1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 use alloc::string::ToString;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
76 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
79 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
80 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
81 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
86 use util::logger::Logger;
88 use core::convert::TryInto;
91 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
94 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
95 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
96 // retrieve said payment type bits.
97 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
99 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
100 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
102 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
103 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
104 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
105 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
106 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
107 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
108 /// registered with LDK.
109 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
110 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
111 /// registered with LDK.
112 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
116 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
117 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
118 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
133 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
135 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
136 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
137 unknown => Err(unknown),
142 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
143 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
145 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
147 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
148 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
149 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
151 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
152 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
153 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
154 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
156 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
157 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
158 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
161 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
162 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
164 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
165 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
166 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
167 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
169 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
170 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
172 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
175 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
176 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
180 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
181 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
182 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
184 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
186 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
187 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
188 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
189 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
190 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
191 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
193 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
194 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
195 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
200 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
201 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
202 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
203 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
205 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
206 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
207 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
209 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
212 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
214 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
215 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
218 /// The metadata is constructed as:
219 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
220 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
222 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
223 /// match what was constructed.
225 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
226 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
227 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
228 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
230 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
231 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
232 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
235 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
236 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
237 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
239 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
241 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
242 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
244 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
245 where L::Target: Logger
247 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
249 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
250 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
251 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
252 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
253 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
254 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
255 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
257 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
259 let mut payment_preimage = None;
260 match payment_type_res {
261 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
262 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
263 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
264 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
265 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
266 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
270 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
271 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
272 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
273 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
274 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
279 Err(unknown_bits) => {
280 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
285 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
290 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
298 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
299 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
301 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
302 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
303 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
304 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
305 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
308 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
309 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
311 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
315 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
316 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
317 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
318 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
320 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
321 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
322 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
323 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
326 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
329 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
331 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
332 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
333 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
334 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
335 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
336 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
337 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
339 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
343 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
345 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
346 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
347 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
349 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
350 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
351 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
352 // before we forward it.
354 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
355 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
356 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
357 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
358 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
360 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
361 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
363 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
364 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
367 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
368 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
369 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
372 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
377 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
378 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
379 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
380 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
381 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
382 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
383 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
386 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
387 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
388 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
389 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
392 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
393 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
394 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
395 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
396 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
399 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
401 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
403 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
404 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
405 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
407 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
409 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
413 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
417 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
418 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
420 short_channel_id: u64,
422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
424 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
425 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
430 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
431 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
432 /// are part of the same payment.
433 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
434 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
435 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
438 struct ClaimableHTLC {
439 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
442 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
445 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
446 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
447 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
448 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
450 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
451 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
456 impl Readable for PaymentId {
457 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
458 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
462 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
463 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
464 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
465 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
466 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
469 session_priv: SecretKey,
470 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
471 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
472 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
473 payment_id: PaymentId,
474 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
475 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
478 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
479 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
480 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
482 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
484 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
486 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
489 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
490 payment_id.hash(hasher);
491 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
492 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
493 payment_params.hash(hasher);
500 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
503 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
504 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
505 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
506 payment_secret: None,
507 payment_params: None,
512 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
513 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
515 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 struct ReceiveError {
529 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
530 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
532 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
537 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
539 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
540 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
541 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
542 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
543 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
545 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
546 err: msgs::LightningError,
547 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
548 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
550 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
552 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
554 err: LightningError {
556 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
557 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
564 shutdown_finish: None,
568 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
570 err: LightningError {
572 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
575 shutdown_finish: None,
579 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
580 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
583 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
585 err: LightningError {
587 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
588 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
594 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
595 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
599 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
602 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
604 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
605 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
609 log_level: Level::Warn,
612 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
614 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
616 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
618 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
619 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
625 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
628 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
636 shutdown_finish: None,
641 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
642 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
643 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
644 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
645 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
647 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
648 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
649 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
650 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
651 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
652 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
653 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
655 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
659 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
660 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
661 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
662 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
663 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
664 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
665 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
666 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
667 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
668 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
669 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
670 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
672 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
673 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
674 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
675 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
678 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
679 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
680 /// quite some time lag.
681 enum BackgroundEvent {
682 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
683 /// commitment transaction.
684 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
687 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
688 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
690 latest_features: InitFeatures,
693 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
694 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
696 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
699 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
700 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
701 struct PendingInboundPayment {
702 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
703 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
704 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
705 /// this payment being removed.
707 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
708 user_payment_id: u64,
709 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
710 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
711 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
714 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
715 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
716 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
718 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
721 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
722 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
723 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
724 pending_amt_msat: u64,
725 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
726 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
727 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
729 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
730 starting_block_height: u32,
732 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
733 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
734 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
736 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
737 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
739 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
740 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
741 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
742 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
743 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
745 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
747 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
748 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
752 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
753 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
755 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
759 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
761 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
765 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
767 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
771 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
773 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
778 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
780 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
781 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
782 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
783 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
787 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
788 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
789 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
790 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
796 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
797 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
800 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
801 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
802 let our_payment_hash;
803 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
804 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
805 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
807 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
808 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
809 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
813 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
817 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
818 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
819 let remove_res = match self {
820 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
821 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
822 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
823 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
824 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
828 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
829 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
830 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
831 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
832 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
833 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
840 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
841 let insert_res = match self {
842 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
843 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
844 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
846 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
847 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
850 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
851 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
852 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
853 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
854 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
861 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
863 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
864 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
865 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
866 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
873 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
874 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
875 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
876 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
877 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
878 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
879 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
880 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
882 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
883 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
884 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
885 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
886 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
887 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
888 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
889 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
890 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
892 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
893 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
895 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
896 /// to individual Channels.
898 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
899 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
900 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
901 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
903 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
904 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
905 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
906 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
907 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
908 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
909 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
911 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
912 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
913 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
914 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
917 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
918 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
919 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
920 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
921 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
923 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
924 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
925 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
926 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
927 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
928 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
929 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
930 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
931 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
932 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
935 default_configuration: UserConfig,
936 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
942 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
944 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
945 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
947 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
948 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
949 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
950 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
952 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
953 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
954 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
955 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
956 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
957 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
959 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
960 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
961 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
962 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
963 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
964 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
965 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
966 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
968 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
970 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
971 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
973 our_network_key: SecretKey,
974 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
976 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
978 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
979 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
980 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
982 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
983 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
985 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
986 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
987 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
989 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
990 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
991 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
992 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
994 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
995 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
996 /// are currently open with that peer.
997 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
998 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1001 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1002 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1004 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1005 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1006 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1007 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1008 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1009 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1010 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1011 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1012 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1014 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1021 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1023 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1024 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1025 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1026 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1027 pub struct ChainParameters {
1028 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1029 pub network: Network,
1031 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1033 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1034 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1037 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1043 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1044 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1045 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1046 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1047 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1048 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1050 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1051 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1052 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1053 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1054 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1056 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1057 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1060 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1061 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1062 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1065 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1066 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1068 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1069 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1070 should_persist: persist_check,
1071 _read_guard: read_guard,
1076 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1077 fn drop(&mut self) {
1078 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1079 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1084 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1085 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1087 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1089 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1090 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1091 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1092 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1093 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1095 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1096 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1098 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1100 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1101 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1102 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1103 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1104 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1105 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1106 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1108 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1109 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1111 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1112 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1113 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1114 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1116 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1117 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1118 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1119 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1120 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1121 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1124 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1126 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1127 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1130 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1132 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1133 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1134 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1136 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1137 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1138 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1139 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1140 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1141 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1142 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1143 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1144 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1145 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1146 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1149 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1150 /// to better separate parameters.
1151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1152 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1153 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1154 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1155 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1156 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1157 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1158 pub features: InitFeatures,
1159 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1160 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1161 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1163 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1165 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1166 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1167 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1168 /// payments to us through this channel.
1169 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1172 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1173 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1174 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1175 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1176 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1177 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1178 /// lifetime of the channel.
1179 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1180 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1181 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1182 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1183 /// our counterparty already.
1185 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1186 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1187 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1188 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1189 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1190 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1191 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1192 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1193 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1194 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1195 /// this value on chain.
1197 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1199 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1201 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1202 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1203 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1204 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1205 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1206 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1207 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1209 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1210 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1211 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1212 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1214 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1215 pub balance_msat: u64,
1216 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1217 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1218 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1219 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1221 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1223 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1224 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1225 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1226 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1227 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1228 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1229 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1230 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1231 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1233 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1234 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1235 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1236 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1237 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1238 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1239 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1240 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1241 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1243 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1245 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1246 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1247 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1248 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1249 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1250 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1251 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1252 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1253 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1255 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1256 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1257 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1258 pub is_outbound: bool,
1259 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1260 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1261 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1262 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1263 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1265 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1266 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1267 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1268 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1270 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1271 pub is_usable: bool,
1272 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1273 pub is_public: bool,
1276 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1277 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1278 /// states for more.
1279 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1280 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1281 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1282 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1283 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1284 ParameterError(APIError),
1285 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1286 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1287 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1288 /// payment in full.
1290 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1292 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1293 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1294 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1295 /// paths than the ones selected).
1296 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1297 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1298 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1299 /// in over-/re-payment.
1301 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1302 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1303 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1305 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1306 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1307 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1308 /// with the latest update_id.
1310 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1311 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1312 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1313 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1314 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1315 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1316 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1317 payment_id: PaymentId,
1321 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1323 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1324 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1325 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1326 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1327 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1329 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1330 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1331 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1334 macro_rules! handle_error {
1335 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1338 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1341 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1342 // entering the macro.
1343 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1344 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1347 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1349 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1350 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1351 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1352 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1356 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1357 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1358 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1359 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1364 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1365 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1367 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1368 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1369 action: err.action.clone()
1373 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1374 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1377 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1384 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1385 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1386 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1388 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1389 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1391 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1392 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1394 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1395 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1396 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1397 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1399 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1400 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1401 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1403 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1404 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1405 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1406 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1408 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1409 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1410 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1416 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1417 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1421 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1423 $entry.remove_entry();
1431 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1432 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1436 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1438 $entry.remove_entry();
1446 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1447 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1449 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1450 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1451 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1458 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1459 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1460 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1462 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1464 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1465 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1466 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1467 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1469 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1470 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1471 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1472 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1473 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1474 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1475 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1476 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1477 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1478 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1479 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1482 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1483 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1484 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1485 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1486 match $action_type {
1487 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1488 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1490 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1491 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1493 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1494 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1495 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1496 if !$resend_commitment {
1497 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1500 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1502 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1503 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1507 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1508 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1510 $entry.remove_entry();
1514 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1515 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1519 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1520 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1521 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1523 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1524 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1528 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1529 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1530 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1531 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1532 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1535 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1540 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1541 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1542 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1543 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1544 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1545 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1547 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1548 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1550 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1551 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1552 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1553 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1556 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1557 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1558 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1559 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1560 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1561 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1562 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1563 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1564 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1565 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1566 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1567 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1570 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1571 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1572 // before it should be allowed to.
1573 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1574 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1575 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1578 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1580 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1581 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1582 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1587 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1588 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1589 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1590 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1591 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1592 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1593 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1594 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1595 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1596 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1597 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1598 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1599 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1600 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1601 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1602 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1603 let mut order = $order;
1605 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1607 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1611 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1612 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1613 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1614 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1619 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1620 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1621 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1622 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1623 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1628 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1632 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1637 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1638 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1639 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1644 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1645 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1646 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1647 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1648 assert!(res.is_ok());
1651 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1655 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1656 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1657 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1659 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1661 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1662 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1667 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1668 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1669 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1670 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1671 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1674 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1676 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1677 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1679 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1681 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1683 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1684 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1685 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1686 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1687 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1688 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1689 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1690 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1692 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1693 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1694 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1698 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1700 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1701 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1702 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1703 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1704 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1705 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1707 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1708 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1710 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1711 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1714 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1715 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1717 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1718 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1720 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1722 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1723 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1724 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1725 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1733 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1734 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1735 &self.default_configuration
1738 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1740 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1741 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1742 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1743 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1744 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1747 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1748 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1750 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1751 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1752 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1754 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1755 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1756 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1757 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1758 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1759 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1761 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1762 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1763 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1764 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1765 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1766 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1770 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1771 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1772 Some(peer_state) => {
1773 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1774 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1775 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1776 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1777 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1779 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1782 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1784 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1785 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1786 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1788 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1789 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1790 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1792 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1793 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1795 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1800 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1801 node_id: their_network_key,
1804 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1807 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1808 let mut res = Vec::new();
1810 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1811 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1812 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1813 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1814 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1815 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1816 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1817 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1818 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1819 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1820 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1821 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1822 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1823 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1825 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1826 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1827 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1828 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1830 inbound_capacity_msat,
1831 outbound_capacity_msat,
1832 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1833 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1834 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1835 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1836 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1837 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1838 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1843 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1844 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1845 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1851 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1852 /// more information.
1853 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1854 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1857 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1858 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1860 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1861 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1863 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1864 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1865 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1866 // really wanted anyway.
1867 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1870 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1871 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1872 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1873 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1874 Some(transaction) => {
1875 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1879 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1880 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1881 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1882 reason: closure_reason
1886 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1889 let counterparty_node_id;
1890 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1891 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1892 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1893 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1894 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1895 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1896 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1898 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1899 Some(peer_state) => {
1900 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1901 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1902 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1904 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1906 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1908 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1909 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1910 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1911 let (result, is_permanent) =
1912 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1914 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1920 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1921 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1925 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1926 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1927 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1928 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1932 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1936 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1940 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1941 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1944 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1948 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1949 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1950 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1952 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1953 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1955 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1956 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1957 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1958 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1960 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1963 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1964 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1965 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1966 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1969 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1970 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1971 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1973 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1974 /// the channel being closed or not:
1975 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1976 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1977 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1978 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1979 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1980 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1981 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1983 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1985 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1986 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1987 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1988 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1989 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1993 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1994 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1995 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1996 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1997 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1999 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2000 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2001 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2002 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2003 // ignore the result here.
2004 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2008 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2009 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2010 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2012 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2013 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2014 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2015 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2016 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2017 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2020 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2021 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2023 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2024 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2025 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2028 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2030 chan.remove_entry().1
2032 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2035 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2036 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2037 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2038 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2039 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2044 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2047 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2048 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2049 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2050 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2051 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2052 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2053 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2054 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2055 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2056 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2057 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2067 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2068 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2069 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2070 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2071 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2075 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2076 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2078 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2079 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2080 return Err(ReceiveError {
2081 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2083 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2086 // final_expiry_too_soon
2087 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2088 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2089 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2090 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2091 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2092 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2093 return Err(ReceiveError {
2095 err_data: Vec::new(),
2096 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2099 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2100 return Err(ReceiveError {
2102 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2103 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2107 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2108 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2109 return Err(ReceiveError {
2110 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2111 err_data: Vec::new(),
2112 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2115 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2116 return Err(ReceiveError {
2117 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2118 err_data: Vec::new(),
2119 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2122 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2123 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2124 return Err(ReceiveError {
2125 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2126 err_data: Vec::new(),
2127 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2129 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2130 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2132 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2133 phantom_shared_secret,
2135 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2136 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2137 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2138 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2139 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2140 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2141 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2142 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2143 return Err(ReceiveError {
2144 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2145 err_data: Vec::new(),
2146 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2150 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2152 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2155 return Err(ReceiveError {
2156 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2157 err_data: Vec::new(),
2158 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2163 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2166 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2167 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2168 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2172 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2173 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2174 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2176 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2177 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2178 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2179 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2180 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2181 failure_code: $err_code,
2182 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2187 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2188 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2191 let shared_secret = {
2192 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2193 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2197 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2198 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2199 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2200 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2201 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2202 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2203 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2204 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2207 let mut channel_state = None;
2208 macro_rules! return_err {
2209 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2211 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2212 if channel_state.is_none() {
2213 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2215 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2216 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2217 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2218 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2219 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2224 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2226 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2227 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2229 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2230 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2234 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2235 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2237 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2239 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2240 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2241 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2242 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2243 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2245 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2248 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2249 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2251 let blinding_factor = {
2252 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2253 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2254 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2255 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2258 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2260 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2262 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2265 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2266 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2269 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2271 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2272 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2273 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2277 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2278 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2279 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2282 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2283 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2284 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2285 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2290 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2291 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2292 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2293 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2294 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2295 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2296 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2297 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2298 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2299 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2300 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2302 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2305 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2308 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2310 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2311 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2312 // Leave channel updates as None for private channels.
2313 let chan_update_opt = if chan.should_announce() {
2314 Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()) } else { None };
2315 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2316 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2317 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2318 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2319 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2322 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2323 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2324 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2325 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2326 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2327 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2328 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2330 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2331 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2333 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2334 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2335 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2336 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2337 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2339 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2340 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2342 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2343 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2345 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2346 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2347 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2348 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2349 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2350 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2352 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2353 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2355 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2356 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2357 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2358 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2359 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2360 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2361 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2362 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2363 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2364 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2370 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2371 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2372 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2373 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2375 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2376 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2378 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2379 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2380 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2382 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2384 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2389 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2392 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2393 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2394 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2396 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2397 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2398 if !chan.should_announce() {
2399 return Err(LightningError {
2400 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2405 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2408 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2409 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2410 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2411 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2412 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2413 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2415 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2416 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2420 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2422 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2423 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2425 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2426 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2427 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2428 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2429 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2430 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2431 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2432 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2435 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2436 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2438 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2444 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2445 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2447 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2448 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2449 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2451 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2452 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2453 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2454 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2455 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2457 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2461 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2462 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2464 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2465 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2466 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2467 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2468 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2469 err: "Payment already completed"
2474 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2475 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2476 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2479 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2481 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2482 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2483 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2484 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2485 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2486 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2487 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2488 total_msat: total_value,
2490 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2494 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2495 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2497 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2498 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2500 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2501 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2503 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2504 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2506 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2507 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2509 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2510 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2511 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2512 channel_state, chan)
2514 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2515 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2516 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2517 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2518 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2519 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2520 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2521 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2522 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2523 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2525 insert_outbound_payment!();
2527 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2529 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2530 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2531 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2532 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2533 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2534 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2540 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2542 } else { unreachable!(); }
2546 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2547 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2549 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2554 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2556 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2557 /// fields for more info.
2559 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2560 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2561 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2562 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2563 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2564 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2566 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2568 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2569 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2570 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2572 /// In general, a path may raise:
2573 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2574 /// node public key) is specified.
2575 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2576 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2578 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2579 /// relevant updates.
2581 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2582 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2583 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2585 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2586 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2587 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2588 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2590 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2591 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2592 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2593 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2594 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2597 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2598 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2599 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2601 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2602 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2603 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2604 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2605 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2607 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2608 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2610 let mut total_value = 0;
2611 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2612 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2613 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2614 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2615 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2616 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2617 continue 'path_check;
2619 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2620 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2621 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2622 continue 'path_check;
2625 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2626 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2628 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2629 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2631 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2632 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2633 total_value = amt_msat;
2636 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2637 let mut results = Vec::new();
2638 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2639 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2641 let mut has_ok = false;
2642 let mut has_err = false;
2643 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2644 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2645 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2646 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2647 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2648 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2649 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2653 } else if res.is_err() {
2654 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2655 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2658 if has_err && has_ok {
2659 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2662 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2663 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2664 Some(RouteParameters {
2665 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2666 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2667 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2673 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2674 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2675 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2676 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2682 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2684 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2685 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2686 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2687 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2688 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2690 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2691 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2692 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2693 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2694 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2695 if path.len() == 0 {
2696 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2697 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2702 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2703 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2704 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2706 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2707 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2709 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2710 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2711 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2712 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2715 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2717 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2718 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2719 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2722 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2723 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2724 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2727 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2728 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2729 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2734 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2735 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2739 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2742 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2744 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2745 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2746 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2747 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2749 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2750 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2751 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2753 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2754 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2755 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2756 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2759 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2760 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2761 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2762 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2763 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2765 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2773 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2774 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2775 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2776 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2777 /// never reach the recipient.
2779 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2781 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2782 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2784 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2786 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2787 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2788 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2790 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2792 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2793 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2794 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2799 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2800 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2801 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2802 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2804 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2806 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2808 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2809 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2810 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2811 } else { unreachable!(); })
2814 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2816 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2817 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2820 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2821 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2826 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2828 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2833 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2843 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2844 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2845 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2849 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2851 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2852 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2854 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2855 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2857 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2858 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2859 /// keys per-channel).
2861 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2862 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2863 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2865 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2866 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2867 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2869 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2870 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2871 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2874 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2875 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2876 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2877 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2881 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2882 let mut output_index = None;
2883 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2884 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2885 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2886 if output_index.is_some() {
2887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2888 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2891 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2892 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2893 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2896 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2899 if output_index.is_none() {
2900 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2901 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2904 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2909 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2910 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2911 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2913 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2916 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2917 // smaller than 500:
2918 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2920 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2921 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2922 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2923 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2924 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2925 /// our network addresses.
2927 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2928 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2930 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2931 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2932 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2933 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2935 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2937 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2938 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2941 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2942 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2945 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2946 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2947 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2949 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2950 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2951 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2952 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2953 rgb, alias, addresses,
2954 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2955 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2957 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2958 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2963 let mut announced_chans = false;
2964 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2965 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2966 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2968 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2973 announced_chans = true;
2975 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2976 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2977 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2981 if announced_chans {
2982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2983 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2984 signature: node_announce_sig,
2985 contents: announcement
2991 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2993 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2994 /// Will likely generate further events.
2995 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2998 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2999 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3000 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3001 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3006 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3007 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3008 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3009 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3011 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3012 match forward_info {
3013 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3014 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3015 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3016 let htlc_failure_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3017 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3018 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3019 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3020 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3022 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3023 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr) => {
3025 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3026 failed_forwards.push((htlc_failure_source, payment_hash,
3027 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3033 macro_rules! fail_phantom_forward {
3034 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_shared_secret: expr) => {
3036 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming phantom node HTLC: {}", $msg);
3037 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&$phantom_shared_secret, $err_code, &$err_data[..]).encode();
3038 let error_data = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&$phantom_shared_secret, &packet);
3039 failed_forwards.push((htlc_failure_source, payment_hash,
3040 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: error_data }
3046 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3047 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3048 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3049 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3050 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3051 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3054 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3056 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3057 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3058 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec());
3060 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3061 fail_phantom_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), phantom_shared_secret);
3065 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3066 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3067 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3068 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_phantom_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, phantom_shared_secret)
3074 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new());
3077 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new());
3080 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3081 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3082 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3083 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3084 // problem, not ours.
3086 // `fail_htlc_backwards_internal` is never called for
3087 // phantom payments, so this is unreachable for them.
3094 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3095 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3096 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3097 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3098 match forward_info {
3099 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3100 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3102 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3103 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3105 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3106 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3107 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3108 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3109 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3111 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3113 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3114 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3116 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3118 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3119 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3120 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3126 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3128 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3129 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3130 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3131 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3132 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3133 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3134 // this channel currently :/.
3140 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3141 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3143 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3145 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3147 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3150 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3152 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3153 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3154 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3157 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3159 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3160 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3161 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3162 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3163 // messages when we can.
3164 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3165 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3166 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3173 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3174 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3177 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3178 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3179 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3180 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3181 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3182 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3184 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3186 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3187 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3188 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3190 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3191 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3193 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3195 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3199 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3200 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3203 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3204 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3205 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3206 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3207 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3208 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3209 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3210 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3211 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3213 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3221 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3222 match forward_info {
3223 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3224 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3225 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3226 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3227 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3228 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3229 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3230 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3232 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3235 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3236 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3237 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3238 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3239 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3240 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3242 value: amt_to_forward,
3247 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3249 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3250 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3251 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3253 let failure_code = 0x4000 | 15;
3254 let failure_reason = if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3255 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &htlc_msat_height_data[..]).encode();
3256 let error_data = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &packet);
3257 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: error_data }
3259 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3261 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3262 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3263 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3264 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3265 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3266 }), payment_hash, failure_reason
3271 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3272 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3273 let mut total_value = 0;
3274 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3275 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3276 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3277 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3278 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3279 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3280 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3284 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3285 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3286 total_value += htlc.value;
3287 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3288 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3289 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3290 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3291 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3292 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3294 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3296 _ => unreachable!(),
3299 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3301 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3302 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3305 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3306 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3308 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3309 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3310 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3314 payment_received_generated = true;
3316 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3317 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3320 payment_received_generated
3324 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3325 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3326 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3327 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3328 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3329 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3330 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3331 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3333 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3334 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3335 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3336 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3338 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3342 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3343 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3344 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3346 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3347 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3348 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3349 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3350 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3352 amt: amt_to_forward,
3353 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3358 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3364 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3366 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3370 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3373 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3375 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3376 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3378 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3379 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3381 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3382 if payment_received_generated {
3383 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3389 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3390 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3398 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3399 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3401 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3403 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3404 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3407 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3408 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3409 events.append(&mut new_events);
3412 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3414 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3415 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3417 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3418 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3419 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3420 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3421 if background_events.is_empty() {
3425 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3427 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3428 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3429 // monitor updating completing.
3430 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3437 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3438 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3439 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3440 self.process_background_events();
3443 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3444 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3445 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3446 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3448 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3449 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3451 if !chan.is_live() {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3453 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3454 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3456 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3457 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3459 let mut retain_channel = true;
3460 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3463 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3464 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3468 let ret_err = match res {
3469 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3470 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3471 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3472 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3475 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3476 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3477 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3478 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3479 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3480 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3481 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3482 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3492 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3496 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3497 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3498 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3499 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3500 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3501 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3502 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3504 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3506 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3508 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3509 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3510 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3511 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3512 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3513 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3514 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3516 handle_errors.push(err);
3526 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3528 /// This currently includes:
3529 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3530 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3531 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3534 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3535 /// estimate fetches.
3536 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3537 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3538 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3539 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3541 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3543 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3545 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3546 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3547 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3548 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3549 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3550 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3551 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3552 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3554 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3556 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3558 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3559 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3560 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3561 if needs_close { return false; }
3564 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3565 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3566 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3567 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3568 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3569 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3570 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3571 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3575 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3576 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3578 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3579 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3584 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3585 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3594 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3595 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3601 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3602 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3603 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3604 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3605 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3606 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3609 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3610 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3611 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3612 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3613 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3614 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3615 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3616 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3617 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3618 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3619 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3625 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3626 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3627 // be surfaced to the user.
3628 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3629 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3631 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3632 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3633 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3635 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3636 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3638 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3643 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3644 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3645 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3647 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3648 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3649 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3650 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3651 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3652 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3653 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3654 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3655 Some(RouteParameters {
3656 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3657 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3658 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3661 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3662 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3663 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3665 rejected_by_dest: false,
3666 network_update: None,
3667 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3669 short_channel_id: None,
3676 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3677 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3679 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3685 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3692 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3693 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3694 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3695 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3696 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3697 /// still-available channels.
3698 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3699 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3700 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3701 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3704 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3705 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3706 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3708 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3709 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3710 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3711 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3712 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3713 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3714 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3715 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3719 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3723 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3724 all_paths_failed = true;
3725 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3726 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3728 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3737 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3738 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3739 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3740 Some(RouteParameters {
3741 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3742 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3743 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3746 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3748 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3749 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3751 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3753 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3754 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3755 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3756 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3757 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3758 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3759 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3760 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3767 error_code: onion_error_code,
3769 error_data: onion_error_data
3772 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3778 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3779 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3780 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3781 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3783 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3784 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3785 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3786 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3787 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3788 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3789 network_update: None,
3792 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3795 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3797 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3801 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3802 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3803 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3805 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3806 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3807 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3808 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3809 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3810 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3812 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3813 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3814 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3818 let mut forward_event = None;
3819 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3820 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3822 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3824 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3827 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3830 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3831 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3832 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3833 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3834 time_forwardable: time
3841 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3842 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3844 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3845 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3846 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3847 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3849 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3850 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3852 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3853 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3854 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3855 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3856 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3857 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3861 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3862 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3863 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3864 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3866 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3867 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3868 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3869 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3871 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3872 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3873 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3874 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3875 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3877 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3878 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3879 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3885 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3886 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3887 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3889 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3890 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3891 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3892 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3894 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3895 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3897 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3898 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3899 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3900 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3901 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3902 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3903 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3904 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3906 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3907 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3908 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3909 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3910 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3911 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3913 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3918 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3919 // which were generated.
3920 channel_state.take();
3922 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3923 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3924 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3931 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3932 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3933 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3934 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3935 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3937 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3941 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3942 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3943 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3944 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3945 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3946 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3947 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3948 payment_preimage, e);
3949 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3950 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3951 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3952 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3955 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3956 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3957 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3959 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3960 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3961 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3962 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3963 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3964 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3970 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3972 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3975 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3976 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3977 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3978 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3979 payment_preimage, e);
3981 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3982 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3984 chan.remove_entry();
3986 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3989 } else { unreachable!(); }
3992 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3993 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3994 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3995 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3996 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3997 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3998 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3999 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4000 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4001 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4002 pending_events.push(
4003 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4005 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4010 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4018 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4020 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4021 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4022 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4023 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4024 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4025 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4026 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4027 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4028 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4029 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4030 pending_events.push(
4031 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4032 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4038 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4042 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4043 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4044 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4046 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4047 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4048 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4049 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4050 pending_events.push(
4051 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4059 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4067 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4068 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4069 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4070 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4071 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4072 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4073 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4076 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4077 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4078 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4079 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4080 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4083 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4084 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4085 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4086 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4087 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4088 payment_preimage, e);
4090 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4091 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4092 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4093 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4096 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4097 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4098 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4099 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4103 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4104 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4105 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4108 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4109 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4111 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4119 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4120 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4121 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4124 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4127 let chan_restoration_res;
4128 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4129 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4130 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4131 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4135 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4139 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4140 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4141 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4142 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4143 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4144 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4146 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4147 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4148 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4151 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4152 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4153 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4155 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4157 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4158 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4159 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4160 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4164 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4167 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4169 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4170 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4171 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4173 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4174 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4175 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4177 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4178 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4180 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4181 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4182 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4186 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4192 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4193 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4194 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4197 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4201 let mut channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4202 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4203 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4206 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4209 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4211 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4212 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4215 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4216 pending_events.push(
4217 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4218 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4219 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4220 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4221 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4226 entry.insert(channel);
4232 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4233 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4234 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4236 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4238 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4241 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4242 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4247 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4248 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4249 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4250 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4252 user_channel_id: user_id,
4257 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4258 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4259 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4260 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4261 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4262 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4264 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4267 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4269 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4272 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4273 // lock before watch_channel
4274 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4276 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4277 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4278 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4279 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4280 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4281 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4282 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4283 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4284 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4285 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4288 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4289 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4290 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4291 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4292 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4293 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4297 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4298 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4299 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4305 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4314 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4316 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4317 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4319 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4321 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4322 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4324 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4325 Ok(update) => update,
4326 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4328 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4329 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4330 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4331 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4332 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4333 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4334 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4335 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4342 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4345 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4346 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4350 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4351 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4352 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4353 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4355 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4358 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4359 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4360 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4363 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4364 msg: announcement_sigs,
4366 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4367 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4368 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4369 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4370 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4371 // announcement_signatures.
4372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4374 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4375 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4384 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4385 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4386 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4387 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4388 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4390 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4391 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4392 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4393 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4396 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4397 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4398 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4399 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4402 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4403 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4405 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4406 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4407 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4408 let (result, is_permanent) =
4409 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4411 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4417 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4419 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4429 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4430 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4433 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4437 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4438 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4439 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4440 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4443 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4446 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4447 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4449 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4454 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4455 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4456 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4457 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4458 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4459 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4460 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4462 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4463 } else { (tx, None) }
4465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4468 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4469 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4470 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4472 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4473 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4474 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4475 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4479 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4484 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4485 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4486 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4487 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4489 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4490 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4491 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4492 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4494 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4495 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4499 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4500 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4503 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4504 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4505 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4506 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4507 match pending_forward_info {
4508 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4509 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4510 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4511 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4512 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4513 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4514 if error_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4515 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4517 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4521 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4522 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4523 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4524 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4525 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4526 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4527 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4528 // no problem just calling this
4529 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4530 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4533 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4535 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4536 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4537 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4540 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4542 _ => pending_forward_info
4545 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4552 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4553 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4554 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4556 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4558 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4561 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4566 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4570 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4571 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4572 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4573 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4574 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4575 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4576 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4578 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4585 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4586 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4590 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4593 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4594 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4595 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4597 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4604 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4606 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4607 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4608 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4609 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4610 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4612 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4613 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4614 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4615 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4616 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4617 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4618 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4623 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4624 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4626 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4627 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4628 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4630 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4631 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4632 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4633 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4634 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4635 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4636 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4637 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4639 commitment_signed: msg,
4645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4650 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4651 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4652 let mut forward_event = None;
4653 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4654 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4655 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4656 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4658 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4659 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4660 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4661 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4662 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4665 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4666 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4669 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4670 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4675 match forward_event {
4677 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4678 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4679 time_forwardable: time
4687 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4688 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4691 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4692 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4694 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4695 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4697 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4698 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4699 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4700 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4701 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4702 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4703 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4704 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4705 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4706 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4707 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4709 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4710 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4711 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4712 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4713 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4715 } else { unreachable!(); }
4718 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4719 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4720 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4724 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4725 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4726 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4727 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4728 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4733 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4735 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4736 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4738 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4739 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4741 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4742 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4749 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4750 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4751 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4752 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4754 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4755 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4757 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4764 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4765 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4766 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4768 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4770 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4771 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4773 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4777 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4778 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4779 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4780 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4781 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4782 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4790 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4791 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4792 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4793 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4794 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4795 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4797 // It's not a local channel
4798 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4801 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4803 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4804 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4805 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4806 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4807 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4808 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4812 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4813 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4814 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4815 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4817 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4822 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4825 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4826 let chan_restoration_res;
4827 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4833 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4836 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4837 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4838 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4839 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4840 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4841 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4842 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4843 let mut channel_update = None;
4844 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4845 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4846 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4849 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4850 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4851 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4852 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4853 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4854 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4855 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4858 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4859 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4860 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4861 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4862 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4865 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4870 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4871 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4873 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4874 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4879 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4880 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4881 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4882 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4883 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4884 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4885 match monitor_event {
4886 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4887 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4888 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4889 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4892 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4895 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4896 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4897 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4898 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4899 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4900 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4901 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4902 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4903 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4904 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4906 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4907 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4908 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4912 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4913 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4915 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4917 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4918 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4919 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4920 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4921 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4926 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4927 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4932 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4933 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4936 has_pending_monitor_events
4939 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4940 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4941 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4942 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4943 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4944 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4947 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4948 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4949 /// update was applied.
4951 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4952 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4953 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4954 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4955 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4956 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4957 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4958 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4962 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4963 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4964 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4966 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4967 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4968 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4969 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4970 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4972 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4973 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4974 has_monitor_update = true;
4975 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4976 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4977 if close_channel { return false; }
4979 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4980 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4981 updates: commitment_update,
4988 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4989 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4990 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4997 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4998 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4999 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5002 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5003 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5009 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5010 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5011 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5012 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5013 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5014 let mut has_update = false;
5016 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5018 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5019 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5020 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5022 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5023 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5024 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5025 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5027 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5028 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5031 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5032 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5033 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5034 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5035 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5038 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5039 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5044 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5046 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5047 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5053 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5054 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5061 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5062 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5068 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5069 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5071 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5072 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5073 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5074 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5075 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5076 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5077 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5078 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5079 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5080 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5081 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5082 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5083 assert!(should_broadcast);
5084 } else { unreachable!(); }
5085 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5087 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5091 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5092 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5094 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5095 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5098 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5101 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5102 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5104 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5105 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5106 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5107 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5108 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5109 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5110 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5111 // never fail a payment too early.
5112 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5114 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5122 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5125 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5126 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5128 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5129 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5130 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5132 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5134 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5135 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5139 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5140 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5142 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5144 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5145 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5146 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5147 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5148 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5149 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5152 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5153 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5156 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5158 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5160 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5161 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5162 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5163 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5164 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5167 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5168 /// stored external to LDK.
5170 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5171 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5172 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5174 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5175 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5178 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5179 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5180 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5181 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5183 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5184 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5185 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5186 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5187 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5189 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5190 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5191 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5192 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5193 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5195 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5197 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5198 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5200 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5201 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5205 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5206 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5208 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5210 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5211 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5212 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5213 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5216 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5217 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5220 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5222 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5224 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5225 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5228 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5229 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5231 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5232 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5233 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5236 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5237 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5239 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5240 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5241 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5242 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5244 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::get_phantom_scid(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.keys_manager);
5245 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5246 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5253 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5255 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5256 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5258 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5259 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5260 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5264 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5265 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5266 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5267 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5268 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5273 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5274 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5278 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5279 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5283 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5284 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5285 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5286 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5287 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5290 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5291 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5292 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5293 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5295 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5296 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5297 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5298 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5301 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5302 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5304 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5305 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5308 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5309 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5310 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5312 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5313 events.replace(pending_events);
5322 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5324 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5325 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5326 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5327 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5330 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5332 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5333 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5335 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5336 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5337 /// restarting from an old state.
5338 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5339 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5340 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5342 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5343 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5344 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5345 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5348 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5349 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5350 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5353 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5354 handler.handle_event(&event);
5362 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5364 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5365 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5366 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5367 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5370 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5372 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5373 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5374 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5375 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5376 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5379 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5380 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5381 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5384 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5386 let new_height = height - 1;
5388 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5389 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5390 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5391 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5392 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5393 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5396 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5400 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5402 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5403 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5404 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5405 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5408 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5409 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5410 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5411 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5413 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5414 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5417 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5418 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5421 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5422 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5423 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5424 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5426 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5427 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5431 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5433 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5435 macro_rules! max_time {
5436 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5438 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5439 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5440 // having an explicit local time source.
5441 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5442 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5443 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5444 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5445 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5451 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5452 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5453 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5454 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5455 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5458 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5459 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5460 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5461 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5462 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5463 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5464 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5465 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5466 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5474 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5475 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5476 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5477 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5478 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5479 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5485 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5487 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5488 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5489 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5490 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5491 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5492 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5497 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5499 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5500 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5501 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5505 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5506 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5508 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5509 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5510 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5511 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5512 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5514 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5515 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5517 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5518 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5519 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5520 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5521 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5522 let res = f(channel);
5523 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5524 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5525 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5526 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5527 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5531 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5532 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5533 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5534 msg: funding_locked,
5536 if channel.is_usable() {
5537 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5539 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5540 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5545 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5547 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5549 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5550 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5551 msg: announcement_sigs,
5553 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5554 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5555 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5557 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5558 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5559 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5564 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5565 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5566 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5568 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5569 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5570 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5571 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5576 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5577 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5578 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5579 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5580 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5581 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5582 data: reason_message,
5590 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5591 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5592 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5593 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5594 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5595 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5596 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5597 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5598 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5599 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5600 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5601 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5602 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5607 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5612 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5614 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5615 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5619 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5620 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5621 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5624 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5626 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5627 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5630 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5631 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5633 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5634 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5637 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5638 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5639 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5640 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5641 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5645 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5646 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5647 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5648 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5652 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5653 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5654 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5655 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5656 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5657 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5660 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5662 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5665 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5667 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5670 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5672 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5675 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5680 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5682 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5685 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5687 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5690 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5692 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5695 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5697 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5700 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5702 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5705 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5707 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5710 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5712 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5715 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5717 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5720 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5722 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5725 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5726 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5727 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5730 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5732 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5735 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5736 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5737 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5740 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5745 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5747 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5750 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5752 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5753 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5755 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5756 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5757 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5758 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5759 if no_connection_possible {
5760 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5761 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5762 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5763 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5764 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5766 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5767 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5772 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5779 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5780 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5781 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5782 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5783 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5784 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5785 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5787 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5790 no_channels_remain = false;
5796 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5798 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5799 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5800 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5801 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5802 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5804 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5806 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5809 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5810 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5811 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5813 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5815 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5820 if no_channels_remain {
5821 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5824 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5825 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5829 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5830 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5835 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5836 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5838 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5839 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5843 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5849 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5850 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5851 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5852 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5853 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5854 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5855 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5856 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5860 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5861 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5862 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5868 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5871 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5874 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5875 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5876 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5877 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5878 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5882 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5883 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5888 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5889 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5890 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5891 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5892 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5893 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5896 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5899 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5905 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5906 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5911 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5912 let result = *guard;
5920 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5921 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5922 let current_time = Instant::now();
5924 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5925 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5930 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5931 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5932 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5933 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5934 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5936 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5937 let result = *guard;
5938 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5942 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5943 None => return result,
5949 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5951 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5952 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5953 *persistence_lock = true;
5954 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5959 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5960 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5962 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5963 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5964 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5965 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5968 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5969 (2, node_id, required),
5970 (4, features, required),
5971 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5972 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5975 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5976 (2, channel_id, required),
5977 (4, counterparty, required),
5978 (6, funding_txo, option),
5979 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5980 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5981 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5982 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5983 (16, balance_msat, required),
5984 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5985 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5986 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5987 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5988 (26, is_outbound, required),
5989 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5990 (30, is_usable, required),
5991 (32, is_public, required),
5994 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5995 (2, channels, vec_type),
5996 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5997 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6000 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6002 (0, onion_packet, required),
6003 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6006 (0, payment_data, required),
6007 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6008 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6010 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6011 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6012 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6016 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6017 (0, routing, required),
6018 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6019 (4, payment_hash, required),
6020 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6021 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6025 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6026 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6028 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6030 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6031 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6032 reason.write(writer)?;
6034 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6035 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6038 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6039 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6040 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6041 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6048 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6049 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6050 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6053 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6054 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6055 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6056 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6060 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6061 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6062 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6063 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6064 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6067 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6068 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6069 // messages contained in the variants.
6070 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6071 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6072 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6074 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6075 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6076 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6077 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6078 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6081 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6082 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6083 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6084 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6085 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6087 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6092 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6097 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6098 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6099 (2, outpoint, required),
6100 (4, htlc_id, required),
6101 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6104 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6105 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6106 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6107 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6110 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6111 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6112 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6117 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6118 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6119 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6125 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6126 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6127 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6129 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6130 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6131 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6135 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6136 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6137 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6139 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6141 if payment_data.is_some() {
6142 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6144 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6147 if payment_data.is_none() {
6148 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6150 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6154 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6162 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6163 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6164 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6167 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6168 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6169 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6170 let mut payment_id = None;
6171 let mut payment_secret = None;
6172 let mut payment_params = None;
6173 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6174 (0, session_priv, required),
6175 (1, payment_id, option),
6176 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6177 (3, payment_secret, option),
6178 (4, path, vec_type),
6179 (5, payment_params, option),
6181 if payment_id.is_none() {
6182 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6184 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6186 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6187 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6188 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6189 path: path.unwrap(),
6190 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6195 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6196 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6201 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6202 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6204 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6206 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6207 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6208 (0, session_priv, required),
6209 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6210 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6211 (3, payment_secret, option),
6212 (4, path, vec_type),
6213 (5, payment_params, option),
6216 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6218 field.write(writer)?;
6225 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6226 (0, LightningError) => {
6230 (0, failure_code, required),
6231 (2, data, vec_type),
6235 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6237 (0, forward_info, required),
6238 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6239 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6240 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6243 (0, htlc_id, required),
6244 (2, err_packet, required),
6248 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6249 (0, payment_secret, required),
6250 (2, expiry_time, required),
6251 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6252 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6253 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6256 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6258 (0, session_privs, required),
6261 (0, session_privs, required),
6262 (1, payment_hash, option),
6265 (0, session_privs, required),
6266 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6267 (2, payment_hash, required),
6268 (4, payment_secret, option),
6269 (6, total_msat, required),
6270 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6271 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6274 (0, session_privs, required),
6275 (2, payment_hash, required),
6279 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6280 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6281 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6282 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6283 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6286 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6287 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6289 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6291 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6293 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6294 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6295 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6298 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6299 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6300 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6301 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6302 unfunded_channels += 1;
6305 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6306 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6307 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6308 channel.write(writer)?;
6312 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6313 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6314 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6315 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6316 for forward in pending_forwards {
6317 forward.write(writer)?;
6321 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6322 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6323 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6324 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6325 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6326 htlc.write(writer)?;
6330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6331 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6332 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6333 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6334 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6335 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6338 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6339 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6340 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6341 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6342 for event in events.iter() {
6343 event.write(writer)?;
6346 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6347 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6348 for event in background_events.iter() {
6350 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6352 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6353 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6358 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6359 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6361 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6362 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6363 hash.write(writer)?;
6364 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6367 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6368 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6369 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6370 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6371 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6374 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6375 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6377 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6378 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6379 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6380 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6383 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6384 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6388 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6389 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6390 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6392 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6393 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6394 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6399 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6400 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6401 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6402 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6403 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6410 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6412 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6414 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6415 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6416 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6417 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6418 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6419 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6420 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6421 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6422 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6423 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6424 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6425 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6426 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6428 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6429 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6431 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6432 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6434 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6435 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6436 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6437 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6438 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6439 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6441 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6442 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6443 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6444 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6445 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6446 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6449 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6450 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6452 pub keys_manager: K,
6454 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6456 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6457 pub fee_estimator: F,
6458 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6460 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6461 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6462 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6463 pub chain_monitor: M,
6465 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6466 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6467 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6468 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6469 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6470 /// deserialization.
6472 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6473 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6474 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6476 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6477 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6479 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6480 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6481 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6482 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6484 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6487 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6488 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6491 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6492 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6493 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6494 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6495 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6496 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6499 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6500 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6501 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6502 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6503 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6505 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6506 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6511 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6512 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6513 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6514 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6515 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6516 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6517 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6518 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6521 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6522 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6523 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6527 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6528 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6529 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6530 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6531 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6532 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6535 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6536 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6538 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6539 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6540 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6542 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6544 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6545 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6546 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6547 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6548 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6549 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6550 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6551 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6552 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6553 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6554 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6555 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6556 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6557 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6558 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6559 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6560 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6561 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6562 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6563 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6564 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6565 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6566 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6567 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6568 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6569 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6570 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6571 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6572 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6573 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6574 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6575 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6576 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6577 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6578 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6579 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6580 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6581 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6582 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6585 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6586 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6587 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6589 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6592 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6593 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6594 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6595 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6596 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6597 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6601 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6602 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6603 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6604 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6608 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6609 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6611 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6612 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6613 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6614 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6615 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6616 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6618 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6621 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6623 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6624 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6626 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6627 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6628 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6630 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6633 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6634 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6635 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6636 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637 let peer_state = PeerState {
6638 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6640 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6643 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6645 for _ in 0..event_count {
6646 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6647 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6651 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6652 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6653 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6654 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6655 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6656 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6657 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6658 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6662 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6663 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6664 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6665 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6666 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6667 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6671 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6672 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6675 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6676 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6677 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6682 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6684 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6685 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6686 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6687 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6688 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6690 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6691 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6695 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6696 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6697 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6698 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6699 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6700 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6701 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6702 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6703 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6704 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6706 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6707 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6710 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6711 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6712 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6713 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6714 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6715 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6717 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6719 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6720 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6721 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6722 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6723 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6724 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6725 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6727 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6728 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6729 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6730 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6731 if path.is_empty() {
6732 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6733 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6735 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6736 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6737 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6738 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6740 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6741 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6742 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6745 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6746 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6747 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6748 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6750 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6751 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6752 total_msat: path_amt,
6753 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6755 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6756 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6765 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6766 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6768 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6769 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6772 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6774 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6776 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6777 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6778 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6779 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6780 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6784 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6785 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6786 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6788 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6789 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6790 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6792 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6794 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6799 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6801 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6802 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6803 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6804 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6810 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6811 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6813 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6815 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6816 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6817 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6818 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6820 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6821 logger: args.logger,
6822 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6825 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6826 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6829 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6830 //connection or two.
6832 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6838 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6839 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6840 use core::time::Duration;
6841 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6842 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6843 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6844 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6845 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6846 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6848 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6849 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6850 use util::errors::APIError;
6851 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6852 use util::test_utils;
6854 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6856 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6857 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6859 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6862 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6863 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6865 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6866 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6867 thread::spawn(move || {
6869 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6870 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6871 *persistence_lock = true;
6874 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6880 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6881 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6883 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6886 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6891 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6893 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6896 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6903 fn test_notify_limits() {
6904 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6905 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6909 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6911 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6912 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6913 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6914 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6915 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6917 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6919 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6920 // to connect messages with new values
6921 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6922 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6923 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6924 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6926 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6927 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6928 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6929 // ... but the last node should not.
6930 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6931 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6932 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6933 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6935 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6936 // about the channel.
6937 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6938 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6939 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6941 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6943 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6944 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6945 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6946 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6947 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6948 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6950 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6951 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6952 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6954 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6955 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6956 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6957 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6958 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6959 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6961 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6962 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6963 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6964 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6965 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6966 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6967 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6968 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6970 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6971 // the channel info has updated.
6972 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6973 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6974 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6975 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6976 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6977 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6981 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6982 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6987 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6988 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6990 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6991 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6992 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6993 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6994 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6995 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6996 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6998 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7000 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7002 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7003 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7005 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7006 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7007 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7008 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7009 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7012 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7015 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7016 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7017 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7018 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7019 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7020 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7021 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7022 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7023 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7025 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7026 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7028 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7030 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7032 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7033 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7034 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7035 // lightning messages manually.
7036 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7038 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7039 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7040 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7042 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7043 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7045 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7046 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7048 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7049 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7050 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7052 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7053 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7054 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7056 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7058 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7060 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7061 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7064 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7065 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7066 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7069 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7070 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7071 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7072 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7077 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7078 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7079 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7080 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7085 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7086 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7087 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7088 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7095 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7096 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7097 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7098 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7099 // fails as expected.
7100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7102 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7103 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7104 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7105 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7107 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7108 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7109 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7111 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7112 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7113 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7114 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7115 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7117 let route = find_route(
7118 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7119 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7121 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7123 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7124 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7125 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7126 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7130 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7131 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7133 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7134 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7135 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7136 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7137 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7138 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7139 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7141 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7143 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7144 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7146 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7147 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7148 let route = find_route(
7149 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7150 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7152 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7154 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7156 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7157 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7158 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7160 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7161 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7162 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7164 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7166 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7167 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7170 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7171 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7172 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7174 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7175 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7176 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7177 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7178 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7179 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7181 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7182 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7184 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7185 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7189 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7190 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7191 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7192 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7193 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7194 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7195 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7197 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7198 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7199 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7200 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7202 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7203 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7204 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7205 final_value_msat: 10000,
7206 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7208 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7209 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7210 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7211 let route = find_route(
7212 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7213 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7216 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7217 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7218 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7221 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7222 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7223 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7224 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7225 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7226 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7227 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7229 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7233 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7234 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7235 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7238 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7240 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7241 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7242 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7243 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7245 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7246 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7247 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7248 final_value_msat: 10000,
7249 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7251 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7252 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7253 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7254 let route = find_route(
7255 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7256 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7259 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7260 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7261 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7262 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7265 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7266 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7267 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7268 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7269 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7270 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7271 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7273 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7277 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7278 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7281 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7283 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7284 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7285 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7286 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7288 // Marshall an MPP route.
7289 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7290 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7291 route.paths.push(path);
7292 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7293 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7294 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7295 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7296 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7297 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7299 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7300 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7301 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7302 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7307 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7308 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7312 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7314 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7315 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7317 total_msat: 100_000,
7320 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7321 // payment verification fails as expected.
7322 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7323 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7324 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7325 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7327 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7331 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7332 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7336 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7339 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7340 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7341 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7342 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7343 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7344 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7345 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7346 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7347 use util::test_utils;
7348 use util::config::UserConfig;
7349 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7351 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7352 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7353 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7355 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7359 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7360 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7361 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7362 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7363 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7364 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7365 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7370 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7371 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7374 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7375 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7376 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7378 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7379 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7381 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7382 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7384 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7385 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7387 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7388 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7389 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7390 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7391 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7393 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7395 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7397 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7398 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7399 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7400 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7401 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7403 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7405 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7407 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7408 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7409 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7410 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7411 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7414 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7415 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7416 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7418 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7419 } else { panic!(); }
7421 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7422 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7424 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7427 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7430 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7431 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7433 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7434 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7435 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7436 match msg_events[0] {
7437 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7438 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7439 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7443 match msg_events[1] {
7444 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7448 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7450 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7451 macro_rules! send_payment {
7452 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7453 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7454 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7455 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7456 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7457 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7458 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7460 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7461 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7463 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7464 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7466 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7467 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7468 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7469 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7470 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7471 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7472 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7473 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7475 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7476 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7477 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7479 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7480 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7481 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7482 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7483 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7485 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7488 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7489 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7490 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7491 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7493 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7498 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7499 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);