1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
363 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
364 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
365 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
366 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
368 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
369 err: msgs::LightningError,
370 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
371 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
373 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
375 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
377 err: LightningError {
379 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
380 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
387 shutdown_finish: None,
391 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
392 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
395 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
397 err: LightningError {
399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
400 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
406 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
407 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
411 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
414 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
417 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
421 log_level: Level::Warn,
424 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
431 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
444 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
445 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
446 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
447 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
448 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
450 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
451 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
452 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
453 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
454 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
455 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
456 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
458 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
462 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
463 struct ClaimingPayment {
465 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
466 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
469 (0, amount_msat, required),
470 (2, payment_purpose, required),
471 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
474 struct ClaimablePayment {
475 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
476 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
477 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
480 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
481 struct ClaimablePayments {
482 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
483 /// failed/claimed by the user.
485 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
486 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
488 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
489 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
490 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
492 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
493 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
494 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
495 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
498 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
499 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
500 /// quite some time lag.
501 enum BackgroundEvent {
502 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
503 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
504 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
505 /// need the counterparty node_id.
507 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
508 /// are regenerated on startup.
509 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
511 /// channel to continue normal operation.
513 /// In general this should be used rather than
514 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
515 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
516 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
518 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
519 /// are regenerated on startup.
520 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
521 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
522 funding_txo: OutPoint,
523 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
528 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
529 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
530 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
531 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
532 /// event can be generated.
533 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
534 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
535 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
538 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
539 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
540 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
543 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
544 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
545 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
546 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
547 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
550 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
551 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
552 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
553 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
557 /// State we hold per-peer.
558 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
559 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
561 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
562 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
564 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
565 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
566 latest_features: InitFeatures,
567 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
568 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
569 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
570 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
571 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
573 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
574 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
575 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
576 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
578 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
579 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
580 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
581 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
582 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
583 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
584 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
585 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
586 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
587 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
591 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
592 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
593 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
594 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
595 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
596 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
599 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
603 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
604 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
606 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
609 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
610 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
611 struct PendingInboundPayment {
612 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
613 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
614 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
615 /// this payment being removed.
617 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
618 user_payment_id: u64,
619 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
620 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
621 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
624 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
625 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
626 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
627 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
628 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
629 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
630 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
631 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
633 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
634 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
642 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
644 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
649 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
650 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
651 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
652 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
653 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
654 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
655 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
656 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
657 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
659 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
660 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
662 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
663 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
664 $vis trait AChannelManager {
665 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
666 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
667 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
668 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
669 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
670 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
671 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
672 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
673 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
674 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
675 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
676 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
677 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
678 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
679 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
680 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
681 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
682 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
685 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
686 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
687 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
688 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
689 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
690 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
692 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
694 ES::Target: EntropySource,
695 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
696 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
701 type Watch = M::Target;
703 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
705 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
707 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
709 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
710 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
712 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
714 type Router = R::Target;
716 type Logger = L::Target;
718 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
721 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
722 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
724 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
725 /// to individual Channels.
727 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
728 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
729 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
730 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
732 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
733 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
734 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
735 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
736 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
737 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
738 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
740 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
741 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
742 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
744 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
745 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
746 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
747 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
748 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
750 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
751 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
752 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
753 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
755 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
756 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
757 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
759 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
760 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
761 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
762 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
763 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
765 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
766 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
767 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
768 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
769 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
770 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
771 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
772 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
775 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
776 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
777 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
778 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
779 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
783 // `total_consistency_lock`
785 // |__`forward_htlcs`
787 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
789 // |__`per_peer_state`
791 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
793 // | |__`claimable_payments`
795 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
801 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
803 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
807 // | |__`pending_events`
809 // | |__`pending_background_events`
811 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
813 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
814 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
815 ES::Target: EntropySource,
816 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
817 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
818 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
822 default_configuration: UserConfig,
823 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
824 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
830 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
832 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
834 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
835 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
837 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
838 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
839 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
840 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
842 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
843 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
845 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
846 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
847 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
848 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
849 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
850 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
851 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
852 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
854 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
856 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
857 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
859 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
861 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
862 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
863 /// and via the classic SCID.
865 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
866 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
868 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
870 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
872 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
873 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
874 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
876 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
877 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
879 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
880 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
882 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
883 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
885 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
886 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
887 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
888 /// active channel list on load.
890 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
891 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
893 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
895 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
896 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
897 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
899 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
900 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
901 /// the handling of the events.
903 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
904 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
907 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
908 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
909 /// would break backwards compatability.
910 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
911 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
912 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
914 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
915 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
917 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
919 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
920 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
921 /// confirmation depth.
923 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
924 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
925 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
927 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
929 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
931 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
933 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
935 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
937 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
938 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
939 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
941 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
942 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
944 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
945 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
946 /// keeping additional state.
947 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
949 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
950 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
951 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
952 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
954 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
955 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
957 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
958 /// are currently open with that peer.
960 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
961 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
964 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
966 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
967 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
968 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
969 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
970 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
972 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
973 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
974 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
975 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
976 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
978 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
979 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
981 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
982 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
983 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
984 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
985 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
986 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
987 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
988 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
989 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
990 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
991 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
992 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
993 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
995 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1004 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1006 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1007 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1008 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1009 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1010 pub struct ChainParameters {
1011 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1012 pub network: Network,
1014 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1016 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1017 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1020 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1026 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1027 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1028 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1029 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1030 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1031 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1033 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1034 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1035 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1036 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1037 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1039 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1040 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1043 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1044 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1045 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1048 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1049 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1051 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1052 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1053 should_persist: persist_check,
1054 _read_guard: read_guard,
1059 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1060 fn drop(&mut self) {
1061 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1062 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1067 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1068 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1070 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1072 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1073 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1074 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1075 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1076 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1078 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1079 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1081 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1083 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1084 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1085 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1086 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1087 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1088 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1089 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1090 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1091 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1092 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1093 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1094 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1095 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1097 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1098 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1100 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1101 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1102 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1103 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1105 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1106 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1107 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1108 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1109 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1110 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1113 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1115 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1116 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1119 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1121 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1122 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1124 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1125 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1126 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1127 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1129 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1130 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1131 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1133 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1134 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1135 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1137 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1138 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1139 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1140 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1142 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1143 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1144 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1146 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1147 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1148 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1150 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1152 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1153 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1154 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1155 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1156 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1157 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1158 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1159 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1160 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1163 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1164 /// to better separate parameters.
1165 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1166 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1167 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1168 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1169 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1170 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1171 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1172 pub features: InitFeatures,
1173 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1174 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1175 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1177 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1179 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1180 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1181 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1182 /// payments to us through this channel.
1183 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1184 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1185 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1186 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1187 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1188 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1189 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1192 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1193 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1194 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1195 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1196 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1197 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1198 /// lifetime of the channel.
1199 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1200 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1201 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1202 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1203 /// our counterparty already.
1205 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1206 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1207 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1208 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1210 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1211 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1212 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1213 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1215 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1216 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1218 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1219 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1221 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1222 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1223 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1224 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1225 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1226 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1227 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1228 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1229 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1232 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1234 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1235 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1236 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1237 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1238 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1239 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1240 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1242 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1243 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1245 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1246 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1247 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1248 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1249 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1250 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1251 /// this value on chain.
1253 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1255 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1257 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1258 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1259 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1260 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1262 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1263 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1264 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1266 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1267 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1268 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1269 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1270 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1272 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1273 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1274 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1275 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1277 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1278 pub balance_msat: u64,
1279 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1280 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1281 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1282 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1284 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1286 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1287 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1288 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1289 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1290 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1291 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1292 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1293 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1295 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1296 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1297 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1298 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1299 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1300 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1301 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1303 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1304 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1305 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1306 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1307 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1308 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1309 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1310 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1311 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1313 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1315 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1316 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1317 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1318 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1319 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1321 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1322 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1323 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1324 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1325 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1326 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1327 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1329 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1330 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1331 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1332 pub is_outbound: bool,
1333 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1334 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1335 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1336 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1337 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1339 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1340 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1341 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1342 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1344 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1345 pub is_usable: bool,
1346 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1347 pub is_public: bool,
1348 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1349 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1350 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1351 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1352 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1353 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1355 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1356 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1359 impl ChannelDetails {
1360 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1361 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1362 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1364 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1365 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1366 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1367 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1370 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1371 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1372 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1374 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1375 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1376 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1377 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1380 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1381 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1383 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1384 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1385 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1387 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1388 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1389 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1390 features: latest_features,
1391 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1392 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1393 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1394 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1395 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1396 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1397 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1398 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1399 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1400 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1402 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1403 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1404 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1405 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1406 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1407 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1408 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1409 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1410 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1411 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1412 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1413 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1414 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1415 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1416 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1417 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1418 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1419 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1420 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1421 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1422 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1423 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1424 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1425 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1426 config: Some(channel.config()),
1431 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1432 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1433 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1434 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1435 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1437 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1440 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1441 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1444 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1445 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1446 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1448 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1449 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1450 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1452 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1453 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1454 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1456 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1457 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1461 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1463 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1465 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1466 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1467 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1468 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1470 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1471 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1472 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1475 macro_rules! handle_error {
1476 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1477 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1478 // entering the macro.
1479 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1480 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1484 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1485 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1487 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1488 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1489 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1490 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1494 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1495 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1496 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1497 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1502 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1503 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1505 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1506 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1507 action: err.action.clone()
1511 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1512 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1513 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1514 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1515 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1519 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1526 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1527 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1528 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1529 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1530 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1531 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1533 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1534 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1535 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1536 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1537 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1539 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1540 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1542 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1546 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1547 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1548 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1550 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1551 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1553 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1554 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1556 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1557 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1558 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1559 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1560 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1561 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1567 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1568 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1572 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1574 $entry.remove_entry();
1582 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1583 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1587 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1589 $entry.remove_entry();
1597 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1598 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1600 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1601 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1607 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1608 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1609 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1610 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1611 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1613 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1614 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1615 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1616 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1617 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1618 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1619 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1620 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1621 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1622 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1627 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1628 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1629 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1630 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1631 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1632 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1633 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1634 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1635 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1637 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1642 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1643 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1644 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1645 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1646 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1647 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1648 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1649 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1650 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1652 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1657 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1658 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1659 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1660 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1661 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1662 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1663 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1664 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1665 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1666 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1667 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1669 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1670 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1671 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1677 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1678 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1680 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1681 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1682 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1683 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1684 updates.announcement_sigs);
1685 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1686 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1689 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1690 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1691 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1693 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1695 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1696 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1698 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1699 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1700 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1701 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1706 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1707 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1708 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1709 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1710 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1712 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1713 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1714 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1717 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1718 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1719 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1720 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1721 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1722 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1723 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1724 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1728 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1729 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1730 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1731 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1737 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1738 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1742 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1743 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1744 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1745 while !processed_all_events {
1746 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1750 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1753 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1754 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1755 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1757 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1758 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1759 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1760 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1764 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1765 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1766 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1767 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1770 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1772 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1773 $event_to_handle = event;
1775 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1776 post_event_actions.push(action);
1781 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1782 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1783 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1784 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1787 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1788 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1789 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1790 processed_all_events = false;
1793 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1794 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1800 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1802 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1803 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1804 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1805 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1806 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1807 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1811 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1813 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1814 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1816 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1818 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1819 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1820 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1823 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1824 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1825 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1826 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1827 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1828 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1829 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1830 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1832 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1833 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1834 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1839 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1841 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1842 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1843 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1844 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1845 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1846 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1847 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1848 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1850 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1853 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1854 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1856 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1858 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1860 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1862 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1863 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1864 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1865 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1866 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1876 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1877 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1878 &self.default_configuration
1881 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1882 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1883 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1886 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1887 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1889 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1891 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1895 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1900 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1902 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1903 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1904 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1905 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1906 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1908 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1909 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1911 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1912 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1913 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1915 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1916 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1917 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1919 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1920 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1921 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1922 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1923 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1924 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1926 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1927 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1928 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1929 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1930 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1935 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1936 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1940 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1941 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1943 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1945 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1946 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1947 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1948 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1949 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1950 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1954 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1959 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1961 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1962 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1967 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1973 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1974 node_id: their_network_key,
1977 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1980 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1981 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1982 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1983 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1984 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1985 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1986 // the same channel.
1987 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1989 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1990 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1991 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1994 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1995 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1996 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2004 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2005 /// more information.
2006 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2007 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
2010 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2011 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2013 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2014 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2016 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2017 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2018 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2019 // really wanted anyway.
2020 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2023 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2024 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2025 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2028 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2031 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2032 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2035 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2041 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2042 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2044 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2045 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2046 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2048 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2049 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2050 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2051 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2052 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2053 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2054 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2055 total_msat: *total_msat,
2058 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2059 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2061 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2062 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2064 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2069 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2070 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2071 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2072 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2073 Some(transaction) => {
2074 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2075 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2080 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2081 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2082 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2083 reason: closure_reason
2087 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2088 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2090 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2091 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2094 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2095 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2097 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2098 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2099 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2101 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2102 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2103 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2104 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2105 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2107 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2108 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2109 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2110 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2111 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2115 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2116 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2117 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2118 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2119 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2122 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2123 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2124 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2125 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2129 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2137 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2138 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2139 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2140 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2143 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2147 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2148 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2149 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2151 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2152 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2154 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2155 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2156 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2157 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2159 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2161 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2162 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2163 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2166 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2167 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2168 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2169 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2170 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2171 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2174 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2175 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2176 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2178 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2179 /// the channel being closed or not:
2180 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2181 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2182 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2183 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2184 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2185 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2186 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2188 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2189 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2190 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2191 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2193 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2195 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2196 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2197 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2200 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2201 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2202 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2203 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2204 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2205 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2209 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2210 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2211 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2212 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2213 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2214 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2215 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2216 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2218 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2219 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2220 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2221 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2222 // ignore the result here.
2223 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2227 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2228 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2229 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2230 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2231 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2232 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2233 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2235 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2236 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2237 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2238 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2239 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2241 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2243 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2245 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2248 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2249 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2250 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2251 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2252 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2257 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2260 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2262 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2263 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2264 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2265 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2266 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2267 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2268 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2269 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2271 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2282 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2283 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2284 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2286 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2287 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2288 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2291 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2292 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2293 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2295 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2296 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2297 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2298 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2299 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2302 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2303 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2304 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2305 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2306 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2310 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2311 /// local transaction(s).
2312 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2313 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2314 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2318 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2319 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2321 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2322 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2323 return Err(ReceiveError {
2324 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2326 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2329 // final_expiry_too_soon
2330 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2331 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2333 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2334 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2335 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2336 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2337 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2338 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2339 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2340 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2341 return Err(ReceiveError {
2342 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2343 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2346 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2347 return Err(ReceiveError {
2349 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2350 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2354 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2355 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2356 return Err(ReceiveError {
2357 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2358 err_data: Vec::new(),
2359 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2362 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2363 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2364 return Err(ReceiveError {
2365 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2366 err_data: Vec::new(),
2367 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2369 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2370 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2373 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2374 phantom_shared_secret,
2376 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2377 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2378 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2379 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2380 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2381 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2382 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2383 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2384 return Err(ReceiveError {
2385 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2386 err_data: Vec::new(),
2387 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2391 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2394 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2397 return Err(ReceiveError {
2398 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2399 err_data: Vec::new(),
2400 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2405 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2408 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2409 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2410 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2411 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2415 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2416 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2417 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2419 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2420 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2421 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2422 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2423 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2424 failure_code: $err_code,
2430 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2431 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2434 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2435 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2436 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2438 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2439 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2440 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2441 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2442 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2443 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2444 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2445 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2447 macro_rules! return_err {
2448 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2450 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2451 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2452 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2453 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2454 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2455 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2461 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2463 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2464 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2466 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2467 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2471 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2472 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2474 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2476 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2477 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2478 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2479 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2480 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2482 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2485 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2486 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2487 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2489 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2490 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2491 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2494 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2495 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2496 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2497 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2501 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2502 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2503 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2506 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2507 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2508 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2509 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2510 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2515 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2516 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2517 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2518 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2519 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2520 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2521 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2522 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2523 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2524 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2525 // phantom or an intercept.
2526 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2527 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2528 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2532 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2535 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2537 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2538 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2539 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2540 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2541 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2545 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2547 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2548 // have no consistency guarantees.
2549 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2553 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2554 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2555 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2556 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2557 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2559 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2560 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2561 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2562 // we don't have the channel here.
2563 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2565 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2567 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2568 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2569 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2570 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2571 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2572 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2573 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2574 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2575 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2576 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2577 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2579 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2582 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2583 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2585 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2586 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2590 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2591 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2592 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2593 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2595 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2602 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2603 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2604 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2605 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2606 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2607 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2609 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2610 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2612 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2613 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2614 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2615 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2616 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2617 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2618 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2619 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2620 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2621 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2627 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2628 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2629 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2630 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2632 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2633 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2635 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2636 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2637 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2639 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2640 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2641 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2642 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2643 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2644 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2645 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2649 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2654 pending_forward_info
2657 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2658 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2659 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2661 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2662 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2663 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2665 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2666 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2667 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2668 if !chan.should_announce() {
2669 return Err(LightningError {
2670 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2671 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2674 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2675 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2677 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2678 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2681 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2682 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2683 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2684 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2686 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2687 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2688 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2690 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2691 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2692 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2693 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2694 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2695 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2699 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2701 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2702 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2703 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2705 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2706 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2707 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2708 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2709 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2712 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2713 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2715 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2716 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2717 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2718 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2719 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2720 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2721 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2722 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2724 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2725 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2726 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2728 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2730 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2737 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2738 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2739 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2742 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2743 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2744 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2746 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2747 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2748 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2750 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2751 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2752 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2753 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2754 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2756 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2758 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2759 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2760 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2761 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2765 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2766 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2767 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2768 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2769 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2770 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2771 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2773 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2774 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2775 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2777 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2778 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2780 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2781 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2782 Some(monitor_update) => {
2783 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2784 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2785 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2788 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2789 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2790 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2791 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2792 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2793 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2794 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2795 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2801 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2802 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2803 // `channel_by_id` map.
2804 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2805 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2810 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2811 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2813 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2818 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2820 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2821 /// fields for more info.
2823 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2824 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2826 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2828 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2829 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2830 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2831 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2832 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2834 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2835 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2836 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2837 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2838 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2840 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2841 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2842 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2843 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2845 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2847 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2848 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2849 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2851 /// In general, a path may raise:
2852 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2853 /// node public key) is specified.
2854 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2855 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2857 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2858 /// relevant updates.
2860 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2861 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2862 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2864 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2865 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2866 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2867 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2868 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2869 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2870 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2872 self.pending_outbound_payments
2873 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2874 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2875 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2878 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2879 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2880 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2881 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2883 self.pending_outbound_payments
2884 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2885 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2886 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2887 &self.pending_events,
2888 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2889 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2893 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2894 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2896 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2897 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2898 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2902 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2903 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2904 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2908 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2909 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2913 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2914 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2915 /// retries are exhausted.
2917 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2918 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2920 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2921 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2922 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2924 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2925 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2927 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2928 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2929 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2931 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2934 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2935 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2936 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2937 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2938 /// never reach the recipient.
2940 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2941 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2943 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2944 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2946 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2948 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2949 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2950 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2952 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2953 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2954 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2955 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2956 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2959 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2960 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2962 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2965 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2966 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2967 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2969 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2970 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2971 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2972 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2973 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2974 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2977 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2978 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2979 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2980 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2981 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2983 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2984 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2985 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2988 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2991 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2992 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2995 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2996 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2997 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2998 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2999 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3001 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3002 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3006 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3008 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3010 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3011 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3012 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
3013 } else { unreachable!(); });
3015 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3017 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3018 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3020 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3021 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3022 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3028 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3030 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3031 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3037 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3040 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3041 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3042 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3044 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3045 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3046 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3047 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3056 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3057 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3058 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3062 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3064 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3065 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3067 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3068 /// across the p2p network.
3070 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3071 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3073 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3074 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3075 /// keys per-channel).
3077 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3078 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3079 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3081 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3082 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3083 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3085 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3086 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3087 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3088 /// for more details.
3090 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3091 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3092 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3095 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3096 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3097 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3098 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3103 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3104 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3105 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3106 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3107 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3108 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3109 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3110 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3114 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3115 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3116 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3117 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3121 let mut output_index = None;
3122 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3123 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3124 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3125 if output_index.is_some() {
3126 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3127 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3130 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3133 if output_index.is_none() {
3134 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3135 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3138 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3142 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3144 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3145 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3146 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3147 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3149 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3150 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3152 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3153 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3155 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3157 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3158 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3159 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3160 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3161 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3162 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3163 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3164 pub fn update_channel_config(
3165 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3166 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3167 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3168 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3169 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3174 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3177 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3178 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3181 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3182 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3183 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3184 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3188 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3189 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3190 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3193 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3194 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3195 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3196 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3197 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3205 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3206 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3208 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3209 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3211 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3212 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3213 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3214 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3215 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3217 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3218 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3220 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3223 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3224 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3225 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3226 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3227 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3230 let next_hop_scid = {
3231 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3232 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3233 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3236 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3238 if !chan.is_usable() {
3239 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3240 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3243 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3245 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3246 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3251 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3252 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3253 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3256 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3257 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3258 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3260 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3262 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3263 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3266 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3267 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3268 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3269 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3270 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3272 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3276 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3277 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3279 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3282 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3283 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3286 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3287 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3288 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3291 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3292 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3293 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3294 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3295 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3296 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3297 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3300 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3301 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3302 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3303 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3308 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3310 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3311 /// Will likely generate further events.
3312 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3315 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3316 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3317 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3319 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3320 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3322 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3323 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3324 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3326 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3327 match forward_info {
3328 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3329 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3330 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3331 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3332 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3335 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3336 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3337 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3339 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3340 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3341 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3342 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3343 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3344 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3347 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3348 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3350 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3353 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3354 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3360 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3361 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3363 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3367 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3368 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3370 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3374 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3375 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3376 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3377 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3378 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3380 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3381 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3382 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3383 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3384 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3386 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3388 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3389 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3393 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3394 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3395 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3396 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3402 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3405 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3408 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3409 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3410 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3411 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3412 // problem, not ours.
3418 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3419 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3421 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3426 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3427 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3428 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3433 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3435 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3439 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3440 match forward_info {
3441 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3442 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3443 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3444 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3445 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3449 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3450 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3451 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3452 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3453 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3454 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3455 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3457 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3458 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3459 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3461 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3462 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3464 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3466 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3467 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3468 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3469 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3474 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3475 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3477 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3478 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3479 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3480 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3482 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3485 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3487 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3488 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3489 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3498 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3499 match forward_info {
3500 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3501 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3502 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3503 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3506 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3507 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3508 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3510 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3511 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3512 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3514 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3515 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3516 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3517 None, None, onion_fields)
3520 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3523 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3524 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3525 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3526 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3527 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3528 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3529 phantom_shared_secret,
3531 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3532 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3533 // if routing nodes overpay
3534 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3535 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3537 total_value_received: None,
3538 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3543 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3545 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3546 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3547 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3548 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3549 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3550 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3552 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3553 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3554 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3555 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3556 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3557 phantom_shared_secret,
3559 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3560 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3562 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3565 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3566 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3567 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3568 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3569 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3572 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3573 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3574 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3576 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3577 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3578 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3581 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3582 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3583 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3585 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3586 .entry(payment_hash)
3587 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3588 .or_insert_with(|| {
3589 committed_to_claimable = true;
3591 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3594 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3595 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3596 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3599 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3601 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3602 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3603 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3605 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3608 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3609 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3610 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3611 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3612 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3613 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3614 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3615 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3616 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3617 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3618 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3620 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3622 _ => unreachable!(),
3625 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3626 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3627 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3628 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3629 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3631 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3632 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3633 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3634 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3635 committed_to_claimable = true;
3637 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3638 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3639 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3640 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3641 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3642 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3646 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3647 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3648 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3649 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3651 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3653 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3654 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3656 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3657 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3658 committed_to_claimable = true;
3661 payment_claimable_generated
3665 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3666 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3667 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3668 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3669 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3670 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3671 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3672 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3674 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3675 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3676 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3677 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3678 Ok(result) => result,
3680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3681 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3684 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3685 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3686 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3687 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3688 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3689 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3692 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3694 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3695 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3696 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3697 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3699 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3701 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3702 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3703 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3704 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3705 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3706 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3707 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3708 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3710 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3711 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3712 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3716 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3717 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3719 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3723 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3724 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3731 if payment_data.is_none() {
3732 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3733 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3735 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3736 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3738 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3739 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3741 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3742 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3744 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3745 if payment_claimable_generated {
3746 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3752 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3753 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3761 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3762 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3763 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3764 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3765 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3766 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3768 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3769 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3771 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3773 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3774 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3775 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3777 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3779 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3780 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3781 events.append(&mut new_events);
3784 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3786 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3787 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3789 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3790 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3791 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3792 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3793 if background_events.is_empty() {
3797 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3799 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3800 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3801 // monitor updating completing.
3802 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3804 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
3805 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3808 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3809 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3812 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3814 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
3816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
3820 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
3821 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
3822 // however, ensure that.
3824 log_error!(self.logger,
3825 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
3827 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3834 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3835 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3836 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3837 self.process_background_events();
3840 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3841 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3842 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3843 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3845 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3846 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3848 if !chan.is_live() {
3849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3850 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3851 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3853 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3854 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3856 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3857 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3861 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3862 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3863 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3864 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3865 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3866 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3867 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3869 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3872 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3873 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3874 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3875 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3876 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3877 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3885 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3887 /// This currently includes:
3888 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3889 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3890 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3892 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3893 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3894 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3896 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3897 /// estimate fetches.
3899 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3900 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3901 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3902 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3903 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3904 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3906 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3908 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3909 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3910 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3913 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3914 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3916 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3917 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3918 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3919 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3920 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3922 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3923 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3924 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3925 if needs_close { return false; }
3928 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3929 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3930 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3931 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3932 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3933 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3934 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3935 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3937 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3938 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3939 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3940 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3944 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3946 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3949 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3951 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3952 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3953 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3954 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3958 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3960 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3966 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3970 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3971 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3976 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3977 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3978 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3979 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3980 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3981 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3982 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3983 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3984 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3985 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3986 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3987 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3988 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3989 // have no channels to the peer.
3990 let remove_entry = {
3991 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3992 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3995 entry.remove_entry();
3998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4003 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4004 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4005 // This should be unreachable
4006 debug_assert!(false);
4009 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4010 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4011 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4012 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4013 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4014 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4015 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4018 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4019 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4020 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4022 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4023 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4030 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4031 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4032 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4033 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4034 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4037 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4038 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4041 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4043 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4044 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4045 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4046 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4047 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4054 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4055 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4056 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4058 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4059 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4060 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4061 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4063 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4064 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4065 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4066 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4067 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4068 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4071 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4072 /// reason for the failure.
4074 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4075 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4078 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4079 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4080 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4081 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4082 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4083 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4089 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4090 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4091 match failure_code {
4092 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4093 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4094 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4095 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4096 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4097 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4102 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4103 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4105 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4107 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4108 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4109 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4110 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4111 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4112 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4113 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4115 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4117 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4118 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4120 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4125 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4126 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4127 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4128 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4129 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4130 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4131 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4132 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4133 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4134 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4136 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4137 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4138 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4139 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4141 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4142 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4143 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4144 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4145 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4149 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4150 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4151 // be surfaced to the user.
4152 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4153 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4154 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4156 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4158 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4159 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4160 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4161 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4163 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4167 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4170 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4171 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4172 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4173 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4177 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4178 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4179 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4180 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4181 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4182 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4183 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4184 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4185 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4188 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4189 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4190 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4193 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4194 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4195 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4197 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4198 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4199 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4200 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4201 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4203 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4205 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4207 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4208 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4209 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4210 push_forward_ev = true;
4212 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4214 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4216 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4217 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4220 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4221 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4222 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4223 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4224 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4225 failed_next_destination: destination,
4231 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4232 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4234 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4235 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4236 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4237 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4239 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4240 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4241 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4242 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4244 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4245 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4246 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4247 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4248 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4249 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4250 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4251 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4256 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4257 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4258 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4259 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4260 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4261 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4262 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4263 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4268 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4269 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4270 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4272 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4273 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4274 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4275 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4280 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4282 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4283 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4284 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4285 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4286 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4287 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4288 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4289 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4290 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4292 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4293 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4294 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4295 debug_assert!(false);
4299 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4301 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4302 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4303 debug_assert!(false);
4307 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4309 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4310 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4311 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4312 if sources.len() != 1 {
4313 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4314 debug_assert!(false);
4320 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4322 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4323 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4324 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4325 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4328 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4329 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4330 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4331 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4335 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4336 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4337 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4338 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4340 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4341 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4342 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4343 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4344 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4349 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4350 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4351 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4352 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4353 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4354 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4355 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4357 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4360 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4361 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4362 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4363 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4367 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4368 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4369 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4370 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4374 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4375 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4376 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4380 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4381 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4382 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4385 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4388 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4389 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4390 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4392 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4393 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4395 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4396 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4398 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4399 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4400 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4401 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4402 if let Err(e) = res {
4403 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4404 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4405 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4406 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4407 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4414 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4415 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4416 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4420 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4421 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4422 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4423 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4424 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4425 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4426 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4427 // again on restart.
4428 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4429 payment_preimage, update_res);
4431 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4432 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4433 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4434 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4435 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4436 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4440 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4441 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4444 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4446 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4447 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4449 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4450 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4451 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4452 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4453 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4454 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4455 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4458 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4459 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4461 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4463 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4466 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4470 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4471 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4472 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4478 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4479 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4480 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4483 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4484 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4486 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4487 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4488 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4489 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4490 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4494 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4495 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4501 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4502 /// update completion.
4503 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4504 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4505 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4506 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4507 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4508 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4510 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4511 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4512 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4513 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4514 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4515 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4517 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4519 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4520 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4521 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4522 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4525 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4526 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4528 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4530 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4535 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4536 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4537 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4538 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4543 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4544 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4545 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4546 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4547 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4552 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4556 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4562 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4563 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4564 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4568 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4569 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4570 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4576 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4577 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4579 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4580 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4582 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4583 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4584 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4585 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4586 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4592 let mut peer_state_lock;
4593 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4594 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4595 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4598 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4603 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4604 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4605 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4608 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4611 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4613 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4614 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4617 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4618 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4619 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4621 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4622 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4623 /// used to accept such channels.
4625 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4626 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4627 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4628 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4631 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4632 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4634 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4635 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4636 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4638 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4639 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4641 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4642 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4644 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4645 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4647 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4648 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4649 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4650 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4653 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4654 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4656 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4657 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4658 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4659 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4662 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4663 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4665 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4666 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4669 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4670 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4671 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4672 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4673 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4674 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4677 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4678 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4679 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4681 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4682 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4683 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4684 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4685 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4686 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4687 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4688 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4691 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4692 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4693 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4697 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4698 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4699 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4703 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4709 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4710 /// or 0-conf channels.
4712 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4713 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4714 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4715 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4716 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4717 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4719 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4720 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4721 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4722 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4723 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4724 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4725 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4729 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4732 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4733 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4735 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4736 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4737 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4738 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4740 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4743 num_unfunded_channels
4746 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4747 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4748 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4751 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4755 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4756 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4757 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4758 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4760 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4761 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4762 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4763 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4768 debug_assert!(false);
4769 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4774 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4775 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4776 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4777 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4778 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4779 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4781 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4782 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4783 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4786 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4787 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4788 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4789 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4790 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4793 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4794 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4795 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4798 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4803 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4805 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4809 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4810 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4813 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4814 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4815 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4818 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4819 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4820 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4821 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4822 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4823 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4824 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4828 entry.insert(channel);
4834 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4835 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4836 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4837 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4839 debug_assert!(false);
4840 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4842 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4843 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4844 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4846 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4847 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4852 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4853 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4854 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4855 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4856 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4858 user_channel_id: user_id,
4863 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4864 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4866 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4867 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4869 debug_assert!(false);
4870 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4873 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4874 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4875 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4876 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4878 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4883 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4885 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4888 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4891 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4892 funding_msg.channel_id))
4894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4895 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4899 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4900 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4901 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4902 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4903 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4904 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4905 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4909 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4911 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4912 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4913 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4915 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4916 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4917 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4918 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4919 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4920 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4921 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4922 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4930 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4931 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4933 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4935 debug_assert!(false);
4936 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4939 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4941 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4943 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4944 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4945 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4946 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4947 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4948 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4949 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4950 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4951 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4952 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4961 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4963 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4965 debug_assert!(false);
4966 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4970 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4972 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4973 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4974 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4976 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4977 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4978 msg: announcement_sigs,
4980 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4981 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4982 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4983 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4984 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4985 // announcement_signatures.
4986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4987 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4988 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4989 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4996 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4997 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5006 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5007 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5008 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5009 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5010 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5012 debug_assert!(false);
5013 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5017 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5020 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5021 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5022 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5023 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5026 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
5027 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5028 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5029 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5031 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5032 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5033 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5034 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5035 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5036 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5041 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5042 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5043 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5044 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5045 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5052 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5053 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5054 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5055 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5061 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5063 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5065 debug_assert!(false);
5066 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5068 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5069 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5070 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5071 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5073 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5074 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5075 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5076 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5081 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5082 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5083 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5084 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5085 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5086 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5087 } else { (tx, None) }
5089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5092 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5093 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5094 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5096 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5097 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5100 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5104 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5109 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5110 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5111 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5112 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5114 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5115 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5116 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5117 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5119 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5123 debug_assert!(false);
5124 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5131 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5132 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5133 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5134 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5135 match pending_forward_info {
5136 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5137 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5138 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5139 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5141 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5142 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5143 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5144 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5145 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5148 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5150 _ => pending_forward_info
5153 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5160 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5161 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5162 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5163 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5165 debug_assert!(false);
5166 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5170 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5172 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5177 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5181 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5183 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5185 debug_assert!(false);
5186 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5190 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5192 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5199 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5200 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5201 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5203 debug_assert!(false);
5204 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5208 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5210 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5211 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5212 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5214 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5217 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5221 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5223 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5225 debug_assert!(false);
5226 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5230 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5232 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5233 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5234 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5235 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5236 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5237 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5238 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5246 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5247 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5248 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5249 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5250 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5251 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5252 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5253 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5254 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5255 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5256 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5258 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5259 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5261 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5262 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5263 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5265 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5266 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5269 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5270 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5272 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5273 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5274 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5276 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5277 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5278 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5279 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5280 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5283 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5284 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5286 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5287 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5288 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5289 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5290 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5291 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5292 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5293 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5296 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5297 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5298 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5303 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5304 // payments are being processed.
5305 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5306 push_forward_event = true;
5308 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5309 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5316 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5317 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5320 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5321 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5322 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5324 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5328 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5329 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5330 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5331 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5332 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5334 if !forward_ev_exists {
5335 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5337 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5342 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5343 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5344 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5345 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5347 debug_assert!(false);
5348 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5349 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5351 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5353 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5354 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5355 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5356 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5357 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5358 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5359 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5361 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5366 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5370 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5372 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5374 debug_assert!(false);
5375 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5377 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5378 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5379 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5381 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5388 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5389 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5390 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5392 debug_assert!(false);
5393 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5397 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5399 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5403 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5404 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5405 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5406 msg, &self.default_configuration
5408 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5409 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5410 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5418 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5419 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5420 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5421 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5423 // It's not a local channel
5424 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5428 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5429 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5430 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5432 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5433 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5434 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5436 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5437 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5438 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5439 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5440 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5441 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5445 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5446 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5447 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5448 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5450 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5451 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5456 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5459 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5461 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5464 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5466 debug_assert!(false);
5467 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5469 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5470 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5471 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5473 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5474 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5475 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5476 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5477 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5478 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5479 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5480 let mut channel_update = None;
5481 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5482 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5483 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5486 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5487 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5488 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5489 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5490 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5491 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5492 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5497 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5498 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5499 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5500 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5501 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5502 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5510 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5511 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5514 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5515 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5520 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5521 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5522 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5524 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5525 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5526 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5527 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5528 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5529 match monitor_event {
5530 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5531 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5533 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5535 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5536 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5537 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5538 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5541 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5542 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5543 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5544 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5546 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5547 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5548 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5549 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5552 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5553 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5554 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5555 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5556 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5557 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5558 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5559 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5560 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5561 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5562 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5566 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5567 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5569 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5571 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5573 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5574 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5575 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5582 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5583 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5589 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5590 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5593 has_pending_monitor_events
5596 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5597 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5598 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5600 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5601 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5602 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5603 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5605 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5610 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5611 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5612 /// update was applied.
5613 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5614 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5615 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5616 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5618 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5619 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5620 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5621 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5623 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5624 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5626 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5627 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5628 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5629 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5630 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5631 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5632 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5633 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5634 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5636 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5637 has_monitor_update = true;
5639 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5640 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5641 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5642 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5643 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5644 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5645 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5647 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5649 continue 'peer_loop;
5658 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5659 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5660 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5663 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5664 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5670 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5671 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5672 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5673 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5674 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5675 let mut has_update = false;
5677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5679 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5682 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5683 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5684 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5685 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5686 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5688 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5689 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5692 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5693 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5694 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5695 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5696 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5701 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5703 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5704 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5705 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5711 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5712 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5720 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5721 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5727 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5728 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5730 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5731 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5732 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5733 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5734 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5735 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5736 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5737 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5738 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5739 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5740 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5741 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5742 assert!(should_broadcast);
5743 } else { unreachable!(); }
5744 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5745 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5746 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5749 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5753 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5754 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5756 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5757 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5760 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5763 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5764 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5765 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5766 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5767 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5768 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5769 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5770 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5771 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5772 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5773 // never fail a payment too early.
5774 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5776 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5784 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5787 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5788 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5790 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5791 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5792 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5793 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5795 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5797 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5798 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5802 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5803 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5805 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5807 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5808 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5810 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5811 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5812 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5813 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5814 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5815 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5816 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5817 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5818 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5819 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5820 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5823 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5824 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5826 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5829 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5831 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5833 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5834 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5835 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5836 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5837 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5840 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5841 /// stored external to LDK.
5843 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5844 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5845 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5847 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5848 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5851 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5852 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5853 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5854 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5856 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5857 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5858 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5859 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5860 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5862 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5863 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5864 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5865 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5866 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5868 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5869 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5871 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5872 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5876 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5877 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5879 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5881 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5882 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5884 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5885 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5886 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5887 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5888 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5889 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5890 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5893 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5894 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5896 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5899 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5901 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5903 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5904 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5907 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5908 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5910 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5911 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5912 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5915 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5916 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5918 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5919 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5920 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5921 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5923 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5924 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5925 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5926 Some(_) => continue,
5927 None => return scid_candidate
5932 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5934 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5935 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5937 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5938 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5939 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5943 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5944 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5945 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5947 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5948 /// times to get a unique scid.
5949 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5950 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5951 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5953 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5954 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5955 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5956 return scid_candidate
5960 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5961 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5962 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5963 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5965 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5966 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5969 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5970 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5971 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5972 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5981 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5982 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5983 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5984 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5985 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5989 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5990 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5991 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5992 events.push_back((event, None));
5996 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5997 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5998 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6002 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6003 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6007 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6008 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6011 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
6012 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6015 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6016 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6018 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
6019 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6020 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6023 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
6024 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
6025 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
6026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
6027 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6030 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6031 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6032 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6033 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6034 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6035 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6036 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6037 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6038 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6040 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6042 if further_update_exists {
6043 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6048 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6049 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6053 log_debug!(self.logger,
6054 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6055 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6059 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6060 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6061 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6065 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6066 for action in actions {
6068 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6069 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6071 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6077 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6078 /// using the given event handler.
6080 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6081 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6085 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6091 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6092 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6093 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6094 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6095 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6100 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6101 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6102 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6103 /// is always placed next to each other.
6105 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6106 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6107 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6108 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6110 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6111 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6112 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6113 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6114 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6115 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6116 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6118 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6119 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6120 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6121 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6124 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6125 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6127 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6128 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6131 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6132 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6133 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6134 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6135 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6136 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6137 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6141 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6142 events.replace(pending_events);
6151 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6153 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6154 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6155 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6156 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6157 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6158 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6162 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6164 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6165 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6166 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6168 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6172 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6174 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6175 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6176 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6177 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6178 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6179 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6183 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6185 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6186 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6187 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6188 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6189 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6192 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6193 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6196 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198 let new_height = height - 1;
6200 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6201 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6202 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6203 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6204 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6205 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6208 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6212 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6214 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6216 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6217 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6218 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6223 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6224 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6225 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6226 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6228 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6229 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6231 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6232 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6233 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6235 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6236 if height < last_best_block_height {
6237 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6238 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6242 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6243 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6244 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6245 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6247 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6248 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6252 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6254 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6256 macro_rules! max_time {
6257 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6259 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6260 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6261 // having an explicit local time source.
6262 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6263 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6264 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6265 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6266 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6272 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6273 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6274 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6275 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6279 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6280 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6281 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6282 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6283 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6284 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6285 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6286 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6293 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6295 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6296 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6297 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6298 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6299 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6300 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6305 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6307 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6309 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6310 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6311 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6312 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6316 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6317 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6319 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6320 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6321 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6322 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6323 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6325 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6326 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6329 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6330 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6331 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6332 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6333 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6334 let res = f(channel);
6335 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6336 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6337 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6338 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6339 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6341 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6342 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6343 if channel.is_usable() {
6344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6345 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6346 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6347 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6357 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6358 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6361 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6363 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6364 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6365 msg: announcement_sigs,
6367 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6368 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6369 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6371 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6372 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6373 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6378 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6379 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6380 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6381 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6382 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6383 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6384 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6385 // is always consistent.
6386 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6387 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6388 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6389 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6390 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6393 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6394 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6395 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6396 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6397 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6398 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6399 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6403 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6404 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6406 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6407 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6408 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6409 data: reason_message,
6419 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6420 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6421 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6422 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6423 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6424 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6425 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6426 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6427 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6428 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6430 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6431 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6432 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6436 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6439 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6440 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6441 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6442 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6443 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6444 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6445 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6446 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6447 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6450 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6451 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6452 _ => unreachable!(),
6454 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6455 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6456 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6463 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6465 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6470 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6472 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6473 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6475 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6476 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6479 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6480 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6481 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6484 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6485 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6486 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6487 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6490 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6491 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6492 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6493 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6496 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6497 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6499 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6500 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6501 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6502 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6503 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6506 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6507 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6508 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6509 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6512 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6513 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6514 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6515 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6518 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6519 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6520 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6521 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6525 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6526 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6528 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6529 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6530 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6531 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6532 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6533 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6537 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6539 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6542 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6543 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6544 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6545 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6548 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6550 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6553 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6554 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6555 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6556 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6559 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6561 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6564 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6566 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6569 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6571 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6574 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6576 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6579 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6581 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6584 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6586 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6589 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6591 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6594 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6596 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6599 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6601 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6604 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6606 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6609 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6611 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6614 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6616 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6619 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6621 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6624 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6625 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6626 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6629 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6634 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6636 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6639 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6641 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6642 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6644 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6645 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6646 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6647 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6648 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6649 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6650 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6651 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6652 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6653 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6654 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6659 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6661 // V1 Channel Establishment
6662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6666 // V2 Channel Establishment
6667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6669 // Common Channel Establishment
6670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6672 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6676 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6677 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6680 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6681 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6682 // Channel Operations
6683 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6684 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6685 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6686 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6687 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6688 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6690 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6691 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6692 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6693 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6694 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6695 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6696 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6697 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6698 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6701 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6702 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6703 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6704 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6707 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6709 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6711 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6712 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6716 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6717 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6718 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6724 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6725 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6726 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6727 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6728 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6729 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6732 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6733 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6735 if inbound_peer_limited {
6738 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6739 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6740 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6741 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6742 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6747 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6748 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6750 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6751 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6752 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6753 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6758 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6759 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6764 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6767 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6770 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6771 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6772 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6773 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6774 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6775 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6776 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6780 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6781 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6782 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6787 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6788 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6789 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6790 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6791 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6800 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6804 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6807 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6808 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6810 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6811 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6812 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6813 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6814 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6816 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6817 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6818 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6822 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6824 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6825 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6826 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6827 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6828 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6829 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6830 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6831 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6839 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6840 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6844 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6845 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6848 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6849 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6852 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6853 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6854 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6855 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6858 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6859 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6860 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6861 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6864 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6865 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6866 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6867 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6870 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6871 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6872 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6873 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6876 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
6877 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6878 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6879 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6882 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
6883 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6884 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6885 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6888 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
6889 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6890 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6891 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6894 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
6895 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6896 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6897 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6900 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
6901 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6902 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6903 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6907 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6908 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6909 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6910 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6913 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6914 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6916 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6917 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6918 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6919 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6920 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6923 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6924 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6925 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6926 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6929 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6930 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6931 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6932 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6935 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6936 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6937 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6938 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6939 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6940 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6941 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6942 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6943 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6944 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6945 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6946 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6947 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6948 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6949 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6950 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6951 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6952 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6954 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6955 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6956 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6962 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6963 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6965 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6966 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6967 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6968 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6971 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6972 (2, node_id, required),
6973 (4, features, required),
6974 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6975 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6976 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6977 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6980 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6981 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6982 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6983 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6984 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6985 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6986 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6987 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6988 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6989 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6990 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6991 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6992 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6993 (7, self.config, option),
6994 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6995 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6996 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6997 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6998 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6999 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7000 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7001 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7002 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7003 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7004 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7005 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7006 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7007 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7008 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7009 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7010 (32, self.is_public, required),
7011 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7012 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7013 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7014 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7020 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7021 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7022 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7023 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7024 (2, channel_id, required),
7025 (3, channel_type, option),
7026 (4, counterparty, required),
7027 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7028 (6, funding_txo, option),
7029 (7, config, option),
7030 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7031 (9, confirmations, option),
7032 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7033 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7034 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7035 (16, balance_msat, required),
7036 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7037 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7038 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7039 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7040 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7041 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7042 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7043 (26, is_outbound, required),
7044 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7045 (30, is_usable, required),
7046 (32, is_public, required),
7047 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7048 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7049 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7050 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7053 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7054 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7055 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7056 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7057 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7061 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7063 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7064 outbound_scid_alias,
7068 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7069 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7071 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7072 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7073 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7074 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7075 confirmations_required,
7077 force_close_spend_delay,
7078 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7079 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7080 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7081 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7082 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7083 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7084 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7089 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7090 (2, channels, vec_type),
7091 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7092 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7095 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7097 (0, onion_packet, required),
7098 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7101 (0, payment_data, required),
7102 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7103 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7104 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7106 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7107 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7108 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7109 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7113 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7114 (0, routing, required),
7115 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7116 (4, payment_hash, required),
7117 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7118 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7119 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7123 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7124 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7126 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7128 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7129 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7130 reason.write(writer)?;
7132 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7133 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7136 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7137 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7138 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7139 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7146 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7147 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7148 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7152 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7153 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7154 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7158 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7159 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7160 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7161 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7162 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7165 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7166 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7167 // messages contained in the variants.
7168 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7169 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7170 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7172 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7173 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7174 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7175 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7176 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7179 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7181 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7182 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7183 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7185 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7190 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7195 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7196 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7197 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7198 (2, outpoint, required),
7199 (4, htlc_id, required),
7200 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7203 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7204 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7205 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7206 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7207 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7209 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7210 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7211 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7212 (2, self.value, required),
7213 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7214 (4, payment_data, option),
7215 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7216 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7217 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7223 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7224 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7225 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7227 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7228 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7229 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7230 let mut total_value_received = None;
7231 let mut total_msat = None;
7232 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7233 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7234 (0, prev_hop, required),
7235 (1, total_msat, option),
7236 (2, value, required),
7237 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7238 (4, payment_data, option),
7239 (5, total_value_received, option),
7240 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7241 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7243 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7245 if payment_data.is_some() {
7246 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7248 if total_msat.is_none() {
7249 total_msat = Some(value);
7251 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7254 if total_msat.is_none() {
7255 if payment_data.is_none() {
7256 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7258 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7260 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7264 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7267 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7268 total_value_received,
7269 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7276 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7277 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7278 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7281 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7282 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7283 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7284 let mut payment_id = None;
7285 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7286 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7287 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7288 (0, session_priv, required),
7289 (1, payment_id, option),
7290 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7291 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7292 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7293 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7295 if payment_id.is_none() {
7296 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7298 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7300 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7301 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7302 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7304 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7305 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7306 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7307 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7311 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7312 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7313 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7315 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7318 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7319 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7324 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7325 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7327 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7329 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7330 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7331 (0, session_priv, required),
7332 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7333 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7334 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7335 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7336 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7337 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7340 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7342 field.write(writer)?;
7349 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7350 (0, forward_info, required),
7351 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7352 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7353 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7354 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7357 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7359 (0, htlc_id, required),
7360 (2, err_packet, required),
7365 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7366 (0, payment_secret, required),
7367 (2, expiry_time, required),
7368 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7369 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7370 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7373 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7375 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7376 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7377 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7378 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7379 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7380 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7384 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7385 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7387 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7389 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7391 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7392 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7393 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7396 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7399 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7400 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7401 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7402 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7403 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7404 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7405 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7407 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7408 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7409 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7410 unfunded_channels += 1;
7415 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7417 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7418 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7419 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7420 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7421 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7422 channel.write(writer)?;
7429 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7430 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7431 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7432 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7433 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7434 for forward in pending_forwards {
7435 forward.write(writer)?;
7440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7442 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7443 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7444 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7446 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7447 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7448 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7449 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7450 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7451 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7452 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7453 htlc.write(writer)?;
7455 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7456 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7459 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7460 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7461 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7462 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7463 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7464 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7465 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7468 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7469 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7470 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7471 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7472 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7474 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7475 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7476 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7477 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7478 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7479 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7480 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7485 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7486 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7487 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7488 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7489 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7490 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7491 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7492 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7493 0u64.write(writer)?;
7495 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7496 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7497 event.write(writer)?;
7501 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7502 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7503 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7504 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7505 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7506 0u64.write(writer)?;
7508 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7509 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7510 // likely to be identical.
7511 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7512 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7514 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7515 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7516 hash.write(writer)?;
7517 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7520 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7521 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7522 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7523 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7524 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7527 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7528 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7530 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7531 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7532 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7533 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7536 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7537 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7541 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7542 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7543 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7545 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7546 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7547 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7553 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7554 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7555 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7556 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7559 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7560 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7561 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7562 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7563 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7566 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7567 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7568 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7569 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7570 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7571 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7572 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7573 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7574 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7575 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7576 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7577 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7584 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7585 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7586 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7587 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7591 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7592 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7593 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7594 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7595 // check that the event is sane here.
7596 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7597 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7598 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7599 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7605 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7606 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7607 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7608 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7609 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7610 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7613 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7614 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7615 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7616 events.push_back((ev, action));
7617 } else if action.is_some() {
7618 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7625 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7627 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7629 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7630 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7631 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7632 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7633 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7634 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7635 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7636 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7637 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7638 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7639 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7640 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7641 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7643 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7644 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7646 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7647 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7649 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7650 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7651 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7652 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7653 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7654 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7656 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7657 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7659 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7660 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7661 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7662 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7663 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7664 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7668 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7669 pub entropy_source: ES,
7671 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7672 pub node_signer: NS,
7674 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7675 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7677 pub signer_provider: SP,
7679 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7681 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7682 pub fee_estimator: F,
7683 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7685 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7686 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7687 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7688 pub chain_monitor: M,
7690 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7691 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7692 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7693 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7694 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7695 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7697 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7699 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7700 /// deserialization.
7702 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7703 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7704 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7706 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7707 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7709 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7710 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7711 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7712 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7714 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7717 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7718 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7721 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7722 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7724 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7725 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7726 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7727 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7728 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7729 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7733 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7734 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7735 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7736 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7737 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7739 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7740 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7745 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7746 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7747 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7748 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7750 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7751 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7752 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7753 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7754 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7755 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7759 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7760 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7761 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7765 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7766 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7768 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7769 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7770 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7771 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7772 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7773 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7777 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7778 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7780 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7781 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7782 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7784 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7786 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7787 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7788 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7789 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7790 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7791 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7792 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7793 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7794 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7795 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7797 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7798 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7799 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7800 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7801 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7802 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7803 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7804 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7805 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7806 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7807 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7808 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7809 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7810 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7811 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7812 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7813 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7814 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7815 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7816 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7817 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7818 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7819 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7820 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
7821 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7822 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7825 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7826 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7827 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7828 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7829 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7831 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7832 let mut found_htlc = false;
7833 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7834 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7837 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7838 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7839 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7840 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7841 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7842 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7843 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7844 log_info!(args.logger,
7845 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7846 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7847 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7851 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7852 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7853 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7855 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7856 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7858 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7860 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7861 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7864 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7865 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7866 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7870 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7871 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7872 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7873 // safely discard the channel.
7874 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7875 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7876 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7877 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7878 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7881 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7882 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7883 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7884 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7885 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7886 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7890 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7891 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7892 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
7893 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7894 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7895 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7896 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7898 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7902 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7903 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7904 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7905 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7906 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7907 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7908 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7909 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7910 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7912 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7915 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7916 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7917 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7918 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7919 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7920 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7921 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7922 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7924 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7927 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7928 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7929 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7930 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7931 let peer_state = PeerState {
7932 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7933 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7934 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7935 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7936 is_connected: false,
7938 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7941 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7942 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7943 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7944 for _ in 0..event_count {
7945 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7946 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7951 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7952 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7953 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7955 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
7956 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
7957 // on-startup monitor updates.
7958 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
7959 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
7961 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7965 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7966 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7968 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7969 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7970 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7971 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7976 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7977 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7978 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7979 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7980 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7981 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7982 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7984 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7985 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7989 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7990 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7991 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7992 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7993 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7994 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7995 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7996 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7997 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7998 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7999 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
8000 let mut events_override = None;
8001 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8002 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8003 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8004 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8005 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8006 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8007 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8008 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8009 (8, events_override, option),
8010 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8011 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8012 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8014 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8015 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8018 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8019 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8022 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8023 pending_events_read = events;
8026 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8027 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8030 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8031 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8032 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8033 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8034 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8035 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8037 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8039 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8040 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8041 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8045 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8046 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8047 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8048 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8049 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8050 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8051 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8053 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8054 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8055 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8056 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8057 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8058 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8059 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8062 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8063 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8064 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8065 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8066 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8067 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8068 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8069 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8072 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8073 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8074 retry_strategy: None,
8075 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8076 payment_params: None,
8077 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8078 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8079 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8080 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8081 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8082 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8083 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8084 total_msat: path_amt,
8085 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8087 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8088 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8093 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8095 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8096 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8097 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8098 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8100 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8101 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8102 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8103 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8104 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8105 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8106 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8107 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8108 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8109 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8110 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8115 !forwards.is_empty()
8117 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8118 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8119 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8120 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8121 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8122 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8123 intercepted_id != ev_id
8130 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8131 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8132 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8133 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8134 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8135 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8136 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8137 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8138 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8139 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8140 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8141 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8142 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8151 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8152 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8153 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8154 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8155 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8156 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8157 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8158 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8162 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8163 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8165 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8166 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8167 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8168 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8170 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8171 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8172 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8174 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8175 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8177 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8178 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8180 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8183 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8184 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8185 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8187 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8191 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8192 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8193 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8194 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8195 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8197 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8198 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8199 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8200 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8201 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8202 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8203 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8204 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8206 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8207 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8211 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8213 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8215 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8216 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8218 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8219 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8224 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8225 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8227 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8229 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8231 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8232 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8233 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8234 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8238 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8239 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8240 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8241 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8242 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8243 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8244 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8246 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8247 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8248 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8250 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8251 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8252 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8253 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8254 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8255 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8257 if chan.is_usable() {
8258 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8259 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8260 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8261 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8268 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8270 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8271 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8272 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8273 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8274 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8275 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8276 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8277 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8278 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8279 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8280 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8282 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8283 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8285 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8286 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8287 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8288 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8290 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8291 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8292 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8293 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8295 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8296 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8297 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8298 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8300 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8301 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8302 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8303 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8304 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8305 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8306 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8309 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8310 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8313 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8316 purpose: payment.purpose,
8317 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8323 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8324 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8325 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8327 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8332 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8334 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8335 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8336 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8337 router: args.router,
8339 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8341 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8342 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8343 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8344 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8346 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8347 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8348 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8349 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8350 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8351 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8353 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8358 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8360 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8362 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8363 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8364 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8365 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8366 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8368 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8369 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8370 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8372 logger: args.logger,
8373 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8376 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8377 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8378 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8379 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8380 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8383 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8384 //connection or two.
8386 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8392 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8393 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8394 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8395 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8396 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8397 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8398 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8399 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8400 use crate::ln::msgs;
8401 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8402 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8403 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8404 use crate::util::test_utils;
8405 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8406 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8409 fn test_notify_limits() {
8410 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8411 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8412 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8415 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8417 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8418 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8419 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8420 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8421 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8423 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8425 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8426 // to connect messages with new values
8427 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8428 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8429 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8430 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8431 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8432 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8434 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8435 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8436 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8437 // ... but the last node should not.
8438 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8439 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8440 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8441 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8443 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8444 // about the channel.
8445 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8446 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8447 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8449 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8451 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8452 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8453 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8454 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8455 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8456 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8458 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8459 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8460 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8462 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8463 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8464 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8465 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8466 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8467 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8469 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8470 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8471 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8472 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8473 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8474 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8475 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8476 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8478 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8479 // the channel info has updated.
8480 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8481 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8482 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8484 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8485 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8489 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8490 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8492 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8493 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8494 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8495 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8496 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8498 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8499 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8500 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8501 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8503 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8504 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8505 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8506 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8507 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8508 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8509 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8510 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8512 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8513 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8514 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8516 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8517 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8518 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8520 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8522 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8523 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8524 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8527 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8528 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8530 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8532 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8533 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8534 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8535 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8536 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8537 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8538 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8540 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8541 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8542 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8544 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8545 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8546 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8548 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8549 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8550 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8551 // lightning messages manually.
8552 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8553 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8556 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8557 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8558 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8560 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8561 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8563 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8564 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8566 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8567 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8568 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8570 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8571 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8572 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8574 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8576 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8578 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8579 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8582 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8583 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8584 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8585 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8587 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8588 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8589 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8590 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8595 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8596 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8597 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8598 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8603 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8604 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8605 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8606 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8608 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8613 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8614 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8615 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8616 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8617 // fails as expected.
8618 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8619 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8621 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8622 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8623 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8624 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8626 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8627 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8628 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8630 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8631 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8632 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8633 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8635 let route = find_route(
8636 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8637 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8639 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8640 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8642 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8644 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8645 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8646 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8648 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8649 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8650 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8651 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8652 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8654 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8655 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8656 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8657 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8658 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8659 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8660 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8661 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8662 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8664 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8665 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8667 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8668 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8669 let route = find_route(
8670 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8671 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8673 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8674 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8676 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8678 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8679 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8680 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8682 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8683 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8684 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8685 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8687 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8689 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8690 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8691 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8693 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8694 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8695 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8697 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8698 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8699 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8700 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8701 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8702 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8703 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8704 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8705 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8707 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8708 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8712 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8713 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8714 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8715 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8716 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8717 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8718 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8720 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8721 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8723 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8724 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8725 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8726 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8728 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8729 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8730 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8731 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8732 let route = find_route(
8733 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8734 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8737 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8738 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8739 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8740 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8741 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8742 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8745 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8746 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8747 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8748 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8749 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8750 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8751 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8753 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8757 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8758 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8762 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8764 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8765 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8767 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8768 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8769 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8770 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8772 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8773 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8774 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8775 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8776 let route = find_route(
8777 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8778 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8781 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8782 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8783 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8784 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8785 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8786 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8787 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8788 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8791 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8792 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8793 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8794 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8795 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8796 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8797 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8799 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8803 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8807 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8809 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8810 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8811 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8812 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8814 // Marshall an MPP route.
8815 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8816 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8817 route.paths.push(path);
8818 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8819 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8820 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8821 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8822 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8823 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8825 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8826 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8828 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8829 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8831 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8836 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8837 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8840 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8842 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8844 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8845 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8847 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8850 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8853 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8854 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8855 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8856 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8857 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8858 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8861 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8864 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8865 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8870 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8871 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8872 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8874 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8875 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8877 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8878 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8880 total_msat: 100_000,
8883 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8884 // payment verification fails as expected.
8885 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8886 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8887 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8888 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8890 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8894 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8895 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8899 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8900 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8901 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8902 // the channel is successfully closed.
8903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8906 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8908 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8909 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8910 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8911 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8912 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8914 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8915 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8917 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8918 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8919 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8920 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8923 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8925 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8926 // as it has the funding transaction.
8927 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8928 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8929 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8932 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8934 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8936 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8938 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8939 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8940 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8942 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8945 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8946 // as it has the funding transaction.
8947 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8948 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8949 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8952 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8953 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8955 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8956 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8957 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8958 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8960 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8961 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8962 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8963 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8965 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8966 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8968 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8969 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8970 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8971 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8972 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8973 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8974 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8978 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8979 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8980 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8981 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8982 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8983 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8984 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8987 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8989 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8990 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8991 // closing transaction).
8992 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8993 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8994 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8996 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8997 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8998 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8999 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9000 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9003 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9005 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9007 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9008 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9009 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9011 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9013 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9014 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9017 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9018 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9019 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9022 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9023 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9024 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9027 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9029 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9030 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9032 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9033 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9035 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9036 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9041 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9042 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9043 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9044 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9045 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9046 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9047 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9048 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9051 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9052 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9053 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9055 // Test the API functions.
9056 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9058 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9060 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9062 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9064 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9066 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9068 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9072 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9073 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9074 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9075 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9076 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9077 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9079 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9081 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9082 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9084 let mut funding_tx = None;
9085 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9086 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9087 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9090 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9091 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9092 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9093 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9094 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9096 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9098 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9100 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9102 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9104 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9106 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9109 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9110 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9111 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9112 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9113 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9115 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9116 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9118 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9119 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9120 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9121 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9122 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9123 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9124 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9126 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9127 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9128 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9129 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9131 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9132 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9133 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9134 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9135 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9136 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9137 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9139 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9140 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9141 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9142 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9144 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9145 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9146 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9147 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9149 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9150 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9152 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9153 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9154 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9155 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9156 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9158 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9159 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9160 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9162 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9163 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9164 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9166 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9167 // "protected" and can connect again.
9168 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9169 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9170 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9171 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9173 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9175 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9176 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9180 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9181 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9182 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9183 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9184 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9185 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9187 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9189 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9190 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9192 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9193 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9194 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9195 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9198 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9200 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9201 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9202 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9204 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9205 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9206 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9208 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9209 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9210 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9211 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9215 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9216 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9217 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9218 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9219 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9220 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9221 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9223 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9225 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9227 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9228 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9230 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9231 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9232 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9233 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9234 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9235 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9237 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9238 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9240 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9241 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9245 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9246 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9249 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9250 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9251 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9252 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9253 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9254 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9255 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9257 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9258 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9259 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9260 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9266 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9267 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9269 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9270 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9271 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9273 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9274 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9278 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9283 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9284 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9285 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9286 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9289 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9290 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9291 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9292 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9293 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9295 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9296 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9297 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9299 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9300 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9302 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9303 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9308 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9309 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9311 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9312 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9314 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9318 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9320 use crate::chain::Listen;
9321 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9322 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9323 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9324 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9325 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9326 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9327 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9328 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9329 use crate::util::test_utils;
9330 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9332 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9333 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9334 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9336 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9340 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9341 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9342 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9343 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9344 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9345 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9346 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9348 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9349 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9351 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9352 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9354 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9356 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9361 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9362 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9365 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9366 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9367 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9369 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9371 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9372 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9373 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9374 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9375 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9377 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9378 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9380 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9381 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9382 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9383 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9385 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9387 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9389 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9390 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9391 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9392 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9393 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9395 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9397 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9399 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9400 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9401 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9402 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9403 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9406 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9407 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9408 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9410 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9411 } else { panic!(); }
9413 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9414 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9415 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9417 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9418 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9423 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9424 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9425 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9427 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9428 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9433 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9436 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9439 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9440 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9442 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9443 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9444 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9445 match msg_events[0] {
9446 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9447 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9448 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9452 match msg_events[1] {
9453 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9457 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9458 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9460 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9461 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9466 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9467 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9469 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9470 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9472 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9475 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9476 macro_rules! send_payment {
9477 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9478 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9479 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9480 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9481 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9483 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9484 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9486 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9487 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9488 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9489 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9490 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9491 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9492 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9493 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9494 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9495 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9496 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9498 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9499 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9500 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9501 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9503 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9504 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9505 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9506 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9507 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9509 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9512 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9513 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9514 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9515 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9517 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9522 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9523 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);