1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115 /// A forwarded HTLC.
117 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
118 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
119 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
120 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
121 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
122 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
123 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
125 /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
126 /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us,
127 /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
129 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
130 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
132 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
133 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
134 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
135 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
136 /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the
137 /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be
138 /// settled by this node.
139 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
140 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
141 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
143 /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
145 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
146 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
147 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
148 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
149 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
151 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
152 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
156 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
160 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
161 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
162 pub struct BlindedForward {
163 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
164 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
165 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
166 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
167 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
170 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
171 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
172 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
173 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
174 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
175 /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
176 /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards.
177 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
178 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
179 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
180 /// Amount offered by this HTLC.
181 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
182 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
183 /// may overshoot this in either case)
184 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
185 /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight.
186 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
187 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
188 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
189 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
192 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
193 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
194 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
195 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
198 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
199 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
200 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
201 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
202 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
205 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
206 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
208 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
209 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
210 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
213 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
214 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
216 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
217 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
220 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
221 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
224 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
228 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
229 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
230 enum BlindedFailure {
231 FromIntroductionNode,
232 // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
237 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
238 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
239 short_channel_id: u64,
240 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
242 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
244 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
246 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
247 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
252 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
254 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
255 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
256 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
258 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
259 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
262 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
263 struct ClaimableHTLC {
264 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
266 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
268 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
269 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
270 sender_intended_value: u64,
271 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
273 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
274 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
275 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
276 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
278 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
279 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
282 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
283 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
284 events::ClaimedHTLC {
285 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
286 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
287 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
288 value_msat: val.value,
289 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
294 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
295 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
297 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
298 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
299 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
302 /// Number of bytes in the id.
303 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
306 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
307 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
312 impl Readable for PaymentId {
313 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
314 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
319 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
320 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
321 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
325 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
327 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
328 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
329 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
331 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
332 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
337 impl Readable for InterceptId {
338 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
339 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
344 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
345 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
346 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
347 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
348 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
351 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
353 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
354 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
355 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
357 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
358 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
362 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
363 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
364 (0, short_channel_id, required),
365 (2, htlc_id, required),
367 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
368 (0, session_priv, required),
373 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
374 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
375 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
376 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
377 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
380 session_priv: SecretKey,
381 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
382 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
383 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
384 payment_id: PaymentId,
387 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
388 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
389 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
391 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
393 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
395 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
398 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
399 payment_id.hash(hasher);
400 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
406 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
408 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
409 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
410 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
411 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
412 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
413 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
417 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
418 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
419 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
420 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
421 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
422 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
424 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
430 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
431 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
433 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
434 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
435 pub enum FailureCode {
436 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
437 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
438 TemporaryNodeFailure,
439 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
440 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
441 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
442 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
443 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
444 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
445 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
446 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
447 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
448 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
450 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
451 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
452 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
455 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
456 fn into(self) -> u16 {
458 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
459 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
460 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
461 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
466 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
467 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
468 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
469 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
470 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
472 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
473 err: msgs::LightningError,
474 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
475 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
476 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
478 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
480 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
482 err: LightningError {
484 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
485 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
492 shutdown_finish: None,
493 channel_capacity: None,
497 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
498 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
501 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
502 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
503 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
504 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
505 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
506 // commitment upon reconnecting.
507 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
509 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
512 err: LightningError { err, action },
513 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
514 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
515 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
519 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
522 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
524 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
525 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
529 log_level: Level::Warn,
532 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
534 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
536 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
538 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
539 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
547 shutdown_finish: None,
548 channel_capacity: None,
552 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
553 self.chan_id.is_some()
557 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
558 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
559 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
560 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
561 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
563 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
564 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
565 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
566 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
567 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
568 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
569 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
571 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
575 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
576 struct ClaimingPayment {
578 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
579 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
580 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
581 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
583 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
584 (0, amount_msat, required),
585 (2, payment_purpose, required),
586 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
587 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
588 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
591 struct ClaimablePayment {
592 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
593 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
594 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
597 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
598 struct ClaimablePayments {
599 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
600 /// failed/claimed by the user.
602 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
603 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
605 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
606 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
607 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
609 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
610 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
611 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
612 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
615 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
616 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
617 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
618 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
620 enum BackgroundEvent {
621 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
622 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
623 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
624 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
626 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
627 /// are regenerated on startup.
628 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
629 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
630 /// channel to continue normal operation.
632 /// In general this should be used rather than
633 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
634 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
635 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
637 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
638 /// are regenerated on startup.
639 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
640 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
641 funding_txo: OutPoint,
642 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
644 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
645 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
647 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
648 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
649 channel_id: ChannelId,
654 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
655 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
656 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
657 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
658 /// event can be generated.
659 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
660 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
661 /// operation of another channel.
663 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
664 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
665 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
666 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
668 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
669 event: events::Event,
670 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
672 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
673 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
674 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
676 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
677 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
678 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
679 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
680 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
682 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
683 /// stored for later processing.
684 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
685 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
686 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
687 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
691 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
692 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
693 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
694 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
695 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
696 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
697 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
698 (4, blocking_action, required),
700 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
701 (0, event, upgradable_required),
702 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
703 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
704 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
705 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
706 // downgrades to prior versions.
707 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
711 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
712 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
713 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
714 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
715 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
718 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
719 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
720 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
721 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
725 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
726 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
727 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
728 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
729 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
730 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
732 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
733 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
734 channel_id: ChannelId,
735 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
740 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
741 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
742 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
743 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
744 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
749 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
750 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
754 /// State we hold per-peer.
755 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
756 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
758 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
759 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
760 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
762 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
763 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
764 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
765 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
766 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
767 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
768 latest_features: InitFeatures,
769 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
770 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
771 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
772 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
773 /// user but which have not yet completed.
775 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
776 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
777 /// for a missing channel.
778 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
779 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
780 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
782 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
783 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
784 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
785 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
787 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
788 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
789 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
790 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
791 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
792 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
793 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
794 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
795 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
796 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
797 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
798 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
799 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
800 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
801 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
805 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
806 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
807 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
808 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
809 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
810 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
813 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
814 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
815 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
818 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
819 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
820 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
823 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
824 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
825 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
826 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
830 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
831 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
832 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
833 /// The original OpenChannel message.
834 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
835 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
836 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
839 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
840 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
841 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
843 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
844 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
846 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
849 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
850 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
851 struct PendingInboundPayment {
852 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
853 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
854 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
855 /// this payment being removed.
857 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
858 user_payment_id: u64,
859 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
860 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
861 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
864 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
865 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
866 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
867 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
868 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
869 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
870 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
871 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
873 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
874 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
875 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
883 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
885 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
886 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
887 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
892 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
893 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
894 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
895 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
896 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
897 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
898 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
899 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
900 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
902 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
903 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
904 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
913 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
915 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
916 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
917 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
922 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
924 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
926 pub trait AChannelManager {
927 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
928 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
929 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
930 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
931 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
932 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
933 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
934 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
935 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
936 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
937 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
938 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
939 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
940 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
941 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
942 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
943 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
944 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
945 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
946 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
947 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
948 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
949 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
950 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
951 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
952 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
953 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
954 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
955 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
956 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
957 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
958 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
959 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
960 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
961 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
962 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
965 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
966 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
968 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
969 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
970 ES::Target: EntropySource,
971 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
972 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
973 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
977 type Watch = M::Target;
979 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
981 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
983 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
985 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
986 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
988 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
990 type Router = R::Target;
992 type Logger = L::Target;
994 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
997 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
998 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1000 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1001 /// to individual Channels.
1003 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1004 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1005 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1006 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1008 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1009 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1010 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1011 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1012 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1013 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1014 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1015 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1016 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1018 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1019 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1020 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1022 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1023 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1024 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1025 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1026 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1028 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1029 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1030 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1031 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1033 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1034 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1035 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1037 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1038 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1039 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1040 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1041 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1043 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1044 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1045 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1046 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1047 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1048 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1049 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1050 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1053 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1054 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1055 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1056 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1057 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1061 // `pending_offers_messages`
1063 // `total_consistency_lock`
1065 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1067 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1069 // |__`per_peer_state`
1071 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1073 // |__`claimable_payments`
1075 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1081 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1083 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1087 // |__`pending_events`
1089 // |__`pending_background_events`
1091 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1093 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1094 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1095 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1096 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1097 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1098 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1102 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1103 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1104 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1110 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1112 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1114 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1115 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1117 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1118 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1119 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1120 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1122 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1123 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1125 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1126 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1127 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1128 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1129 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1130 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1131 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1132 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1134 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1136 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1137 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1139 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1141 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1142 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1143 /// and via the classic SCID.
1145 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1146 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1148 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1150 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1152 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1153 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1154 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1156 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1157 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1159 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1160 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1162 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1163 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1165 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1166 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1167 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1168 /// active channel list on load.
1170 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1171 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1173 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1175 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1176 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1177 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1179 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1180 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1181 /// the handling of the events.
1183 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1184 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1187 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1188 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1189 /// would break backwards compatability.
1190 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1191 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1192 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1194 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1195 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1197 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1199 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1200 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1201 /// confirmation depth.
1203 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1204 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1205 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1207 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1209 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1211 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1213 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1215 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1217 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1218 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1219 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1221 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1222 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1224 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1225 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1226 /// keeping additional state.
1227 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1229 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1230 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1231 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1232 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1234 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1235 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1237 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1238 /// are currently open with that peer.
1240 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1241 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1244 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1246 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1247 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1248 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1249 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1250 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1252 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1253 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1254 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1255 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1256 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1258 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1259 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1261 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1262 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1263 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1264 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1265 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1267 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1268 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1270 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1271 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1272 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1273 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1274 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1276 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1278 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1280 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1281 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1282 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1283 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1284 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1285 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1286 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1287 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1288 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1289 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1290 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1292 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1293 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1294 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1296 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1298 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1299 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1301 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1305 signer_provider: SP,
1310 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1312 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1313 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1314 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1315 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1316 pub struct ChainParameters {
1317 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1318 pub network: Network,
1320 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1322 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1323 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1326 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1330 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1331 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1334 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1335 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1336 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1337 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1338 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1339 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1341 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1342 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1343 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1344 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1345 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1346 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1348 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1349 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1352 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1353 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1354 /// events to handle.
1356 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1357 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1359 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1360 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1363 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1364 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1365 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1366 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1368 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1369 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1370 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1371 should_persist: move || {
1372 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1373 // processing and return that.
1374 let notify = persist_check();
1375 match (notify, force_notify) {
1376 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1377 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1378 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1379 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1380 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1383 _read_guard: read_guard,
1387 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1388 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1389 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1390 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1391 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1392 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1394 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1395 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1396 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1397 should_persist: persist_check,
1398 _read_guard: read_guard,
1403 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1404 fn drop(&mut self) {
1405 match (self.should_persist)() {
1406 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1407 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1408 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1410 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1411 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1412 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1417 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1418 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1420 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1422 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1423 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1424 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1425 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1426 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1428 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1429 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1431 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1433 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1434 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1435 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1436 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1437 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1438 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1439 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1440 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1441 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1442 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1443 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1444 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1445 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1447 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1448 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1450 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1451 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1452 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1453 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1455 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1456 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1457 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1458 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1459 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1460 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1463 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1465 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1466 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1469 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1471 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1472 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1474 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1475 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1476 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1478 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1479 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1480 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1482 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1483 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1484 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1485 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1487 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1488 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1489 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1491 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1492 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1493 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1495 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1496 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1497 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1498 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1499 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1500 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1501 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1502 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1503 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1504 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1505 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1508 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1509 /// to better separate parameters.
1510 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1511 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1512 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1513 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1514 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1515 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1516 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1517 pub features: InitFeatures,
1518 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1519 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1520 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1522 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1524 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1525 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1526 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1527 /// payments to us through this channel.
1528 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1529 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1530 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1531 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1532 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1533 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1534 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1537 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1538 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1539 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1540 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1541 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1542 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1543 /// lifetime of the channel.
1544 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1545 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1546 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1547 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1548 /// our counterparty already.
1550 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1551 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1552 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1553 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1555 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1556 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1557 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1558 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1560 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1561 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1563 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1564 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1566 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1567 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1568 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1569 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1570 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1571 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1572 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1573 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1574 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1577 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1579 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1580 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1581 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1582 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1583 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1584 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1585 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1587 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1588 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1590 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1591 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1592 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1593 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1594 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1595 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1596 /// this value on chain.
1598 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1600 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1602 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1603 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1604 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1605 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1606 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1607 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1608 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1610 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1611 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1612 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1613 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1614 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1615 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1617 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1618 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1619 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1620 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1621 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1623 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1624 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1625 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1626 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1628 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1629 pub balance_msat: u64,
1630 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1631 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1632 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1633 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1635 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1637 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1638 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1639 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1640 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1641 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1642 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1643 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1644 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1646 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1647 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1648 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1649 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1650 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1651 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1652 /// route which is valid.
1653 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1654 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1655 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1656 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1657 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1658 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1660 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1661 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1662 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1663 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1664 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1665 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1666 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1667 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1668 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1670 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1672 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1673 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1674 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1675 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1676 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1678 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1679 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1680 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1681 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1682 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1683 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1684 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1686 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1687 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1688 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1689 pub is_outbound: bool,
1690 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1691 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1692 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1693 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1694 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1696 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1697 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1698 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1699 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1700 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1701 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1702 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1704 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1705 pub is_usable: bool,
1706 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1707 pub is_public: bool,
1708 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1709 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1710 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1711 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1712 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1713 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1715 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1716 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1719 impl ChannelDetails {
1720 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1721 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1722 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1724 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1725 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1726 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1727 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1730 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1731 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1732 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1734 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1735 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1736 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1737 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1740 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1741 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1742 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1745 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1746 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1748 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1749 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1750 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1752 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1753 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1754 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1755 features: latest_features,
1756 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1757 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1758 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1759 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1760 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1761 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1762 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1763 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1764 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1765 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1767 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1768 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1769 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1770 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1771 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1772 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1773 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1774 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1775 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1776 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1777 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1778 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1779 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1780 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1781 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1782 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1783 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1784 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1785 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1786 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1787 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1788 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1789 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1790 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1791 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1792 config: Some(context.config()),
1793 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1798 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1799 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1800 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1801 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1802 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1803 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1804 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1805 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1806 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1808 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1810 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1811 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1813 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1814 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1815 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1816 /// to drop the channel.
1820 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1821 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1822 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1823 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1824 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1826 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1827 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1828 payment_id: PaymentId,
1830 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1832 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1833 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1834 payment_id: PaymentId,
1835 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1837 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1838 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1839 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1842 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1843 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1844 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1846 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1847 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1848 payment_id: PaymentId,
1849 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1850 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1851 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1853 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1854 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1855 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1857 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1858 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1859 payment_id: PaymentId,
1860 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1861 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1865 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1867 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1869 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1870 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1871 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1872 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1874 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1875 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1876 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1879 macro_rules! handle_error {
1880 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1881 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1882 // entering the macro.
1883 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1884 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1888 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1889 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1891 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1892 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1893 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1894 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1898 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1899 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1900 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1901 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1902 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1903 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1908 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1909 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1911 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1912 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1913 action: err.action.clone()
1917 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1918 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1919 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1920 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1921 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1925 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1930 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1933 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1934 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1935 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1941 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1942 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1943 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1944 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1945 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1946 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1948 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1949 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1950 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1951 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1952 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1954 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1955 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1957 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1961 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1962 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1963 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1965 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1966 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1968 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1969 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1971 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1972 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1973 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1974 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1975 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1976 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1978 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1979 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1983 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1984 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1986 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1987 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1989 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1990 match $channel_phase {
1991 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1992 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1994 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1995 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1997 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1998 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2004 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2005 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2009 let key = *$entry.key();
2010 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2012 $entry.remove_entry();
2020 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2021 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2025 let key = *$entry.key();
2026 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2028 $entry.remove_entry();
2036 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2037 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2039 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2040 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2046 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2047 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2048 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2049 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2050 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2052 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2053 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2054 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2055 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2056 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2057 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2058 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2059 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2060 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2061 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2066 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2067 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2068 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2069 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2070 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2071 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2072 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2073 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2074 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2076 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2081 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2082 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2083 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2084 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2085 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2086 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2087 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2088 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2089 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2091 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2096 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2097 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2098 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2099 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2100 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2101 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2102 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2103 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2104 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2105 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2106 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2108 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2109 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2110 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2116 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2117 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2119 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2120 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2121 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2122 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2123 updates.announcement_sigs);
2124 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2125 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2128 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2129 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2130 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2131 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2133 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2134 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2135 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2136 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2137 let mut batch_completed = false;
2138 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2139 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2140 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2141 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2143 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2144 channel_state.2 = true;
2146 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2148 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2150 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2153 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2154 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2155 if batch_completed {
2156 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2157 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2158 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2159 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2160 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2161 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2162 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2163 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2164 chan.set_batch_ready();
2165 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2166 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2170 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2171 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2172 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2177 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2179 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2180 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2182 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2183 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2184 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2185 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2190 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2191 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2192 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2194 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2195 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2196 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2197 panic!("{}", err_str);
2199 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2200 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2201 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2204 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2210 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2211 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2212 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2214 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2215 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2216 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2217 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2218 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2219 // filter for uniqueness here.
2220 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2221 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2222 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2223 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2225 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2226 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2228 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2229 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2230 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2236 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2237 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2238 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2239 while !processed_all_events {
2240 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2247 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2248 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2249 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2251 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2252 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2253 result = $self.process_background_events();
2255 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2256 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2257 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2258 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2262 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2263 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2264 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2265 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2268 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2270 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2271 $event_to_handle = event;
2273 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2274 post_event_actions.push(action);
2279 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2280 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2281 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2282 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2283 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2284 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2287 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2288 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2289 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2290 processed_all_events = false;
2294 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2295 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2296 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2298 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2299 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2300 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2306 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2308 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2309 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2310 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2311 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2312 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2313 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2317 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2319 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2321 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2322 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2324 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2326 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2327 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2328 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2331 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2332 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2333 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2335 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2336 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2337 current_timestamp: u32,
2339 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2340 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2341 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2342 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2344 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2345 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2346 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2351 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2353 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2354 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2355 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2356 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2357 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2358 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2359 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2360 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2362 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2365 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2366 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2368 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2370 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2372 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2374 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2375 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2376 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2377 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2378 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2379 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2380 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2381 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2383 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2393 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2394 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2395 &self.default_configuration
2398 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2399 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2400 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2403 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2404 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2406 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2408 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2412 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2417 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2419 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2420 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2421 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2422 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2423 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2425 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2426 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2428 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2429 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2430 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2432 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2433 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2434 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2436 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2437 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2439 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2440 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2441 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2442 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2443 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2444 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2446 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2447 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2448 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2449 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2450 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2451 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2455 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2456 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2458 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2460 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2461 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2463 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2465 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2466 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2467 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2472 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2473 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2474 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2475 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2476 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2477 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2481 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2486 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2488 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2489 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2490 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2492 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2494 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2497 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2500 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2501 node_id: their_network_key,
2504 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2507 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2508 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2509 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2510 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2511 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2512 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2513 // the same channel.
2514 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2516 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2518 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2519 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2520 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2521 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2522 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2523 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2524 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2528 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2529 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2530 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2538 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2539 /// more information.
2540 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2541 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2542 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2543 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2544 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2545 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2546 // the same channel.
2547 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2549 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2551 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2552 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2553 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2554 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2555 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2556 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2564 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2565 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2567 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2568 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2570 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2571 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2572 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2573 // really wanted anyway.
2574 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2577 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2578 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2579 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2582 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2585 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2586 let context_to_details = |context| {
2587 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2589 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2591 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2592 .map(context_to_details)
2598 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2599 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2601 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2602 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2603 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2605 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2606 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2607 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2608 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2609 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2610 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2612 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2613 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2614 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2616 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2617 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2618 payment_id: *payment_id,
2619 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2620 total_msat: *total_msat,
2623 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2624 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2626 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2627 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2629 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2634 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2635 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2636 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2637 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2638 Some(transaction) => {
2639 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2640 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2645 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2646 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2647 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2648 reason: closure_reason,
2649 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2650 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2654 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2657 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2658 let shutdown_result;
2660 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2662 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2663 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2665 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2666 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2668 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2670 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2671 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2672 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2673 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2674 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2675 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2676 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2677 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2679 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2680 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2681 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2682 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2683 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2687 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2688 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2690 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2691 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2692 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2693 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2697 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2698 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2699 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2700 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2704 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2711 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2712 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2714 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2715 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2716 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2717 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2722 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2723 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2724 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2725 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2728 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2729 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2735 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2736 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2737 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2739 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2740 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2742 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2743 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2744 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2745 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2747 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2749 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2750 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2751 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2754 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2755 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2756 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2757 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2758 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2759 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2762 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2763 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2764 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2766 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2767 /// the channel being closed or not:
2768 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2769 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2770 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2771 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2772 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2773 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2774 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2776 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2777 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2778 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2779 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2781 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2783 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2784 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2785 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2788 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2789 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2790 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2791 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2792 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2795 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2796 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2797 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2798 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2799 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2802 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2803 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2804 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2805 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2806 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2807 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2809 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2810 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2811 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2812 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2813 // ignore the result here.
2814 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2816 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2817 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2818 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2819 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2821 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2822 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2823 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2824 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2825 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2826 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2827 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2828 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2831 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2834 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2835 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2838 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2839 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2843 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2844 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2845 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2846 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2848 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2849 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2850 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2851 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2852 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2853 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2855 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2857 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2858 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2859 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2860 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2861 mem::drop(peer_state);
2862 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2864 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2865 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2866 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2868 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2869 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2870 // Unfunded channel has no update
2871 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2874 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2875 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2876 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2877 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2879 (None, *peer_node_id)
2881 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2884 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2885 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2886 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2887 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2888 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2889 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2890 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2891 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2892 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2898 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2901 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2903 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2904 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2906 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2907 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2908 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2909 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2910 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2911 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2912 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2923 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2924 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2925 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2927 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2928 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2929 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2932 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2933 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2934 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2936 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2937 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2938 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2939 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2940 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2943 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2944 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2945 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2946 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2947 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2951 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2952 /// local transaction(s).
2953 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2954 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2955 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2959 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2960 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2962 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2964 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2965 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2968 macro_rules! return_err {
2969 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2971 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2972 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2973 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2974 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2975 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2976 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2982 let NextPacketDetails {
2983 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
2984 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
2985 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
2986 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
2987 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2990 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2991 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2992 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2993 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2994 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2995 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2996 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2997 // phantom or an intercept.
2998 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2999 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3000 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3004 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3007 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3009 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3011 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3012 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3013 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3017 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3018 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3021 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3022 // have no consistency guarantees.
3023 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3027 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3028 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3029 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3030 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3031 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3033 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3034 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3035 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3036 // we don't have the channel here.
3037 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3039 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3041 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3042 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3043 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3044 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3045 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3046 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3047 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3048 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3049 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3050 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3051 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3053 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3056 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3057 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3059 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3060 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3067 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3069 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3070 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3072 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3073 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3074 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3075 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3076 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3078 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3079 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3085 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3086 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3087 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3088 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3090 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3091 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3093 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3094 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3095 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3097 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3098 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3099 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3100 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3101 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3102 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3103 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3107 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3109 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3112 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3113 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3114 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3115 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3116 macro_rules! return_err {
3117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3119 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3120 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3121 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3122 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3123 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3124 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3130 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3132 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3133 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3134 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3135 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3138 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3139 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3140 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3141 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3142 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3144 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3147 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3148 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3149 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3150 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3151 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3157 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3158 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3159 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3161 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3162 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3163 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3165 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3166 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3167 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3168 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3169 return Err(LightningError {
3170 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3171 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3174 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3175 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3177 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3178 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3181 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3182 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3183 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3184 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3186 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3187 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3188 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3190 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3191 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3192 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3193 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3194 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3195 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3199 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3202 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3204 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3206 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3207 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3208 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3209 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3210 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3213 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3214 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3216 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3217 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3218 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3219 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3220 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3221 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3222 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3223 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3225 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3226 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3227 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3229 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3231 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3238 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3239 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3240 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3241 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3246 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3247 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3248 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3251 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3252 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3254 log_trace!(self.logger,
3255 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3256 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3257 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3258 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3260 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3261 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3262 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3265 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3266 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3267 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3268 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3271 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3272 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3273 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3276 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3277 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3278 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3279 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3280 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3282 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3283 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3284 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3286 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3287 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3289 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3290 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3291 Some(monitor_update) => {
3292 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3294 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3295 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3296 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3297 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3298 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3299 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3300 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3308 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3311 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3312 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3313 // `channel_by_id` map.
3314 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3315 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3320 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3321 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3323 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3328 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3330 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3331 /// fields for more info.
3333 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3334 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3336 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3338 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3339 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3340 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3341 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3342 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3344 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3345 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3346 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3347 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3348 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3350 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3351 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3352 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3353 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3355 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3357 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3358 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3359 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3361 /// In general, a path may raise:
3362 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3363 /// node public key) is specified.
3364 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3365 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3366 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3367 /// relevant updates.
3369 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3370 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3371 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3373 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3374 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3375 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3376 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3377 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3378 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3379 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3380 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3382 self.pending_outbound_payments
3383 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3384 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3385 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3388 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3389 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3390 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3391 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3392 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3393 self.pending_outbound_payments
3394 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3395 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3396 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3397 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3401 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3402 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3404 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3405 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3406 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3410 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3411 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3412 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3416 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3417 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3420 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3421 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3423 self.pending_outbound_payments
3424 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3425 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3426 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3427 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3428 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3432 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3433 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3434 /// retries are exhausted.
3436 /// # Event Generation
3438 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3439 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3441 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3442 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3443 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3445 /// # Requested Invoices
3447 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3448 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3449 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3450 /// once the invoice has been received.
3452 /// # Restart Behavior
3454 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3455 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3456 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3458 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3459 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3461 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3464 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3465 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3466 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3467 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3468 /// never reach the recipient.
3470 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3471 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3473 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3474 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3476 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3477 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3478 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3480 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3481 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3482 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3485 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3486 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3488 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3491 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3492 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3493 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3495 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3496 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3497 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3498 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3501 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3502 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3503 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3504 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3505 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3507 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3508 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3509 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3512 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3515 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3516 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3519 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3520 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3522 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3523 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3524 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3525 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3526 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3527 let payment_params =
3528 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3530 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3532 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3535 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3536 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3538 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3539 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3540 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3541 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3543 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3544 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3545 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3546 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3547 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3548 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3549 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3550 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3551 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3552 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3554 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3555 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3556 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3557 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3561 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3563 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3564 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3567 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3569 let mut res = Vec::new();
3571 for mut path in route.paths {
3572 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3573 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3574 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3575 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3576 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3579 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3582 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3583 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3585 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3587 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3588 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3593 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3596 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3601 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3602 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3603 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3605 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3606 let used_liquidity =
3607 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3609 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3610 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3612 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3615 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3620 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3621 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3622 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3629 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3630 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3631 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3632 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3633 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3634 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3636 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3637 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3641 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3642 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3643 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3645 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3646 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3647 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3648 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3649 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3650 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3651 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3652 } else { unreachable!(); });
3654 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3655 Err((chan, err)) => {
3656 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3657 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3659 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3660 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3661 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3667 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3668 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3670 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3671 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3674 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3675 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3676 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3680 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3681 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3682 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3686 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3688 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3691 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3692 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3693 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3695 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3702 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3703 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3704 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3708 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3710 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3711 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3713 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3714 /// across the p2p network.
3716 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3717 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3719 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3720 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3721 /// keys per-channel).
3723 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3724 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3725 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3727 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3728 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3729 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3731 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3732 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3733 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3734 /// for more details.
3736 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3737 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3738 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3739 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3742 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3744 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3745 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3747 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3748 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3749 /// signature for each channel.
3751 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3752 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3754 let mut result = Ok(());
3756 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3757 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3758 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3759 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3760 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3765 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3766 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3767 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3771 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3772 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3773 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3774 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3775 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3776 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3777 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3778 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3780 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3781 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3786 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3787 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3788 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3789 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3793 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3794 match states.entry(txid) {
3795 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3796 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3797 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3801 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3804 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3805 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3806 temporary_channel_id,
3807 counterparty_node_id,
3808 funding_transaction.clone(),
3811 let mut output_index = None;
3812 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3813 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3814 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3815 if output_index.is_some() {
3816 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3817 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3820 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3823 if output_index.is_none() {
3824 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3825 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3828 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3829 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3830 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3836 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3837 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3838 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3839 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3840 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3841 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3842 .into_iter().flatten()
3843 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3845 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3846 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3848 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3851 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3852 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3853 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3854 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3856 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3857 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3858 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3862 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3863 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3869 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3871 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3872 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3873 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3874 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3876 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3877 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3879 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3880 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3882 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3884 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3885 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3886 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3887 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3888 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3889 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3890 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3891 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3892 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3893 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3894 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3895 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3896 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3901 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3902 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3903 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3906 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3907 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3908 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3909 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3913 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3914 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3915 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3916 config.apply(config_update);
3917 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3920 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3921 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3922 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3923 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3924 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3925 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3932 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3933 debug_assert!(false);
3934 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3936 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3937 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3944 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3946 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3947 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3948 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3949 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3951 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3952 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3954 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3955 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3957 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3959 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3960 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3961 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3962 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3963 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3964 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3965 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3966 pub fn update_channel_config(
3967 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3968 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3969 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3972 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3973 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3975 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3976 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3978 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3979 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3980 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3981 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3982 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3984 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3985 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3986 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3989 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3992 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3993 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3994 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3995 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3996 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3997 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4000 let next_hop_scid = {
4001 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4002 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4003 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4006 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4007 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4008 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4010 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4013 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4015 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4016 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4017 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4020 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4021 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4022 log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4023 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4030 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4031 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4032 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4035 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4036 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4037 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4038 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4041 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4043 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4044 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4045 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4046 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4047 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4050 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4051 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4052 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4053 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4054 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4056 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4060 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4061 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4063 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4066 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4067 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4070 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4071 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4072 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4075 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4076 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4077 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4078 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4079 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4080 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4081 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4082 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4083 blinded_failure: None,
4086 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4087 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4089 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4094 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4096 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4097 /// Will likely generate further events.
4098 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4101 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4102 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4103 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4105 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4106 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4108 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4109 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4110 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4112 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4113 match forward_info {
4114 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4115 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4116 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4117 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4118 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4121 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4122 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4123 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4125 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4126 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4127 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4128 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4129 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4130 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4131 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4132 blinded_failure: None,
4135 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4136 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4138 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4141 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4142 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4148 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4149 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4151 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4155 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4156 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4158 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4162 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4163 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4164 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4165 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4166 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4167 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4168 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4171 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4172 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4173 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4174 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4175 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4177 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4179 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4180 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4184 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4185 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4186 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4187 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4188 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4189 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4191 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4192 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4198 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4201 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4204 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4205 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4206 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4207 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4208 // problem, not ours.
4214 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4215 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4216 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4218 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4223 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4224 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4225 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4230 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4231 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4232 match forward_info {
4233 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4234 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4235 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4236 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4237 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4241 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4242 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4243 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4244 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4245 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4246 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4247 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4248 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4249 blinded_failure: None,
4251 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4252 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4253 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4256 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4259 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4261 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4262 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4263 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4264 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4269 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4270 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4272 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4273 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4274 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4275 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4277 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4280 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4282 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4283 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4284 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4291 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4295 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4296 match forward_info {
4297 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4298 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4299 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4300 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4301 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4304 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4305 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4306 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4307 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4308 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4309 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4310 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4312 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4313 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4314 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4318 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4319 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4322 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4325 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4326 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4327 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4328 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4329 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4330 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4331 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4332 phantom_shared_secret,
4333 blinded_failure: None,
4335 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4336 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4337 // if routing nodes overpay
4338 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4339 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4341 total_value_received: None,
4342 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4345 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4348 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4350 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4351 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4352 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4353 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4354 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4355 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4357 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4358 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4359 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4360 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4361 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4362 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4363 phantom_shared_secret,
4364 blinded_failure: None,
4366 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4367 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4369 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4372 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4373 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4374 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4375 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4376 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4379 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4380 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4381 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4382 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4383 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4384 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4386 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4387 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4390 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4391 .entry(payment_hash)
4392 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4393 .or_insert_with(|| {
4394 committed_to_claimable = true;
4396 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4399 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4400 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4402 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4404 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4406 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4408 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4409 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4410 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4413 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4415 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4416 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4417 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4418 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4419 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4420 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4421 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4423 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4424 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4426 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4428 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4429 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4430 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4431 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4432 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4433 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4435 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4436 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4437 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4438 committed_to_claimable = true;
4440 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4441 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4442 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4443 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4444 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4445 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4446 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4447 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4448 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4449 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4453 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4454 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4455 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4456 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4457 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4459 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4461 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4462 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4464 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4465 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4466 committed_to_claimable = true;
4469 payment_claimable_generated
4473 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4474 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4475 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4476 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4477 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4478 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4479 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4480 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4482 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4483 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4484 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4485 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4486 Ok(result) => result,
4488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4489 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4492 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4493 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4494 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4495 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4496 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4497 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4500 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4501 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4502 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4504 check_total_value!(purpose);
4506 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4507 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4508 check_total_value!(purpose);
4512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4513 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4514 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4515 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4517 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4518 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4520 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4521 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4523 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4524 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4526 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4527 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4528 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4530 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4531 if payment_claimable_generated {
4532 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4538 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4539 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4547 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4548 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4549 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4550 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4552 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4553 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4555 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4557 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4558 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4559 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4561 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4563 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4564 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4565 events.append(&mut new_events);
4568 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4570 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4571 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4572 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4574 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4576 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4577 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4578 if background_events.is_empty() {
4579 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4582 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4584 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4585 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4586 // monitor updating completing.
4587 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4589 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4590 let mut updated_chan = false;
4592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4593 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4594 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4595 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4596 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4598 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4599 updated_chan = true;
4600 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4601 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4603 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4611 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4612 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4615 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4616 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4617 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4618 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4619 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4620 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4621 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4623 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4624 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4625 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4626 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4627 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4633 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4636 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4637 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4638 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4639 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4640 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4643 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4644 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4645 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4646 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4647 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4648 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4649 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4651 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4653 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4655 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4656 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4659 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4661 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4662 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4666 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4667 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4668 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4669 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4670 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4671 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4672 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4674 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4675 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4678 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4681 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4682 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4684 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4689 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4690 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4698 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4700 /// This currently includes:
4701 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4702 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4703 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4705 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4706 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4707 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4708 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4709 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4710 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4711 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4712 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4714 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4715 /// estimate fetches.
4717 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4718 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4719 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4720 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4721 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4723 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4724 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4726 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4727 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4728 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4729 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4731 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4732 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4733 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4734 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4735 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4736 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4738 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4739 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4740 log_error!(self.logger,
4741 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4742 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4743 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4744 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4745 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4746 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4747 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4748 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4749 channel_id: *chan_id,
4750 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4762 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4765 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4766 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4767 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4769 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4770 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4775 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4776 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4778 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4779 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4780 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4781 if needs_close { return false; }
4784 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4785 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4786 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4787 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4788 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4789 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4790 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4791 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4793 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4794 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4795 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4796 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4800 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4802 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4805 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4807 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4808 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4809 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4814 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4816 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4822 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4824 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4825 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4826 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4827 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4828 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4829 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4830 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4831 channel_id: *chan_id,
4832 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4840 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4841 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4842 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4844 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4845 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4846 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4851 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4852 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4853 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4854 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4855 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4856 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4857 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4858 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4864 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4866 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4867 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4872 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4873 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4874 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4875 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4876 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4877 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4878 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4879 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4880 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4881 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4882 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4884 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4885 // have no channels to the peer.
4886 let remove_entry = {
4887 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4888 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4891 entry.remove_entry();
4894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4899 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4900 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4901 // This should be unreachable
4902 debug_assert!(false);
4905 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4906 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4907 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4908 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4909 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4910 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4911 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4914 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4915 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4916 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4918 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4919 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4926 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4927 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4928 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4929 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4930 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4933 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4934 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4937 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4938 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4941 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4942 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4943 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4944 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4945 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4946 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4947 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
4950 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
4951 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
4954 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4955 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4956 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4957 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4958 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4965 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4966 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4967 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4969 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4970 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4971 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4972 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4974 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4975 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4976 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4977 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4978 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4979 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4982 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4983 /// reason for the failure.
4985 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4986 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4989 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4990 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4991 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4992 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4993 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4994 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4995 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5000 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5001 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5002 match failure_code {
5003 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5004 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5005 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5006 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5007 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5008 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5010 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5011 let fail_data = match data {
5012 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5015 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5020 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5021 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5023 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5025 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5026 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5027 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5028 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5029 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5030 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5031 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5033 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5035 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5036 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5038 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5043 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5044 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5045 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5046 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5047 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5048 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5049 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5050 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5051 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5052 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5054 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5055 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5056 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5057 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5059 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5060 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5061 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5062 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5063 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5067 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5068 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5069 // be surfaced to the user.
5070 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5071 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5072 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5074 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5075 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5076 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5079 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5081 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5082 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5084 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5085 debug_assert!(false);
5086 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5091 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5094 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5095 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5096 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5101 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5102 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5103 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5104 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5105 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5106 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5107 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5108 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5109 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5110 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5113 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5114 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5115 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5118 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5119 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5120 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5122 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5123 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5124 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5125 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5126 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5128 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5130 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5132 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5133 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5134 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5135 push_forward_ev = true;
5137 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5139 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5142 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5145 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5146 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5147 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5148 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5149 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5150 failed_next_destination: destination,
5156 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5157 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5159 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5160 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5161 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5162 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5164 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5165 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5166 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5167 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5169 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5170 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5171 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5173 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5174 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5175 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5176 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5177 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5178 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5179 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5180 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5181 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5184 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5185 /// even type numbers.
5189 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5190 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5192 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5193 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5194 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5197 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5198 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5203 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5204 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5205 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5206 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5207 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5208 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5209 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5210 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5215 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5216 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5217 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5218 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5219 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5221 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5222 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5223 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5227 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5228 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5229 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5230 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5231 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5232 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5233 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5234 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5235 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5236 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5246 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5248 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5249 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5250 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5251 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5252 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5253 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5254 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5255 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5256 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5257 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5258 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5259 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5260 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5261 debug_assert!(false);
5265 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5267 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5268 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5269 debug_assert!(false);
5273 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5274 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5276 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5277 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5278 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5279 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5282 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5283 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5284 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5285 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5289 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5290 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5291 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5292 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5293 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5294 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5297 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5298 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5299 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5300 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5301 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5306 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5307 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5308 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5309 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5310 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5311 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5312 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5314 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5317 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5318 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5319 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5320 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5324 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5325 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5326 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5327 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5329 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5330 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5331 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5332 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5334 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5335 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5336 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5337 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5341 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5342 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5343 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5347 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5348 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5349 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5352 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5353 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5355 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5356 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5357 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5358 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5361 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5362 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5365 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5368 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5369 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5371 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5372 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5373 // monitor update as a background event.
5374 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5375 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5376 counterparty_node_id,
5377 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5378 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5382 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5383 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5388 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5392 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5393 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5394 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5395 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5396 blocking_action: blocker,
5398 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5400 debug_assert!(false,
5401 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5404 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5405 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5406 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5407 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5408 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5410 let mut found_blocker = false;
5411 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5412 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5413 // which case we need to only remove the one
5414 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5415 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5416 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5417 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5419 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5422 debug_assert!(false);
5431 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5432 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5433 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5439 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5440 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5441 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5442 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5443 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5444 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5445 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5446 // again on restart.
5447 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5448 payment_preimage, update_res);
5451 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5452 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5454 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5455 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5456 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5457 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5458 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5459 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5460 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5461 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5462 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5463 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5466 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5467 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5468 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5469 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5470 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5471 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5475 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5476 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5479 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5480 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5481 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5484 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5485 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5486 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5487 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5488 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5490 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5491 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5492 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5494 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5495 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5498 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5499 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5500 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5501 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5502 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5503 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5504 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5505 let chan_to_release =
5506 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5507 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5509 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5510 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5511 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5512 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5517 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5518 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5519 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5520 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5521 // in the background.
5522 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5523 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5524 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5525 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5527 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5528 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5529 funding_txo, update, ..
5531 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5532 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5533 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5534 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5536 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5542 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5543 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5544 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5546 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5547 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5549 monitor_update.updates[0],
5550 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5555 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5556 // immediately once we get going.
5557 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5560 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5562 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5565 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5566 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5567 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5568 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5569 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5570 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5574 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5575 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5576 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5579 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5580 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5582 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5583 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5584 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5585 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5587 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5591 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5592 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5593 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5599 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5600 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5601 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5604 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5605 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5606 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5607 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5609 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5611 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5612 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5613 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5615 payment_purpose: purpose,
5618 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5620 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5624 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5626 sender_intended_total_msat,
5630 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5631 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5633 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5634 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5635 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5638 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5639 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5641 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5642 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5643 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5644 Some(blocking_action),
5651 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5652 /// update completion.
5653 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5654 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5655 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5656 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5657 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5658 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5660 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5661 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5662 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5663 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5664 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5665 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5667 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5669 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5670 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5671 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5672 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5675 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5676 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5678 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5679 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5680 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5685 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5686 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5687 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5688 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5693 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5694 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5695 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5696 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5697 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5702 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5706 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5712 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5713 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5714 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5718 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5719 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5720 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5726 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5727 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5729 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5730 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5732 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5733 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5734 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5735 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5736 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5742 let mut peer_state_lock;
5743 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5744 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5745 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5748 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5751 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5752 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5753 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5754 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5755 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5758 let remaining_in_flight =
5759 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5760 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5763 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5764 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5765 remaining_in_flight);
5766 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5769 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5772 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5774 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5775 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5778 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5779 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5780 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5782 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5783 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5784 /// used to accept such channels.
5786 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5787 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5788 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5789 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5792 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5793 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5795 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5796 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5797 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5799 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5800 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5802 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5803 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5805 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5806 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5808 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5809 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5810 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5811 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5814 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5817 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5818 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5820 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5821 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5824 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5826 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5827 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5828 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5830 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5831 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5832 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5833 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5834 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5835 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5836 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5838 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5842 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5843 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5844 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5845 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5846 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5847 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5848 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5851 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5852 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5854 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5855 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5856 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5857 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5858 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5859 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5860 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5861 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5864 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5865 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5869 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5870 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5871 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5873 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5874 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5875 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5878 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5883 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5884 /// or 0-conf channels.
5886 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5887 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5888 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5889 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5890 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5891 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5893 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5894 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5895 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5896 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5897 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5898 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5899 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5903 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5906 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5907 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5909 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5910 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5912 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5913 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5914 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5915 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5916 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5918 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5922 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5923 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5926 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5927 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5932 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5935 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5936 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5937 // likely to be lost on restart!
5938 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5939 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5942 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5946 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5947 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5948 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5949 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5950 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5953 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5955 debug_assert!(false);
5956 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5961 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5962 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5963 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5964 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5965 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5966 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5968 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5969 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5970 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5973 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5974 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5976 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5977 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5980 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5981 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5986 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5987 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5988 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5989 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5990 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5991 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5992 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5993 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5994 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5996 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5997 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5998 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6003 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6004 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6005 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6006 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6007 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6008 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6009 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6012 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6017 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6018 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6019 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6021 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6022 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6025 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6026 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6029 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6030 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6032 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6036 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6037 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6038 // likely to be lost on restart!
6039 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6041 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6043 debug_assert!(false);
6044 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6048 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6050 match phase.get_mut() {
6051 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6052 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6053 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6063 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6064 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6065 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6066 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6067 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6069 user_channel_id: user_id,
6074 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6075 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6078 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6080 debug_assert!(false);
6081 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6085 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6086 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6087 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6088 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6089 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6091 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6092 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6093 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6094 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6095 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6096 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6097 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6098 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6099 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6103 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6104 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6106 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6109 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6111 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6112 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6113 chan.context.channel_id()
6116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6117 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6118 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6119 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6121 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6122 chan.context.channel_id()))
6124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6125 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6126 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6127 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6128 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6130 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6131 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6132 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6133 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6134 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6135 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6136 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6141 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6142 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6143 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6145 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6149 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6150 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6151 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6152 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6154 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6155 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6164 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6165 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6166 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6167 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6169 debug_assert!(false);
6170 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6173 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6174 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6175 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6177 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6178 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6179 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6180 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6181 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6182 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6185 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6197 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6198 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6199 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6200 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6201 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6203 debug_assert!(false);
6204 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6208 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6210 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6211 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6212 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6213 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6214 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6215 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6216 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6217 msg: announcement_sigs,
6219 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6220 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6221 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6222 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6223 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6224 // announcement_signatures.
6225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6226 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6227 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6228 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6235 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6236 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6241 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6242 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6246 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6251 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6252 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6253 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6255 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6256 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6258 debug_assert!(false);
6259 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6261 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6262 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6263 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6264 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6266 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6267 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6268 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6270 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6273 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6274 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6275 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6276 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6278 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6279 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6280 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6281 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6282 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6283 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6287 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6288 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6289 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6290 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6293 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6294 let context = phase.context_mut();
6295 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6296 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6297 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6298 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6305 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6306 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6307 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6308 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6310 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6311 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6317 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6318 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6319 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6321 debug_assert!(false);
6322 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6324 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6327 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6329 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6330 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6331 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6332 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6333 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6334 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6339 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6340 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6341 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6342 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6343 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6344 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6345 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6347 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6348 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6354 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6355 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6356 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6358 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6359 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6360 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6361 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6362 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6366 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6368 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6369 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6370 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6375 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6376 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6377 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6378 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6380 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6381 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6382 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6383 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6385 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6386 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6388 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6389 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6390 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6392 debug_assert!(false);
6393 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6397 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6399 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6400 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6401 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6402 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6403 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6404 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6406 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6407 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6408 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6409 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6410 match pending_forward_info {
6411 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6412 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6413 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6414 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6416 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6417 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6418 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6419 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6420 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6423 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6425 _ => pending_forward_info
6428 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6430 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6431 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6439 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6441 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6442 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6443 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6445 debug_assert!(false);
6446 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6450 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6451 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6452 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6453 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6454 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6455 log_trace!(self.logger,
6456 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6458 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6459 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6460 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6462 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6463 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6464 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6465 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6466 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6467 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6468 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6471 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6472 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6478 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6482 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6483 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6484 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6485 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6486 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6488 debug_assert!(false);
6489 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6491 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6492 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6493 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6494 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6495 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6496 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6498 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6499 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6507 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6508 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6509 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6510 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6511 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6513 debug_assert!(false);
6514 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6516 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6517 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6518 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6519 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6520 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6521 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6522 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6524 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6525 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6527 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6528 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6536 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6537 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6538 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6540 debug_assert!(false);
6541 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6545 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6547 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6548 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6549 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6550 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6551 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6552 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6556 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6557 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6565 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6566 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6567 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6568 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6569 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6570 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6571 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6572 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6573 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6574 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6575 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6577 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6578 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6580 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6581 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6582 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6584 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6585 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6588 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6589 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6591 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6592 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6593 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6595 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6596 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6597 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6598 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6599 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6602 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6603 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6606 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6607 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6608 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6609 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6610 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6611 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6612 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6613 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6614 blinded_failure: None,
6617 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6618 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6619 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6624 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6625 // payments are being processed.
6626 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6627 push_forward_event = true;
6629 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6630 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6637 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6638 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6641 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6642 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6643 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6645 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6649 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6650 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6651 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6652 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6653 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6655 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6656 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6657 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6658 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6659 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6660 // real by taking more time.
6661 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6662 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6663 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6668 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6669 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6670 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6671 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6672 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6673 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6674 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6676 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6677 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6678 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6679 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6680 channel_funding_outpoint,
6681 counterparty_node_id,
6686 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6687 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6688 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6690 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6691 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6692 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6693 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6695 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6696 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6697 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6703 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6704 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6706 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6708 debug_assert!(false);
6709 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6710 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6711 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6712 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6714 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6715 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6716 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6717 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6718 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6719 *counterparty_node_id)
6721 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6722 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6723 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6724 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6725 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6726 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6727 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6731 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6732 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6738 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6742 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6744 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6746 debug_assert!(false);
6747 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6751 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6753 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6754 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6756 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6757 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6765 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6767 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6769 debug_assert!(false);
6770 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6776 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6777 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6778 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6781 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6782 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6783 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6784 msg, &self.default_configuration
6785 ), chan_phase_entry),
6786 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6787 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6788 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6791 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6792 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6800 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6801 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6802 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6803 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6805 // It's not a local channel
6806 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6810 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6811 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6812 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6816 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6818 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6819 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6820 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6821 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6822 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6823 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6824 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6826 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6828 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6829 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6830 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6831 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6833 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6834 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6835 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6838 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6842 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6843 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6848 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6851 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6853 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6854 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6856 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6858 debug_assert!(false);
6859 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6860 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6864 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6865 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6866 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6868 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6869 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6870 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6871 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6872 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6873 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6874 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6875 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6876 let mut channel_update = None;
6877 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6878 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6879 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6882 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6883 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6884 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6885 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6886 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6887 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6888 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6893 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6894 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6895 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6896 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6897 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6898 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6902 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6903 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6907 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6908 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6909 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6910 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6911 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6912 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6913 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6914 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6916 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6917 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6918 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6919 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6920 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6921 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6922 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6923 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6924 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6925 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6926 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6927 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6928 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6929 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6930 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6931 next_funding_txid: None,
6934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6935 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6936 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6942 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6943 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6944 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6945 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6948 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6949 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6954 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6955 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6956 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6958 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6959 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6960 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6961 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6962 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6963 match monitor_event {
6964 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6965 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6967 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6969 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6970 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6971 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6972 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6975 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6976 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6977 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6979 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6980 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6981 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6982 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6985 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6987 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6988 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6989 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6990 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6991 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6992 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6993 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6994 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6995 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6999 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7001 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7002 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7003 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7011 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7012 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7018 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7019 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7022 has_pending_monitor_events
7025 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7026 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7027 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7029 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7031 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7034 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7035 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7036 /// update was applied.
7037 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7038 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7039 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7041 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7042 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7043 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7044 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7047 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7049 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7050 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7051 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7052 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7054 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7055 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7056 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7057 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7058 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7059 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7061 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7062 has_monitor_update = true;
7064 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7065 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7066 continue 'peer_loop;
7075 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7076 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7077 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7083 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7084 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7086 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7087 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7089 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7090 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7091 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7092 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7095 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7096 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7097 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7098 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7099 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7100 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7105 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7106 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7111 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7112 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7117 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7118 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7124 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7125 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7128 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7129 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7133 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7134 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7135 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7136 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7137 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7143 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7144 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7145 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7146 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7147 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7148 let mut has_update = false;
7149 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7151 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7153 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7154 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7155 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7156 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7157 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7159 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7160 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7161 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7162 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7164 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7165 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7168 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7169 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7170 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7172 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7173 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7174 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7175 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7176 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7181 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7183 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7184 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7185 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7191 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7192 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7197 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7203 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7204 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7207 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7208 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7214 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7215 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7217 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7218 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7219 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7220 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7221 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7222 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7223 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7224 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7225 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7226 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7227 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7228 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7229 assert!(should_broadcast);
7230 } else { unreachable!(); }
7231 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7232 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7233 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7236 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7240 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7241 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7242 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7246 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7247 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7248 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7249 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7253 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7256 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7258 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7259 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7260 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7261 &self, description: String
7262 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7263 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7264 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7265 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7266 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7267 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7269 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7270 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7274 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7275 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7279 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7280 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7282 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7283 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7284 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7287 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7288 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7289 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7291 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7292 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7296 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7297 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7298 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7299 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7303 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7304 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7308 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7309 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7311 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7313 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7314 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7315 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7316 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7317 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7318 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7319 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7320 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7321 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7322 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7323 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7324 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7326 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7327 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7329 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7330 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7333 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7334 self.pending_outbound_payments
7335 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7336 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7338 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7343 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7344 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7345 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7347 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7348 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7349 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7350 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7351 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7352 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7353 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7355 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7356 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7360 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7361 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7364 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7365 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7366 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7370 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7371 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7372 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7373 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7377 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7378 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7379 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7383 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7384 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7386 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7387 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7388 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7389 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7390 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7391 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7392 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7393 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7394 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7395 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7396 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7397 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7398 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7399 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7400 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7403 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7404 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7405 let builder = match quantity {
7407 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7409 let builder = match amount_msats {
7411 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7413 let builder = match payer_note {
7415 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7418 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7419 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7421 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7422 self.pending_outbound_payments
7423 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7424 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7426 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7428 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7429 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7430 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7431 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7432 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7435 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7437 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7438 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7439 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7440 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7441 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7442 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7443 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7444 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7445 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7447 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7454 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7457 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7458 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7459 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7463 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7464 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7465 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7466 /// received and no retries will be made.
7468 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7469 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7470 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7471 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7472 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7474 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7475 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7477 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7478 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7479 let payment_paths = vec![
7480 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7482 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7483 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7484 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7486 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7487 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7488 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7490 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7491 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7492 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7494 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7495 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7497 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7498 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7499 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7500 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7501 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7504 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7506 for path in refund.paths() {
7507 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7508 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7509 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7510 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7512 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7518 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7522 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7525 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7526 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7528 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7529 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7530 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7531 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7533 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7535 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7536 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7540 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7541 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7543 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7545 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7546 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7548 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7549 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7550 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7551 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7552 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7553 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7554 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7555 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7556 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7557 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7558 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7561 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7562 /// stored external to LDK.
7564 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7565 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7566 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7568 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7569 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7572 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7573 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7574 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7575 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7577 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7578 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7579 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7580 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7581 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7583 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7584 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7585 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7586 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7587 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7589 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7590 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7592 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7593 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7597 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7598 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7600 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7602 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7603 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7605 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7606 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7607 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7608 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7609 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7610 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7611 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7614 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7615 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7617 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7618 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7619 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7622 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7624 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7625 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7626 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7627 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7630 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7632 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7633 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7634 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7635 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7636 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7638 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7639 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7640 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7642 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7644 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7647 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7648 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7649 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7653 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7654 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7656 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7657 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7658 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7659 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7661 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7662 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7663 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7664 Some(_) => continue,
7665 None => return scid_candidate
7670 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7672 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7673 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7675 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7676 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7677 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7681 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7682 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7683 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7685 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7686 /// times to get a unique scid.
7687 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7688 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7689 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7691 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7692 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7693 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7694 return scid_candidate
7698 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7699 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7700 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7701 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7704 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7705 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7706 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7707 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7708 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7710 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7711 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7712 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7721 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7722 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7723 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7724 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7725 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7729 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7730 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7731 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7732 events.push_back((event, None));
7736 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7737 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7738 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7742 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7743 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7747 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7748 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7751 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7752 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7753 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7754 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7755 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7758 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7759 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7762 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7763 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7764 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7765 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7767 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7771 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7772 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7773 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7774 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7775 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7776 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7777 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7781 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7782 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7783 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7784 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7785 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7786 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7787 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7788 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7789 if further_update_exists {
7790 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7796 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7801 log_debug!(self.logger,
7802 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7803 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7809 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7810 for action in actions {
7812 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7813 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7815 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7821 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7822 /// using the given event handler.
7824 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7825 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7829 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7833 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7835 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7837 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7838 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7839 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7844 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7845 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7846 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7847 /// is always placed next to each other.
7849 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7850 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7851 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7852 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7854 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7855 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7856 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7857 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7858 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7859 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7860 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7862 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7863 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7864 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7865 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7868 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7869 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7871 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7872 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7875 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7877 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7878 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7879 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7880 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7881 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7885 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7886 events.replace(pending_events);
7895 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7897 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7898 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7899 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7900 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7901 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7906 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7908 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7909 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7910 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7912 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7916 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7918 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7919 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7920 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7921 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7922 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7923 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7927 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7929 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7930 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7931 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7932 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7933 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7936 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7937 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7940 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
7941 let _persistence_guard =
7942 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7943 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7944 let new_height = height - 1;
7946 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7947 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7948 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7949 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7950 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7951 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7954 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7958 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7960 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7961 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7962 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7963 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7964 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7965 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7969 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7970 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7971 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7972 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7974 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7975 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7977 let _persistence_guard =
7978 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7979 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7980 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7981 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7983 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7984 if height < last_best_block_height {
7985 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7986 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7990 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
7991 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7992 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7993 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7995 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7996 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7998 let _persistence_guard =
7999 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8000 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8001 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8003 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8005 macro_rules! max_time {
8006 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8008 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8009 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8010 // having an explicit local time source.
8011 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8012 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8013 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8014 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8015 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8021 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8022 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8023 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8024 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8028 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8029 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8030 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8031 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8032 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8033 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8034 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8035 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8036 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8037 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8038 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8045 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8046 let _persistence_guard =
8047 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8048 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8049 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8050 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8051 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8052 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8053 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8054 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8059 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8061 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8062 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8063 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8064 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8065 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8066 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8070 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8071 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8073 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8074 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8075 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8076 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8077 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8079 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8080 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8082 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8083 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8085 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8086 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8087 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8089 // Retain unfunded channels.
8090 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8091 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8092 let res = f(channel);
8093 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8094 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8095 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8096 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8097 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8099 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8100 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8101 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8103 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8104 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8105 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8110 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8115 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8116 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8119 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8120 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8121 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8122 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8123 msg: announcement_sigs,
8125 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8126 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8127 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8129 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8130 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8131 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8136 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8137 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8138 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8139 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8140 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8141 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8142 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8143 // is always consistent.
8144 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8145 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8146 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8147 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8148 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8151 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8152 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8153 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8154 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8155 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8156 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8157 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8161 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8162 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8163 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8164 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8165 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8166 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8167 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8168 data: reason_message,
8181 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8182 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8183 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8184 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8185 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8186 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8187 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8188 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8189 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8190 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8192 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8193 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8194 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8198 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8201 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8202 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8203 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8204 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8205 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8206 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8207 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8208 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8209 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8210 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8211 blinded_failure: None,
8214 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8215 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8216 _ => unreachable!(),
8218 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8219 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8220 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8221 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8227 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8229 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8230 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8234 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8235 /// may have events that need processing.
8237 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8238 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8240 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8241 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8242 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8243 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8246 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8247 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8248 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8251 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8252 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8253 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8256 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8257 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8258 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8259 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8262 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8263 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8264 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8265 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8268 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8269 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8271 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8272 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8273 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8274 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8275 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8278 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8279 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8280 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8281 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8284 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8285 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8286 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8287 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8290 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8291 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8292 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8293 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8296 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8297 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8298 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8299 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8303 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8304 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8306 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8307 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8308 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8309 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8310 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8311 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8315 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8316 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8317 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8318 // change to the contents.
8319 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8320 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8321 let persist = match &res {
8322 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8323 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8324 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8326 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8328 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8333 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8334 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8335 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8336 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8339 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8340 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8341 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8342 // change to the contents.
8343 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8344 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8345 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8349 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8350 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8351 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8352 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8355 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8356 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8357 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8360 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8362 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8365 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8366 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8367 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8368 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8369 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8371 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8372 let persist = match &res {
8373 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8374 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8376 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8381 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8382 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8383 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8384 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8387 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8388 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8389 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8390 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8393 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8394 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8395 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8396 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8399 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8400 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8401 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8402 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8405 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8407 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8410 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8412 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8415 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8416 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8417 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8418 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8419 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8420 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8421 let persist = match &res {
8422 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8423 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8424 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8426 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8431 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8432 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8433 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8436 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8437 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8438 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8439 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8441 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8442 let persist = match &res {
8443 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8444 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8445 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8447 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8452 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8453 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8454 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8455 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8457 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8458 let persist = match &res {
8459 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8460 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8461 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8463 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8468 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8470 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8473 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8475 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8478 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8479 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8480 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8481 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8482 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8483 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8484 let persist = match &res {
8485 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8486 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8487 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8489 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8494 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8496 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8499 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8500 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8501 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8504 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8509 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8511 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8512 let persist = match &res {
8513 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8514 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8515 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8517 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8522 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8524 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8525 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8526 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8528 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8529 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8530 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8533 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8534 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8535 let context = match phase {
8536 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8537 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8538 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8543 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8544 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8547 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8551 // Clean up for removal.
8552 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8553 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8554 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8557 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8558 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8559 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8560 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8562 // V1 Channel Establishment
8563 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8564 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8565 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8566 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8567 // V2 Channel Establishment
8568 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8569 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8570 // Common Channel Establishment
8571 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8572 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8574 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8576 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8577 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8578 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8579 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8580 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8581 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8582 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8583 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8584 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8585 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8586 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8587 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8588 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8589 // Channel Operations
8590 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8591 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8592 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8593 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8594 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8595 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8597 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8598 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8599 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8600 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8603 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8604 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8605 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8608 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8609 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8610 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8611 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8614 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8616 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8618 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8619 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8623 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8624 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8625 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8629 let mut res = Ok(());
8631 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8632 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8633 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8634 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8635 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8636 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8637 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8640 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8641 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8643 if inbound_peer_limited {
8645 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8647 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8648 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8649 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8650 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8651 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8652 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8653 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8654 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8659 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8660 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8663 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8664 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8665 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8668 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8671 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8672 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8677 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8679 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8680 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8681 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8683 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8685 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8686 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8687 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8688 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8689 // worry about closing and removing them.
8690 debug_assert!(false);
8694 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8695 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8696 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8701 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8702 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8707 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8710 match &msg.data as &str {
8711 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8712 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8714 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8715 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8716 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8717 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8718 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8719 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8720 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8721 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8722 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8723 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8724 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8725 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8726 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8727 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8728 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8729 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8733 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8734 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8735 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8736 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8737 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8738 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8740 log_level: Level::Trace,
8750 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8751 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8753 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8754 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8757 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8758 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8759 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8760 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8762 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8763 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8764 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8768 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8770 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8771 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8774 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8775 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8776 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8777 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8785 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8786 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8790 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8791 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8794 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8795 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8798 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8799 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8802 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8803 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8804 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8805 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8808 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8809 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8810 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8811 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8814 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8815 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8816 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8817 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8820 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8821 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8822 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8823 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8826 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8827 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8828 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8829 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8832 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8833 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8834 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8835 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8838 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8839 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8840 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8841 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8844 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8845 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8846 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8847 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8850 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8851 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8852 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8853 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8857 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8858 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8860 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8861 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8862 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8863 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8864 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8865 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8869 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8870 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8871 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8874 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8875 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8878 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8879 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8881 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8882 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8884 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8885 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8888 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8890 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8891 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8892 let payment_paths = vec![
8893 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8895 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8896 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8897 payment_paths, payment_hash
8899 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8900 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8901 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8903 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8904 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8905 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8907 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8908 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8909 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8912 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8913 let payment_paths = vec![
8914 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8916 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8917 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8918 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8919 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8920 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8922 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8923 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8924 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8926 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8927 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8929 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8930 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8931 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8932 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
8934 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8935 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
8939 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8940 Err(error) => Some(error),
8944 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
8948 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
8949 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8951 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
8953 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
8954 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
8957 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
8958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
8959 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
8966 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
8967 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
8973 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
8974 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
8978 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8979 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8980 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8981 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8982 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8986 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8987 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8989 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8990 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8991 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8992 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8993 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8996 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8997 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8998 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8999 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9002 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9003 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9004 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9005 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9008 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9009 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9010 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9011 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9014 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9015 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9016 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9017 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9018 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9019 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9020 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9021 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9022 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9023 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9024 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9025 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9026 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9027 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9028 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9029 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9030 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9031 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9032 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9033 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9038 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9039 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9041 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9042 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9043 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9044 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9047 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9048 (2, node_id, required),
9049 (4, features, required),
9050 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9051 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9052 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9053 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9056 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9057 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9058 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9059 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9060 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9061 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9062 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9063 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9064 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9065 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9066 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9067 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9068 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9069 (7, self.config, option),
9070 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9071 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9072 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9073 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9074 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9075 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9076 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9077 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9078 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9079 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9080 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9081 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9082 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9083 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9084 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9085 (32, self.is_public, required),
9086 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9087 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9088 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9089 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9090 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9096 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9097 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9098 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9099 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9100 (2, channel_id, required),
9101 (3, channel_type, option),
9102 (4, counterparty, required),
9103 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9104 (6, funding_txo, option),
9105 (7, config, option),
9106 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9107 (9, confirmations, option),
9108 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9109 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9110 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9111 (16, balance_msat, required),
9112 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9113 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9114 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9115 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9116 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9117 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9118 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9119 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9120 (26, is_outbound, required),
9121 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9122 (30, is_usable, required),
9123 (32, is_public, required),
9124 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9125 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9126 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9127 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9128 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9131 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9132 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9133 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9134 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9135 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9139 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9141 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9142 outbound_scid_alias,
9146 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9147 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9149 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9150 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9151 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9152 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9153 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9154 confirmations_required,
9156 force_close_spend_delay,
9157 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9158 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9159 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9160 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9161 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9162 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9163 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9164 channel_shutdown_state,
9169 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9170 (2, channels, required_vec),
9171 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9172 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9175 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9176 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9179 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9181 (0, onion_packet, required),
9182 (1, blinded, option),
9183 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9186 (0, payment_data, required),
9187 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9188 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9189 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9190 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9192 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9193 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9194 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9195 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9196 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9197 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9201 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9202 (0, routing, required),
9203 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9204 (4, payment_hash, required),
9205 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9206 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9207 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9208 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9212 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9213 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9215 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9217 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9218 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9219 reason.write(writer)?;
9221 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9222 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9225 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9226 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9227 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9228 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9235 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9236 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9237 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9240 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9241 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9242 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9243 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9247 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9248 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9249 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9250 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9251 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9254 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9255 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9256 // messages contained in the variants.
9257 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9258 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9259 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9261 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9262 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9263 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9264 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9265 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9268 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9269 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9270 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9271 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9272 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9274 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9279 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9284 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9285 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
9288 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9289 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9290 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9291 (2, outpoint, required),
9292 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9293 (4, htlc_id, required),
9294 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9295 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9298 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9299 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9300 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9301 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9302 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9304 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9305 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9306 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9307 (2, self.value, required),
9308 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9309 (4, payment_data, option),
9310 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9311 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9312 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9313 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9319 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9320 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9321 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9322 (0, prev_hop, required),
9323 (1, total_msat, option),
9324 (2, value_ser, required),
9325 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9326 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9327 (5, total_value_received, option),
9328 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9329 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9330 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9332 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9333 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9334 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9336 if payment_data.is_some() {
9337 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9339 if total_msat.is_none() {
9340 total_msat = Some(value);
9342 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9345 if total_msat.is_none() {
9346 if payment_data.is_none() {
9347 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9349 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9351 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9355 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9358 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9359 total_value_received,
9360 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9362 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9363 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9368 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9369 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9370 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9373 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9374 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9375 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9376 let mut payment_id = None;
9377 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9378 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9379 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9380 (0, session_priv, required),
9381 (1, payment_id, option),
9382 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9383 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9384 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9385 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9387 if payment_id.is_none() {
9388 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9390 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9392 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9393 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9394 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9396 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9397 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9398 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9399 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9403 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9404 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9405 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9407 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9410 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9411 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9416 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9417 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9419 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9421 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9422 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9423 (0, session_priv, required),
9424 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9425 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9426 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9427 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9428 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9429 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9432 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9434 field.write(writer)?;
9441 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9442 (0, forward_info, required),
9443 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9444 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9445 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9446 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9449 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9451 (0, htlc_id, required),
9452 (2, err_packet, required),
9457 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9458 (0, payment_secret, required),
9459 (2, expiry_time, required),
9460 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9461 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9462 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9465 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9467 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9468 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9469 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9470 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9471 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9472 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9476 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9477 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9479 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9481 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9483 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9484 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9485 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9488 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9491 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9492 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9495 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9496 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9499 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9500 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9504 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9506 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9509 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9510 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9511 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9514 channel.write(writer)?;
9520 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9521 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9522 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9523 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9524 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9525 for forward in pending_forwards {
9526 forward.write(writer)?;
9531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9533 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9534 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9535 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9537 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9538 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9539 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9540 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9541 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9542 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9543 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9544 htlc.write(writer)?;
9546 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9547 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9550 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9551 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9552 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9553 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9554 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9555 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9556 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9559 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9560 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9561 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9562 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9563 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9565 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9566 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9567 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9568 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9569 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9570 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9571 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9576 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9577 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9578 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9579 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9580 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9581 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9582 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9583 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9584 0u64.write(writer)?;
9586 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9587 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9588 event.write(writer)?;
9592 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9593 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9594 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9595 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9596 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9597 0u64.write(writer)?;
9599 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9600 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9601 // likely to be identical.
9602 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9603 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9605 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9606 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9607 hash.write(writer)?;
9608 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9611 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9612 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9613 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9614 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9615 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9618 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9619 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9621 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9622 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9623 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9624 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9627 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9628 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9629 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9630 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9634 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9635 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9636 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9638 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9639 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9640 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9646 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9647 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9648 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9649 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9652 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9653 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9654 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9655 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9656 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9659 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9660 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9661 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9662 if !updates.is_empty() {
9663 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9664 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9669 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9670 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9671 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9672 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9673 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9674 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9675 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9676 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9677 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9678 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9679 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9680 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9681 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9688 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9689 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9690 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9691 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9695 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9696 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9697 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9698 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9699 // check that the event is sane here.
9700 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9701 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9702 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9703 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9709 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9710 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9711 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9712 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9713 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9714 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9717 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9718 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9719 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9720 events.push_back((ev, action));
9721 } else if action.is_some() {
9722 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9729 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9730 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9731 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9732 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9733 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9734 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9737 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9739 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9741 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9742 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9743 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9744 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9745 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9746 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9747 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9748 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9749 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9750 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9751 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9752 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9753 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9755 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9756 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9758 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9759 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9761 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9762 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9763 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9764 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9765 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9766 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9768 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9769 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9771 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9772 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9773 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9774 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9775 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9776 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9780 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9781 pub entropy_source: ES,
9783 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9784 pub node_signer: NS,
9786 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9787 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9789 pub signer_provider: SP,
9791 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9793 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9794 pub fee_estimator: F,
9795 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9797 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9798 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9799 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9800 pub chain_monitor: M,
9802 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9803 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9804 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9805 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9806 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9807 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9809 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9811 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9812 /// deserialization.
9814 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9815 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9816 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9818 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9819 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9821 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9822 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9823 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9824 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9826 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9829 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9830 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
9833 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9834 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9836 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9837 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9838 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9839 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9840 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9841 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9845 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9846 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9847 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9848 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9849 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
9851 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9852 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9857 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9858 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9859 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9860 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9862 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9863 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9864 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9865 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9866 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9867 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9871 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9872 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9873 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9877 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9878 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9880 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9881 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9882 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9883 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9884 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9885 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9889 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9890 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9892 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9893 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9894 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9896 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9898 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9899 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9900 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9901 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9902 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9903 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9904 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9905 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9906 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9907 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9909 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9910 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9911 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9912 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9913 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9914 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9915 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9916 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9917 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9918 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9919 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9920 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9921 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9923 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9924 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9925 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9927 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9928 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9929 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9931 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9932 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9933 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9935 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9936 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9937 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9939 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
9940 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9941 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9944 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
9945 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9946 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9947 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9948 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9949 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9950 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9952 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9953 let mut found_htlc = false;
9954 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9955 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9958 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9959 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9960 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9961 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9962 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9963 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9964 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9965 log_info!(args.logger,
9966 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9967 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9968 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9972 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9973 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9974 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9975 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9976 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9978 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9979 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9981 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9983 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9984 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9987 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9988 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9989 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9993 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9994 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9995 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9996 // safely discard the channel.
9997 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9998 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9999 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10000 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10001 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10002 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10003 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10006 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10007 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10008 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10009 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10010 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10011 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10015 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10016 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10017 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10018 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10019 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10020 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10021 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10023 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10027 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10028 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10029 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10030 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10031 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10032 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10033 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10034 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10035 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10037 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10040 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10041 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10042 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10043 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10044 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10045 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10046 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10047 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10049 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10052 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10055 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10056 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10057 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10058 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10059 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10060 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10061 is_connected: false,
10065 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10066 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10067 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10068 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10069 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10070 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10071 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10072 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10075 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10076 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10077 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10078 for _ in 0..event_count {
10079 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10080 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10085 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10086 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10087 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10089 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10090 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10091 // on-startup monitor updates.
10092 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10093 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10095 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10099 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10100 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10102 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10103 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10104 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10105 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10106 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10110 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10111 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10112 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10113 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10114 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10115 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10116 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10118 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10119 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10123 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10124 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10125 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10126 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10127 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10128 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10129 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10130 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10131 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10132 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10133 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10134 let mut events_override = None;
10135 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10136 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10137 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10138 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10139 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10140 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10141 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10142 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10143 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10144 (8, events_override, option),
10145 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10146 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10147 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10148 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10150 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10151 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10154 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10155 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10158 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10159 pending_events_read = events;
10162 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10163 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10166 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10167 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10168 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10169 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10170 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10171 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10173 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10175 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10176 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10177 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10180 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10181 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10182 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10183 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10184 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10186 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10187 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10188 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10190 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10191 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10192 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10193 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10194 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10196 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10197 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10198 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10199 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10200 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10201 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10202 pending_background_events.push(
10203 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10204 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10205 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10206 update: update.clone(),
10209 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10210 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10211 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10212 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10213 pending_background_events.push(
10214 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10215 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10216 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10219 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10220 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10221 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10223 max_in_flight_update_id
10227 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10230 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10231 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10232 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10234 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10235 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10236 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10237 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10238 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10239 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10240 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10241 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10242 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10245 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10246 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10247 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10248 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10249 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10250 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10251 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10252 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10253 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10254 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10255 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10258 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10259 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10260 debug_assert!(false);
10261 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10266 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10267 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10268 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10269 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10270 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10271 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10272 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10273 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10275 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10276 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10277 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10279 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10280 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10281 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10282 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10283 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10284 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10285 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10286 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10291 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10292 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10294 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10295 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10296 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10297 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10300 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10301 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10302 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10303 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10304 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10305 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10306 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10308 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10309 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10310 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10311 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10312 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10313 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10314 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10318 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10319 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10320 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10321 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10323 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10324 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10325 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10328 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10329 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10330 retry_strategy: None,
10331 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10332 payment_params: None,
10333 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10334 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10335 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10336 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10337 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10338 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10339 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10340 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10341 total_msat: path_amt,
10342 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10343 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10345 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10346 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10351 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10352 match htlc_source {
10353 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10354 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10355 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10356 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10358 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10359 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10360 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10361 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10362 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10363 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10364 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10365 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10366 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10367 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10368 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10373 !forwards.is_empty()
10375 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10376 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10377 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10378 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10379 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10380 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10381 intercepted_id != ev_id
10388 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10389 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10390 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10391 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10392 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10393 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10394 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10395 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10396 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10397 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10398 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10400 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10401 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10402 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10404 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10405 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10406 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10413 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10414 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10416 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10418 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10419 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10420 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10421 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10422 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10423 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10424 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10425 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10426 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10427 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10430 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10431 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10432 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10433 // channel still live case here.
10437 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10438 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10443 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10444 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10445 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10446 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10447 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10448 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10449 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10450 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10454 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10455 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10457 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10458 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10459 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10460 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10462 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10463 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10464 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10466 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10467 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10469 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10470 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10472 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10475 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10476 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10477 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10479 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10483 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10484 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10485 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10486 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10487 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10489 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10490 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10491 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10492 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10493 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10494 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10495 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10496 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10498 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10499 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10503 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10505 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10507 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10508 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10510 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10511 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10516 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10517 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10519 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10521 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10523 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10524 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10525 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10526 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10530 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10531 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10534 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10535 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10536 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10537 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10539 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10540 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10541 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10543 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10544 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10545 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10546 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10547 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10548 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10550 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10551 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10552 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10553 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10554 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10559 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10560 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10561 debug_assert!(false);
10562 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10567 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10569 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10570 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10571 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10572 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10573 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10574 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10575 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10576 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10577 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10578 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10579 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10581 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10582 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10584 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10585 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10586 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10587 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10589 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10590 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10591 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10592 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10594 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10595 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10596 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10597 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10599 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10600 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10602 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10603 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10604 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10605 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10608 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10609 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10612 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10615 purpose: payment.purpose,
10616 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10617 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10618 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10624 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10625 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10626 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10627 for action in actions.iter() {
10628 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10629 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10630 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10632 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10633 log_trace!(args.logger,
10634 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10635 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10636 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10637 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10638 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10640 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10641 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10642 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10643 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10647 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10648 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10652 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10654 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10655 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10659 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10661 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10662 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10663 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10664 router: args.router,
10666 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10668 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10669 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10670 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10671 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10673 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10674 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10675 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10676 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10677 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10678 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10680 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10682 our_network_pubkey,
10685 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10687 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10689 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10690 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10691 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10692 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10693 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10695 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10696 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10698 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10700 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10702 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10703 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10704 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10706 logger: args.logger,
10707 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10710 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10711 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10712 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10713 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10714 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10717 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10718 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10719 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10720 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10721 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10722 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10725 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10726 //connection or two.
10728 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10734 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10735 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10736 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10737 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10738 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10739 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10740 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10741 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10742 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10743 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10744 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10745 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10746 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10747 use crate::util::test_utils;
10748 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10749 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10752 fn test_notify_limits() {
10753 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10754 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10755 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10756 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10757 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10758 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10760 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10761 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10762 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10763 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10764 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10766 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10768 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10769 // to connect messages with new values
10770 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10771 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10772 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10773 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10774 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10775 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10777 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10778 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10779 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10780 // ... but the last node should not.
10781 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10782 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10783 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10784 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10786 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10787 // about the channel.
10788 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10789 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10790 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10792 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10794 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10795 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10796 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10797 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10798 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10799 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10801 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10802 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10803 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10805 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10806 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10807 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10808 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10809 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10810 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10812 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10813 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10814 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10815 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10816 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10817 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10818 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10819 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10821 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10822 // the channel info has updated.
10823 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10824 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10825 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10826 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10827 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10828 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10832 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10833 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10838 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10839 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10841 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10842 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10843 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10844 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10846 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10847 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10848 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10849 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10850 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10851 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10852 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10853 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10855 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10857 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10859 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10860 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10861 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10863 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10865 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10866 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10867 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10869 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10870 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10871 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10873 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10874 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10875 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10876 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10877 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10878 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10880 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10881 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10883 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10884 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10885 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10887 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10889 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10891 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10892 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10893 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10894 // lightning messages manually.
10895 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10896 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10899 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10900 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10901 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10902 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10904 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10905 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10907 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10908 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10910 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10911 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10912 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10914 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10915 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10916 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10918 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10922 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10923 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10926 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10927 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10928 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10929 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10931 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10932 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10933 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10934 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10939 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10940 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10941 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10942 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10949 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10950 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10951 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10954 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10955 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10956 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10957 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10958 // fails as expected.
10959 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10960 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10961 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10962 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10963 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10964 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10965 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10967 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10968 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10970 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10971 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10972 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10973 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10975 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10976 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10977 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10979 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10980 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10981 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10982 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10983 let route = find_route(
10984 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10985 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10987 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10988 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10990 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10992 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10993 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10994 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10996 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10997 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10998 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10999 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11000 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11002 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11003 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11004 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11005 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11006 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11007 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11009 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11010 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11012 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11013 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11015 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11016 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11017 let route = find_route(
11018 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11019 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11021 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11022 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11024 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11026 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11027 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11028 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11030 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11031 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11032 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11033 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11035 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11037 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11038 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11039 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11041 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11045 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11046 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11047 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11048 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11049 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11050 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11052 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11053 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11055 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11056 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11058 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11059 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11060 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11061 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11063 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11064 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11065 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11066 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11067 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11069 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11070 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11071 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11074 let route = find_route(
11075 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11076 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11078 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11079 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11080 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11082 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11084 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11085 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11086 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11088 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11089 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11092 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11093 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11094 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11095 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11096 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11097 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11098 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11099 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11100 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11102 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11103 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11107 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11108 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11109 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11110 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11111 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11112 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11113 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11115 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11116 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11118 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11119 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11120 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11121 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11122 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11123 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11124 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11125 let route = find_route(
11126 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11127 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11130 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11131 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11132 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11133 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11134 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11135 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11138 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11139 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11140 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11141 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11142 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11143 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11146 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11150 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11151 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11152 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11153 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11154 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11158 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11160 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11161 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11163 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11164 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11165 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11166 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11167 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11168 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11169 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11170 let route = find_route(
11171 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11172 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11175 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11176 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11177 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11178 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11179 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11180 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11181 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11182 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11185 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11186 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11187 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11188 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11189 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11190 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11191 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11193 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11197 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11201 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11203 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11204 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11205 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11206 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11208 // Marshall an MPP route.
11209 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11210 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11211 route.paths.push(path);
11212 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11213 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11214 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11215 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11216 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11217 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11219 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11220 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11222 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11223 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11225 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11230 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11234 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11236 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11238 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11239 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11241 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11242 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11244 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11247 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11248 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11249 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11250 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11251 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11252 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11255 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11258 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11259 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11264 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11265 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11269 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11271 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11272 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11274 total_msat: 100_000,
11277 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11278 // payment verification fails as expected.
11279 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11280 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11281 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11282 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11284 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11288 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11289 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11293 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11294 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11295 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11296 // the channel is successfully closed.
11297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11302 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11303 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11304 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11305 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11306 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11308 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11309 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11311 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11312 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11313 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11314 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11317 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11319 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11320 // as it has the funding transaction.
11321 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11322 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11323 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11326 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11328 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11330 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11332 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11333 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11334 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11336 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11339 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11340 // as it has the funding transaction.
11341 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11342 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11343 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11346 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11347 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11349 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11350 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11351 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11352 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11354 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11355 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11356 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11357 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11359 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11360 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11362 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11363 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11364 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11365 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11366 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11367 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11368 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11372 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11373 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11374 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11375 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11376 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11377 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11378 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11381 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11383 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11384 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11385 // closing transaction).
11386 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11387 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11388 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11390 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11391 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11392 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11393 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11394 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11397 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11399 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11401 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11402 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11403 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11405 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11407 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11408 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11411 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11412 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11413 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11416 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11417 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11418 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11421 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11422 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11423 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11426 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11427 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11428 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11431 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11433 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11434 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11436 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11437 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11439 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11440 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11445 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11446 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11447 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11448 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11449 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11450 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11451 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11452 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11455 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11456 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11457 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11459 // Test the API functions.
11460 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11462 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11464 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11466 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11468 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11470 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11472 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11476 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11477 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11478 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11479 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11480 // the given `channel_id`.
11481 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11482 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11483 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11484 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11486 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11489 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11491 // Test the API functions.
11492 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11494 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11496 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11498 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11500 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11502 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11506 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11507 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11513 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11516 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11518 let mut funding_tx = None;
11519 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11520 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11521 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11524 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11525 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11526 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11527 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11528 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11530 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11532 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11534 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11536 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11538 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11540 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11543 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11544 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11545 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11546 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11547 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11549 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11550 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11552 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11553 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11554 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11555 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11556 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11557 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11558 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11561 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11562 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11563 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11564 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11565 }, true).unwrap_err();
11567 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11568 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11569 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11570 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11571 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11572 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11573 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11575 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11576 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11578 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11579 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11580 }, true).unwrap_err();
11582 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11583 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11584 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11585 }, false).unwrap();
11586 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11588 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11589 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11591 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11592 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11593 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11594 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11595 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11597 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11598 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11599 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11601 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11602 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11603 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11605 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11606 // "protected" and can connect again.
11607 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11608 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11609 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11611 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11613 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11615 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11616 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11620 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11621 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11622 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11623 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11624 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11625 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11627 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11629 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11630 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11632 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11633 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11634 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11635 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11638 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11640 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11641 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11642 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11644 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11645 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11646 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11648 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11649 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11650 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11651 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11655 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11656 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11657 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11660 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11661 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11663 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11665 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11667 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11668 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11670 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11671 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11672 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11673 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11674 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11675 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11678 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11679 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11681 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11682 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11686 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11687 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11690 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11691 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11692 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11693 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11694 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11696 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11697 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11699 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11700 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11701 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11702 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11708 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11709 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11711 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11712 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11713 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11715 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11716 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11720 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11724 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11725 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11726 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11727 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11728 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11729 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11730 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11731 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11733 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11734 payment_metadata: None,
11735 keysend_preimage: None,
11736 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11737 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11739 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11741 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11742 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11743 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11744 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11745 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11746 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11747 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11749 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11750 } else { panic!(); }
11752 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11753 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11755 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11756 payment_metadata: None,
11757 keysend_preimage: None,
11758 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11759 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11761 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11763 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11764 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11765 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11766 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11770 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11771 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11772 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11773 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11774 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11776 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11777 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11779 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11780 payment_metadata: None,
11781 keysend_preimage: None,
11782 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11783 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11785 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11786 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11787 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11789 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11790 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11791 // is not satisfied.
11792 assert!(result.is_ok());
11796 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11797 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11798 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11799 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11800 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11802 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11803 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11808 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11809 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11811 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11812 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11814 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11815 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11816 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11817 match &msg_events[0] {
11818 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11819 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11821 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11822 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11823 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11829 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11830 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11832 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11833 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11836 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11840 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11841 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11842 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11843 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11844 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11845 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11846 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11847 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11848 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11852 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11853 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11854 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11856 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11857 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11859 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11860 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11865 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11866 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11868 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11869 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11871 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11872 // not have generated any events.
11873 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11877 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11878 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11879 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11880 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11881 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11882 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11883 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11884 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11886 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11887 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11890 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11891 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11892 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11893 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11896 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11897 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11900 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11901 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11902 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11904 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11905 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11906 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11907 ..Default::default()
11909 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11910 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11913 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11914 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11917 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11918 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11919 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11920 ..Default::default()
11922 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11923 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11924 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11925 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11927 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11928 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11931 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11932 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11933 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11934 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11935 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11938 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11939 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11940 ..Default::default()
11942 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11945 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11946 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11947 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11948 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11952 fn test_payment_display() {
11953 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11954 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11955 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11956 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11957 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11958 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11962 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11963 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11964 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11965 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11966 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11967 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11969 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11970 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11971 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11972 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11973 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11974 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11975 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11976 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11978 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11979 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11980 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11983 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11984 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11986 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11987 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11989 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11990 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11991 }, false).unwrap();
11992 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11993 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11994 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11996 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11998 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11999 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12000 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12001 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12002 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12003 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12004 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12005 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12006 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12007 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12008 } else { panic!() };
12009 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12010 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12011 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12012 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12014 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12016 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12017 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12018 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12025 use crate::chain::Listen;
12026 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12027 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12028 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12029 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12030 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12031 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12032 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12033 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12034 use crate::util::test_utils;
12035 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12037 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12038 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12039 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12040 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12042 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12044 use criterion::Criterion;
12046 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12047 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12048 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12049 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12050 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12051 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12052 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12054 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12055 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12057 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12058 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12060 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12062 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12065 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12066 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12069 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12070 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12071 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12073 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12074 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12076 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12077 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12078 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12079 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12080 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12082 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12083 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12084 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12086 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12087 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12088 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12089 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12091 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12092 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12093 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12095 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12096 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12097 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12098 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12099 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12101 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12102 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12103 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12105 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12106 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12108 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12109 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12110 }, false).unwrap();
12111 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12112 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12113 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12116 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12117 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12118 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12120 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12121 } else { panic!(); }
12123 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12124 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12125 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12126 match events_b[0] {
12127 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12128 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12133 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12134 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12135 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12136 match events_a[0] {
12137 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12138 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12143 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12145 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12146 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12147 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12149 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12150 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12151 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12152 match msg_events[0] {
12153 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12154 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12155 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12159 match msg_events[1] {
12160 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12164 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12165 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12166 match events_a[0] {
12167 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12168 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12173 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12174 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12175 match events_b[0] {
12176 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12177 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12179 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12182 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12183 macro_rules! send_payment {
12184 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12185 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12186 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12187 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12188 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12189 payment_count += 1;
12190 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12191 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12193 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12194 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12195 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12196 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12197 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12198 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12199 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12200 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12201 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12202 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12203 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12205 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12206 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12207 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12208 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12210 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12211 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12212 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12213 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12214 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12216 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12219 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12220 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12221 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12222 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12224 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12228 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12229 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12230 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);