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Send peers error messages for failures due to invalid batch funding
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::msgs;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 #[cfg(test)]
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 use {
80         crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
81         crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
82         crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
83         crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
84         crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 };
86 #[cfg(c_bindings)]
87 use {
88         crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
89         crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 };
91
92 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
93
94 use crate::io;
95 use crate::prelude::*;
96 use core::{cmp, mem};
97 use core::cell::RefCell;
98 use crate::io::Read;
99 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
100 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
101 use core::time::Duration;
102 use core::ops::Deref;
103
104 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
105 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
106 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
107
108 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
109 //
110 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
111 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
112 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
113 //
114 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
115 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
116 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
117 // before we forward it.
118 //
119 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
120 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
121 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
122 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
123 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
124
125 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
128 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
129         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
130         Forward {
131                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
132                 /// do with the HTLC.
133                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
134                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
135                 ///
136                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
137                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
138                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
139                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
140                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
141                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
142         },
143         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
144         ///
145         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
146         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
147         Receive {
148                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
149                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
150                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
151                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
152                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
153                 ///
154                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
157                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
158                 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
159                 /// blinded path was not used.
160                 ///
161                 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
162                 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
163                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
164                 ///
165                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
166                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
167                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
168                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
169                 /// instructions.
170                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
171                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
172                 ///
173                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
174                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
175                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
176                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
177                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
178                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
179         },
180         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
181         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
182         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
183         ReceiveKeysend {
184                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
185                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
186                 ///
187                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
188                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
189                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
191                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
192                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
193                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
194                 ///
195                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
196                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
197                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
198                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
199                 ///
200                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
201                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
202                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
203                 ///
204                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
205                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
206                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
207                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
208                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
209         },
210 }
211
212 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
213 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
214 pub struct BlindedForward {
215         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
216         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
217         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
218         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
219         /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
220         /// the introduction node.
221         pub failure: BlindedFailure,
222 }
223
224 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
225         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
226         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
227                 match self {
228                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
229                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
230                         Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
231                         _ => None,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
237 /// should go next.
238 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
239 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
240 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
241         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
242         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
243         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
244         ///
245         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
246         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
247         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
248         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
250         ///
251         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
252         /// versions.
253         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
254         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
255         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
256         ///
257         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
258         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
259         /// it along another path).
260         ///
261         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
262         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
263         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
264         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
265         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
266         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
267         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
268         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
269         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
270         ///
271         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
272         /// HTLC.
273         ///
274         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
275         ///
276         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
277         /// shoulder them.
278         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
279 }
280
281 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
282 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
283         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
284         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
285 }
286
287 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
288 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
289 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
290         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
291         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
292 }
293
294 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
295 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
296         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
297
298         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
299         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
300         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
301         // HTLCs.
302         //
303         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
304         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
305         prev_htlc_id: u64,
306         prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
307         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
308         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
309 }
310
311 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
312 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
313         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
314         FailHTLC {
315                 htlc_id: u64,
316                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317         },
318         FailMalformedHTLC {
319                 htlc_id: u64,
320                 failure_code: u16,
321                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
322         },
323 }
324
325 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
326 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
327 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
328 pub enum BlindedFailure {
329         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
330         /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
331         FromIntroductionNode,
332         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
333         /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334         FromBlindedNode,
335 }
336
337 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
338 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
340         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
341         short_channel_id: u64,
342         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
343         htlc_id: u64,
344         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
345         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
346         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
347         channel_id: ChannelId,
348
349         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
350         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351         outpoint: OutPoint,
352 }
353
354 enum OnionPayload {
355         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
356         Invoice {
357                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
358                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
359                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
360         },
361         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
362         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
363 }
364
365 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
366 struct ClaimableHTLC {
367         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
368         cltv_expiry: u32,
369         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
370         value: u64,
371         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
372         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
373         sender_intended_value: u64,
374         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
375         timer_ticks: u8,
376         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
377         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
378         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
379         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
380         total_msat: u64,
381         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
382         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
383 }
384
385 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
386         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
387                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
388                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
389                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
390                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
391                         value_msat: val.value,
392                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393                 }
394         }
395 }
396
397 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
398 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
399 ///
400 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
401 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
402 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
403
404 impl PaymentId {
405         /// Number of bytes in the id.
406         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
407 }
408
409 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
410         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411                 self.0.write(w)
412         }
413 }
414
415 impl Readable for PaymentId {
416         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
417                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
419         }
420 }
421
422 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
423         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
424                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
425         }
426 }
427
428 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
429 ///
430 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
431 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
432 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
433
434 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
435         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436                 self.0.write(w)
437         }
438 }
439
440 impl Readable for InterceptId {
441         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
442                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
444         }
445 }
446
447 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
448 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
449 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
450         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
451         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
452 }
453 impl SentHTLCId {
454         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
455                 match source {
456                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
457                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
458                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
459                         },
460                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
461                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
462                 }
463         }
464 }
465 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
466         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
467                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
468                 (2, htlc_id, required),
469         },
470         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
471                 (0, session_priv, required),
472         };
473 );
474
475
476 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
477 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
478 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
479 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
480         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
481         OutboundRoute {
482                 path: Path,
483                 session_priv: SecretKey,
484                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
485                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
486                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
487                 payment_id: PaymentId,
488         },
489 }
490 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
491 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
492         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
493                 match self {
494                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
495                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
496                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
497                         },
498                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
499                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
500                                 path.hash(hasher);
501                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
502                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
503                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
504                         },
505                 }
506         }
507 }
508 impl HTLCSource {
509         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
510         #[cfg(test)]
511         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
512                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
513                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
514                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
515                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
516                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
517                 }
518         }
519
520         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
521         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
522         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
523         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
524                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
525                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
526                 } else {
527                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
528                         true
529                 }
530         }
531 }
532
533 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
534 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
535 ///
536 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
537 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
538 pub enum FailureCode {
539         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
540         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
541         TemporaryNodeFailure,
542         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
543         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
544         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
545         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
546         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
547         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
548         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
549         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
550         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
551         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
552         ///
553         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
554         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
555         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
556 }
557
558 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
559     fn into(self) -> u16 {
560                 match self {
561                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
562                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
563                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
564                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565                 }
566         }
567 }
568
569 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
570 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
571 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
572 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
573 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
574
575 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
576         err: msgs::LightningError,
577         closes_channel: bool,
578         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
579 }
580 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
581         #[inline]
582         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
583                 Self {
584                         err: LightningError {
585                                 err: err.clone(),
586                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
587                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
588                                                 channel_id,
589                                                 data: err
590                                         },
591                                 },
592                         },
593                         closes_channel: false,
594                         shutdown_finish: None,
595                 }
596         }
597         #[inline]
598         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
599                 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
600         }
601         #[inline]
602         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
603                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
604                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
605                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
606                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
607                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
608                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
609                 } else {
610                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
611                 };
612                 Self {
613                         err: LightningError { err, action },
614                         closes_channel: true,
615                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
616                 }
617         }
618         #[inline]
619         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
620                 Self {
621                         err: match err {
622                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
623                                         err: msg.clone(),
624                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
625                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
626                                                         channel_id,
627                                                         data: msg
628                                                 },
629                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
630                                         },
631                                 },
632                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
633                                         err: msg,
634                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
635                                 },
636                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
637                                         err: msg.clone(),
638                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
639                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
640                                                         channel_id,
641                                                         data: msg
642                                                 },
643                                         },
644                                 },
645                         },
646                         closes_channel: false,
647                         shutdown_finish: None,
648                 }
649         }
650
651         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652                 self.closes_channel
653         }
654 }
655
656 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
657 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
658 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
659 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
660 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
661
662 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
663 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
664 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
665 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
666 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
667 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
668         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
669         CommitmentFirst,
670         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
671         RevokeAndACKFirst,
672 }
673
674 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
675 struct ClaimingPayment {
676         amount_msat: u64,
677         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
678         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
679         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
680         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
681 }
682 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
683         (0, amount_msat, required),
684         (2, payment_purpose, required),
685         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
686         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
687         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
688 });
689
690 struct ClaimablePayment {
691         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
692         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
693         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
694 }
695
696 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
697 struct ClaimablePayments {
698         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
699         /// failed/claimed by the user.
700         ///
701         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
702         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
703         ///
704         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
705         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
706         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
707
708         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
709         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
710         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
711         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
712 }
713
714 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
715 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
716 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
717 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
718 #[derive(Debug)]
719 enum BackgroundEvent {
720         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
721         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
722         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
723         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
724         ///
725         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
726         /// are regenerated on startup.
727         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
728         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
729         /// channel to continue normal operation.
730         ///
731         /// In general this should be used rather than
732         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
733         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
734         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
735         ///
736         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
737         /// are regenerated on startup.
738         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
739                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
740                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
741                 channel_id: ChannelId,
742                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
743         },
744         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
745         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
746         /// on a channel.
747         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
748                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
749                 channel_id: ChannelId,
750         },
751 }
752
753 #[derive(Debug)]
754 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
755         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
756         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
757         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
758         /// event can be generated.
759         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
760         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
761         /// operation of another channel.
762         ///
763         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
764         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
765         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
766         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
767         /// outbound edge.
768         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
769                 event: events::Event,
770                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
771         },
772         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
773         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
774         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
775         ///
776         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
777         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
778         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
779         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
780         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
781         ///
782         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
783         /// stored for later processing.
784         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
785                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
786                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
787                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
788                 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
789         },
790 }
791
792 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
793         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
794         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
795         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
796         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
797                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
798                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
799                 (4, blocking_action, required),
800                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
801                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
802                 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
803         },
804         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
805                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
806                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
807                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
808                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
809                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
810                 // downgrades to prior versions.
811                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
812         },
813 );
814
815 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
816 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
817         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
818                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
819                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
820                 channel_id: ChannelId,
821         },
822 }
823 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
824         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
825                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
826                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
827                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
828                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
829                 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
830         };
831 );
832
833 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
834 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
835 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
836 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
837         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
838         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
839         /// durably to disk.
840         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
841                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
842                 channel_id: ChannelId,
843                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844                 htlc_id: u64,
845         },
846 }
847
848 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
849         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
850                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
851                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
852                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853                 }
854         }
855 }
856
857 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
858         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
859 ;);
860
861
862 /// State we hold per-peer.
863 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
864         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
865         ///
866         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
867         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
868         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
869         ///
870         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
871         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
872         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
873         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
874         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
875         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
876         latest_features: InitFeatures,
877         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
878         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
879         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
880         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
881         /// user but which have not yet completed.
882         ///
883         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
884         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
885         /// for a missing channel.
886         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
887         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
888         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
889         ///
890         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
891         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
892         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
893         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
894         ///
895         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
896         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
897         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
898         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
899         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
900         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
901         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
902         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
903         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
904         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
905         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
906         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
907         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
908         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
909         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
910         pub is_connected: bool,
911 }
912
913 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
914         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
915         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
916         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
917         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
918                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
919                         return false
920                 }
921                 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
922                         match phase {
923                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
924                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
925                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
926                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
927                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
928                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
929                         }
930                 )
931                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
932                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
933         }
934
935         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
936         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
937                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
938         }
939
940         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
941         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
942                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
943                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
944         }
945 }
946
947 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
948 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
949 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
950         /// The original OpenChannel message.
951         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
952         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
953         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
954 }
955
956 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
957 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
958 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
959
960 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
961 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
962 ///
963 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
964 /// here.
965 ///
966 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
967 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
968 struct PendingInboundPayment {
969         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
970         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
971         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
972         /// this payment being removed.
973         expiry_time: u64,
974         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
975         user_payment_id: u64,
976         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
977         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
978         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
979 }
980
981 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
982 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
983 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
984 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
985 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
986 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
987 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
988 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
989 ///
990 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
991 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
992 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
993         Arc<M>,
994         Arc<T>,
995         Arc<KeysManager>,
996         Arc<KeysManager>,
997         Arc<KeysManager>,
998         Arc<F>,
999         Arc<DefaultRouter<
1000                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1001                 Arc<L>,
1002                 Arc<KeysManager>,
1003                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1004                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1005                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006         >>,
1007         Arc<L>
1008 >;
1009
1010 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1011 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1012 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1013 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1014 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1015 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1016 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1017 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1018 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1019 ///
1020 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1021 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1022 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1023         ChannelManager<
1024                 &'a M,
1025                 &'b T,
1026                 &'c KeysManager,
1027                 &'c KeysManager,
1028                 &'c KeysManager,
1029                 &'d F,
1030                 &'e DefaultRouter<
1031                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1032                         &'g L,
1033                         &'c KeysManager,
1034                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1035                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1036                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037                 >,
1038                 &'g L
1039         >;
1040
1041 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1042 ///
1043 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1044 /// languages.
1045 pub trait AChannelManager {
1046         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1047         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1048         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1049         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1050         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1051         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1052         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1053         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1054         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1055         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1056         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1057         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1058         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1059         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1060         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1061         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1062         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1063         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1064         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1065         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1066         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1067         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1068         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1069         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1070         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1071         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1072         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1073         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1074         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1075         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1076         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1077         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1078         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1079         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1080         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1081         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1082 }
1083
1084 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1085 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1086 where
1087         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1088         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1089         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1090         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1091         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1092         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1093         R::Target: Router,
1094         L::Target: Logger,
1095 {
1096         type Watch = M::Target;
1097         type M = M;
1098         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1099         type T = T;
1100         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1101         type ES = ES;
1102         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1103         type NS = NS;
1104         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1105         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1106         type SP = SP;
1107         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1108         type F = F;
1109         type Router = R::Target;
1110         type R = R;
1111         type Logger = L::Target;
1112         type L = L;
1113         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1114 }
1115
1116 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1117 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1118 ///
1119 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1120 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1121 ///   channel
1122 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1123 ///   closing channels
1124 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1125 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1126 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1127 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1128 ///   timely manner
1129 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1130 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1131 ///
1132 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1133 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1134 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1135 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1136 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1137 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1138 ///
1139 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1140 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1141 ///
1142 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1143 ///
1144 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1145 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1146 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1147 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1148 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1149 ///
1150 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1151 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1152 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1153 ///
1154 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1155 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1156 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1157 ///
1158 /// # Initialization
1159 ///
1160 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1161 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1162 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1163 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1164 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1165 ///
1166 /// ```
1167 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1168 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1169 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1170 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1171 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1172 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1173 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1174 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1175 ///
1176 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1177 /// # fn example<
1178 /// #     'a,
1179 /// #     L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1180 /// #     ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1181 /// #     S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1182 /// #     SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1183 /// #     SP: Sized,
1184 /// #     R: lightning::io::Read,
1185 /// # >(
1186 /// #     fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1187 /// #     chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1188 /// #     tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1189 /// #     router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1190 /// #     logger: &L,
1191 /// #     entropy_source: &ES,
1192 /// #     node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1193 /// #     signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1194 /// #     best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1195 /// #     current_timestamp: u32,
1196 /// #     mut reader: R,
1197 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1198 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1199 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1200 ///     network: Network::Bitcoin,
1201 ///     best_block,
1202 /// };
1203 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1204 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1205 ///     fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1206 ///     signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1207 /// );
1208 ///
1209 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1210 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1211 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1212 ///     entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1213 ///     router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1214 /// );
1215 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1216 ///     <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1217 ///
1218 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1219 /// // ...
1220 ///
1221 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1222 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1223 ///     chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1224 /// }
1225 /// # Ok(())
1226 /// # }
1227 /// ```
1228 ///
1229 /// # Operation
1230 ///
1231 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1232 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1233 ///   called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1234 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1235 ///   (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1236 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1237 ///   as documented by those traits
1238 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1239 ///   every minute
1240 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1241 ///   [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1242 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1243 ///
1244 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1245 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1246 ///
1247 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1248 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1249 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1250 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1251 ///
1252 /// # Channels
1253 ///
1254 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1255 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1256 /// currently open channels.
1257 ///
1258 /// ```
1259 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1260 /// #
1261 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1262 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1263 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1264 /// for details in channels {
1265 ///     println!("{:?}", details);
1266 /// }
1267 /// # }
1268 /// ```
1269 ///
1270 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1271 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1272 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1273 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1274 ///
1275 /// ## Opening Channels
1276 ///
1277 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1278 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1279 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1280 ///
1281 /// ```
1282 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1283 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1284 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1285 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1286 /// #
1287 /// # trait Wallet {
1288 /// #     fn create_funding_transaction(
1289 /// #         &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1290 /// #     ) -> Transaction;
1291 /// # }
1292 /// #
1293 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1294 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1295 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1296 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1297 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1298 ///     Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1299 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1300 /// }
1301 ///
1302 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1303 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1304 ///     Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1305 ///         temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1306 ///         user_channel_id, ..
1307 ///     } => {
1308 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1309 ///         let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1310 ///             channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1311 ///         );
1312 ///         match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1313 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1314 ///         ) {
1315 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1316 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1317 ///         }
1318 ///     },
1319 ///     Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1320 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1321 ///         println!(
1322 ///             "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1323 ///             former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1324 ///         );
1325 ///     },
1326 ///     Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1327 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1328 ///         println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1329 ///     },
1330 ///     // ...
1331 /// #     _ => {},
1332 /// });
1333 /// # }
1334 /// ```
1335 ///
1336 /// ## Accepting Channels
1337 ///
1338 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1339 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1340 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1341 ///
1342 /// ```
1343 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1344 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1345 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1346 /// #
1347 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1348 /// #     // ...
1349 /// #     unimplemented!()
1350 /// # }
1351 /// #
1352 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1353 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1354 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1355 ///     Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, ..  } => {
1356 ///         if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1357 ///             match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1358 ///                 &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1359 ///             ) {
1360 ///                 Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1361 ///                 Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1362 ///             }
1363 ///             return;
1364 ///         }
1365 ///
1366 ///         let user_channel_id = 43;
1367 ///         match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1368 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1369 ///         ) {
1370 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1371 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1372 ///         }
1373 ///     },
1374 ///     // ...
1375 /// #     _ => {},
1376 /// });
1377 /// # }
1378 /// ```
1379 ///
1380 /// ## Closing Channels
1381 ///
1382 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1383 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1384 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1385 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1386 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1387 ///
1388 /// ```
1389 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1390 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1391 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1392 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1393 /// #
1394 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1395 /// #     channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1396 /// # ) {
1397 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1398 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1399 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1400 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1401 /// }
1402 ///
1403 /// // On the event processing thread
1404 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1405 ///     Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, ..  } => {
1406 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1407 ///         println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1408 ///     },
1409 ///     // ...
1410 /// #     _ => {},
1411 /// });
1412 /// # }
1413 /// ```
1414 ///
1415 /// # Payments
1416 ///
1417 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1418 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1419 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1420 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1421 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1422 /// HTLCs.
1423 ///
1424 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1425 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1426 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1427 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1428 ///
1429 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1430 ///
1431 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1432 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1433 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1434 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1435 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1436 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1437 ///
1438 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1439 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1440 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1441 ///
1442 /// ```
1443 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1444 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1445 /// #
1446 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1447 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1448 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1449 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1450 ///     Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1451 /// ) {
1452 ///     Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1453 ///         println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1454 ///         payment_hash
1455 ///     },
1456 ///     Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1457 /// };
1458 ///
1459 /// // On the event processing thread
1460 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1461 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1462 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1463 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1464 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1465 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1466 ///         },
1467 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1468 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1469 ///         },
1470 ///         PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1471 ///             assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1472 ///             println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1473 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1474 ///         },
1475 ///         // ...
1476 /// #         _ => {},
1477 ///     },
1478 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1479 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1480 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1481 ///     },
1482 ///     // ...
1483 /// #     _ => {},
1484 /// });
1485 /// # }
1486 /// ```
1487 ///
1488 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1489 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1490 ///
1491 /// ```
1492 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1493 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1494 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1495 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1496 /// #
1497 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1498 /// #     channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1499 /// #     route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1500 /// # ) {
1501 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1502 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1503 /// //     payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1504 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1505 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1506 ///     payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1507 /// ) {
1508 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1509 ///     Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1510 /// }
1511 ///
1512 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1513 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1514 /// assert!(
1515 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1516 ///         details,
1517 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1518 ///             payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1519 ///             payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1520 ///             ..
1521 ///         }
1522 ///     )).is_some()
1523 /// );
1524 ///
1525 /// // On the event processing thread
1526 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1527 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1528 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1529 ///     // ...
1530 /// #     _ => {},
1531 /// });
1532 /// # }
1533 /// ```
1534 ///
1535 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1536 ///
1537 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1538 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1539 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1540 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1541 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1542 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1543 ///
1544 /// ```
1545 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1546 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1547 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1548 /// #
1549 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1550 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1551 /// let offer = channel_manager
1552 ///     .create_offer_builder("coffee".to_string())?
1553 /// # ;
1554 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1555 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1556 /// # let offer = builder
1557 ///     .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1558 ///     .build()?;
1559 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1560 ///
1561 /// // On the event processing thread
1562 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1563 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1564 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1565 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1566 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1567 ///         },
1568 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1569 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1570 ///         },
1571 ///         // ...
1572 /// #         _ => {},
1573 ///     },
1574 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1575 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1576 ///     },
1577 ///     // ...
1578 /// #     _ => {},
1579 /// });
1580 /// # Ok(())
1581 /// # }
1582 /// ```
1583 ///
1584 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1585 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1586 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1587 ///
1588 /// ```
1589 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1590 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1591 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1592 /// #
1593 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1594 /// #     channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1595 /// #     payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1596 /// # ) {
1597 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1598 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1599 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1600 ///     offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1601 /// ) {
1602 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1603 ///     Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1604 /// }
1605 ///
1606 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1607 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1608 /// assert!(
1609 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1610 ///         details,
1611 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1612 ///     )).is_some()
1613 /// );
1614 ///
1615 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1616 /// assert!(
1617 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1618 ///         details,
1619 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1620 ///     )).is_some()
1621 /// );
1622 ///
1623 /// // On the event processing thread
1624 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1625 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1626 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1627 ///     Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1628 ///     // ...
1629 /// #     _ => {},
1630 /// });
1631 /// # }
1632 /// ```
1633 ///
1634 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1635 ///
1636 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1637 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1638 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1639 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1640 ///
1641 /// ```
1642 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1643 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1644 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1645 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1646 /// #
1647 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1648 /// #     channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1649 /// #     max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1650 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1651 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1652 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1653 /// let refund = channel_manager
1654 ///     .create_refund_builder(
1655 ///         "coffee".to_string(), amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry,
1656 ///         max_total_routing_fee_msat
1657 ///     )?
1658 /// # ;
1659 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1660 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1661 /// # let refund = builder
1662 ///     .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1663 ///     .build()?;
1664 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1665 ///
1666 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1667 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1668 /// assert!(
1669 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1670 ///         details,
1671 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1672 ///     )).is_some()
1673 /// );
1674 ///
1675 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1676 /// assert!(
1677 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1678 ///         details,
1679 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1680 ///     )).is_some()
1681 /// );
1682 ///
1683 /// // On the event processing thread
1684 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1685 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1686 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1687 ///     // ...
1688 /// #     _ => {},
1689 /// });
1690 /// # Ok(())
1691 /// # }
1692 /// ```
1693 ///
1694 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1695 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1696 ///
1697 /// ```
1698 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1699 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1700 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1701 /// #
1702 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1703 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1704 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1705 ///     Ok(invoice) => {
1706 ///         let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1707 ///         println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1708 ///         payment_hash
1709 ///     },
1710 ///     Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1711 /// };
1712 ///
1713 /// // On the event processing thread
1714 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1715 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1716 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1717 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1718 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1719 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1720 ///         },
1721 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1722 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1723 ///             },
1724 ///         // ...
1725 /// #         _ => {},
1726 ///     },
1727 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1728 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1729 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1730 ///     },
1731 ///     // ...
1732 /// #     _ => {},
1733 /// });
1734 /// # }
1735 /// ```
1736 ///
1737 /// # Persistence
1738 ///
1739 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1740 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1741 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1742 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1743 ///
1744 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1745 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1746 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1747 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1748 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1749 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1750 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1751 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1752 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1753 ///
1754 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1755 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1756 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1757 ///
1758 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1759 ///
1760 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1761 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1762 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1763 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1764 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1765 ///
1766 /// # DoS Mitigation
1767 ///
1768 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1769 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1770 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1771 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1772 ///
1773 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1774 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1775 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1776 ///
1777 /// # Type Aliases
1778 ///
1779 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1780 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1781 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1782 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1783 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1784 ///
1785 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1786 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1787 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1788 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1789 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1790 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1791 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1792 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1793 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1794 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1795 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1796 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1797 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1798 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1799 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1800 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1801 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1802 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1803 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1804 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1805 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1806 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1807 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1808 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1809 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1810 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1811 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1812 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1813 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1814 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1815 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1816 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1817 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1818 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1819 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1820 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1821 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1822 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1823 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1824 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1825 //
1826 // Lock order:
1827 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1828 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1829 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1830 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1831 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1832 //
1833 // Lock order tree:
1834 //
1835 // `pending_offers_messages`
1836 //
1837 // `total_consistency_lock`
1838 //  |
1839 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1840 //  |   |
1841 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1842 //  |
1843 //  |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1844 //  |
1845 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1846 //      |
1847 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1848 //          |
1849 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1850 //          |
1851 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1852 //              |
1853 //              |__`peer_state`
1854 //                  |
1855 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1856 //                  |
1857 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1858 //                  |
1859 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1860 //                  |
1861 //                  |__`best_block`
1862 //                  |
1863 //                  |__`pending_events`
1864 //                      |
1865 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1866 //
1867 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1868 where
1869         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1870         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1871         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1872         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1873         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1874         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1875         R::Target: Router,
1876         L::Target: Logger,
1877 {
1878         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1879         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1880         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1881         chain_monitor: M,
1882         tx_broadcaster: T,
1883         #[allow(unused)]
1884         router: R,
1885
1886         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1887         #[cfg(test)]
1888         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1889         #[cfg(not(test))]
1890         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1891         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1892
1893         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1894         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1895         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1896         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1897         ///
1898         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1899         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1900
1901         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1902         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1903         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1904         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1905         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1906         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1907         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1908         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1909         ///
1910         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1911         ///
1912         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1913         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1914
1915         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1916         ///
1917         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1918         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1919         /// and via the classic SCID.
1920         ///
1921         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1922         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1923         ///
1924         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1925         #[cfg(test)]
1926         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1927         #[cfg(not(test))]
1928         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1929         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1930         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1931         ///
1932         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1933         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1934
1935         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1936         ///
1937         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1938         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1939         /// and via the classic SCID.
1940         ///
1941         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1942         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1943         ///
1944         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1945         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1946
1947         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1948         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1949         ///
1950         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1951         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1952
1953         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1954         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1955         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1956         /// active channel list on load.
1957         ///
1958         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1959         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1960
1961         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1962         ///
1963         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1964         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1965         /// the handling of the events.
1966         ///
1967         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1968         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1969         ///
1970         /// TODO:
1971         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1972         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1973         /// would break backwards compatability.
1974         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1975         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1976         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1977         ///
1978         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1979         #[cfg(not(test))]
1980         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1981         #[cfg(test)]
1982         pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1983
1984         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1985         ///
1986         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1987         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1988         /// confirmation depth.
1989         ///
1990         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1991         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1992         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1993         ///
1994         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1995         #[cfg(test)]
1996         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1997         #[cfg(not(test))]
1998         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1999
2000         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2001
2002         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2003
2004         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2005         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2006         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2007         ///
2008         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2009         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2010
2011         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2012         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2013         /// keeping additional state.
2014         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2015
2016         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2017         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2018         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2019         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2020
2021         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2022         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2023         ///
2024         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2025         /// are currently open with that peer.
2026         ///
2027         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2028         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2029         /// channels.
2030         ///
2031         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2032         ///
2033         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2034         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2035         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2036         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2037         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2038
2039         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2040         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2041         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2042         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2043         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2044         ///
2045         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2046         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2047         ///
2048         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2049         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2050         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2051         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2052         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2053
2054         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2055         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2056
2057         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2058         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2059         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2060         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2061         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2062         ///
2063         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2064         ///
2065         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2066         ///
2067         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2068         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2069         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2070         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2071         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2072         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2073         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2074         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2075         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2076         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2077         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2078         ///
2079         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2080         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2081         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2082
2083         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2084
2085         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2086         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2087
2088         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2089
2090         /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2091         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2092
2093         entropy_source: ES,
2094         node_signer: NS,
2095         signer_provider: SP,
2096
2097         logger: L,
2098 }
2099
2100 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2101 ///
2102 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2103 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2104 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2105 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2106 pub struct ChainParameters {
2107         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2108         pub network: Network,
2109
2110         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2111         ///
2112         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2113         pub best_block: BestBlock,
2114 }
2115
2116 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2117 #[must_use]
2118 enum NotifyOption {
2119         DoPersist,
2120         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2121         SkipPersistNoEvents,
2122 }
2123
2124 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2125 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2126 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2127 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2128 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2129 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2130 ///
2131 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2132 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2133 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2134 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2135         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2136         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2137         should_persist: F,
2138         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2139         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2140 }
2141
2142 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2143         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2144         /// events to handle.
2145         ///
2146         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2147         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2148         /// isn't ideal.
2149         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2150                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2151         }
2152
2153         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2154         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2155                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2156                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2157
2158                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2159                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2160                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2161                         should_persist: move || {
2162                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2163                                 // processing and return that.
2164                                 let notify = persist_check();
2165                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
2166                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2167                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2168                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2169                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2170                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2171                                 }
2172                         },
2173                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2174                 }
2175         }
2176
2177         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2178         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2179         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2180         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2181         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2182                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2183
2184                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2185                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2186                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2187                         should_persist: persist_check,
2188                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2189                 }
2190         }
2191 }
2192
2193 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2194         fn drop(&mut self) {
2195                 match (self.should_persist)() {
2196                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2197                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2198                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2199                         },
2200                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2201                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2202                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2203                 }
2204         }
2205 }
2206
2207 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2208 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2209 ///
2210 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2211 ///
2212 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2213 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2214 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2215 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2216 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2217
2218 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2219 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2220 ///
2221 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2222 ///
2223 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2224 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2225 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2226 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2227 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2228 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2229 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2230 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2231 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2232 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2233 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2234 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2235 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2236
2237 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2238 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2239 /// this value.
2240 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2241 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2242 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2243 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2244
2245 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2246 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2247 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2248 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2249 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2250 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2251 #[allow(dead_code)]
2252 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2253
2254 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2255 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2256 #[allow(dead_code)]
2257 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2258
2259 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2260 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2261
2262 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2263 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2264 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2265
2266 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2267 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2268 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2269
2270 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2271 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2272 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2273 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2274
2275 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2276 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2277 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2278
2279 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2280 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2281 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2282
2283 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2284 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2285 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2286         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2287         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2288         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2289         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2290         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2291         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2292         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2293         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2294 }
2295
2296 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2297 /// to better separate parameters.
2298 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2299 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2300         /// The node_id of our counterparty
2301         pub node_id: PublicKey,
2302         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2303         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2304         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2305         pub features: InitFeatures,
2306         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2307         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2308         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2309         ///
2310         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2311         ///
2312         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2313         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2314         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2315         /// payments to us through this channel.
2316         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2317         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2318         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2319         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2320         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2321         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2322         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2323 }
2324
2325 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2327 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2328         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2329         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2330         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2331         /// lifetime of the channel.
2332         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2333         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2334         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2335         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2336         /// our counterparty already.
2337         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2338         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2339         ///
2340         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2341         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2342         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2343         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2344         ///
2345         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2346         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2347         ///
2348         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2349         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2350         ///
2351         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2352         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2353         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2354         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2355         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2356         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2357         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2358         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2359         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2360         /// `Some(0)`).
2361         ///
2362         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2363         ///
2364         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2365         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2366         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2367         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2368         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2369         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2370         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2371         ///
2372         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2373         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2374         ///
2375         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2376         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2377         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2378         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2379         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2380         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2381         /// this value on chain.
2382         ///
2383         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2384         ///
2385         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2386         ///
2387         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2388         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2389         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2390         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2391         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2392         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
2393         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2394         ///
2395         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2396         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2397         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2398         pub user_channel_id: u128,
2399         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2400         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2401         ///
2402         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2403         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2404         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2405         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2406         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2407         ///
2408         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2409         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2410         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2411         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2412         ///
2413         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2414         pub balance_msat: u64,
2415         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2416         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2417         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2418         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2419         ///
2420         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2421         ///
2422         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2423         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2424         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2425         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2426         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2427         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2428         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2429         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2430         ///
2431         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2432         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2433         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2434         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2435         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2436         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2437         /// route which is valid.
2438         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2439         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2440         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2441         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2442         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2443         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2444         ///
2445         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2446         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2447         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2448         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2449         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2450         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2451         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2452         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2453         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2454         ///
2455         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2456         ///
2457         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2458         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2459         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2460         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2461         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2462         ///
2463         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2464         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2465         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2466         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2467         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2468         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2469         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2470         ///
2471         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2472         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2473         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2474         pub is_outbound: bool,
2475         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2476         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2477         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2478         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2479         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2480         ///
2481         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2482         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2483         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2484         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2485         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2486         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2487         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2488         ///
2489         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2490         pub is_usable: bool,
2491         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2492         pub is_public: bool,
2493         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2494         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2495         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2496         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2497         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2498         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2499         ///
2500         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2501         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2502         /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2503         ///
2504         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2505         pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2506         /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2507         ///
2508         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2509         pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2510 }
2511
2512 impl ChannelDetails {
2513         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2514         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2515         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2516         ///
2517         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2518         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2519         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2520                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2521         }
2522
2523         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2524         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2525         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2526         ///
2527         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2528         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2529         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2530                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2531         }
2532
2533         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2534                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2535                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2536         ) -> Self
2537         where
2538                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2539                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2540         {
2541                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2542                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2543                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2544                 ChannelDetails {
2545                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2546                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2547                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2548                                 features: latest_features,
2549                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2550                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2551                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2552                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2553                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2554                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2555                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2556                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2557                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2558                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2559                         },
2560                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2561                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2562                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2563                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2564                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2565                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2566                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2567                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2568                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2569                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2570                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2571                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2572                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2573                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2574                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2575                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2576                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2577                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2578                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2579                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2580                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2581                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
2582                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
2583                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2584                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2585                         config: Some(context.config()),
2586                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2587                         pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2588                         pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2589                 }
2590         }
2591 }
2592
2593 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2594 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2595 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2596 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2597 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2598 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2599 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2600 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2601         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2602         NotShuttingDown,
2603         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2604         ShutdownInitiated,
2605         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2606         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2607         ResolvingHTLCs,
2608         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2609         NegotiatingClosingFee,
2610         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2611         /// to drop the channel.
2612         ShutdownComplete,
2613 }
2614
2615 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2616 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2617 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2618 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2619         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2620         AwaitingInvoice {
2621                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2622                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2623                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2624         },
2625         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2626         Pending {
2627                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2628                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2629                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2630                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2631                 /// abandoned.
2632                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2633                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2634                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2635                 total_msat: u64,
2636         },
2637         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2638         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2639         /// payment is removed from tracking.
2640         Fulfilled {
2641                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2642                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2643                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2644                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2645                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2646                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2647         },
2648         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2649         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2650         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2651         Abandoned {
2652                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2653                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2654                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2655                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2656                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2657         },
2658 }
2659
2660 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2661 ///
2662 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2663 #[derive(Clone)]
2664 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2665         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2666         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2667         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2668         /// route hints.
2669         pub phantom_scid: u64,
2670         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2671         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2672 }
2673
2674 macro_rules! handle_error {
2675         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2676                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2677                 // entering the macro.
2678                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2679                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2680
2681                 match $internal {
2682                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2683                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2684                                 let mut msg_event = None;
2685
2686                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2687                                         let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2688                                         let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2689                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
2690                                                 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2691                                         );
2692                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2693
2694                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2695                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
2696                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2697                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2698                                                         msg: update
2699                                                 });
2700                                         }
2701                                 } else {
2702                                         log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2703                                 }
2704
2705                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2706                                 } else {
2707                                         msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2708                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2709                                                 action: err.action.clone()
2710                                         });
2711                                 }
2712
2713                                 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2714                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2715                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2716                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2717                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2718                                         }
2719                                 }
2720
2721                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2722                                 Err(err)
2723                         },
2724                 }
2725         } };
2726 }
2727
2728 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2729         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2730                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2731                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2732                 }
2733                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2734                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2735                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2736                 } else {
2737                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2738                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2739                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2740                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2741                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2742                         // stage.
2743                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2744                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2745                 }
2746                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2747         }}
2748 }
2749
2750 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2751 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2752         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2753                 match $err {
2754                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2755                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2756                         },
2757                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2758                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2759                         },
2760                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2761                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2762                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2763                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2764                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2765                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2766                                 let err =
2767                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2768                                 (true, err)
2769                         },
2770                 }
2771         };
2772         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2773                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2774         };
2775         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2776                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2777         };
2778         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2779                 match $channel_phase {
2780                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2781                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2782                         },
2783                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2784                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2785                         },
2786                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2787                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2788                         },
2789                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2790                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2791                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2792                         },
2793                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2794                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2795                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2796                         },
2797                 }
2798         };
2799 }
2800
2801 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2802         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2803                 match $res {
2804                         Ok(res) => res,
2805                         Err(e) => {
2806                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2807                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2808                                 if drop {
2809                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2810                                 }
2811                                 break Err(res);
2812                         }
2813                 }
2814         }
2815 }
2816
2817 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2818         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2819                 match $res {
2820                         Ok(res) => res,
2821                         Err(e) => {
2822                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2823                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2824                                 if drop {
2825                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2826                                 }
2827                                 return Err(res);
2828                         }
2829                 }
2830         }
2831 }
2832
2833 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2834         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2835                 {
2836                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2837                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2838                         channel
2839                 }
2840         }
2841 }
2842
2843 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2844         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2845                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2846                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2847                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2848                 });
2849                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2850                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2851                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2852                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2853                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2854                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2855                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2856                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2857                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2858                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2859                 }
2860         }}
2861 }
2862
2863 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2864         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2865                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2866                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2867                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2868                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2869                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2870                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2871                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2872                                 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2873                         }, None));
2874                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2875                 }
2876         }
2877 }
2878
2879 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2880         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2881                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2882                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2883                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2884                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2885                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2886                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2887                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2888                         }, None));
2889                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2890                 }
2891         }
2892 }
2893
2894 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2895         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2896                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2897                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2898                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2899                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2900                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2901                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2902                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2903                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2904                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2905                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2906                         // now.
2907                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2908                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2909                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2910                                         msg,
2911                                 })
2912                         } else { None }
2913                 } else { None };
2914
2915                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2916                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2917
2918                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2919                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2920                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2921                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2922                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2923                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2924                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2925                 }
2926
2927                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2928                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2929                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2930                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2931
2932                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2933                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2934                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2935                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2936                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2937                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2938                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2939                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2940                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2941                                 ));
2942                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2943                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2944                                 } else {
2945                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2946                                 }
2947                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2948                         } else {
2949                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2950                         }
2951
2952                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2953                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2954                         if batch_completed {
2955                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2956                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2957                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2958                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2959                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2960                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2961                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2962                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2963                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2964                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2965                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2966                                                 }
2967                                         }
2968                                 }
2969                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2970                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2971                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2972                                 }
2973                         }
2974                 }
2975
2976                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2977
2978                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2979                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2980                 }
2981                 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2982                         $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2983                 }
2984                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2985                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2986                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2987                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2988                 }
2989         } }
2990 }
2991
2992 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2993         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2994                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2995                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2996                 match $update_res {
2997                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2998                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2999                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
3000                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
3001                         },
3002                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
3003                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
3004                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
3005                                 false
3006                         },
3007                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3008                                 $completed;
3009                                 true
3010                         },
3011                 }
3012         } };
3013         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3014                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3015                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3016         };
3017         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3018                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3019                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3020                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3021                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3022                 // filter for uniqueness here.
3023                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3024                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3025                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3026                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3027                         });
3028                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3029                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3030                         {
3031                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3032                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3033                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3034                                 }
3035                         })
3036         } };
3037 }
3038
3039 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3040         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3041                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3042                 while !processed_all_events {
3043                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3044                                 return;
3045                         }
3046
3047                         let mut result;
3048
3049                         {
3050                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3051                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3052                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3053
3054                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3055                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3056                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
3057
3058                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3059                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3060                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3061                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3062                                 }
3063                         }
3064
3065                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3066                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
3067                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3068                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3069                         }
3070
3071                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3072
3073                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3074                                 $event_to_handle = event;
3075                                 $handle_event;
3076                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3077                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
3078                                 }
3079                         }
3080
3081                         {
3082                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3083                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3084                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3085                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3086                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3087                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3088                         }
3089
3090                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3091                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3092                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3093                                 processed_all_events = false;
3094                         }
3095
3096                         match result {
3097                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3098                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3099                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3100                                 },
3101                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3102                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3103                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3104                         }
3105                 }
3106         }
3107 }
3108
3109 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3110 where
3111         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3112         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3113         ES::Target: EntropySource,
3114         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3115         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3116         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3117         R::Target: Router,
3118         L::Target: Logger,
3119 {
3120         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3121         ///
3122         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3123         ///
3124         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3125         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3126         ///
3127         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3128         ///
3129         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3130         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3131         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3132         /// more details.
3133         ///
3134         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3135         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3136         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3137         pub fn new(
3138                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3139                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3140                 current_timestamp: u32,
3141         ) -> Self {
3142                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3143                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3144                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3145                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3146                 ChannelManager {
3147                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
3148                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3149                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3150                         chain_monitor,
3151                         tx_broadcaster,
3152                         router,
3153
3154                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3155
3156                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3157                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3158                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3159                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3160                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3161                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3162                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3163                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3164                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3165
3166                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3167                         secp_ctx,
3168
3169                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3170                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3171
3172                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3173
3174                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3175
3176                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3177
3178                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3179                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3180                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3181                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3182                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3183                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3184                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3185                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3186
3187                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3188                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3189
3190                         entropy_source,
3191                         node_signer,
3192                         signer_provider,
3193
3194                         logger,
3195                 }
3196         }
3197
3198         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3199         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3200                 &self.default_configuration
3201         }
3202
3203         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3204                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3205                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3206                 let mut i = 0;
3207                 loop {
3208                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3209                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3210                         } else {
3211                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3212                         }
3213                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3214                                 break;
3215                         }
3216                         i += 1;
3217                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3218                 }
3219                 outbound_scid_alias
3220         }
3221
3222         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3223         ///
3224         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3225         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3226         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3227         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3228         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3229         ///
3230         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3231         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3232         ///
3233         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3234         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3235         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3236         ///
3237         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3238         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3239         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3240         ///
3241         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3242         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3243         ///
3244         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3245         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3246         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3247         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3248         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3249         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3250         ///
3251         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3252         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3253         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3254         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3255                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3256                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3257                 }
3258
3259                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3260                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3261                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3262
3263                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3264
3265                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3266                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3267
3268                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3269
3270                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3271                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3272                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3273                         }
3274                 }
3275
3276                 let channel = {
3277                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3278                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3279                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3280                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3281                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3282                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3283                         {
3284                                 Ok(res) => res,
3285                                 Err(e) => {
3286                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3287                                         return Err(e);
3288                                 },
3289                         }
3290                 };
3291                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3292
3293                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3294                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3295                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3296                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
3297                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3298                                 } else {
3299                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
3300                                 }
3301                         },
3302                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3303                 }
3304
3305                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3306                         node_id: their_network_key,
3307                         msg: res,
3308                 });
3309                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3310         }
3311
3312         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3313                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3314                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3315                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3316                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3317                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3318                 // the same channel.
3319                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3320                 {
3321                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3322                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3323                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3324                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3325                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3326                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3327                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3328                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3329                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3330                                                 _ => None,
3331                                         })
3332                                         .filter(f)
3333                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3334                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3335                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3336                                         })
3337                                 );
3338                         }
3339                 }
3340                 res
3341         }
3342
3343         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3344         /// more information.
3345         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3346                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3347                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3348                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3349                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3350                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3351                 // the same channel.
3352                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3353                 {
3354                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3355                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3356                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3357                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3358                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3359                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3360                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3361                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3362                                         res.push(details);
3363                                 }
3364                         }
3365                 }
3366                 res
3367         }
3368
3369         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3370         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3371         ///
3372         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3373         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3374         /// are.
3375         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3376                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3377                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3378                 // really wanted anyway.
3379                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3380         }
3381
3382         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3383         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3384                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3385                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3386
3387                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3388                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3389                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3390                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3391                         let context_to_details = |context| {
3392                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3393                         };
3394                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
3395                                 .iter()
3396                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3397                                 .map(context_to_details)
3398                                 .collect();
3399                 }
3400                 vec![]
3401         }
3402
3403         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3404         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3405         ///
3406         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3407         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3408         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3409         ///
3410         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3411         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3412                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3413                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3414                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3415                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3416                                 },
3417                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3418                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3419                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3420                                 },
3421                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3422                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3423                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
3424                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3425                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
3426                                         })
3427                                 },
3428                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3429                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3430                                 },
3431                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3432                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3433                                 },
3434                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3435                         })
3436                         .collect()
3437         }
3438
3439         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3440                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3441
3442                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3443                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3444
3445                 {
3446                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3447
3448                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3449                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3450
3451                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3452                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3453
3454                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3455                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3456                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3457                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3458                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3459                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3460                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3461                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3462
3463                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3464                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3465                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3466                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3467                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3468                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
3469                                                 });
3470
3471                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3472                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3473
3474                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3475                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3476                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3477                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3478                                                 }
3479                                         } else {
3480                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3481                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3482                                         }
3483                                 },
3484                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3485                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3486                                                 err: format!(
3487                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3488                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3489                                                 )
3490                                         });
3491                                 },
3492                         }
3493                 }
3494
3495                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3496                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3497                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3498                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3499                 }
3500
3501                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3502                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3503                 }
3504
3505                 Ok(())
3506         }
3507
3508         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3509         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3510         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3511         ///
3512         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3513         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3514         ///    fee estimate.
3515         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3516         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3517         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3518         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3519         ///
3520         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3521         ///
3522         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3523         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3524         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3525         /// channel.
3526         ///
3527         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3528         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3529         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3530         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3531         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3532                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3533         }
3534
3535         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3536         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3537         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3538         ///
3539         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3540         /// the channel being closed or not:
3541         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3542         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3543         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3544         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3545         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3546         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3547         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3548         ///
3549         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3550         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3551         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3552         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3553         ///
3554         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3555         ///
3556         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3557         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3558         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3559         /// channel.
3560         ///
3561         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3562         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3563         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3564         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3565                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3566         }
3567
3568         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3569                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3570                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3571                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3572                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3573                 }
3574
3575                 let logger = WithContext::from(
3576                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3577                 );
3578
3579                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3580                         shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3581                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3582                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3583                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3584                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3585                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3586                 }
3587                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3588                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3589                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3590                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3591                         // ignore the result here.
3592                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3593                 }
3594                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3595                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3596                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3597                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3598                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3599                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3600                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3601                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3602                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3603                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3604                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3605                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3606                                         }
3607                                 }
3608                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3609                         }
3610                         debug_assert!(
3611                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3612                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3613                         );
3614                 }
3615
3616                 {
3617                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3618                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3619                                 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3620                                 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3621                                 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3622                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3623                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3624                                 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3625                         }, None));
3626
3627                         if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3628                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3629                                         channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3630                                 }, None));
3631                         }
3632                 }
3633                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3634                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3635                 }
3636         }
3637
3638         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3639         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3640         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3641         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3642                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3643                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3644                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3645                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3646                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3647                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3648                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3649                         } else {
3650                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3651                         };
3652                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3653                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3654                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3655                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3656                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
3657                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3658                                 match chan_phase {
3659                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3660                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3661                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3662                                         },
3663                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3664                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3665                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3666                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3667                                         },
3668                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3669                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3670                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3671                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3672                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3673                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3674                                         },
3675                                 }
3676                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3677                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3678                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3679                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3680                                 // events anyway.
3681                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
3682                         } else {
3683                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3684                         }
3685                 };
3686                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3687                         // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3688                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3689                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3690                                 msg: update
3691                         });
3692                 }
3693
3694                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3695         }
3696
3697         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3698                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3699                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3700                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3701                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3702                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3703                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3704                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3705                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3706                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3707                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3708                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3709                                                         },
3710                                                 }
3711                                         );
3712                                 }
3713                                 Ok(())
3714                         },
3715                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3716                 }
3717         }
3718
3719         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3720         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3721         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3722         /// channel.
3723         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3724         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3725                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3726         }
3727
3728         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3729         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3730         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3731         ///
3732         /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3733         /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3734         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3735         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3736                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3737         }
3738
3739         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3740         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3741         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3742                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3743                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3744                 }
3745         }
3746
3747         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3748         /// local transaction(s).
3749         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3750                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3751                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3752                 }
3753         }
3754
3755         fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3756                 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3757         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3758                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3759                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3760                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3761                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3762                         return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3763                 }
3764                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3765                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3766                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3767                         // we don't have the channel here.
3768                         return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3769                 }
3770
3771                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3772                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3773                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3774                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3775                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3776                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3777                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3778                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3779                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3780                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3781                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3782                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3783                         } else {
3784                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3785                         }
3786                 }
3787                 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3788                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3789                         return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3790                 }
3791                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3792                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3793                         return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3794                 }
3795
3796                 Ok(())
3797         }
3798
3799         /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3800         /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3801         fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3802                 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3803         ) -> Option<X> {
3804                 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3805                         None => return None,
3806                         Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3807                 };
3808                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3809                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3810                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3811                         return None;
3812                 }
3813                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3814                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3815                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3816                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3817                 ) {
3818                         None => None,
3819                         Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3820                 }
3821         }
3822
3823         fn can_forward_htlc(
3824                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3825         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3826                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3827                         self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3828                 }) {
3829                         Some(Ok(())) => {},
3830                         Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3831                         None => {
3832                                 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3833                                 // intercept forward.
3834                                 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3835                                         fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3836                                         fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3837                                 {} else {
3838                                         return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3839                                 }
3840                         }
3841                 }
3842
3843                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3844                 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3845                         cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3846                 ) {
3847                         let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3848                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3849                         }).flatten();
3850                         return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3851                 }
3852
3853                 Ok(())
3854         }
3855
3856         fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3857                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3858                 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3859                 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3860         ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3861                 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3862                 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3863                         let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3864                         if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3865                                 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3866                         }
3867                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3868                                 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3869                         }
3870                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3871                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3872                                 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3873                         }
3874                         (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3875                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3876                         chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3877                 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3878                         // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3879                         // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3880                         // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3881                         // instead.
3882                         err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3883                 }
3884
3885                 log_info!(
3886                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3887                         "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3888                 );
3889                 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3890                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3891                         return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3892                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3893                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3894                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3895                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3896                         });
3897                 }
3898
3899                 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3900                         (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3901                 } else {
3902                         (err_code, &res.0[..])
3903                 };
3904                 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3905                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3906                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3907                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3908                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3909                 })
3910         }
3911
3912         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3913                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3914         ) -> Result<
3915                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3916         > {
3917                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3918                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3919                 )?;
3920
3921                 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3922                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3923                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3924                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3925                 };
3926
3927                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3928                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3929                 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3930                         let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3931                         self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3932                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3933                                 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3934                         )
3935                 })?;
3936
3937                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3938         }
3939
3940         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3941                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3942                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3943                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3944         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3945                 macro_rules! return_err {
3946                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3947                                 {
3948                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3949                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3950                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3951                                                 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3952                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3953                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3954                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3955                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3956                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3957                                                         }
3958                                                 ))
3959                                         }
3960                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3961                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3962                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3963                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3964                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3965                                         }));
3966                                 }
3967                         }
3968                 }
3969                 match decoded_hop {
3970                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3971                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3972                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3973                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3974                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3975                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3976                                 {
3977                                         Ok(info) => {
3978                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3979                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3980                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3981                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3982                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3983                                         },
3984                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3985                                 }
3986                         },
3987                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3988                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3989                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3990                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3991                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3992                                 }
3993                         }
3994                 }
3995         }
3996
3997         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3998         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3999         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
4000         ///
4001         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
4002         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
4003         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4004         ///
4005         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4006         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4007         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4008                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4009                         return Err(LightningError {
4010                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4011                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4012                         });
4013                 }
4014                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4015                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4016                 }
4017                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4018                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4019                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4020         }
4021
4022         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4023         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4024         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4025         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4026         ///
4027         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4028         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4029         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4030         ///
4031         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4032         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4033         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4034                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4035                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4036                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4037                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4038                         Some(id) => id,
4039                 };
4040
4041                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4042         }
4043
4044         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4045                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4046                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4047                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4048
4049                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4050                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4051                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4052                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4053                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4054                 };
4055
4056                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4057                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4058                         short_channel_id,
4059                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4060                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4061                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4062                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4063                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4064                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4065                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4066                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4067                 };
4068                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4069                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4070                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4071                 // channel.
4072                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4073
4074                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4075                         signature: sig,
4076                         contents: unsigned
4077                 })
4078         }
4079
4080         #[cfg(test)]
4081         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4082                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4083                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4084                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4085                         session_priv_bytes
4086                 })
4087         }
4088
4089         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4090                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4091                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4092                         session_priv_bytes
4093                 } = args;
4094                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4095                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4096                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4097                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4098
4099                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4100                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4101                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4102                 ).map_err(|e| {
4103                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4104                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4105                         e
4106                 })?;
4107
4108                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4109                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4110                                 None => {
4111                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4112                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4113                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4114                                 },
4115                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4116                         };
4117
4118                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4119                         log_trace!(logger,
4120                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4121                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4122
4123                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4124                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4125                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4126                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4127                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4128                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4129                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4130                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4131                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4132                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4133                                                 }
4134                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4135                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4136                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4137                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4138                                                                 path: path.clone(),
4139                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4140                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4141                                                                 payment_id,
4142                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4143                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4144                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
4145                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4146                                                                         false => {
4147                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4148                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4149                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4150                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4151                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4152                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4153                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4154                                                                         },
4155                                                                         true => {},
4156                                                                 }
4157                                                         },
4158                                                         None => {},
4159                                                 }
4160                                         },
4161                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4162                                 };
4163                         } else {
4164                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4165                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4166                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
4167                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4168                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4169                         }
4170                         return Ok(());
4171                 };
4172                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4173                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4174                         Err(e) => {
4175                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4176                         },
4177                 }
4178         }
4179
4180         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4181         ///
4182         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4183         /// fields for more info.
4184         ///
4185         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4186         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4187         ///
4188         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4189         ///
4190         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4191         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4192         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4193         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4194         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4195         ///
4196         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4197         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4198         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4199         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4200         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4201         ///
4202         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4203         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4204         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4205         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4206         ///
4207         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4208         ///
4209         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4210         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4211         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4212         ///
4213         /// In general, a path may raise:
4214         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4215         ///    node public key) is specified.
4216         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4217         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4218         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4219         ///    relevant updates.
4220         ///
4221         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4222         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4223         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4224         ///
4225         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4226         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4227         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4228         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4229         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4230         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4231         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4232                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4233                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4234                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4235                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4236                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4237                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4238         }
4239
4240         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4241         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4242         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4243                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4244                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4245                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4246                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4247                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4248                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4249                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4250         }
4251
4252         #[cfg(test)]
4253         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4254                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4255                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4256                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4257                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4258                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4259         }
4260
4261         #[cfg(test)]
4262         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4263                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4264                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4265         }
4266
4267         #[cfg(test)]
4268         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4269                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4270         }
4271
4272         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4273                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4274                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4275                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4276                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4277                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4278                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4279                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4280                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4281                         )
4282         }
4283
4284         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4285         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4286         /// retries are exhausted.
4287         ///
4288         /// # Event Generation
4289         ///
4290         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4291         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4292         ///
4293         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4294         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4295         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4296         ///
4297         /// # Requested Invoices
4298         ///
4299         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4300         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4301         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4302         /// once the invoice has been received.
4303         ///
4304         /// # Restart Behavior
4305         ///
4306         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4307         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4308         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4309         ///
4310         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4311         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4312                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4313                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4314         }
4315
4316         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4317         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4318         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4319         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4320         /// never reach the recipient.
4321         ///
4322         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4323         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4324         ///
4325         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4326         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4327         ///
4328         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4329         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4330                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4331                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4332                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4333                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4334                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4335         }
4336
4337         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4338         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4339         ///
4340         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4341         /// payments.
4342         ///
4343         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4344         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4345                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4346                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4347                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4348                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4349                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4350                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4351         }
4352
4353         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4354         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4355         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4356         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4357                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4358                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4359                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4360                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4361                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4362         }
4363
4364         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4365         /// payment probe.
4366         #[cfg(test)]
4367         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4368                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4369         }
4370
4371         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4372         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4373         ///
4374         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4375         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4376                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4377                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4378         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4379                 let payment_params =
4380                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4381
4382                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4383
4384                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4385         }
4386
4387         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4388         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4389         ///
4390         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4391         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4392         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4393         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4394         ///
4395         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4396         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4397         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4398         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4399         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4400         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4401         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4402                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4403         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4404                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4405
4406                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4407                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4408                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4409                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4410
4411                 let route = self
4412                         .router
4413                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4414                         .map_err(|e| {
4415                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4416                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4417                         })?;
4418
4419                 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4420
4421                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4422
4423                 for mut path in route.paths {
4424                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4425                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4426                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4427                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4428                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4429                                         break;
4430                                 } else {
4431                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4432                                         log_debug!(
4433                                                 self.logger,
4434                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4435                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4436                                         );
4437                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4438                                         path.hops.pop();
4439                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4440                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4441                                         }
4442                                 }
4443                         }
4444
4445                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4446                                 log_debug!(
4447                                         self.logger,
4448                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4449                                 );
4450                                 continue;
4451                         }
4452
4453                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4454                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4455                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4456                                 }) {
4457                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4458                                         let used_liquidity =
4459                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4460
4461                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4462                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4463                                         {
4464                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4465                                                 continue;
4466                                         } else {
4467                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4468                                         }
4469                                 }
4470                         }
4471
4472                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4473                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4474                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4475                         })?);
4476                 }
4477
4478                 Ok(res)
4479         }
4480
4481         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4482         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4483         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4484                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4485                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4486         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4487                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4488                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4489                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4490
4491                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4492                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4493                 let funding_txo;
4494                 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4495                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4496                                 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4497                                         let counterparty;
4498                                         let err = if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = $err {
4499                                                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4500                                                 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4501                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4502                                                 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4503                                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4504                                         } else { unreachable!(); };
4505
4506                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4507                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4508                                         let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4509                                         Err($api_err)
4510                                 } } }
4511                                 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4512                                         Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4513                                         Err(err) => {
4514                                                 let chan_err = ChannelError::Close(err.to_owned());
4515                                                 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4516                                                 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4517                                         },
4518                                 }
4519
4520                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4521                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4522                                 match funding_res {
4523                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4524                                         Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4525                                                 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4526                                                 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4527                                         }
4528                                 }
4529                         },
4530                         Some(phase) => {
4531                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4532                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4533                                         err: format!(
4534                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4535                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4536                                 })
4537                         },
4538                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4539                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4540                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4541                                 }),
4542                 };
4543
4544                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4545                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4546                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4547                                 msg,
4548                         });
4549                 }
4550                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4551                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4552                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4553                         },
4554                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4555                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4556                                 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4557                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4558                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4559                                                 let err = format!(
4560                                                         "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4561                                                         funding_txo, o.get()
4562                                                 );
4563                                                 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4564                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4565                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4566                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4567                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4568                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4569                                         }
4570                                 }
4571                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4572                         }
4573                 }
4574                 Ok(())
4575         }
4576
4577         #[cfg(test)]
4578         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4579                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4580                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4581                 })
4582         }
4583
4584         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4585         ///
4586         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4587         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4588         ///
4589         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4590         /// across the p2p network.
4591         ///
4592         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4593         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4594         ///
4595         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4596         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4597         /// keys per-channel).
4598         ///
4599         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4600         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4601         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4602         ///
4603         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4604         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4605         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4606         ///
4607         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4608         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4609         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4610         /// for more details.
4611         ///
4612         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4613         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4614         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4615                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4616         }
4617
4618         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4619         ///
4620         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4621         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4622         ///
4623         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4624         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4625         /// signature for each channel.
4626         ///
4627         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4628         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4629                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4630                 let mut result = Ok(());
4631
4632                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4633                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4634                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4635                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4636                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4637                                         }));
4638                                 }
4639                         }
4640                 }
4641                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4642                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4643                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4644                         }));
4645                 }
4646                 {
4647                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4648                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4649                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4650                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4651                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4652                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4653                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4654                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4655                         {
4656                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4657                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4658                                 }));
4659                         }
4660                 }
4661
4662                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4663                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4664                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4665                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4666                 } else {
4667                         None
4668                 };
4669                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4670                         match states.entry(txid) {
4671                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4672                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4673                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4674                                         }));
4675                                         None
4676                                 },
4677                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4678                         }
4679                 });
4680                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4681                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4682                                 temporary_channel_id,
4683                                 counterparty_node_id,
4684                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
4685                                 is_batch_funding,
4686                                 |chan, tx| {
4687                                         let mut output_index = None;
4688                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4689                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4690                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4691                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
4692                                                                 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4693                                                         }
4694                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4695                                                 }
4696                                         }
4697                                         if output_index.is_none() {
4698                                                 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4699                                         }
4700                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4701                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4702                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4703                                                 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4704                                                 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4705                                                 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4706                                         }
4707                                         Ok(outpoint)
4708                                 })
4709                         );
4710                 }
4711                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4712                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4713                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4714                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4715                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4716                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4717                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4718                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4719                         );
4720                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4721                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4722                         );
4723                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4724                         {
4725                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4726                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4727                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4728                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4729                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4730                                                 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4731                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4732                                                         let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4733                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4734                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4735                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4736                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4737                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4738                                                                                 channel_id,
4739                                                                                 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4740                                                                         }
4741                                                                 },
4742                                                         });
4743                                                 });
4744                                 }
4745                         }
4746                         mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4747                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4748                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4749                         }
4750                 }
4751                 result
4752         }
4753
4754         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4755         ///
4756         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4757         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4758         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4759         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4760         ///
4761         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4762         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4763         ///
4764         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4765         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4766         ///
4767         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4768         ///
4769         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4770         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4771         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4772         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4773         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4774         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4775         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4776         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4777                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4778         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4779                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4780                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4781                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4782                         });
4783                 }
4784
4785                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4786                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4787                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4788                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4789                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4790                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4791
4792                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4793                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4794                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4795                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4796                                 });
4797                         };
4798                 }
4799                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4800                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4801                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4802                                 config.apply(config_update);
4803                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4804                                         continue;
4805                                 }
4806                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4807                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4808                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4809                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4810                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4811                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4812                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4813                                                         msg,
4814                                                 });
4815                                         }
4816                                 }
4817                                 continue;
4818                         } else {
4819                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4820                                 debug_assert!(false);
4821                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4822                                         err: format!(
4823                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4824                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4825                                 });
4826                         };
4827                 }
4828                 Ok(())
4829         }
4830
4831         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4832         ///
4833         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4834         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4835         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4836         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4837         ///
4838         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4839         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4840         ///
4841         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4842         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4843         ///
4844         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4845         ///
4846         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4847         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4848         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4849         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4850         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4851         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4852         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4853         pub fn update_channel_config(
4854                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4855         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4856                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4857         }
4858
4859         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4860         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4861         ///
4862         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4863         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4864         ///
4865         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4866         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4867         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4868         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4869         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4870         ///
4871         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4872         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4873         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4874         /// than expected.
4875         ///
4876         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4877         /// backwards.
4878         ///
4879         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4880         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4881         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4882         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4883         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4884         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4885                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4886
4887                 let next_hop_scid = {
4888                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4889                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4890                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4891                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4892                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4893                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4894                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4895                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4896                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4897                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4898                                                 })
4899                                         }
4900                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4901                                 },
4902                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4903                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4904                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4905                                 }),
4906                                 None => {
4907                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4908                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4909                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4910                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4911                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4912                                                 err: error
4913                                         })
4914                                 }
4915                         }
4916                 };
4917
4918                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4919                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4920                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4921                         })?;
4922
4923                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4924                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4925                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4926                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4927                                 }
4928                         },
4929                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4930                 };
4931                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4932                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4933                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4934                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4935                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4936                 };
4937
4938                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4939                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4940                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4941                         payment.prev_channel_id,
4942                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4943                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4944                 )];
4945                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4946                 Ok(())
4947         }
4948
4949         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4950         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4951         ///
4952         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4953         /// backwards.
4954         ///
4955         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4956         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4957                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4958
4959                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4960                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4961                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4962                         })?;
4963
4964                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4965                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4966                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4967                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4968                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4969                                 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4970                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4971                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4972                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4973                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4974                         });
4975
4976                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4977                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4978                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4979                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4980
4981                 Ok(())
4982         }
4983
4984         fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4985                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4986                 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4987
4988                 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4989                         if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4990                                 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4991                                         Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4992                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4993                                                         node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4994                                                         channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4995                                                 },
4996                                         None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4997                                                 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4998                                         },
4999                                 }
5000                         } else {
5001                                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
5002                         }
5003                 };
5004
5005                 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
5006                         let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5007                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5008                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
5009                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
5010                                 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
5011                                 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
5012                                 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
5013                         });
5014                         let (
5015                                 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
5016                                 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
5017                          ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
5018                                 incoming_channel_details
5019                         } else {
5020                                 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5021                                 continue;
5022                         };
5023
5024                         let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5025                         let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5026                         for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5027                                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5028                                         &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5029                                 ) {
5030                                         Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5031                                         Err(htlc_fail) => {
5032                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5033                                                 continue;
5034                                         },
5035                                 };
5036
5037                                 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5038                                 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5039
5040                                 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5041                                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5042                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5043                                         chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5044                                                 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5045                                         )
5046                                 }) {
5047                                         Some(Ok(_)) => {},
5048                                         Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5049                                                 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5050                                                         self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5051                                                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5052                                                         }).flatten()
5053                                                 } else {
5054                                                         None
5055                                                 };
5056                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5057                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5058                                                         outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5059                                                 );
5060                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5061                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5062                                                 continue;
5063                                         },
5064                                         // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5065                                         None => continue 'outer_loop,
5066                                 }
5067
5068                                 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5069                                 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5070                                         if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5071                                                 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5072                                         ) {
5073                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5074                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5075                                                         chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5076                                                 );
5077                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5078                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5079                                                 continue;
5080                                         }
5081                                 }
5082
5083                                 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5084                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5085                                         incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5086                                 ) {
5087                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5088                                                 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5089                                         },
5090                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5091                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5092                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5093                                         },
5094                                 }
5095                         }
5096
5097                         // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5098                         // proposed to as a batch.
5099                         let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5100                                 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5101                         self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5102                         for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5103                                 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5104                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5105                                                 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5106                                                 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5107                                         },
5108                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5109                                                 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5110                                                 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5111                                                 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5112                                         },
5113                                 };
5114                                 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5115                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5116                                         prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5117                                         failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5118                                 }, None));
5119                         }
5120                 }
5121         }
5122
5123         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5124         ///
5125         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5126         /// Will likely generate further events.
5127         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5128                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5129
5130                 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5131
5132                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5133                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5134                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5135                 {
5136                         let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5137                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5138
5139                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5140                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5141                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5142                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5143                                                 () => {
5144                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5145                                                                 match forward_info {
5146                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5147                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5148                                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5149                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5150                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5151                                                                                 }
5152                                                                         }) => {
5153                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5154                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5155                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
5156                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5157
5158                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5159                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5160                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5161                                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5162                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5163                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5164                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5165                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5166                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5167                                                                                                 });
5168
5169                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5170                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5171                                                                                                 } else {
5172                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5173                                                                                                 };
5174
5175                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5176                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5177                                                                                                         reason
5178                                                                                                 ));
5179                                                                                                 continue;
5180                                                                                         }
5181                                                                                 }
5182                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5183                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5184                                                                                                 {
5185                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5186                                                                                                 }
5187                                                                                         }
5188                                                                                 }
5189                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5190                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5191                                                                                                 {
5192                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5193                                                                                                 }
5194                                                                                         }
5195                                                                                 }
5196                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5197                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5198                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5199                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5200                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5201                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5202                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5203                                                                                                 ) {
5204                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
5205                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5206                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5207                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5208                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5209                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5210                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
5211                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5212                                                                                                         },
5213                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5214                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5215                                                                                                         },
5216                                                                                                 };
5217                                                                                                 match next_hop {
5218                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5219                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5220                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5221                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5222                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5223                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5224                                                                                                                 {
5225                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5226                                                                                                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5227                                                                                                                 }
5228                                                                                                         },
5229                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
5230                                                                                                 }
5231                                                                                         } else {
5232                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5233                                                                                         }
5234                                                                                 } else {
5235                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5236                                                                                 }
5237                                                                         },
5238                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5239                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5240                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5241                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5242                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
5243                                                                         }
5244                                                                 }
5245                                                         }
5246                                                 }
5247                                         }
5248                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5249                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5250                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5251                                                 None => {
5252                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5253                                                         continue;
5254                                                 }
5255                                         };
5256                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5257                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5258                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5259                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5260                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5261                                                 continue;
5262                                         }
5263                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5264                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5265                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5266                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5267                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5268                                                         let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5269                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5270                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5271                                                                         prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5272                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5273                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5274                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
5275                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5276                                                                         },
5277                                                                 }) => {
5278                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5279                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5280                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5281                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5282                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5283                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5284                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5285                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5286                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5287                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5288                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5289                                                                         });
5290                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5291                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5292                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5293                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5294                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5295                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5296                                                                                 ).ok()
5297                                                                         });
5298                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5299                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5300                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5301                                                                                 &&logger)
5302                                                                         {
5303                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5304                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5305                                                                                 } else {
5306                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5307                                                                                 }
5308                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5309                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5310                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5311                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5312                                                                                 ));
5313                                                                                 continue;
5314                                                                         }
5315                                                                         None
5316                                                                 },
5317                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5318                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5319                                                                 },
5320                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5321                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5322                                                                         Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5323                                                                 },
5324                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5325                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5326                                                                         let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5327                                                                                 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5328                                                                         );
5329                                                                         Some((res, htlc_id))
5330                                                                 },
5331                                                         };
5332                                                         if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5333                                                                 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5334                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5335                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5336                                                                         } else {
5337                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5338                                                                         }
5339                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5340                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5341                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5342                                                                         continue;
5343                                                                 }
5344                                                         }
5345                                                 }
5346                                         } else {
5347                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5348                                                 continue;
5349                                         }
5350                                 } else {
5351                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5352                                                 match forward_info {
5353                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5354                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5355                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5356                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5357                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5358                                                                 }
5359                                                         }) => {
5360                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5361                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5362                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5363                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5364                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5365                                                                                 requires_blinded_error: _
5366                                                                         } => {
5367                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5368                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5369                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5370                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5371                                                                                         Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5372                                                                         },
5373                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5374                                                                                 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5375                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5376                                                                         } => {
5377                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5378                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5379                                                                                         payment_metadata,
5380                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
5381                                                                                 };
5382                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5383                                                                                         payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5384                                                                         },
5385                                                                         _ => {
5386                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5387                                                                         }
5388                                                                 };
5389                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5390                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5391                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5392                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5393                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5394                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5395                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5396                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5397                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5398                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5399                                                                         },
5400                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5401                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5402                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
5403                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5404                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5405                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
5406                                                                         total_value_received: None,
5407                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5408                                                                         cltv_expiry,
5409                                                                         onion_payload,
5410                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5411                                                                 };
5412
5413                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5414
5415                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5416                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5417                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5418                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5419                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5420                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5421                                                                                 );
5422                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5423                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5424                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5425                                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5426                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5427                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5428                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5429                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5430                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5431                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
5432                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5433                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5434                                                                                 ));
5435                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5436                                                                         }
5437                                                                 }
5438                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5439                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5440                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5441                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5442                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5443                                                                 }
5444
5445                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5446                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
5447                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5448                                                                                 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5449                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5450                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5451                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5452                                                                                 }
5453                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5454                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
5455                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5456                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
5457                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5458                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
5459                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5460                                                                                                 }
5461                                                                                         });
5462                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5463                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5464                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5465                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5466                                                                                 }
5467                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5468                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5469                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5470                                                                                 }
5471                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5472                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5473                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5474                                                                                         }
5475                                                                                 } else {
5476                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5477                                                                                 }
5478                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5479                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5480                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5481                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5482                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5483                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5484                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5485                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5486                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5487                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5488                                                                                         }
5489                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5490                                                                                 }
5491                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5492                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5493                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5494                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5495                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5496                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5497                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
5498                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5499                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5500                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5501                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5502                                                                                         }
5503                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5504                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5505                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5506                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5507                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5508                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5509                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5510                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5511                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5512                                                                                                 payment_hash,
5513                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
5514                                                                                                 amount_msat,
5515                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5516                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5517                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5518                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5519                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5520                                                                                         }, None));
5521                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
5522                                                                                 } else {
5523                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5524                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5525                                                                                         // MPP parts.
5526                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5527                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5528                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5529                                                                                         }
5530                                                                                 }
5531                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
5532                                                                         }}
5533                                                                 }
5534
5535                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5536                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5537                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5538                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5539                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5540                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5541                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5542                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5543                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5544                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5545                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5546                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5547                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5548                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
5549                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
5550                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5551                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5552                                                                                                         }
5553                                                                                                 };
5554                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5555                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5556                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5557                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5558                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5559                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5560                                                                                                         }
5561                                                                                                 }
5562                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5563                                                                                                         payment_preimage,
5564                                                                                                         payment_data.payment_secret,
5565                                                                                                         payment_context,
5566                                                                                                 );
5567                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5568                                                                                         },
5569                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5570                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5571                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5572                                                                                         }
5573                                                                                 }
5574                                                                         },
5575                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5576                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5577                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5578                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5579                                                                                 }
5580                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5581                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5582                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5583                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5584                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5585                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5586                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5587                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5588                                                                                 } else {
5589                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5590                                                                                                 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5591                                                                                                 payment_data.payment_secret,
5592                                                                                                 payment_context,
5593                                                                                         );
5594                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5595                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
5596                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5597                                                                                         }
5598                                                                                 }
5599                                                                         },
5600                                                                 };
5601                                                         },
5602                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5603                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5604                                                         }
5605                                                 }
5606                                         }
5607                                 }
5608                         }
5609                 }
5610
5611                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5612                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5613                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5614                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5615
5616                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5617                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5618                 }
5619                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5620
5621                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5622                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5623                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5624                 // network stack.
5625                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5626
5627                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5628                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5629                 events.append(&mut new_events);
5630         }
5631
5632         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5633         ///
5634         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5635         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5636                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5637
5638                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5639
5640                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5641                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5642                 if background_events.is_empty() {
5643                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5644                 }
5645
5646                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5647                         match event {
5648                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5649                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5650                                         // monitor updating completing.
5651                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5652                                 },
5653                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5654                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
5655                                         {
5656                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5657                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5658                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5659                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5660                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5661                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5662                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5663                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
5664                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5665                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5666                                                                         } else {
5667                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5668                                                                         }
5669                                                                 },
5670                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5671                                                         }
5672                                                 }
5673                                         }
5674                                         if !updated_chan {
5675                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5676                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5677                                         }
5678                                 },
5679                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5680                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5681                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5682                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5683                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5684                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5685                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5686                                                 } else {
5687                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5688                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5689                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5690                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5691                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5692                                                 }
5693                                         }
5694                                 },
5695                         }
5696                 }
5697                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5698         }
5699
5700         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5701         /// Process background events, for functional testing
5702         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5703                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5704                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5705         }
5706
5707         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5708                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5709
5710                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5711
5712                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5713                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5714                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5715                 }
5716                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5717                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5718                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5719                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5720                 }
5721                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5722                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5723
5724                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5725                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5726         }
5727
5728         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5729         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5730         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5731         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5732         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5733         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5734                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5735                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5736
5737                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5738                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5739
5740                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5741                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5742                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5743                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5744                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5745                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5746                                 ) {
5747                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5748                                                 anchor_feerate
5749                                         } else {
5750                                                 non_anchor_feerate
5751                                         };
5752                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5753                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5754                                 }
5755                         }
5756
5757                         should_persist
5758                 });
5759         }
5760
5761         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5762         ///
5763         /// This currently includes:
5764         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5765         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5766         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5767         ///    the channel.
5768         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5769         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5770         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5771         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5772         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5773         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5774         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5775         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
5776         ///
5777         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5778         /// estimate fetches.
5779         ///
5780         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5781         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5782         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5783                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5784                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5785
5786                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5787                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5788
5789                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5790                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5791                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5792                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5793
5794                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5795                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5796                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5797                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5798                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5799                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5800                         | {
5801                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5802                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5803                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5804                                         log_error!(logger,
5805                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5806                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5807                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5808                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5809                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5810                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5811                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5812                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5813                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5814                                                         },
5815                                                 },
5816                                         });
5817                                         false
5818                                 } else {
5819                                         true
5820                                 }
5821                         };
5822
5823                         {
5824                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5825                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5826                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5827                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5828                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5829                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5830                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5831                                                 match phase {
5832                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5833                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5834                                                                         anchor_feerate
5835                                                                 } else {
5836                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
5837                                                                 };
5838                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5839                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5840
5841                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5842                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5843                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5844                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
5845                                                                 }
5846
5847                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5848                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5849                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5850                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5851                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5852                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5853                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5854                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5855                                                                                 n += 1;
5856                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5857                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5858                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5859                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5860                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5861                                                                                                         msg: update
5862                                                                                                 });
5863                                                                                         }
5864                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5865                                                                                 } else {
5866                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5867                                                                                 }
5868                                                                         },
5869                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5870                                                                                 n += 1;
5871                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5872                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5873                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5874                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5875                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5876                                                                                                         msg: update
5877                                                                                                 });
5878                                                                                         }
5879                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5880                                                                                 } else {
5881                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5882                                                                                 }
5883                                                                         },
5884                                                                         _ => {},
5885                                                                 }
5886
5887                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5888
5889                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5890                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5891                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5892                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5893                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5894                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5895                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5896                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5897                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5898                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5899                                                                                         },
5900                                                                                 },
5901                                                                         });
5902                                                                 }
5903
5904                                                                 true
5905                                                         },
5906                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5907                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5908                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5909                                                         },
5910                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5911                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5912                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5913                                                         },
5914                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5915                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5916                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5917                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5918                                                         },
5919                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5920                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5921                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5922                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5923                                                         },
5924                                                 }
5925                                         });
5926
5927                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5928                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5929                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5930                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5931                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5932                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5933                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5934                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5935                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5936                                                                         },
5937                                                                 }
5938                                                         );
5939                                                 }
5940                                         }
5941                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5942
5943                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5944                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5945                                         }
5946                                 }
5947                         }
5948
5949                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5950                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5951                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5952                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5953                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5954                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5955                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5956                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5957                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5958                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5959                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5960                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5961                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5962                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5963                                                         let remove_entry = {
5964                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5965                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5966                                                         };
5967                                                         if remove_entry {
5968                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5969                                                         }
5970                                                 },
5971                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5972                                         }
5973                                 }
5974                         }
5975
5976                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5977                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5978                                         // This should be unreachable
5979                                         debug_assert!(false);
5980                                         return false;
5981                                 }
5982                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5983                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5984                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5985                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5986                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5987                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5988                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5989                                         {
5990                                                 return true;
5991                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5992                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5993                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5994                                         }) {
5995                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5996                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5997                                                 return false;
5998                                         }
5999                                 }
6000                                 true
6001                         });
6002
6003                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
6004                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
6005                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
6006                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
6007                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6008                         }
6009
6010                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6011                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6012                         }
6013
6014                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
6015                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6016                         }
6017
6018                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6019                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
6020                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
6021                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
6022                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
6023                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6024                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6025                         );
6026
6027                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6028                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6029                         );
6030
6031                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6032                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6033                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6034                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6035                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6036                         }
6037
6038                         should_persist
6039                 });
6040         }
6041
6042         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6043         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6044         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6045         ///
6046         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6047         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6048         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6049         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6050         ///
6051         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6052         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6053         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6054         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6055         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6056                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6057         }
6058
6059         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6060         /// reason for the failure.
6061         ///
6062         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6063         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6064                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6065
6066                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6067                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6068                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6069                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6070                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6071                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6072                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6073                         }
6074                 }
6075         }
6076
6077         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6078         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6079                 match failure_code {
6080                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6081                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6082                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6083                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6084                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6085                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6086                         },
6087                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6088                                 let fail_data = match data {
6089                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6090                                         None => Vec::new(),
6091                                 };
6092                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6093                         }
6094                 }
6095         }
6096
6097         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6098         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6099         ///
6100         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6101         /// forwarding
6102         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6103                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6104                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6105                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6106                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6107                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6108                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6109                 } else {
6110                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6111                 };
6112                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6113                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6114                 } else {
6115                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6116                 }
6117         }
6118
6119
6120         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6121         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6122         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6123                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6124                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6125                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6126                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6127                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6128                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6129                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6130                         }
6131                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6132                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6133                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6134                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6135                 } else {
6136                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6137                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6138                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6139                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6140                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6141                 }
6142         }
6143
6144         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6145         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6146         // be surfaced to the user.
6147         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6148                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6149                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6150         ) {
6151                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6152                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6153                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6154                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6155                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6156                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6157                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6158                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6159                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6160                                                 } else {
6161                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6162                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6163                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6164                                                 }
6165                                         },
6166                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6167                                 }
6168                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6169                 };
6170
6171                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6172                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6173                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6174                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6175                 }
6176         }
6177
6178         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6179                 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6180                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6181         }
6182
6183         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6184         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6185         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6186                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6187                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6188                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6189                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6190                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6191                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6192                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6193                 }
6194
6195                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6196                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6197                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6198                 //timer handling.
6199
6200                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6201                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6202                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6203                 let mut push_forward_event;
6204                 match source {
6205                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6206                                 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6207                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6208                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6209                         },
6210                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6211                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6212                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6213                         }) => {
6214                                 log_trace!(
6215                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6216                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6217                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6218                                 );
6219                                 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6220                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6221                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6222                                                 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6223                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6224                                                 );
6225                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6226                                         },
6227                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6228                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6229                                                         htlc_id: *htlc_id,
6230                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6231                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6232                                                 }
6233                                         },
6234                                         None => {
6235                                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6236                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6237                                                 );
6238                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6239                                         }
6240                                 };
6241
6242                                 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6243                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6244                                 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6245                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6246                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6247                                                 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6248                                         },
6249                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6250                                                 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6251                                         }
6252                                 }
6253                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6254                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6255                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6256                                         prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6257                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
6258                                 }, None));
6259                         },
6260                 }
6261                 push_forward_event
6262         }
6263
6264         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6265         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6266         ///
6267         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6268         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6269         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6270         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6271         ///
6272         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6273         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6274         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6275         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6276         ///
6277         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6278         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6279         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6280         ///
6281         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6282         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6283         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6284         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6285         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6286         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6287         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6288         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6289                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6290         }
6291
6292         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6293         /// even type numbers.
6294         ///
6295         /// # Note
6296         ///
6297         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6298         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6299         ///
6300         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6301         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6302                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6303         }
6304
6305         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6306                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6307
6308                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6309
6310                 let mut sources = {
6311                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6312                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6313                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6314                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6315                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6316                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6317                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6318                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6319                                                 break;
6320                                         }
6321                                 }
6322
6323                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6324                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6325                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6326                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6327                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6328                                 });
6329                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6330                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6331                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6332                                                 &payment_hash);
6333                                 }
6334
6335                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6336                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6337                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6338                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6339                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6340                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6341                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6342                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6343                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6344                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6345                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6346                                                 }
6347                                                 return;
6348                                         }
6349                                 }
6350
6351                                 payment.htlcs
6352                         } else { return; }
6353                 };
6354                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6355
6356                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6357                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6358                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6359                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6360                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6361                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6362                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6363                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6364                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6365                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6366                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6367                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6368                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6369                                 debug_assert!(false);
6370                                 valid_mpp = false;
6371                                 break;
6372                         }
6373                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6374
6375                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6376                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6377                                 debug_assert!(false);
6378                                 valid_mpp = false;
6379                                 break;
6380                         }
6381                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6382                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6383                 }
6384                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6385                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6386                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6387                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6388                         return;
6389                 }
6390                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6391                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6392                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6393                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6394                         return;
6395                 }
6396                 if valid_mpp {
6397                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6398                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6399                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6400                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6401                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6402                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6403                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6404                                         }
6405                                 ) {
6406                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6407                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6408                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6409                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6410                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6411                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6412                                 }
6413                         }
6414                 }
6415                 if !valid_mpp {
6416                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6417                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6418                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6419                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6420                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6421                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6422                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6423                         }
6424                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6425                 }
6426
6427                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6428                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6429                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6430                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6431                 }
6432         }
6433
6434         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6435                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6436         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6437                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6438
6439                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6440                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6441                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6442                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6443
6444                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6445                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6446                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6447                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6448
6449                 {
6450                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6451                         let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6452                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6453                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6454                                 None => None
6455                         };
6456
6457                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6458                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6459                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6460                         ).unwrap_or(None);
6461
6462                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6463                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6464                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6465                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6466                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6467                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6468                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6469                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6470
6471                                                 match fulfill_res {
6472                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6473                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6474                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6475                                                                                 chan_id, action);
6476                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6477                                                                 }
6478                                                                 if !during_init {
6479                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6480                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6481                                                                 } else {
6482                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6483                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6484                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
6485                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6486                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6487                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
6488                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6489                                                                                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6490                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
6491                                                                                 });
6492                                                                 }
6493                                                         }
6494                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6495                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6496                                                                         action
6497                                                                 } else {
6498                                                                         return Ok(());
6499                                                                 };
6500                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6501
6502                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6503                                                                         chan_id, action);
6504                                                                 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6505                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6506                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6507                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6508                                                                         blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6509                                                                 } = action {
6510                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6511                                                                 } else {
6512                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
6513                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6514                                                                         return Ok(());
6515                                                                 };
6516                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6517                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6518                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6519                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6520                                                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6521                                                                         {
6522                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
6523                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6524                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6525                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
6526                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6527                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6528                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6529                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6530                                                                                 });
6531                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6532                                                                         }
6533                                                                 } else {
6534                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6535                                                                 }
6536                                                         }
6537                                                 }
6538                                         }
6539                                         return Ok(());
6540                                 }
6541                         }
6542                 }
6543                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6544                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6545                         counterparty_node_id: None,
6546                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6547                                 payment_preimage,
6548                         }],
6549                         channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6550                 };
6551
6552                 if !during_init {
6553                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6554                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6555                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6556                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6557                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6558                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6559                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6560                                 // again on restart.
6561                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6562                                         "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6563                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
6564                         }
6565                 } else {
6566                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6567                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6568                         // event.
6569                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6570                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6571                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6572                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6573                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6574                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6575                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6576                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6577                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6578                                         prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6579                                 )));
6580                 }
6581                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6582                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6583                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6584                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6585                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6586                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6587                 Ok(())
6588         }
6589
6590         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6591                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6592         }
6593
6594         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6595                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6596                 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6597                 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6598         ) {
6599                 match source {
6600                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6601                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6602                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6603                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6604                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6605                                 }
6606                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6607                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6608                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6609                                 };
6610                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6611                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6612                                         &self.logger);
6613                         },
6614                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6615                                 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6616                                 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6617                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6618                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6619                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6620                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6621                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6622                                                 let chan_to_release =
6623                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6624                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6625                                                         } else {
6626                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6627                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6628                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6629                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6630                                                                 // closed.
6631                                                                 None
6632                                                         };
6633
6634                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6635                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6636                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6637                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6638                                                         // in the background.
6639                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6640                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6641                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6642                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6643                                                                         match ev {
6644                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6645                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6646                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
6647                                                                                 } => {
6648                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6649                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6650                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6651                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6652                                                                                                         } = upd {
6653                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6654                                                                                                         } else { false }
6655                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
6656                                                                                                 true
6657                                                                                         } else { false }
6658                                                                                 },
6659                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6660                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6661                                                                                         (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6662                                                                                 ) => {
6663                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6664                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6665                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
6666                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
6667                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6668                                                                                                 ));
6669                                                                                                 true
6670                                                                                         } else { false }
6671                                                                                 },
6672                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6673                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
6674                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6675                                                                                         channel_id, ..
6676                                                                                 } =>
6677                                                                                         *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6678                                                                         }
6679                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6680                                                         }
6681                                                         None
6682                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6683                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6684                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6685                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6686                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6687                                                                         downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6688                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6689                                                                 })
6690                                                         } else { None }
6691                                                 } else {
6692                                                         let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6693                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6694                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6695                                                                 } else { None }
6696                                                         } else { None };
6697                                                         debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6698                                                                 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6699                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6700                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6701                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6702                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6703                                                                         prev_user_channel_id,
6704                                                                         next_user_channel_id,
6705                                                                         total_fee_earned_msat,
6706                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6707                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6708                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6709                                                                 },
6710                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6711                                                         })
6712                                                 }
6713                                         });
6714                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6715                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6716                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6717                                 }
6718                         },
6719                 }
6720         }
6721
6722         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6723         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6724                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6725         }
6726
6727         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6728                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6729                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6730                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6731
6732                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6733                         match action {
6734                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6735                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6736                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6737                                                 amount_msat,
6738                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
6739                                                 receiver_node_id,
6740                                                 htlcs,
6741                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6742                                         }) = payment {
6743                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6744                                                         payment_hash,
6745                                                         purpose,
6746                                                         amount_msat,
6747                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6748                                                         htlcs,
6749                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
6750                                                 }, None));
6751                                         }
6752                                 },
6753                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6754                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6755                                 } => {
6756                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6757                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6758                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6759                                         }
6760                                 },
6761                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6762                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6763                                 } => {
6764                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6765                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6766                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6767                                                 downstream_channel_id,
6768                                                 Some(blocking_action),
6769                                         );
6770                                 },
6771                         }
6772                 }
6773         }
6774
6775         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6776         /// update completion.
6777         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6778                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6779                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6780                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6781                 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6782                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6783         -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6784                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6785                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6786                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
6787                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6788                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6789                         pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6790                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6791                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6792                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6793
6794                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6795                 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6796
6797                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6798                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6799                         htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6800                                 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6801                 }
6802                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6803                 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6804                         decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6805                 }
6806
6807                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6808                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6809                 }
6810                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6811                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6812                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6813                                 msg,
6814                         });
6815                 }
6816
6817                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6818                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6819                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6820                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6821                                         updates: update,
6822                                 });
6823                         }
6824                 } }
6825                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6826                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6827                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6828                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6829                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
6830                                 });
6831                         }
6832                 } }
6833                 match order {
6834                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6835                                 handle_cs!();
6836                                 handle_raa!();
6837                         },
6838                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6839                                 handle_raa!();
6840                                 handle_cs!();
6841                         },
6842                 }
6843
6844                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6845                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6846                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6847                 }
6848
6849                 {
6850                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6851                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6852                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6853                 }
6854
6855                 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6856         }
6857
6858         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6859                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6860
6861                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6862                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6863                         None => {
6864                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6865                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6866                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6867                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6868                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6869                                         None => return,
6870                                 }
6871                         }
6872                 };
6873                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6874                 let mut peer_state_lock;
6875                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6876                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6877                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6878                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6879                 let channel =
6880                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6881                                 chan
6882                         } else {
6883                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6884                                         .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6885                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6886                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6887                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6888                                 return;
6889                         };
6890                 let remaining_in_flight =
6891                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6892                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6893                                 pending.len()
6894                         } else { 0 };
6895                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6896                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6897                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6898                         remaining_in_flight);
6899                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6900                         return;
6901                 }
6902                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6903         }
6904
6905         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6906         ///
6907         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6908         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6909         /// the channel.
6910         ///
6911         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6912         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6913         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6914         ///
6915         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6916         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6917         /// used to accept such channels.
6918         ///
6919         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6920         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6921         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6922                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6923         }
6924
6925         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6926         /// it as confirmed immediately.
6927         ///
6928         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6929         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6930         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6931         ///
6932         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6933         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6934         ///
6935         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6936         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6937         ///
6938         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6939         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6940         ///
6941         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6942         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6943         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6944                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6945         }
6946
6947         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6948
6949                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6950                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6951
6952                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6953                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6954                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6955                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6956                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6957                         let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6958                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6959
6960                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6961                 })?;
6962                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6963                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6964                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6965
6966                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6967                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6968                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6969                 // succeed.
6970                 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6971                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6972                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6973                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6974                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6975                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6976                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6977                         },
6978                         _ => {
6979                                 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6980                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6981
6982                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6983                         }
6984                 };
6985
6986                 match res {
6987                         Err(err) => {
6988                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6989                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6990                                 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6991                                         Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6992                                         Err(e) => {
6993                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6994                                         },
6995                                 }
6996                         }
6997                         Ok(mut channel) => {
6998                                 if accept_0conf {
6999                                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
7000                                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
7001                                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
7002                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7003                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7004                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7005                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
7006                                                 }
7007                                         };
7008                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7009                                         let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
7010                                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7011
7012                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7013                                 } else {
7014                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7015                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7016                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7017                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
7018                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7019                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7020                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7021                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
7022                                                         }
7023                                                 };
7024                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7025                                                 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7026                                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7027
7028                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7029                                         }
7030                                 }
7031
7032                                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7033                                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7034                                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7035
7036                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7037                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7038                                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7039                                 });
7040
7041                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7042
7043                                 Ok(())
7044                         },
7045                 }
7046         }
7047
7048         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7049         /// or 0-conf channels.
7050         ///
7051         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7052         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7053         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7054         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7055                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7056                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7057                 {
7058                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7059                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7060                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7061                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7062                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7063                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7064                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7065                                 }
7066                         }
7067                 }
7068                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7069         }
7070
7071         fn unfunded_channel_count(
7072                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7073         ) -> usize {
7074                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7075                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7076                         match phase {
7077                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7078                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7079                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7080                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7081                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7082                                         {
7083                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7084                                         }
7085                                 },
7086                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7087                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7088                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7089                                         }
7090                                 },
7091                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7092                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7093                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7094                                         // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7095                                         // included in the unfunded count.
7096                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7097                                                 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7098                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7099                                         }
7100                                 },
7101                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7102                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7103                                         continue;
7104                                 },
7105                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7106                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7107                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7108                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7109                                         continue;
7110                                 }
7111                         }
7112                 }
7113                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7114         }
7115
7116         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7117                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7118                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7119                 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7120                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7121                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7122                 }
7123
7124                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7125                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7126                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7127                 }
7128
7129                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7130                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7131                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7132                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7133                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7134
7135                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7136                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7137                     .ok_or_else(|| {
7138                                 debug_assert!(false);
7139                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7140                                         format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7141                                         msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7142                         })?;
7143                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7144                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7145
7146                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7147                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7148                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7149                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7150                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7151                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7152                 {
7153                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7154                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7155                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7156                 }
7157
7158                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7159                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7160                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7161                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7162                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7163                 }
7164
7165                 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7166                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7167                 if channel_exists {
7168                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7169                                 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7170                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7171                 }
7172
7173                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7174                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7175                         let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7176                                         &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7177                                 ).map_err(|e|
7178                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7179                                 )?;
7180                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7181                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7182                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7183                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7184                                 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7185                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7186                                 channel_type,
7187                         }, None));
7188                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7189                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7190                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7191                         });
7192                         return Ok(());
7193                 }
7194
7195                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7196                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7197                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7198                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7199                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7200                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7201                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7202                 {
7203                         Err(e) => {
7204                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7205                         },
7206                         Ok(res) => res
7207                 };
7208
7209                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7210                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7211                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7212                                 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7213                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7214                 }
7215                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7216                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7217                                 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7218                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7219                 }
7220
7221                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7222                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7223
7224                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7225                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7226                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7227                 });
7228                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7229                 Ok(())
7230         }
7231
7232         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7233                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7234                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7235                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7236                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7237                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7238                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7239                                         debug_assert!(false);
7240                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7241                                 })?;
7242                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7243                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7244                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7245                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7246                                         match phase.get_mut() {
7247                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7248                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7249                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7250                                                 },
7251                                                 _ => {
7252                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7253                                                 }
7254                                         }
7255                                 },
7256                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7257                         }
7258                 };
7259                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7260                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7261                         temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7262                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7263                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
7264                         output_script,
7265                         user_channel_id: user_id,
7266                 }, None));
7267                 Ok(())
7268         }
7269
7270         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7271                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7272
7273                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7274                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7275                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7276                                 debug_assert!(false);
7277                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7278                         })?;
7279
7280                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7281                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7282                 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7283                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7284                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7285                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7286                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7287                                                 Ok(res) => res,
7288                                                 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7289                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7290                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7291                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7292                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7293                                                         // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7294                                                         // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7295                                                         // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7296                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7297                                                 },
7298                                         }
7299                                 },
7300                                 Some(mut phase) => {
7301                                         let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7302                                         let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7303                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7304                                 },
7305                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7306                         };
7307
7308                 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7309
7310                 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7311                         // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7312                         // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7313                         // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7314                         // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7315                         // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7316                         // on the channel.
7317                         let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7318                         chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7319                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7320                 } } }
7321
7322                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7323                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7324                                 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7325                         },
7326                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7327                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7328                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7329                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7330                                                 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7331                                         },
7332                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7333                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7334                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7335                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7336                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7337
7338                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7339                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7340                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7341                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
7342                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7343                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7344                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7345                                                                         msg,
7346                                                                 });
7347                                                         }
7348
7349                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7350                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7351                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7352                                                         } else {
7353                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7354                                                         }
7355                                                         Ok(())
7356                                                 } else {
7357                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7358                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7359                                                         fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7360                                                 }
7361                                         }
7362                                 }
7363                         }
7364                 }
7365         }
7366
7367         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7368                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7369                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7370                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7371                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7372                                 debug_assert!(false);
7373                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7374                         })?;
7375
7376                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7377                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7378                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7379                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7380                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7381                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7382                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
7383                                                 &self.logger,
7384                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7385                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7386                                         );
7387                                         let res =
7388                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7389                                         match res {
7390                                                 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7391                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7392                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7393                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7394                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7395                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7396                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7397                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7398                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7399                                                                 Ok(())
7400                                                         } else {
7401                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7402                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7403                                                                 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7404                                                                 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7405                                                                 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7406                                                                 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7407                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7408                                                         }
7409                                                 },
7410                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
7411                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7412                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7413                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7414                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7415                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7416                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7417                                                 }
7418                                         }
7419                                 } else {
7420                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7421                                 }
7422                         },
7423                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7424                 }
7425         }
7426
7427         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7428                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7429                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7430                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7431                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7432                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7433                                 debug_assert!(false);
7434                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7435                         })?;
7436                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7437                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7438                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7439                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7440                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7441                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7442                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7443                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7444                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7445                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7446                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7447                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7448                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
7449                                                 });
7450                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7451                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7452                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7453                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7454                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7455                                                 // announcement_signatures.
7456                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7457                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7458                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7459                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7460                                                                 msg,
7461                                                         });
7462                                                 }
7463                                         }
7464
7465                                         {
7466                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7467                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7468                                         }
7469
7470                                         Ok(())
7471                                 } else {
7472                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7473                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7474                                 }
7475                         },
7476                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7477                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7478                         }
7479                 }
7480         }
7481
7482         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7483                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7484                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7485                 {
7486                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7487                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7488                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7489                                         debug_assert!(false);
7490                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7491                                 })?;
7492                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7493                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7494                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7495                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7496                                 match phase {
7497                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7498                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7499                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7500                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7501                                                                 msg.channel_id,
7502                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7503                                                 }
7504
7505                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7506                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7507                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7508                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7509
7510                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7511                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7512                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7513                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7514                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7515                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7516                                                                 msg,
7517                                                         });
7518                                                 }
7519                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7520                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7521                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7522                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7523                                                 }
7524                                         },
7525                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7526                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7527                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7528                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7529                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7530                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7531                                         },
7532                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7533                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7534                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7535                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7536                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7537                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7538                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7539                                         },
7540                                 }
7541                         } else {
7542                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7543                         }
7544                 }
7545                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7546                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7547                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7548                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7549                 }
7550                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7551                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7552                 }
7553
7554                 Ok(())
7555         }
7556
7557         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7558                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7559                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7560                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7561                                 debug_assert!(false);
7562                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7563                         })?;
7564                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7565                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7566                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7567                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7568                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7569                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7570                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7571                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7572                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7573                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7574                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7575                                                                 msg,
7576                                                         });
7577                                                 }
7578                                                 if tx.is_some() {
7579                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7580                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7581                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7582                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7583                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7584                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7585                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7586                                         } else {
7587                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7588                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7589                                         }
7590                                 },
7591                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7592                         }
7593                 };
7594                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7595                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7596                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7597                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7598                 }
7599                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7600                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7601                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7602                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7603                                         msg: update
7604                                 });
7605                         }
7606                 }
7607                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7608                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7609                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7610                 }
7611                 Ok(())
7612         }
7613
7614         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7615                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7616                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7617                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7618                 //
7619                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7620                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7621                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7622                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7623
7624                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7625                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7626
7627                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7628                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7629                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7630                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7631                                 debug_assert!(false);
7632                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7633                         })?;
7634                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7635                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7636                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7637                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7638                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7639                                         let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7640                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7641                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7642                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7643                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7644                                                         ),
7645                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7646                                         };
7647                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7648                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7649                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7650                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7651                                         if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7652                                                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7653                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7654                                                                 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7655                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7656                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7657                                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7658                                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7659                                                                 }
7660                                                         ))
7661                                                 } else {
7662                                                         match pending_forward_info {
7663                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7664                                                                         ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7665                                                                 }) => {
7666                                                                         let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7667                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7668                                                                         } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7669                                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7670                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7671                                                                         } else {
7672                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7673                                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7674                                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7675                                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7676                                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7677                                                                                 reason
7678                                                                         };
7679                                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7680                                                                 },
7681                                                                 _ => {},
7682                                                         }
7683                                                 }
7684                                         }
7685                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7686                                 } else {
7687                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7688                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7689                                 }
7690                         },
7691                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7692                 }
7693                 Ok(())
7694         }
7695
7696         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7697                 let funding_txo;
7698                 let next_user_channel_id;
7699                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7700                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7701                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7702                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7703                                         debug_assert!(false);
7704                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7705                                 })?;
7706                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7707                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7708                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7709                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7710                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7711                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7712                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7713                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7714                                                         log_trace!(logger,
7715                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7716                                                                 msg.channel_id);
7717                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7718                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7719                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7720                                                 }
7721                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7722                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7723                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7724                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7725                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7726                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7727                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7728                                                 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7729                                                 res
7730                                         } else {
7731                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7732                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7733                                         }
7734                                 },
7735                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7736                         }
7737                 };
7738                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7739                         Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7740                         funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7741                 );
7742
7743                 Ok(())
7744         }
7745
7746         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7747                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7748                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7749                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7750                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7751                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7752                                 debug_assert!(false);
7753                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7754                         })?;
7755                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7756                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7757                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7758                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7759                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7760                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7761                                 } else {
7762                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7763                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7764                                 }
7765                         },
7766                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7767                 }
7768                 Ok(())
7769         }
7770
7771         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7772                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7773                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7774                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7775                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7776                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7777                                 debug_assert!(false);
7778                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7779                         })?;
7780                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7781                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7782                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7783                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7784                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7785                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7786                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7787                                 }
7788                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7789                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7790                                 } else {
7791                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7792                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7793                                 }
7794                                 Ok(())
7795                         },
7796                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7797                 }
7798         }
7799
7800         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7801                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7802                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7803                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7804                                 debug_assert!(false);
7805                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7806                         })?;
7807                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7808                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7809                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7810                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7811                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7812                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7813                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7814                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7815                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7816                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7817                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7818                                         }
7819                                         Ok(())
7820                                 } else {
7821                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7822                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7823                                 }
7824                         },
7825                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7826                 }
7827         }
7828
7829         fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7830                 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7831                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7832                 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7833                 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7834                 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7835                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7836                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7837                 }
7838                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7839         }
7840
7841         #[inline]
7842         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7843                 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7844                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7845         }
7846
7847         #[inline]
7848         fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7849                 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7850                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7851                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7852                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7853                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7854                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7855                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7856                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7857                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7858                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7859                                         };
7860                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7861                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7862
7863                                         let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7864                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7865                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7866                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7867                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7868                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7869                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7870                                                 },
7871                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7872                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7873                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7874                                                         {
7875                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7876                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7877                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7878                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7879                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7880                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7881                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7882                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7883                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7884                                                                                         intercept_id
7885                                                                                 }, None));
7886                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7887                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7888                                                                         },
7889                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7890                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7891                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7892                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7893                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7894                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7895                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7896                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7897                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7898                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7899                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
7900                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7901                                                                                 });
7902
7903                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7904                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7905                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7906                                                                                 ));
7907                                                                         }
7908                                                                 }
7909                                                         } else {
7910                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7911                                                                 // payments are being processed.
7912                                                                 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7913                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7914                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7915                                                         }
7916                                                 }
7917                                         }
7918                                 }
7919                         }
7920
7921                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7922                                 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7923                         }
7924
7925                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7926                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7927                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7928                         }
7929                 }
7930                 push_forward_event
7931         }
7932
7933         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7934                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7935                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7936                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7937                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7938                 ).count();
7939                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7940                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7941                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7942                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7943                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7944                 // real by taking more time.
7945                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7946                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7947                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7948                         }, None));
7949                 }
7950         }
7951
7952         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7953         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7954         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7955         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7956         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7957                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7958                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7959         ) -> bool {
7960                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7961                         .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7962                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7963                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7964                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
7965                                 channel_id,
7966                                 counterparty_node_id,
7967                         })
7968                 })
7969         }
7970
7971         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7972         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7973                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7974         ) -> bool {
7975                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7976                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7977                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7978                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7979
7980                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7981                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7982                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7983                         }
7984                 }
7985                 false
7986         }
7987
7988         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7989                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7990                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7991                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7992                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7993                                         debug_assert!(false);
7994                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7995                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7996                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7997                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7998                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7999                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8000                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8001                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8002                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
8003                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
8004                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
8005                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
8006                                                 } else { false };
8007                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
8008                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
8009                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
8010                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
8011                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
8012                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
8013                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8014                                                 }
8015                                                 htlcs_to_fail
8016                                         } else {
8017                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8018                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8019                                         }
8020                                 },
8021                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8022                         }
8023                 };
8024                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8025                 Ok(())
8026         }
8027
8028         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8029                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8030                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8031                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8032                                 debug_assert!(false);
8033                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8034                         })?;
8035                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8036                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8037                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8038                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8039                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8040                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8041                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8042                                 } else {
8043                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8044                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8045                                 }
8046                         },
8047                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8048                 }
8049                 Ok(())
8050         }
8051
8052         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8053                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8054                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8055                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8056                                 debug_assert!(false);
8057                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8058                         })?;
8059                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8060                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8061                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8062                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8063                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8064                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8065                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8066                                         }
8067
8068                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8069                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8070                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8071                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
8072                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
8073                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8074                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8075                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8076                                         });
8077                                 } else {
8078                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8079                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8080                                 }
8081                         },
8082                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8083                 }
8084                 Ok(())
8085         }
8086
8087         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8088         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8089                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8090                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8091                         None => {
8092                                 // It's not a local channel
8093                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8094                         }
8095                 };
8096                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8097                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8098                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8099                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8100                 }
8101                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8102                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8103                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8104                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8105                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8106                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8107                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8108                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8109                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8110                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8111                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8112                                                 }
8113                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8114                                         }
8115                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8116                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8117                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8118                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8119                                         } else {
8120                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8121                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8122                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8123                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8124                                                 // persisting.
8125                                                 if !did_change {
8126                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8127                                                 }
8128                                         }
8129                                 } else {
8130                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8131                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8132                                 }
8133                         },
8134                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8135                 }
8136                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8137         }
8138
8139         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8140                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8141                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8142
8143                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8144                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
8145                                         debug_assert!(false);
8146                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8147                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8148                                                 msg.channel_id
8149                                         )
8150                                 })?;
8151                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
8152                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8153                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8154                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8155                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8156                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8157                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8158                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8159                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8160                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8161                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8162                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8163                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8164                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
8165                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8166                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8167                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8168                                                                 msg,
8169                                                         });
8170                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8171                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8172                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8173                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
8174                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8175                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8176                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8177                                                                         msg,
8178                                                                 });
8179                                                         }
8180                                                 }
8181                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8182                                                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8183                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8184                                                         Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8185                                                 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8186                                                 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8187                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8188                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8189                                                 }
8190                                                 need_lnd_workaround
8191                                         } else {
8192                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8193                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8194                                         }
8195                                 },
8196                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8197                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8198                                                 msg.channel_id);
8199                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8200                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8201                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8202                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8203                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8204                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8205                                         //
8206                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8207                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8208                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8209                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8210                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8211                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8212                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8213                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8214                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8215                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8216                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8217                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8218                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8219                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8220                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8221                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
8222                                                 },
8223                                         });
8224                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8225                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8226                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8227                                         )
8228                                 }
8229                         }
8230                 };
8231
8232                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8233                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8234                 }
8235                 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8236         }
8237
8238         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8239         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8240                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8241
8242                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8243                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8244                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8245                 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8246                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8247                                 match monitor_event {
8248                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8249                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8250                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8251                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8252                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8253                                                                 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8254                                                                 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8255                                                 } else {
8256                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8257                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8258                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8259                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8260                                                 }
8261                                         },
8262                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8263                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8264                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8265                                                         None => {
8266                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8267                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8268                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8269                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8270                                                         }
8271                                                 };
8272                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8273                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8274                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8275                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8276                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8277                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8278                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8279                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8280                                                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8281                                                                                         reason
8282                                                                                 } else {
8283                                                                                         ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8284                                                                                 };
8285                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8286                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8287                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8288                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8289                                                                                                 msg: update
8290                                                                                         });
8291                                                                                 }
8292                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8293                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8294                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8295                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8296                                                                                         },
8297                                                                                 });
8298                                                                         }
8299                                                                 }
8300                                                         }
8301                                                 }
8302                                         },
8303                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8304                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8305                                         },
8306                                 }
8307                         }
8308                 }
8309
8310                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8311                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8312                 }
8313
8314                 has_pending_monitor_events
8315         }
8316
8317         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8318         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8319         /// update events as a separate process method here.
8320         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
8321         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8322                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8323                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8324         }
8325
8326         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8327         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8328         /// update was applied.
8329         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8330                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8331                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8332
8333                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8334                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8335                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8336                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8337                 'peer_loop: loop {
8338                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8339                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8340                                 'chan_loop: loop {
8341                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8342                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8343                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8344                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8345                                         ) {
8346                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8347                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8348                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8349                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8350                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8351                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8352                                                 }
8353                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8354                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
8355
8356                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8357                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8358                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
8359                                                 }
8360                                         }
8361                                         break 'chan_loop;
8362                                 }
8363                         }
8364                         break 'peer_loop;
8365                 }
8366
8367                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8368                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8369                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8370                 }
8371
8372                 has_update
8373         }
8374
8375         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8376         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8377         ///
8378         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8379         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8380         ///
8381         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8382         #[cfg(async_signing)]
8383         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8384                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8385
8386                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8387                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8388                         match phase {
8389                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8390                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8391                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8392                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8393                                                         node_id,
8394                                                         updates,
8395                                                 });
8396                                         }
8397                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8398                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8399                                                         node_id,
8400                                                         msg,
8401                                                 });
8402                                         }
8403                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8404                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8405                                         }
8406                                 }
8407                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8408                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8409                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8410                                                         node_id,
8411                                                         msg,
8412                                                 });
8413                                         }
8414                                 }
8415                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8416                         }
8417                 };
8418
8419                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8420                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8421                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8422                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8423                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8424                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8425                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8426                                 }
8427                         }
8428                 } else {
8429                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8430                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8431                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8432                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8433                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8434                                 }
8435                         }
8436                 }
8437         }
8438
8439         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8440         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8441         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8442         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8443                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8444                 let mut has_update = false;
8445                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8446                 {
8447                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8448
8449                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8450                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8451                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8452                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8453                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8454                                         match phase {
8455                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8456                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8457                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8458                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8459                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8460                                                                                 has_update = true;
8461                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8462                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8463                                                                                 });
8464                                                                         }
8465                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8466                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8467                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8468                                                                         }
8469                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8470                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8471                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8472                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8473                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8474                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8475                                                                                                 msg: update
8476                                                                                         });
8477                                                                                 }
8478
8479                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8480                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8481                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8482                                                                                 false
8483                                                                         } else { true }
8484                                                                 },
8485                                                                 Err(e) => {
8486                                                                         has_update = true;
8487                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8488                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8489                                                                         !close_channel
8490                                                                 }
8491                                                         }
8492                                                 },
8493                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8494                                         }
8495                                 });
8496                         }
8497                 }
8498
8499                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8500                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8501                 }
8502
8503                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8504                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8505                 }
8506
8507                 has_update
8508         }
8509
8510         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8511         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8512         /// Channel object.
8513         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8514                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8515                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8516                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8517                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
8518                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8519                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8520                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8521                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8522                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8523                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8524                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8525                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
8526                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
8527                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8528                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8529                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8530                                         });
8531                         }
8532                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8533                 }
8534         }
8535 }
8536
8537 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8538         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8539         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8540         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8541         ///
8542         /// # Privacy
8543         ///
8544         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8545         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8546         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8547         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8548         /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8549         ///
8550         /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8551         ///
8552         /// # Limitations
8553         ///
8554         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8555         /// reply path.
8556         ///
8557         /// # Errors
8558         ///
8559         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8560         ///
8561         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8562         ///
8563         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8564         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8565         pub fn create_offer_builder(
8566                 &$self, description: String
8567         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8568                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8569                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8570                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8571                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8572
8573                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8574                 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8575                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8576                 )
8577                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8578                         .path(path);
8579
8580                 Ok(builder.into())
8581         }
8582 } }
8583
8584 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8585         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8586         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8587         ///
8588         /// # Payment
8589         ///
8590         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8591         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8592         ///
8593         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8594         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8595         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8596         /// expired.
8597         ///
8598         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8599         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8600         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8601         ///
8602         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8603         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8604         ///
8605         /// # Privacy
8606         ///
8607         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8608         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8609         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8610         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8611         /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8612         ///
8613         /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8614         ///
8615         /// # Limitations
8616         ///
8617         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8618         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8619         ///
8620         /// # Errors
8621         ///
8622         /// Errors if:
8623         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8624         /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8625         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8626         ///
8627         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8628         ///
8629         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8630         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8631         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8632         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8633         pub fn create_refund_builder(
8634                 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8635                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8636         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8637                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8638                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8639                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8640                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8641
8642                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8643                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8644                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8645                 )?
8646                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8647                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8648                         .path(path);
8649
8650                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8651
8652                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8653                 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8654                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8655                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8656                         )
8657                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8658
8659                 Ok(builder.into())
8660         }
8661 } }
8662
8663 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8664 where
8665         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8666         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8667         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8668         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8669         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8670         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8671         R::Target: Router,
8672         L::Target: Logger,
8673 {
8674         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8675         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8676         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8677         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8678
8679         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8680         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8681         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8682         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8683
8684         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8685         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8686         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8687         ///
8688         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8689         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8690         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8691         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8692         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8693         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8694         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8695         ///
8696         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8697         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8698         ///
8699         /// # Payment
8700         ///
8701         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8702         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8703         /// been sent.
8704         ///
8705         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8706         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8707         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8708         ///
8709         /// # Privacy
8710         ///
8711         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8712         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8713         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8714         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8715         ///
8716         /// # Limitations
8717         ///
8718         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8719         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8720         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8721         ///
8722         /// # Errors
8723         ///
8724         /// Errors if:
8725         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8726         /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8727         /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8728         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8729         ///   request.
8730         ///
8731         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8732         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8733         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8734         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8735         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8736         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8737         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8738         pub fn pay_for_offer(
8739                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8740                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8741                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8742         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8743                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8744                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8745                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8746
8747                 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8748                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8749                         .into();
8750                 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8751
8752                 let builder = match quantity {
8753                         None => builder,
8754                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8755                 };
8756                 let builder = match amount_msats {
8757                         None => builder,
8758                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8759                 };
8760                 let builder = match payer_note {
8761                         None => builder,
8762                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8763                 };
8764                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8765                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8766
8767                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8768
8769                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8770                 self.pending_outbound_payments
8771                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8772                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8773                         )
8774                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8775
8776                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8777                 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8778                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8779                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8780                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8781                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8782                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8783                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8784                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8785                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8786                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8787                                 );
8788                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8789                         }
8790                 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8791                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8792                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8793                                 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8794                                 Some(reply_path),
8795                         );
8796                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8797                 } else {
8798                         debug_assert!(false);
8799                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8800                 }
8801
8802                 Ok(())
8803         }
8804
8805         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8806         /// message.
8807         ///
8808         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8809         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8810         /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8811         ///
8812         /// # Limitations
8813         ///
8814         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8815         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8816         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8817         /// received and no retries will be made.
8818         ///
8819         /// # Errors
8820         ///
8821         /// Errors if:
8822         /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8823         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8824         ///   the invoice.
8825         ///
8826         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8827         pub fn request_refund_payment(
8828                 &self, refund: &Refund
8829         ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8830                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8831                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8832                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8833
8834                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8835                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8836
8837                 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8838                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8839                 }
8840
8841                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8842
8843                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8844                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8845                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8846                                 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8847                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8848                                 )
8849                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8850
8851                                 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8852                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8853                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8854                                 )?;
8855                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8856                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8857                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8858                                 );
8859                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8860                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8861                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8862                                 )?;
8863                                 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8864                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8865                                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8866                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8867
8868                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8869                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8870                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8871                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8872                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8873                                                 Some(reply_path),
8874                                         );
8875                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8876                                 } else {
8877                                         for path in refund.paths() {
8878                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8879                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8880                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8881                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8882                                                 );
8883                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8884                                         }
8885                                 }
8886
8887                                 Ok(invoice)
8888                         },
8889                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8890                 }
8891         }
8892
8893         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8894         /// to pay us.
8895         ///
8896         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8897         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8898         ///
8899         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8900         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8901         /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8902         ///
8903         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8904         ///
8905         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8906         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8907         ///
8908         /// # Note
8909         ///
8910         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8911         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8912         ///
8913         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8914         ///
8915         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8916         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8917         ///
8918         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8919         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8920         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8921         /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8922         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8923         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8924                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8925                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8926                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8927                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8928         }
8929
8930         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8931         /// stored external to LDK.
8932         ///
8933         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8934         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8935         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8936         ///
8937         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8938         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8939         /// payments.
8940         ///
8941         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8942         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8943         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8944         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8945         ///
8946         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8947         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8948         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8949         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8950         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8951         ///
8952         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8953         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8954         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8955         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8956         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8957         ///
8958         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8959         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8960         ///
8961         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8962         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8963         ///
8964         /// # Note
8965         ///
8966         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8967         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8968         ///
8969         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8970         ///
8971         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8972         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8973         ///
8974         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8975         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8976         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8977                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8978                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8979                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8980                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
8981         }
8982
8983         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8984         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8985         ///
8986         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8987         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8988                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8989         }
8990
8991         /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8992         ///
8993         /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8994         fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8995                 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8996                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8997
8998                 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8999                         .iter()
9000                         .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
9001                         .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
9002                         .collect::<Vec<_>>();
9003
9004                 self.router
9005                         .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
9006                         .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
9007         }
9008
9009         /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
9010         /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
9011         fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
9012                 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
9013         ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
9014                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9015
9016                 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
9017                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
9018                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
9019                         + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
9020                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
9021                         payment_secret,
9022                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
9023                                 max_cltv_expiry,
9024                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
9025                         },
9026                         payment_context,
9027                 };
9028                 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9029                         payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9030                 )
9031         }
9032
9033         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9034         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9035         ///
9036         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9037         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9038                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9039                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9040                 loop {
9041                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9042                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9043                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9044                                 Some(_) => continue,
9045                                 None => return scid_candidate
9046                         }
9047                 }
9048         }
9049
9050         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9051         ///
9052         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9053         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9054                 PhantomRouteHints {
9055                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9056                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9057                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9058                 }
9059         }
9060
9061         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9062         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9063         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9064         ///
9065         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9066         /// times to get a unique scid.
9067         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9068                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9069                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9070                 loop {
9071                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9072                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9073                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9074                         return scid_candidate
9075                 }
9076         }
9077
9078         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9079         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9080         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9081                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9082
9083                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9084                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9085                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9086                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9087                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9088                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9089                         ) {
9090                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9091                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9092                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9093                                         }
9094                                 }
9095                         }
9096                 }
9097
9098                 inflight_htlcs
9099         }
9100
9101         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9102         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9103                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9104                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9105                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9106                 events.into_inner()
9107         }
9108
9109         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9110         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9111                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9112                 events.push_back((event, None));
9113         }
9114
9115         #[cfg(test)]
9116         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9117                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9118                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9119         }
9120
9121         #[cfg(test)]
9122         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9123                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9124         }
9125
9126         #[cfg(test)]
9127         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9128                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9129         }
9130
9131         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9132         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9133         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9134         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9135         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9136                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9137                 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9138
9139                 let logger = WithContext::from(
9140                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
9141                 );
9142                 loop {
9143                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9144                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9145                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9146                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9147                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9148                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9149                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9150                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9151                                         {
9152                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9153                                         }
9154                                 }
9155
9156                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9157                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9158                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9159                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9160                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9161                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9162                                                 &channel_id);
9163                                         break;
9164                                 }
9165
9166                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9167                                         channel_id) {
9168                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9169                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9170                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9171                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9172                                                                 channel_id);
9173                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9174                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9175                                                         if further_update_exists {
9176                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9177                                                                 // top of the loop.
9178                                                                 continue;
9179                                                         }
9180                                                 } else {
9181                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9182                                                                 channel_id);
9183                                                 }
9184                                         }
9185                                 }
9186                         } else {
9187                                 log_debug!(logger,
9188                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9189                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9190                         }
9191                         break;
9192                 }
9193         }
9194
9195         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9196                 for action in actions {
9197                         match action {
9198                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9199                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9200                                 } => {
9201                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9202                                 }
9203                         }
9204                 }
9205         }
9206
9207         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9208         /// using the given event handler.
9209         ///
9210         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9211         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9212                 &self, handler: H
9213         ) {
9214                 let mut ev;
9215                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9216         }
9217 }
9218
9219 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9220 where
9221         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9222         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9223         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9224         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9225         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9226         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9227         R::Target: Router,
9228         L::Target: Logger,
9229 {
9230         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9231         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9232         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9233         /// is always placed next to each other.
9234         ///
9235         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9236         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9237         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9238         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9239         ///
9240         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9241         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9242         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9243         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9244                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9245                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9246                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9247
9248                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9249                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9250                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9251                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9252                         }
9253
9254                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9255                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9256                         }
9257                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9258                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9259                         }
9260
9261                         let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9262                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9263                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9264                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9265                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9266                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9267                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9268                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9269                                 }
9270                                 if peer_state.is_connected {
9271                                         is_any_peer_connected = true
9272                                 }
9273                         }
9274
9275                         // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9276                         if is_any_peer_connected {
9277                                 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9278                                 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9279                         }
9280
9281                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9282                                 events.replace(pending_events);
9283                         }
9284
9285                         result
9286                 });
9287                 events.into_inner()
9288         }
9289 }
9290
9291 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9292 where
9293         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9294         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9295         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9296         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9297         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9298         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9299         R::Target: Router,
9300         L::Target: Logger,
9301 {
9302         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9303         ///
9304         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9305         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9306         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9307                 let mut ev;
9308                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9309         }
9310 }
9311
9312 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9313 where
9314         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9315         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9316         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9317         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9318         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9319         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9320         R::Target: Router,
9321         L::Target: Logger,
9322 {
9323         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9324                 {
9325                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9326                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9327                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9328                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9329                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9330                 }
9331
9332                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9333                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9334         }
9335
9336         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9337                 let _persistence_guard =
9338                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9339                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9340                 let new_height = height - 1;
9341                 {
9342                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9343                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9344                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9345                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9346                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9347                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9348                 }
9349
9350                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9351         }
9352 }
9353
9354 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9355 where
9356         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9357         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9358         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9359         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9360         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9361         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9362         R::Target: Router,
9363         L::Target: Logger,
9364 {
9365         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9366                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9367                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9368                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9369
9370                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9371                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9372
9373                 let _persistence_guard =
9374                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9375                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9376                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9377                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9378
9379                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9380                 if height < last_best_block_height {
9381                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9382                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9383                 }
9384         }
9385
9386         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9387                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9388                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9389                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9390
9391                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9392                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9393
9394                 let _persistence_guard =
9395                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9396                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9397                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9398
9399                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9400
9401                 macro_rules! max_time {
9402                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
9403                                 loop {
9404                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9405                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9406                                         // having an explicit local time source.
9407                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9408                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9409                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9410                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9411                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9412                                                 break;
9413                                         }
9414                                 }
9415                         }
9416                 }
9417                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9418                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9419                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9420                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9421                 });
9422         }
9423
9424         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9425                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9426                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9427                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9428                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9429                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9430                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9431                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9432                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9433                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9434                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9435                                 }
9436                         }
9437                 }
9438                 res
9439         }
9440
9441         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9442                 let _persistence_guard =
9443                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9444                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9445                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9446                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9447                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9448                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9449                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9450                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9451                 });
9452         }
9453 }
9454
9455 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9456 where
9457         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9458         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9459         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9460         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9461         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9462         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9463         R::Target: Router,
9464         L::Target: Logger,
9465 {
9466         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9467         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9468         /// the function.
9469         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9470                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9471                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9472                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9473                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9474
9475                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9476                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9477                 {
9478                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9479                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9480                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9481                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9482                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9483
9484                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9485                                         match phase {
9486                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
9487                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9488                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9489                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9490                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9491                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9492                                                         let res = f(channel);
9493                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9494                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9495                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9496                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9497                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9498                                                                 }
9499                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9500                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9501                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9502                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
9503                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9504                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9505                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9506                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9507                                                                                                 msg,
9508                                                                                         });
9509                                                                                 }
9510                                                                         } else {
9511                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9512                                                                         }
9513                                                                 }
9514
9515                                                                 {
9516                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9517                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9518                                                                 }
9519
9520                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9521                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9522                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9523                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9524                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
9525                                                                         });
9526                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9527                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9528                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9529                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
9530                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9531                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9532                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9533                                                                                         });
9534                                                                                 }
9535                                                                         }
9536                                                                 }
9537                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9538                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9539                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9540                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9541                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9542                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9543                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9544                                                                                 // is always consistent.
9545                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9546                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9547                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9548                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9549                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9550                                                                         }
9551                                                                 }
9552                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9553                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9554                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9555                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9556                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9557                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9558                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9559                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9560                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9561                                                                                 msg: update
9562                                                                         });
9563                                                                 }
9564                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9565                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9566                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9567                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9568                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9569                                                                                         data: reason_message,
9570                                                                                 })
9571                                                                         },
9572                                                                 });
9573                                                                 return false;
9574                                                         }
9575                                                         true
9576                                                 }
9577                                         }
9578                                 });
9579                         }
9580                 }
9581
9582                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9583                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9584                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9585                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9586                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9587                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9588                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9589                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9590                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9591                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9592
9593                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9594                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9595                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9596                                                 false
9597                                         } else { true }
9598                                 });
9599                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9600                         });
9601
9602                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9603                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9604                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9605                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9606                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9607                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9608                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9609                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9610                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9611                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9612                                                 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9613                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9614                                         });
9615
9616                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9617                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9618                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
9619                                         };
9620                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9621                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9622                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9623                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
9624                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9625                                         );
9626                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9627                                         false
9628                                 } else { true }
9629                         });
9630                 }
9631
9632                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9633
9634                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9635                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9636                 }
9637         }
9638
9639         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9640         /// may have events that need processing.
9641         ///
9642         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9643         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9644         ///
9645         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9646         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9647         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9648                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9649         }
9650
9651         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9652         ///
9653         /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9654         /// indicates this should be checked.
9655         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9656                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9657         }
9658
9659         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9660         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9661                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9662         }
9663
9664         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9665         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9666         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9667                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9668         }
9669
9670         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9671         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9672         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9673                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9674         }
9675
9676         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9677         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9678         ///
9679         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9680         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9681         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9682         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9683                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9684         }
9685
9686         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9687         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9688         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9689                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9690         }
9691
9692         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9693         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9694         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9695                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9696         }
9697
9698         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9699         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9700         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9701                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9702         }
9703
9704         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9705         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9706         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9707                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9708         }
9709 }
9710
9711 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9712         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9713 where
9714         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9715         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9716         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9717         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9718         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9719         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9720         R::Target: Router,
9721         L::Target: Logger,
9722 {
9723         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9724                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9725                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9726                 // change to the contents.
9727                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9728                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9729                         let persist = match &res {
9730                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9731                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9732                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
9733                                 },
9734                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9735                         };
9736                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9737                         persist
9738                 });
9739         }
9740
9741         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9742                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9743                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9744                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9745         }
9746
9747         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9748                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9749                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9750                 // change to the contents.
9751                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9752                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9753                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9754                 });
9755         }
9756
9757         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9758                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9759                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9760                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9761         }
9762
9763         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9764                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9765                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9766         }
9767
9768         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9769                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9770                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9771         }
9772
9773         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9774                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9775                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9776                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9777                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9778                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9779                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9780                         let persist = match &res {
9781                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9782                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9783                         };
9784                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9785                         persist
9786                 });
9787         }
9788
9789         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9790                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9791                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9792                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9793         }
9794
9795         #[cfg(splicing)]
9796         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9797                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9798                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9799                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9800         }
9801
9802         #[cfg(splicing)]
9803         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9804                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9805                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9806                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9807         }
9808
9809         #[cfg(splicing)]
9810         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9811                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9812                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9813                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9814         }
9815
9816         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9817                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9818                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9819         }
9820
9821         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9822                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9823                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9824         }
9825
9826         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9827                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9828                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9829                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9830                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9831                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9832                         let persist = match &res {
9833                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9834                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9835                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9836                         };
9837                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9838                         persist
9839                 });
9840         }
9841
9842         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9843                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9844                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9845         }
9846
9847         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9848                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9849                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9850                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9851                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9852                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9853                         let persist = match &res {
9854                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9855                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9856                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9857                         };
9858                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9859                         persist
9860                 });
9861         }
9862
9863         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9864                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9865                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9866                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9867                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9868                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9869                         let persist = match &res {
9870                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9871                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9872                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9873                         };
9874                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9875                         persist
9876                 });
9877         }
9878
9879         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9880                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9881                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9882         }
9883
9884         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9885                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9886                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9887         }
9888
9889         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9890                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9891                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9892                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9893                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9894                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9895                         let persist = match &res {
9896                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9897                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9898                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9899                         };
9900                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9901                         persist
9902                 });
9903         }
9904
9905         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9906                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9907                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9908         }
9909
9910         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9911                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9912                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9913                                 persist
9914                         } else {
9915                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9916                         }
9917                 });
9918         }
9919
9920         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9921                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9922                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9923                         let persist = match &res {
9924                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9925                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9926                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9927                         };
9928                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9929                         persist
9930                 });
9931         }
9932
9933         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9934                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9935                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9936                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9937                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9938                 let remove_peer = {
9939                         log_debug!(
9940                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9941                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9942                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9943                         );
9944                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9945                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9946                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9947                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9948                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9949                                         let context = match phase {
9950                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9951                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9952                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9953                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9954                                                                 return true;
9955                                                         }
9956                                                         &mut chan.context
9957                                                 },
9958                                                 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9959                                                 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9960                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9961                                                         return true;
9962                                                 },
9963                                                 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9964                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9965                                                         &mut chan.context
9966                                                 },
9967                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9968                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9969                                                         &mut chan.context
9970                                                 },
9971                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9972                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9973                                                         &mut chan.context
9974                                                 },
9975                                         };
9976                                         // Clean up for removal.
9977                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9978                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9979                                         false
9980                                 });
9981                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9982                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9983                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9984                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9985                                         match msg {
9986                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
9987                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9988                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9989                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9990                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9991                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
9992                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9993                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9994                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
9995                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9996                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9997                                                 // Quiescence
9998                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9999                                                 // Splicing
10000                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
10001                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
10002                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
10003                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
10004                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
10005                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
10006                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
10007                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
10008                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
10009                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
10010                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
10011                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
10012                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
10013                                                 // Channel Operations
10014                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
10015                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
10016                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
10017                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
10018                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
10019                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
10020                                                 // Gossip
10021                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
10022                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10023                                                 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
10024                                                 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
10025                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
10026                                                         debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
10027                                                         false
10028                                                 },
10029                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10030                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
10031                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10032                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10033                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10034                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10035                                         }
10036                                 });
10037                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10038                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10039                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10040                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10041                 };
10042                 if remove_peer {
10043                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10044                 }
10045                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10046
10047                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10048                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10049                 }
10050         }
10051
10052         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10053                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
10054                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10055                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10056                         return Err(());
10057                 }
10058
10059                 let mut res = Ok(());
10060
10061                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10062                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10063                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10064                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10065                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10066                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10067                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10068
10069                         {
10070                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10071                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10072                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10073                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
10074                                                         res = Err(());
10075                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10076                                                 }
10077                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10078                                                         channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10079                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10080                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10081                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10082                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10083                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10084                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10085                                                         is_connected: true,
10086                                                 }));
10087                                         },
10088                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10089                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10090                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10091
10092                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10093                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10094                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10095                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10096                                                 {
10097                                                         res = Err(());
10098                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10099                                                 }
10100
10101                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10102                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10103                                         },
10104                                 }
10105                         }
10106
10107                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10108
10109                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10110                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10111                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10112                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10113                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10114
10115                                 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10116                                         match phase {
10117                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10118                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
10119                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10120                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10121                                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10122                                                         });
10123                                                 }
10124
10125                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10126                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10127                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10128                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10129                                                         });
10130                                                 }
10131
10132                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10133                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10134                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10135                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10136                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10137                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10138                                                         });
10139                                                 },
10140
10141                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10142                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10143                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10144                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10145                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10146                                                 }
10147
10148                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10149                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10150                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10151                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10152                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10153                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10154                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10155                                                 },
10156                                         }
10157                                 }
10158                         }
10159
10160                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10161                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10162                 });
10163                 res
10164         }
10165
10166         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10167                 match &msg.data as &str {
10168                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10169                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
10170                         {
10171                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10172                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10173                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10174                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10175                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10176                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10177                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10178                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10179                                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10180                                                 self,
10181                                                 || -> NotifyOption {
10182                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10183                                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10184                                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10185                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10186                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10187                                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10188                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10189                                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10190                                                                                 msg,
10191                                                                         });
10192                                                                 }
10193                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10194                                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10195                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10196                                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10197                                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10198                                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10199                                                                                 },
10200                                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
10201                                                                         }
10202                                                                 });
10203                                                                 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10204                                                                 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10205                                                                 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10206                                                         }
10207                                                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10208                                                 }
10209                                         );
10210                                 }
10211                                 return;
10212                         }
10213                         _ => {}
10214                 }
10215
10216                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10217
10218                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10219                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10220                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10221                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10222                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10223                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10224                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10225                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10226                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10227                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10228                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10229                         };
10230                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
10231                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10232                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10233                         }
10234                 } else {
10235                         {
10236                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10237                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10238                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10239                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10240                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10241                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10242                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10243                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10244                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10245                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10246                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10247                                                                 msg,
10248                                                         });
10249                                                         return;
10250                                                 }
10251                                         },
10252                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10253                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10254                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10255                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10256                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10257                                                                 msg,
10258                                                         });
10259                                                         return;
10260                                                 }
10261                                         },
10262                                         None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10263                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10264                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10265                                 }
10266                         }
10267
10268                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10269                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10270                 }
10271         }
10272
10273         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10274                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10275         }
10276
10277         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10278                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10279         }
10280
10281         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10282                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10283         }
10284
10285         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10286                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10287                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10288                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10289         }
10290
10291         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10292                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10293                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10294                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10295         }
10296
10297         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10298                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10299                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10300                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10301         }
10302
10303         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10304                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10305                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10306                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10307         }
10308
10309         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10310                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10311                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10312                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10313         }
10314
10315         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10316                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10317                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10318                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10319         }
10320
10321         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10322                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10323                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10324                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10325         }
10326
10327         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10328                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10329                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10330                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10331         }
10332
10333         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10334                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10335                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10336                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10337         }
10338 }
10339
10340 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10341 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10342 where
10343         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10344         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10345         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10346         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10347         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10348         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10349         R::Target: Router,
10350         L::Target: Logger,
10351 {
10352         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10353                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10354                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10355
10356                 match message {
10357                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10358                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10359                                         &invoice_request
10360                                 ) {
10361                                         Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10362                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10363                                 };
10364                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10365                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10366                                         Err(()) => {
10367                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10368                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10369                                         },
10370                                 };
10371
10372                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10373                                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10374                                         Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10375                                 ) {
10376                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10377                                         Err(()) => {
10378                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10379                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10380                                         },
10381                                 };
10382
10383                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10384                                         offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10385                                         invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10386                                 });
10387                                 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10388                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10389                                 ) {
10390                                         Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10391                                         Err(()) => {
10392                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10393                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10394                                         },
10395                                 };
10396
10397                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10398                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10399                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10400                                 );
10401
10402                                 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10403                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10404                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10405                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash
10406                                         );
10407                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10408                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10409                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10410                                         );
10411                                         builder
10412                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10413                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10414                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10415                                 } else {
10416                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10417                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10418                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10419                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10420                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10421                                         );
10422                                         builder
10423                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10424                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10425                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10426                                                 .and_then(|invoice| {
10427                                                         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
10428                                                         let mut invoice = invoice;
10429                                                         invoice
10430                                                                 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10431                                                                         self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10432                                                                 )
10433                                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10434                                                 })
10435                                 };
10436
10437                                 match response {
10438                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10439                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10440                                 }
10441                         },
10442                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10443                                 let response = invoice
10444                                         .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10445                                         .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10446                                         .and_then(|payment_id| {
10447                                                 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10448                                                 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10449                                                         Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10450                                                 } else {
10451                                                         self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10452                                                                 .map_err(|e| {
10453                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10454                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10455                                                                 })
10456                                                 }
10457                                         });
10458
10459                                 match response {
10460                                         Ok(()) => None,
10461                                         Err(e) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10462                                 }
10463                         },
10464                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10465                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10466                                 None
10467                         },
10468                 }
10469         }
10470
10471         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10472                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10473         }
10474 }
10475
10476 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10477 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10478 where
10479         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10480         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10481         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10482         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10483         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10484         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10485         R::Target: Router,
10486         L::Target: Logger,
10487 {
10488         fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10489                 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10490         }
10491 }
10492
10493 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10494 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10495 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10496         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10497         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10498         node_features
10499 }
10500
10501 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10502 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10503 ///
10504 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10505 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10506 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10507 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10508         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10509 }
10510
10511 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10512 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10513 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10514         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10515 }
10516
10517 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10518 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10519 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10520         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10521 }
10522
10523 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10524 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10525 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10526         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10527 }
10528
10529 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10530 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10531 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10532         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10533         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10534         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10535         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10536         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10537         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10538         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10539         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10540         features.set_payment_secret_required();
10541         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10542         features.set_wumbo_optional();
10543         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10544         features.set_channel_type_optional();
10545         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10546         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10547         features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10548         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10549                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10550         }
10551         features
10552 }
10553
10554 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10555 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10556
10557 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10558         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10559         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10560         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10561 });
10562
10563 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10564         (2, node_id, required),
10565         (4, features, required),
10566         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10567         (8, forwarding_info, option),
10568         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10569         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10570 });
10571
10572 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10573         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10574                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10575                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10576                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10577                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10578                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10579                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10580                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
10581                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
10582                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
10583                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10584                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10585                         (7, self.config, option),
10586                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10587                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
10588                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10589                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10590                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10591                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10592                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10593                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10594                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10595                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10596                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10597                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10598                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10599                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10600                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
10601                         (32, self.is_public, required),
10602                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10603                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10604                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10605                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10606                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10607                         (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10608                         (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10609                 });
10610                 Ok(())
10611         }
10612 }
10613
10614 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10615         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10616                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10617                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10618                         (2, channel_id, required),
10619                         (3, channel_type, option),
10620                         (4, counterparty, required),
10621                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10622                         (6, funding_txo, option),
10623                         (7, config, option),
10624                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
10625                         (9, confirmations, option),
10626                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10627                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10628                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10629                         (16, balance_msat, required),
10630                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10631                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10632                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10633                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10634                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10635                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10636                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
10637                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10638                         (26, is_outbound, required),
10639                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10640                         (30, is_usable, required),
10641                         (32, is_public, required),
10642                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10643                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10644                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10645                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10646                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10647                         (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10648                         (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10649                 });
10650
10651                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10652                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10653                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10654                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10655                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10656
10657                 Ok(Self {
10658                         inbound_scid_alias,
10659                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10660                         channel_type,
10661                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10662                         outbound_scid_alias,
10663                         funding_txo,
10664                         config,
10665                         short_channel_id,
10666                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10667                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10668                         user_channel_id,
10669                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10670                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10671                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10672                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10673                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10674                         confirmations_required,
10675                         confirmations,
10676                         force_close_spend_delay,
10677                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10678                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10679                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10680                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10681                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10682                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10683                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10684                         channel_shutdown_state,
10685                         pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10686                         pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10687                 })
10688         }
10689 }
10690
10691 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10692         (2, channels, required_vec),
10693         (4, phantom_scid, required),
10694         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10695 });
10696
10697 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10698         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10699         (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10700 });
10701
10702 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10703         (0, Forward) => {
10704                 (0, onion_packet, required),
10705                 (1, blinded, option),
10706                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10707         },
10708         (1, Receive) => {
10709                 (0, payment_data, required),
10710                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10711                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10712                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10713                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10714                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10715                 (9, payment_context, option),
10716         },
10717         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10718                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10719                 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10720                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10721                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10722                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10723                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10724         },
10725 ;);
10726
10727 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10728         (0, routing, required),
10729         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10730         (4, payment_hash, required),
10731         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10732         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10733         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10734         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10735 });
10736
10737
10738 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10739         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10740                 match self {
10741                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10742                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10743                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10744                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10745                                 reason.write(writer)?;
10746                         },
10747                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10748                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10749                         }) => {
10750                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10751                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10752                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10753                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10754                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10755                         },
10756                 }
10757                 Ok(())
10758         }
10759 }
10760
10761 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10762         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10763                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10764                 match id {
10765                         0 => {
10766                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10767                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10768                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10769                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10770                                 }))
10771                         },
10772                         1 => {
10773                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10774                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10775                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10776                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10777                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10778                                 }))
10779                         },
10780                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10781                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10782                         // messages contained in the variants.
10783                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10784                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10785                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10786                         2 => {
10787                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10788                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10789                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10790                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10791                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10792                         },
10793                         3 => {
10794                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10795                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10796                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10797                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10798                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10799                         },
10800                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10801                 }
10802         }
10803 }
10804
10805 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10806         (0, Forward),
10807         (1, Fail),
10808 );
10809
10810 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10811         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10812         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10813 );
10814
10815 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10816         (0, short_channel_id, required),
10817         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10818         (2, outpoint, required),
10819         (3, blinded_failure, option),
10820         (4, htlc_id, required),
10821         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10822         (7, user_channel_id, option),
10823         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10824         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10825         (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10826 });
10827
10828 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10829         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10830                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10831                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10832                                 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10833                         },
10834                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10835                 };
10836                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10837                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10838                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
10839                         (2, self.value, required),
10840                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10841                         (4, payment_data, option),
10842                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10843                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10844                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10845                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10846                 });
10847                 Ok(())
10848         }
10849 }
10850
10851 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10852         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10853                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10854                         (0, prev_hop, required),
10855                         (1, total_msat, option),
10856                         (2, value_ser, required),
10857                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10858                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10859                         (5, total_value_received, option),
10860                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10861                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10862                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10863                 });
10864                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10865                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10866                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10867                         Some(p) => {
10868                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
10869                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10870                                 }
10871                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10872                                         total_msat = Some(value);
10873                                 }
10874                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10875                         },
10876                         None => {
10877                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10878                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
10879                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10880                                         }
10881                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10882                                 }
10883                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10884                         },
10885                 };
10886                 Ok(Self {
10887                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10888                         timer_ticks: 0,
10889                         value,
10890                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10891                         total_value_received,
10892                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10893                         onion_payload,
10894                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10895                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10896                 })
10897         }
10898 }
10899
10900 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10901         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10902                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10903                 match id {
10904                         0 => {
10905                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10906                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10907                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10908                                 let mut payment_id = None;
10909                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10910                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10911                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10912                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10913                                         (1, payment_id, option),
10914                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10915                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10916                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10917                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
10918                                 });
10919                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
10920                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10921                                         // instead.
10922                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10923                                 }
10924                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10925                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10926                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10927                                 }
10928                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10929                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10930                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10931                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10932                                                 }
10933                                         }
10934                                 }
10935                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10936                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10937                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
10938                                         path,
10939                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10940                                 })
10941                         }
10942                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10943                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10944                 }
10945         }
10946 }
10947
10948 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10949         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10950                 match self {
10951                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10952                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10953                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10954                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10955                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10956                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10957                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10958                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10959                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10960                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10961                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10962                                  });
10963                         }
10964                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10965                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10966                                 field.write(writer)?;
10967                         }
10968                 }
10969                 Ok(())
10970         }
10971 }
10972
10973 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10974         (0, forward_info, required),
10975         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10976         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10977         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10978         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10979         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10980         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10981         (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10982 });
10983
10984 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10985         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10986                 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10987                 match self {
10988                         Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10989                                 0u8.write(w)?;
10990                                 info.write(w)?;
10991                         },
10992                         Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10993                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10994                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10995                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10996                                         (2, err_packet, required),
10997                                 });
10998                         },
10999                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
11000                                 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
11001                                 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
11002                                 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
11003                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
11004                                 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
11005                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
11006                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11007                                         (1, failure_code, required),
11008                                         (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
11009                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
11010                                 });
11011                         },
11012                 }
11013                 Ok(())
11014         }
11015 }
11016
11017 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11018         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11019                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
11020                 Ok(match id {
11021                         0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
11022                         1 => {
11023                                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
11024                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11025                                         (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
11026                                         (2, err_packet, required),
11027                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
11028                                 });
11029                                 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
11030                                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
11031                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11032                                                 failure_code,
11033                                                 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
11034                                         }
11035                                 } else {
11036                                         Self::FailHTLC {
11037                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11038                                                 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11039                                         }
11040                                 }
11041                         },
11042                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11043                 })
11044         }
11045 }
11046
11047 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11048         (0, payment_secret, required),
11049         (2, expiry_time, required),
11050         (4, user_payment_id, required),
11051         (6, payment_preimage, required),
11052         (8, min_value_msat, required),
11053 });
11054
11055 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11056 where
11057         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11058         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11059         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11060         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11061         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11062         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11063         R::Target: Router,
11064         L::Target: Logger,
11065 {
11066         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11067                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11068
11069                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11070
11071                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11072                 {
11073                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11074                         best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11075                         best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11076                 }
11077
11078                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11079
11080                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11081                 {
11082                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11083                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11084                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11085                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11086                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11087                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
11088                                 }
11089
11090                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11091                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11092                                 ).count();
11093                         }
11094
11095                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11096
11097                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11098                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11099                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11100                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11101                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11102                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11103                                         } else { None }
11104                                 ) {
11105                                         channel.write(writer)?;
11106                                 }
11107                         }
11108                 }
11109
11110                 {
11111                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11112                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11113                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11114                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11115                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11116                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
11117                                         forward.write(writer)?;
11118                                 }
11119                         }
11120                 }
11121
11122                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11123                 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11124                 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11125                         decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11126                 }
11127
11128                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11129                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11130                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11131
11132                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11133                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11134                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11135                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11136                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11137                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11138                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11139                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
11140                         }
11141                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11142                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11143                 }
11144
11145                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11146                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11147                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11148                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11149                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11150                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
11151                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11152                 }
11153
11154                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11155                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11156                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11157                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11158                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11159                         // no channels.
11160                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11161                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11162                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11163                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11164                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11165                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11166                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11167                                 }
11168                         }
11169                 }
11170
11171                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11172                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11173                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11174                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11175                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11176                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11177                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11178                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
11179                         0u64.write(writer)?;
11180                 } else {
11181                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11182                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11183                                 event.write(writer)?;
11184                         }
11185                 }
11186
11187                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11188                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11189                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11190                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11191                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11192                 0u64.write(writer)?;
11193
11194                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11195                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11196                 // likely to be identical.
11197                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11198                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11199
11200                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11201                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11202                         hash.write(writer)?;
11203                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11204                 }
11205
11206                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11207                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11208                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11209                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11210                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11211                         }
11212                 }
11213                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11214                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11215                         match outbound {
11216                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11217                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11218                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11219                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11220                                         }
11221                                 }
11222                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11223                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11224                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11225                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11226                         }
11227                 }
11228
11229                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11230                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11231                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11232                         match outbound {
11233                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11234                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11235                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11236                                 },
11237                                 _ => {},
11238                         }
11239                 }
11240
11241                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11242                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11243                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11244                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11245                 }
11246
11247                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11248                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11249                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11250                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11251                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
11252                 }
11253
11254                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11255                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11256                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11257                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
11258                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11259                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11260                                 }
11261                         }
11262                 }
11263
11264                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11265                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11266                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11267                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11268                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11269                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11270                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11271                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11272                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11273                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11274                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11275                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11276                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11277                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11278                 });
11279
11280                 Ok(())
11281         }
11282 }
11283
11284 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11285         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11286                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11287                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11288                         event.write(w)?;
11289                         action.write(w)?;
11290                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11291                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11292                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11293                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11294                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11295                                 // check that the event is sane here.
11296                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11297                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11298                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11299                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11300                         }
11301                 }
11302                 Ok(())
11303         }
11304 }
11305 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11306         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11307                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11308                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11309                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11310                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11311                         len) as usize);
11312                 for _ in 0..len {
11313                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11314                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11315                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11316                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
11317                         } else if action.is_some() {
11318                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11319                         }
11320                 }
11321                 Ok(events)
11322         }
11323 }
11324
11325 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11326         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11327         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11328         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11329         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11330         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11331 );
11332
11333 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11334 ///
11335 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11336 /// is:
11337 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11338 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11339 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11340 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11341 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11342 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11343 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11344 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11345 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11346 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11347 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11348 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11349 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11350 ///    the next step.
11351 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11352 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11353 ///
11354 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11355 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11356 ///
11357 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11358 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11359 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11360 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11361 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11362 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11363 ///
11364 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11365 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11366 where
11367         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11368         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11369         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11370         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11371         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11372         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11373         R::Target: Router,
11374         L::Target: Logger,
11375 {
11376         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11377         pub entropy_source: ES,
11378
11379         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11380         pub node_signer: NS,
11381
11382         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11383         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11384         /// signing data.
11385         pub signer_provider: SP,
11386
11387         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11388         ///
11389         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11390         pub fee_estimator: F,
11391         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11392         ///
11393         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11394         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11395         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11396         pub chain_monitor: M,
11397
11398         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11399         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11400         /// force-closed during deserialization.
11401         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11402         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11403         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11404         ///
11405         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11406         pub router: R,
11407         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11408         /// deserialization.
11409         pub logger: L,
11410         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11411         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11412         pub default_config: UserConfig,
11413
11414         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11415         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11416         ///
11417         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11418         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11419         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11420         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11421         ///
11422         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11423         /// this struct.
11424         ///
11425         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11426         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11427 }
11428
11429 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11430                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11431 where
11432         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11433         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11434         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11435         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11436         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11437         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11438         R::Target: Router,
11439         L::Target: Logger,
11440 {
11441         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11442         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11443         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11444         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11445                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11446                 Self {
11447                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11448                         channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11449                                 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11450                         ),
11451                 }
11452         }
11453 }
11454
11455 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11456 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11457 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11458         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11459 where
11460         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11461         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11462         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11463         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11464         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11465         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11466         R::Target: Router,
11467         L::Target: Logger,
11468 {
11469         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11470                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11471                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11472         }
11473 }
11474
11475 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11476         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11477 where
11478         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11479         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11480         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11481         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11482         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11483         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11484         R::Target: Router,
11485         L::Target: Logger,
11486 {
11487         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11488                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11489
11490                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11491                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11492                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11493
11494                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11495
11496                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11497                 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11498                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11499                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11500                 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11501                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11502                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11503                 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11504                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11505                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11506                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11507                         ))?;
11508                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11509                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11510                         funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11511                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11512                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11513                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11514                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11515                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11516                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11517                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11518                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11519                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11520                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11521                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11522                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11523                                         }
11524                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11525                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11526                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11527                                         }
11528                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11529                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11530                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11531                                         }
11532                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11533                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11534                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11535                                         }
11536                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11537                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11538                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11539                                         }
11540                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11541                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11542                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11543                                                 });
11544                                         }
11545                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11546                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11547                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11548                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11549                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11550                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11551                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11552                                                 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11553                                         }, None));
11554                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11555                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
11556                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11557                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11558                                                 }
11559                                                 if !found_htlc {
11560                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11561                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11562                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11563                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11564                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11565                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11566                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11567                                                         log_info!(logger,
11568                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11569                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11570                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11571                                                 }
11572                                         }
11573                                 } else {
11574                                         channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11575                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11576                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11577                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11578                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11579                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11580                                         }
11581                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11582                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11583                                         }
11584                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11585                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11586                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11587                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11588                                                 },
11589                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11590                                                         let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11591                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11592                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
11593                                                 }
11594                                         }
11595                                 }
11596                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11597                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11598                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11599                                 // safely discard the channel.
11600                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11601                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11602                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11603                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11604                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11605                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11606                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11607                                         channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11608                                 }, None));
11609                         } else {
11610                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11611                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11612                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11613                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11614                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11615                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11616                         }
11617                 }
11618
11619                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11620                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11621                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11622                                 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11623                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11624                                         &channel_id);
11625                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11626                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11627                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
11628                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11629                                         channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11630                                 };
11631                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11632                         }
11633                 }
11634
11635                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11636                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11637                 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11638                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11639                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11640                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11641                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11642                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11643                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11644                         }
11645                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11646                 }
11647
11648                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11649                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11650                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11651                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11652                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11653                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11654                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11655                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11656                         }
11657                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11658                 }
11659
11660                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11661                         PeerState {
11662                                 channel_by_id,
11663                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11664                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11665                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11666                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11667                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11668                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11669                                 is_connected: false,
11670                         }
11671                 };
11672
11673                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11674                 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11675                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11676                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11677                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11678                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11679                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11680                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11681                 }
11682
11683                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11684                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11685                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11686                 for _ in 0..event_count {
11687                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11688                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11689                                 None => continue,
11690                         }
11691                 }
11692
11693                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11694                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11695                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11696                                 0 => {
11697                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11698                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11699                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
11700                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11701                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11702                                 }
11703                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11704                         }
11705                 }
11706
11707                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11708                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11709
11710                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11711                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11712                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11713                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11714                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11715                         }
11716                 }
11717
11718                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11719                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11720                         hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11721                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11722                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11723                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11724                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11725                         };
11726                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11727                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11728                         };
11729                 }
11730
11731                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11732                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11733                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11734                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11735                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11736                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11737                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11738                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11739                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11740                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11741                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11742                 let mut events_override = None;
11743                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11744                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11745                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11746                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11747                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11748                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11749                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11750                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11751                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11752                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11753                         (8, events_override, option),
11754                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11755                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11756                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11757                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11758                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11759                 });
11760                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11761                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11762                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11763                 }
11764
11765                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11766                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11767                 }
11768
11769                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11770                         pending_events_read = events;
11771                 }
11772
11773                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11774                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11775                 }
11776
11777                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11778                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11779                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11780                         let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11781                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11782                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11783                         }
11784                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11785                 }
11786                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11787                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11788                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11789                 };
11790
11791                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11792                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11793                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11794                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11795                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11796                 //
11797                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11798                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11799                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11800                 //
11801                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11802                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11803                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11804                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11805                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11806                         ) => { {
11807                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11808                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11809                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11810                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11811                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11812                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11813                                         pending_background_events.push(
11814                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11815                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11816                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11817                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11818                                                         update: update.clone(),
11819                                                 });
11820                                 }
11821                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11822                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11823                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11824                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11825                                         pending_background_events.push(
11826                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11827                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11828                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11829                                                 });
11830                                 }
11831                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11832                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11833                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11834                                 }
11835                                 max_in_flight_update_id
11836                         } }
11837                 }
11838
11839                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11840                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11841                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11842                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11843                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11844                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11845
11846                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11847                                         // discarded.
11848                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11849                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11850                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11851                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11852                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11853                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11854                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11855                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11856                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11857                                                 }
11858                                         }
11859                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11860                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11861                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11862                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11863                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11864                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11865                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11866                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11867                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11868                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11869                                                 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11870                                         }
11871                                 } else {
11872                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11873                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11874                                         debug_assert!(false);
11875                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11876                                 }
11877                         }
11878                 }
11879
11880                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11881                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11882                                 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11883                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11884                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11885                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11886                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11887                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11888                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11889                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11890                                         });
11891                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11892                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11893                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11894                                 } else {
11895                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11896                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11897                                                 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11898                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11899                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11900                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11901                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11902                                         log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11903                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11904                                 }
11905                         }
11906                 }
11907
11908                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11909                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11910
11911                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11912                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11913                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11914                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11915
11916                 {
11917                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11918                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11919                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11920                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11921                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11922                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11923                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11924                         // 0.0.102+
11925                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11926                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11927                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11928                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11929                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11930                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11931                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
11932                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11933                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11934                                                         }
11935
11936                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11937                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11938                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11939                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11940                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11941                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11942                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11943                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11944                                                                 },
11945                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11946                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11947                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11948                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
11949                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11950                                                                                 payment_params: None,
11951                                                                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11952                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11953                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11954                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11955                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11956                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11957                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11958                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11959                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
11960                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11961                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11962                                                                         });
11963                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11964                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11965                                                                 }
11966                                                         }
11967                                                 }
11968                                         }
11969                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11970                                                 match htlc_source {
11971                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11972                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11973                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11974                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11975                                                                 };
11976                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11977                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11978                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11979                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11980                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11981                                                                 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11982                                                                         update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11983                                                                                 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11984                                                                                         update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11985                                                                                 if matches {
11986                                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11987                                                                                                 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11988                                                                                 }
11989                                                                                 !matches
11990                                                                         });
11991                                                                         !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11992                                                                 });
11993                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11994                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
11995                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11996                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11997                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11998                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11999                                                                                                 false
12000                                                                                         } else { true }
12001                                                                                 } else { true }
12002                                                                         });
12003                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
12004                                                                 });
12005                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
12006                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
12007                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12008                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12009                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
12010                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
12011                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
12012                                                                                         } else { true }
12013                                                                                 });
12014                                                                                 false
12015                                                                         } else { true }
12016                                                                 });
12017                                                         },
12018                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
12019                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
12020                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
12021                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
12022                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
12023                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
12024                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
12025                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
12026                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
12027                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
12028                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
12029                                                                         let compl_action =
12030                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
12031                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
12032                                                                                         channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
12033                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
12034                                                                                 };
12035                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
12036                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
12037                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
12038                                                                 }
12039                                                         },
12040                                                 }
12041                                         }
12042                                 }
12043
12044                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12045                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12046                                 // payments.
12047                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12048                                         .into_iter()
12049                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12050                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12051                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12052                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12053                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12054                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12055                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12056                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12057                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12058                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12059                                                         } else { None }
12060                                                 } else {
12061                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12062                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12063                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12064                                                         // channel still live case here.
12065                                                         None
12066                                                 }
12067                                         });
12068                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12069                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12070                                 }
12071                         }
12072                 }
12073
12074                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12075                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12076                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12077                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12078                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12079                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12080                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12081                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12082                         }, None));
12083                 }
12084
12085                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12086                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12087
12088                 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12089                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12090                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12091                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12092                         }
12093                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12094                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12095                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12096                                 }
12097                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12098                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12099                                 {
12100                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12101                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12102                                         });
12103                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12104                                 }
12105                         } else {
12106                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12107                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12108                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12109                                         });
12110                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12111                                 }
12112                         }
12113                 } else {
12114                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12115                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12116                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12117                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12118                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12119                                 }
12120                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12121                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
12122                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12123                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
12124                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12125                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12126                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12127                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12128                                                                                 Err(()) => {
12129                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12130                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12131                                                                                 }
12132                                                                         }
12133                                                                 },
12134                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12135                                                         }
12136                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12137                                         },
12138                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12139                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12140                                 };
12141                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12142                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12143                                 });
12144                         }
12145                 }
12146
12147                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12148                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12149
12150                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12151                         Ok(key) => key,
12152                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12153                 };
12154                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12155                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12156                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12157                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12158                         }
12159                 }
12160
12161                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12162                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12163                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12164                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12165                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12166                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12167                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
12168                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12169                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12170                                                 loop {
12171                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12172                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12173                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12174                                                 }
12175                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12176                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12177                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12178                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12179                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12180                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12181                                         }
12182                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
12183                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12184                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12185                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12186                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12187                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12188                                                 }
12189                                         }
12190                                 } else {
12191                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12192                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12193                                         debug_assert!(false);
12194                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12195                                 }
12196                         }
12197                 }
12198
12199                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12200
12201                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12202                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12203                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12204                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12205                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12206                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12207                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12208                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12209                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12210                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12211                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12212                                         }
12213                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12214                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12215
12216                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12217                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12218                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12219                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12220                                                 //
12221                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12222                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12223                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12224                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12225                                                 // reason to.
12226                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12227                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12228                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12229                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12230                                                 // restart.
12231                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12232                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12233                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12234                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12235                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12236                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12237                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
12238                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12239                                                         }
12240                                                 }
12241                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12242                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12243                                                 }
12244                                         }
12245                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12246                                                 receiver_node_id,
12247                                                 payment_hash,
12248                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
12249                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12250                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12251                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12252                                         }, None));
12253                                 }
12254                         }
12255                 }
12256
12257                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12258                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12259                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12260                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
12261                                         for action in actions.iter() {
12262                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12263                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12264                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12265                                                 } = action {
12266                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12267                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
12268                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12269                                                                         blocked_channel_id);
12270                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12271                                                                         .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12272                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12273                                                         } else {
12274                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12275                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12276                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12277                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12278                                                                 // anymore.
12279                                                         }
12280                                                 }
12281                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12282                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12283                                                 }
12284                                         }
12285                                 }
12286                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12287                         } else {
12288                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12289                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12290                         }
12291                 }
12292
12293                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12294                         chain_hash,
12295                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12296                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12297                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12298                         router: args.router,
12299
12300                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12301
12302                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12303                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12304                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12305                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12306
12307                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12308                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12309                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12310                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12311                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12312                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12313                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12314
12315                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12316
12317                         our_network_pubkey,
12318                         secp_ctx,
12319
12320                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12321
12322                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12323
12324                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12325                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12326                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12327                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12328                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12329
12330                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12331                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12332
12333                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12334
12335                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12336
12337                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12338
12339                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12340                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
12341                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12342
12343                         logger: args.logger,
12344                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
12345                 };
12346
12347                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12348                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12349                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12350                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12351                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12352                 }
12353
12354                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12355                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12356                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12357                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12358                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12359                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12360                                 downstream_channel_id, None
12361                         );
12362                 }
12363
12364                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12365                 //connection or two.
12366
12367                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12368         }
12369 }
12370
12371 #[cfg(test)]
12372 mod tests {
12373         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12374         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12375         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12376         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12377         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12378         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12379         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
12380         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12381         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12382         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12383         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12384         use crate::prelude::*;
12385         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12386         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12387         use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12388         use crate::util::test_utils;
12389         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12390         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12391
12392         #[test]
12393         fn test_notify_limits() {
12394                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12395                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12396                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12397                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12398                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12399                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12400
12401                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12402                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12403                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12404                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12405                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12406
12407                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12408
12409                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12410                 // to connect messages with new values
12411                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12412                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12413                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12414                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12415                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12416                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12417
12418                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12419                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12420                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12421                 // ... but the last node should not.
12422                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12423                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12424                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12425                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12426
12427                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12428                 // about the channel.
12429                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12430                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12431                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12432
12433                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12434                 // parties.
12435                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12436                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12437                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12438                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12439                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12440                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12441
12442                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12443                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12444                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12445
12446                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12447                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12448                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12449                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12450                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12451                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12452
12453                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12454                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12455                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12456                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12457                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12458                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12459                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12460                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12461
12462                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12463                 // the channel info has updated.
12464                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12465                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12466                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12467                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12468                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12469                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12470         }
12471
12472         #[test]
12473         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12474                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12475                 // expected.
12476                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12477                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12478                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12479                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12480                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12481
12482                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12483                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12484                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12485                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12486
12487                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12488                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12489                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12490                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12491                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12492                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12493                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12494                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12495                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12496                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12497                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12498                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12499
12500                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12501                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12502                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12503                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12504                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12505                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12506                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12507                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12508                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12509                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12510                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12511                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12512                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12513                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12514                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12515                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12516                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12517                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12518                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12519                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12520                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12521                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12522                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12523
12524                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12525                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12526                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12528                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12529                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12530                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12531
12532                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12533                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12534                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12535                 // lightning messages manually.
12536                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12537                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12539
12540                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12541                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12542                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12543                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12544                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12545                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12546                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12547                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12548                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12549                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12550                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12551                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12552                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12553                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12554                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12555                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12556                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12557                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12558                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12559                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12560                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12561                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12562                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12563                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12564                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12565                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12566
12567                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12568                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12569                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12570                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12571                 match events[0] {
12572                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12573                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12574                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12575                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12576                         },
12577                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12578                 }
12579                 match events[1] {
12580                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12581                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12582                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12583                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12584                         },
12585                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12586                 }
12587         }
12588
12589         #[test]
12590         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12591                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12592                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12593         }
12594
12595         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12596                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12597                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12598                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12599                 //      fails as expected.
12600                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12601                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12602                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12603                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12604                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12605                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12606                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12607                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12608                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12609                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12610                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12611                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12612                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12613                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12614                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12615
12616                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12617                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12618                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12619
12620                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12621                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12622                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12623                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12624                 let route = find_route(
12625                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12626                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12627                 ).unwrap();
12628                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12629                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12630                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12631                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12632                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12633                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12634                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12635                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12636                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12637                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12638                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12639                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12640                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12641                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12642                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12643                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12644                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12645                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12646                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12647                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12648                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12649                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12650                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12651                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12652
12653                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12654                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12655
12656                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12657                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12658                 let route = find_route(
12659                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12660                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12661                 ).unwrap();
12662                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12663                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12664                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12665                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12666                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12667                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12668                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12669                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12670
12671                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12672                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12673                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12674                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12675                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12676                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12677                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12678                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12679                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12680                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12681                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12682                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12683                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12684                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12685                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12686                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12687                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12688                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12689                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12690                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12691                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12692                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12693                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12694                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12695
12696                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12697                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12698
12699                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12700                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12701                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12702                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12703                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12704                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12705                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12706                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12707                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12708                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12709
12710                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12711                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12712                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12713                         100_000
12714                 );
12715                 let route = find_route(
12716                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12717                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12718                 ).unwrap();
12719                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12720                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12721                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12723                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12724                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12725                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12726                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12727                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12728                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12729                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12730                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12731                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12732                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12733                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12734                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12735                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12736                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12737                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12738                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12739                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12740                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12741                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12742
12743                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12744                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12745         }
12746
12747         #[test]
12748         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12749                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12750                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12751                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12752                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12753                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12754                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12755
12756                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12757                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12758
12759                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12760                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12761                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12762                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12763                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12764                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12765                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12766                 let route = find_route(
12767                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12768                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12769                 ).unwrap();
12770
12771                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12772                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12773                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12774                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12775                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12776                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12777                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12778
12779                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12780                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12781                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12782                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12783                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12784                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12785                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12786
12787                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12788         }
12789
12790         #[test]
12791         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12792                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12793                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12794                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12795                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12796                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12797                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12798                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12799                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12800
12801                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12802                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12803
12804                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12805                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12806                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12807                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12808                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12809                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12810                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12811                 let route = find_route(
12812                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12813                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12814                 ).unwrap();
12815
12816                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12817                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12818                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12819                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12820                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12821                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12822                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12823                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12824                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12825
12826                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12827                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12828                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12829                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12830                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12831                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12832                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12833
12834                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12835         }
12836
12837         #[test]
12838         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12839                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12840                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12841                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12842                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12843
12844                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12845                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12846                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12847                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12848
12849                 // Marshall an MPP route.
12850                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12851                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12852                 route.paths.push(path);
12853                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12854                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12855                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12856                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12857                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12858                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12859
12860                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12861                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12862                 .unwrap_err() {
12863                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12864                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12865                         },
12866                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12867                 }
12868         }
12869
12870         #[test]
12871         fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12872                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12873                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12874                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12875                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12876
12877                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12878
12879                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12880                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12881                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12882
12883                 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12884                 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12885                 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12886
12887                 {
12888                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12889                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12890                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12891                 }
12892
12893                 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12894                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12895                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12896
12897                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12898                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12899
12900                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12901                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12902
12903                 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12904                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12905                         features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12906                 }, true).unwrap();
12907                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12908                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12909                 }, false).unwrap();
12910
12911                 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12912                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12913                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12914                 match &node_0_events[0] {
12915                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12916                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12917                 }
12918                 {
12919                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12920                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12921                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12922                 }
12923         }
12924
12925         #[test]
12926         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12927                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12928                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12929                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12930                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12931
12932                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12933
12934                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12935                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12936
12937                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12938                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12939                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12940                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12941
12942                 {
12943                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12944                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12945                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12946                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12947                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12948                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12949                 }
12950
12951                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12952
12953                 {
12954                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12955                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12956                 }
12957         }
12958
12959         #[test]
12960         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12961                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12962                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12963                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12964                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12965                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12966
12967                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12968                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12969                         payment_secret,
12970                         total_msat: 100_000,
12971                 };
12972
12973                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12974                 // payment verification fails as expected.
12975                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12976                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12977                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12978                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12979                         Err(()) => {
12980                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12981                         }
12982                 }
12983
12984                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12985                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12986         }
12987
12988         #[test]
12989         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12990                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12991                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12992                 // the channel is successfully closed.
12993                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12994                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12995                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12996                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12997
12998                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12999                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13000                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
13001                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13002                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13003
13004                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
13005                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
13006                 {
13007                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
13008                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
13009                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13010                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13011                 }
13012
13013                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13014                 {
13015                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
13016                         // as it has the funding transaction.
13017                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13018                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13019                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13020                 }
13021
13022                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13023
13024                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13025
13026                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13027                 {
13028                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13029                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13030                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13031                 }
13032                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13033
13034                 {
13035                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
13036                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
13037                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13038                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13039                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13040                 }
13041                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13042                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13043                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13044                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13045                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13046                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13047                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13048                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13049
13050                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13051                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13052                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13053                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13054
13055                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13056                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13057                 {
13058                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13059                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13060                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13061                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13062                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13063                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13064                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13065                 }
13066
13067                 {
13068                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13069                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13070                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13071                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13072                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13073                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13074                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13075                 }
13076
13077                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13078                 {
13079                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13080                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13081                         // closing transaction).
13082                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13083                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13084                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13085
13086                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13087                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13088                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13089                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13090                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13091                 }
13092
13093                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13094
13095                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13096                 {
13097                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13098                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13099                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13100                 }
13101                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13102
13103                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13104                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13105         }
13106
13107         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13108                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13109                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13110         }
13111
13112         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13113                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13114                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13115         }
13116
13117         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13118                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13119                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13120         }
13121
13122         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13123                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13124                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13125         }
13126
13127         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13128                 match res_err {
13129                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13130                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13131                         },
13132                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13133                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13134                         },
13135                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13136                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13137                 }
13138         }
13139
13140         #[test]
13141         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13142                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13143                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13144                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13145                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13146                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13147                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13148                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13149
13150                 // Dummy values
13151                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13152                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13153                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13154
13155                 // Test the API functions.
13156                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13157
13158                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13159
13160                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13161
13162                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13163
13164                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13165
13166                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13167
13168                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13169         }
13170
13171         #[test]
13172         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13173                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13174                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13175                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13176                 // the given `channel_id`.
13177                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13178                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13179                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13180                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13181
13182                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13183
13184                 // Dummy values
13185                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13186
13187                 // Test the API functions.
13188                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13189
13190                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13191
13192                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13193
13194                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13195
13196                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13197
13198                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13199         }
13200
13201         #[test]
13202         fn test_connection_limiting() {
13203                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13204                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13205                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13206                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13207                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13208
13209                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13210
13211                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13212                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13213
13214                 let mut funding_tx = None;
13215                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13216                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13217                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13218
13219                         if idx == 0 {
13220                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13221                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13222                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13223                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13224                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13225
13226                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13227                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13228                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13229
13230                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13231
13232                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13233                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13234                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13235                         }
13236                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13237                 }
13238
13239                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13240                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13241                         &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13242                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13243                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13244                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13245
13246                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13247                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13248                 // limit.
13249                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13250                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13251                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13252                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13253                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13254                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13255                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13256                         }, true).unwrap();
13257                 }
13258                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13259                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13260                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13261                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13262                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13263
13264                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13265                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13266                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13267                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13268                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13269                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13270                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13271                 }
13272                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13273                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13274                 }, true).unwrap();
13275                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13276                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13277                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13278
13279                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13280                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13281                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13282                 }, false).unwrap();
13283                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13284
13285                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13286                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13287                 // open channels.
13288                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13289                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13290                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13291                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13292                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13293                 }
13294                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13295                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13296                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13297
13298                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13299                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13300                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13301
13302                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13303                 // "protected" and can connect again.
13304                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13305                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13306                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13307                 }, true).unwrap();
13308                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13309
13310                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13311                 // last_random_pk.
13312                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13313                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13314         }
13315
13316         #[test]
13317         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13318                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13319                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13320                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13321                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13322                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13323
13324                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13325
13326                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13327                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13328
13329                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13330                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13331                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13332                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13333                 }
13334
13335                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13336                 // rejected.
13337                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13338                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13339                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13340
13341                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13342                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13343                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13344
13345                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13346                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13347                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13348                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13349         }
13350
13351         #[test]
13352         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13353                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13354                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13355                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13356                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13357                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13358                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13359                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13360                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13361
13362                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13363
13364                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13365                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13366
13367                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13368                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13369                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13370                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13371                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13372                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13373                         }, true).unwrap();
13374
13375                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13376                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13377                         match events[0] {
13378                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13379                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13380                                 }
13381                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13382                         }
13383                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13384                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13385                 }
13386
13387                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13388                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13389                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13390                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13391                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13392                 }, true).unwrap();
13393                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13394                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13395                 match events[0] {
13396                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13397                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13398                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13399                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13400                                         _ => panic!(),
13401                                 }
13402                         }
13403                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13404                 }
13405                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13406                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13407
13408                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13409                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13410                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13411                 match events[0] {
13412                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13413                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13414                         }
13415                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13416                 }
13417                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13418         }
13419
13420         #[test]
13421         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13422                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13423                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13424                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13425                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13426                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13427                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13428                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13429                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13430                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13431                         payment_metadata: None,
13432                         keysend_preimage: None,
13433                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13434                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13435                         }),
13436                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13437                 };
13438                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13439                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13440                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13441                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13442                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13443                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13444                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13445                 {
13446                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13447                 } else { panic!(); }
13448
13449                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13450                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13451                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13452                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13453                         payment_metadata: None,
13454                         keysend_preimage: None,
13455                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13456                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13457                         }),
13458                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13459                 };
13460                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13461                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13462                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13463                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13464         }
13465
13466         #[test]
13467         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13468                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13469                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13470                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13471                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13472
13473                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13474                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13475                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13476                         cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13477                         payment_metadata: None,
13478                         keysend_preimage: None,
13479                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13480                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13481                         }),
13482                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13483                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13484                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13485
13486                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13487                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13488                 // is not satisfied.
13489                 assert!(result.is_ok());
13490         }
13491
13492         #[test]
13493         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13494                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13495                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13496                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13497                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13498
13499                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13500                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13501
13502                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13503                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13504                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13505                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13506                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13507
13508                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13509                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13510
13511                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13512                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13513                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13514                 match &msg_events[0] {
13515                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13516                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13517                                 match action {
13518                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13519                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13520                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13521                                 }
13522                         }
13523                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13524                 }
13525
13526                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13527                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13528                 match events[0] {
13529                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13530                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13531                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13532                 }
13533                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13534         }
13535
13536         #[test]
13537         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13538                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13539                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13540                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13541                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13542                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13543                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13544                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13545                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13546                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13547                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13548
13549                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13550                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13551                 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13552
13553                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13554                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13555                 match events[0] {
13556                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13557                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13558                         }
13559                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13560                 }
13561
13562                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13563                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13564
13565                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13566                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13567
13568                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13569                 // not have generated any events.
13570                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13571         }
13572
13573         #[test]
13574         fn test_update_channel_config() {
13575                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13576                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13577                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13578                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13579                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13580                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13581                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13582
13583                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13584                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13585                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13586
13587                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13588                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13589                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13590                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13591                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13592                 match &events[0] {
13593                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13594                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13595                 }
13596
13597                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13598                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13599                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13600
13601                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13602                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13603                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13604                         ..Default::default()
13605                 }).unwrap();
13606                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13607                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13608                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13609                 match &events[0] {
13610                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13611                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13612                 }
13613
13614                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13615                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13616                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13617                         ..Default::default()
13618                 }).unwrap();
13619                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13620                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13621                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13622                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13623                 match &events[0] {
13624                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13625                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13626                 }
13627
13628                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13629                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13630                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13631                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13632                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13633                 assert!(
13634                         matches!(
13635                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13636                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13637                                         ..Default::default()
13638                                 }),
13639                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13640                         )
13641                 );
13642                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13643                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13644                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13645                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13646         }
13647
13648         #[test]
13649         fn test_payment_display() {
13650                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13651                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13652                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13653                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13654                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13655                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13656         }
13657
13658         #[test]
13659         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13660                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13661                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13662                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13663                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13664                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13665
13666                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13667                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13668                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13669                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13670                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13671                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13672                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13673                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13674                 {
13675                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13676                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13677                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13678                 }
13679
13680                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13681                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13682                 // their side.
13683                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13684                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13685                 }, true).unwrap();
13686                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13687                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13688                 }, false).unwrap();
13689                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13690                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13691                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13692                 );
13693                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13694
13695                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13696                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13697                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13698                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13699                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13700                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13701                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13702                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13703                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13704                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13705                 } else { panic!() };
13706                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13707                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13708                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13709                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13710                 };
13711                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13712                 {
13713                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13714                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13715                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13716                 }
13717         }
13718
13719         #[test]
13720         fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13721                 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13722                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13723                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13724                 let persister;
13725                 let chain_monitor;
13726                 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13727                 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13728                 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13729
13730                 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13731                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13732                 };
13733                 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13734                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13735                 };
13736
13737                 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13738                         if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13739                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13740                         } else {
13741                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13742                         }
13743                 }).collect();
13744
13745                 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13746                         if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13747                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13748                         } else {
13749                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13750                         }
13751                 }).collect();
13752
13753
13754                 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13755                 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13756                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13757                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13758
13759                 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13760                 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13761                 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13762
13763                 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13764
13765                 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13766                 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13767                         let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13768                         assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13769                 }
13770                 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13771                 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13772
13773                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13774         }
13775 }
13776
13777 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
13778 pub mod bench {
13779         use crate::chain::Listen;
13780         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13781         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13782         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13783         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13784         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13785         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13786         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13787         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13788         use crate::util::test_utils;
13789         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13790
13791         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13792         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13793         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13794         use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13795
13796         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13797
13798         use criterion::Criterion;
13799
13800         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13801                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13802                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13803                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13804                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13805                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13806                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13807
13808         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13809                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13810         }
13811         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13812                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13813                 #[inline]
13814                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13815                 #[inline]
13816                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13817         }
13818
13819         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13820                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13821         }
13822
13823         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13824                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13825                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13826                 // calls per node.
13827                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13828                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13829
13830                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13831                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13832                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13833                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13834                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13835
13836                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13837                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13838                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13839
13840                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13841                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13842                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13843                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13844                         network,
13845                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13846                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13847                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13848
13849                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13850                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13851                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13852                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13853                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13854                         network,
13855                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13856                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13857                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13858
13859                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13860                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13861                 }, true).unwrap();
13862                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13863                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13864                 }, false).unwrap();
13865                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13866                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13867                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13868
13869                 let tx;
13870                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13871                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13872                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13873                         }]};
13874                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13875                 } else { panic!(); }
13876
13877                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13878                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13879                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13880                 match events_b[0] {
13881                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13882                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13883                         },
13884                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13885                 }
13886
13887                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13888                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13889                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13890                 match events_a[0] {
13891                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13892                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13893                         },
13894                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13895                 }
13896
13897                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13898
13899                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13900                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13901                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13902
13903                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13904                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13905                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13906                 match msg_events[0] {
13907                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13908                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13909                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13910                         },
13911                         _ => panic!(),
13912                 }
13913                 match msg_events[1] {
13914                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13915                         _ => panic!(),
13916                 }
13917
13918                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13919                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13920                 match events_a[0] {
13921                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13922                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13923                         },
13924                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13925                 }
13926
13927                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13928                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13929                 match events_b[0] {
13930                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13931                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13932                         },
13933                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13934                 }
13935
13936                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13937                 macro_rules! send_payment {
13938                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13939                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13940                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13941                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13942                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13943                                 payment_count += 1;
13944                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13945                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13946
13947                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13948                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13949                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13950                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13951                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13952                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13953                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13954                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13955                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13956                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13957                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13958
13959                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13960                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13961                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13962                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13963
13964                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13965                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13966                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13967                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13968                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13969                                         },
13970                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13971                                 }
13972
13973                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13974                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13975                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13976                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13977
13978                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13979                         }
13980                 }
13981
13982                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13983                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13984                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
13985                 }));
13986         }
13987 }