1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
48 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
49 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
50 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
52 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
54 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
55 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
56 use util::config::UserConfig;
57 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
58 use util::{byte_utils, events};
59 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
60 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
61 use util::logger::Logger;
62 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use std::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
202 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
203 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
204 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
205 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
206 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
208 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
209 err: msgs::LightningError,
210 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
212 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
214 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 err: LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 shutdown_finish: None,
229 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
231 err: LightningError {
233 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
235 shutdown_finish: None,
239 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
240 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
243 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
245 err: LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
254 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
258 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
261 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
263 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
265 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
268 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
274 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 shutdown_finish: None,
289 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
290 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
291 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
292 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
293 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
295 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
296 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
297 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
298 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
299 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
300 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
301 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
303 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
307 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
308 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
309 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
310 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
311 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
312 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
313 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
314 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
315 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
316 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
317 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
318 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
320 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
321 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
322 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
323 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
326 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
327 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
328 /// quite some time lag.
329 enum BackgroundEvent {
330 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
331 /// commitment transaction.
332 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
335 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
336 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
338 latest_features: InitFeatures,
341 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
342 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
344 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
346 struct PendingInboundPayment {
347 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
348 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
349 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
350 /// this payment being removed.
352 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
353 user_payment_id: u64,
354 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
355 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
356 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
359 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
360 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
361 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
362 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
363 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
364 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
365 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
366 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
368 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
369 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
370 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
371 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
372 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
373 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
374 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
375 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
376 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
378 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
379 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
381 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
382 /// to individual Channels.
384 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
385 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
386 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
387 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
389 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
390 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
391 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
392 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
393 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
394 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
395 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
397 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
398 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
399 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
400 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
403 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
404 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
405 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
406 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
407 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
409 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
410 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
411 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
412 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
413 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
414 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
415 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
416 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
417 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
418 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
421 default_configuration: UserConfig,
422 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
428 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
430 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
431 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
434 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
435 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
436 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
438 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
439 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
440 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
441 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
442 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
443 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
445 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
446 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
447 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
448 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
449 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
450 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
451 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
452 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
454 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
455 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
457 our_network_key: SecretKey,
458 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
460 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
461 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
462 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
464 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
465 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
466 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
467 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
469 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
470 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
471 /// are currently open with that peer.
472 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
473 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
475 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
477 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
478 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
479 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
480 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
481 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
482 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
483 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
484 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
485 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
487 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
494 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
496 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
497 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
498 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
499 pub struct ChainParameters {
500 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
501 pub network: Network,
503 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
505 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
506 pub best_block: BestBlock,
509 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
510 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
511 pub struct BestBlock {
512 block_hash: BlockHash,
517 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
518 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
520 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
525 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
526 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
527 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
530 /// Returns the best block hash.
531 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
533 /// Returns the best block height.
534 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
537 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
543 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
544 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
545 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
546 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
547 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
548 /// updates are ready for persistence).
550 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
551 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
552 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
553 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
554 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
556 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
557 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
560 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
561 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
562 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
565 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
566 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
568 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
569 persistence_notifier: notifier,
570 should_persist: persist_check,
571 _read_guard: read_guard,
576 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
578 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
579 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
584 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
585 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
587 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
589 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
590 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
591 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
592 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
593 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
595 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
596 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
598 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
600 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
601 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
602 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
603 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
604 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
605 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
606 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
608 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
609 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
611 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
612 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
613 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
614 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
616 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
617 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
618 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
619 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
620 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
621 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
624 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
626 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
627 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
630 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
632 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
634 pub struct ChannelDetails {
635 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
636 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
637 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
638 /// lifetime of the channel.
639 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
640 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
641 /// our counterparty already.
643 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
644 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
645 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
646 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
647 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
648 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
649 /// The node_id of our counterparty
650 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
651 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
652 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
653 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
654 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
655 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
656 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
657 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
659 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
660 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
661 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
662 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
663 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
664 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
665 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
666 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
667 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
668 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
669 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
670 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
671 pub is_outbound: bool,
672 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
673 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
674 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
675 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
676 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
677 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
678 /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
679 /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
681 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
683 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
685 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
686 /// payments to us through this channel.
687 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
690 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
691 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
693 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
694 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
695 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
696 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
697 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
698 ParameterError(APIError),
699 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
700 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
701 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
704 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
706 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
707 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
708 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
709 /// paths than the ones selected).
710 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
711 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
712 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
713 /// in over-/re-payment.
715 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
716 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
717 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
719 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
720 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
721 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
722 /// with the latest update_id.
723 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
726 macro_rules! handle_error {
727 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
730 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
731 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
733 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
734 // entering the macro.
735 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
738 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
740 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
741 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
742 if let Some(update) = update_option {
743 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
749 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
750 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
752 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
753 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
754 action: err.action.clone()
758 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
759 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
762 // Return error in case higher-API need one
769 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
770 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
773 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
774 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
776 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
777 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
778 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
779 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
780 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
782 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
784 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
789 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
790 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
793 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
796 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
797 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
798 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
799 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
800 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
802 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
804 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
805 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
806 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
807 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
808 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
810 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
817 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
818 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
819 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
821 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
823 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
824 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
825 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
826 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
827 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
829 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
830 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
831 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
832 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
833 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
834 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
835 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
836 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
837 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
838 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
841 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
842 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
843 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
844 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
846 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
847 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
849 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
850 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
852 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
853 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
854 if !$resend_commitment {
855 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
858 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
860 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
861 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
867 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
868 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
869 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
871 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
872 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
876 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
877 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
878 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
879 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
880 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
883 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
888 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
889 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
890 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
891 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
892 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
893 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
895 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
896 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
898 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
899 if !forwards.is_empty() {
900 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
901 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
904 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
905 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
906 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
907 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
908 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
909 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
910 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
911 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
912 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
913 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
914 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
915 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
918 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
919 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
920 // before it should be allowed to.
921 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
922 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
923 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
926 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
927 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
928 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
929 msg: announcement_sigs,
932 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
935 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
936 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
937 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
938 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
939 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
940 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
941 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
942 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
943 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
944 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
945 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
946 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
947 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
948 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
949 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
950 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
951 let mut order = $order;
953 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
955 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
959 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
960 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
961 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
962 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
967 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
968 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
969 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
970 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
976 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
980 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
985 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
986 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
987 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
992 if chanmon_update_is_none {
993 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
994 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
995 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
996 assert!(res.is_ok());
999 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1003 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1004 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1005 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1007 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1009 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1010 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1015 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1016 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1017 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1018 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1019 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1022 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1024 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1025 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1027 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1029 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1031 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1032 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1033 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1034 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1035 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1036 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1039 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1040 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1041 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1045 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1047 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1048 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1049 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1050 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1051 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1052 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1054 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1055 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1057 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1058 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1061 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1062 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1064 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1066 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1067 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1068 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1069 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1077 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1078 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1079 &self.default_configuration
1082 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1084 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1085 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1086 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1087 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1088 /// otherwise ignored.
1090 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1091 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1093 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1094 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1095 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1096 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1097 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1100 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1101 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1102 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1105 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1106 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1108 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1109 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1111 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1112 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1114 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1119 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1120 node_id: their_network_key,
1126 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1127 let mut res = Vec::new();
1129 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1130 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1131 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1132 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1133 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1134 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1135 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1136 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1137 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1138 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1139 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1140 inbound_capacity_msat,
1141 outbound_capacity_msat,
1142 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1143 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1144 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1145 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1146 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1147 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1151 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1152 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1153 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1154 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1160 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1161 /// more information.
1162 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1163 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1166 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1167 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1169 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1170 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1172 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1173 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1174 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1175 // really wanted anyway.
1176 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1179 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1180 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1181 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1183 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1184 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1187 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1188 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1190 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1192 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1193 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1194 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1197 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1198 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1199 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1201 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1202 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1207 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1210 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1211 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1216 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1217 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1218 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1227 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1228 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1230 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1231 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1233 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1234 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1235 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1236 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1237 // ignore the result here.
1238 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1242 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1244 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1245 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1246 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1247 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1248 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1249 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1252 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1253 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1255 chan.remove_entry().1
1257 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1260 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1261 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1262 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1263 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1264 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1269 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1272 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1273 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1274 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1276 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1277 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1278 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1279 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1280 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1282 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1292 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1293 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1294 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1295 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1296 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1300 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1301 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1302 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1304 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1305 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1306 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1307 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1308 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1309 failure_code: $err_code,
1310 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1315 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1316 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1319 let shared_secret = {
1320 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1321 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1324 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1326 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1327 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1328 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1329 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1330 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1331 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1332 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1333 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1336 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1337 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1338 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1339 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1340 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1343 let mut channel_state = None;
1344 macro_rules! return_err {
1345 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1347 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1348 if channel_state.is_none() {
1349 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1351 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1352 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1353 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1354 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1355 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1360 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1361 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1362 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1363 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1365 let error_code = match err {
1366 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1367 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1368 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1369 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1370 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1372 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1375 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1376 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1377 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1384 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1387 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1388 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1389 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1390 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1391 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1392 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1393 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1394 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1395 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1396 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1397 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1398 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1402 // final_expiry_too_soon
1403 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1404 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1405 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1406 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1407 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1408 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1410 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1411 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1412 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1414 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1415 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1416 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1419 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1420 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1421 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1422 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1425 if payment_data.is_none() {
1426 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1429 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1430 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1431 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1432 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1434 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1435 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1436 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1437 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1439 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1440 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1441 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1442 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1445 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1446 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1447 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1449 // Check two things:
1450 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1451 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1452 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1454 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1456 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1457 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1458 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1460 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1462 let blinding_factor = {
1463 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1464 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1465 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1466 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1469 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1471 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1473 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1476 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1477 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1480 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1481 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1482 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1483 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1484 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1488 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1489 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1490 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1493 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1494 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1495 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1496 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1500 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1501 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1502 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1503 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1504 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1505 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1506 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1507 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1508 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1509 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1511 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1513 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1514 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1516 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1517 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1518 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1519 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1520 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1521 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1522 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1524 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1525 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1527 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1528 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1529 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1531 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1532 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1534 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1535 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1536 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1537 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1538 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1540 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1541 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1543 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1544 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1545 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1546 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1552 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1553 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1554 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1555 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1557 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1558 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1560 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1561 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1562 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1564 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1566 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1571 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1574 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1575 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1576 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1577 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1578 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1582 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1584 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1585 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1587 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1588 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1589 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1590 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1591 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1592 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1593 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1594 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1597 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1598 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1600 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1606 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1607 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1608 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1609 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1610 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1611 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1613 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1614 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1615 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1616 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1617 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1619 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1622 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1624 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1625 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1626 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1627 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1628 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1631 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1632 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1634 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1635 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1637 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1638 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1640 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1642 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1643 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1644 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1646 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1647 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1648 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1649 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1650 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1651 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1652 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1653 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1654 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1657 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1658 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1659 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1660 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1661 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1662 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1663 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1671 } else { unreachable!(); }
1675 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1676 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1678 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1683 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1685 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1686 /// fields for more info.
1688 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1689 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1690 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1691 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1692 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1693 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1695 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1697 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1698 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1699 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1701 /// In general, a path may raise:
1702 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1703 /// node public key) is specified.
1704 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1705 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1707 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1708 /// relevant updates.
1710 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1711 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1712 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1714 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1715 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1716 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1717 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1719 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1720 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1721 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1722 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1723 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1724 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1726 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1727 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1728 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1729 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1730 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1732 let mut total_value = 0;
1733 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1734 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1735 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1736 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1737 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1738 continue 'path_check;
1740 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1741 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1742 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1743 continue 'path_check;
1746 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1747 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1749 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1750 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1753 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1754 let mut results = Vec::new();
1755 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1756 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1758 let mut has_ok = false;
1759 let mut has_err = false;
1760 for res in results.iter() {
1761 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1762 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1763 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1764 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1771 if has_err && has_ok {
1772 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1774 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1780 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1781 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1782 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1783 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1785 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1787 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1789 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1790 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1791 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1792 } else { unreachable!(); })
1795 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1797 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1798 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1801 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1802 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1807 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1808 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1809 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1812 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1814 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1824 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1825 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1826 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1830 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1832 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1833 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1835 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1837 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1838 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1839 /// keys per-channel).
1841 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1842 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1843 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1845 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1846 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1847 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1848 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1851 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1852 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1853 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1854 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1858 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1859 let mut output_index = None;
1860 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1861 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1862 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1863 if output_index.is_some() {
1864 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1865 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1868 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1869 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1870 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1873 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1876 if output_index.is_none() {
1877 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1878 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1881 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1885 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1886 if !chan.should_announce() {
1887 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1891 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1893 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1895 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1896 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1898 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1899 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1900 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1901 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1902 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1907 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1908 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1909 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1911 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1914 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1915 // smaller than 500:
1916 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1918 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1919 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1920 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1922 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1923 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1925 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1926 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1927 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1928 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1930 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1931 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1934 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1935 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1938 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
1939 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
1940 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
1942 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1943 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1944 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1945 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1946 rgb, alias, addresses,
1947 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1948 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1950 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1952 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1953 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1954 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1955 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1956 contents: announcement
1961 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1963 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1964 /// Will likely generate further events.
1965 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1968 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1969 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1970 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1972 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1973 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1975 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1976 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1977 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1978 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1980 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1981 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1982 match forward_info {
1983 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1984 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1985 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1986 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1987 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1988 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1989 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1991 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1992 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1995 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1996 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1997 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1998 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1999 // problem, not ours.
2006 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2007 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2008 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2009 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2010 match forward_info {
2011 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2012 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2014 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2015 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2016 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
2017 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2018 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2019 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2020 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2021 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2023 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2025 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2028 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2030 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
2031 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2032 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2038 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2040 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2041 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2042 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2043 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2044 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2045 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2046 // this channel currently :/.
2052 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2053 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2055 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
2057 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
2059 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2060 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
2062 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2064 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2065 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2066 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2069 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2071 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2072 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2073 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2074 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2075 // messages when we can.
2076 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2077 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2078 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2085 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2086 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2089 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2090 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2091 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2092 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2093 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2094 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2096 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2097 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2098 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2099 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2100 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2102 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
2104 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2106 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2110 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2111 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2114 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2115 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2116 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2117 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2118 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2119 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2120 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2122 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2130 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2131 match forward_info {
2132 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2133 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2134 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2135 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2136 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2137 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2138 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2139 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2140 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2141 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2143 value: amt_to_forward,
2144 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2145 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2148 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2150 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2151 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2152 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2154 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2155 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2156 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2157 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2160 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2165 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2166 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2167 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2168 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2169 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2170 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2171 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2172 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2174 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2175 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2178 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2179 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2180 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2181 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2182 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2183 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2184 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2186 let mut total_value = 0;
2187 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2188 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2189 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2190 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2191 total_value += htlc.value;
2192 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2193 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2194 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2195 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2197 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2199 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2200 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2201 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2202 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2205 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2206 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2208 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2209 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2211 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2213 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2214 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2216 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2218 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2219 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2226 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2227 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2229 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2230 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2238 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2239 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2242 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2243 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2246 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2247 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2248 events.append(&mut new_events);
2251 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2253 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2254 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2256 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2257 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2258 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2259 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2260 if background_events.is_empty() {
2264 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2266 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2267 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2268 // monitor updating completing.
2269 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2276 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2277 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2278 self.process_background_events();
2281 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2282 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2283 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2285 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2287 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2288 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2289 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2290 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2291 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2293 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2294 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2295 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2296 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2297 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2298 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2299 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2300 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2301 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2302 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2307 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2308 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2310 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2311 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2312 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2316 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2317 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2327 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2328 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2329 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2330 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2331 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2332 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2335 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2336 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2337 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2338 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2339 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2340 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2341 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2342 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2343 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2344 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2345 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2351 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2352 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2353 // be surfaced to the user.
2354 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2355 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2357 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2358 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2359 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2361 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2362 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2364 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2367 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2369 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2370 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2371 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2373 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2375 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2376 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2377 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2379 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2380 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2382 rejected_by_dest: false,
2390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2397 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2398 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2399 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2400 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2401 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2402 /// still-available channels.
2403 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2404 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2405 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2406 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2409 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2410 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2411 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2413 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2415 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2416 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2417 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2423 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2424 match &onion_error {
2425 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2427 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2429 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2430 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2431 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2432 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2433 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2434 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2435 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2440 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2441 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2442 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2443 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2445 error_code: onion_error_code,
2447 error_data: onion_error_data
2451 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2457 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2458 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2459 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2460 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2462 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2463 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2464 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2465 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2466 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2467 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2469 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2471 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2477 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2478 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2479 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2481 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2482 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2484 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2486 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2490 let mut forward_event = None;
2491 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2492 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2494 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2495 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2496 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2498 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2499 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2502 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2503 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2504 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2505 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2506 time_forwardable: time
2513 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2514 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2515 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2517 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2518 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2519 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2520 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2522 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2524 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2525 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2526 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2527 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2531 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2532 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2533 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2534 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2536 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2537 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2538 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2539 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2541 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2542 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2543 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2544 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2545 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2547 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2548 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2549 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2555 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2556 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2557 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2559 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2560 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2561 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2562 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2563 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2564 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2565 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2567 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2569 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2570 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2571 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2572 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2573 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2574 } else { errs.push(e); }
2576 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2577 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2582 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2583 // which were generated.
2584 channel_state.take();
2586 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2587 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2588 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2595 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2596 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2597 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2598 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2599 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2605 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2606 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2607 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2608 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2609 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2610 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2611 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2612 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2614 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2618 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2620 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2621 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2622 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2623 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2624 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2625 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2634 // TODO: Do something with e?
2635 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2636 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2637 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2638 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2639 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2640 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2641 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2645 } else { unreachable!(); }
2648 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2650 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2651 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2653 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2654 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2655 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2657 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2658 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2665 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2666 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2667 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2670 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2671 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2672 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2673 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2676 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2677 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2678 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2679 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2680 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2681 payment_preimage, e);
2685 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2687 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2688 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2689 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2695 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2696 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2697 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2700 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2701 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2704 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2705 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2707 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2708 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2709 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2710 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2712 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2713 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2714 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2715 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2716 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2717 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2718 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2719 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2720 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2723 let (mut pending_failures, chan_restoration_res) = {
2724 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2725 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2726 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2730 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2734 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2735 (pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
2737 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2738 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2739 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2743 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2744 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2745 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2748 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2749 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2750 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2751 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2752 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2755 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2756 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2757 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2759 entry.insert(channel);
2765 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2766 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2767 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2768 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2771 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2774 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2775 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2780 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2781 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2782 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2783 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2785 user_channel_id: user_id,
2790 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2791 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2792 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2793 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2794 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2795 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2797 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2798 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2800 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2805 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2806 // lock before watch_channel
2807 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2809 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2810 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2811 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2812 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2813 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2814 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2815 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2816 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2817 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2818 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2819 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2821 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2822 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2823 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2824 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2825 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2826 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2830 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2831 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2832 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2837 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2838 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2847 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2849 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2850 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2852 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2854 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2855 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2857 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2858 Ok(update) => update,
2859 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2861 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2862 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2869 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2870 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2874 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2875 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2876 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2877 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2879 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2880 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2882 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2883 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2884 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2885 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2886 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2887 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2888 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2889 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2890 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2891 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2892 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2893 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2894 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2895 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2896 msg: announcement_sigs,
2901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2905 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2906 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2907 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2908 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2910 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2912 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2913 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2915 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2916 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2918 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2922 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2923 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2924 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2928 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2929 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2930 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2932 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2933 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2938 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2939 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2941 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2942 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2943 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2944 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2952 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2953 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2954 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2955 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2956 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2958 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2961 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2962 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2963 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2964 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2969 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2970 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2971 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2972 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2973 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2974 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2975 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2977 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2978 } else { (tx, None) }
2980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2983 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2984 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2985 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2987 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2988 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2989 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2990 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2998 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2999 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3000 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3001 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3003 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3004 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3005 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3006 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3008 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3009 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3011 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3012 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3013 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3014 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3017 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3018 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3019 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3020 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3021 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3022 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3023 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3024 match pending_forward_info {
3025 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3026 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
3027 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3028 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3029 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3030 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3031 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3035 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3036 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3037 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3038 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3039 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3040 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3041 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3042 // no problem just calling this
3043 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3044 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3046 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3047 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3048 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3051 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3053 _ => pending_forward_info
3056 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3063 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3064 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3066 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3067 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3069 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3072 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3077 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3081 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3082 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3083 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3084 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3086 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3087 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3089 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3096 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3097 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3098 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3099 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3101 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3102 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3104 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3105 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3106 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3108 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3115 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3116 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3117 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3118 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3119 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3120 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3121 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3123 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3124 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3125 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3126 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3127 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3128 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3129 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3134 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3135 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3136 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3138 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3139 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3140 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3142 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3143 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3144 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3145 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3146 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3147 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3148 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3149 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3151 commitment_signed: msg,
3155 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3156 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3157 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3168 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3169 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3170 let mut forward_event = None;
3171 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3172 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3173 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3174 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3176 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3177 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3178 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3179 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3181 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3182 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3183 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3186 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3187 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3192 match forward_event {
3194 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3195 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3196 time_forwardable: time
3204 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3205 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3207 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3208 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3209 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3210 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3211 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3212 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3214 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3215 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3216 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3217 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3218 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3219 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3220 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3221 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3223 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3225 } else { unreachable!(); }
3228 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3229 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3230 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3234 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3236 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3240 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3242 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3245 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3247 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3248 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3249 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3251 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3258 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3259 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3260 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3261 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3263 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3264 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3266 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3273 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3274 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3275 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3277 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3279 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3280 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3282 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3283 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3286 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3287 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3288 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3290 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3291 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3293 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3294 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3295 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3296 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3298 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3299 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3302 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3303 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3309 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3311 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3312 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3313 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3314 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3315 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3316 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3317 contents: announcement,
3319 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3327 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3328 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3329 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3330 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3331 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3333 // It's not a local channel
3337 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3339 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3340 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3343 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3350 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3351 let chan_restoration_res = {
3352 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3353 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3355 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3357 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3358 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3360 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3361 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3362 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3363 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3364 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, shutdown) =
3365 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3366 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3367 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3368 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3372 handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked)
3374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3377 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3381 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3382 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3383 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3384 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3385 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3387 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3389 let counterparty_node_id;
3390 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3391 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3392 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3394 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3397 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3398 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3400 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3401 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3403 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3404 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3406 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3407 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3408 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3410 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3413 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3414 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3415 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3416 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3417 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3418 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3419 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3420 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3430 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3431 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3432 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3436 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3437 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3438 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3440 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3441 match monitor_event {
3442 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3443 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3445 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3448 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3451 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3452 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3453 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3454 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3455 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3456 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3457 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3458 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3459 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3461 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3462 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3463 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3468 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3469 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3470 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3479 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3480 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3484 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3485 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3487 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3488 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3489 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3490 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3491 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3492 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3493 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3494 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3495 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3496 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3497 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3498 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3499 assert!(should_broadcast);
3500 } else { unreachable!(); }
3501 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3503 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3507 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3508 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3510 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3513 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3514 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3516 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3517 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3518 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3519 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3520 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3521 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3522 // never fail a payment too early.
3523 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3525 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3533 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3536 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3537 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3539 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3540 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3541 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3543 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3545 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3546 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3547 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3548 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3549 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3550 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3551 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3554 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3555 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3558 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3559 /// stored external to LDK.
3561 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3562 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3563 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3565 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3566 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3568 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3569 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3570 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3571 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3572 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3574 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3575 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3576 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3577 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3579 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3580 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3581 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3582 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3583 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3585 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3586 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3587 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3588 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3589 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3591 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3592 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3593 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3595 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3597 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3598 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3600 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3601 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3602 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3603 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3604 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3608 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3609 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3610 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3611 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3612 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3615 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3616 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3617 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3618 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3620 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3621 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3622 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3627 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3628 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3629 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3630 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3631 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3634 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3635 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3636 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3637 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3639 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3640 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3641 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3646 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3648 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3649 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3650 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3651 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3654 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3656 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3657 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3658 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3659 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3660 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3663 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3664 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3665 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3668 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3670 let new_height = height - 1;
3672 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3673 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3674 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3675 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3676 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3677 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3680 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3684 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3686 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3687 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3688 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3692 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3693 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3694 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3695 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3697 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3698 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3701 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3704 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3705 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3706 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3707 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3709 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3710 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3714 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3716 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3718 macro_rules! max_time {
3719 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3721 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3722 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3723 // having an explicit local time source.
3724 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3725 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3726 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3727 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3728 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3734 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3735 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3736 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3737 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3738 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3742 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3743 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3744 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3745 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3746 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3747 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3753 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3754 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3755 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3756 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3757 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3758 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3759 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3760 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3765 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3767 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3768 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3769 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3770 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3773 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3774 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3776 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3777 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3778 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3779 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3780 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3782 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3783 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3785 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3786 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3787 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3788 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3789 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3790 let res = f(channel);
3791 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3792 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3793 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3794 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3795 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3799 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3800 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3801 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3802 msg: funding_locked,
3804 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3805 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3806 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3807 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3808 msg: announcement_sigs,
3811 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3813 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3815 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3816 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3817 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3819 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3820 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3821 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3822 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3823 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3827 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3828 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3829 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3836 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3837 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3838 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3839 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3840 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3841 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3842 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3843 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3844 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3845 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3846 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3847 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3848 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3853 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3858 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3860 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3861 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3865 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3866 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3867 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3869 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3870 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3871 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3872 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3875 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3876 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3878 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3879 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3882 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3883 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3884 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3885 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3886 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3891 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
3892 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3893 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3894 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3895 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3896 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3899 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3901 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3904 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3906 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3909 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3910 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3911 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3914 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3916 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3919 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3921 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3924 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3926 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3929 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3931 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3934 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3935 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3936 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3939 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3941 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3944 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3946 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3949 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3951 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3954 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3956 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3959 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3961 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3964 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3966 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3969 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3971 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3974 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3976 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3979 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3981 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3984 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3985 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3986 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3987 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3988 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3990 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3991 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3992 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3993 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3994 if no_connection_possible {
3995 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3996 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3997 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3998 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3999 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4001 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
4003 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4013 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4014 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4015 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4016 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
4017 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
4018 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
4019 // reestablish logic.
4020 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4021 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
4022 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4023 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
4025 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4026 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4027 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4031 no_channels_remain = false;
4037 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4039 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4042 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4043 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4045 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4046 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4047 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4048 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4049 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4050 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4051 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4052 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4053 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4054 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4055 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4056 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4057 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4061 if no_channels_remain {
4062 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4065 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4066 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4068 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
4069 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
4070 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
4075 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4076 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4081 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4082 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4084 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4085 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4089 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4094 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4095 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4096 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4097 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4098 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4099 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4100 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4101 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4102 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4106 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4107 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4108 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4114 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4117 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4120 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4121 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4122 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4123 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4124 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4128 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4129 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4134 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4135 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4136 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4137 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4138 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4139 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4142 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4145 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4151 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4152 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4157 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4158 let result = *guard;
4166 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4167 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4168 let current_time = Instant::now();
4170 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4171 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4176 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4177 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4178 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4179 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4180 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4182 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4183 let result = *guard;
4184 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4188 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4189 None => return result,
4195 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4197 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4198 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4199 *persistence_lock = true;
4200 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4205 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4206 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4208 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4209 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4210 match &self.routing {
4211 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
4213 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4214 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4216 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
4218 payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4219 payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4220 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4223 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
4224 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4225 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
4226 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
4231 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4232 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
4233 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
4234 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
4235 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4236 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4237 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4239 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4240 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4241 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4242 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4244 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4246 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4248 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4249 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4250 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
4251 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4256 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4257 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4259 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
4261 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4263 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
4265 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4272 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4273 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
4274 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4275 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4276 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4277 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4282 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4285 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4287 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4289 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4291 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4298 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4299 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4300 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4301 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4302 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4303 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4308 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4312 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4315 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4316 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4317 self.prev_hop.write(writer)?;
4318 self.value.write(writer)?;
4319 self.payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4320 self.payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4321 self.cltv_expiry.write(writer)
4325 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4326 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4328 prev_hop: Readable::read(reader)?,
4329 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4330 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4331 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4332 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4334 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4339 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4340 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4342 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4344 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4346 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4348 path.write(writer)?;
4349 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4350 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4357 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4358 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4359 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4360 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4361 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4362 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4363 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4364 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4366 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4371 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4372 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4374 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4378 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4380 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4381 data.write(writer)?;
4388 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4389 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4390 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4391 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4392 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4393 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4394 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4396 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4401 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4402 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4404 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4406 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4407 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4408 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4409 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4411 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4413 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4414 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4421 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4422 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4423 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4424 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4425 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4426 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4427 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4428 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4430 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4431 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4432 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4434 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4439 impl_writeable!(PendingInboundPayment, 0, {
4447 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4448 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4450 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4451 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4454 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4455 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4457 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4458 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4460 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4462 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4463 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4464 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4467 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4468 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4469 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4470 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4471 unfunded_channels += 1;
4474 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4475 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4476 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4477 channel.write(writer)?;
4481 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4482 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4483 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4484 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4485 for forward in pending_forwards {
4486 forward.write(writer)?;
4490 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4491 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4492 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4493 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4494 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4495 htlc.write(writer)?;
4499 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4500 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4501 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4502 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4503 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4504 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4507 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4508 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4509 for event in events.iter() {
4510 event.write(writer)?;
4513 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4514 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4515 for event in background_events.iter() {
4517 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4519 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4520 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4525 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4526 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4528 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4529 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4530 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4531 hash.write(writer)?;
4532 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4535 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4536 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4537 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4538 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4545 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4547 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4549 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4550 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4551 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4552 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4553 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4554 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4555 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4556 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4557 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4558 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4559 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4561 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4562 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4564 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4565 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4566 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4567 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4568 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4569 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4570 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4571 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4572 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4573 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4574 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4577 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4578 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4580 pub keys_manager: K,
4582 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4584 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4585 pub fee_estimator: F,
4586 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4588 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4589 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4590 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4591 pub chain_monitor: M,
4593 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4594 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4595 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4596 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4597 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4598 /// deserialization.
4600 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4601 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4602 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4604 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4605 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4607 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4608 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4609 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4610 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4612 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4615 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4616 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4619 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4620 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4621 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4622 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4623 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4624 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4627 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4628 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4629 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4630 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4631 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4633 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4634 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4639 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4640 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4641 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4642 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4643 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4644 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4645 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4646 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4649 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4650 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4651 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4655 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4656 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4657 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4658 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4659 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4660 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4663 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4664 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4665 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4666 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4667 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4670 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4671 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4672 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4674 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4676 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4677 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4678 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4679 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4680 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4681 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4682 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4683 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4684 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4685 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4686 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4687 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4688 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4689 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4690 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4691 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4692 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4693 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4694 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4695 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4696 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4697 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4698 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4700 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4701 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4703 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4706 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4710 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4711 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4712 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4716 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4717 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4718 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4719 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4720 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4721 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4722 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4723 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4724 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4726 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4729 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4730 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4731 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4732 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4733 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4734 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4735 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4736 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4738 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4741 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4742 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4743 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4744 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4745 let peer_state = PeerState {
4746 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4748 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4751 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4752 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4753 for _ in 0..event_count {
4754 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4755 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4760 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4761 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4762 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4763 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4764 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4765 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4769 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4770 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4772 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4773 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4774 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4775 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4776 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4780 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4781 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4782 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4783 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4784 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4788 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4789 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4791 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4793 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4794 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4795 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4797 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4799 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4804 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4806 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4807 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4809 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4810 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4813 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4814 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4816 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4818 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4819 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4820 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4821 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4823 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4824 logger: args.logger,
4825 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4828 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4829 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4832 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4833 //connection or two.
4835 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4841 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4843 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4845 use std::time::Duration;
4848 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4849 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4850 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4852 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4853 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4854 thread::spawn(move || {
4856 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4857 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4858 *persistence_lock = true;
4861 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4867 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4868 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4870 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4873 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4878 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4880 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4883 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4890 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4893 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4894 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4895 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4896 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4897 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4898 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4899 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4900 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4901 use routing::router::get_route;
4902 use util::test_utils;
4903 use util::config::UserConfig;
4904 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4906 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4907 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4908 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4910 use std::sync::Mutex;
4914 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4915 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4916 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4917 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4918 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4919 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4920 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4925 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4926 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4929 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4930 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4931 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4933 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4934 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4936 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4937 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4939 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4940 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4942 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4943 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4944 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4945 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4946 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4948 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4950 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4952 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4953 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4954 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4955 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4956 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4958 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4960 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4962 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4963 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4964 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4967 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4968 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4969 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4971 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4972 } else { panic!(); }
4974 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4975 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4977 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4980 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4983 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4984 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4986 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4987 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4989 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4991 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
4992 macro_rules! send_payment {
4993 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4994 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4995 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
4996 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4998 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4999 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5001 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5002 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5004 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5005 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5006 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5007 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5008 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5009 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5010 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5011 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5014 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5015 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5017 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5018 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5019 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5020 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5021 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5023 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5026 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5027 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5028 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5029 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5031 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5036 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5037 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);