 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2044 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2045 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2046 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2047 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2049 macro_rules! return_err {
2050 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2052 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2053 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2054 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2055 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2056 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2057 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2063 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2065 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2066 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2068 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2069 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2073 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2074 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2076 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2078 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2079 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2080 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2081 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2082 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2084 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2087 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2088 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2089 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2091 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2092 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2093 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2096 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2097 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2098 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2099 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2103 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2104 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2105 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2108 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2109 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2110 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2111 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2112 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2117 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2118 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2119 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2120 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2121 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2122 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2123 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2124 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2125 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2126 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2127 // phantom or an intercept.
2128 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2129 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2130 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2134 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2137 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2139 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2140 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2141 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2142 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2143 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2147 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2149 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2150 // have no consistency guarantees.
2151 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2155 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2156 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2157 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2158 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2159 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2161 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2162 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2163 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2164 // we don't have the channel here.
2165 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2167 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2169 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2170 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2171 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2172 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2173 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2174 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2175 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2177 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2178 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2180 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2181 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2185 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2186 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2187 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2188 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2190 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2197 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2198 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2199 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2200 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2201 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2202 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2204 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2205 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2207 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2208 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2209 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2210 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2211 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2212 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2213 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2214 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2215 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2216 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2222 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2223 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2224 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2225 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2227 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2228 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2230 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2231 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2232 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2234 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2235 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2236 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2237 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2238 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2239 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2240 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2244 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2249 pending_forward_info
2252 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2253 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2254 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2256 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2257 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2258 if !chan.should_announce() {
2259 return Err(LightningError {
2260 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2261 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2264 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2265 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2268 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2271 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2272 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2273 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2274 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2275 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2276 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2278 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2279 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2283 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2285 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2287 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2289 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2290 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2292 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2293 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2294 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2295 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2296 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2297 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2298 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2299 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2301 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2302 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2303 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2305 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2307 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2313 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2314 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2315 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2316 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2317 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2319 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2320 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2321 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2322 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2323 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2325 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2327 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2329 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2330 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2331 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2332 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2335 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2336 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2337 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2338 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" });
2340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2342 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2344 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2345 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2347 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2348 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2350 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2351 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2353 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2354 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2355 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2358 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2359 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2360 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2362 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2363 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2365 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2366 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2367 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2368 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2369 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2370 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2371 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2372 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2373 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2374 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2376 _ => unreachable!(),
2379 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2380 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2381 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2382 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2383 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2384 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2385 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2386 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2395 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2396 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2397 // `channel_by_id` map.
2398 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2399 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2404 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2405 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2407 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2412 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2414 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2415 /// fields for more info.
2417 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2418 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2419 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2420 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2423 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2424 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2425 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2426 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2427 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2429 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2430 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2432 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2433 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2434 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2436 /// In general, a path may raise:
2437 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2438 /// node public key) is specified.
2439 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2440 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2442 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2443 /// relevant updates.
2445 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2446 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2447 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2449 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2450 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2451 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2452 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2455 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2456 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2457 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2459 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2460 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2461 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2462 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2463 self.pending_outbound_payments
2464 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2465 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2466 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2470 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2471 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2472 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2473 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2474 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2478 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2479 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2480 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2484 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2486 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2487 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2488 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2489 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2490 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2492 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2493 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2494 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2495 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2496 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2497 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2498 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2501 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2503 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2504 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2505 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2507 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2508 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2509 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2511 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2512 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2513 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2514 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2515 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2517 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2518 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2519 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2520 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2521 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2523 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2524 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2528 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2529 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2530 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2531 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2532 /// never reach the recipient.
2534 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2535 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2537 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2538 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2540 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2542 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2543 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2544 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2545 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2546 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2547 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2550 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2551 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2552 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2553 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2554 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2555 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2556 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2557 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2560 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2563 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2564 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2567 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2568 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2569 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2570 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2571 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2573 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2574 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2575 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
2578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2582 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2584 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2586 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2587 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2588 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2589 } else { unreachable!(); })
2592 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2595 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2596 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2599 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2600 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2605 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2606 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2609 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2611 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2614 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2615 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2616 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2625 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2626 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2627 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2631 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2633 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2634 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2636 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2637 /// across the p2p network.
2639 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2640 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2642 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2643 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2644 /// keys per-channel).
2646 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2647 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2648 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2650 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2651 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2652 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2654 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2655 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2656 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2657 /// for more details.
2659 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2660 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2661 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2664 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2665 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2666 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2667 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2672 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2673 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2674 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2675 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2676 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2677 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2678 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2682 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2683 let mut output_index = None;
2684 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2685 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2686 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2687 if output_index.is_some() {
2688 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2689 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2692 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2693 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2694 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2697 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2700 if output_index.is_none() {
2701 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2702 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2705 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2709 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2711 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2712 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2713 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2714 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2716 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2717 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2719 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2720 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2722 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2724 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2725 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2726 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2727 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2728 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2729 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2730 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2731 pub fn update_channel_config(
2732 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2733 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2734 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2735 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2736 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2741 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2744 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2745 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2746 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
2748 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2749 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2750 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2751 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2752 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2753 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2757 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2758 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2759 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2762 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2763 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2764 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2765 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2766 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2774 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2775 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2777 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2778 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2780 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2781 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2782 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2783 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2784 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2786 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2787 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2789 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2792 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2793 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2794 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2795 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2796 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2799 let next_hop_scid = {
2800 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2801 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
2802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2804 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2806 if !chan.is_usable() {
2807 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2808 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2811 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2813 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2814 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2818 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) });
2822 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2823 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2824 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2827 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2828 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2829 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2831 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2833 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2834 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2837 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2838 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2839 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2840 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2841 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2843 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2847 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2848 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2850 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2853 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2854 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2857 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2858 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2859 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2862 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2863 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2864 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2865 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2866 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2867 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2868 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2871 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2872 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2873 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2874 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2879 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2881 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2882 /// Will likely generate further events.
2883 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2886 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2887 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2888 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2890 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2891 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2893 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2894 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2895 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2897 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2898 match forward_info {
2899 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2900 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2901 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2902 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2903 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2906 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2907 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2908 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2910 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2911 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2912 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2913 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2914 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2915 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2918 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2919 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2921 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2924 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2925 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2931 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2932 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2934 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2938 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2939 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2941 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2945 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2946 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2947 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2948 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2949 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2951 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2952 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2953 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2954 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2955 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2957 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2959 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2960 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2964 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2965 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2966 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2967 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2973 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2976 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2979 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2980 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2981 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2982 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2983 // problem, not ours.
2989 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
2990 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2992 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2997 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2998 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2999 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3002 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3004 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3006 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3010 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3011 match forward_info {
3012 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3013 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3014 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3015 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3016 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3019 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3020 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3021 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3022 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3023 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3024 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3025 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3026 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3028 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3029 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3030 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3032 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3033 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3035 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3037 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3038 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3039 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3040 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3045 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3046 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3048 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3050 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3051 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3053 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3056 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3058 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3059 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3060 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3069 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3070 match forward_info {
3071 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3072 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3073 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3074 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3077 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3078 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3079 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3080 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3082 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3083 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3085 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3088 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3089 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3090 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3091 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3092 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3093 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3094 phantom_shared_secret,
3096 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3098 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3103 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3104 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3105 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3106 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3107 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3109 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3110 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3111 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3112 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3113 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3114 phantom_shared_secret,
3116 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3117 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3121 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3122 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3123 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3124 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3125 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3128 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3129 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3130 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3132 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3133 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3134 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3137 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3138 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3139 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3142 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3143 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3144 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3145 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3147 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3151 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3152 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3153 total_value += htlc.value;
3154 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3155 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3156 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3158 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3159 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3161 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3163 _ => unreachable!(),
3166 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3168 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3169 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3170 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3171 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3172 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3173 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3174 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3177 amount_msat: total_value,
3178 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3179 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3181 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3183 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3184 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3186 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3188 payment_claimable_generated
3192 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3193 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3194 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3195 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3196 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3197 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3198 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3199 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3201 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3202 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3203 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3204 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3205 Ok(result) => result,
3207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3208 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3212 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3213 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3214 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3216 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3217 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3221 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3223 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3224 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3225 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3226 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3229 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3231 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3232 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3233 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3234 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3235 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3237 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3239 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3240 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3244 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3245 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3251 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3252 if payment_data.is_none() {
3253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3254 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3257 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3258 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3260 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3261 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3262 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3263 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3264 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3266 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3267 if payment_claimable_generated {
3268 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3274 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3275 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3283 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3284 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3286 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3288 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3289 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3290 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3292 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3294 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3295 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3296 events.append(&mut new_events);
3299 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3301 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3302 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3304 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3305 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3306 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3307 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3308 if background_events.is_empty() {
3312 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3314 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3315 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3316 // monitor updating completing.
3317 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3324 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3325 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3326 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3327 self.process_background_events();
3330 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3331 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3332 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3333 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3334 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3335 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3336 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3338 if !chan.is_live() {
3339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3340 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3341 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3344 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3346 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3347 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3351 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3352 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3353 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3354 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3355 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3356 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3357 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3359 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3361 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3362 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3365 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3366 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3367 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3375 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3377 /// This currently includes:
3378 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3379 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3380 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3382 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3383 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3385 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3386 /// estimate fetches.
3387 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3388 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3389 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3390 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3392 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3394 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3395 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3398 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3401 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3402 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3403 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3404 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3406 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3407 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3408 handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
3409 if needs_close { return false; }
3412 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3413 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3414 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3415 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3416 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3417 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3418 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3419 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3423 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3424 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3426 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3427 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3428 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3432 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3433 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3438 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3445 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3446 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3447 // This should be unreachable
3448 debug_assert!(false);
3451 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3452 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3453 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3454 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3456 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3457 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3458 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3460 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3467 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3468 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3469 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3470 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3471 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3474 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3475 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3478 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3480 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3481 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3482 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3483 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3484 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3491 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3492 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3493 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3495 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3496 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3497 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3498 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3500 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3501 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3502 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3503 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3504 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3505 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3508 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3509 /// reason for the failure.
3511 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3512 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3515 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3516 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3517 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3518 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3519 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3520 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3521 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3526 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3527 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3528 match failure_code {
3529 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3530 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3531 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3532 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3533 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3534 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3539 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3540 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3542 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3544 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3545 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3546 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3547 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3548 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3549 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3550 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3552 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3554 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3555 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3557 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3562 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3563 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3564 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3565 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3566 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3567 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3568 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3569 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3570 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3571 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3573 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3574 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3575 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3576 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3578 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3579 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3580 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3581 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3582 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3586 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3587 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3588 // be surfaced to the user.
3589 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3590 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3591 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3593 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3594 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3595 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3596 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3597 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3598 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3600 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3604 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3607 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3608 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3609 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3610 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3614 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3615 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3616 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3617 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
3619 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this
3621 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3622 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3623 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock aquired would.
3624 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3625 for (_, peer) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3626 debug_assert!(peer.try_lock().is_ok());
3630 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3631 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3632 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3635 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3636 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3637 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3639 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3640 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3642 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3643 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3644 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3646 let mut forward_event = None;
3647 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3648 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3649 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3651 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3652 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3653 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3656 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3659 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3660 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3661 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3662 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3663 time_forwardable: time
3666 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3667 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3668 failed_next_destination: destination,
3674 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3675 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3677 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3678 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3679 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3681 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3682 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3683 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3684 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3686 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3687 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3688 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3689 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3690 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3691 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3692 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3697 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3698 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3699 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3700 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3701 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3702 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3703 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3704 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3709 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3710 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3711 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3713 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3714 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3715 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3716 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3721 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3723 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3724 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3725 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3726 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3727 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3729 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3730 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3732 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3733 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3734 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3735 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3736 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3738 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3739 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3740 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3741 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3742 let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap());
3743 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3744 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3745 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3752 if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
3758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3761 if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3766 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3767 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3768 debug_assert!(false);
3773 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3774 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3775 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3776 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3777 if sources.len() != 1 {
3778 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3779 debug_assert!(false);
3785 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3787 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3788 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3789 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3790 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3793 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3794 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3795 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3796 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3797 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3801 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3802 if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); }
3803 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(per_peer_state.take().unwrap(),
3804 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3805 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3807 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3808 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3809 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3810 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3811 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3815 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3817 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3818 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3819 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3820 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3821 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3822 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3823 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3825 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3828 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3829 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3830 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3831 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3835 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3836 per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
3837 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3838 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3839 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3841 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3843 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3844 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3848 let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
3849 let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
3850 let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3851 let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
3852 (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
3853 } else { (false, None) };
3856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap();
3857 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3858 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3859 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3860 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3861 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3862 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3863 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3865 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3866 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3867 payment_preimage, e);
3868 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3869 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3870 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3871 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3872 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3875 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3876 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3877 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3878 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3879 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3880 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3881 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3882 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3883 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3884 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3890 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3891 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3892 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3898 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3899 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3900 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3902 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3903 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3904 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3905 // again on restart.
3906 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3907 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3908 payment_preimage, e);
3911 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3913 chan.remove_entry();
3915 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3916 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3917 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3918 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3922 // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
3923 // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
3927 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3928 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3929 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3933 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3934 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3935 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
3936 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3937 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3938 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3939 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3940 // again on restart.
3941 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3942 payment_preimage, update_res);
3944 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3945 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3946 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3947 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3948 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3949 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3950 // `PaymentForwarded`).
3951 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3956 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3957 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3960 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3962 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3963 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3965 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3966 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3967 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage,
3968 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
3969 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3970 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3971 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3974 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
3975 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
3977 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3979 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3985 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
3986 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3987 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3993 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3994 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3995 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3998 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
3999 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4001 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4002 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4003 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4004 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4005 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4009 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4010 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4016 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4017 /// update completion.
4018 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4019 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4020 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4021 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4022 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4023 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4024 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4026 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4027 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4028 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4029 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4032 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4033 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4035 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4036 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4037 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4042 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4044 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4045 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4046 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4047 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4052 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4053 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4054 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4055 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4056 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4061 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4065 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4071 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4072 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4073 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4079 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4080 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4083 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4084 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4085 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4087 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4088 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4089 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4090 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4091 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4097 let mut peer_state_lock;
4098 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4099 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return }
4100 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4103 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4105 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4108 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4112 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4113 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4114 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4115 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4116 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4117 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4119 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4120 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4121 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4126 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4127 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4128 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4131 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4133 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4134 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4136 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4137 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4138 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4139 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4143 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4145 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4146 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4149 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4150 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4151 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4153 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4154 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4155 /// used to accept such channels.
4157 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4158 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4159 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4160 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4163 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4164 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4166 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4167 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4168 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4170 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4171 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4173 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4174 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4176 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4177 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4179 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4180 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4181 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4182 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4185 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4186 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4189 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4190 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4191 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
4193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4195 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4197 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4198 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4201 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4202 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4203 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4204 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4205 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4206 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4209 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4210 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4211 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4214 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4215 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4216 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4220 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4226 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4227 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4228 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4231 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4235 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4236 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4237 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4239 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4240 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4241 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4242 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4243 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4245 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4246 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4247 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4248 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4249 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4252 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4253 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4257 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4259 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4260 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4263 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4264 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4267 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4268 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4269 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4272 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4273 pending_events.push(
4274 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4275 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4276 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4277 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4278 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4279 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4284 entry.insert(channel);
4290 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4291 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4292 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4293 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4294 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4295 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4297 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4298 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4299 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4301 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4302 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4307 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4308 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4309 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4310 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4311 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4313 user_channel_id: user_id,
4318 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4320 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4321 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4322 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4324 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4325 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4326 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4327 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4328 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4330 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4335 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4336 // lock before watch_channel
4337 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4338 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4340 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4341 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4342 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4343 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4344 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4345 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4346 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4347 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4348 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4351 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4352 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4353 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4354 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4355 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4356 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4357 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4360 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4361 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4362 // the channel above.
4363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4365 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4370 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4371 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4373 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4374 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4375 funding_msg.channel_id))
4377 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4378 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4381 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4382 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4385 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4386 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4394 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4396 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4398 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4399 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4405 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4407 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4408 Ok(update) => update,
4409 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4411 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4412 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4414 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4415 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4416 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4417 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4418 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4419 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4420 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4426 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4427 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4434 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4435 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4439 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4441 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4442 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4445 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4446 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4447 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4448 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4449 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4450 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4451 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4454 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4455 msg: announcement_sigs,
4457 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4458 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4459 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4460 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4461 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4462 // announcement_signatures.
4463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4464 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4465 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4466 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4472 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4480 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4481 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4482 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4483 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4484 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4485 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4488 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4489 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4490 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4493 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4494 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4495 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4496 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4499 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4500 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4502 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4503 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4504 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4505 let (result, is_permanent) =
4506 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4508 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4513 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4514 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4515 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4525 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4526 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4527 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4528 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4531 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4535 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4537 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4538 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4539 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4541 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4542 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4543 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4544 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4546 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4547 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4548 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4549 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4554 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4555 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4556 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4557 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4558 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4559 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4560 } else { (tx, None) }
4562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4565 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4566 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4567 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4569 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4570 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4571 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4572 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4573 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4577 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4582 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4583 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4584 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4585 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4587 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4588 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4589 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4590 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4592 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4593 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4594 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4595 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4596 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4600 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4603 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4604 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4605 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4606 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4607 match pending_forward_info {
4608 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4609 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4610 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4611 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4613 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4614 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4615 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4616 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4617 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4620 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4622 _ => pending_forward_info
4625 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4632 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4633 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4635 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4636 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4637 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4641 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4643 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4648 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4652 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4653 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4654 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4655 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4656 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4660 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4662 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4664 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4669 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4671 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4672 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4673 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4677 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4679 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4680 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4681 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4683 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4690 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4692 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4693 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4694 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4696 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4697 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4698 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4700 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4701 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4702 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4703 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4704 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4705 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4706 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4711 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4712 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4716 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4717 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4718 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4720 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4721 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4722 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4723 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4724 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4725 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4726 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4727 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4729 commitment_signed: msg,
4735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4740 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4741 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4742 let mut forward_event = None;
4743 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4744 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4745 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4746 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4747 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4748 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4749 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4750 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4752 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4753 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4755 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4756 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4757 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4759 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4760 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4763 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4764 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4766 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4767 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4768 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4770 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4771 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4772 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4773 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4774 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4777 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4778 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4781 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4782 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4783 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4784 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4785 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4786 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4787 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4790 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4791 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4792 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4797 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4798 // payments are being processed.
4799 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4800 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4802 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4803 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4810 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4814 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4815 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4816 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4819 match forward_event {
4821 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4822 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4823 time_forwardable: time
4831 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4832 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4835 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4836 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4837 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4841 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4843 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4844 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4845 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4846 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4847 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4848 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4849 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4850 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4851 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4852 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4853 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4854 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4856 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4857 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4858 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4859 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4860 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4861 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4863 } else { unreachable!(); }
4865 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4866 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4867 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4871 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4872 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4873 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4874 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4875 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4876 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4881 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4883 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4884 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4886 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4887 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4888 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4890 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4891 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4898 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4900 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4901 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4902 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4906 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4908 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4910 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4915 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4917 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4918 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4919 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4921 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4923 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4925 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4929 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4930 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4931 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
4932 msg, &self.default_configuration
4934 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4935 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4936 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4939 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4944 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4945 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4946 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4947 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4949 // It's not a local channel
4950 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4953 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4954 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
4955 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4956 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4960 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4962 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4963 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4964 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4965 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4966 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4967 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4971 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4972 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4973 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4974 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4976 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
4977 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
4980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4982 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4985 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4987 let need_lnd_workaround = {
4988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4990 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4991 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4992 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4994 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4996 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4998 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4999 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5000 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5001 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5002 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5003 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5004 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5005 let mut channel_update = None;
5006 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5007 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5008 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5011 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5012 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5013 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5014 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5015 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5016 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5017 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5022 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5023 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5024 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5025 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5026 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5027 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5031 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5035 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5036 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5039 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5040 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5045 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5046 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5047 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5048 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5049 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5050 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5051 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5052 match monitor_event {
5053 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5054 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5055 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5056 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5058 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5059 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5060 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5061 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5064 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5065 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5066 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5067 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5069 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5070 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5071 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5072 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5075 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5077 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5078 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5079 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5080 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5081 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5082 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5083 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5084 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5085 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5089 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5090 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5092 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5094 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5095 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5096 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5097 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5098 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5105 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5106 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5112 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5113 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5116 has_pending_monitor_events
5119 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5120 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5121 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5123 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5124 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5127 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5128 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5129 /// update was applied.
5130 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5131 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5132 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5133 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5135 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5137 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5138 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5139 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5140 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5141 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5142 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5143 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5144 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5146 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5148 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5151 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5152 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5153 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5154 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5155 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5156 updates: commitment_update,
5160 has_monitor_update = true;
5161 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5162 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5163 if close_channel { return false; }
5170 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5171 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5172 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5180 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5181 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5182 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5185 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5186 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5192 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5193 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5194 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5195 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5196 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5197 let mut has_update = false;
5199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5201 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5202 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5203 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5204 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5205 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5206 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5207 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5208 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5210 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5211 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5214 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5215 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5216 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5217 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5218 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5223 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5225 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5226 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5227 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5233 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5234 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5242 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5243 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5249 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5250 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5252 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5253 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5254 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5255 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5256 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5257 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5258 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5259 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5260 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5261 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5262 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5263 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5264 assert!(should_broadcast);
5265 } else { unreachable!(); }
5266 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5268 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5272 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5273 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5275 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5276 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5279 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5282 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5283 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5285 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5286 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5287 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5288 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5289 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5290 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5291 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5292 // never fail a payment too early.
5293 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5295 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5303 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5306 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5307 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5309 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5310 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5311 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5313 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5315 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5316 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5320 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5321 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5323 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5325 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5326 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5328 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5329 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5330 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5331 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5332 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5333 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5334 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5335 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5336 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5339 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5340 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5342 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5345 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5347 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5349 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5350 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5351 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5352 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5353 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5356 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5357 /// stored external to LDK.
5359 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5360 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5361 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5363 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5364 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5367 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5368 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5369 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5370 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5372 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5373 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5374 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5375 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5376 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5378 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5379 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5380 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5381 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5382 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5384 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5385 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5387 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5388 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5392 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5393 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5395 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5397 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5398 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5400 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5401 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5402 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5403 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5404 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5405 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5406 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5409 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5410 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5412 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5415 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5417 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5419 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5420 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5423 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5424 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5426 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5427 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5428 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5431 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5432 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5434 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5435 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5436 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5437 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5439 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5440 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5441 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5442 Some(_) => continue,
5443 None => return scid_candidate
5448 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5450 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5451 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5453 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5454 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5455 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5459 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5460 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5461 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5463 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5464 /// times to get a unique scid.
5465 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5466 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5467 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5469 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5470 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5471 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5472 return scid_candidate
5476 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5477 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5478 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5479 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5482 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5483 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5484 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5485 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5486 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5487 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5488 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5497 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5498 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5499 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5500 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5501 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5506 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5507 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5508 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5512 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5513 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5517 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5518 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5521 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5522 /// using the given event handler.
5524 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5525 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5528 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5529 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5530 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5532 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5534 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5535 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5536 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5537 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5540 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5541 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5542 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5545 for event in pending_events {
5546 handler(event).await;
5549 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5550 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5555 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5557 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5558 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5559 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5560 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5561 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5562 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5566 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5567 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5568 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5569 /// is always placed next to each other.
5571 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5572 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5573 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5574 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5576 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5577 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5578 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5579 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5580 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5581 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5582 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5584 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5585 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5586 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5587 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5590 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5591 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5593 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5594 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5597 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5599 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5600 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5601 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5602 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5603 let mut peer_pending_events = Vec::new();
5604 mem::swap(&mut peer_pending_events, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5605 pending_events.append(&mut peer_pending_events);
5609 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5610 events.replace(pending_events);
5619 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5621 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5622 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5623 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5624 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5625 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5626 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5630 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5632 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5633 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5634 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5635 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5636 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5638 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5639 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5640 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5641 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5644 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5645 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5646 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5649 for event in pending_events {
5650 handler.handle_event(event);
5658 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5660 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5661 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5662 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5663 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5664 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5665 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5669 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5671 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5672 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5673 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5674 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5675 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5678 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5679 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5682 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5684 let new_height = height - 1;
5686 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5687 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5688 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5689 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5690 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5691 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5694 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5698 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5700 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5701 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5702 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5703 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5704 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5705 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5709 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5710 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5711 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5712 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5714 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5715 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5718 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5719 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5721 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5722 if height < last_best_block_height {
5723 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5724 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5728 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5729 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5730 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5731 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5733 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5734 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5738 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5740 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5742 macro_rules! max_time {
5743 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5745 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5746 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5747 // having an explicit local time source.
5748 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5749 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5750 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5751 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5752 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5758 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5759 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5760 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5761 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5765 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5766 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5767 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5770 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5771 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5772 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5779 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5781 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5782 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5783 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5784 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5785 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5786 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5791 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5793 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5794 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5795 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5796 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5797 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5802 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5803 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5805 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5806 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5807 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5808 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5809 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5811 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5812 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5815 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5818 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5819 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5820 let res = f(channel);
5821 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5822 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5823 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5824 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5825 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5827 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5828 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5829 if channel.is_usable() {
5830 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5831 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5832 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5833 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5838 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5842 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5844 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5845 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5846 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5847 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5848 msg: announcement_sigs,
5850 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5851 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5852 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5854 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5855 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5856 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5861 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5862 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5863 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5864 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5865 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5866 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5867 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5868 // is always consistent.
5869 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5870 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5871 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5872 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5873 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5876 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5877 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5878 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5879 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5880 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5881 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5882 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5886 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5887 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5888 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5889 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5890 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5891 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5892 data: reason_message,
5902 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5903 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5904 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5905 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5906 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5907 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5908 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5909 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5910 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5911 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5913 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5914 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5915 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5919 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5922 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5923 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5924 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5925 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5926 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5927 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5928 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5929 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5930 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5933 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5934 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5935 _ => unreachable!(),
5937 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5938 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5939 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5940 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5946 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5948 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5949 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5953 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5954 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5955 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5956 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5958 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5960 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5961 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5962 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5963 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5964 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5965 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5968 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5969 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5970 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5972 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5973 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5974 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5975 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5978 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5979 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5980 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5981 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5982 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5985 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5986 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5987 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5990 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5991 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5992 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5993 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5996 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5997 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5998 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
5999 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6002 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6003 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6005 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6006 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6007 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6008 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6009 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6012 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6013 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6014 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6015 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6018 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6019 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6020 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6021 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6024 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6025 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6026 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6027 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6031 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6032 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6034 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6035 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6036 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6037 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6038 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6039 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6043 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6044 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6045 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6048 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6050 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6053 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6055 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6058 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6060 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6063 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6065 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6068 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6070 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6073 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6075 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6078 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6080 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6083 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6084 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6085 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6088 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6090 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6093 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6095 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6098 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6100 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6103 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6105 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6108 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6110 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6113 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6115 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6118 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6119 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6120 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6123 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6128 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6130 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6133 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6134 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6135 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6136 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6137 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6139 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6140 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6141 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6142 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6143 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6144 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6145 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6146 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6147 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6148 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6149 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6152 no_channels_remain = false;
6156 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6158 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6159 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6161 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6162 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6163 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6164 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6165 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6166 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6167 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6168 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6169 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6170 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6171 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6172 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6173 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6174 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6175 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6176 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6177 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6182 if no_channels_remain {
6183 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6185 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6187 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6188 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6192 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6193 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6194 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6198 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6203 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6204 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6206 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6207 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6208 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6209 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6212 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6213 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6218 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6220 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6223 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6224 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6225 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6226 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6227 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6228 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6229 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6233 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6234 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6235 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6240 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6241 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6242 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6244 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6253 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6257 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6260 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6261 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6263 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6264 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6265 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6266 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6267 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6269 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6270 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6271 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6275 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6276 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6277 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6278 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6279 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6280 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6281 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6282 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6283 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6284 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6292 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6293 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6297 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6298 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6301 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6302 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6306 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6307 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6308 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6309 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6312 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6313 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6315 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6316 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6317 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6318 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6319 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6322 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6323 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6324 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6325 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6328 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6329 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6330 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6331 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6334 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6335 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6336 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6337 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6338 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6339 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6340 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6341 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6342 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6343 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6344 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6345 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6346 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6347 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6348 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6349 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6350 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6351 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6353 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6354 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6355 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6361 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6362 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6364 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6365 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6366 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6367 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6370 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6371 (2, node_id, required),
6372 (4, features, required),
6373 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6374 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6375 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6376 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6379 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6380 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6381 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6382 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6383 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6384 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6385 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6386 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6387 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6388 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6389 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6390 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6391 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6392 (7, self.config, option),
6393 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6394 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6395 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6396 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6397 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6398 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6399 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6400 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6401 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6402 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6403 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6404 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6405 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6406 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6407 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6408 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6409 (32, self.is_public, required),
6410 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6411 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6412 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6418 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6419 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6420 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6421 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6422 (2, channel_id, required),
6423 (3, channel_type, option),
6424 (4, counterparty, required),
6425 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6426 (6, funding_txo, option),
6427 (7, config, option),
6428 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6429 (9, confirmations, option),
6430 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6431 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6432 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6433 (16, balance_msat, required),
6434 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6435 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6436 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6437 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6438 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6439 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6440 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6441 (26, is_outbound, required),
6442 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6443 (30, is_usable, required),
6444 (32, is_public, required),
6445 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6446 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6447 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6450 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6451 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6452 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6453 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6454 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6458 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6460 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6461 outbound_scid_alias,
6465 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6466 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6468 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6469 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6470 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6471 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6472 confirmations_required,
6474 force_close_spend_delay,
6475 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6476 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6477 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6478 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6479 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6480 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6485 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6486 (2, channels, vec_type),
6487 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6488 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6491 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6493 (0, onion_packet, required),
6494 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6497 (0, payment_data, required),
6498 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6499 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6501 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6502 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6503 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6507 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6508 (0, routing, required),
6509 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6510 (4, payment_hash, required),
6511 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6512 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6513 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6517 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6518 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6520 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6522 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6523 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6524 reason.write(writer)?;
6526 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6527 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6530 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6531 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6532 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6533 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6540 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6541 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6542 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6545 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6546 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6547 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6548 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6552 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6553 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6554 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6555 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6556 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6559 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6560 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6561 // messages contained in the variants.
6562 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6563 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6564 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6566 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6567 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6568 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6569 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6570 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6573 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6574 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6575 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6576 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6577 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6579 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6584 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6589 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6590 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6591 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6592 (2, outpoint, required),
6593 (4, htlc_id, required),
6594 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6597 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6598 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6599 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6600 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6601 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6603 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6604 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6605 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6606 (2, self.value, required),
6607 (4, payment_data, option),
6608 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6609 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6615 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6616 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6617 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6619 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6620 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6621 let mut total_msat = None;
6622 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6623 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6624 (0, prev_hop, required),
6625 (1, total_msat, option),
6626 (2, value, required),
6627 (4, payment_data, option),
6628 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6629 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6631 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6633 if payment_data.is_some() {
6634 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6636 if total_msat.is_none() {
6637 total_msat = Some(value);
6639 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6642 if total_msat.is_none() {
6643 if payment_data.is_none() {
6644 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6646 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6648 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6652 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6655 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6662 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6663 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6664 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6668 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6669 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6670 let mut payment_id = None;
6671 let mut payment_secret = None;
6672 let mut payment_params = None;
6673 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6674 (0, session_priv, required),
6675 (1, payment_id, option),
6676 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6677 (3, payment_secret, option),
6678 (4, path, vec_type),
6679 (5, payment_params, option),
6681 if payment_id.is_none() {
6682 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6684 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6686 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6687 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6688 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6689 path: path.unwrap(),
6690 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6695 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6696 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6701 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6702 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6704 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6706 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6707 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6708 (0, session_priv, required),
6709 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6710 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6711 (3, payment_secret, option),
6712 (4, *path, vec_type),
6713 (5, payment_params, option),
6716 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6718 field.write(writer)?;
6725 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6726 (0, forward_info, required),
6727 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6728 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6729 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6730 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6733 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6735 (0, htlc_id, required),
6736 (2, err_packet, required),
6741 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6742 (0, payment_secret, required),
6743 (2, expiry_time, required),
6744 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6745 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6746 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6749 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6751 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6752 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6753 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6754 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6755 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6756 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6760 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6761 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6763 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6765 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6767 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6768 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6769 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6773 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6774 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6775 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6776 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6779 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6780 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6781 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6782 unfunded_channels += 1;
6787 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6789 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6790 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6791 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6792 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6793 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6794 channel.write(writer)?;
6801 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6802 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6803 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6804 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6805 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6806 for forward in pending_forwards {
6807 forward.write(writer)?;
6812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6814 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6815 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6816 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6818 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6819 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6820 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6821 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6822 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6823 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6824 htlc.write(writer)?;
6826 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6829 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6830 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6831 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6832 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6833 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6836 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6837 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6838 for event in events.iter() {
6839 event.write(writer)?;
6842 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6843 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6844 for event in background_events.iter() {
6846 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6848 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6849 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6854 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6855 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6856 // likely to be identical.
6857 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6858 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6860 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6861 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6862 hash.write(writer)?;
6863 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6866 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6867 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6868 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6869 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6870 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6873 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6874 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6876 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6877 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6878 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6879 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6882 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6883 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6887 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6888 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6889 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6891 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6892 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6893 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6899 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6900 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6901 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6902 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6905 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6906 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6907 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6908 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6909 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6911 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6914 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6915 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6916 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6917 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6918 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6919 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6920 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6921 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6922 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6929 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6931 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6933 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6934 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6935 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6936 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6937 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6938 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6939 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6940 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6941 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6942 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6943 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6944 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6945 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6947 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6948 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6950 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6951 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6953 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6954 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6955 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6956 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6957 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6958 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6960 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6961 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6963 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6964 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6965 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6966 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6967 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6968 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6972 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
6973 pub entropy_source: ES,
6975 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
6976 pub node_signer: NS,
6978 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6979 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6981 pub signer_provider: SP,
6983 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6985 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6986 pub fee_estimator: F,
6987 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6989 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6990 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6991 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6992 pub chain_monitor: M,
6994 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6995 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6996 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6997 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6998 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
6999 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7001 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7003 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7004 /// deserialization.
7006 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7007 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7008 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7010 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7011 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7013 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7014 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7015 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7016 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7018 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7021 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7022 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7025 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7026 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7028 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7029 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7030 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7031 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7032 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7033 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7037 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7038 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7039 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7040 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7041 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7043 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7044 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7049 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7050 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7051 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7052 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7054 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7055 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7056 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7057 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7058 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7059 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7063 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7064 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7065 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7069 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7070 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7072 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7073 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7074 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7075 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7076 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7077 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7081 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7082 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7084 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7085 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7086 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7088 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7090 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7091 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7092 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7093 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7094 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7095 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7096 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7097 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7098 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7100 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7101 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7102 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7103 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7104 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7105 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7106 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7107 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7108 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7109 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7110 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7111 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7112 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7113 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7114 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7115 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7116 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7117 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7118 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7119 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7120 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7121 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7122 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7123 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7124 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7125 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7126 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7127 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7128 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7129 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7130 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7131 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7133 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7134 let mut found_htlc = false;
7135 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7136 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7139 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7140 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7141 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7142 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7143 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7144 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7145 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7146 log_info!(args.logger,
7147 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7148 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7149 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7153 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7154 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7155 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7157 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7158 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7160 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7162 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7163 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7166 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7167 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7168 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7172 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7173 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7174 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7175 // safely discard the channel.
7176 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7177 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7178 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7179 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7180 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7183 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7184 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7185 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7186 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7187 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7188 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7192 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7193 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7194 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7195 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7199 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7200 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7201 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7202 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7203 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7205 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7206 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7207 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7209 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7212 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7214 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7215 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7216 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7217 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7218 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7219 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7221 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7224 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7225 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7226 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7227 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7228 let peer_state = PeerState {
7229 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7230 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7231 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7233 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7236 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7237 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7238 for _ in 0..event_count {
7239 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7240 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7245 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7246 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7247 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7248 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7249 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7250 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7254 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7255 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7257 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7258 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7259 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7260 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7261 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7265 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7266 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7267 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7268 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7269 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7270 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7271 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7273 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7274 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7278 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7279 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7280 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7281 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7282 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7283 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7284 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7285 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7286 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7287 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7288 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7289 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7290 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7291 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7292 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7293 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7294 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7295 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7297 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7298 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7301 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7302 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7305 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7306 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7307 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7308 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7309 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7310 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7312 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7314 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7315 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7316 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7317 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7318 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7319 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7320 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7322 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7323 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7324 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7325 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7326 if path.is_empty() {
7327 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7330 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7331 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7332 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7333 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7334 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7335 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7336 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7337 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7340 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7341 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7342 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7343 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7345 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7346 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7347 total_msat: path_amt,
7348 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7350 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7351 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7356 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7357 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7358 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7359 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7360 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7362 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7363 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7364 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7365 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7366 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7367 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7368 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7369 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7370 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7371 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7372 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7377 !forwards.is_empty()
7379 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7380 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7381 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7382 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7383 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7384 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7385 intercepted_id != ev_id
7397 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7398 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7399 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7400 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7401 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7402 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7403 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7404 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7408 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7409 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7411 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7412 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7413 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7414 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7416 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7417 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7420 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7421 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7422 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7423 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7424 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7426 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7427 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7428 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7429 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7430 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7431 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7432 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7433 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7435 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7436 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7440 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7442 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7444 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7445 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7447 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7451 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7452 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7454 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7455 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7458 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7460 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7462 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7463 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7464 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7465 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7469 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7470 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7471 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7472 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7473 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7474 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7475 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7477 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7478 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7479 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7481 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7482 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7483 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7484 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7485 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7486 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7488 if chan.is_usable() {
7489 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7490 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7491 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7492 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7493 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7499 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7501 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7502 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7503 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7504 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7505 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7506 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7507 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7508 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7509 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7510 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7511 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7513 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7514 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7516 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7517 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7518 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7519 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7521 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7522 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7523 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7524 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7526 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7527 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7528 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7529 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7531 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7532 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7533 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7534 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7535 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7536 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7537 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7540 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7541 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7544 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7547 purpose: payment_purpose,
7548 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7554 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7556 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7557 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7558 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7559 router: args.router,
7561 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7563 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7564 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7565 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7566 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7568 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7569 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7570 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7571 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7572 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7573 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7575 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7580 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7582 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7584 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7585 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7586 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7587 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7589 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7590 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7591 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7593 logger: args.logger,
7594 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7597 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7598 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7599 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7600 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7601 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7604 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7605 //connection or two.
7607 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7613 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7614 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7615 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7616 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7617 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
7618 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7619 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
7621 use core::time::Duration;
7622 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7623 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7624 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7625 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7626 use crate::ln::msgs;
7627 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, OptionalField};
7628 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7629 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7630 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7631 use crate::util::test_utils;
7632 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7633 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7636 fn test_notify_limits() {
7637 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7638 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7642 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7644 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7645 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7646 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7647 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7648 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7650 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7652 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7653 // to connect messages with new values
7654 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7655 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7656 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7657 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7659 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7660 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7661 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7662 // ... but the last node should not.
7663 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7664 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7665 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7666 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7668 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7669 // about the channel.
7670 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7671 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7672 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7674 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7676 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7677 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7678 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7679 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7680 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7681 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7683 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7684 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7685 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7687 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7688 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7689 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7690 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7691 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7692 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7694 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7695 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7696 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7697 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7698 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7699 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7700 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7701 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7703 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7704 // the channel info has updated.
7705 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7706 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7707 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7708 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7709 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7710 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7714 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7715 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7720 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7721 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7723 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7724 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7725 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7726 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7728 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7729 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7730 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7731 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7732 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7733 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7735 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7737 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7739 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7740 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7742 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7743 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7744 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7745 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7746 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7748 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7749 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7750 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7752 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7753 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7754 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7755 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7756 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7757 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7758 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7759 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7760 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7762 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7763 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7765 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7767 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7769 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7770 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7771 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7772 // lightning messages manually.
7773 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7774 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7777 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7778 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7779 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7781 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7782 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7784 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7785 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7787 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7788 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7789 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7791 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7792 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7793 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7795 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7797 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7799 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7800 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7803 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7804 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7805 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7808 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7809 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7810 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7811 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7816 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7817 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7818 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7819 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7824 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7825 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7826 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7827 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7834 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7835 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7836 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7837 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7838 // fails as expected.
7839 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7840 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7841 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7842 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7843 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7844 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7845 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7847 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7848 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7849 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7851 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7852 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7853 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7854 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7855 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7857 let route = find_route(
7858 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7859 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7861 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7863 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7865 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7866 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7867 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7869 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7870 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7871 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7872 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7873 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7875 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7876 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7877 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7878 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7879 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7880 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7881 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7882 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7883 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7885 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7886 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7888 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7889 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7890 let route = find_route(
7891 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7892 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7894 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7896 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7898 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7899 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7900 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7902 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7903 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7904 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7906 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7908 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7909 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7912 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7914 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7916 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7917 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7918 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7919 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7920 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7921 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7923 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7924 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7926 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7927 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7931 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7932 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7933 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7934 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7935 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7936 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7937 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7939 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7940 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7941 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7942 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7944 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7945 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7946 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7947 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7948 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7950 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7951 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7952 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7953 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7954 let route = find_route(
7955 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7956 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7959 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7960 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7961 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7962 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7965 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7966 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7967 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7968 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7969 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7970 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7973 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7977 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7978 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7982 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7984 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7985 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7986 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7987 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7989 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7990 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7991 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7992 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7993 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7995 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7996 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7997 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7998 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7999 let route = find_route(
8000 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8001 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8004 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8005 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8006 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8007 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8008 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8011 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8012 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8013 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8014 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8015 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8016 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8017 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8019 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8023 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8026 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8027 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8029 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8030 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8031 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8032 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8034 // Marshall an MPP route.
8035 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8036 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8037 route.paths.push(path);
8038 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8039 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8040 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8041 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8042 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8043 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8045 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8046 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8047 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8048 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8053 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8054 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8055 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8056 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8057 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8058 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8060 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8061 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8063 total_msat: 100_000,
8066 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8067 // payment verification fails as expected.
8068 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8069 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8070 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8071 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8073 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8077 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8078 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8082 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8083 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8084 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8085 // the channel is successfully closed.
8086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8088 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8089 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8091 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8092 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8093 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8094 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8095 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8097 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8098 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8100 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8101 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8102 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8103 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8106 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8108 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8109 // as it has the funding transaction.
8110 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8111 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8112 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8114 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8117 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8119 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8121 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8122 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8123 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8125 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8126 // as it has the funding transaction.
8127 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8128 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8129 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8132 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8133 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8135 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8136 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8137 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8139 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8140 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8141 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8142 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8144 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8145 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8147 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8148 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8149 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8150 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8151 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8152 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8153 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8155 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8156 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8157 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8158 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8159 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8160 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8161 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8164 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8166 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8167 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8168 // closing transaction).
8169 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8170 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8171 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8173 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8174 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8175 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8176 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8177 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8180 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8182 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8184 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8185 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8186 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8188 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8190 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8191 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8194 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8195 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8196 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8199 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8200 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8201 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8204 fn check_api_misuse_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8206 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8207 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8209 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8210 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8215 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8216 // Tests that our API functions and message handlers that expects a `counterparty_node_id`
8217 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8218 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8219 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8220 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8221 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8222 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8224 // Boilerplate code to produce `open_channel` and `accept_channel` msgs more densly than
8225 // creating dummy ones.
8226 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8227 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8228 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8229 let accept_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8232 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8233 let signature = Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() });
8234 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8235 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8238 let funding_created_msg = msgs::FundingCreated {
8239 temporary_channel_id: open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id,
8240 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap(),
8241 funding_output_index: 0,
8242 signature: signature,
8245 let funding_signed_msg = msgs::FundingSigned {
8246 channel_id: channel_id,
8247 signature: signature,
8250 let channel_ready_msg = msgs::ChannelReady {
8251 channel_id: channel_id,
8252 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8253 short_channel_id_alias: None,
8256 let announcement_signatures_msg = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
8257 channel_id: channel_id,
8258 short_channel_id: 0,
8259 node_signature: signature,
8260 bitcoin_signature: signature,
8263 let channel_reestablish_msg = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8264 channel_id: channel_id,
8265 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8266 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8267 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
8270 let closing_signed_msg = msgs::ClosingSigned {
8271 channel_id: channel_id,
8273 signature: signature,
8277 let shutdown_msg = msgs::Shutdown {
8278 channel_id: channel_id,
8279 scriptpubkey: Script::new(),
8282 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
8284 public_key: Ok(unkown_public_key),
8285 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
8289 let update_add_htlc_msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
8290 channel_id: channel_id,
8292 amount_msat: 1000000,
8293 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
8294 cltv_expiry: 821716,
8295 onion_routing_packet
8298 let commitment_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
8299 channel_id: channel_id,
8300 signature: signature,
8301 htlc_signatures: Vec::new(),
8304 let update_fee_msg = msgs::UpdateFee {
8305 channel_id: channel_id,
8306 feerate_per_kw: 1000,
8309 let malformed_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
8310 channel_id: channel_id,
8312 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
8313 failure_code: 0x8000,
8316 let fulfill_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
8317 channel_id: channel_id,
8319 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
8322 let fail_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
8323 channel_id: channel_id,
8325 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
8328 let revoke_and_ack_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
8329 channel_id: channel_id,
8330 per_commitment_secret: [1; 32],
8331 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8334 // Test the API functions and message handlers.
8335 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8337 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&unkown_public_key, &open_channel_msg);
8339 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&unkown_public_key, &accept_channel_msg);
8341 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8343 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&unkown_public_key, &funding_created_msg);
8345 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&unkown_public_key, &funding_signed_msg);
8347 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&unkown_public_key, &channel_ready_msg);
8349 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&unkown_public_key, &announcement_signatures_msg);
8351 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8353 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8355 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8357 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8359 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8361 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&unkown_public_key, &shutdown_msg);
8363 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&unkown_public_key, &closing_signed_msg);
8365 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&unkown_public_key, &channel_reestablish_msg);
8367 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &update_add_htlc_msg);
8369 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&unkown_public_key, &commitment_signed_msg);
8371 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &malformed_update_msg);
8373 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fail_update_msg);
8375 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fulfill_update_msg);
8377 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&unkown_public_key, &revoke_and_ack_msg);
8379 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&unkown_public_key, &update_fee_msg);
8384 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8385 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8386 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8387 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8388 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8389 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8390 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8391 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8392 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8396 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8397 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8398 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8400 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8401 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8403 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8404 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8409 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8410 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8412 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8413 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8415 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8419 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8421 use crate::chain::Listen;
8422 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8423 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8424 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8425 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8426 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8427 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8428 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8429 use crate::util::test_utils;
8430 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8431 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8433 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8434 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8435 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8437 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8441 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8442 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8443 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8444 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8445 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8446 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8447 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8448 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8453 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8454 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8457 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8458 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8459 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8461 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8462 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8464 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8465 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8466 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8467 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8469 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8470 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8472 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8473 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8474 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8475 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8477 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8479 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8481 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8482 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8483 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8484 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8485 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8487 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8489 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8491 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8492 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8493 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8494 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8495 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8498 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8499 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8500 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8502 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8503 } else { panic!(); }
8505 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8506 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8508 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8511 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8514 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8515 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8517 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8518 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8519 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8520 match msg_events[0] {
8521 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8522 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8523 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8527 match msg_events[1] {
8528 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8532 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8533 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8535 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8536 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8538 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8541 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8542 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8544 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8545 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8550 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8552 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8553 macro_rules! send_payment {
8554 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8555 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8556 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8557 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8558 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8559 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8560 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8561 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8562 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8563 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8565 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8566 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8568 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8569 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8571 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8572 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8573 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8574 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8575 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8576 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8577 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8578 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8580 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8581 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8582 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8583 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8585 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8586 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8587 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8588 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8589 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8591 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8594 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8595 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8596 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8597 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8599 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8604 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8605 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);