1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
242 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
243 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
248 impl Readable for PaymentId {
249 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
250 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
255 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
257 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
258 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
259 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
261 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
262 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
267 impl Readable for InterceptId {
268 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
269 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
274 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
275 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
276 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
277 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
278 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
281 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
283 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
284 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
285 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
287 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
288 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
292 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
293 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
294 (0, short_channel_id, required),
295 (2, htlc_id, required),
297 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
298 (0, session_priv, required),
303 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
304 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
305 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
306 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
307 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
310 session_priv: SecretKey,
311 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
312 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
313 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
314 payment_id: PaymentId,
317 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
318 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
319 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
321 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
323 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
325 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
328 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
329 payment_id.hash(hasher);
330 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
336 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
338 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
339 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
340 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
341 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
342 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
343 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
347 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
348 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
349 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
350 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
351 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
352 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
354 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
360 struct InboundOnionErr {
366 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
367 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
369 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
370 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
371 pub enum FailureCode {
372 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
373 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
374 TemporaryNodeFailure,
375 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
376 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
377 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
378 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
379 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
380 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
381 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
382 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
383 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
384 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
386 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
387 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
388 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
391 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
392 fn into(self) -> u16 {
394 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
395 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
396 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
397 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
402 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
403 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
404 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
405 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
406 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
408 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
409 err: msgs::LightningError,
410 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
411 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
412 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
414 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
416 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
418 err: LightningError {
420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
428 shutdown_finish: None,
429 channel_capacity: None,
433 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
434 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
437 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
439 err: LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
448 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
449 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
450 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
454 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
457 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
459 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
460 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
464 log_level: Level::Warn,
467 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
469 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
471 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
473 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
474 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
482 shutdown_finish: None,
483 channel_capacity: None,
488 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
489 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
490 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
491 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
492 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
494 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
495 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
496 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
497 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
498 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
499 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
500 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
502 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
506 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
507 struct ClaimingPayment {
509 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
510 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
511 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
512 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
514 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
515 (0, amount_msat, required),
516 (2, payment_purpose, required),
517 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
518 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
519 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
522 struct ClaimablePayment {
523 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
524 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
525 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
528 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
529 struct ClaimablePayments {
530 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
531 /// failed/claimed by the user.
533 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
534 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
536 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
537 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
538 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
540 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
541 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
542 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
543 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
546 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
547 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
548 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
549 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
550 enum BackgroundEvent {
551 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
552 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
553 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
554 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
556 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
557 /// are regenerated on startup.
558 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
559 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
560 /// channel to continue normal operation.
562 /// In general this should be used rather than
563 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
564 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
565 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
567 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
568 /// are regenerated on startup.
569 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
570 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
571 funding_txo: OutPoint,
572 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
574 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
575 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
577 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
578 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
579 channel_id: [u8; 32],
584 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
585 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
586 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
587 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
588 /// event can be generated.
589 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
590 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
591 /// operation of another channel.
593 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
594 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
595 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
596 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
598 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
599 event: events::Event,
600 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
604 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
605 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
606 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
607 (0, event, upgradable_required),
608 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
609 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
610 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
611 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
612 // downgrades to prior versions.
613 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
617 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
618 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
619 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
620 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
621 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
625 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
626 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
627 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
631 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
632 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
633 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
634 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
635 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
636 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
638 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
639 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
640 channel_id: [u8; 32],
641 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
646 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
648 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
649 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
650 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
651 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
656 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
657 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
661 /// State we hold per-peer.
662 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
663 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
665 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
666 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<SP>>,
667 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
669 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
670 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
672 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<SP>>,
673 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
675 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
676 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
678 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<SP>>,
679 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
681 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
682 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
683 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
684 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
685 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
686 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
687 latest_features: InitFeatures,
688 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
689 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
690 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
691 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
692 /// user but which have not yet completed.
694 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
695 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
696 /// for a missing channel.
697 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
698 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
699 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
701 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
702 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
703 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
704 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
706 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
707 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
708 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
709 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
710 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
711 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
712 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
713 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
714 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
715 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
716 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
717 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
718 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
719 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
720 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
724 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
725 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
726 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
727 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
728 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
729 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
732 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
733 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
736 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
737 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
738 self.channel_by_id.len() +
739 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
740 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
741 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
744 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
745 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
746 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
747 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
749 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
753 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
754 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
755 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
756 /// The original OpenChannel message.
757 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
758 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
759 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
762 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
763 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
764 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
766 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
767 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
769 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
772 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
773 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
774 struct PendingInboundPayment {
775 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
776 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
777 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
778 /// this payment being removed.
780 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
781 user_payment_id: u64,
782 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
783 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
784 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
787 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
788 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
789 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
790 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
791 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
792 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
793 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
794 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
796 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
797 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
805 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
807 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
808 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
809 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
814 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
815 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
816 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
817 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
818 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
819 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
820 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
821 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
822 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
824 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
825 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
834 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
836 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
837 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
838 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
843 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
844 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
845 $vis trait AChannelManager {
846 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
847 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
848 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
849 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
850 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
851 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
852 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
853 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
854 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
855 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
856 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
857 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
858 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
859 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
860 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
861 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
862 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
863 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
866 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
867 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
868 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
869 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
870 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
871 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
873 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
874 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
875 ES::Target: EntropySource,
876 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
877 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
882 type Watch = M::Target;
884 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
886 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
888 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
890 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
891 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
893 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
895 type Router = R::Target;
897 type Logger = L::Target;
899 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
902 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
903 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
905 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
906 /// to individual Channels.
908 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
909 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
910 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
911 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
913 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
914 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
915 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
916 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
917 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
918 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
919 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
921 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
922 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
923 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
925 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
926 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
927 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
928 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
929 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
931 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
932 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
933 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
934 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
936 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
937 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
938 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
940 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
941 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
942 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
943 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
944 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
946 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
947 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
948 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
949 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
950 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
951 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
952 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
953 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
956 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
957 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
958 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
959 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
960 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
964 // `total_consistency_lock`
966 // |__`forward_htlcs`
968 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
970 // |__`per_peer_state`
972 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
974 // | |__`claimable_payments`
976 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
982 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
984 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
988 // | |__`pending_events`
990 // | |__`pending_background_events`
992 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
994 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
995 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
996 ES::Target: EntropySource,
997 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
998 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
999 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1003 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1004 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1005 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1011 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1013 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1015 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1016 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1018 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1019 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1020 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1021 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1023 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1024 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1026 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1027 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1028 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1029 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1030 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1031 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1032 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1033 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1035 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1037 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1038 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1040 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1042 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1043 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1044 /// and via the classic SCID.
1046 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1047 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1049 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1051 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1053 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1054 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1055 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1057 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1058 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1060 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1061 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1063 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1064 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1066 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1067 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1068 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1069 /// active channel list on load.
1071 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1074 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1076 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1077 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1078 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1080 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1081 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1082 /// the handling of the events.
1084 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1085 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1088 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1089 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1090 /// would break backwards compatability.
1091 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1092 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1093 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1095 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1096 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1098 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1100 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1101 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1102 /// confirmation depth.
1104 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1105 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1106 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1108 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1112 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1114 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1116 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1118 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1119 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1120 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1122 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1123 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1125 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1126 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1127 /// keeping additional state.
1128 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1130 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1131 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1132 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1133 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1135 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1136 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1138 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1139 /// are currently open with that peer.
1141 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1142 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1145 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1147 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1148 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1149 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1150 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1151 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1153 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1154 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1155 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1156 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1157 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1159 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1160 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1162 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1163 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1164 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1165 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1166 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1168 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1169 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1171 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1172 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1173 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1174 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1175 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1177 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1179 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1181 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1182 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1183 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1184 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1185 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1186 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1187 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1188 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1189 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1191 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1193 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1197 signer_provider: SP,
1202 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1204 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1205 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1206 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1207 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1208 pub struct ChainParameters {
1209 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1210 pub network: Network,
1212 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1214 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1215 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1218 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1225 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1226 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1227 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1228 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1229 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1230 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1232 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1233 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1234 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1235 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1236 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1238 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1239 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1242 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1243 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1244 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1245 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1247 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1248 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1249 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1250 _read_guard: read_guard,
1255 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1256 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1257 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1258 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1260 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1261 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1262 should_persist: persist_check,
1263 _read_guard: read_guard,
1268 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1269 fn drop(&mut self) {
1270 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1271 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1276 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1277 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1279 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1281 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1282 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1283 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1284 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1285 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1287 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1288 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1290 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1292 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1293 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1294 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1295 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1296 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1297 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1298 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1299 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1300 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1301 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1302 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1303 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1304 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1306 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1307 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1309 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1310 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1311 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1312 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1314 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1315 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1316 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1317 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1318 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1319 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1322 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1324 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1325 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1328 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1330 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1331 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1333 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1334 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1335 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1336 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1338 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1339 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1340 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1342 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1343 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1344 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1346 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1347 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1348 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1349 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1351 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1352 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1353 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1355 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1356 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1357 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1359 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1360 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1361 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1362 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1363 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1364 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1365 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1366 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1367 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1368 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1369 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1372 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1373 /// to better separate parameters.
1374 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1375 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1376 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1377 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1378 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1379 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1380 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1381 pub features: InitFeatures,
1382 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1383 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1384 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1386 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1388 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1389 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1390 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1391 /// payments to us through this channel.
1392 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1393 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1394 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1395 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1396 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1397 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1398 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1401 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1403 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1404 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1407 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1408 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1409 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1410 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1411 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1412 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1413 /// lifetime of the channel.
1414 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1415 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1416 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1417 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1418 /// our counterparty already.
1420 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1421 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1422 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1423 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1425 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1426 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1427 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1428 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1430 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1431 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1433 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1434 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1436 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1437 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1438 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1439 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1440 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1441 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1442 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1443 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1444 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1447 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1449 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1450 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1451 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1452 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1453 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1454 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1455 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1457 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1458 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1460 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1461 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1462 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1463 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1464 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1465 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1466 /// this value on chain.
1468 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1470 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1472 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1473 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1474 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1475 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1476 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1477 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1478 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1480 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1481 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1482 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1483 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1484 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1485 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1487 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1488 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1489 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1490 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1491 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1492 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1494 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1495 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1496 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1497 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1498 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1499 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1500 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1501 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1503 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1504 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1505 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1506 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1507 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1508 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1509 /// route which is valid.
1510 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1511 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1512 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1513 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1514 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1515 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1517 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1518 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1519 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1520 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1521 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1522 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1523 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1524 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1525 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1527 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1529 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1530 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1531 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1532 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1533 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1535 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1536 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1537 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1538 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1539 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1540 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1541 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1543 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1544 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1545 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1546 pub is_outbound: bool,
1547 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1548 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1549 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1550 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1551 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1553 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1554 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1555 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1556 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1557 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1558 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1559 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1561 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1562 pub is_usable: bool,
1563 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1564 pub is_public: bool,
1565 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1566 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1567 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1568 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1569 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1570 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1572 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1573 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1576 impl ChannelDetails {
1577 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1578 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1579 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1581 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1582 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1583 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1584 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1587 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1588 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1589 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1591 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1592 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1593 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1594 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1597 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1598 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1599 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1602 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1603 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1605 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1606 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1607 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1609 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1610 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1611 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1612 features: latest_features,
1613 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1614 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1615 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1616 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1617 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1618 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1619 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1620 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1621 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1622 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1624 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1625 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1626 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1627 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1628 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1629 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1630 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1631 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1632 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1633 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1634 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1635 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1636 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1637 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1638 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1639 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1640 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1641 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1642 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1643 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1644 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1645 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1646 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1647 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1648 config: Some(context.config()),
1649 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1654 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1655 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1656 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1657 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1658 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1659 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1660 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1661 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1662 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1664 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1666 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1667 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1669 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1670 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1671 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1672 /// to drop the channel.
1676 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1677 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1678 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1679 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1680 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1682 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1684 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1685 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1686 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1689 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1690 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1691 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1693 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1694 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1695 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1697 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1698 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1699 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1701 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1702 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1706 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1708 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1710 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1711 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1712 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1713 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1715 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1716 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1717 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1720 macro_rules! handle_error {
1721 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1722 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1723 // entering the macro.
1724 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1725 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1729 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1730 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1732 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1733 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1734 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1735 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1739 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1740 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1741 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1742 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1743 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1744 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1749 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1750 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1752 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1753 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1754 action: err.action.clone()
1758 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1759 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1760 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1761 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1762 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1766 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1771 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1774 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1775 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1776 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1782 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1783 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1784 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1785 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1786 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1787 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1789 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1790 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1791 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1792 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1793 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1795 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1796 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1798 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1802 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1803 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1804 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1806 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1807 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1809 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1810 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1812 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1813 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1814 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1815 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1816 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1817 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1821 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1823 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1824 // In any case, just close the channel.
1825 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1826 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1827 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1828 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1829 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1830 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1836 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1837 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1841 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1843 $entry.remove_entry();
1851 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1852 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1856 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1858 $entry.remove_entry();
1866 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1867 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1871 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1873 $entry.remove_entry();
1881 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1882 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1884 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1885 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1891 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1892 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1893 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1894 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1895 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1897 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1898 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1899 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1900 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1901 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1902 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1903 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1904 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1905 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1906 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1911 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1912 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1913 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1914 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1915 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1916 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1917 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1918 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1919 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1921 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1926 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1927 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1928 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1929 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1930 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1931 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1932 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1933 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1934 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1936 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1941 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1942 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1943 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1944 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1945 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1946 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1947 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1948 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1949 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1950 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1951 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1953 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1954 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1955 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1961 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1962 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1964 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1965 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1966 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1967 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1968 updates.announcement_sigs);
1969 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1970 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1973 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1974 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1975 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1977 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1979 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1980 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1982 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1983 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1984 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1985 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1990 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1991 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1992 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1993 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1994 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1995 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1997 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1998 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1999 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2002 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2003 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2004 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2005 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2006 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2007 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2008 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2009 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2013 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2019 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2020 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2021 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2022 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2024 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2025 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2027 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2028 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2029 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2030 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2031 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2032 // filter for uniqueness here.
2033 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2034 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2035 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2036 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2038 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2039 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2040 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2042 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2043 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2044 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2048 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2049 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2053 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2054 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2055 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2056 while !processed_all_events {
2057 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2061 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2064 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2065 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2066 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2068 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2069 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2070 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2072 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2073 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2074 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2075 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2079 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2080 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2081 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2082 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2085 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2087 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2088 $event_to_handle = event;
2090 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2091 post_event_actions.push(action);
2096 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2097 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2098 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2099 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2100 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2101 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2104 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2105 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2106 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2107 processed_all_events = false;
2110 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2111 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2117 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2119 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2120 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2121 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2122 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2123 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2124 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2128 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2130 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2132 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2133 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2135 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2137 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2138 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2139 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2142 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2143 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2144 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2146 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2147 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2148 current_timestamp: u32,
2150 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2151 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2152 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2153 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2155 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2156 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2157 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2162 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2164 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2165 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2166 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2167 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2168 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2169 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2170 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2171 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2173 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2176 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2177 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2179 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2181 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2183 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2185 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2186 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2187 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2188 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2189 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2190 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2200 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2201 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2202 &self.default_configuration
2205 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2206 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2207 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2210 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2211 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2213 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2215 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2219 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2224 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2226 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2227 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2228 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2229 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2230 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2232 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2233 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2235 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2236 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2237 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2239 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2240 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2241 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2243 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2244 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2245 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2246 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2247 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2248 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2250 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2251 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2252 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2253 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2254 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2255 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2259 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2260 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2264 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2265 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2267 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2269 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2270 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2271 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2272 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2273 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2274 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2278 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2283 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2285 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2286 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2287 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2289 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2291 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2297 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2298 node_id: their_network_key,
2301 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2304 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2305 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2306 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2307 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2308 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2309 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2310 // the same channel.
2311 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2313 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2315 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2316 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2317 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2318 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2319 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2320 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2321 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2329 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2330 /// more information.
2331 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2332 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2333 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2334 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2335 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2336 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2337 // the same channel.
2338 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2340 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2341 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2342 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2345 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2346 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2347 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2350 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2351 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2352 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2355 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2356 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2357 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2365 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2366 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2368 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2369 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2371 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2372 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2373 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2374 // really wanted anyway.
2375 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2378 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2379 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2380 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2381 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2383 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2384 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2385 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2386 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2387 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2388 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2390 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2392 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2393 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2394 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2395 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2401 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2402 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2404 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2405 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2406 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2408 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2409 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2410 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2411 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2412 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2413 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2414 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2415 total_msat: *total_msat,
2418 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2419 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2421 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2422 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2424 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2429 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2430 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2431 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2432 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2433 Some(transaction) => {
2434 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2435 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2440 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2441 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2442 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2443 reason: closure_reason,
2444 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2445 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2449 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2452 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2453 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2455 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2457 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2458 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2460 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2461 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2463 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2465 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2466 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2467 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2468 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2469 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2471 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2472 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2473 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2474 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2475 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2479 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2480 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2481 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2482 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2485 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2486 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2487 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2488 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2492 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2499 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2500 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2502 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2503 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2504 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2505 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2508 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2509 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2510 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2511 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2514 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2518 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2519 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2520 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2522 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2523 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2525 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2526 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2527 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2528 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2530 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2532 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2533 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2534 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2537 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2538 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2539 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2540 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2541 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2542 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2545 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2546 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2547 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2549 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2550 /// the channel being closed or not:
2551 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2552 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2553 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2554 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2555 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2556 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2557 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2559 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2560 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2561 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2562 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2564 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2566 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2567 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2568 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2571 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2572 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2573 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2574 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2575 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2576 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2580 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2581 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2582 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2583 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2584 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2585 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2586 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2587 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2589 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2590 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2591 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2592 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2593 // ignore the result here.
2594 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2598 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2599 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2600 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2601 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2603 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2604 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2605 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2608 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2609 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2611 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2613 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2614 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2615 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2616 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2617 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2618 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2619 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2620 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2621 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2622 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2623 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2624 // Unfunded channel has no update
2625 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2626 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2627 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2628 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2629 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2630 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2631 // Unfunded channel has no update
2632 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2633 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2634 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2635 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2636 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2638 (None, *peer_node_id)
2640 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2643 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2644 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2645 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2650 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2653 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2654 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2655 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2656 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2657 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2658 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2659 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2660 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2661 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2662 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2663 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2664 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2675 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2676 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2677 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2679 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2680 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2681 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2684 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2685 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2686 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2688 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2689 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2690 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2691 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2692 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2695 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2696 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2697 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2698 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2699 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2703 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2704 /// local transaction(s).
2705 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2706 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2707 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2711 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2712 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2713 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2714 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2715 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2716 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2717 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2719 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2720 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2724 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2725 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2726 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2727 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2728 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2729 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2730 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2731 err_data: Vec::new(),
2735 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2736 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2737 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2740 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2741 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2742 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2743 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2744 outgoing_cltv_value,
2745 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2749 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2750 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2751 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2752 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2753 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2754 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2755 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2756 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2758 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2760 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2761 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2762 err_data: Vec::new(),
2763 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2766 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2767 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2768 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2769 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2771 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2774 // final_expiry_too_soon
2775 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2776 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2778 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2779 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2780 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2781 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2782 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2783 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2784 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2785 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2786 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2787 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2788 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2791 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2792 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2793 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2795 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2797 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2798 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2802 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2803 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2804 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2805 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2806 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2807 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2808 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2809 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2810 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2811 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2812 err_data: Vec::new(),
2813 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2816 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2817 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2818 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2819 err_data: Vec::new(),
2820 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2823 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2827 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2830 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2831 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2834 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2835 phantom_shared_secret,
2839 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2840 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2841 err_data: Vec::new(),
2842 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2845 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2848 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2849 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2850 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2851 outgoing_cltv_value,
2852 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2856 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2857 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2858 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2859 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2860 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2862 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2863 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2864 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2865 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2866 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2867 failure_code: $err_code,
2873 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2874 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2877 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2878 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2879 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2881 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2882 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2883 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2884 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2885 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2886 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2887 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2888 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2890 macro_rules! return_err {
2891 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2893 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2894 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2895 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2896 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2897 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2898 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2904 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2906 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2907 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2909 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2910 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2913 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2914 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2915 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2916 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2919 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2920 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2921 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2923 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2924 // inbound channel's state.
2925 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2926 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2927 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2931 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2932 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2933 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2934 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2935 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2936 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2937 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2938 // phantom or an intercept.
2939 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2940 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2941 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2945 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2948 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2950 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2952 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2953 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2954 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2958 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2960 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2961 // have no consistency guarantees.
2962 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2966 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2967 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2968 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2969 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2970 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2972 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2973 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2974 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2975 // we don't have the channel here.
2976 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2978 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2980 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2981 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2982 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2983 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2984 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2985 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2986 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2987 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2988 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2989 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2990 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2992 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2995 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2996 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2998 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2999 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3003 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3004 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3005 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3006 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3008 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3015 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3016 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3017 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3018 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3019 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3020 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3022 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3023 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3025 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3026 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3027 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3028 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3029 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3030 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3031 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3032 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3033 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3034 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3040 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3041 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3042 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3043 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3045 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3046 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3048 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3049 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3050 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3052 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3053 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3054 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3055 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3056 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3057 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3058 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3062 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3064 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3067 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3068 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3069 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3070 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3071 macro_rules! return_err {
3072 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3074 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3075 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3076 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3077 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3078 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3079 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3085 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3087 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3088 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3091 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3092 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3093 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3094 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3095 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3097 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3100 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3101 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3102 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3103 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3104 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3110 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3111 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3112 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3114 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3115 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3116 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3118 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3119 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3120 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3121 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3122 return Err(LightningError {
3123 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3124 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3127 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3128 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3131 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3134 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3135 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3136 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3137 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3139 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3140 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3141 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3143 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3144 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3145 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3147 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3148 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3152 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3155 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3157 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3159 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3160 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3161 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3162 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3163 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3166 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3167 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3169 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3170 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3171 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3172 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3173 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3174 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3175 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3176 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3178 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3179 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3180 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3182 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3184 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3191 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3192 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3193 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3194 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3199 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3200 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3201 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3204 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3205 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3208 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3209 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3211 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3212 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3213 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3215 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3216 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3218 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3219 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3220 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3221 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3224 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3225 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3226 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3227 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3228 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3229 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3230 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3231 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3233 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3234 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3235 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3237 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3238 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3240 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3241 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3242 Some(monitor_update) => {
3243 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3244 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3246 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3247 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3248 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3249 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3250 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3251 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3252 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3260 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3261 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3262 // `channel_by_id` map.
3263 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3264 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3269 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3270 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3272 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3277 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3279 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3280 /// fields for more info.
3282 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3283 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3285 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3287 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3288 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3289 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3290 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3291 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3293 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3294 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3295 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3296 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3297 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3299 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3300 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3301 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3302 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3304 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3306 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3307 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3308 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3310 /// In general, a path may raise:
3311 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3312 /// node public key) is specified.
3313 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3314 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3316 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3317 /// relevant updates.
3319 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3320 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3321 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3323 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3324 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3325 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3326 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3327 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3328 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3329 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3330 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3332 self.pending_outbound_payments
3333 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3334 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3335 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3338 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3339 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3340 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3341 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3343 self.pending_outbound_payments
3344 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3345 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3346 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3347 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3351 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3352 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3353 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3354 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3355 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3356 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3360 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3361 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3362 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3366 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3367 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3371 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3372 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3373 /// retries are exhausted.
3375 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3376 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3378 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3379 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3380 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3382 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3383 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3385 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3386 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3387 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3389 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3392 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3393 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3394 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3395 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3396 /// never reach the recipient.
3398 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3399 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3401 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3402 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3404 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3405 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3406 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3407 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3408 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3409 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3410 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3413 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3414 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3416 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3419 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3420 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3421 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3423 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3424 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3425 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3426 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3429 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3430 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3431 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3432 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3433 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3434 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3435 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3436 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3437 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3440 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3443 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3444 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3447 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3448 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3449 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3450 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3451 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3452 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3453 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3454 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3456 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3457 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3458 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3460 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3462 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3463 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3464 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3465 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3466 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3467 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3468 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3469 } else { unreachable!(); });
3471 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3472 Err((chan, err)) => {
3473 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3474 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3476 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3477 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3478 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3484 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3486 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3487 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3492 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3493 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3496 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3497 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3498 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3501 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3502 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3503 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3512 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3513 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3514 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3518 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3520 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3521 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3523 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3524 /// across the p2p network.
3526 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3527 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3529 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3530 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3531 /// keys per-channel).
3533 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3534 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3535 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3537 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3538 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3539 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3541 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3542 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3543 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3544 /// for more details.
3546 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3547 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3548 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3551 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3552 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3554 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3559 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3560 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3561 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3562 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3563 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3564 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3565 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3566 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3570 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3571 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3573 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3577 let mut output_index = None;
3578 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3579 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3580 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3581 if output_index.is_some() {
3582 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3583 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3586 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3589 if output_index.is_none() {
3590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3591 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3594 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3598 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3600 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3601 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3602 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3603 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3605 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3606 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3608 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3609 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3611 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3613 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3614 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3615 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3616 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3617 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3618 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3619 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3620 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3621 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3622 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3623 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3624 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3625 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3631 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3632 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3635 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3636 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3637 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3638 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3642 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3643 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3644 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3645 config.apply(config_update);
3646 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3649 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3650 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3651 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3652 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3653 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3660 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3661 &mut channel.context
3662 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3663 &mut channel.context
3665 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3666 debug_assert!(false);
3667 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3669 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3670 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3673 let mut config = context.config();
3674 config.apply(config_update);
3675 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3676 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3677 context.update_config(&config);
3682 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3684 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3685 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3686 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3687 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3689 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3690 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3692 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3693 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3695 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3697 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3698 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3699 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3700 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3701 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3702 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3703 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3704 pub fn update_channel_config(
3705 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3706 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3707 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3710 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3711 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3713 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3714 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3716 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3717 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3718 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3719 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3720 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3722 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3723 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3724 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3727 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3730 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3731 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3732 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3733 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3734 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3735 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3738 let next_hop_scid = {
3739 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3740 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3741 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3742 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3743 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3744 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3746 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3747 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3748 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3751 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3753 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3754 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3755 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3760 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3761 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3762 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3765 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3766 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3767 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3769 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3771 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3772 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3773 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3774 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3775 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3778 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3779 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3780 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3781 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3782 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3784 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3788 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3789 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3791 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3794 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3795 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3796 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3798 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3799 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3800 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3803 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3804 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3805 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3806 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3807 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3808 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3809 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3810 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3813 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3814 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3815 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3816 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3821 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3823 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3824 /// Will likely generate further events.
3825 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3826 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3828 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3829 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3830 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3832 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3833 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3835 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3836 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3837 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3839 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3840 match forward_info {
3841 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3842 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3843 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3844 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3845 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3848 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3849 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3850 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3852 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3853 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3854 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3855 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3856 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3857 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3858 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3861 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3862 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3864 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3867 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3868 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3874 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3875 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3877 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3881 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3882 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3884 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3888 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3889 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3890 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3891 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3892 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3894 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3895 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3896 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3897 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3898 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3900 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3902 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3903 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3907 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3908 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3909 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3910 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3912 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3913 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3919 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3922 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3925 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3926 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3927 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3928 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3929 // problem, not ours.
3935 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3936 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3938 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3943 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3944 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3945 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3950 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3952 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3956 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3957 match forward_info {
3958 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3959 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3960 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3961 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3962 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3965 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3966 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3967 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3968 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3969 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3970 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3971 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3972 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3973 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3975 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3976 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3977 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3980 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3983 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3985 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3986 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3987 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3988 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3993 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3994 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3996 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3997 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3998 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3999 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4001 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4004 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4006 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4007 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4008 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4017 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4018 match forward_info {
4019 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4020 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4021 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4022 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4023 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4026 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4027 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4028 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4029 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4030 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4031 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4032 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4034 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4035 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4036 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4040 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4041 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4044 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4047 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4048 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4049 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4050 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4051 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4052 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4053 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4054 phantom_shared_secret,
4056 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4057 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4058 // if routing nodes overpay
4059 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4060 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4062 total_value_received: None,
4063 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4066 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4069 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4071 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4072 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4073 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4074 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4075 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4076 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4078 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4079 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4080 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4081 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4082 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4083 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4084 phantom_shared_secret,
4086 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4087 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4089 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4092 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4093 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4094 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4095 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4096 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4099 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4100 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4101 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4102 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4103 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4104 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4106 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4107 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4108 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4110 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4111 .entry(payment_hash)
4112 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4113 .or_insert_with(|| {
4114 committed_to_claimable = true;
4116 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4119 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4120 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4121 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4122 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4124 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4126 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4128 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4129 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4130 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4133 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4135 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4136 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4137 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4138 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4139 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4140 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4141 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4142 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4143 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4144 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4146 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4148 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4149 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4150 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4151 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4152 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4153 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4154 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4155 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4156 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4157 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4158 committed_to_claimable = true;
4160 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4161 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4162 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4163 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4164 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4165 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4166 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4167 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4168 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4169 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4173 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4174 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4175 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4176 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4177 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4179 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4181 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4182 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4184 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4185 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4186 committed_to_claimable = true;
4189 payment_claimable_generated
4193 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4194 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4195 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4196 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4197 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4198 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4199 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4200 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4202 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4203 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4204 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4205 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4206 Ok(result) => result,
4208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4209 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4212 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4213 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4214 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4216 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4217 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4220 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4221 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4222 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4224 check_total_value!(purpose);
4226 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4227 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4228 check_total_value!(purpose);
4232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4233 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4235 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4237 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4238 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4240 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4241 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4243 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4244 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4246 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4247 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4248 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4250 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4251 if payment_claimable_generated {
4252 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4258 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4259 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4267 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4268 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4269 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4270 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4272 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4275 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4277 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4278 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4279 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4281 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4283 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4284 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4285 events.append(&mut new_events);
4288 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4290 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4291 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4292 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4294 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4296 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4297 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4298 if background_events.is_empty() {
4299 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4302 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4304 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4305 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4306 // monitor updating completing.
4307 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4309 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4310 let mut updated_chan = false;
4312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4313 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4316 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4318 updated_chan = true;
4319 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4320 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4327 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4328 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4330 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4331 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4332 // however, ensure that.
4334 log_error!(self.logger,
4335 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4337 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4339 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4341 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4344 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4345 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4347 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4348 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4349 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4350 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4351 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4357 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4360 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4361 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4362 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4363 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4364 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4367 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4368 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4369 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4370 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4372 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4373 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4375 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4376 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4377 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4378 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4381 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4383 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4384 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4388 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4389 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4390 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4391 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4392 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4393 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4394 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4396 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4397 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4400 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4401 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4402 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4403 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4404 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4409 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4410 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4418 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4420 /// This currently includes:
4421 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4422 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4423 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4425 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4426 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4427 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4428 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4430 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4431 /// estimate fetches.
4433 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4434 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4435 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4436 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4437 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4439 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4440 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4442 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4443 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4444 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4446 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4447 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4450 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4451 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4452 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4453 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4458 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4459 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4461 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4462 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4463 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4464 if needs_close { return false; }
4467 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4468 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4469 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4470 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4471 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4472 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4473 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4474 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4476 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4477 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4478 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4479 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4483 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4485 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4488 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4490 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4491 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4492 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4493 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4497 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4499 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4505 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4507 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4508 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4509 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4510 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4511 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4512 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4513 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4514 channel_id: *chan_id,
4515 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4524 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4526 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4527 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4528 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4530 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4531 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4532 log_error!(self.logger,
4533 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4534 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4535 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4536 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4537 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4538 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4539 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4540 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4541 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4542 channel_id: *chan_id,
4543 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4552 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4553 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4554 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4555 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4557 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4558 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4559 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4560 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4561 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4562 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4563 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4564 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4570 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4572 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4573 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4578 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4579 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4580 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4581 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4582 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4583 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4584 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4585 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4586 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4587 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4588 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4590 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4591 // have no channels to the peer.
4592 let remove_entry = {
4593 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4594 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4597 entry.remove_entry();
4600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4605 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4606 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4607 // This should be unreachable
4608 debug_assert!(false);
4611 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4612 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4613 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4614 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4615 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4616 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4617 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4620 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4621 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4622 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4624 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4625 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4632 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4633 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4634 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4635 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4636 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4639 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4640 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4643 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4645 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4646 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4647 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4648 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4649 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4656 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4657 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4658 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4660 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4661 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4662 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4663 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4665 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4666 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4667 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4668 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4669 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4670 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4673 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4674 /// reason for the failure.
4676 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4677 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4680 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4681 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4682 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4683 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4684 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4685 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4691 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4692 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4693 match failure_code {
4694 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4695 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4696 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4697 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4698 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4699 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4701 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4702 let fail_data = match data {
4703 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4706 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4711 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4712 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4714 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4716 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4717 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4718 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4719 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4720 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4721 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4722 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4724 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4726 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4727 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4729 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4734 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4735 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4736 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4737 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4738 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4739 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4740 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4741 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4742 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4743 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4745 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4746 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4747 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4748 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4750 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4751 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4752 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4753 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4754 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4758 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4759 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4760 // be surfaced to the user.
4761 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4762 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4763 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4765 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4767 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4770 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4772 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4776 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4779 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4780 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4781 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4782 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4786 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4787 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4788 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4789 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4790 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4791 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4792 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4793 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4794 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4797 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4798 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4799 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4802 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4803 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4804 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4806 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4807 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4808 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4809 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4810 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4812 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4813 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4814 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4816 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4817 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4818 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4819 push_forward_ev = true;
4821 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4823 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4825 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4826 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4829 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4830 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4831 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4832 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4833 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4834 failed_next_destination: destination,
4840 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4841 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4843 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4844 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4845 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4846 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4848 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4849 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4850 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4851 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4853 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4854 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4855 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4857 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4858 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4859 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4860 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4861 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4862 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4863 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4864 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4865 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4868 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4869 /// even type numbers.
4873 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4874 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4876 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4877 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4878 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4881 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4882 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4887 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4888 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4889 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4890 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4891 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4892 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4893 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4894 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4899 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4900 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4901 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4902 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4903 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4905 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4906 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4907 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4908 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4911 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4912 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4913 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4914 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4915 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4916 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4917 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4918 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4919 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4920 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4930 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4932 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4933 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4934 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4935 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4936 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4937 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4938 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4939 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4940 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4942 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4943 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4944 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4945 debug_assert!(false);
4949 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4951 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4952 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4953 debug_assert!(false);
4957 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4958 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4960 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4961 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4962 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4963 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4966 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4967 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4968 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4969 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4973 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4974 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4975 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4976 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4978 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4979 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4980 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4981 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4982 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4987 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4988 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4989 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4990 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4991 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4992 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4993 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4995 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4998 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4999 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5000 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5001 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5005 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5006 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5007 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5008 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5010 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5011 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5012 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5013 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5016 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5017 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5018 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5019 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5023 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5024 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5025 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5028 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5031 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5032 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5033 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5035 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5036 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5037 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5038 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
5039 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5042 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5043 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5044 if let Err(e) = res {
5045 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5046 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5047 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5048 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5049 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5052 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5053 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5054 // monitor update as a background event.
5055 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5056 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5057 counterparty_node_id,
5058 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5059 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5067 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5068 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5069 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5075 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5076 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5077 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5078 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5079 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5080 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5081 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5082 // again on restart.
5083 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5084 payment_preimage, update_res);
5087 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5088 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5090 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5091 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5092 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5093 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5094 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5095 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5096 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5097 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5098 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5099 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5102 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5103 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5104 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5105 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5106 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5107 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5111 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5112 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5115 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5118 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5119 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5120 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5121 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5122 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5124 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5125 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5128 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5129 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5130 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5131 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5132 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5133 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5134 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5137 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5138 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5140 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5141 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5142 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5143 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5145 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5149 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5150 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5151 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5157 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5158 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5159 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5162 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5163 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5165 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5166 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5167 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5169 payment_purpose: purpose,
5172 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5174 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5178 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5180 sender_intended_total_msat,
5184 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5185 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5187 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5188 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5189 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5196 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5197 /// update completion.
5198 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5199 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5200 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5201 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5202 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5203 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5205 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5206 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5207 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5208 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5209 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5210 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5212 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5214 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5215 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5216 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5217 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5220 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5221 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5223 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5224 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5225 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5230 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5231 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5232 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5233 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5238 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5239 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5240 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5241 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5242 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5247 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5251 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5257 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5258 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5259 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5263 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5264 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5265 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5271 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5272 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5274 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5275 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5277 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5278 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5279 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5280 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5281 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5286 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5287 let mut peer_state_lock;
5288 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5289 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5290 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5291 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5293 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5296 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5297 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5298 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5299 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5300 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5303 let remaining_in_flight =
5304 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5305 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5308 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5309 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5310 remaining_in_flight);
5311 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5314 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5317 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5319 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5320 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5323 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5324 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5325 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5327 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5328 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5329 /// used to accept such channels.
5331 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5332 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5333 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5334 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5337 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5338 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5340 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5341 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5342 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5344 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5345 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5347 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5348 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5350 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5351 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5353 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5354 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5355 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5356 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5359 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5362 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5363 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5364 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5365 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5366 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5367 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5368 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5369 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5371 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5372 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5373 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5375 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5376 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5377 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5378 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5379 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5380 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5381 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5383 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5387 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5388 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5389 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5390 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5391 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5393 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5396 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5397 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5399 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5400 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5401 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5402 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5403 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5404 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5405 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5406 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5409 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5410 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5414 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5415 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5416 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5418 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5419 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5420 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5423 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5428 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5429 /// or 0-conf channels.
5431 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5432 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5433 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5434 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5435 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5436 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5438 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5439 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5440 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5441 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5442 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5443 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5444 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5448 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5451 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5452 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5454 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5455 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5456 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5457 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5458 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5459 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5461 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5464 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5465 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5466 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5469 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5472 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5473 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5477 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5481 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5482 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5483 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5484 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5485 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5488 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5490 debug_assert!(false);
5491 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5496 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5497 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5498 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5499 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5500 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5501 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5503 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5504 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5505 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5508 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5509 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5510 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5511 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5512 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5515 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5516 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5521 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5522 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5523 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5524 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5525 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5526 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5527 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5528 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5529 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5531 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5532 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5533 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5538 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5539 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5540 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5541 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5542 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5543 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5544 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5547 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5552 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5553 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5554 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5556 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5557 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5560 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5561 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5563 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5564 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5565 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5567 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5571 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5572 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5573 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5574 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5576 debug_assert!(false);
5577 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5579 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5580 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5581 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5582 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5583 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5584 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5586 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5589 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5590 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5591 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5592 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5593 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5595 user_channel_id: user_id,
5600 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5601 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5603 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5604 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5606 debug_assert!(false);
5607 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5610 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5611 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5612 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5613 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5614 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5615 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5617 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5618 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5619 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5620 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5621 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5622 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5623 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5624 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5625 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5629 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5632 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5634 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5637 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5639 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5640 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5641 funding_msg.channel_id))
5643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5644 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5648 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5649 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5650 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5651 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5652 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5653 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5654 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5658 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5660 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5661 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5662 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5663 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5665 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5666 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5667 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5668 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5669 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5670 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5671 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5672 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5680 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5681 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5683 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5685 debug_assert!(false);
5686 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5689 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5690 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5691 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5692 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5693 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5694 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5695 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5696 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5697 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5698 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5699 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5700 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5701 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5702 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5711 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5713 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5715 debug_assert!(false);
5716 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5718 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5719 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5720 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5722 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5723 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5724 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5725 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5726 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5727 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5728 msg: announcement_sigs,
5730 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5731 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5732 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5733 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5734 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5735 // announcement_signatures.
5736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5737 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5738 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5739 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5746 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5747 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5756 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5757 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5758 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5760 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5762 debug_assert!(false);
5763 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5767 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5768 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5769 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5770 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5771 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5772 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5773 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5775 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5776 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5777 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5778 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5779 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5781 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5782 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5783 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5784 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5785 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5788 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5789 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5790 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5791 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5793 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5794 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5795 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5796 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5797 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5798 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5803 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5804 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5805 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5806 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5813 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5814 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5815 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5816 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5822 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5824 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5826 debug_assert!(false);
5827 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5829 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5830 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5832 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5834 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5835 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5836 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5837 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5842 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5843 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5844 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5845 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5846 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5847 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5848 } else { (tx, None) }
5850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5853 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5854 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5855 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5857 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5858 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5859 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5861 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5865 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5870 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5871 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5872 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5873 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5875 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5876 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5877 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5878 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5880 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5882 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5884 debug_assert!(false);
5885 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5889 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5892 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5893 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5894 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5895 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5896 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5898 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5899 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5900 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5901 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5902 match pending_forward_info {
5903 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5904 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5905 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5906 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5908 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5909 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5910 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5911 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5912 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5915 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5917 _ => pending_forward_info
5920 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5927 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5929 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5931 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5933 debug_assert!(false);
5934 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5938 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5940 let res = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan);
5941 funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
5944 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5947 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
5951 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5953 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5955 debug_assert!(false);
5956 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5960 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5962 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5964 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5969 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5970 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5971 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5973 debug_assert!(false);
5974 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5976 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5978 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5979 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5980 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5981 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5982 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5984 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5991 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5992 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5993 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5995 debug_assert!(false);
5996 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5998 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5999 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6000 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6002 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6003 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
6004 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6005 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6006 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6014 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6015 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6016 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6017 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6018 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6019 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6020 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6021 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6022 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6023 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6024 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6026 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6027 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6029 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6030 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6031 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6033 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6034 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6036 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6037 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6038 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6040 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6041 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6042 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6044 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6045 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6046 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6047 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6048 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6051 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6052 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6054 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6055 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6056 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6057 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6058 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6059 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6060 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6061 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6062 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6065 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6066 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6067 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6072 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6073 // payments are being processed.
6074 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6075 push_forward_event = true;
6077 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6078 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6085 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6086 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6089 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6090 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6091 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6093 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6097 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6098 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6099 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6100 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6101 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6103 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6104 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6105 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6106 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6107 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6108 // real by taking more time.
6109 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6110 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6111 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6116 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6117 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6118 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6119 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6120 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6121 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6122 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6124 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6125 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6126 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6127 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6128 channel_funding_outpoint,
6129 counterparty_node_id,
6134 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6135 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6136 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6137 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6139 debug_assert!(false);
6140 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6141 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6143 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6145 let funding_txo_opt = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6146 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6147 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6148 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6149 *counterparty_node_id)
6151 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self,
6152 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan);
6153 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6154 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6155 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6156 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6157 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6159 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6164 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6168 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6170 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6172 debug_assert!(false);
6173 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6175 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6176 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6177 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6179 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6186 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6187 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6188 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6190 debug_assert!(false);
6191 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6195 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6197 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6201 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6202 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6203 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6204 msg, &self.default_configuration
6206 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6207 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6208 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6211 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6216 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6217 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6218 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6219 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6221 // It's not a local channel
6222 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6225 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6226 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6227 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6228 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6230 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6231 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6232 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6234 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6235 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6236 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6237 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6238 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6239 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6241 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6243 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6244 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6245 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6246 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6248 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6249 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6254 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6257 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6259 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6262 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6264 debug_assert!(false);
6265 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6267 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6268 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6269 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6271 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6272 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6273 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6274 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6275 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6276 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6277 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6278 let mut channel_update = None;
6279 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6280 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6281 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6284 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6285 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6286 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6287 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6288 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6289 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6290 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6295 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6296 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6297 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6298 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6299 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6300 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6308 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6309 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6312 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6313 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6318 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6319 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6320 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6322 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6323 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6324 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6325 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6326 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6327 match monitor_event {
6328 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6329 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6330 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6331 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6333 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6334 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6335 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6336 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6339 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6340 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6341 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6342 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6344 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6345 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6346 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6347 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6350 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6351 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6352 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6353 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6355 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6356 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6357 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6358 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6359 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6360 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6364 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6365 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6367 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6369 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6370 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6371 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6372 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6373 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6380 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6381 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6387 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6388 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6391 has_pending_monitor_events
6394 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6395 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6396 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6398 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6399 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6400 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6403 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6404 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6405 /// update was applied.
6406 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6407 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6408 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6409 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6411 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6412 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6413 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6414 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6417 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6419 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6420 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6421 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6422 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6423 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6424 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6425 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6426 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6427 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6429 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6430 has_monitor_update = true;
6432 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6433 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6434 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6435 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6437 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6439 continue 'peer_loop;
6448 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6449 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6450 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6453 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6454 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6460 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6461 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6462 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6463 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6464 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6465 let mut has_update = false;
6467 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6469 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6472 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6473 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6474 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6475 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6476 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6478 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6479 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6482 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6483 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6484 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6485 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6486 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6491 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6493 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6494 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6495 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6501 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6502 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6510 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6511 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6517 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6518 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6520 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6521 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6522 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6523 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6524 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6525 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6526 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6527 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6528 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6529 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6530 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6531 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6532 assert!(should_broadcast);
6533 } else { unreachable!(); }
6534 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6535 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6536 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6539 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6543 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6546 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6547 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6549 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6550 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6551 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6552 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6554 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6556 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6557 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6561 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6562 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6564 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6566 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6567 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6569 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6570 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6571 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6572 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6573 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6574 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6575 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6576 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6577 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6578 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6579 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6582 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6583 /// stored external to LDK.
6585 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6586 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6587 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6589 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6590 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6593 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6594 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6595 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6596 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6598 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6599 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6600 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6601 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6602 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6604 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6605 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6606 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6607 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6608 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6610 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6611 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6613 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6614 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6618 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6619 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6621 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6623 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6624 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6626 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6627 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6628 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6629 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6630 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6631 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6632 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6635 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6636 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6638 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6639 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6640 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6643 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6644 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6646 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6647 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6648 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6649 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6651 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6652 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6653 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6654 Some(_) => continue,
6655 None => return scid_candidate
6660 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6662 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6663 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6665 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6666 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6667 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6671 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6672 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6673 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6675 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6676 /// times to get a unique scid.
6677 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6678 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6679 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6681 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6682 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6683 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6684 return scid_candidate
6688 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6689 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6690 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6691 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6694 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6695 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6697 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6698 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6699 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6700 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6709 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6710 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6711 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6712 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6713 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6717 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6718 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6719 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6720 events.push_back((event, None));
6724 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6725 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6726 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6730 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6731 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6735 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6736 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6739 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6740 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6741 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6742 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6743 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6744 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6746 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6747 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6748 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6749 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6751 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6752 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6753 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6754 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6756 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6760 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6761 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6762 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6763 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6764 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6766 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6770 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6771 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6772 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6773 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6774 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6775 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6776 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6778 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6780 if further_update_exists {
6781 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6786 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6787 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6791 log_debug!(self.logger,
6792 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6793 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6797 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6798 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6799 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6803 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6804 for action in actions {
6806 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6807 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6809 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6815 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6816 /// using the given event handler.
6818 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6819 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6823 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6827 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6829 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6830 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6831 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6832 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6833 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6834 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6838 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6839 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6840 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6841 /// is always placed next to each other.
6843 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6844 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6845 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6846 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6848 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6849 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6850 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6851 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6852 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6853 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6854 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6856 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6857 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6858 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6859 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6862 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6863 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6865 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6866 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6869 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6870 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6871 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6874 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6875 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6879 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6880 events.replace(pending_events);
6889 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6891 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6892 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6893 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6894 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6895 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6896 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6900 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6902 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6903 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6904 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6906 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6910 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6912 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6913 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6914 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6915 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6916 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6917 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6921 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6923 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6924 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6925 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6926 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6927 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6930 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6931 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6934 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6935 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6936 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6937 let new_height = height - 1;
6939 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6940 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6941 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6942 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6943 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6944 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6947 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6951 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6953 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6954 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6955 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6956 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6957 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6958 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6962 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6963 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6964 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6965 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6967 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6968 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6971 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6972 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6973 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6975 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6976 if height < last_best_block_height {
6977 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6978 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6982 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6983 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6984 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6985 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6987 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6988 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6991 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6992 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6994 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6996 macro_rules! max_time {
6997 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6999 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7000 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7001 // having an explicit local time source.
7002 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7003 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7004 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7005 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7006 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7012 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7013 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7014 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7015 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7019 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7020 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7021 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7022 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7023 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7024 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
7025 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7026 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7033 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7034 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7035 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7036 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7037 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7038 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7039 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7040 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7041 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7046 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7048 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7050 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7051 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7052 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7053 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7057 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7058 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7060 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7061 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7062 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7063 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7064 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7066 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7067 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7069 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7070 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7071 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7072 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7073 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7074 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7075 let res = f(channel);
7076 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7077 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7078 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7079 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7080 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7082 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7083 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7084 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7085 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7086 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7087 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7088 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7093 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7098 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7099 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7102 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7103 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7104 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7105 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7106 msg: announcement_sigs,
7108 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7109 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7110 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7112 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7113 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7114 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7119 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7120 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7121 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7122 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7123 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7124 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7125 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7126 // is always consistent.
7127 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7128 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7129 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7130 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7131 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7134 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7135 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7136 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7137 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7138 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7139 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7140 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7144 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7145 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7146 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7147 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7148 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7149 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7150 data: reason_message,
7160 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7161 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7162 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7163 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7164 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7165 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7166 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7167 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7168 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7169 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7171 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7172 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7173 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7177 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7180 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7181 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7182 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7183 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7184 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7185 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7186 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7187 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7188 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7189 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7192 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7193 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7194 _ => unreachable!(),
7196 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7197 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7198 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7205 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7207 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7212 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7214 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7215 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7217 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7218 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7221 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7222 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7223 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7226 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7227 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7228 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7229 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7232 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7233 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7234 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7235 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7238 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7239 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7241 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7242 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7243 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7244 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7245 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7248 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7249 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7250 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7251 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7254 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7255 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7256 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7257 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7260 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7261 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7262 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7263 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7267 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7268 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7270 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7271 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7272 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7273 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7274 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7279 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7284 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7285 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7286 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7287 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7290 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7295 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7296 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7297 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7298 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7301 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7303 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7306 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7308 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7311 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7312 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7313 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7316 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7318 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7321 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7322 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7323 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7326 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7327 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7328 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7331 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7332 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7333 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7336 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7337 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7338 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7341 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7343 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7346 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7348 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7351 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7352 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7353 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7356 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7357 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7358 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7361 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7362 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7363 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7366 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7367 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7368 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7369 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7370 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7372 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7377 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7379 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7382 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7383 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7384 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7385 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7387 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7388 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7389 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7392 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7393 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7394 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7395 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7396 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7397 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7402 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7403 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7404 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7407 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7408 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7409 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7412 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7413 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7414 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7415 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7417 // V1 Channel Establishment
7418 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7419 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7420 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7421 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7422 // V2 Channel Establishment
7423 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7424 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7425 // Common Channel Establishment
7426 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7427 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7428 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7429 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7430 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7431 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7432 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7433 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7434 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7435 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7436 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7437 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7438 // Channel Operations
7439 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7440 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7441 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7442 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7443 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7444 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7446 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7447 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7448 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7449 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7450 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7451 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7452 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7453 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7454 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7457 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7458 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7459 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7460 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7463 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7465 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7467 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7468 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7472 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7473 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7474 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7480 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7481 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7482 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7483 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7484 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7485 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7488 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7489 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7491 if inbound_peer_limited {
7494 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7495 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7496 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7497 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7498 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7499 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7500 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7501 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7502 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7503 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7508 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7509 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7511 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7512 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7513 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7514 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7519 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7520 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7525 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7527 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7528 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7529 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7530 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7531 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7533 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7534 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7535 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7536 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7537 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7539 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7540 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7544 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7548 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7551 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7552 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7553 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7554 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7555 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7558 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7559 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7560 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7561 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7562 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7563 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7565 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7566 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7567 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7571 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7573 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7574 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7577 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7578 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7579 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7580 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7588 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7589 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7593 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7594 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7597 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7598 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7601 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7602 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7605 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7606 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7607 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7608 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7611 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7612 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7613 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7614 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7617 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7618 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7619 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7620 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7623 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7624 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7625 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7626 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7629 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7630 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7631 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7632 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7635 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7636 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7637 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7638 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7641 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7642 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7643 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7644 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7647 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7648 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7649 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7650 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7653 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7654 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7655 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7656 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7660 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7661 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7662 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7663 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7664 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7668 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7669 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7671 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7672 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7673 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7674 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7675 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7678 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7679 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7680 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7681 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7684 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7685 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7686 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7687 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7690 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7691 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7692 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7693 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7694 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7695 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7696 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7697 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7698 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7699 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7700 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7701 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7702 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7703 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7704 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7705 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7706 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7707 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7708 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7709 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7714 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7715 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7717 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7718 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7719 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7720 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7723 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7724 (2, node_id, required),
7725 (4, features, required),
7726 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7727 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7728 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7729 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7732 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7733 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7734 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7735 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7736 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7737 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7738 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7739 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7740 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7741 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7742 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7743 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7744 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7745 (7, self.config, option),
7746 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7747 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7748 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7749 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7750 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7751 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7752 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7753 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7754 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7755 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7756 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7757 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7758 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7759 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7760 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7761 (32, self.is_public, required),
7762 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7763 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7764 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7765 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7766 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7772 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7773 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7774 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7775 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7776 (2, channel_id, required),
7777 (3, channel_type, option),
7778 (4, counterparty, required),
7779 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7780 (6, funding_txo, option),
7781 (7, config, option),
7782 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7783 (9, confirmations, option),
7784 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7785 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7786 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7787 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7788 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7789 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7790 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7791 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7792 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7793 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7794 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7795 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7796 (26, is_outbound, required),
7797 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7798 (30, is_usable, required),
7799 (32, is_public, required),
7800 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7801 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7802 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7803 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7804 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7807 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7808 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7809 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7810 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7811 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7813 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7817 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7819 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7820 outbound_scid_alias,
7824 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7825 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7827 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7828 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7829 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7830 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7831 confirmations_required,
7833 force_close_spend_delay,
7834 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7835 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7836 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7837 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7838 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7839 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7840 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7841 channel_shutdown_state,
7846 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7847 (2, channels, required_vec),
7848 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7849 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7852 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7854 (0, onion_packet, required),
7855 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7858 (0, payment_data, required),
7859 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7860 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7861 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7862 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7864 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7865 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7866 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7867 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7868 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7869 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7873 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7874 (0, routing, required),
7875 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7876 (4, payment_hash, required),
7877 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7878 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7879 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7880 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7884 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7885 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7887 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7889 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7890 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7891 reason.write(writer)?;
7893 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7894 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7897 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7898 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7899 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7900 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7907 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7908 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7909 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7912 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7913 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7914 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7915 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7919 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7920 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7921 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7922 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7923 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7926 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7927 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7928 // messages contained in the variants.
7929 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7930 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7931 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7933 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7935 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7936 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7937 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7940 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7941 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7942 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7943 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7944 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7946 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7951 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7956 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7957 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7958 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7959 (2, outpoint, required),
7960 (4, htlc_id, required),
7961 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
7962 (7, user_channel_id, option),
7965 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7966 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7967 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7968 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7969 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7971 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7972 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7973 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7974 (2, self.value, required),
7975 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7976 (4, payment_data, option),
7977 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7978 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7979 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7980 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7986 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7987 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7988 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7989 (0, prev_hop, required),
7990 (1, total_msat, option),
7991 (2, value_ser, required),
7992 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7993 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7994 (5, total_value_received, option),
7995 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7996 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7997 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7999 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8000 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8001 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8003 if payment_data.is_some() {
8004 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8006 if total_msat.is_none() {
8007 total_msat = Some(value);
8009 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8012 if total_msat.is_none() {
8013 if payment_data.is_none() {
8014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8016 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8018 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8022 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8025 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8026 total_value_received,
8027 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8029 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8030 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8035 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8036 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8037 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8040 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8041 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8042 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8043 let mut payment_id = None;
8044 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8045 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8046 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8047 (0, session_priv, required),
8048 (1, payment_id, option),
8049 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8050 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8051 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8052 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8054 if payment_id.is_none() {
8055 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8057 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8059 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8060 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8061 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8063 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8064 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8065 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8066 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8070 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8071 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8072 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8074 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8077 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8078 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8083 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8084 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8086 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8088 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8089 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8090 (0, session_priv, required),
8091 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8092 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8093 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8094 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8095 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8096 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8099 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8101 field.write(writer)?;
8108 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8109 (0, forward_info, required),
8110 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8111 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8112 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8113 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8116 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8118 (0, htlc_id, required),
8119 (2, err_packet, required),
8124 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8125 (0, payment_secret, required),
8126 (2, expiry_time, required),
8127 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8128 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8129 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8132 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8134 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8135 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8136 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8137 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8138 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8139 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8143 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8144 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8146 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8148 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8150 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8151 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8152 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8155 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8158 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8159 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8160 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8163 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8164 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8166 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8167 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8168 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8169 unfunded_channels += 1;
8174 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8176 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8179 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8180 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8181 channel.write(writer)?;
8188 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8189 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8190 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8191 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8192 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8193 for forward in pending_forwards {
8194 forward.write(writer)?;
8199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8201 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8202 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8203 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8205 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8206 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8207 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8208 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8209 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8210 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8211 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8212 htlc.write(writer)?;
8214 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8215 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8218 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8219 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8220 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8221 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8222 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8223 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8224 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8227 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8228 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8229 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8230 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8231 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8233 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8234 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8235 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8236 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8237 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8238 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8239 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8244 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8245 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8246 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8247 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8248 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8249 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8250 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8251 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8252 0u64.write(writer)?;
8254 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8255 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8256 event.write(writer)?;
8260 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8261 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8262 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8263 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8264 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8265 0u64.write(writer)?;
8267 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8268 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8269 // likely to be identical.
8270 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8271 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8273 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8274 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8275 hash.write(writer)?;
8276 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8279 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8280 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8281 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8282 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8283 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8286 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8287 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8289 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8290 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8291 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8292 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8295 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8296 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8300 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8301 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8302 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8304 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8305 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8306 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8312 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8313 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8314 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8315 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8318 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8319 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8320 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8321 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8322 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8325 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8326 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8327 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8328 if !updates.is_empty() {
8329 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8330 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8335 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8336 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8337 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8338 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8339 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8340 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8341 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8342 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8343 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8344 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8345 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8346 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8347 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8354 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8355 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8356 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8357 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8360 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8361 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8362 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8363 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8364 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8365 // check that the event is sane here.
8366 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8367 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8368 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8369 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8375 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8376 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8377 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8378 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8379 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8380 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8383 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8384 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8385 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8386 events.push_back((ev, action));
8387 } else if action.is_some() {
8388 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8395 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8396 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8397 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8398 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8399 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8400 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8403 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8405 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8407 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8408 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8409 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8410 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8411 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8412 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8413 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8414 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8415 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8416 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8417 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8418 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8419 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8421 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8422 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8424 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8425 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8427 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8428 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8429 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8430 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8431 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8432 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8434 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8435 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8437 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8438 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8439 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8440 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8441 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8442 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8446 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8447 pub entropy_source: ES,
8449 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8450 pub node_signer: NS,
8452 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8453 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8455 pub signer_provider: SP,
8457 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8459 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8460 pub fee_estimator: F,
8461 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8463 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8464 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8465 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8466 pub chain_monitor: M,
8468 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8469 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8470 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8471 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8472 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8473 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8475 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8477 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8478 /// deserialization.
8480 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8481 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8482 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8484 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8485 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8487 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8488 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8489 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8490 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8492 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8495 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8496 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8499 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8500 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8502 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8503 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8504 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8505 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8506 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8507 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8511 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8512 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8513 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8514 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8515 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8517 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8518 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8523 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8524 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8525 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8526 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8528 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8529 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8530 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8531 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8532 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8533 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8537 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8538 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8539 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8543 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8544 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8546 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8547 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8548 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8549 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8550 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8551 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8555 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8556 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8558 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8559 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8560 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8562 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8564 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8565 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8566 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8567 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8568 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8569 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8570 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8571 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8572 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8573 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8575 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8576 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8577 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8578 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8579 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8580 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8581 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8582 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8583 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8584 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8585 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8586 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8587 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8588 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8589 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8590 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8593 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8594 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8595 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8596 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8597 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8598 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8599 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8601 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8602 let mut found_htlc = false;
8603 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8604 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8607 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8608 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8609 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8610 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8611 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8612 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8613 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8614 log_info!(args.logger,
8615 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8616 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8617 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8621 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8622 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8623 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8624 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8625 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8627 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8628 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8630 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8632 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8633 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8636 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8637 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8638 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8642 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8643 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8644 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8645 // safely discard the channel.
8646 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8647 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8648 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8649 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8650 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8651 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8652 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8655 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8656 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8657 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8658 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8659 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8660 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8664 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8665 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8666 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8667 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8668 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8669 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8670 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8672 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8676 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8677 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8678 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8679 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8680 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8681 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8682 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8683 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8684 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8686 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8689 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8690 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8691 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8692 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8693 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8694 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8695 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8696 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8698 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8701 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8704 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8705 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8706 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8707 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8708 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8709 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8710 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8711 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8712 is_connected: false,
8716 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8717 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
8718 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8719 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8720 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8721 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8722 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8723 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8726 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8727 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8728 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8729 for _ in 0..event_count {
8730 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8731 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8736 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8737 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8738 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8740 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8741 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8742 // on-startup monitor updates.
8743 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8744 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8746 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8750 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8751 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8753 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8754 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8755 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8756 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8757 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8761 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8762 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8763 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8764 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8765 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8766 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8767 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8769 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8770 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8774 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8775 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8776 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8777 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8778 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8779 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8780 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8781 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8782 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8783 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8784 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8785 let mut events_override = None;
8786 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8787 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8788 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8789 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8790 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8791 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8792 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8793 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8794 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8795 (8, events_override, option),
8796 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8797 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8798 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8799 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8801 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8802 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8805 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8806 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8809 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8810 pending_events_read = events;
8813 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8814 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8817 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8818 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8819 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8820 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8821 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8822 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8824 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8826 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8827 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8828 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8831 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8832 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8833 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8834 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8835 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8837 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8838 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8839 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8841 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8842 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8843 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8844 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8845 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8847 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8848 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8849 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8850 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8851 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8852 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8853 pending_background_events.push(
8854 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8855 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8856 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8857 update: update.clone(),
8860 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8861 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8862 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8863 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8864 pending_background_events.push(
8865 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8866 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8867 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8870 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8871 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8872 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8874 max_in_flight_update_id
8878 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8881 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8882 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8884 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8885 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8886 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8887 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8888 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8889 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8890 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8891 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8892 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8895 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8896 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8897 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8898 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8899 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8900 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8901 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8902 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8903 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8904 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8910 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8911 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8912 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8913 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8914 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8915 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8916 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8917 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8919 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8920 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8921 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8923 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8924 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8925 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8926 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8927 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8928 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8929 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8930 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8935 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8936 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8938 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8939 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8940 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8941 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8944 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8945 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8946 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8947 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8948 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8949 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8950 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8952 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8953 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8954 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8955 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8956 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8957 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8958 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8959 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8962 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8963 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8964 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8965 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8967 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8968 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8969 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8972 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8973 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8974 retry_strategy: None,
8975 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8976 payment_params: None,
8977 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8978 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8979 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8980 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8981 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8982 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8983 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8984 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8985 total_msat: path_amt,
8986 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8988 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8989 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8994 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8996 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8997 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8998 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8999 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9001 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9002 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9003 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9004 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9005 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9006 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9007 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9008 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9009 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9010 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9011 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9016 !forwards.is_empty()
9018 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9019 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9020 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9021 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9022 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9023 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9024 intercepted_id != ev_id
9031 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9032 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9033 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9034 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9035 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9036 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9037 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9038 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9039 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9040 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9041 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9043 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9044 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9045 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9047 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9048 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9049 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9056 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9057 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9059 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9061 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9062 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9063 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9064 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9065 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9066 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9067 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9068 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9069 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9072 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9073 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9074 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9075 // channel still live case here.
9079 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9080 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9085 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9086 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9087 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9088 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9089 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9090 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9091 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9092 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9096 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9097 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9099 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9100 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9101 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9102 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9104 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9105 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9106 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9108 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9109 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9111 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9112 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9114 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9117 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9118 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9119 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9121 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9125 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9126 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9127 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9128 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9129 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9131 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9132 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9133 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9134 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9135 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9136 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9137 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9138 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9140 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9145 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9147 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9149 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9150 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9152 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9153 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9158 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9159 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9161 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9163 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9165 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9166 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9167 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9168 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9172 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9173 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9174 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9175 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9176 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9177 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9178 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9180 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9181 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9182 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9184 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9185 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9186 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9187 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9188 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9189 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9191 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9192 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9193 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9194 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9195 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9196 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9202 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9204 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9205 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9206 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9207 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9208 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9209 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9210 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9211 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9212 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9213 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9214 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9216 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9217 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9219 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9220 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9221 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9222 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9224 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9225 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9226 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9227 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9229 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9230 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9231 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9232 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9234 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9235 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9236 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9237 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9238 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9239 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9240 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9243 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9244 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9247 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9250 purpose: payment.purpose,
9251 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9252 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9253 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9259 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9260 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9261 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9262 for action in actions.iter() {
9263 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9264 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9265 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9267 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9268 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9269 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9270 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9272 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9273 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9274 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9275 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9281 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9283 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9288 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9290 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9291 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9292 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9293 router: args.router,
9295 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9297 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9298 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9299 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9300 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9302 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9303 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9304 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9305 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9306 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9307 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9309 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9314 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9316 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9318 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9319 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9320 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9321 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9322 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9323 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9325 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9326 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9327 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9329 logger: args.logger,
9330 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9333 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9334 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9335 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9336 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9337 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9340 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9341 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9342 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9343 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9344 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9345 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9348 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9349 //connection or two.
9351 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9357 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9358 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9359 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9360 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9361 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9362 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9363 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9364 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9365 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9366 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9367 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9368 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9369 use crate::util::test_utils;
9370 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9371 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9374 fn test_notify_limits() {
9375 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9376 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9380 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9382 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9383 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9384 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9385 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9386 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9388 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9390 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9391 // to connect messages with new values
9392 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9393 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9394 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9395 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9396 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9397 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9399 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9400 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9401 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9402 // ... but the last node should not.
9403 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9404 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9405 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9406 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9408 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9409 // about the channel.
9410 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9411 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9412 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9414 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9416 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9417 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9418 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9419 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9420 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9421 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9423 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9424 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9425 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9427 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9428 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9429 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9430 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9431 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9432 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9434 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9435 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9436 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9437 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9438 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9439 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9441 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9443 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9444 // the channel info has updated.
9445 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9446 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9447 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9448 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9449 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9450 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9454 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9455 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9461 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9463 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9464 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9465 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9466 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9468 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9469 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9470 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9471 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9472 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9473 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9474 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9475 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9477 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9478 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9479 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9481 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9482 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9483 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9485 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9487 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9488 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9491 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9492 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9493 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9495 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9496 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9497 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9498 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9499 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9500 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9501 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9502 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9503 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9505 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9506 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9507 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9509 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9511 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9513 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9514 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9515 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9516 // lightning messages manually.
9517 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9518 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9521 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9522 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9523 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9524 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9526 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9527 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9529 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9530 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9532 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9533 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9534 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9536 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9537 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9538 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9540 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9542 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9544 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9545 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9548 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9549 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9550 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9553 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9554 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9555 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9556 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9561 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9562 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9563 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9564 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9571 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9572 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9573 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9576 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9577 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9578 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9579 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9580 // fails as expected.
9581 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9582 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9583 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9584 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9585 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9586 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9589 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9590 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9593 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9594 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9595 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9597 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9598 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9599 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9601 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9602 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9603 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9604 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9606 let route = find_route(
9607 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9608 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9610 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9611 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9613 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9615 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9616 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9619 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9620 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9621 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9622 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9623 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9625 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9626 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9627 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9628 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9629 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9630 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9631 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9632 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9633 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9635 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9636 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9638 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9639 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9640 let route = find_route(
9641 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9642 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9644 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9645 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9647 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9649 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9650 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9651 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9653 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9654 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9655 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9656 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9658 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9659 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9660 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9661 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9665 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9666 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9668 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9669 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9670 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9671 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9672 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9673 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9674 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9675 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9676 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9678 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9679 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9681 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9682 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9683 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9684 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9686 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9687 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9688 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9689 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9690 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9692 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9693 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9694 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9695 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9697 let route = find_route(
9698 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9699 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9701 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9702 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9703 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9705 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9707 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9708 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9711 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9712 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9713 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9715 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9716 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9717 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9718 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9719 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9720 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9721 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9722 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9723 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9725 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9726 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9730 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9731 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9732 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9733 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9734 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9735 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9736 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9738 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9739 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9741 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9742 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9743 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9744 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9746 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9747 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9748 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9749 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9750 let route = find_route(
9751 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9752 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9755 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9756 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9757 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9758 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9759 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9760 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9763 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9764 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9765 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9766 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9767 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9768 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9769 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9771 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9775 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9776 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9777 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9778 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9779 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9783 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9785 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9786 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9788 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9789 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9790 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9791 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9793 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9794 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9795 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9796 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9797 let route = find_route(
9798 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9799 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9802 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9803 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9804 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9805 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9806 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9807 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9808 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9809 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9812 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9813 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9814 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9815 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9816 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9817 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9818 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9820 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9824 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9828 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9830 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9831 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9832 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9833 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9835 // Marshall an MPP route.
9836 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9837 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9838 route.paths.push(path);
9839 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9840 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9841 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9842 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9843 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9844 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9846 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9847 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9849 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9850 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9852 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9857 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9863 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9865 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9866 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9868 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9869 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9871 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9874 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9875 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9876 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9877 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9878 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9879 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9882 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9885 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9886 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9891 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9892 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9893 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9894 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9895 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9896 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9898 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9899 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9901 total_msat: 100_000,
9904 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9905 // payment verification fails as expected.
9906 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9907 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9908 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9909 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9911 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9915 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9916 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9920 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9921 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9922 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9923 // the channel is successfully closed.
9924 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9925 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9927 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9929 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9930 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9931 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9932 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9933 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9935 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9936 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9938 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9939 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9940 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9941 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9944 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9946 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9947 // as it has the funding transaction.
9948 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9949 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9950 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9953 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9955 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9957 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9959 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9960 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9961 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9963 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9966 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9967 // as it has the funding transaction.
9968 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9969 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9970 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9973 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9974 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9976 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9977 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9978 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9979 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9981 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9982 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9983 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9984 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9986 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9987 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9989 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9990 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9991 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9992 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9993 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9994 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9995 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9999 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10000 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10001 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10002 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10003 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10004 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10005 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10008 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10010 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10011 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10012 // closing transaction).
10013 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10014 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10015 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10017 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10018 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10019 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10020 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10021 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10024 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10026 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10028 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10029 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10030 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10032 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10034 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10035 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10038 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10039 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10040 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10043 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10044 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10045 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10048 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10050 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10051 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10053 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10054 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10056 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10057 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10062 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10063 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10064 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10065 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10066 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10067 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10068 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10072 let channel_id = [4; 32];
10073 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10074 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10076 // Test the API functions.
10077 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10079 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10081 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10083 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10085 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10087 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10089 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10093 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10094 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10098 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10100 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10102 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10103 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10105 let mut funding_tx = None;
10106 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10107 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10108 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10111 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10112 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10113 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10114 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10115 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10117 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10119 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10121 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10123 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10125 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10127 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10130 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10131 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10132 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10133 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10134 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10136 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10137 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10139 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10140 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10141 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10142 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10143 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10144 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10145 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10148 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10149 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10150 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10151 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10152 }, true).unwrap_err();
10154 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10155 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10156 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10157 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10158 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10159 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10160 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10162 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10163 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10165 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10166 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10167 }, true).unwrap_err();
10169 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10170 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10171 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10172 }, false).unwrap();
10173 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10175 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10176 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10178 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10179 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10180 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10181 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10182 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10184 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10185 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10186 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10188 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10189 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10190 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10192 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10193 // "protected" and can connect again.
10194 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10195 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10196 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10198 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10200 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10202 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10203 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10207 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10208 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10212 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10214 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10216 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10217 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10219 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10220 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10221 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10222 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10225 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10227 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10228 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10229 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10231 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10232 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10233 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10235 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10236 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10237 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10238 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10242 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10243 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10244 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10246 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10247 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10248 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10249 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10250 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10252 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10254 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10255 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10257 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10258 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10259 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10260 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10261 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10262 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10265 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10266 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10268 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10269 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10273 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10274 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10277 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10278 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10279 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10280 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10281 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10283 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10284 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10286 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10287 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10288 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10289 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10295 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10296 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10298 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10299 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10300 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10302 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10303 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10307 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10311 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10312 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10313 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10314 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10315 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10316 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10317 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10318 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10320 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10321 payment_metadata: None,
10322 keysend_preimage: None,
10323 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10324 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10326 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10328 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10329 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10330 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10331 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10332 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10334 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10335 } else { panic!(); }
10337 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10338 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10340 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10341 payment_metadata: None,
10342 keysend_preimage: None,
10343 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10344 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10346 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10348 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10349 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10353 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10354 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10355 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10356 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10357 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10359 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10360 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10362 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10363 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10365 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10366 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10368 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10369 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10371 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10372 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10373 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10374 match &msg_events[0] {
10375 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10376 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10378 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10379 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10380 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10386 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10387 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10389 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10390 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10393 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10397 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10398 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10399 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10400 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10403 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10404 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10405 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10406 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10407 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10409 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10410 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10411 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10413 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10414 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10416 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10417 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10422 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10423 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10425 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10426 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10428 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10429 // not have generated any events.
10430 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10434 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10435 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10436 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10437 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10438 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10440 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10441 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10443 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10444 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10447 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10448 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10449 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10450 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10451 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10453 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10454 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10457 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10458 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10461 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10462 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10463 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10464 ..Default::default()
10466 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10467 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10468 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10470 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10471 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10474 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10475 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10476 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10477 ..Default::default()
10479 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10480 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10481 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10484 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10485 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10488 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10489 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10490 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10491 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10492 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10495 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10496 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10497 ..Default::default()
10499 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10502 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10503 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10504 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10505 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10511 use crate::chain::Listen;
10512 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10513 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10514 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10515 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10516 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10517 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10518 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10519 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10520 use crate::util::test_utils;
10521 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10523 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10524 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10525 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10527 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10529 use criterion::Criterion;
10531 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10532 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10533 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10534 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10535 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10536 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10537 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10539 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10540 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10542 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10543 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10545 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10547 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10550 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10551 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10554 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10555 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10556 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10558 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10559 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10561 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10562 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10563 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10564 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10565 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10567 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10568 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10569 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10571 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10572 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10573 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10574 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10576 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10577 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10578 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10580 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10581 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10582 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10583 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10584 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10586 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10587 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10588 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10590 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10591 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10593 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10594 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10595 }, false).unwrap();
10596 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10597 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10598 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10601 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10602 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10603 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10605 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10606 } else { panic!(); }
10608 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10609 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10610 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10611 match events_b[0] {
10612 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10613 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10618 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10619 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10620 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10621 match events_a[0] {
10622 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10623 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10628 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10630 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10631 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10632 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10634 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10635 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10636 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10637 match msg_events[0] {
10638 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10639 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10640 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10644 match msg_events[1] {
10645 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10649 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10650 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10651 match events_a[0] {
10652 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10653 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10658 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10659 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10660 match events_b[0] {
10661 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10662 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10667 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10668 macro_rules! send_payment {
10669 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10670 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10671 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10672 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10673 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10674 payment_count += 1;
10675 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10676 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10678 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10679 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10680 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10681 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10682 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10683 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10684 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10685 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10686 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10687 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10688 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10690 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10691 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10692 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10693 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10695 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10696 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10697 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10698 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10699 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10701 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10704 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10705 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10706 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10707 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10709 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10713 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10714 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10715 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);