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Merge pull request #2957 from G8XSU/pause-events
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
46 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
48 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
49 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
50 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
51 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
52 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::msgs;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 #[cfg(test)]
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
80 use {
81         crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82         crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83         crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84         crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85         crate::sign::KeysManager,
86 };
87 #[cfg(c_bindings)]
88 use {
89         crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90         crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
91 };
92
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
94
95 use crate::io;
96 use crate::prelude::*;
97 use core::{cmp, mem};
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
99 use crate::io::Read;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
104
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
108
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
110 //
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
114 //
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
119 //
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
125
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
131         Forward {
132                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133                 /// do with the HTLC.
134                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
136                 ///
137                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
143         },
144         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
145         ///
146         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
148         Receive {
149                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
154                 ///
155                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159                 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
160                 /// blinded path was not used.
161                 ///
162                 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
163                 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
164                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
165                 ///
166                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
167                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
168                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
169                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
170                 /// instructions.
171                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
173                 ///
174                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
175                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
176                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
177                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
178                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
179                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
180         },
181         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
182         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
183         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
184         ReceiveKeysend {
185                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
186                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
187                 ///
188                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
189                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
190                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
192                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
193                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
194                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
195                 ///
196                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
197                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
198                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
199                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
200                 ///
201                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
202                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
203                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
204                 ///
205                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
206                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
207                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
208                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
209                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
210         },
211 }
212
213 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
214 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct BlindedForward {
216         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
217         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
218         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
219         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
220         /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
221         /// the introduction node.
222         pub failure: BlindedFailure,
223 }
224
225 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
226         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
227         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
228                 match self {
229                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
230                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
231                         Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232                         _ => None,
233                 }
234         }
235 }
236
237 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
238 /// should go next.
239 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
240 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
241 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
242         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
243         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
244         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
245         ///
246         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
247         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
248         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
249         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
250         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
251         ///
252         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
253         /// versions.
254         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
255         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
256         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
257         ///
258         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
259         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
260         /// it along another path).
261         ///
262         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
263         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
264         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
265         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
266         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
267         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
268         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
269         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
270         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
271         ///
272         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
273         /// HTLC.
274         ///
275         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
276         ///
277         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
278         /// shoulder them.
279         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
280 }
281
282 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
283 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
284         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
285         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
286 }
287
288 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
289 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
290 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
291         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
292         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
293 }
294
295 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
296 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
297         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
298
299         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
300         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
301         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
302         // HTLCs.
303         //
304         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
305         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
306         prev_htlc_id: u64,
307         prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
308         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
309         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
310 }
311
312 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
313 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
314         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
315         FailHTLC {
316                 htlc_id: u64,
317                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
318         },
319         FailMalformedHTLC {
320                 htlc_id: u64,
321                 failure_code: u16,
322                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
323         },
324 }
325
326 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
327 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
328 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
329 pub enum BlindedFailure {
330         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
331         /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
332         FromIntroductionNode,
333         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
334         /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
335         FromBlindedNode,
336 }
337
338 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
339 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
340 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
341         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
342         short_channel_id: u64,
343         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
344         htlc_id: u64,
345         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
346         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
347         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
348         channel_id: ChannelId,
349
350         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
351         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
352         outpoint: OutPoint,
353 }
354
355 enum OnionPayload {
356         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
357         Invoice {
358                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
359                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
360                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
361         },
362         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
363         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
364 }
365
366 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
367 struct ClaimableHTLC {
368         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
369         cltv_expiry: u32,
370         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
371         value: u64,
372         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
373         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
374         sender_intended_value: u64,
375         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
376         timer_ticks: u8,
377         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
378         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
379         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
380         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
381         total_msat: u64,
382         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
383         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
384 }
385
386 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
387         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
388                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
389                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
390                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
391                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
392                         value_msat: val.value,
393                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
394                 }
395         }
396 }
397
398 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
399 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
400 ///
401 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
402 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
403 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
404
405 impl PaymentId {
406         /// Number of bytes in the id.
407         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
408 }
409
410 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
411         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
412                 self.0.write(w)
413         }
414 }
415
416 impl Readable for PaymentId {
417         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
418                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
419                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
420         }
421 }
422
423 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
424         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
425                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
426         }
427 }
428
429 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
430 ///
431 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
432 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
433 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
434
435 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
436         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
437                 self.0.write(w)
438         }
439 }
440
441 impl Readable for InterceptId {
442         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
443                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
444                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
445         }
446 }
447
448 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
449 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
450 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
451         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
452         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
453 }
454 impl SentHTLCId {
455         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
456                 match source {
457                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
458                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
459                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
460                         },
461                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
462                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
463                 }
464         }
465 }
466 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
467         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
468                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
469                 (2, htlc_id, required),
470         },
471         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
472                 (0, session_priv, required),
473         };
474 );
475
476
477 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
478 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
479 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
480 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
481         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
482         OutboundRoute {
483                 path: Path,
484                 session_priv: SecretKey,
485                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
486                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
487                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
488                 payment_id: PaymentId,
489         },
490 }
491 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
492 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
493         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
494                 match self {
495                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
496                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
497                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
498                         },
499                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
500                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
501                                 path.hash(hasher);
502                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
503                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
504                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505                         },
506                 }
507         }
508 }
509 impl HTLCSource {
510         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
511         #[cfg(test)]
512         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
513                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
514                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
515                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
516                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
517                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
518                 }
519         }
520
521         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
522         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
523         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
524         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
525                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
526                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
527                 } else {
528                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529                         true
530                 }
531         }
532 }
533
534 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
535 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
536 ///
537 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
538 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
539 pub enum FailureCode {
540         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
541         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
542         TemporaryNodeFailure,
543         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
544         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
545         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
546         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
547         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
548         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
549         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
550         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
551         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
552         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
553         ///
554         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
555         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
556         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
557 }
558
559 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
560     fn into(self) -> u16 {
561                 match self {
562                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
563                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
564                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
565                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
566                 }
567         }
568 }
569
570 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
571 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
572 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
573 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
574 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
575
576 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
577         err: msgs::LightningError,
578         closes_channel: bool,
579         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
580 }
581 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
582         #[inline]
583         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
584                 Self {
585                         err: LightningError {
586                                 err: err.clone(),
587                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
588                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589                                                 channel_id,
590                                                 data: err
591                                         },
592                                 },
593                         },
594                         closes_channel: false,
595                         shutdown_finish: None,
596                 }
597         }
598         #[inline]
599         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
600                 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
601         }
602         #[inline]
603         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
604                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
605                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
606                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
607                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
608                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
609                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
610                 } else {
611                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
612                 };
613                 Self {
614                         err: LightningError { err, action },
615                         closes_channel: true,
616                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
617                 }
618         }
619         #[inline]
620         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
621                 Self {
622                         err: match err {
623                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
624                                         err: msg.clone(),
625                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
626                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
627                                                         channel_id,
628                                                         data: msg
629                                                 },
630                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
631                                         },
632                                 },
633                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
634                                         err: msg,
635                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
636                                 },
637                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
638                                         err: msg.clone(),
639                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
640                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
641                                                         channel_id,
642                                                         data: msg
643                                                 },
644                                         },
645                                 },
646                         },
647                         closes_channel: false,
648                         shutdown_finish: None,
649                 }
650         }
651
652         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
653                 self.closes_channel
654         }
655 }
656
657 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
658 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
659 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
660 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
661 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
662
663 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
664 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
665 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
666 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
667 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
668 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
669         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
670         CommitmentFirst,
671         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
672         RevokeAndACKFirst,
673 }
674
675 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
676 struct ClaimingPayment {
677         amount_msat: u64,
678         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
679         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
680         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
681         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
682 }
683 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
684         (0, amount_msat, required),
685         (2, payment_purpose, required),
686         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
687         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
688         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
689 });
690
691 struct ClaimablePayment {
692         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
693         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
694         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
695 }
696
697 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
698 struct ClaimablePayments {
699         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
700         /// failed/claimed by the user.
701         ///
702         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
703         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
704         ///
705         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
706         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
707         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
708
709         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
710         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
711         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
712         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
713 }
714
715 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
716 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
717 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
718 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
719 #[derive(Debug)]
720 enum BackgroundEvent {
721         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
722         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
723         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
724         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
725         ///
726         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
727         /// are regenerated on startup.
728         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
729         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
730         /// channel to continue normal operation.
731         ///
732         /// In general this should be used rather than
733         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
734         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
735         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
736         ///
737         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
738         /// are regenerated on startup.
739         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
740                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
741                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
742                 channel_id: ChannelId,
743                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
744         },
745         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
746         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
747         /// on a channel.
748         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
749                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
750                 channel_id: ChannelId,
751         },
752 }
753
754 #[derive(Debug)]
755 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
756         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
757         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
758         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
759         /// event can be generated.
760         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
761         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
762         /// operation of another channel.
763         ///
764         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
765         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
766         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
767         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
768         /// outbound edge.
769         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
770                 event: events::Event,
771                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
772         },
773         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
774         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
775         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
776         ///
777         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
778         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
779         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
780         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
781         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
782         ///
783         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
784         /// stored for later processing.
785         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
786                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
787                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
788                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
789                 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
790         },
791 }
792
793 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
794         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
795         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
796         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
797         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
798                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
799                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
800                 (4, blocking_action, required),
801                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
802                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
803                 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
804         },
805         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
806                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
807                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
808                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
809                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
810                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
811                 // downgrades to prior versions.
812                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
813         },
814 );
815
816 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
817 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
818         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
819                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
820                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
821                 channel_id: ChannelId,
822         },
823 }
824 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
825         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
826                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
827                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
828                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
829                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
830                 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
831         };
832 );
833
834 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
835 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
836 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
837 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
838         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
839         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
840         /// durably to disk.
841         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
842                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
843                 channel_id: ChannelId,
844                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
845                 htlc_id: u64,
846         },
847 }
848
849 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
850         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
851                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
852                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
853                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
854                 }
855         }
856 }
857
858 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
859         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
860 ;);
861
862
863 /// State we hold per-peer.
864 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
865         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
866         ///
867         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
868         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
869         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
870         ///
871         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
872         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
873         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
874         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
875         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
876         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
877         latest_features: InitFeatures,
878         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
879         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
880         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
881         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
882         /// user but which have not yet completed.
883         ///
884         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
885         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
886         /// for a missing channel.
887         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
888         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
889         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
890         ///
891         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
892         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
893         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
894         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
895         ///
896         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
897         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
898         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
899         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
900         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
901         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
902         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
903         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
904         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
905         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
906         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
907         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
908         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
909         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
910         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
911         pub is_connected: bool,
912 }
913
914 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
915         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
916         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
917         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
918         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
919                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
920                         return false
921                 }
922                 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
923                         match phase {
924                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
925                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
926                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
927                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
928                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
929                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
930                         }
931                 )
932                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
933                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
934         }
935
936         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
937         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
938                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
939         }
940
941         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
942         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
943                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
944                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
945         }
946 }
947
948 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
949 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
950 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
951         /// The original OpenChannel message.
952         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
953         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
954         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
955 }
956
957 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
958 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
959 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
960
961 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
962 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
963 ///
964 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
965 /// here.
966 ///
967 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
968 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
969 struct PendingInboundPayment {
970         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
971         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
972         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
973         /// this payment being removed.
974         expiry_time: u64,
975         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
976         user_payment_id: u64,
977         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
978         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
979         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
980 }
981
982 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
983 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
984 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
985 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
986 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
987 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
988 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
989 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
990 ///
991 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
992 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
993 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
994         Arc<M>,
995         Arc<T>,
996         Arc<KeysManager>,
997         Arc<KeysManager>,
998         Arc<KeysManager>,
999         Arc<F>,
1000         Arc<DefaultRouter<
1001                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1002                 Arc<L>,
1003                 Arc<KeysManager>,
1004                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1005                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1006                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1007         >>,
1008         Arc<L>
1009 >;
1010
1011 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1012 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1013 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1014 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1015 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1016 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1017 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1018 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1019 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1020 ///
1021 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1022 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1023 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1024         ChannelManager<
1025                 &'a M,
1026                 &'b T,
1027                 &'c KeysManager,
1028                 &'c KeysManager,
1029                 &'c KeysManager,
1030                 &'d F,
1031                 &'e DefaultRouter<
1032                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1033                         &'g L,
1034                         &'c KeysManager,
1035                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1036                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1037                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1038                 >,
1039                 &'g L
1040         >;
1041
1042 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1043 ///
1044 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1045 /// languages.
1046 pub trait AChannelManager {
1047         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1048         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1049         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1050         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1051         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1052         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1053         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1054         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1055         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1056         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1057         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1058         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1059         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1060         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1061         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1062         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1063         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1064         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1065         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1066         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1067         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1068         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1069         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1070         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1071         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1072         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1073         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1074         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1075         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1076         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1077         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1078         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1079         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1080         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1081         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1082         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1083 }
1084
1085 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1086 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1087 where
1088         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1089         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1090         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1091         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1092         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1093         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1094         R::Target: Router,
1095         L::Target: Logger,
1096 {
1097         type Watch = M::Target;
1098         type M = M;
1099         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1100         type T = T;
1101         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1102         type ES = ES;
1103         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1104         type NS = NS;
1105         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1106         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1107         type SP = SP;
1108         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1109         type F = F;
1110         type Router = R::Target;
1111         type R = R;
1112         type Logger = L::Target;
1113         type L = L;
1114         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1115 }
1116
1117 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1118 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1119 ///
1120 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1121 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1122 ///   channel
1123 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1124 ///   closing channels
1125 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1126 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1127 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1128 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1129 ///   timely manner
1130 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1131 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1132 ///
1133 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1134 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1135 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1136 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1137 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1138 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1139 ///
1140 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1141 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1142 ///
1143 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1144 ///
1145 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1146 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1147 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1148 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1149 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1150 ///
1151 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1152 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1153 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1154 ///
1155 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1156 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1157 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1158 ///
1159 /// # Initialization
1160 ///
1161 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1162 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1163 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1164 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1165 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1166 ///
1167 /// ```
1168 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1169 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1170 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1171 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1172 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1173 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1174 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1175 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1176 ///
1177 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1178 /// # fn example<
1179 /// #     'a,
1180 /// #     L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1181 /// #     ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1182 /// #     S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1183 /// #     SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1184 /// #     SP: Sized,
1185 /// #     R: lightning::io::Read,
1186 /// # >(
1187 /// #     fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1188 /// #     chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1189 /// #     tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1190 /// #     router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1191 /// #     logger: &L,
1192 /// #     entropy_source: &ES,
1193 /// #     node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1194 /// #     signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1195 /// #     best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1196 /// #     current_timestamp: u32,
1197 /// #     mut reader: R,
1198 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1199 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1200 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1201 ///     network: Network::Bitcoin,
1202 ///     best_block,
1203 /// };
1204 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1205 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1206 ///     fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1207 ///     signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1208 /// );
1209 ///
1210 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1211 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1212 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1213 ///     entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1214 ///     router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1215 /// );
1216 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1217 ///     <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1218 ///
1219 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1220 /// // ...
1221 ///
1222 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1223 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1224 ///     chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1225 /// }
1226 /// # Ok(())
1227 /// # }
1228 /// ```
1229 ///
1230 /// # Operation
1231 ///
1232 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1233 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1234 ///   called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1235 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1236 ///   (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1237 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1238 ///   as documented by those traits
1239 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1240 ///   every minute
1241 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1242 ///   [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1243 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1244 ///
1245 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1246 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1247 ///
1248 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1249 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1250 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1251 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1252 ///
1253 /// # Channels
1254 ///
1255 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1256 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1257 /// currently open channels.
1258 ///
1259 /// ```
1260 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1261 /// #
1262 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1263 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1264 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1265 /// for details in channels {
1266 ///     println!("{:?}", details);
1267 /// }
1268 /// # }
1269 /// ```
1270 ///
1271 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1272 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1273 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1274 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1275 ///
1276 /// ## Opening Channels
1277 ///
1278 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1279 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1280 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1281 ///
1282 /// ```
1283 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1284 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1285 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1286 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1287 /// #
1288 /// # trait Wallet {
1289 /// #     fn create_funding_transaction(
1290 /// #         &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1291 /// #     ) -> Transaction;
1292 /// # }
1293 /// #
1294 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1295 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1296 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1297 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1298 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1299 ///     Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1300 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1301 /// }
1302 ///
1303 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1304 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1305 ///     Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1306 ///         temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1307 ///         user_channel_id, ..
1308 ///     } => {
1309 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1310 ///         let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1311 ///             channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1312 ///         );
1313 ///         match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1314 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1315 ///         ) {
1316 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1317 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1318 ///         }
1319 ///     },
1320 ///     Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1321 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1322 ///         println!(
1323 ///             "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1324 ///             former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1325 ///         );
1326 ///     },
1327 ///     Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1328 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1329 ///         println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1330 ///     },
1331 ///     // ...
1332 /// #     _ => {},
1333 /// });
1334 /// # }
1335 /// ```
1336 ///
1337 /// ## Accepting Channels
1338 ///
1339 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1340 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1341 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1342 ///
1343 /// ```
1344 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1345 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1346 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1347 /// #
1348 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1349 /// #     // ...
1350 /// #     unimplemented!()
1351 /// # }
1352 /// #
1353 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1354 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1355 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1356 ///     Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, ..  } => {
1357 ///         if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1358 ///             match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1359 ///                 &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1360 ///             ) {
1361 ///                 Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1362 ///                 Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1363 ///             }
1364 ///             return;
1365 ///         }
1366 ///
1367 ///         let user_channel_id = 43;
1368 ///         match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1369 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1370 ///         ) {
1371 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1372 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1373 ///         }
1374 ///     },
1375 ///     // ...
1376 /// #     _ => {},
1377 /// });
1378 /// # }
1379 /// ```
1380 ///
1381 /// ## Closing Channels
1382 ///
1383 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1384 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1385 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1386 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1387 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1388 ///
1389 /// ```
1390 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1391 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1392 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1393 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1394 /// #
1395 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1396 /// #     channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1397 /// # ) {
1398 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1399 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1400 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1401 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1402 /// }
1403 ///
1404 /// // On the event processing thread
1405 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1406 ///     Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, ..  } => {
1407 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1408 ///         println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1409 ///     },
1410 ///     // ...
1411 /// #     _ => {},
1412 /// });
1413 /// # }
1414 /// ```
1415 ///
1416 /// # Payments
1417 ///
1418 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1419 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1420 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1421 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1422 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1423 /// HTLCs.
1424 ///
1425 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1426 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1427 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1428 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1429 ///
1430 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1431 ///
1432 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1433 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1434 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1435 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1436 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1437 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1438 ///
1439 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1440 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1441 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1442 ///
1443 /// ```
1444 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1445 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1446 /// #
1447 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1448 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1449 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1450 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1451 ///     Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1452 /// ) {
1453 ///     Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1454 ///         println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1455 ///         payment_hash
1456 ///     },
1457 ///     Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1458 /// };
1459 ///
1460 /// // On the event processing thread
1461 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1462 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1463 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1464 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1465 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1466 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1467 ///         },
1468 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1469 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1470 ///         },
1471 ///         PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1472 ///             assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1473 ///             println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1474 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1475 ///         },
1476 ///         // ...
1477 /// #         _ => {},
1478 ///     },
1479 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1480 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1481 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1482 ///     },
1483 ///     // ...
1484 /// #     _ => {},
1485 /// });
1486 /// # }
1487 /// ```
1488 ///
1489 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1490 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1491 ///
1492 /// ```
1493 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1494 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1495 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1496 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1497 /// #
1498 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1499 /// #     channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1500 /// #     route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1501 /// # ) {
1502 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1503 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1504 /// //     payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1505 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1506 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1507 ///     payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1508 /// ) {
1509 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1510 ///     Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1511 /// }
1512 ///
1513 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1514 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1515 /// assert!(
1516 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1517 ///         details,
1518 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1519 ///             payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1520 ///             payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1521 ///             ..
1522 ///         }
1523 ///     )).is_some()
1524 /// );
1525 ///
1526 /// // On the event processing thread
1527 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1528 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1529 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1530 ///     // ...
1531 /// #     _ => {},
1532 /// });
1533 /// # }
1534 /// ```
1535 ///
1536 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1537 ///
1538 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1539 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1540 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1541 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1542 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1543 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1544 ///
1545 /// ```
1546 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1547 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1548 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1549 /// #
1550 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1551 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1552 /// let offer = channel_manager
1553 ///     .create_offer_builder()?
1554 /// # ;
1555 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1556 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1557 /// # let offer = builder
1558 ///     .description("coffee".to_string())
1559 ///     .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1560 ///     .build()?;
1561 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1562 ///
1563 /// // On the event processing thread
1564 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1565 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1566 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1567 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1568 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1569 ///         },
1570 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1571 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1572 ///         },
1573 ///         // ...
1574 /// #         _ => {},
1575 ///     },
1576 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1577 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1578 ///     },
1579 ///     // ...
1580 /// #     _ => {},
1581 /// });
1582 /// # Ok(())
1583 /// # }
1584 /// ```
1585 ///
1586 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1587 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1588 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1589 ///
1590 /// ```
1591 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1592 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1593 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1594 /// #
1595 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1596 /// #     channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1597 /// #     payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1598 /// # ) {
1599 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1600 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1601 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1602 ///     offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1603 /// ) {
1604 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1605 ///     Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1606 /// }
1607 ///
1608 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1609 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1610 /// assert!(
1611 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1612 ///         details,
1613 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1614 ///     )).is_some()
1615 /// );
1616 ///
1617 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1618 /// assert!(
1619 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1620 ///         details,
1621 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1622 ///     )).is_some()
1623 /// );
1624 ///
1625 /// // On the event processing thread
1626 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1627 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1628 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1629 ///     Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1630 ///     // ...
1631 /// #     _ => {},
1632 /// });
1633 /// # }
1634 /// ```
1635 ///
1636 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1637 ///
1638 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1639 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1640 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1641 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1642 ///
1643 /// ```
1644 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1645 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1646 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1647 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1648 /// #
1649 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1650 /// #     channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1651 /// #     max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1652 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1653 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1654 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1655 /// let refund = channel_manager
1656 ///     .create_refund_builder(
1657 ///         amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1658 ///     )?
1659 /// # ;
1660 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1661 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1662 /// # let refund = builder
1663 ///     .description("coffee".to_string())
1664 ///     .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1665 ///     .build()?;
1666 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1667 ///
1668 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1669 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1670 /// assert!(
1671 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1672 ///         details,
1673 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1674 ///     )).is_some()
1675 /// );
1676 ///
1677 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1678 /// assert!(
1679 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1680 ///         details,
1681 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1682 ///     )).is_some()
1683 /// );
1684 ///
1685 /// // On the event processing thread
1686 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1687 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1688 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1689 ///     // ...
1690 /// #     _ => {},
1691 /// });
1692 /// # Ok(())
1693 /// # }
1694 /// ```
1695 ///
1696 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1697 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1698 ///
1699 /// ```
1700 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1701 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1702 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1703 /// #
1704 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1705 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1706 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1707 ///     Ok(invoice) => {
1708 ///         let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1709 ///         println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1710 ///         payment_hash
1711 ///     },
1712 ///     Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1713 /// };
1714 ///
1715 /// // On the event processing thread
1716 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1717 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1718 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1719 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1720 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1721 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1722 ///         },
1723 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1724 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1725 ///             },
1726 ///         // ...
1727 /// #         _ => {},
1728 ///     },
1729 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1730 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1731 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1732 ///     },
1733 ///     // ...
1734 /// #     _ => {},
1735 /// });
1736 /// # }
1737 /// ```
1738 ///
1739 /// # Persistence
1740 ///
1741 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1742 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1743 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1744 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1745 ///
1746 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1747 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1748 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1749 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1750 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1751 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1752 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1753 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1754 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1755 ///
1756 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1757 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1758 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1759 ///
1760 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1761 ///
1762 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1763 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1764 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1765 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1766 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1767 ///
1768 /// # DoS Mitigation
1769 ///
1770 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1771 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1772 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1773 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1774 ///
1775 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1776 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1777 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1778 ///
1779 /// # Type Aliases
1780 ///
1781 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1782 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1783 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1784 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1785 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1786 ///
1787 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1788 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1789 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1790 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1791 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1792 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1793 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1794 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1795 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1796 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1797 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1798 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1799 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1800 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1801 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1802 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1803 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1804 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1805 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1806 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1807 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1808 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1809 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1810 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1811 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1812 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1813 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1814 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1815 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1816 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1817 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1818 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1819 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1820 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1821 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1822 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1823 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1824 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1825 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1826 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1827 //
1828 // Lock order:
1829 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1830 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1831 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1832 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1833 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1834 //
1835 // Lock order tree:
1836 //
1837 // `pending_offers_messages`
1838 //
1839 // `total_consistency_lock`
1840 //  |
1841 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1842 //  |   |
1843 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1844 //  |
1845 //  |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1846 //  |
1847 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1848 //      |
1849 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1850 //          |
1851 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1852 //          |
1853 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1854 //              |
1855 //              |__`peer_state`
1856 //                  |
1857 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1858 //                  |
1859 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1860 //                  |
1861 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1862 //                  |
1863 //                  |__`best_block`
1864 //                  |
1865 //                  |__`pending_events`
1866 //                      |
1867 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1868 //
1869 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1870 where
1871         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1872         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1873         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1874         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1875         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1876         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1877         R::Target: Router,
1878         L::Target: Logger,
1879 {
1880         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1881         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1882         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1883         chain_monitor: M,
1884         tx_broadcaster: T,
1885         #[allow(unused)]
1886         router: R,
1887
1888         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1889         #[cfg(test)]
1890         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1891         #[cfg(not(test))]
1892         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1893         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1894
1895         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1896         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1897         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1898         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1899         ///
1900         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1901         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1902
1903         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1904         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1905         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1906         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1907         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1908         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1909         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1910         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1911         ///
1912         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1913         ///
1914         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1915         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1916
1917         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1918         ///
1919         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1920         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1921         /// and via the classic SCID.
1922         ///
1923         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1924         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1925         ///
1926         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1927         #[cfg(test)]
1928         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1929         #[cfg(not(test))]
1930         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1931         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1932         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1933         ///
1934         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1935         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1936
1937         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1938         ///
1939         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1940         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1941         /// and via the classic SCID.
1942         ///
1943         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1944         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1945         ///
1946         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1947         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1948
1949         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1950         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1951         ///
1952         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1953         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1954
1955         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1956         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1957         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1958         /// active channel list on load.
1959         ///
1960         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1961         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1962
1963         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1964         ///
1965         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1966         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1967         /// the handling of the events.
1968         ///
1969         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1970         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1971         ///
1972         /// TODO:
1973         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1974         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1975         /// would break backwards compatability.
1976         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1977         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1978         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1979         ///
1980         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1981         #[cfg(not(test))]
1982         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1983         #[cfg(test)]
1984         pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1985
1986         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1987         ///
1988         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1989         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1990         /// confirmation depth.
1991         ///
1992         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1993         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1994         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1995         ///
1996         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1997         #[cfg(test)]
1998         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1999         #[cfg(not(test))]
2000         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2001
2002         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2003
2004         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2005
2006         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2007         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2008         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2009         ///
2010         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2011         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2012
2013         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2014         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2015         /// keeping additional state.
2016         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2017
2018         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2019         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2020         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2021         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2022
2023         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2024         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2025         ///
2026         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2027         /// are currently open with that peer.
2028         ///
2029         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2030         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2031         /// channels.
2032         ///
2033         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2034         ///
2035         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2036         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2037         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2038         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2039         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2040
2041         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2042         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2043         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2044         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2045         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2046         ///
2047         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2048         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2049         ///
2050         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2051         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2052         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2053         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2054         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2055
2056         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2057         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2058
2059         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2060         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2061         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2062         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2063         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2064         ///
2065         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2066         ///
2067         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2068         ///
2069         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2070         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2071         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2072         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2073         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2074         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2075         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2076         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2077         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2078         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2079         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2080         ///
2081         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2082         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2083         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2084
2085         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2086
2087         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2088         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2089
2090         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2091
2092         /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2093         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2094
2095         entropy_source: ES,
2096         node_signer: NS,
2097         signer_provider: SP,
2098
2099         logger: L,
2100 }
2101
2102 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2103 ///
2104 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2105 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2106 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2107 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2108 pub struct ChainParameters {
2109         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2110         pub network: Network,
2111
2112         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2113         ///
2114         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2115         pub best_block: BestBlock,
2116 }
2117
2118 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2119 #[must_use]
2120 enum NotifyOption {
2121         DoPersist,
2122         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2123         SkipPersistNoEvents,
2124 }
2125
2126 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2127 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2128 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2129 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2130 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2131 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2132 ///
2133 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2134 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2135 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2136 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2137         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2138         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2139         should_persist: F,
2140         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2141         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2142 }
2143
2144 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2145         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2146         /// events to handle.
2147         ///
2148         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2149         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2150         /// isn't ideal.
2151         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2152                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2153         }
2154
2155         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2156         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2157                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2158                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2159
2160                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2161                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2162                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2163                         should_persist: move || {
2164                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2165                                 // processing and return that.
2166                                 let notify = persist_check();
2167                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
2168                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2169                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2170                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2171                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2172                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2173                                 }
2174                         },
2175                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2176                 }
2177         }
2178
2179         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2180         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2181         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2182         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2183         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2184                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2185
2186                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2187                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2188                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2189                         should_persist: persist_check,
2190                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2191                 }
2192         }
2193 }
2194
2195 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2196         fn drop(&mut self) {
2197                 match (self.should_persist)() {
2198                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2199                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2200                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2201                         },
2202                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2203                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2204                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2205                 }
2206         }
2207 }
2208
2209 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2210 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2211 ///
2212 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2213 ///
2214 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2215 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2216 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2217 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2218 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2219
2220 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2221 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2222 ///
2223 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2224 ///
2225 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2226 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2227 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2228 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2229 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2230 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2231 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2232 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2233 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2234 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2235 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2236 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2237 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2238
2239 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2240 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2241 /// this value.
2242 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2243 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2244 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2245 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2246
2247 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2248 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2249 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2250 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2251 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2252 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2253 #[allow(dead_code)]
2254 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2255
2256 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2257 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2258 #[allow(dead_code)]
2259 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2260
2261 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2262 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2263
2264 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2265 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2266 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2267
2268 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2269 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2270 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2271
2272 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2273 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2274 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2275 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2276
2277 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2278 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2279 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2280
2281 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2282 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2283 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2284
2285 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2286 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2287 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2288         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2289         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2290         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2291         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2292         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2293         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2294         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2295         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2296 }
2297
2298 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2299 /// to better separate parameters.
2300 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2301 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2302         /// The node_id of our counterparty
2303         pub node_id: PublicKey,
2304         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2305         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2306         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2307         pub features: InitFeatures,
2308         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2309         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2310         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2311         ///
2312         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2313         ///
2314         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2315         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2316         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2317         /// payments to us through this channel.
2318         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2319         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2320         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2321         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2322         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2323         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2324         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2325 }
2326
2327 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2329 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2330         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2331         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2332         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2333         /// lifetime of the channel.
2334         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2335         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2336         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2337         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2338         /// our counterparty already.
2339         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2340         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2341         ///
2342         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2343         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2344         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2345         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2346         ///
2347         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2348         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2349         ///
2350         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2351         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2352         ///
2353         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2354         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2355         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2356         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2357         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2358         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2359         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2360         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2361         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2362         /// `Some(0)`).
2363         ///
2364         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2365         ///
2366         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2367         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2368         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2369         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2370         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2371         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2372         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2373         ///
2374         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2375         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2376         ///
2377         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2378         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2379         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2380         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2381         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2382         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2383         /// this value on chain.
2384         ///
2385         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2386         ///
2387         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2388         ///
2389         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2390         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2391         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2392         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2393         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2394         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
2395         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2396         ///
2397         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2398         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2399         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2400         pub user_channel_id: u128,
2401         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2402         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2403         ///
2404         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2405         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2406         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2407         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2408         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2409         ///
2410         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2411         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2412         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2413         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2414         ///
2415         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2416         pub balance_msat: u64,
2417         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2418         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2419         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2420         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2421         ///
2422         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2423         ///
2424         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2425         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2426         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2427         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2428         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2429         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2430         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2431         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2432         ///
2433         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2434         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2435         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2436         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2437         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2438         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2439         /// route which is valid.
2440         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2441         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2442         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2443         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2444         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2445         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2446         ///
2447         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2448         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2449         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2450         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2451         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2452         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2453         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2454         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2455         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2456         ///
2457         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2458         ///
2459         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2460         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2461         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2462         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2463         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2464         ///
2465         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2466         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2467         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2468         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2469         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2470         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2471         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2472         ///
2473         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2474         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2475         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2476         pub is_outbound: bool,
2477         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2478         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2479         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2480         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2481         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2482         ///
2483         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2484         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2485         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2486         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2487         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2488         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2489         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2490         ///
2491         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2492         pub is_usable: bool,
2493         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2494         pub is_public: bool,
2495         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2496         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2497         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2498         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2499         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2500         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2501         ///
2502         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2503         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2504         /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2505         ///
2506         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2507         pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2508         /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2509         ///
2510         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2511         pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2512 }
2513
2514 impl ChannelDetails {
2515         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2516         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2517         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2518         ///
2519         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2520         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2521         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2522                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2523         }
2524
2525         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2526         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2527         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2528         ///
2529         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2530         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2531         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2532                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2533         }
2534
2535         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2536                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2537                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2538         ) -> Self
2539         where
2540                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2541                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2542         {
2543                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2544                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2545                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2546                 ChannelDetails {
2547                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2548                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2549                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2550                                 features: latest_features,
2551                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2552                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2553                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2554                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2555                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2556                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2557                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2558                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2559                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2560                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2561                         },
2562                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2563                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2564                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2565                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2566                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2567                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2568                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2569                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2570                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2571                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2572                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2573                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2574                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2575                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2576                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2577                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2578                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2579                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2580                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2581                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2582                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2583                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
2584                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
2585                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2586                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2587                         config: Some(context.config()),
2588                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2589                         pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2590                         pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2591                 }
2592         }
2593 }
2594
2595 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2596 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2597 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2598 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2599 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2600 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2601 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2602 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2603         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2604         NotShuttingDown,
2605         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2606         ShutdownInitiated,
2607         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2608         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2609         ResolvingHTLCs,
2610         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2611         NegotiatingClosingFee,
2612         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2613         /// to drop the channel.
2614         ShutdownComplete,
2615 }
2616
2617 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2618 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2619 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2620 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2621         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2622         AwaitingInvoice {
2623                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2624                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2625                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2626         },
2627         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2628         Pending {
2629                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2630                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2631                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2632                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2633                 /// abandoned.
2634                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2635                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2636                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2637                 total_msat: u64,
2638         },
2639         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2640         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2641         /// payment is removed from tracking.
2642         Fulfilled {
2643                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2644                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2645                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2646                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2647                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2648                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2649         },
2650         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2651         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2652         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2653         Abandoned {
2654                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2655                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2656                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2657                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2658                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2659         },
2660 }
2661
2662 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2663 ///
2664 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2665 #[derive(Clone)]
2666 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2667         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2668         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2669         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2670         /// route hints.
2671         pub phantom_scid: u64,
2672         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2673         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2674 }
2675
2676 macro_rules! handle_error {
2677         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2678                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2679                 // entering the macro.
2680                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2681                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2682
2683                 match $internal {
2684                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2685                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2686                                 let mut msg_event = None;
2687
2688                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2689                                         let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2690                                         let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2691                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
2692                                                 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2693                                         );
2694                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2695
2696                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2697                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
2698                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2699                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2700                                                         msg: update
2701                                                 });
2702                                         }
2703                                 } else {
2704                                         log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2705                                 }
2706
2707                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2708                                 } else {
2709                                         msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2710                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2711                                                 action: err.action.clone()
2712                                         });
2713                                 }
2714
2715                                 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2716                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2717                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2718                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2719                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2720                                         }
2721                                 }
2722
2723                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2724                                 Err(err)
2725                         },
2726                 }
2727         } };
2728 }
2729
2730 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2731         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2732                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2733                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2734                 }
2735                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2736                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2737                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2738                 } else {
2739                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2740                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2741                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2742                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2743                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2744                         // stage.
2745                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2746                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2747                 }
2748                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2749         }}
2750 }
2751
2752 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2753 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2754         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2755                 match $err {
2756                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2757                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2758                         },
2759                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2760                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2761                         },
2762                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2763                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2764                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2765                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2766                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2767                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2768                                 let err =
2769                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2770                                 (true, err)
2771                         },
2772                 }
2773         };
2774         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2775                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2776         };
2777         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2778                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2779         };
2780         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2781                 match $channel_phase {
2782                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2783                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2784                         },
2785                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2786                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2787                         },
2788                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2789                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2790                         },
2791                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2792                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2793                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2794                         },
2795                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2796                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2797                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2798                         },
2799                 }
2800         };
2801 }
2802
2803 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2804         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2805                 match $res {
2806                         Ok(res) => res,
2807                         Err(e) => {
2808                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2809                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2810                                 if drop {
2811                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2812                                 }
2813                                 break Err(res);
2814                         }
2815                 }
2816         }
2817 }
2818
2819 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2820         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2821                 match $res {
2822                         Ok(res) => res,
2823                         Err(e) => {
2824                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2825                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2826                                 if drop {
2827                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2828                                 }
2829                                 return Err(res);
2830                         }
2831                 }
2832         }
2833 }
2834
2835 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2836         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2837                 {
2838                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2839                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2840                         channel
2841                 }
2842         }
2843 }
2844
2845 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2846         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2847                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2848                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2849                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2850                 });
2851                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2852                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2853                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2854                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2855                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2856                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2857                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2858                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2859                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2860                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2861                 }
2862         }}
2863 }
2864
2865 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2866         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2867                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2868                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2869                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2870                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2871                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2872                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2873                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2874                                 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2875                         }, None));
2876                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2877                 }
2878         }
2879 }
2880
2881 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2882         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2883                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2884                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2885                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2886                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2887                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2888                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2889                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2890                         }, None));
2891                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2892                 }
2893         }
2894 }
2895
2896 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2897         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2898                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2899                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2900                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2901                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2902                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2903                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2904                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2905                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2906                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2907                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2908                         // now.
2909                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2910                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2911                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2912                                         msg,
2913                                 })
2914                         } else { None }
2915                 } else { None };
2916
2917                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2918                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2919
2920                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2921                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2922                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2923                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2924                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2925                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2926                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2927                 }
2928
2929                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2930                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2931                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2932                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2933
2934                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2935                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2936                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2937                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2938                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2939                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2940                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2941                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2942                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2943                                 ));
2944                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2945                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2946                                 } else {
2947                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2948                                 }
2949                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2950                         } else {
2951                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2952                         }
2953
2954                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2955                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2956                         if batch_completed {
2957                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2958                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2959                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2960                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2961                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2962                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2963                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2964                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2965                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2966                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2967                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2968                                                 }
2969                                         }
2970                                 }
2971                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2972                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2973                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2974                                 }
2975                         }
2976                 }
2977
2978                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2979
2980                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2981                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2982                 }
2983                 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2984                         $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2985                 }
2986                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2987                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2988                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2989                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2990                 }
2991         } }
2992 }
2993
2994 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2995         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2996                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2997                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2998                 match $update_res {
2999                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
3000                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
3001                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
3002                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
3003                         },
3004                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
3005                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
3006                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
3007                                 false
3008                         },
3009                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3010                                 $completed;
3011                                 true
3012                         },
3013                 }
3014         } };
3015         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3016                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3017                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3018         };
3019         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3020                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3021                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3022                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3023                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3024                 // filter for uniqueness here.
3025                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3026                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3027                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3028                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3029                         });
3030                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3031                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3032                         {
3033                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3034                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3035                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3036                                 }
3037                         })
3038         } };
3039 }
3040
3041 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3042         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3043                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3044                 while !processed_all_events {
3045                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3046                                 return;
3047                         }
3048
3049                         let mut result;
3050
3051                         {
3052                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3053                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3054                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3055
3056                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3057                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3058                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
3059
3060                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3061                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3062                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3063                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3064                                 }
3065                         }
3066
3067                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3068                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
3069                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3070                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3071                         }
3072
3073                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3074
3075                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3076                                 $event_to_handle = event;
3077                                 $handle_event;
3078                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3079                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
3080                                 }
3081                         }
3082
3083                         {
3084                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3085                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3086                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3087                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3088                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3089                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3090                         }
3091
3092                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3093                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3094                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3095                                 processed_all_events = false;
3096                         }
3097
3098                         match result {
3099                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3100                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3101                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3102                                 },
3103                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3104                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3105                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3106                         }
3107                 }
3108         }
3109 }
3110
3111 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3112 where
3113         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3114         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3115         ES::Target: EntropySource,
3116         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3117         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3118         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3119         R::Target: Router,
3120         L::Target: Logger,
3121 {
3122         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3123         ///
3124         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3125         ///
3126         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3127         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3128         ///
3129         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3130         ///
3131         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3132         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3133         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3134         /// more details.
3135         ///
3136         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3137         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3138         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3139         pub fn new(
3140                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3141                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3142                 current_timestamp: u32,
3143         ) -> Self {
3144                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3145                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3146                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3147                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3148                 ChannelManager {
3149                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
3150                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3151                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3152                         chain_monitor,
3153                         tx_broadcaster,
3154                         router,
3155
3156                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3157
3158                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3159                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3160                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3161                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3162                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3163                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3164                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3165                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3166                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3167
3168                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3169                         secp_ctx,
3170
3171                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3172                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3173
3174                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3175
3176                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3177
3178                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3179
3180                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3181                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3182                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3183                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3184                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3185                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3186                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3187                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3188
3189                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3190                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3191
3192                         entropy_source,
3193                         node_signer,
3194                         signer_provider,
3195
3196                         logger,
3197                 }
3198         }
3199
3200         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3201         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3202                 &self.default_configuration
3203         }
3204
3205         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3206                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3207                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3208                 let mut i = 0;
3209                 loop {
3210                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3211                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3212                         } else {
3213                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3214                         }
3215                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3216                                 break;
3217                         }
3218                         i += 1;
3219                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3220                 }
3221                 outbound_scid_alias
3222         }
3223
3224         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3225         ///
3226         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3227         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3228         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3229         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3230         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3231         ///
3232         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3233         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3234         ///
3235         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3236         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3237         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3238         ///
3239         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3240         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3241         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3242         ///
3243         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3244         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3245         ///
3246         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3247         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3248         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3249         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3250         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3251         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3252         ///
3253         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3254         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3255         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3256         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3257                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3258                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3259                 }
3260
3261                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3262                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3263                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3264
3265                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3266
3267                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3268                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3269
3270                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3271
3272                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3273                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3274                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3275                         }
3276                 }
3277
3278                 let channel = {
3279                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3280                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3281                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3282                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3283                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3284                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3285                         {
3286                                 Ok(res) => res,
3287                                 Err(e) => {
3288                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3289                                         return Err(e);
3290                                 },
3291                         }
3292                 };
3293                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3294
3295                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3296                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3297                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3298                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
3299                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3300                                 } else {
3301                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
3302                                 }
3303                         },
3304                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3305                 }
3306
3307                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3308                         node_id: their_network_key,
3309                         msg: res,
3310                 });
3311                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3312         }
3313
3314         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3315                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3316                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3317                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3318                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3319                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3320                 // the same channel.
3321                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3322                 {
3323                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3324                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3325                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3326                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3327                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3328                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3329                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3330                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3331                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3332                                                 _ => None,
3333                                         })
3334                                         .filter(f)
3335                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3336                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3337                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3338                                         })
3339                                 );
3340                         }
3341                 }
3342                 res
3343         }
3344
3345         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3346         /// more information.
3347         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3348                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3349                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3350                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3351                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3352                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3353                 // the same channel.
3354                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3355                 {
3356                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3357                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3358                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3359                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3360                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3361                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3362                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3363                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3364                                         res.push(details);
3365                                 }
3366                         }
3367                 }
3368                 res
3369         }
3370
3371         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3372         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3373         ///
3374         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3375         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3376         /// are.
3377         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3378                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3379                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3380                 // really wanted anyway.
3381                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3382         }
3383
3384         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3385         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3386                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3387                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3388
3389                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3390                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3391                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3392                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3393                         let context_to_details = |context| {
3394                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3395                         };
3396                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
3397                                 .iter()
3398                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3399                                 .map(context_to_details)
3400                                 .collect();
3401                 }
3402                 vec![]
3403         }
3404
3405         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3406         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3407         ///
3408         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3409         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3410         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3411         ///
3412         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3413         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3414                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3415                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3416                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3417                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3418                                 },
3419                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3420                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3421                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3422                                 },
3423                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3424                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3425                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
3426                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3427                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
3428                                         })
3429                                 },
3430                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3431                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3432                                 },
3433                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3434                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3435                                 },
3436                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3437                         })
3438                         .collect()
3439         }
3440
3441         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3442                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3443
3444                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3445                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3446
3447                 {
3448                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3449
3450                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3451                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3452
3453                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3454                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3455
3456                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3457                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3458                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3459                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3460                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3461                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3462                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3463                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3464
3465                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3466                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3467                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3468                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3469                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3470                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
3471                                                 });
3472
3473                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3474                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3475
3476                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3477                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3478                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3479                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3480                                                 }
3481                                         } else {
3482                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3483                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3484                                         }
3485                                 },
3486                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3487                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3488                                                 err: format!(
3489                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3490                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3491                                                 )
3492                                         });
3493                                 },
3494                         }
3495                 }
3496
3497                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3498                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3499                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3500                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3501                 }
3502
3503                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3504                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3505                 }
3506
3507                 Ok(())
3508         }
3509
3510         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3511         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3512         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3513         ///
3514         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3515         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3516         ///    fee estimate.
3517         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3518         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3519         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3520         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3521         ///
3522         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3523         ///
3524         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3525         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3526         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3527         /// channel.
3528         ///
3529         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3530         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3531         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3532         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3533         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3534                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3535         }
3536
3537         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3538         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3539         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3540         ///
3541         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3542         /// the channel being closed or not:
3543         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3544         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3545         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3546         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3547         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3548         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3549         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3550         ///
3551         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3552         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3553         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3554         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3555         ///
3556         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3557         ///
3558         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3559         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3560         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3561         /// channel.
3562         ///
3563         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3564         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3565         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3566         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3567                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3568         }
3569
3570         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3571                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3572                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3573                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3574                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3575                 }
3576
3577                 let logger = WithContext::from(
3578                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3579                 );
3580
3581                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3582                         shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3583                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3584                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3585                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3586                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3587                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3588                 }
3589                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3590                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3591                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3592                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3593                         // ignore the result here.
3594                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3595                 }
3596                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3597                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3598                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3599                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3600                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3601                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3602                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3603                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3604                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3605                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3606                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3607                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3608                                         }
3609                                 }
3610                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3611                         }
3612                         debug_assert!(
3613                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3614                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3615                         );
3616                 }
3617
3618                 {
3619                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3620                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3621                                 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3622                                 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3623                                 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3624                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3625                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3626                                 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3627                         }, None));
3628
3629                         if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3630                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3631                                         channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3632                                 }, None));
3633                         }
3634                 }
3635                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3636                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3637                 }
3638         }
3639
3640         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3641         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3642         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3643         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3644                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3645                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3646                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3647                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3648                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3649                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3650                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3651                         } else {
3652                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3653                         };
3654                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3655                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3656                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3657                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3658                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
3659                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3660                                 match chan_phase {
3661                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3662                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3663                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3664                                         },
3665                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3666                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3667                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3668                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3669                                         },
3670                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3671                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3672                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3673                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3674                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3675                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3676                                         },
3677                                 }
3678                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3679                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3680                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3681                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3682                                 // events anyway.
3683                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
3684                         } else {
3685                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3686                         }
3687                 };
3688                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3689                         // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3690                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3691                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3692                                 msg: update
3693                         });
3694                 }
3695
3696                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3697         }
3698
3699         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3700                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3701                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3702                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3703                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3704                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3705                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3706                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3707                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3708                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3709                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3710                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3711                                                         },
3712                                                 }
3713                                         );
3714                                 }
3715                                 Ok(())
3716                         },
3717                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3718                 }
3719         }
3720
3721         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3722         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3723         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3724         /// channel.
3725         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3726         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3727                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3728         }
3729
3730         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3731         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3732         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3733         ///
3734         /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3735         /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3736         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3737         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3738                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3739         }
3740
3741         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3742         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3743         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3744                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3745                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3746                 }
3747         }
3748
3749         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3750         /// local transaction(s).
3751         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3752                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3753                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3754                 }
3755         }
3756
3757         fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3758                 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3759         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3760                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3761                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3762                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3763                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3764                         return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3765                 }
3766                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3767                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3768                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3769                         // we don't have the channel here.
3770                         return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3771                 }
3772
3773                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3774                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3775                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3776                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3777                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3778                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3779                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3780                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3781                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3782                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3783                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3784                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3785                         } else {
3786                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3787                         }
3788                 }
3789                 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3790                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3791                         return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3792                 }
3793                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3794                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3795                         return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3796                 }
3797
3798                 Ok(())
3799         }
3800
3801         /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3802         /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3803         fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3804                 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3805         ) -> Option<X> {
3806                 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3807                         None => return None,
3808                         Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3809                 };
3810                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3811                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3812                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3813                         return None;
3814                 }
3815                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3816                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3817                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3818                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3819                 ) {
3820                         None => None,
3821                         Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3822                 }
3823         }
3824
3825         fn can_forward_htlc(
3826                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3827         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3828                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3829                         self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3830                 }) {
3831                         Some(Ok(())) => {},
3832                         Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3833                         None => {
3834                                 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3835                                 // intercept forward.
3836                                 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3837                                         fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3838                                         fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3839                                 {} else {
3840                                         return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3841                                 }
3842                         }
3843                 }
3844
3845                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3846                 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3847                         cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3848                 ) {
3849                         let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3850                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3851                         }).flatten();
3852                         return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3853                 }
3854
3855                 Ok(())
3856         }
3857
3858         fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3859                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3860                 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3861                 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3862         ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3863                 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3864                 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3865                         let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3866                         if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3867                                 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3868                         }
3869                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3870                                 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3871                         }
3872                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3873                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3874                                 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3875                         }
3876                         (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3877                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3878                         chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3879                 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3880                         // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3881                         // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3882                         // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3883                         // instead.
3884                         err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3885                 }
3886
3887                 log_info!(
3888                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3889                         "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3890                 );
3891                 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3892                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3893                         return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3894                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3895                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3896                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3897                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3898                         });
3899                 }
3900
3901                 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3902                         (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3903                 } else {
3904                         (err_code, &res.0[..])
3905                 };
3906                 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3907                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3908                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3909                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3910                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3911                 })
3912         }
3913
3914         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3915                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3916         ) -> Result<
3917                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3918         > {
3919                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3920                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3921                 )?;
3922
3923                 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3924                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3925                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3926                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3927                 };
3928
3929                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3930                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3931                 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3932                         let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3933                         self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3934                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3935                                 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3936                         )
3937                 })?;
3938
3939                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3940         }
3941
3942         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3943                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3944                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3945                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3946         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3947                 macro_rules! return_err {
3948                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3949                                 {
3950                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3951                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3952                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3953                                                 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3954                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3955                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3956                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3957                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3958                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3959                                                         }
3960                                                 ))
3961                                         }
3962                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3963                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3964                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3965                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3966                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3967                                         }));
3968                                 }
3969                         }
3970                 }
3971                 match decoded_hop {
3972                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3973                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3974                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3975                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3976                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3977                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3978                                 {
3979                                         Ok(info) => {
3980                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3981                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3982                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3983                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3984                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3985                                         },
3986                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3987                                 }
3988                         },
3989                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3990                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3991                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3992                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3993                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3994                                 }
3995                         }
3996                 }
3997         }
3998
3999         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
4000         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
4001         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
4002         ///
4003         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
4004         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
4005         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4006         ///
4007         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4008         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4009         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4010                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4011                         return Err(LightningError {
4012                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4013                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4014                         });
4015                 }
4016                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4017                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4018                 }
4019                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4020                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4021                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4022         }
4023
4024         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4025         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4026         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4027         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4028         ///
4029         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4030         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4031         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4032         ///
4033         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4034         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4035         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4036                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4037                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4038                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4039                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4040                         Some(id) => id,
4041                 };
4042
4043                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4044         }
4045
4046         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4047                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4048                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4049                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4050
4051                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4052                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4053                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4054                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4055                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4056                 };
4057
4058                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4059                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4060                         short_channel_id,
4061                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4062                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4063                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4064                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4065                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4066                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4067                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4068                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4069                 };
4070                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4071                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4072                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4073                 // channel.
4074                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4075
4076                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4077                         signature: sig,
4078                         contents: unsigned
4079                 })
4080         }
4081
4082         #[cfg(test)]
4083         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4084                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4085                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4086                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4087                         session_priv_bytes
4088                 })
4089         }
4090
4091         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4092                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4093                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4094                         session_priv_bytes
4095                 } = args;
4096                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4097                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4098                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4099                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4100
4101                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4102                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4103                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4104                 ).map_err(|e| {
4105                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4106                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4107                         e
4108                 })?;
4109
4110                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4111                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4112                                 None => {
4113                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4114                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4115                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4116                                 },
4117                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4118                         };
4119
4120                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4121                         log_trace!(logger,
4122                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4123                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4124
4125                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4126                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4127                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4128                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4129                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4130                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4131                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4132                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4133                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4134                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4135                                                 }
4136                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4137                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4138                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4139                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4140                                                                 path: path.clone(),
4141                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4142                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4143                                                                 payment_id,
4144                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4145                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4146                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
4147                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4148                                                                         false => {
4149                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4150                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4151                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4152                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4153                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4154                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4155                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4156                                                                         },
4157                                                                         true => {},
4158                                                                 }
4159                                                         },
4160                                                         None => {},
4161                                                 }
4162                                         },
4163                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4164                                 };
4165                         } else {
4166                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4167                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4168                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
4169                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4170                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4171                         }
4172                         return Ok(());
4173                 };
4174                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4175                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4176                         Err(e) => {
4177                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4178                         },
4179                 }
4180         }
4181
4182         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4183         ///
4184         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4185         /// fields for more info.
4186         ///
4187         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4188         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4189         ///
4190         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4191         ///
4192         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4193         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4194         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4195         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4196         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4197         ///
4198         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4199         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4200         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4201         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4202         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4203         ///
4204         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4205         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4206         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4207         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4208         ///
4209         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4210         ///
4211         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4212         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4213         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4214         ///
4215         /// In general, a path may raise:
4216         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4217         ///    node public key) is specified.
4218         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4219         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4220         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4221         ///    relevant updates.
4222         ///
4223         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4224         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4225         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4226         ///
4227         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4228         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4229         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4230         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4231         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4232         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4233         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4234                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4235                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4236                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4237                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4238                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4239                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4240         }
4241
4242         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4243         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4244         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4245                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4246                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4247                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4248                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4249                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4250                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4251                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4252         }
4253
4254         #[cfg(test)]
4255         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4256                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4257                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4258                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4259                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4260                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4261         }
4262
4263         #[cfg(test)]
4264         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4265                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4266                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4267         }
4268
4269         #[cfg(test)]
4270         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4271                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4272         }
4273
4274         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4275                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4276                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4277                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4278                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4279                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4280                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4281                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4282                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4283                         )
4284         }
4285
4286         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4287         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4288         /// retries are exhausted.
4289         ///
4290         /// # Event Generation
4291         ///
4292         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4293         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4294         ///
4295         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4296         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4297         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4298         ///
4299         /// # Requested Invoices
4300         ///
4301         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4302         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4303         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4304         /// once the invoice has been received.
4305         ///
4306         /// # Restart Behavior
4307         ///
4308         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4309         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4310         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4311         ///
4312         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4313         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4314                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4315                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4316         }
4317
4318         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4319         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4320         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4321         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4322         /// never reach the recipient.
4323         ///
4324         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4325         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4326         ///
4327         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4328         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4329         ///
4330         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4331         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4332                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4333                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4334                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4335                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4336                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4337         }
4338
4339         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4340         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4341         ///
4342         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4343         /// payments.
4344         ///
4345         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4346         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4347                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4348                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4349                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4350                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4351                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4352                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4353         }
4354
4355         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4356         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4357         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4358         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4359                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4360                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4361                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4362                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4363                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4364         }
4365
4366         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4367         /// payment probe.
4368         #[cfg(test)]
4369         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4370                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4371         }
4372
4373         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4374         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4375         ///
4376         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4377         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4378                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4379                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4380         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4381                 let payment_params =
4382                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4383
4384                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4385
4386                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4387         }
4388
4389         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4390         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4391         ///
4392         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4393         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4394         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4395         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4396         ///
4397         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4398         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4399         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4400         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4401         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4402         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4403         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4404                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4405         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4406                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4407
4408                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4409                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4410                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4411                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4412
4413                 let route = self
4414                         .router
4415                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4416                         .map_err(|e| {
4417                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4418                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4419                         })?;
4420
4421                 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4422
4423                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4424
4425                 for mut path in route.paths {
4426                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4427                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4428                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4429                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4430                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4431                                         break;
4432                                 } else {
4433                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4434                                         log_debug!(
4435                                                 self.logger,
4436                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4437                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4438                                         );
4439                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4440                                         path.hops.pop();
4441                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4442                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4443                                         }
4444                                 }
4445                         }
4446
4447                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4448                                 log_debug!(
4449                                         self.logger,
4450                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4451                                 );
4452                                 continue;
4453                         }
4454
4455                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4456                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4457                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4458                                 }) {
4459                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4460                                         let used_liquidity =
4461                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4462
4463                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4464                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4465                                         {
4466                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4467                                                 continue;
4468                                         } else {
4469                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4470                                         }
4471                                 }
4472                         }
4473
4474                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4475                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4476                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4477                         })?);
4478                 }
4479
4480                 Ok(res)
4481         }
4482
4483         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4484         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4485         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4486                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4487                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4488         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4489                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4490                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4491                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4492
4493                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4494                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4495                 let funding_txo;
4496                 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4497                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4498                                 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4499                                         let counterparty;
4500                                         let err = if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = $err {
4501                                                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4502                                                 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4503                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4504                                                 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4505                                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4506                                         } else { unreachable!(); };
4507
4508                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4509                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4510                                         let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4511                                         Err($api_err)
4512                                 } } }
4513                                 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4514                                         Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4515                                         Err(err) => {
4516                                                 let chan_err = ChannelError::Close(err.to_owned());
4517                                                 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4518                                                 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4519                                         },
4520                                 }
4521
4522                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4523                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4524                                 match funding_res {
4525                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4526                                         Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4527                                                 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4528                                                 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4529                                         }
4530                                 }
4531                         },
4532                         Some(phase) => {
4533                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4534                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4535                                         err: format!(
4536                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4537                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4538                                 })
4539                         },
4540                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4541                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4542                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4543                                 }),
4544                 };
4545
4546                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4547                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4548                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4549                                 msg,
4550                         });
4551                 }
4552                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4553                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4554                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4555                         },
4556                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4557                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4558                                 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4559                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4560                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4561                                                 let err = format!(
4562                                                         "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4563                                                         funding_txo, o.get()
4564                                                 );
4565                                                 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4566                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4567                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4568                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4569                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4570                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4571                                         }
4572                                 }
4573                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4574                         }
4575                 }
4576                 Ok(())
4577         }
4578
4579         #[cfg(test)]
4580         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4581                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4582                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4583                 })
4584         }
4585
4586         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4587         ///
4588         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4589         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4590         ///
4591         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4592         /// across the p2p network.
4593         ///
4594         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4595         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4596         ///
4597         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4598         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4599         /// keys per-channel).
4600         ///
4601         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4602         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4603         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4604         ///
4605         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4606         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4607         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4608         ///
4609         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4610         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4611         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4612         /// for more details.
4613         ///
4614         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4615         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4616         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4617                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4618         }
4619
4620         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4621         ///
4622         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4623         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4624         ///
4625         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4626         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4627         /// signature for each channel.
4628         ///
4629         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4630         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4631                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4632                 let mut result = Ok(());
4633
4634                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4635                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4636                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4637                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4638                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4639                                         }));
4640                                 }
4641                         }
4642                 }
4643                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4644                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4645                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4646                         }));
4647                 }
4648                 {
4649                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4650                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4651                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4652                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4653                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4654                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4655                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4656                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4657                         {
4658                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4659                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4660                                 }));
4661                         }
4662                 }
4663
4664                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4665                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4666                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4667                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4668                 } else {
4669                         None
4670                 };
4671                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4672                         match states.entry(txid) {
4673                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4674                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4675                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4676                                         }));
4677                                         None
4678                                 },
4679                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4680                         }
4681                 });
4682                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4683                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4684                                 temporary_channel_id,
4685                                 counterparty_node_id,
4686                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
4687                                 is_batch_funding,
4688                                 |chan, tx| {
4689                                         let mut output_index = None;
4690                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4691                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4692                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4693                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
4694                                                                 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4695                                                         }
4696                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4697                                                 }
4698                                         }
4699                                         if output_index.is_none() {
4700                                                 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4701                                         }
4702                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4703                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4704                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4705                                                 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4706                                                 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4707                                                 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4708                                         }
4709                                         Ok(outpoint)
4710                                 })
4711                         );
4712                 }
4713                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4714                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4715                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4716                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4717                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4718                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4719                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4720                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4721                         );
4722                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4723                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4724                         );
4725                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4726                         {
4727                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4728                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4729                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4730                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4731                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4732                                                 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4733                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4734                                                         let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4735                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4736                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4737                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4738                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4739                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4740                                                                                 channel_id,
4741                                                                                 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4742                                                                         }
4743                                                                 },
4744                                                         });
4745                                                 });
4746                                 }
4747                         }
4748                         mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4749                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4750                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4751                         }
4752                 }
4753                 result
4754         }
4755
4756         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4757         ///
4758         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4759         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4760         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4761         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4762         ///
4763         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4764         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4765         ///
4766         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4767         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4768         ///
4769         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4770         ///
4771         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4772         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4773         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4774         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4775         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4776         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4777         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4778         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4779                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4780         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4781                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4782                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4783                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4784                         });
4785                 }
4786
4787                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4788                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4789                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4790                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4791                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4792                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4793
4794                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4795                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4796                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4797                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4798                                 });
4799                         };
4800                 }
4801                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4802                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4803                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4804                                 config.apply(config_update);
4805                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4806                                         continue;
4807                                 }
4808                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4809                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4810                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4811                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4812                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4813                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4814                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4815                                                         msg,
4816                                                 });
4817                                         }
4818                                 }
4819                                 continue;
4820                         } else {
4821                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4822                                 debug_assert!(false);
4823                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4824                                         err: format!(
4825                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4826                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4827                                 });
4828                         };
4829                 }
4830                 Ok(())
4831         }
4832
4833         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4834         ///
4835         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4836         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4837         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4838         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4839         ///
4840         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4841         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4842         ///
4843         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4844         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4845         ///
4846         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4847         ///
4848         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4849         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4850         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4851         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4852         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4853         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4854         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4855         pub fn update_channel_config(
4856                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4857         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4858                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4859         }
4860
4861         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4862         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4863         ///
4864         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4865         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4866         ///
4867         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4868         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4869         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4870         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4871         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4872         ///
4873         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4874         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4875         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4876         /// than expected.
4877         ///
4878         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4879         /// backwards.
4880         ///
4881         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4882         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4883         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4884         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4885         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4886         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4887                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4888
4889                 let next_hop_scid = {
4890                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4891                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4892                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4893                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4894                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4895                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4896                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4897                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4898                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4899                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4900                                                 })
4901                                         }
4902                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4903                                 },
4904                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4905                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4906                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4907                                 }),
4908                                 None => {
4909                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4910                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4911                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4912                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4913                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4914                                                 err: error
4915                                         })
4916                                 }
4917                         }
4918                 };
4919
4920                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4921                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4922                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4923                         })?;
4924
4925                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4926                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4927                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4928                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4929                                 }
4930                         },
4931                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4932                 };
4933                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4934                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4935                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4936                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4937                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4938                 };
4939
4940                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4941                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4942                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4943                         payment.prev_channel_id,
4944                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4945                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4946                 )];
4947                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4948                 Ok(())
4949         }
4950
4951         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4952         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4953         ///
4954         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4955         /// backwards.
4956         ///
4957         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4958         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4959                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4960
4961                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4962                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4963                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4964                         })?;
4965
4966                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4967                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4968                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4969                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4970                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4971                                 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4972                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4973                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4974                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4975                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4976                         });
4977
4978                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4979                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4980                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4981                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4982
4983                 Ok(())
4984         }
4985
4986         fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4987                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4988                 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4989
4990                 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4991                         if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4992                                 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4993                                         Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4994                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4995                                                         node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4996                                                         channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4997                                                 },
4998                                         None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4999                                                 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
5000                                         },
5001                                 }
5002                         } else {
5003                                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
5004                         }
5005                 };
5006
5007                 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
5008                         let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5009                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5010                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
5011                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
5012                                 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
5013                                 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
5014                                 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
5015                         });
5016                         let (
5017                                 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
5018                                 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
5019                          ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
5020                                 incoming_channel_details
5021                         } else {
5022                                 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5023                                 continue;
5024                         };
5025
5026                         let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5027                         let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5028                         for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5029                                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5030                                         &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5031                                 ) {
5032                                         Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5033                                         Err(htlc_fail) => {
5034                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5035                                                 continue;
5036                                         },
5037                                 };
5038
5039                                 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5040                                 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5041
5042                                 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5043                                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5044                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5045                                         chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5046                                                 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5047                                         )
5048                                 }) {
5049                                         Some(Ok(_)) => {},
5050                                         Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5051                                                 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5052                                                         self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5053                                                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5054                                                         }).flatten()
5055                                                 } else {
5056                                                         None
5057                                                 };
5058                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5059                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5060                                                         outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5061                                                 );
5062                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5063                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5064                                                 continue;
5065                                         },
5066                                         // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5067                                         None => continue 'outer_loop,
5068                                 }
5069
5070                                 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5071                                 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5072                                         if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5073                                                 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5074                                         ) {
5075                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5076                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5077                                                         chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5078                                                 );
5079                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5080                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5081                                                 continue;
5082                                         }
5083                                 }
5084
5085                                 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5086                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5087                                         incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5088                                 ) {
5089                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5090                                                 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5091                                         },
5092                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5093                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5094                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5095                                         },
5096                                 }
5097                         }
5098
5099                         // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5100                         // proposed to as a batch.
5101                         let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5102                                 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5103                         self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5104                         for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5105                                 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5106                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5107                                                 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5108                                                 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5109                                         },
5110                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5111                                                 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5112                                                 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5113                                                 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5114                                         },
5115                                 };
5116                                 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5117                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5118                                         prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5119                                         failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5120                                 }, None));
5121                         }
5122                 }
5123         }
5124
5125         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5126         ///
5127         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5128         /// Will likely generate further events.
5129         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5130                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5131
5132                 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5133
5134                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5135                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5136                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5137                 {
5138                         let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5139                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5140
5141                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5142                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5143                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5144                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5145                                                 () => {
5146                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5147                                                                 match forward_info {
5148                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5149                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5150                                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5151                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5152                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5153                                                                                 }
5154                                                                         }) => {
5155                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5156                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5157                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
5158                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5159
5160                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5161                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5162                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5163                                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5164                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5165                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5166                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5167                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5168                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5169                                                                                                 });
5170
5171                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5172                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5173                                                                                                 } else {
5174                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5175                                                                                                 };
5176
5177                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5178                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5179                                                                                                         reason
5180                                                                                                 ));
5181                                                                                                 continue;
5182                                                                                         }
5183                                                                                 }
5184                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5185                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5186                                                                                                 {
5187                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5188                                                                                                 }
5189                                                                                         }
5190                                                                                 }
5191                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5192                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5193                                                                                                 {
5194                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5195                                                                                                 }
5196                                                                                         }
5197                                                                                 }
5198                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5199                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5200                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5201                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5202                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5203                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5204                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5205                                                                                                 ) {
5206                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
5207                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5208                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5209                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5210                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5211                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5212                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
5213                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5214                                                                                                         },
5215                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5216                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5217                                                                                                         },
5218                                                                                                 };
5219                                                                                                 match next_hop {
5220                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5221                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5222                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5223                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5224                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5225                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5226                                                                                                                 {
5227                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5228                                                                                                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5229                                                                                                                 }
5230                                                                                                         },
5231                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
5232                                                                                                 }
5233                                                                                         } else {
5234                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5235                                                                                         }
5236                                                                                 } else {
5237                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5238                                                                                 }
5239                                                                         },
5240                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5241                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5242                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5243                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5244                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
5245                                                                         }
5246                                                                 }
5247                                                         }
5248                                                 }
5249                                         }
5250                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5251                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5252                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5253                                                 None => {
5254                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5255                                                         continue;
5256                                                 }
5257                                         };
5258                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5259                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5260                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5261                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5262                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5263                                                 continue;
5264                                         }
5265                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5266                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5267                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5268                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5269                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5270                                                         let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5271                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5272                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5273                                                                         prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5274                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5275                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5276                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
5277                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5278                                                                         },
5279                                                                 }) => {
5280                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5281                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5282                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5283                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5284                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5285                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5286                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5287                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5288                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5289                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5290                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5291                                                                         });
5292                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5293                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5294                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5295                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5296                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5297                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5298                                                                                 ).ok()
5299                                                                         });
5300                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5301                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5302                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5303                                                                                 &&logger)
5304                                                                         {
5305                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5306                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5307                                                                                 } else {
5308                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5309                                                                                 }
5310                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5311                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5312                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5313                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5314                                                                                 ));
5315                                                                                 continue;
5316                                                                         }
5317                                                                         None
5318                                                                 },
5319                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5320                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5321                                                                 },
5322                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5323                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5324                                                                         Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5325                                                                 },
5326                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5327                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5328                                                                         let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5329                                                                                 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5330                                                                         );
5331                                                                         Some((res, htlc_id))
5332                                                                 },
5333                                                         };
5334                                                         if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5335                                                                 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5336                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5337                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5338                                                                         } else {
5339                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5340                                                                         }
5341                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5342                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5343                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5344                                                                         continue;
5345                                                                 }
5346                                                         }
5347                                                 }
5348                                         } else {
5349                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5350                                                 continue;
5351                                         }
5352                                 } else {
5353                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5354                                                 match forward_info {
5355                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5356                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5357                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5358                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5359                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5360                                                                 }
5361                                                         }) => {
5362                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5363                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5364                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5365                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5366                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5367                                                                                 requires_blinded_error: _
5368                                                                         } => {
5369                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5370                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5371                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5372                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5373                                                                                         Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5374                                                                         },
5375                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5376                                                                                 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5377                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5378                                                                         } => {
5379                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5380                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5381                                                                                         payment_metadata,
5382                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
5383                                                                                 };
5384                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5385                                                                                         payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5386                                                                         },
5387                                                                         _ => {
5388                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5389                                                                         }
5390                                                                 };
5391                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5392                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5393                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5394                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5395                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5396                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5397                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5398                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5399                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5400                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5401                                                                         },
5402                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5403                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5404                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
5405                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5406                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5407                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
5408                                                                         total_value_received: None,
5409                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5410                                                                         cltv_expiry,
5411                                                                         onion_payload,
5412                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5413                                                                 };
5414
5415                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5416
5417                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5418                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5419                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5420                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5421                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5422                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5423                                                                                 );
5424                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5425                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5426                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5427                                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5428                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5429                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5430                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5431                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5432                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5433                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
5434                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5435                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5436                                                                                 ));
5437                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5438                                                                         }
5439                                                                 }
5440                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5441                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5442                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5443                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5444                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5445                                                                 }
5446
5447                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5448                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
5449                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5450                                                                                 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5451                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5452                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5453                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5454                                                                                 }
5455                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5456                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
5457                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5458                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
5459                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5460                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
5461                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5462                                                                                                 }
5463                                                                                         });
5464                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5465                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5466                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5467                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5468                                                                                 }
5469                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5470                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5471                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5472                                                                                 }
5473                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5474                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5475                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5476                                                                                         }
5477                                                                                 } else {
5478                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5479                                                                                 }
5480                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5481                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5482                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5483                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5484                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5485                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5486                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5487                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5488                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5489                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5490                                                                                         }
5491                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5492                                                                                 }
5493                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5494                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5495                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5496                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5497                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5498                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5499                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
5500                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5501                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5502                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5503                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5504                                                                                         }
5505                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5506                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5507                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5508                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5509                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5510                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5511                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5512                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5513                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5514                                                                                                 payment_hash,
5515                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
5516                                                                                                 amount_msat,
5517                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5518                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5519                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5520                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5521                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5522                                                                                         }, None));
5523                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
5524                                                                                 } else {
5525                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5526                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5527                                                                                         // MPP parts.
5528                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5529                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5530                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5531                                                                                         }
5532                                                                                 }
5533                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
5534                                                                         }}
5535                                                                 }
5536
5537                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5538                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5539                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5540                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5541                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5542                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5543                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5544                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5545                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5546                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5547                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5548                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5549                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5550                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
5551                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
5552                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5553                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5554                                                                                                         }
5555                                                                                                 };
5556                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5557                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5558                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5559                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5560                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5561                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5562                                                                                                         }
5563                                                                                                 }
5564                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5565                                                                                                         payment_preimage,
5566                                                                                                         payment_data.payment_secret,
5567                                                                                                         payment_context,
5568                                                                                                 );
5569                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5570                                                                                         },
5571                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5572                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5573                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5574                                                                                         }
5575                                                                                 }
5576                                                                         },
5577                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5578                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5579                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5580                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5581                                                                                 }
5582                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5583                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5584                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5585                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5586                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5587                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5588                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5589                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5590                                                                                 } else {
5591                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5592                                                                                                 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5593                                                                                                 payment_data.payment_secret,
5594                                                                                                 payment_context,
5595                                                                                         );
5596                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5597                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
5598                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5599                                                                                         }
5600                                                                                 }
5601                                                                         },
5602                                                                 };
5603                                                         },
5604                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5605                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5606                                                         }
5607                                                 }
5608                                         }
5609                                 }
5610                         }
5611                 }
5612
5613                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5614                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5615                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5616                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5617
5618                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5619                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5620                 }
5621                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5622
5623                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5624                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5625                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5626                 // network stack.
5627                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5628
5629                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5630                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5631                 events.append(&mut new_events);
5632         }
5633
5634         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5635         ///
5636         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5637         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5638                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5639
5640                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5641
5642                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5643                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5644                 if background_events.is_empty() {
5645                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5646                 }
5647
5648                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5649                         match event {
5650                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5651                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5652                                         // monitor updating completing.
5653                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5654                                 },
5655                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5656                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
5657                                         {
5658                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5659                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5660                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5661                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5662                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5663                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5664                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5665                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
5666                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5667                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5668                                                                         } else {
5669                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5670                                                                         }
5671                                                                 },
5672                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5673                                                         }
5674                                                 }
5675                                         }
5676                                         if !updated_chan {
5677                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5678                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5679                                         }
5680                                 },
5681                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5682                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5683                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5684                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5685                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5686                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5687                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5688                                                 } else {
5689                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5690                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5691                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5692                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5693                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5694                                                 }
5695                                         }
5696                                 },
5697                         }
5698                 }
5699                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5700         }
5701
5702         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5703         /// Process background events, for functional testing
5704         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5705                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5706                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5707         }
5708
5709         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5710                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5711
5712                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5713
5714                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5715                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5716                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5717                 }
5718                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5719                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5720                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5721                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5722                 }
5723                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5724                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5725
5726                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5727                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5728         }
5729
5730         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5731         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5732         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5733         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5734         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5735         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5736                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5737                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5738
5739                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5740                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5741
5742                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5743                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5744                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5745                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5746                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5747                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5748                                 ) {
5749                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5750                                                 anchor_feerate
5751                                         } else {
5752                                                 non_anchor_feerate
5753                                         };
5754                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5755                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5756                                 }
5757                         }
5758
5759                         should_persist
5760                 });
5761         }
5762
5763         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5764         ///
5765         /// This currently includes:
5766         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5767         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5768         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5769         ///    the channel.
5770         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5771         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5772         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5773         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5774         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5775         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5776         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5777         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
5778         ///
5779         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5780         /// estimate fetches.
5781         ///
5782         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5783         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5784         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5785                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5786                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5787
5788                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5789                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5790
5791                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5792                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5793                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5794                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5795
5796                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5797                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5798                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5799                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5800                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5801                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5802                         | {
5803                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5804                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5805                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5806                                         log_error!(logger,
5807                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5808                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5809                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5810                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5811                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5812                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5813                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5814                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5815                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5816                                                         },
5817                                                 },
5818                                         });
5819                                         false
5820                                 } else {
5821                                         true
5822                                 }
5823                         };
5824
5825                         {
5826                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5827                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5828                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5829                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5830                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5831                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5832                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5833                                                 match phase {
5834                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5835                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5836                                                                         anchor_feerate
5837                                                                 } else {
5838                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
5839                                                                 };
5840                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5841                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5842
5843                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5844                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5845                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5846                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
5847                                                                 }
5848
5849                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5850                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5851                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5852                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5853                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5854                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5855                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5856                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5857                                                                                 n += 1;
5858                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5859                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5860                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5861                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5862                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5863                                                                                                         msg: update
5864                                                                                                 });
5865                                                                                         }
5866                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5867                                                                                 } else {
5868                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5869                                                                                 }
5870                                                                         },
5871                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5872                                                                                 n += 1;
5873                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5874                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5875                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5876                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5877                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5878                                                                                                         msg: update
5879                                                                                                 });
5880                                                                                         }
5881                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5882                                                                                 } else {
5883                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5884                                                                                 }
5885                                                                         },
5886                                                                         _ => {},
5887                                                                 }
5888
5889                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5890
5891                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5892                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5893                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5894                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5895                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5896                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5897                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5898                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5899                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5900                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5901                                                                                         },
5902                                                                                 },
5903                                                                         });
5904                                                                 }
5905
5906                                                                 true
5907                                                         },
5908                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5909                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5910                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5911                                                         },
5912                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5913                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5914                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5915                                                         },
5916                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5917                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5918                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5919                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5920                                                         },
5921                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5922                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5923                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5924                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5925                                                         },
5926                                                 }
5927                                         });
5928
5929                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5930                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5931                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5932                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5933                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5934                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5935                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5936                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5937                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5938                                                                         },
5939                                                                 }
5940                                                         );
5941                                                 }
5942                                         }
5943                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5944
5945                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5946                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5947                                         }
5948                                 }
5949                         }
5950
5951                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5952                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5953                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5954                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5955                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5956                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5957                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5958                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5959                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5960                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5961                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5962                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5963                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5964                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5965                                                         let remove_entry = {
5966                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5967                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5968                                                         };
5969                                                         if remove_entry {
5970                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5971                                                         }
5972                                                 },
5973                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5974                                         }
5975                                 }
5976                         }
5977
5978                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5979                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5980                                         // This should be unreachable
5981                                         debug_assert!(false);
5982                                         return false;
5983                                 }
5984                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5985                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5986                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5987                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5988                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5989                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5990                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5991                                         {
5992                                                 return true;
5993                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5994                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5995                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5996                                         }) {
5997                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5998                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5999                                                 return false;
6000                                         }
6001                                 }
6002                                 true
6003                         });
6004
6005                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
6006                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
6007                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
6008                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
6009                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6010                         }
6011
6012                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6013                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6014                         }
6015
6016                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
6017                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6018                         }
6019
6020                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6021                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
6022                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
6023                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
6024                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
6025                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6026                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6027                         );
6028
6029                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6030                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6031                         );
6032
6033                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6034                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6035                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6036                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6037                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6038                         }
6039
6040                         should_persist
6041                 });
6042         }
6043
6044         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6045         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6046         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6047         ///
6048         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6049         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6050         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6051         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6052         ///
6053         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6054         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6055         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6056         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6057         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6058                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6059         }
6060
6061         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6062         /// reason for the failure.
6063         ///
6064         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6065         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6066                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6067
6068                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6069                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6070                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6071                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6072                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6073                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6074                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6075                         }
6076                 }
6077         }
6078
6079         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6080         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6081                 match failure_code {
6082                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6083                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6084                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6085                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6086                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6087                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6088                         },
6089                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6090                                 let fail_data = match data {
6091                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6092                                         None => Vec::new(),
6093                                 };
6094                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6095                         }
6096                 }
6097         }
6098
6099         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6100         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6101         ///
6102         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6103         /// forwarding
6104         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6105                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6106                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6107                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6108                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6109                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6110                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6111                 } else {
6112                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6113                 };
6114                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6115                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6116                 } else {
6117                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6118                 }
6119         }
6120
6121
6122         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6123         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6124         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6125                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6126                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6127                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6128                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6129                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6130                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6131                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6132                         }
6133                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6134                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6135                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6136                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6137                 } else {
6138                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6139                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6140                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6141                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6142                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6143                 }
6144         }
6145
6146         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6147         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6148         // be surfaced to the user.
6149         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6150                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6151                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6152         ) {
6153                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6154                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6155                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6156                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6157                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6158                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6159                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6160                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6161                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6162                                                 } else {
6163                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6164                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6165                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6166                                                 }
6167                                         },
6168                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6169                                 }
6170                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6171                 };
6172
6173                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6174                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6175                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6176                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6177                 }
6178         }
6179
6180         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6181                 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6182                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6183         }
6184
6185         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6186         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6187         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6188                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6189                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6190                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6191                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6192                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6193                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6194                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6195                 }
6196
6197                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6198                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6199                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6200                 //timer handling.
6201
6202                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6203                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6204                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6205                 let mut push_forward_event;
6206                 match source {
6207                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6208                                 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6209                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6210                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6211                         },
6212                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6213                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6214                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6215                         }) => {
6216                                 log_trace!(
6217                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6218                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6219                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6220                                 );
6221                                 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6222                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6223                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6224                                                 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6225                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6226                                                 );
6227                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6228                                         },
6229                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6230                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6231                                                         htlc_id: *htlc_id,
6232                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6233                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6234                                                 }
6235                                         },
6236                                         None => {
6237                                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6238                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6239                                                 );
6240                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6241                                         }
6242                                 };
6243
6244                                 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6245                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6246                                 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6247                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6248                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6249                                                 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6250                                         },
6251                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6252                                                 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6253                                         }
6254                                 }
6255                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6256                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6257                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6258                                         prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6259                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
6260                                 }, None));
6261                         },
6262                 }
6263                 push_forward_event
6264         }
6265
6266         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6267         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6268         ///
6269         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6270         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6271         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6272         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6273         ///
6274         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6275         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6276         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6277         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6278         ///
6279         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6280         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6281         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6282         ///
6283         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6284         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6285         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6286         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6287         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6288         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6289         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6290         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6291                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6292         }
6293
6294         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6295         /// even type numbers.
6296         ///
6297         /// # Note
6298         ///
6299         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6300         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6301         ///
6302         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6303         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6304                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6305         }
6306
6307         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6308                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6309
6310                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6311
6312                 let mut sources = {
6313                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6314                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6315                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6316                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6317                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6318                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6319                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6320                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6321                                                 break;
6322                                         }
6323                                 }
6324
6325                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6326                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6327                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6328                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6329                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6330                                 });
6331                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6332                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6333                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6334                                                 &payment_hash);
6335                                 }
6336
6337                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6338                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6339                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6340                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6341                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6342                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6343                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6344                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6345                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6346                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6347                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6348                                                 }
6349                                                 return;
6350                                         }
6351                                 }
6352
6353                                 payment.htlcs
6354                         } else { return; }
6355                 };
6356                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6357
6358                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6359                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6360                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6361                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6362                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6363                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6364                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6365                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6366                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6367                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6368                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6369                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6370                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6371                                 debug_assert!(false);
6372                                 valid_mpp = false;
6373                                 break;
6374                         }
6375                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6376
6377                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6378                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6379                                 debug_assert!(false);
6380                                 valid_mpp = false;
6381                                 break;
6382                         }
6383                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6384                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6385                 }
6386                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6387                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6388                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6389                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6390                         return;
6391                 }
6392                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6393                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6394                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6395                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6396                         return;
6397                 }
6398                 if valid_mpp {
6399                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6400                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6401                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6402                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6403                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6404                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6405                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6406                                         }
6407                                 ) {
6408                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6409                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6410                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6411                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6412                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6413                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6414                                 }
6415                         }
6416                 }
6417                 if !valid_mpp {
6418                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6419                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6420                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6421                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6422                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6423                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6424                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6425                         }
6426                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6427                 }
6428
6429                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6430                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6431                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6432                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6433                 }
6434         }
6435
6436         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6437                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6438         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6439                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6440
6441                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6442                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6443                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6444                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6445
6446                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6447                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6448                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6449                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6450
6451                 {
6452                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6453                         let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6454                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6455                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6456                                 None => None
6457                         };
6458
6459                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6460                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6461                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6462                         ).unwrap_or(None);
6463
6464                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6465                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6466                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6467                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6468                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6469                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6470                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6471                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6472
6473                                                 match fulfill_res {
6474                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6475                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6476                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6477                                                                                 chan_id, action);
6478                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6479                                                                 }
6480                                                                 if !during_init {
6481                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6482                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6483                                                                 } else {
6484                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6485                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6486                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
6487                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6488                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6489                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
6490                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6491                                                                                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6492                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
6493                                                                                 });
6494                                                                 }
6495                                                         }
6496                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6497                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6498                                                                         action
6499                                                                 } else {
6500                                                                         return Ok(());
6501                                                                 };
6502                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6503
6504                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6505                                                                         chan_id, action);
6506                                                                 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6507                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6508                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6509                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6510                                                                         blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6511                                                                 } = action {
6512                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6513                                                                 } else {
6514                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
6515                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6516                                                                         return Ok(());
6517                                                                 };
6518                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6519                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6520                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6521                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6522                                                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6523                                                                         {
6524                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
6525                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6526                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6527                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
6528                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6529                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6530                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6531                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6532                                                                                 });
6533                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6534                                                                         }
6535                                                                 } else {
6536                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6537                                                                 }
6538                                                         }
6539                                                 }
6540                                         }
6541                                         return Ok(());
6542                                 }
6543                         }
6544                 }
6545                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6546                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6547                         counterparty_node_id: None,
6548                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6549                                 payment_preimage,
6550                         }],
6551                         channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6552                 };
6553
6554                 if !during_init {
6555                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6556                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6557                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6558                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6559                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6560                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6561                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6562                                 // again on restart.
6563                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6564                                         "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6565                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
6566                         }
6567                 } else {
6568                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6569                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6570                         // event.
6571                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6572                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6573                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6574                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6575                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6576                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6577                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6578                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6579                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6580                                         prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6581                                 )));
6582                 }
6583                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6584                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6585                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6586                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6587                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6588                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6589                 Ok(())
6590         }
6591
6592         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6593                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6594         }
6595
6596         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6597                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6598                 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6599                 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6600         ) {
6601                 match source {
6602                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6603                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6604                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6605                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6606                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6607                                 }
6608                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6609                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6610                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6611                                 };
6612                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6613                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6614                                         &self.logger);
6615                         },
6616                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6617                                 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6618                                 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6619                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6620                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6621                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6622                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6623                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6624                                                 let chan_to_release =
6625                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6626                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6627                                                         } else {
6628                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6629                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6630                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6631                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6632                                                                 // closed.
6633                                                                 None
6634                                                         };
6635
6636                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6637                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6638                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6639                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6640                                                         // in the background.
6641                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6642                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6643                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6644                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6645                                                                         match ev {
6646                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6647                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6648                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
6649                                                                                 } => {
6650                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6651                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6652                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6653                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6654                                                                                                         } = upd {
6655                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6656                                                                                                         } else { false }
6657                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
6658                                                                                                 true
6659                                                                                         } else { false }
6660                                                                                 },
6661                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6662                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6663                                                                                         (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6664                                                                                 ) => {
6665                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6666                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6667                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
6668                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
6669                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6670                                                                                                 ));
6671                                                                                                 true
6672                                                                                         } else { false }
6673                                                                                 },
6674                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6675                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
6676                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6677                                                                                         channel_id, ..
6678                                                                                 } =>
6679                                                                                         *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6680                                                                         }
6681                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6682                                                         }
6683                                                         None
6684                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6685                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6686                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6687                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6688                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6689                                                                         downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6690                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6691                                                                 })
6692                                                         } else { None }
6693                                                 } else {
6694                                                         let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6695                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6696                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6697                                                                 } else { None }
6698                                                         } else { None };
6699                                                         debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6700                                                                 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6701                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6702                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6703                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6704                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6705                                                                         prev_user_channel_id,
6706                                                                         next_user_channel_id,
6707                                                                         total_fee_earned_msat,
6708                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6709                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6710                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6711                                                                 },
6712                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6713                                                         })
6714                                                 }
6715                                         });
6716                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6717                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6718                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6719                                 }
6720                         },
6721                 }
6722         }
6723
6724         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6725         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6726                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6727         }
6728
6729         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6730                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6731                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6732                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6733
6734                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6735                         match action {
6736                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6737                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6738                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6739                                                 amount_msat,
6740                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
6741                                                 receiver_node_id,
6742                                                 htlcs,
6743                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6744                                         }) = payment {
6745                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6746                                                         payment_hash,
6747                                                         purpose,
6748                                                         amount_msat,
6749                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6750                                                         htlcs,
6751                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
6752                                                 }, None));
6753                                         }
6754                                 },
6755                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6756                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6757                                 } => {
6758                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6759                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6760                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6761                                         }
6762                                 },
6763                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6764                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6765                                 } => {
6766                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6767                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6768                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6769                                                 downstream_channel_id,
6770                                                 Some(blocking_action),
6771                                         );
6772                                 },
6773                         }
6774                 }
6775         }
6776
6777         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6778         /// update completion.
6779         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6780                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6781                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6782                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6783                 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6784                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6785         -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6786                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6787                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6788                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
6789                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6790                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6791                         pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6792                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6793                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6794                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6795
6796                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6797                 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6798
6799                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6800                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6801                         htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6802                                 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6803                 }
6804                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6805                 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6806                         decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6807                 }
6808
6809                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6810                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6811                 }
6812                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6813                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6814                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6815                                 msg,
6816                         });
6817                 }
6818
6819                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6820                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6821                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6822                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6823                                         updates: update,
6824                                 });
6825                         }
6826                 } }
6827                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6828                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6829                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6830                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6831                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
6832                                 });
6833                         }
6834                 } }
6835                 match order {
6836                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6837                                 handle_cs!();
6838                                 handle_raa!();
6839                         },
6840                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6841                                 handle_raa!();
6842                                 handle_cs!();
6843                         },
6844                 }
6845
6846                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6847                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6848                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6849                 }
6850
6851                 {
6852                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6853                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6854                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6855                 }
6856
6857                 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6858         }
6859
6860         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6861                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6862
6863                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6864                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6865                         None => {
6866                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6867                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6868                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6869                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6870                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6871                                         None => return,
6872                                 }
6873                         }
6874                 };
6875                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6876                 let mut peer_state_lock;
6877                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6878                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6879                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6880                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6881                 let channel =
6882                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6883                                 chan
6884                         } else {
6885                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6886                                         .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6887                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6888                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6889                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6890                                 return;
6891                         };
6892                 let remaining_in_flight =
6893                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6894                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6895                                 pending.len()
6896                         } else { 0 };
6897                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6898                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6899                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6900                         remaining_in_flight);
6901                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6902                         return;
6903                 }
6904                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6905         }
6906
6907         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6908         ///
6909         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6910         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6911         /// the channel.
6912         ///
6913         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6914         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6915         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6916         ///
6917         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6918         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6919         /// used to accept such channels.
6920         ///
6921         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6922         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6923         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6924                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6925         }
6926
6927         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6928         /// it as confirmed immediately.
6929         ///
6930         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6931         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6932         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6933         ///
6934         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6935         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6936         ///
6937         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6938         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6939         ///
6940         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6941         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6942         ///
6943         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6944         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6945         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6946                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6947         }
6948
6949         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6950
6951                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6952                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6953
6954                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6955                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6956                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6957                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6958                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6959                         let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6960                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6961
6962                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6963                 })?;
6964                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6965                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6966                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6967
6968                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6969                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6970                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6971                 // succeed.
6972                 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6973                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6974                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6975                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6976                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6977                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6978                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6979                         },
6980                         _ => {
6981                                 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6982                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6983
6984                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6985                         }
6986                 };
6987
6988                 match res {
6989                         Err(err) => {
6990                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6991                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6992                                 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6993                                         Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6994                                         Err(e) => {
6995                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6996                                         },
6997                                 }
6998                         }
6999                         Ok(mut channel) => {
7000                                 if accept_0conf {
7001                                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
7002                                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
7003                                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
7004                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7005                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7006                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7007                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
7008                                                 }
7009                                         };
7010                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7011                                         let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
7012                                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7013
7014                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7015                                 } else {
7016                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7017                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7018                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7019                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
7020                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7021                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7022                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7023                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
7024                                                         }
7025                                                 };
7026                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7027                                                 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7028                                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7029
7030                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7031                                         }
7032                                 }
7033
7034                                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7035                                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7036                                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7037
7038                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7039                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7040                                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7041                                 });
7042
7043                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7044
7045                                 Ok(())
7046                         },
7047                 }
7048         }
7049
7050         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7051         /// or 0-conf channels.
7052         ///
7053         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7054         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7055         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7056         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7057                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7058                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7059                 {
7060                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7061                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7062                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7063                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7064                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7065                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7066                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7067                                 }
7068                         }
7069                 }
7070                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7071         }
7072
7073         fn unfunded_channel_count(
7074                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7075         ) -> usize {
7076                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7077                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7078                         match phase {
7079                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7080                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7081                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7082                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7083                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7084                                         {
7085                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7086                                         }
7087                                 },
7088                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7089                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7090                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7091                                         }
7092                                 },
7093                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7094                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7095                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7096                                         // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7097                                         // included in the unfunded count.
7098                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7099                                                 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7100                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7101                                         }
7102                                 },
7103                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7104                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7105                                         continue;
7106                                 },
7107                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7108                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7109                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7110                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7111                                         continue;
7112                                 }
7113                         }
7114                 }
7115                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7116         }
7117
7118         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7119                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7120                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7121                 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7122                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7123                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7124                 }
7125
7126                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7127                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7128                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7129                 }
7130
7131                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7132                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7133                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7134                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7135                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7136
7137                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7138                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7139                     .ok_or_else(|| {
7140                                 debug_assert!(false);
7141                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7142                                         format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7143                                         msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7144                         })?;
7145                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7146                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7147
7148                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7149                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7150                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7151                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7152                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7153                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7154                 {
7155                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7156                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7157                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7158                 }
7159
7160                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7161                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7162                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7163                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7164                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7165                 }
7166
7167                 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7168                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7169                 if channel_exists {
7170                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7171                                 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7172                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7173                 }
7174
7175                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7176                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7177                         let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7178                                         &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7179                                 ).map_err(|e|
7180                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7181                                 )?;
7182                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7183                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7184                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7185                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7186                                 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7187                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7188                                 channel_type,
7189                         }, None));
7190                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7191                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7192                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7193                         });
7194                         return Ok(());
7195                 }
7196
7197                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7198                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7199                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7200                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7201                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7202                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7203                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7204                 {
7205                         Err(e) => {
7206                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7207                         },
7208                         Ok(res) => res
7209                 };
7210
7211                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7212                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7213                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7214                                 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7215                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7216                 }
7217                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7218                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7219                                 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7220                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7221                 }
7222
7223                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7224                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7225
7226                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7227                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7228                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7229                 });
7230                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7231                 Ok(())
7232         }
7233
7234         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7235                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7236                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7237                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7238                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7239                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7240                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7241                                         debug_assert!(false);
7242                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7243                                 })?;
7244                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7245                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7246                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7247                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7248                                         match phase.get_mut() {
7249                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7250                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7251                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7252                                                 },
7253                                                 _ => {
7254                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7255                                                 }
7256                                         }
7257                                 },
7258                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7259                         }
7260                 };
7261                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7262                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7263                         temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7264                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7265                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
7266                         output_script,
7267                         user_channel_id: user_id,
7268                 }, None));
7269                 Ok(())
7270         }
7271
7272         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7273                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7274
7275                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7276                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7277                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7278                                 debug_assert!(false);
7279                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7280                         })?;
7281
7282                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7283                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7284                 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7285                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7286                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7287                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7288                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7289                                                 Ok(res) => res,
7290                                                 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7291                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7292                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7293                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7294                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7295                                                         // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7296                                                         // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7297                                                         // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7298                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7299                                                 },
7300                                         }
7301                                 },
7302                                 Some(mut phase) => {
7303                                         let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7304                                         let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7305                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7306                                 },
7307                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7308                         };
7309
7310                 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7311
7312                 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7313                         // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7314                         // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7315                         // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7316                         // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7317                         // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7318                         // on the channel.
7319                         let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7320                         chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7321                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7322                 } } }
7323
7324                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7325                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7326                                 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7327                         },
7328                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7329                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7330                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7331                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7332                                                 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7333                                         },
7334                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7335                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7336                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7337                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7338                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7339
7340                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7341                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7342                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7343                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
7344                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7345                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7346                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7347                                                                         msg,
7348                                                                 });
7349                                                         }
7350
7351                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7352                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7353                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7354                                                         } else {
7355                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7356                                                         }
7357                                                         Ok(())
7358                                                 } else {
7359                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7360                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7361                                                         fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7362                                                 }
7363                                         }
7364                                 }
7365                         }
7366                 }
7367         }
7368
7369         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7370                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7371                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7372                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7373                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7374                                 debug_assert!(false);
7375                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7376                         })?;
7377
7378                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7379                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7380                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7381                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7382                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7383                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7384                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
7385                                                 &self.logger,
7386                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7387                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7388                                         );
7389                                         let res =
7390                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7391                                         match res {
7392                                                 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7393                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7394                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7395                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7396                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7397                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7398                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7399                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7400                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7401                                                                 Ok(())
7402                                                         } else {
7403                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7404                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7405                                                                 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7406                                                                 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7407                                                                 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7408                                                                 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7409                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7410                                                         }
7411                                                 },
7412                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
7413                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7414                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7415                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7416                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7417                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7418                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7419                                                 }
7420                                         }
7421                                 } else {
7422                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7423                                 }
7424                         },
7425                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7426                 }
7427         }
7428
7429         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7430                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7431                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7432                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7433                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7434                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7435                                 debug_assert!(false);
7436                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7437                         })?;
7438                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7439                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7440                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7441                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7442                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7443                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7444                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7445                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7446                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7447                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7448                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7449                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7450                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
7451                                                 });
7452                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7453                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7454                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7455                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7456                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7457                                                 // announcement_signatures.
7458                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7459                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7460                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7461                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7462                                                                 msg,
7463                                                         });
7464                                                 }
7465                                         }
7466
7467                                         {
7468                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7469                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7470                                         }
7471
7472                                         Ok(())
7473                                 } else {
7474                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7475                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7476                                 }
7477                         },
7478                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7479                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7480                         }
7481                 }
7482         }
7483
7484         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7485                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7486                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7487                 {
7488                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7489                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7490                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7491                                         debug_assert!(false);
7492                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7493                                 })?;
7494                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7495                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7496                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7497                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7498                                 match phase {
7499                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7500                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7501                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7502                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7503                                                                 msg.channel_id,
7504                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7505                                                 }
7506
7507                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7508                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7509                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7510                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7511
7512                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7513                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7514                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7515                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7516                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7517                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7518                                                                 msg,
7519                                                         });
7520                                                 }
7521                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7522                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7523                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7524                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7525                                                 }
7526                                         },
7527                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7528                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7529                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7530                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7531                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7532                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7533                                         },
7534                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7535                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7536                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7537                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7538                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7539                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7540                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7541                                         },
7542                                 }
7543                         } else {
7544                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7545                         }
7546                 }
7547                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7548                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7549                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7550                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7551                 }
7552                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7553                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7554                 }
7555
7556                 Ok(())
7557         }
7558
7559         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7560                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7561                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7562                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7563                                 debug_assert!(false);
7564                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7565                         })?;
7566                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7567                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7568                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7569                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7570                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7571                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7572                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7573                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7574                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7575                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7576                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7577                                                                 msg,
7578                                                         });
7579                                                 }
7580                                                 if tx.is_some() {
7581                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7582                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7583                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7584                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7585                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7586                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7587                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7588                                         } else {
7589                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7590                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7591                                         }
7592                                 },
7593                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7594                         }
7595                 };
7596                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7597                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7598                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7599                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7600                 }
7601                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7602                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7603                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7604                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7605                                         msg: update
7606                                 });
7607                         }
7608                 }
7609                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7610                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7611                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7612                 }
7613                 Ok(())
7614         }
7615
7616         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7617                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7618                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7619                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7620                 //
7621                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7622                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7623                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7624                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7625
7626                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7627                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7628
7629                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7630                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7631                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7632                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7633                                 debug_assert!(false);
7634                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7635                         })?;
7636                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7637                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7638                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7639                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7640                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7641                                         let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7642                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7643                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7644                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7645                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7646                                                         ),
7647                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7648                                         };
7649                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7650                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7651                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7652                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7653                                         if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7654                                                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7655                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7656                                                                 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7657                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7658                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7659                                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7660                                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7661                                                                 }
7662                                                         ))
7663                                                 } else {
7664                                                         match pending_forward_info {
7665                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7666                                                                         ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7667                                                                 }) => {
7668                                                                         let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7669                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7670                                                                         } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7671                                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7672                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7673                                                                         } else {
7674                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7675                                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7676                                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7677                                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7678                                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7679                                                                                 reason
7680                                                                         };
7681                                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7682                                                                 },
7683                                                                 _ => {},
7684                                                         }
7685                                                 }
7686                                         }
7687                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7688                                 } else {
7689                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7690                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7691                                 }
7692                         },
7693                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7694                 }
7695                 Ok(())
7696         }
7697
7698         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7699                 let funding_txo;
7700                 let next_user_channel_id;
7701                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7702                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7703                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7704                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7705                                         debug_assert!(false);
7706                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7707                                 })?;
7708                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7709                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7710                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7711                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7712                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7713                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7714                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7715                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7716                                                         log_trace!(logger,
7717                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7718                                                                 msg.channel_id);
7719                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7720                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7721                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7722                                                 }
7723                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7724                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7725                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7726                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7727                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7728                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7729                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7730                                                 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7731                                                 res
7732                                         } else {
7733                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7734                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7735                                         }
7736                                 },
7737                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7738                         }
7739                 };
7740                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7741                         Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7742                         funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7743                 );
7744
7745                 Ok(())
7746         }
7747
7748         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7749                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7750                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7751                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7752                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7753                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7754                                 debug_assert!(false);
7755                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7756                         })?;
7757                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7758                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7759                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7760                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7761                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7762                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7763                                 } else {
7764                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7765                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7766                                 }
7767                         },
7768                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7769                 }
7770                 Ok(())
7771         }
7772
7773         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7774                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7775                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7776                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7777                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7778                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7779                                 debug_assert!(false);
7780                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7781                         })?;
7782                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7783                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7784                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7785                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7786                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7787                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7788                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7789                                 }
7790                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7791                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7792                                 } else {
7793                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7794                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7795                                 }
7796                                 Ok(())
7797                         },
7798                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7799                 }
7800         }
7801
7802         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7803                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7804                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7805                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7806                                 debug_assert!(false);
7807                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7808                         })?;
7809                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7810                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7811                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7812                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7813                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7814                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7815                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7816                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7817                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7818                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7819                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7820                                         }
7821                                         Ok(())
7822                                 } else {
7823                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7824                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7825                                 }
7826                         },
7827                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7828                 }
7829         }
7830
7831         fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7832                 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7833                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7834                 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7835                 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7836                 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7837                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7838                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7839                 }
7840                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7841         }
7842
7843         #[inline]
7844         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7845                 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7846                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7847         }
7848
7849         #[inline]
7850         fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7851                 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7852                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7853                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7854                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7855                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7856                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7857                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7858                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7859                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7860                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7861                                         };
7862                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7863                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7864
7865                                         let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7866                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7867                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7868                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7869                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7870                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7871                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7872                                                 },
7873                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7874                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7875                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7876                                                         {
7877                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7878                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7879                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7880                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7881                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7882                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7883                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7884                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7885                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7886                                                                                         intercept_id
7887                                                                                 }, None));
7888                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7889                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7890                                                                         },
7891                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7892                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7893                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7894                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7895                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7896                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7897                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7898                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7899                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7900                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7901                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
7902                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7903                                                                                 });
7904
7905                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7906                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7907                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7908                                                                                 ));
7909                                                                         }
7910                                                                 }
7911                                                         } else {
7912                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7913                                                                 // payments are being processed.
7914                                                                 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7915                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7916                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7917                                                         }
7918                                                 }
7919                                         }
7920                                 }
7921                         }
7922
7923                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7924                                 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7925                         }
7926
7927                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7928                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7929                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7930                         }
7931                 }
7932                 push_forward_event
7933         }
7934
7935         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7936                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7937                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7938                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7939                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7940                 ).count();
7941                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7942                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7943                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7944                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7945                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7946                 // real by taking more time.
7947                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7948                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7949                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7950                         }, None));
7951                 }
7952         }
7953
7954         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7955         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7956         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7957         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7958         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7959                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7960                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7961         ) -> bool {
7962                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7963                         .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7964                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7965                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7966                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
7967                                 channel_id,
7968                                 counterparty_node_id,
7969                         })
7970                 })
7971         }
7972
7973         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7974         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7975                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7976         ) -> bool {
7977                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7978                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7979                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7980                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7981
7982                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7983                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7984                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7985                         }
7986                 }
7987                 false
7988         }
7989
7990         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7991                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7992                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7993                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7994                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7995                                         debug_assert!(false);
7996                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7997                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7998                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7999                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8000                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8001                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8002                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8003                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8004                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
8005                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
8006                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
8007                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
8008                                                 } else { false };
8009                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
8010                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
8011                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
8012                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
8013                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
8014                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
8015                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8016                                                 }
8017                                                 htlcs_to_fail
8018                                         } else {
8019                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8020                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8021                                         }
8022                                 },
8023                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8024                         }
8025                 };
8026                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8027                 Ok(())
8028         }
8029
8030         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8031                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8032                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8033                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8034                                 debug_assert!(false);
8035                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8036                         })?;
8037                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8038                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8039                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8040                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8041                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8042                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8043                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8044                                 } else {
8045                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8046                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8047                                 }
8048                         },
8049                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8050                 }
8051                 Ok(())
8052         }
8053
8054         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8055                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8056                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8057                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8058                                 debug_assert!(false);
8059                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8060                         })?;
8061                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8062                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8063                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8064                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8065                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8066                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8067                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8068                                         }
8069
8070                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8071                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8072                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8073                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
8074                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
8075                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8076                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8077                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8078                                         });
8079                                 } else {
8080                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8081                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8082                                 }
8083                         },
8084                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8085                 }
8086                 Ok(())
8087         }
8088
8089         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8090         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8091                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8092                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8093                         None => {
8094                                 // It's not a local channel
8095                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8096                         }
8097                 };
8098                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8099                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8100                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8101                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8102                 }
8103                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8104                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8105                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8106                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8107                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8108                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8109                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8110                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8111                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8112                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8113                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8114                                                 }
8115                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8116                                         }
8117                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8118                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8119                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8120                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8121                                         } else {
8122                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8123                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8124                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8125                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8126                                                 // persisting.
8127                                                 if !did_change {
8128                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8129                                                 }
8130                                         }
8131                                 } else {
8132                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8133                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8134                                 }
8135                         },
8136                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8137                 }
8138                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8139         }
8140
8141         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8142                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8143                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8144
8145                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8146                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
8147                                         debug_assert!(false);
8148                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8149                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8150                                                 msg.channel_id
8151                                         )
8152                                 })?;
8153                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
8154                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8155                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8156                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8157                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8158                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8159                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8160                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8161                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8162                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8163                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8164                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8165                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8166                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
8167                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8168                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8169                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8170                                                                 msg,
8171                                                         });
8172                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8173                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8174                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8175                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
8176                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8177                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8178                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8179                                                                         msg,
8180                                                                 });
8181                                                         }
8182                                                 }
8183                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8184                                                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8185                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8186                                                         Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8187                                                 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8188                                                 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8189                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8190                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8191                                                 }
8192                                                 need_lnd_workaround
8193                                         } else {
8194                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8195                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8196                                         }
8197                                 },
8198                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8199                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8200                                                 msg.channel_id);
8201                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8202                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8203                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8204                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8205                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8206                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8207                                         //
8208                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8209                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8210                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8211                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8212                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8213                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8214                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8215                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8216                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8217                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8218                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8219                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8220                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8221                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8222                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8223                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
8224                                                 },
8225                                         });
8226                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8227                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8228                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8229                                         )
8230                                 }
8231                         }
8232                 };
8233
8234                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8235                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8236                 }
8237                 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8238         }
8239
8240         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8241         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8242                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8243
8244                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8245                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8246                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8247                 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8248                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8249                                 match monitor_event {
8250                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8251                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8252                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8253                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8254                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8255                                                                 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8256                                                                 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8257                                                 } else {
8258                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8259                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8260                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8261                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8262                                                 }
8263                                         },
8264                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8265                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8266                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8267                                                         None => {
8268                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8269                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8270                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8271                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8272                                                         }
8273                                                 };
8274                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8275                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8276                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8277                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8278                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8279                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8280                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8281                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8282                                                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8283                                                                                         reason
8284                                                                                 } else {
8285                                                                                         ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8286                                                                                 };
8287                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8288                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8289                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8290                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8291                                                                                                 msg: update
8292                                                                                         });
8293                                                                                 }
8294                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8295                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8296                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8297                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8298                                                                                         },
8299                                                                                 });
8300                                                                         }
8301                                                                 }
8302                                                         }
8303                                                 }
8304                                         },
8305                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8306                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8307                                         },
8308                                 }
8309                         }
8310                 }
8311
8312                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8313                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8314                 }
8315
8316                 has_pending_monitor_events
8317         }
8318
8319         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8320         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8321         /// update events as a separate process method here.
8322         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
8323         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8324                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8325                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8326         }
8327
8328         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8329         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8330         /// update was applied.
8331         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8332                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8333                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8334
8335                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8336                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8337                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8338                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8339                 'peer_loop: loop {
8340                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8341                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8342                                 'chan_loop: loop {
8343                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8344                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8345                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8346                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8347                                         ) {
8348                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8349                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8350                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8351                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8352                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8353                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8354                                                 }
8355                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8356                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
8357
8358                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8359                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8360                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
8361                                                 }
8362                                         }
8363                                         break 'chan_loop;
8364                                 }
8365                         }
8366                         break 'peer_loop;
8367                 }
8368
8369                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8370                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8371                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8372                 }
8373
8374                 has_update
8375         }
8376
8377         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8378         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8379         ///
8380         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8381         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8382         ///
8383         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8384         #[cfg(async_signing)]
8385         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8386                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8387
8388                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8389                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8390                         match phase {
8391                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8392                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8393                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8394                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8395                                                         node_id,
8396                                                         updates,
8397                                                 });
8398                                         }
8399                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8400                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8401                                                         node_id,
8402                                                         msg,
8403                                                 });
8404                                         }
8405                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8406                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8407                                         }
8408                                 }
8409                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8410                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8411                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8412                                                         node_id,
8413                                                         msg,
8414                                                 });
8415                                         }
8416                                 }
8417                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8418                         }
8419                 };
8420
8421                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8422                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8423                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8424                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8425                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8426                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8427                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8428                                 }
8429                         }
8430                 } else {
8431                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8432                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8433                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8434                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8435                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8436                                 }
8437                         }
8438                 }
8439         }
8440
8441         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8442         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8443         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8444         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8445                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8446                 let mut has_update = false;
8447                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8448                 {
8449                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8450
8451                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8452                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8453                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8454                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8455                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8456                                         match phase {
8457                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8458                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8459                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8460                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8461                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8462                                                                                 has_update = true;
8463                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8464                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8465                                                                                 });
8466                                                                         }
8467                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8468                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8469                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8470                                                                         }
8471                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8472                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8473                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8474                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8475                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8476                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8477                                                                                                 msg: update
8478                                                                                         });
8479                                                                                 }
8480
8481                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8482                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8483                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8484                                                                                 false
8485                                                                         } else { true }
8486                                                                 },
8487                                                                 Err(e) => {
8488                                                                         has_update = true;
8489                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8490                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8491                                                                         !close_channel
8492                                                                 }
8493                                                         }
8494                                                 },
8495                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8496                                         }
8497                                 });
8498                         }
8499                 }
8500
8501                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8502                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8503                 }
8504
8505                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8506                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8507                 }
8508
8509                 has_update
8510         }
8511
8512         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8513         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8514         /// Channel object.
8515         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8516                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8517                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8518                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8519                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
8520                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8521                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8522                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8523                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8524                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8525                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8526                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8527                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
8528                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
8529                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8530                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8531                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8532                                         });
8533                         }
8534                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8535                 }
8536         }
8537 }
8538
8539 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8540         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8541         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8542         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8543         ///
8544         /// # Privacy
8545         ///
8546         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8547         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8548         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8549         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8550         /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8551         ///
8552         /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8553         ///
8554         /// # Limitations
8555         ///
8556         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8557         /// reply path.
8558         ///
8559         /// # Errors
8560         ///
8561         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8562         ///
8563         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8564         ///
8565         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8566         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8567         pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8568                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8569                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8570                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8571                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8572
8573                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8574                 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8575                         node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8576                 )
8577                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8578                         .path(path);
8579
8580                 Ok(builder.into())
8581         }
8582 } }
8583
8584 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8585         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8586         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8587         ///
8588         /// # Payment
8589         ///
8590         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8591         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8592         ///
8593         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8594         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8595         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8596         /// expired.
8597         ///
8598         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8599         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8600         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8601         ///
8602         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8603         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8604         ///
8605         /// # Privacy
8606         ///
8607         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8608         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8609         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8610         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8611         /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8612         ///
8613         /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8614         ///
8615         /// # Limitations
8616         ///
8617         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8618         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8619         ///
8620         /// # Errors
8621         ///
8622         /// Errors if:
8623         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8624         /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8625         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8626         ///
8627         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8628         ///
8629         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8630         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8631         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8632         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8633         pub fn create_refund_builder(
8634                 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8635                 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8636         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8637                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8638                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8639                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8640                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8641
8642                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8643                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8644                         node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8645                 )?
8646                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8647                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8648                         .path(path);
8649
8650                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8651
8652                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8653                 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8654                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8655                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8656                         )
8657                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8658
8659                 Ok(builder.into())
8660         }
8661 } }
8662
8663 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8664 where
8665         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8666         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8667         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8668         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8669         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8670         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8671         R::Target: Router,
8672         L::Target: Logger,
8673 {
8674         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8675         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8676         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8677         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8678
8679         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8680         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8681         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8682         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8683
8684         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8685         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8686         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8687         ///
8688         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8689         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8690         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8691         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8692         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8693         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8694         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8695         ///
8696         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8697         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8698         ///
8699         /// # Payment
8700         ///
8701         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8702         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8703         /// been sent.
8704         ///
8705         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8706         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8707         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8708         ///
8709         /// # Privacy
8710         ///
8711         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8712         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8713         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8714         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8715         ///
8716         /// # Limitations
8717         ///
8718         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8719         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8720         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8721         ///
8722         /// # Errors
8723         ///
8724         /// Errors if:
8725         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8726         /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8727         /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8728         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8729         ///   request.
8730         ///
8731         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8732         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8733         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8734         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8735         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8736         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8737         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8738         pub fn pay_for_offer(
8739                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8740                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8741                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8742         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8743                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8744                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8745                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8746
8747                 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8748                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8749                         .into();
8750                 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8751
8752                 let builder = match quantity {
8753                         None => builder,
8754                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8755                 };
8756                 let builder = match amount_msats {
8757                         None => builder,
8758                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8759                 };
8760                 let builder = match payer_note {
8761                         None => builder,
8762                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8763                 };
8764                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8765                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8766
8767                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8768
8769                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8770                 self.pending_outbound_payments
8771                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8772                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8773                         )
8774                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8775
8776                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8777                 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8778                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8779                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8780                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8781                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8782                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8783                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8784                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8785                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8786                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8787                                 );
8788                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8789                         }
8790                 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8791                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8792                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8793                                 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8794                                 Some(reply_path),
8795                         );
8796                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8797                 } else {
8798                         debug_assert!(false);
8799                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8800                 }
8801
8802                 Ok(())
8803         }
8804
8805         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8806         /// message.
8807         ///
8808         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8809         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8810         /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8811         ///
8812         /// # Limitations
8813         ///
8814         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8815         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8816         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8817         /// received and no retries will be made.
8818         ///
8819         /// # Errors
8820         ///
8821         /// Errors if:
8822         /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8823         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8824         ///   the invoice.
8825         ///
8826         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8827         pub fn request_refund_payment(
8828                 &self, refund: &Refund
8829         ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8830                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8831                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8832                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8833
8834                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8835                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8836
8837                 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8838                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8839                 }
8840
8841                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8842
8843                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8844                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8845                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8846                                 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8847                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8848                                 )
8849                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8850
8851                                 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8852                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8853                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8854                                 )?;
8855                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8856                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8857                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8858                                 );
8859                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8860                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8861                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8862                                 )?;
8863                                 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8864                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8865                                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8866                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8867
8868                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8869                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8870                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8871                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8872                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8873                                                 Some(reply_path),
8874                                         );
8875                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8876                                 } else {
8877                                         for path in refund.paths() {
8878                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8879                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8880                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8881                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8882                                                 );
8883                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8884                                         }
8885                                 }
8886
8887                                 Ok(invoice)
8888                         },
8889                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8890                 }
8891         }
8892
8893         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8894         /// to pay us.
8895         ///
8896         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8897         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8898         ///
8899         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8900         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8901         /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8902         ///
8903         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8904         ///
8905         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8906         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8907         ///
8908         /// # Note
8909         ///
8910         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8911         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8912         ///
8913         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8914         ///
8915         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8916         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8917         ///
8918         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8919         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8920         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8921         /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8922         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8923         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8924                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8925                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8926                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8927                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8928         }
8929
8930         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8931         /// stored external to LDK.
8932         ///
8933         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8934         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8935         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8936         ///
8937         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8938         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8939         /// payments.
8940         ///
8941         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8942         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8943         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8944         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8945         ///
8946         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8947         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8948         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8949         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8950         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8951         ///
8952         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8953         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8954         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8955         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8956         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8957         ///
8958         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8959         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8960         ///
8961         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8962         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8963         ///
8964         /// # Note
8965         ///
8966         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8967         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8968         ///
8969         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8970         ///
8971         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8972         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8973         ///
8974         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8975         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8976         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8977                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8978                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8979                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8980                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
8981         }
8982
8983         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8984         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8985         ///
8986         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8987         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8988                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8989         }
8990
8991         /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8992         ///
8993         /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8994         fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8995                 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8996                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8997
8998                 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8999                         .iter()
9000                         .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
9001                         .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
9002                         .collect::<Vec<_>>();
9003
9004                 self.router
9005                         .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
9006                         .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
9007         }
9008
9009         /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
9010         /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
9011         fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
9012                 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
9013         ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
9014                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9015
9016                 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
9017                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
9018                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
9019                         + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
9020                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
9021                         payment_secret,
9022                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
9023                                 max_cltv_expiry,
9024                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
9025                         },
9026                         payment_context,
9027                 };
9028                 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9029                         payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9030                 )
9031         }
9032
9033         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9034         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9035         ///
9036         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9037         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9038                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9039                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9040                 loop {
9041                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9042                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9043                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9044                                 Some(_) => continue,
9045                                 None => return scid_candidate
9046                         }
9047                 }
9048         }
9049
9050         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9051         ///
9052         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9053         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9054                 PhantomRouteHints {
9055                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9056                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9057                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9058                 }
9059         }
9060
9061         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9062         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9063         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9064         ///
9065         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9066         /// times to get a unique scid.
9067         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9068                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9069                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9070                 loop {
9071                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9072                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9073                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9074                         return scid_candidate
9075                 }
9076         }
9077
9078         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9079         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9080         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9081                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9082
9083                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9084                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9085                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9086                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9087                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9088                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9089                         ) {
9090                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9091                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9092                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9093                                         }
9094                                 }
9095                         }
9096                 }
9097
9098                 inflight_htlcs
9099         }
9100
9101         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9102         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9103                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9104                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9105                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9106                 events.into_inner()
9107         }
9108
9109         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9110         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9111                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9112                 events.push_back((event, None));
9113         }
9114
9115         #[cfg(test)]
9116         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9117                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9118                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9119         }
9120
9121         #[cfg(test)]
9122         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9123                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9124         }
9125
9126         #[cfg(test)]
9127         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9128                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9129         }
9130
9131         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9132         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9133         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9134         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9135         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9136                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9137                 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9138
9139                 let logger = WithContext::from(
9140                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
9141                 );
9142                 loop {
9143                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9144                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9145                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9146                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9147                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9148                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9149                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9150                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9151                                         {
9152                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9153                                         }
9154                                 }
9155
9156                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9157                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9158                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9159                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9160                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9161                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9162                                                 &channel_id);
9163                                         break;
9164                                 }
9165
9166                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9167                                         channel_id) {
9168                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9169                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9170                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9171                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9172                                                                 channel_id);
9173                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9174                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9175                                                         if further_update_exists {
9176                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9177                                                                 // top of the loop.
9178                                                                 continue;
9179                                                         }
9180                                                 } else {
9181                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9182                                                                 channel_id);
9183                                                 }
9184                                         }
9185                                 }
9186                         } else {
9187                                 log_debug!(logger,
9188                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9189                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9190                         }
9191                         break;
9192                 }
9193         }
9194
9195         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9196                 for action in actions {
9197                         match action {
9198                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9199                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9200                                 } => {
9201                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9202                                 }
9203                         }
9204                 }
9205         }
9206
9207         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9208         /// using the given event handler.
9209         ///
9210         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9211         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9212                 &self, handler: H
9213         ) {
9214                 let mut ev;
9215                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9216         }
9217 }
9218
9219 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9220 where
9221         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9222         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9223         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9224         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9225         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9226         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9227         R::Target: Router,
9228         L::Target: Logger,
9229 {
9230         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9231         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9232         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9233         /// is always placed next to each other.
9234         ///
9235         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9236         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9237         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9238         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9239         ///
9240         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9241         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9242         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9243         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9244                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9245                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9246                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9247
9248                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9249                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9250                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9251                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9252                         }
9253
9254                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9255                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9256                         }
9257                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9258                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9259                         }
9260
9261                         let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9262                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9263                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9264                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9265                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9266                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9267                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9268                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9269                                 }
9270                                 if peer_state.is_connected {
9271                                         is_any_peer_connected = true
9272                                 }
9273                         }
9274
9275                         // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9276                         if is_any_peer_connected {
9277                                 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9278                                 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9279                         }
9280
9281                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9282                                 events.replace(pending_events);
9283                         }
9284
9285                         result
9286                 });
9287                 events.into_inner()
9288         }
9289 }
9290
9291 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9292 where
9293         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9294         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9295         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9296         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9297         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9298         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9299         R::Target: Router,
9300         L::Target: Logger,
9301 {
9302         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9303         ///
9304         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9305         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9306         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9307                 let mut ev;
9308                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9309         }
9310 }
9311
9312 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9313 where
9314         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9315         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9316         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9317         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9318         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9319         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9320         R::Target: Router,
9321         L::Target: Logger,
9322 {
9323         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9324                 {
9325                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9326                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9327                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9328                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9329                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9330                 }
9331
9332                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9333                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9334         }
9335
9336         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9337                 let _persistence_guard =
9338                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9339                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9340                 let new_height = height - 1;
9341                 {
9342                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9343                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9344                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9345                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9346                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9347                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9348                 }
9349
9350                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9351         }
9352 }
9353
9354 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9355 where
9356         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9357         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9358         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9359         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9360         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9361         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9362         R::Target: Router,
9363         L::Target: Logger,
9364 {
9365         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9366                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9367                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9368                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9369
9370                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9371                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9372
9373                 let _persistence_guard =
9374                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9375                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9376                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9377                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9378
9379                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9380                 if height < last_best_block_height {
9381                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9382                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9383                 }
9384         }
9385
9386         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9387                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9388                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9389                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9390
9391                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9392                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9393
9394                 let _persistence_guard =
9395                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9396                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9397                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9398
9399                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9400
9401                 macro_rules! max_time {
9402                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
9403                                 loop {
9404                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9405                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9406                                         // having an explicit local time source.
9407                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9408                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9409                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9410                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9411                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9412                                                 break;
9413                                         }
9414                                 }
9415                         }
9416                 }
9417                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9418                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9419                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9420                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9421                 });
9422         }
9423
9424         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9425                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9426                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9427                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9428                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9429                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9430                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9431                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9432                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9433                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9434                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9435                                 }
9436                         }
9437                 }
9438                 res
9439         }
9440
9441         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9442                 let _persistence_guard =
9443                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9444                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9445                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9446                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9447                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9448                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9449                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9450                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9451                 });
9452         }
9453 }
9454
9455 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9456 where
9457         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9458         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9459         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9460         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9461         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9462         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9463         R::Target: Router,
9464         L::Target: Logger,
9465 {
9466         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9467         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9468         /// the function.
9469         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9470                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9471                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9472                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9473                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9474
9475                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9476                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9477                 {
9478                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9479                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9480                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9481                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9482                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9483
9484                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9485                                         match phase {
9486                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
9487                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9488                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9489                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9490                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9491                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9492                                                         let res = f(channel);
9493                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9494                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9495                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9496                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9497                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9498                                                                 }
9499                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9500                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9501                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9502                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
9503                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9504                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9505                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9506                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9507                                                                                                 msg,
9508                                                                                         });
9509                                                                                 }
9510                                                                         } else {
9511                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9512                                                                         }
9513                                                                 }
9514
9515                                                                 {
9516                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9517                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9518                                                                 }
9519
9520                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9521                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9522                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9523                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9524                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
9525                                                                         });
9526                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9527                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9528                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9529                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
9530                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9531                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9532                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9533                                                                                         });
9534                                                                                 }
9535                                                                         }
9536                                                                 }
9537                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9538                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9539                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9540                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9541                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9542                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9543                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9544                                                                                 // is always consistent.
9545                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9546                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9547                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9548                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9549                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9550                                                                         }
9551                                                                 }
9552                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9553                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9554                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9555                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9556                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9557                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9558                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9559                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9560                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9561                                                                                 msg: update
9562                                                                         });
9563                                                                 }
9564                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9565                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9566                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9567                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9568                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9569                                                                                         data: reason_message,
9570                                                                                 })
9571                                                                         },
9572                                                                 });
9573                                                                 return false;
9574                                                         }
9575                                                         true
9576                                                 }
9577                                         }
9578                                 });
9579                         }
9580                 }
9581
9582                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9583                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9584                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9585                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9586                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9587                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9588                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9589                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9590                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9591                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9592
9593                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9594                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9595                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9596                                                 false
9597                                         } else { true }
9598                                 });
9599                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9600                         });
9601
9602                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9603                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9604                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9605                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9606                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9607                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9608                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9609                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9610                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9611                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9612                                                 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9613                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9614                                         });
9615
9616                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9617                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9618                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
9619                                         };
9620                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9621                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9622                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9623                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
9624                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9625                                         );
9626                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9627                                         false
9628                                 } else { true }
9629                         });
9630                 }
9631
9632                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9633
9634                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9635                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9636                 }
9637         }
9638
9639         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9640         /// may have events that need processing.
9641         ///
9642         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9643         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9644         ///
9645         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9646         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9647         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9648                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9649         }
9650
9651         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9652         ///
9653         /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9654         /// indicates this should be checked.
9655         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9656                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9657         }
9658
9659         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9660         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9661                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9662         }
9663
9664         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9665         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9666         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9667                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9668         }
9669
9670         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9671         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9672         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9673                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9674         }
9675
9676         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9677         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9678         ///
9679         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9680         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9681         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9682         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9683                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9684         }
9685
9686         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9687         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9688         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9689                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9690         }
9691
9692         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9693         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9694         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9695                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9696         }
9697
9698         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9699         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9700         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9701                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9702         }
9703
9704         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9705         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9706         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9707                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9708         }
9709 }
9710
9711 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9712         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9713 where
9714         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9715         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9716         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9717         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9718         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9719         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9720         R::Target: Router,
9721         L::Target: Logger,
9722 {
9723         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9724                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9725                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9726                 // change to the contents.
9727                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9728                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9729                         let persist = match &res {
9730                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9731                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9732                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
9733                                 },
9734                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9735                         };
9736                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9737                         persist
9738                 });
9739         }
9740
9741         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9742                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9743                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9744                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9745         }
9746
9747         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9748                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9749                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9750                 // change to the contents.
9751                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9752                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9753                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9754                 });
9755         }
9756
9757         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9758                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9759                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9760                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9761         }
9762
9763         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9764                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9765                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9766         }
9767
9768         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9769                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9770                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9771         }
9772
9773         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9774                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9775                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9776                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9777                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9778                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9779                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9780                         let persist = match &res {
9781                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9782                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9783                         };
9784                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9785                         persist
9786                 });
9787         }
9788
9789         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9790                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9791                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9792                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9793         }
9794
9795         #[cfg(splicing)]
9796         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9797                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9798                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9799                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9800         }
9801
9802         #[cfg(splicing)]
9803         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9804                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9805                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9806                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9807         }
9808
9809         #[cfg(splicing)]
9810         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9811                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9812                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9813                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9814         }
9815
9816         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9817                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9818                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9819         }
9820
9821         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9822                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9823                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9824         }
9825
9826         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9827                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9828                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9829                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9830                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9831                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9832                         let persist = match &res {
9833                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9834                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9835                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9836                         };
9837                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9838                         persist
9839                 });
9840         }
9841
9842         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9843                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9844                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9845         }
9846
9847         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9848                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9849                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9850                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9851                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9852                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9853                         let persist = match &res {
9854                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9855                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9856                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9857                         };
9858                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9859                         persist
9860                 });
9861         }
9862
9863         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9864                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9865                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9866                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9867                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9868                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9869                         let persist = match &res {
9870                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9871                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9872                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9873                         };
9874                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9875                         persist
9876                 });
9877         }
9878
9879         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9880                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9881                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9882         }
9883
9884         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9885                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9886                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9887         }
9888
9889         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9890                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9891                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9892                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9893                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9894                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9895                         let persist = match &res {
9896                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9897                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9898                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9899                         };
9900                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9901                         persist
9902                 });
9903         }
9904
9905         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9906                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9907                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9908         }
9909
9910         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9911                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9912                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9913                                 persist
9914                         } else {
9915                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9916                         }
9917                 });
9918         }
9919
9920         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9921                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9922                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9923                         let persist = match &res {
9924                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9925                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9926                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9927                         };
9928                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9929                         persist
9930                 });
9931         }
9932
9933         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9934                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9935                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9936                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9937                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9938                 let remove_peer = {
9939                         log_debug!(
9940                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9941                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9942                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9943                         );
9944                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9945                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9946                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9947                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9948                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9949                                         let context = match phase {
9950                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9951                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9952                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9953                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9954                                                                 return true;
9955                                                         }
9956                                                         &mut chan.context
9957                                                 },
9958                                                 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9959                                                 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9960                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9961                                                         return true;
9962                                                 },
9963                                                 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9964                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9965                                                         &mut chan.context
9966                                                 },
9967                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9968                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9969                                                         &mut chan.context
9970                                                 },
9971                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9972                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9973                                                         &mut chan.context
9974                                                 },
9975                                         };
9976                                         // Clean up for removal.
9977                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9978                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9979                                         false
9980                                 });
9981                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9982                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9983                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9984                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9985                                         match msg {
9986                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
9987                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9988                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9989                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9990                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9991                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
9992                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9993                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9994                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
9995                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9996                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9997                                                 // Quiescence
9998                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9999                                                 // Splicing
10000                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
10001                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
10002                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
10003                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
10004                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
10005                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
10006                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
10007                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
10008                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
10009                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
10010                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
10011                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
10012                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
10013                                                 // Channel Operations
10014                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
10015                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
10016                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
10017                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
10018                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
10019                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
10020                                                 // Gossip
10021                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
10022                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10023                                                 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
10024                                                 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
10025                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
10026                                                         debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
10027                                                         false
10028                                                 },
10029                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10030                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
10031                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10032                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10033                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10034                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10035                                         }
10036                                 });
10037                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10038                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10039                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10040                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10041                 };
10042                 if remove_peer {
10043                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10044                 }
10045                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10046
10047                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10048                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10049                 }
10050         }
10051
10052         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10053                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
10054                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10055                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10056                         return Err(());
10057                 }
10058
10059                 let mut res = Ok(());
10060
10061                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10062                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10063                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10064                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10065                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10066                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10067                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10068
10069                         {
10070                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10071                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10072                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10073                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
10074                                                         res = Err(());
10075                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10076                                                 }
10077                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10078                                                         channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10079                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10080                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10081                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10082                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10083                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10084                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10085                                                         is_connected: true,
10086                                                 }));
10087                                         },
10088                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10089                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10090                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10091
10092                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10093                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10094                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10095                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10096                                                 {
10097                                                         res = Err(());
10098                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10099                                                 }
10100
10101                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10102                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10103                                         },
10104                                 }
10105                         }
10106
10107                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10108
10109                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10110                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10111                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10112                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10113                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10114
10115                                 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10116                                         match phase {
10117                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10118                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
10119                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10120                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10121                                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10122                                                         });
10123                                                 }
10124
10125                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10126                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10127                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10128                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10129                                                         });
10130                                                 }
10131
10132                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10133                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10134                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10135                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10136                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10137                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10138                                                         });
10139                                                 },
10140
10141                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10142                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10143                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10144                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10145                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10146                                                 }
10147
10148                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10149                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10150                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10151                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10152                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10153                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10154                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10155                                                 },
10156                                         }
10157                                 }
10158                         }
10159
10160                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10161                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10162                 });
10163                 res
10164         }
10165
10166         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10167                 match &msg.data as &str {
10168                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10169                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
10170                         {
10171                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10172                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10173                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10174                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10175                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10176                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10177                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10178                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10179                                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10180                                                 self,
10181                                                 || -> NotifyOption {
10182                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10183                                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10184                                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10185                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10186                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10187                                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10188                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10189                                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10190                                                                                 msg,
10191                                                                         });
10192                                                                 }
10193                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10194                                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10195                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10196                                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10197                                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10198                                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10199                                                                                 },
10200                                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
10201                                                                         }
10202                                                                 });
10203                                                                 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10204                                                                 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10205                                                                 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10206                                                         }
10207                                                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10208                                                 }
10209                                         );
10210                                 }
10211                                 return;
10212                         }
10213                         _ => {}
10214                 }
10215
10216                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10217
10218                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10219                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10220                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10221                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10222                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10223                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10224                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10225                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10226                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10227                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10228                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10229                         };
10230                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
10231                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10232                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10233                         }
10234                 } else {
10235                         {
10236                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10237                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10238                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10239                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10240                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10241                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10242                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10243                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10244                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10245                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10246                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10247                                                                 msg,
10248                                                         });
10249                                                         return;
10250                                                 }
10251                                         },
10252                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10253                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10254                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10255                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10256                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10257                                                                 msg,
10258                                                         });
10259                                                         return;
10260                                                 }
10261                                         },
10262                                         None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10263                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10264                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10265                                 }
10266                         }
10267
10268                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10269                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10270                 }
10271         }
10272
10273         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10274                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10275         }
10276
10277         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10278                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10279         }
10280
10281         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10282                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10283         }
10284
10285         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10286                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10287                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10288                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10289         }
10290
10291         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10292                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10293                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10294                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10295         }
10296
10297         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10298                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10299                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10300                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10301         }
10302
10303         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10304                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10305                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10306                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10307         }
10308
10309         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10310                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10311                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10312                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10313         }
10314
10315         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10316                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10317                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10318                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10319         }
10320
10321         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10322                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10323                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10324                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10325         }
10326
10327         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10328                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10329                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10330                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10331         }
10332
10333         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10334                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10335                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10336                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10337         }
10338 }
10339
10340 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10341 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10342 where
10343         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10344         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10345         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10346         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10347         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10348         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10349         R::Target: Router,
10350         L::Target: Logger,
10351 {
10352         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10353                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10354                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10355
10356                 match message {
10357                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10358                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10359                                         &invoice_request
10360                                 ) {
10361                                         Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10362                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10363                                 };
10364                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10365                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10366                                         Err(()) => {
10367                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10368                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10369                                         },
10370                                 };
10371
10372                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10373                                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10374                                         Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10375                                 ) {
10376                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10377                                         Err(()) => {
10378                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10379                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10380                                         },
10381                                 };
10382
10383                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10384                                         offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10385                                         invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10386                                 });
10387                                 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10388                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10389                                 ) {
10390                                         Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10391                                         Err(()) => {
10392                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10393                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10394                                         },
10395                                 };
10396
10397                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10398                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10399                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10400                                 );
10401
10402                                 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10403                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10404                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10405                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash
10406                                         );
10407                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10408                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10409                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10410                                         );
10411                                         builder
10412                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10413                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10414                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10415                                 } else {
10416                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10417                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10418                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10419                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10420                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10421                                         );
10422                                         builder
10423                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10424                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10425                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10426                                                 .and_then(|invoice| {
10427                                                         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
10428                                                         let mut invoice = invoice;
10429                                                         invoice
10430                                                                 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10431                                                                         self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10432                                                                 )
10433                                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10434                                                 })
10435                                 };
10436
10437                                 match response {
10438                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10439                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10440                                 }
10441                         },
10442                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10443                                 let response = invoice
10444                                         .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10445                                         .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10446                                         .and_then(|payment_id| {
10447                                                 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10448                                                 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10449                                                         Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10450                                                 } else {
10451                                                         self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10452                                                                 .map_err(|e| {
10453                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10454                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10455                                                                 })
10456                                                 }
10457                                         });
10458
10459                                 match response {
10460                                         Ok(()) => None,
10461                                         Err(e) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10462                                 }
10463                         },
10464                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10465                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10466                                 None
10467                         },
10468                 }
10469         }
10470
10471         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10472                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10473         }
10474 }
10475
10476 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10477 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10478 where
10479         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10480         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10481         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10482         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10483         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10484         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10485         R::Target: Router,
10486         L::Target: Logger,
10487 {
10488         fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10489                 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10490         }
10491 }
10492
10493 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10494 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10495 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10496         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10497         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10498         node_features
10499 }
10500
10501 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10502 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10503 ///
10504 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10505 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10506 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10507 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10508         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10509 }
10510
10511 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10512 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10513 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10514         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10515 }
10516
10517 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10518 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10519 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10520         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10521 }
10522
10523 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10524 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10525 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10526         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10527 }
10528
10529 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10530 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10531 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10532         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10533         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10534         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10535         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10536         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10537         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10538         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10539         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10540         features.set_payment_secret_required();
10541         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10542         features.set_wumbo_optional();
10543         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10544         features.set_channel_type_optional();
10545         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10546         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10547         features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10548         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10549                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10550         }
10551         features
10552 }
10553
10554 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10555 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10556
10557 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10558         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10559         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10560         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10561 });
10562
10563 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10564         (2, node_id, required),
10565         (4, features, required),
10566         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10567         (8, forwarding_info, option),
10568         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10569         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10570 });
10571
10572 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10573         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10574                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10575                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10576                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10577                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10578                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10579                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10580                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
10581                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
10582                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
10583                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10584                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10585                         (7, self.config, option),
10586                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10587                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
10588                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10589                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10590                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10591                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10592                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10593                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10594                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10595                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10596                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10597                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10598                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10599                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10600                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
10601                         (32, self.is_public, required),
10602                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10603                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10604                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10605                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10606                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10607                         (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10608                         (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10609                 });
10610                 Ok(())
10611         }
10612 }
10613
10614 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10615         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10616                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10617                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10618                         (2, channel_id, required),
10619                         (3, channel_type, option),
10620                         (4, counterparty, required),
10621                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10622                         (6, funding_txo, option),
10623                         (7, config, option),
10624                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
10625                         (9, confirmations, option),
10626                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10627                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10628                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10629                         (16, balance_msat, required),
10630                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10631                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10632                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10633                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10634                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10635                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10636                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
10637                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10638                         (26, is_outbound, required),
10639                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10640                         (30, is_usable, required),
10641                         (32, is_public, required),
10642                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10643                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10644                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10645                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10646                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10647                         (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10648                         (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10649                 });
10650
10651                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10652                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10653                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10654                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10655                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10656
10657                 Ok(Self {
10658                         inbound_scid_alias,
10659                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10660                         channel_type,
10661                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10662                         outbound_scid_alias,
10663                         funding_txo,
10664                         config,
10665                         short_channel_id,
10666                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10667                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10668                         user_channel_id,
10669                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10670                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10671                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10672                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10673                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10674                         confirmations_required,
10675                         confirmations,
10676                         force_close_spend_delay,
10677                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10678                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10679                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10680                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10681                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10682                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10683                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10684                         channel_shutdown_state,
10685                         pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10686                         pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10687                 })
10688         }
10689 }
10690
10691 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10692         (2, channels, required_vec),
10693         (4, phantom_scid, required),
10694         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10695 });
10696
10697 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10698         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10699         (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10700 });
10701
10702 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10703         (0, Forward) => {
10704                 (0, onion_packet, required),
10705                 (1, blinded, option),
10706                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10707         },
10708         (1, Receive) => {
10709                 (0, payment_data, required),
10710                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10711                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10712                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10713                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10714                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10715                 (9, payment_context, option),
10716         },
10717         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10718                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10719                 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10720                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10721                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10722                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10723                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10724         },
10725 ;);
10726
10727 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10728         (0, routing, required),
10729         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10730         (4, payment_hash, required),
10731         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10732         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10733         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10734         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10735 });
10736
10737
10738 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10739         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10740                 match self {
10741                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10742                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10743                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10744                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10745                                 reason.write(writer)?;
10746                         },
10747                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10748                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10749                         }) => {
10750                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10751                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10752                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10753                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10754                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10755                         },
10756                 }
10757                 Ok(())
10758         }
10759 }
10760
10761 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10762         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10763                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10764                 match id {
10765                         0 => {
10766                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10767                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10768                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10769                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10770                                 }))
10771                         },
10772                         1 => {
10773                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10774                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10775                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10776                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10777                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10778                                 }))
10779                         },
10780                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10781                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10782                         // messages contained in the variants.
10783                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10784                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10785                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10786                         2 => {
10787                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10788                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10789                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10790                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10791                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10792                         },
10793                         3 => {
10794                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10795                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10796                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10797                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10798                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10799                         },
10800                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10801                 }
10802         }
10803 }
10804
10805 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10806         (0, Forward),
10807         (1, Fail),
10808 );
10809
10810 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10811         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10812         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10813 );
10814
10815 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10816         (0, short_channel_id, required),
10817         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10818         (2, outpoint, required),
10819         (3, blinded_failure, option),
10820         (4, htlc_id, required),
10821         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10822         (7, user_channel_id, option),
10823         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10824         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10825         (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10826 });
10827
10828 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10829         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10830                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10831                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10832                                 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10833                         },
10834                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10835                 };
10836                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10837                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10838                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
10839                         (2, self.value, required),
10840                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10841                         (4, payment_data, option),
10842                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10843                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10844                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10845                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10846                 });
10847                 Ok(())
10848         }
10849 }
10850
10851 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10852         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10853                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10854                         (0, prev_hop, required),
10855                         (1, total_msat, option),
10856                         (2, value_ser, required),
10857                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10858                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10859                         (5, total_value_received, option),
10860                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10861                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10862                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10863                 });
10864                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10865                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10866                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10867                         Some(p) => {
10868                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
10869                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10870                                 }
10871                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10872                                         total_msat = Some(value);
10873                                 }
10874                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10875                         },
10876                         None => {
10877                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10878                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
10879                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10880                                         }
10881                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10882                                 }
10883                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10884                         },
10885                 };
10886                 Ok(Self {
10887                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10888                         timer_ticks: 0,
10889                         value,
10890                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10891                         total_value_received,
10892                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10893                         onion_payload,
10894                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10895                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10896                 })
10897         }
10898 }
10899
10900 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10901         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10902                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10903                 match id {
10904                         0 => {
10905                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10906                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10907                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10908                                 let mut payment_id = None;
10909                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10910                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10911                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10912                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10913                                         (1, payment_id, option),
10914                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10915                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10916                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10917                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
10918                                 });
10919                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
10920                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10921                                         // instead.
10922                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10923                                 }
10924                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10925                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10926                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10927                                 }
10928                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10929                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10930                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10931                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10932                                                 }
10933                                         }
10934                                 }
10935                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10936                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10937                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
10938                                         path,
10939                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10940                                 })
10941                         }
10942                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10943                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10944                 }
10945         }
10946 }
10947
10948 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10949         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10950                 match self {
10951                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10952                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10953                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10954                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10955                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10956                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10957                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10958                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10959                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10960                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10961                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10962                                  });
10963                         }
10964                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10965                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10966                                 field.write(writer)?;
10967                         }
10968                 }
10969                 Ok(())
10970         }
10971 }
10972
10973 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10974         (0, forward_info, required),
10975         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10976         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10977         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10978         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10979         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10980         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10981         (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10982 });
10983
10984 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10985         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10986                 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10987                 match self {
10988                         Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10989                                 0u8.write(w)?;
10990                                 info.write(w)?;
10991                         },
10992                         Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10993                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10994                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10995                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10996                                         (2, err_packet, required),
10997                                 });
10998                         },
10999                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
11000                                 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
11001                                 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
11002                                 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
11003                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
11004                                 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
11005                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
11006                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11007                                         (1, failure_code, required),
11008                                         (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
11009                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
11010                                 });
11011                         },
11012                 }
11013                 Ok(())
11014         }
11015 }
11016
11017 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11018         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11019                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
11020                 Ok(match id {
11021                         0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
11022                         1 => {
11023                                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
11024                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11025                                         (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
11026                                         (2, err_packet, required),
11027                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
11028                                 });
11029                                 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
11030                                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
11031                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11032                                                 failure_code,
11033                                                 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
11034                                         }
11035                                 } else {
11036                                         Self::FailHTLC {
11037                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11038                                                 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11039                                         }
11040                                 }
11041                         },
11042                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11043                 })
11044         }
11045 }
11046
11047 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11048         (0, payment_secret, required),
11049         (2, expiry_time, required),
11050         (4, user_payment_id, required),
11051         (6, payment_preimage, required),
11052         (8, min_value_msat, required),
11053 });
11054
11055 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11056 where
11057         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11058         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11059         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11060         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11061         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11062         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11063         R::Target: Router,
11064         L::Target: Logger,
11065 {
11066         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11067                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11068
11069                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11070
11071                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11072                 {
11073                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11074                         best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11075                         best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11076                 }
11077
11078                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11079
11080                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11081                 {
11082                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11083                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11084                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11085                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11086                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11087                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
11088                                 }
11089
11090                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11091                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11092                                 ).count();
11093                         }
11094
11095                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11096
11097                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11098                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11099                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11100                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11101                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11102                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11103                                         } else { None }
11104                                 ) {
11105                                         channel.write(writer)?;
11106                                 }
11107                         }
11108                 }
11109
11110                 {
11111                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11112                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11113                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11114                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11115                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11116                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
11117                                         forward.write(writer)?;
11118                                 }
11119                         }
11120                 }
11121
11122                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11123                 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11124                 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11125                         decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11126                 }
11127
11128                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11129                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11130                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11131
11132                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11133                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11134                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11135                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11136                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11137                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11138                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11139                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
11140                         }
11141                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11142                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11143                 }
11144
11145                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11146                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11147                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11148                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11149                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11150                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
11151                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11152                 }
11153
11154                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11155                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11156                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11157                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11158                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11159                         // no channels.
11160                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11161                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11162                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11163                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11164                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11165                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11166                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11167                                 }
11168                         }
11169                 }
11170
11171                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11172                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11173                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11174                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11175                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11176                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11177                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11178                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
11179                         0u64.write(writer)?;
11180                 } else {
11181                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11182                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11183                                 event.write(writer)?;
11184                         }
11185                 }
11186
11187                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11188                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11189                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11190                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11191                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11192                 0u64.write(writer)?;
11193
11194                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11195                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11196                 // likely to be identical.
11197                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11198                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11199
11200                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11201                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11202                         hash.write(writer)?;
11203                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11204                 }
11205
11206                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11207                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11208                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11209                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11210                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11211                         }
11212                 }
11213                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11214                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11215                         match outbound {
11216                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11217                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11218                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11219                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11220                                         }
11221                                 }
11222                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11223                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11224                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11225                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11226                         }
11227                 }
11228
11229                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11230                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11231                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11232                         match outbound {
11233                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11234                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11235                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11236                                 },
11237                                 _ => {},
11238                         }
11239                 }
11240
11241                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11242                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11243                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11244                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11245                 }
11246
11247                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11248                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11249                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11250                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11251                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
11252                 }
11253
11254                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11255                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11256                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11257                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
11258                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11259                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11260                                 }
11261                         }
11262                 }
11263
11264                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11265                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11266                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11267                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11268                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11269                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11270                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11271                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11272                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11273                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11274                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11275                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11276                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11277                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11278                 });
11279
11280                 Ok(())
11281         }
11282 }
11283
11284 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11285         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11286                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11287                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11288                         event.write(w)?;
11289                         action.write(w)?;
11290                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11291                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11292                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11293                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11294                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11295                                 // check that the event is sane here.
11296                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11297                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11298                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11299                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11300                         }
11301                 }
11302                 Ok(())
11303         }
11304 }
11305 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11306         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11307                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11308                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11309                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11310                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11311                         len) as usize);
11312                 for _ in 0..len {
11313                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11314                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11315                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11316                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
11317                         } else if action.is_some() {
11318                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11319                         }
11320                 }
11321                 Ok(events)
11322         }
11323 }
11324
11325 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11326         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11327         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11328         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11329         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11330         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11331 );
11332
11333 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11334 ///
11335 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11336 /// is:
11337 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11338 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11339 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11340 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11341 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11342 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11343 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11344 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11345 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11346 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11347 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11348 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11349 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11350 ///    the next step.
11351 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11352 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11353 ///
11354 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11355 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11356 ///
11357 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11358 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11359 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11360 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11361 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11362 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11363 ///
11364 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11365 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11366 where
11367         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11368         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11369         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11370         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11371         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11372         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11373         R::Target: Router,
11374         L::Target: Logger,
11375 {
11376         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11377         pub entropy_source: ES,
11378
11379         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11380         pub node_signer: NS,
11381
11382         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11383         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11384         /// signing data.
11385         pub signer_provider: SP,
11386
11387         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11388         ///
11389         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11390         pub fee_estimator: F,
11391         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11392         ///
11393         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11394         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11395         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11396         pub chain_monitor: M,
11397
11398         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11399         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11400         /// force-closed during deserialization.
11401         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11402         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11403         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11404         ///
11405         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11406         pub router: R,
11407         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11408         /// deserialization.
11409         pub logger: L,
11410         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11411         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11412         pub default_config: UserConfig,
11413
11414         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11415         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11416         ///
11417         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11418         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11419         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11420         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11421         ///
11422         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11423         /// this struct.
11424         ///
11425         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11426         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11427 }
11428
11429 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11430                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11431 where
11432         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11433         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11434         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11435         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11436         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11437         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11438         R::Target: Router,
11439         L::Target: Logger,
11440 {
11441         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11442         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11443         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11444         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11445                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11446                 Self {
11447                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11448                         channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11449                                 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11450                         ),
11451                 }
11452         }
11453 }
11454
11455 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11456 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11457 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11458         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11459 where
11460         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11461         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11462         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11463         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11464         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11465         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11466         R::Target: Router,
11467         L::Target: Logger,
11468 {
11469         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11470                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11471                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11472         }
11473 }
11474
11475 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11476         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11477 where
11478         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11479         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11480         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11481         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11482         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11483         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11484         R::Target: Router,
11485         L::Target: Logger,
11486 {
11487         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11488                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11489
11490                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11491                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11492                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11493
11494                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11495
11496                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11497                 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11498                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11499                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11500                 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11501                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11502                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11503                 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11504                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11505                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11506                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11507                         ))?;
11508                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11509                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11510                         funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11511                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11512                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11513                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11514                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11515                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11516                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11517                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11518                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11519                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11520                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11521                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11522                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11523                                         }
11524                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11525                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11526                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11527                                         }
11528                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11529                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11530                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11531                                         }
11532                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11533                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11534                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11535                                         }
11536                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11537                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11538                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11539                                         }
11540                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11541                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11542                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11543                                                 });
11544                                         }
11545                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11546                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11547                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11548                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11549                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11550                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11551                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11552                                                 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11553                                         }, None));
11554                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11555                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
11556                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11557                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11558                                                 }
11559                                                 if !found_htlc {
11560                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11561                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11562                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11563                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11564                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11565                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11566                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11567                                                         log_info!(logger,
11568                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11569                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11570                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11571                                                 }
11572                                         }
11573                                 } else {
11574                                         channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11575                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11576                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11577                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11578                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11579                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11580                                         }
11581                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11582                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11583                                         }
11584                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11585                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11586                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11587                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11588                                                 },
11589                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11590                                                         let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11591                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11592                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
11593                                                 }
11594                                         }
11595                                 }
11596                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11597                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11598                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11599                                 // safely discard the channel.
11600                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11601                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11602                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11603                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11604                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11605                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11606                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11607                                         channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11608                                 }, None));
11609                         } else {
11610                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11611                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11612                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11613                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11614                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11615                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11616                         }
11617                 }
11618
11619                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11620                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11621                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11622                                 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11623                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11624                                         &channel_id);
11625                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11626                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11627                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
11628                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11629                                         channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11630                                 };
11631                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11632                         }
11633                 }
11634
11635                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11636                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11637                 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11638                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11639                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11640                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11641                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11642                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11643                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11644                         }
11645                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11646                 }
11647
11648                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11649                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11650                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11651                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11652                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11653                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11654                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11655                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11656                         }
11657                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11658                 }
11659
11660                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11661                         PeerState {
11662                                 channel_by_id,
11663                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11664                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11665                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11666                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11667                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11668                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11669                                 is_connected: false,
11670                         }
11671                 };
11672
11673                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11674                 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11675                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11676                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11677                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11678                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11679                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11680                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11681                 }
11682
11683                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11684                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11685                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11686                 for _ in 0..event_count {
11687                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11688                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11689                                 None => continue,
11690                         }
11691                 }
11692
11693                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11694                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11695                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11696                                 0 => {
11697                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11698                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11699                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
11700                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11701                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11702                                 }
11703                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11704                         }
11705                 }
11706
11707                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11708                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11709
11710                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11711                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11712                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11713                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11714                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11715                         }
11716                 }
11717
11718                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11719                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11720                         hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11721                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11722                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11723                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11724                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11725                         };
11726                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11727                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11728                         };
11729                 }
11730
11731                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11732                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11733                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11734                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11735                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11736                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11737                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11738                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11739                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11740                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11741                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11742                 let mut events_override = None;
11743                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11744                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11745                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11746                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11747                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11748                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11749                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11750                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11751                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11752                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11753                         (8, events_override, option),
11754                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11755                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11756                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11757                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11758                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11759                 });
11760                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11761                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11762                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11763                 }
11764
11765                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11766                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11767                 }
11768
11769                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11770                         pending_events_read = events;
11771                 }
11772
11773                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11774                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11775                 }
11776
11777                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11778                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11779                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11780                         let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11781                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11782                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11783                         }
11784                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11785                 }
11786                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11787                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11788                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11789                 };
11790
11791                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11792                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11793                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11794                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11795                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11796                 //
11797                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11798                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11799                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11800                 //
11801                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11802                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11803                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11804                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11805                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11806                         ) => { {
11807                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11808                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11809                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11810                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11811                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11812                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11813                                         pending_background_events.push(
11814                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11815                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11816                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11817                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11818                                                         update: update.clone(),
11819                                                 });
11820                                 }
11821                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11822                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11823                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11824                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11825                                         pending_background_events.push(
11826                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11827                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11828                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11829                                                 });
11830                                 }
11831                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11832                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11833                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11834                                 }
11835                                 max_in_flight_update_id
11836                         } }
11837                 }
11838
11839                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11840                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11841                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11842                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11843                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11844                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11845
11846                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11847                                         // discarded.
11848                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11849                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11850                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11851                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11852                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11853                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11854                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11855                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11856                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11857                                                 }
11858                                         }
11859                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11860                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11861                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11862                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11863                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11864                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11865                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11866                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11867                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11868                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11869                                                 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11870                                         }
11871                                 } else {
11872                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11873                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11874                                         debug_assert!(false);
11875                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11876                                 }
11877                         }
11878                 }
11879
11880                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11881                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11882                                 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11883                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11884                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11885                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11886                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11887                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11888                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11889                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11890                                         });
11891                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11892                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11893                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11894                                 } else {
11895                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11896                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11897                                                 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11898                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11899                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11900                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11901                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11902                                         log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11903                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11904                                 }
11905                         }
11906                 }
11907
11908                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11909                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11910
11911                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11912                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11913                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11914                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11915
11916                 {
11917                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11918                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11919                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11920                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11921                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11922                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11923                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11924                         // 0.0.102+
11925                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11926                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11927                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11928                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11929                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11930                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11931                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
11932                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11933                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11934                                                         }
11935
11936                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11937                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11938                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11939                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11940                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11941                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11942                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11943                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11944                                                                 },
11945                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11946                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11947                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11948                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
11949                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11950                                                                                 payment_params: None,
11951                                                                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11952                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11953                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11954                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11955                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11956                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11957                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11958                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11959                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
11960                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11961                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11962                                                                         });
11963                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11964                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11965                                                                 }
11966                                                         }
11967                                                 }
11968                                         }
11969                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11970                                                 match htlc_source {
11971                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11972                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11973                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11974                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11975                                                                 };
11976                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11977                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11978                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11979                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11980                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11981                                                                 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11982                                                                         update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11983                                                                                 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11984                                                                                         update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11985                                                                                 if matches {
11986                                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11987                                                                                                 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11988                                                                                 }
11989                                                                                 !matches
11990                                                                         });
11991                                                                         !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11992                                                                 });
11993                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11994                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
11995                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11996                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11997                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11998                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11999                                                                                                 false
12000                                                                                         } else { true }
12001                                                                                 } else { true }
12002                                                                         });
12003                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
12004                                                                 });
12005                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
12006                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
12007                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12008                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12009                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
12010                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
12011                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
12012                                                                                         } else { true }
12013                                                                                 });
12014                                                                                 false
12015                                                                         } else { true }
12016                                                                 });
12017                                                         },
12018                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
12019                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
12020                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
12021                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
12022                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
12023                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
12024                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
12025                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
12026                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
12027                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
12028                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
12029                                                                         let compl_action =
12030                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
12031                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
12032                                                                                         channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
12033                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
12034                                                                                 };
12035                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
12036                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
12037                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
12038                                                                 }
12039                                                         },
12040                                                 }
12041                                         }
12042                                 }
12043
12044                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12045                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12046                                 // payments.
12047                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12048                                         .into_iter()
12049                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12050                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12051                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12052                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12053                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12054                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12055                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12056                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12057                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12058                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12059                                                         } else { None }
12060                                                 } else {
12061                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12062                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12063                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12064                                                         // channel still live case here.
12065                                                         None
12066                                                 }
12067                                         });
12068                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12069                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12070                                 }
12071                         }
12072                 }
12073
12074                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12075                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12076                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12077                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12078                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12079                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12080                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12081                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12082                         }, None));
12083                 }
12084
12085                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12086                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12087
12088                 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12089                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12090                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12091                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12092                         }
12093                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12094                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12095                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12096                                 }
12097                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12098                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12099                                 {
12100                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12101                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12102                                         });
12103                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12104                                 }
12105                         } else {
12106                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12107                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12108                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12109                                         });
12110                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12111                                 }
12112                         }
12113                 } else {
12114                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12115                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12116                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12117                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12118                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12119                                 }
12120                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12121                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
12122                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12123                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
12124                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12125                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12126                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12127                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12128                                                                                 Err(()) => {
12129                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12130                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12131                                                                                 }
12132                                                                         }
12133                                                                 },
12134                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12135                                                         }
12136                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12137                                         },
12138                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12139                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12140                                 };
12141                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12142                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12143                                 });
12144                         }
12145                 }
12146
12147                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12148                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12149
12150                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12151                         Ok(key) => key,
12152                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12153                 };
12154                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12155                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12156                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12157                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12158                         }
12159                 }
12160
12161                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12162                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12163                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12164                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12165                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12166                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12167                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
12168                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12169                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12170                                                 loop {
12171                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12172                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12173                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12174                                                 }
12175                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12176                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12177                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12178                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12179                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12180                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12181                                         }
12182                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
12183                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12184                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12185                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12186                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12187                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12188                                                 }
12189                                         }
12190                                 } else {
12191                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12192                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12193                                         debug_assert!(false);
12194                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12195                                 }
12196                         }
12197                 }
12198
12199                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12200
12201                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12202                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12203                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12204                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12205                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12206                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12207                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12208                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12209                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12210                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12211                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12212                                         }
12213                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12214                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12215
12216                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12217                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12218                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12219                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12220                                                 //
12221                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12222                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12223                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12224                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12225                                                 // reason to.
12226                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12227                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12228                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12229                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12230                                                 // restart.
12231                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12232                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12233                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12234                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12235                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12236                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12237                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
12238                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12239                                                         }
12240                                                 }
12241                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12242                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12243                                                 }
12244                                         }
12245                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12246                                                 receiver_node_id,
12247                                                 payment_hash,
12248                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
12249                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12250                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12251                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12252                                         }, None));
12253                                 }
12254                         }
12255                 }
12256
12257                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12258                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12259                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12260                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
12261                                         for action in actions.iter() {
12262                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12263                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12264                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12265                                                 } = action {
12266                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12267                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
12268                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12269                                                                         blocked_channel_id);
12270                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12271                                                                         .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12272                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12273                                                         } else {
12274                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12275                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12276                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12277                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12278                                                                 // anymore.
12279                                                         }
12280                                                 }
12281                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12282                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12283                                                 }
12284                                         }
12285                                 }
12286                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12287                         } else {
12288                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12289                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12290                         }
12291                 }
12292
12293                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12294                         chain_hash,
12295                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12296                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12297                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12298                         router: args.router,
12299
12300                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12301
12302                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12303                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12304                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12305                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12306
12307                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12308                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12309                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12310                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12311                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12312                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12313                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12314
12315                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12316
12317                         our_network_pubkey,
12318                         secp_ctx,
12319
12320                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12321
12322                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12323
12324                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12325                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12326                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12327                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12328                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12329
12330                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12331                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12332
12333                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12334
12335                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12336
12337                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12338
12339                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12340                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
12341                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12342
12343                         logger: args.logger,
12344                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
12345                 };
12346
12347                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12348                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12349                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12350                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12351                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12352                 }
12353
12354                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12355                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12356                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12357                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12358                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12359                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12360                                 downstream_channel_id, None
12361                         );
12362                 }
12363
12364                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12365                 //connection or two.
12366
12367                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12368         }
12369 }
12370
12371 #[cfg(test)]
12372 mod tests {
12373         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12374         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12375         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12376         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12377         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12378         use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12379         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12380         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12381         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12382         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12383         use crate::prelude::*;
12384         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12385         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12386         use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12387         use crate::util::test_utils;
12388         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12389         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12390
12391         #[test]
12392         fn test_notify_limits() {
12393                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12394                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12395                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12396                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12397                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12398                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12399
12400                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12401                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12402                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12403                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12404                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12405
12406                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12407
12408                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12409                 // to connect messages with new values
12410                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12411                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12412                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12413                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12414                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12415                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12416
12417                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12418                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12419                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12420                 // ... but the last node should not.
12421                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12422                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12423                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12424                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12425
12426                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12427                 // about the channel.
12428                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12429                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12430                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12431
12432                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12433                 // parties.
12434                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12435                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12436                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12437                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12438                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12439                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12440
12441                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12442                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12443                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12444
12445                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12446                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12447                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12448                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12449                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12450                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12451
12452                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12453                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12454                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12455                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12456                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12457                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12458                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12459                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12460
12461                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12462                 // the channel info has updated.
12463                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12464                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12465                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12466                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12467                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12468                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12469         }
12470
12471         #[test]
12472         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12473                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12474                 // expected.
12475                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12476                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12477                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12478                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12479                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12480
12481                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12482                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12483                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12484                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12485
12486                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12487                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12488                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12489                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12490                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12491                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12492                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12493                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12495                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12496                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12497                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12498
12499                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12500                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12501                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12502                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12503                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12504                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12505                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12506                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12507                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12508                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12509                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12510                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12511                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12512                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12513                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12514                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12515                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12516                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12517                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12518                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12519                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12520                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12521                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12522
12523                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12524                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12525                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12526                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12527                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12528                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12529                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12530
12531                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12532                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12533                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12534                 // lightning messages manually.
12535                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12536                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12537                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12538
12539                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12540                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12541                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12542                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12543                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12544                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12545                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12547                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12548                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12549                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12550                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12551                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12552                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12553                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12554                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12555                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12556                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12557                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12558                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12559                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12560                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12561                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12562                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12563                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12564                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12565
12566                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12567                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12568                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12569                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12570                 match events[0] {
12571                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12572                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12573                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12574                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12575                         },
12576                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12577                 }
12578                 match events[1] {
12579                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12580                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12581                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12582                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12583                         },
12584                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12585                 }
12586         }
12587
12588         #[test]
12589         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12590                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12591                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12592         }
12593
12594         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12595                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12596                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12597                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12598                 //      fails as expected.
12599                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12600                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12601                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12602                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12603                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12604                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12605                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12606                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12607                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12608                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12609                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12610                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12611                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12612                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12613                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12614
12615                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12616                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12617                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12618
12619                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12620                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12621                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12622                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12623                 let route = find_route(
12624                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12625                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12626                 ).unwrap();
12627                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12628                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12629                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12630                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12631                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12632                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12633                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12634                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12635                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12636                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12637                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12638                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12639                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12640                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12641                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12642                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12643                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12644                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12645                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12646                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12647                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12648                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12649                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12650                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12651
12652                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12653                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12654
12655                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12656                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12657                 let route = find_route(
12658                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12659                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12660                 ).unwrap();
12661                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12662                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12663                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12664                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12665                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12666                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12667                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12668                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12669
12670                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12671                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12672                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12673                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12674                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12675                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12676                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12677                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12678                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12679                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12680                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12681                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12682                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12683                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12684                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12685                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12686                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12687                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12688                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12689                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12690                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12691                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12692                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12693                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12694
12695                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12696                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12697
12698                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12699                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12700                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12701                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12702                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12703                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12704                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12705                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12706                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12707                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12708
12709                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12710                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12711                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12712                         100_000
12713                 );
12714                 let route = find_route(
12715                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12716                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12717                 ).unwrap();
12718                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12719                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12720                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12721                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12722                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12723                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12724                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12725                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12726                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12728                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12729                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12730                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12731                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12732                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12733                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12734                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12735                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12736                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12737                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12738                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12739                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12740                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12741
12742                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12743                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12744         }
12745
12746         #[test]
12747         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12748                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12749                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12750                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12751                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12752                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12753                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12754
12755                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12756                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12757
12758                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12759                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12760                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12761                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12762                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12763                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12764                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12765                 let route = find_route(
12766                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12767                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12768                 ).unwrap();
12769
12770                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12771                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12772                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12773                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12774                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12775                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12776                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12777
12778                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12779                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12780                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12781                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12782                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12783                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12784                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12785
12786                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12787         }
12788
12789         #[test]
12790         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12791                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12792                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12793                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12794                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12795                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12796                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12797                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12798                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12799
12800                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12801                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12802
12803                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12804                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12805                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12806                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12807                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12808                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12809                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12810                 let route = find_route(
12811                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12812                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12813                 ).unwrap();
12814
12815                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12816                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12817                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12818                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12819                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12820                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12821                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12822                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12823                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12824
12825                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12826                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12827                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12828                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12829                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12830                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12831                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12832
12833                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12834         }
12835
12836         #[test]
12837         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12838                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12839                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12840                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12841                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12842
12843                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12844                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12845                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12846                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12847
12848                 // Marshall an MPP route.
12849                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12850                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12851                 route.paths.push(path);
12852                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12853                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12854                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12855                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12856                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12857                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12858
12859                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12860                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12861                 .unwrap_err() {
12862                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12863                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12864                         },
12865                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12866                 }
12867         }
12868
12869         #[test]
12870         fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12871                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12872                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12873                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12874                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12875
12876                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12877
12878                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12879                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12880                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12881
12882                 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12883                 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12884                 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12885
12886                 {
12887                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12888                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12889                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12890                 }
12891
12892                 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12893                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12894                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12895
12896                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12897                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12898
12899                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12900                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12901
12902                 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12903                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12904                         features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12905                 }, true).unwrap();
12906                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12907                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12908                 }, false).unwrap();
12909
12910                 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12911                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12912                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12913                 match &node_0_events[0] {
12914                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12915                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12916                 }
12917                 {
12918                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12919                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12920                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12921                 }
12922         }
12923
12924         #[test]
12925         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12926                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12927                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12928                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12929                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12930
12931                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12932
12933                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12934                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12935
12936                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12937                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12938                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12939                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12940
12941                 {
12942                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12943                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12944                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12945                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12946                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12947                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12948                 }
12949
12950                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12951
12952                 {
12953                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12954                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12955                 }
12956         }
12957
12958         #[test]
12959         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12960                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12961                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12962                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12963                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12964                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12965
12966                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12967                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12968                         payment_secret,
12969                         total_msat: 100_000,
12970                 };
12971
12972                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12973                 // payment verification fails as expected.
12974                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12975                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12976                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12977                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12978                         Err(()) => {
12979                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12980                         }
12981                 }
12982
12983                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12984                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12985         }
12986
12987         #[test]
12988         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12989                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12990                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12991                 // the channel is successfully closed.
12992                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12993                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12994                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12995                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12996
12997                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12998                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12999                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
13000                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13001                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13002
13003                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
13004                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
13005                 {
13006                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
13007                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
13008                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13009                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13010                 }
13011
13012                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13013                 {
13014                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
13015                         // as it has the funding transaction.
13016                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13017                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13018                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13019                 }
13020
13021                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13022
13023                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13024
13025                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13026                 {
13027                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13028                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13029                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13030                 }
13031                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13032
13033                 {
13034                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
13035                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
13036                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13037                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13038                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13039                 }
13040                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13041                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13042                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13043                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13044                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13045                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13046                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13047                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13048
13049                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13050                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13051                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13052                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13053
13054                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13055                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13056                 {
13057                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13058                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13059                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13060                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13061                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13062                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13063                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13064                 }
13065
13066                 {
13067                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13068                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13069                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13070                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13071                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13072                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13073                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13074                 }
13075
13076                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13077                 {
13078                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13079                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13080                         // closing transaction).
13081                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13082                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13083                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13084
13085                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13086                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13087                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13088                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13089                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13090                 }
13091
13092                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13093
13094                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13095                 {
13096                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13097                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13098                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13099                 }
13100                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13101
13102                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13103                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13104         }
13105
13106         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13107                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13108                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13109         }
13110
13111         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13112                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13113                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13114         }
13115
13116         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13117                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13118                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13119         }
13120
13121         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13122                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13123                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13124         }
13125
13126         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13127                 match res_err {
13128                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13129                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13130                         },
13131                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13132                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13133                         },
13134                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13135                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13136                 }
13137         }
13138
13139         #[test]
13140         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13141                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13142                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13143                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13144                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13145                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13146                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13147                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13148
13149                 // Dummy values
13150                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13151                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13152                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13153
13154                 // Test the API functions.
13155                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13156
13157                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13158
13159                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13160
13161                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13162
13163                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13164
13165                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13166
13167                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13168         }
13169
13170         #[test]
13171         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13172                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13173                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13174                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13175                 // the given `channel_id`.
13176                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13177                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13178                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13179                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13180
13181                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13182
13183                 // Dummy values
13184                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13185
13186                 // Test the API functions.
13187                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13188
13189                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13190
13191                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13192
13193                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13194
13195                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13196
13197                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13198         }
13199
13200         #[test]
13201         fn test_connection_limiting() {
13202                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13203                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13204                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13205                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13206                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13207
13208                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13209
13210                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13211                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13212
13213                 let mut funding_tx = None;
13214                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13215                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13216                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13217
13218                         if idx == 0 {
13219                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13220                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13221                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13222                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13223                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13224
13225                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13226                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13227                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13228
13229                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13230
13231                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13232                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13233                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13234                         }
13235                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13236                 }
13237
13238                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13239                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13240                         &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13241                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13242                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13243                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13244
13245                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13246                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13247                 // limit.
13248                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13249                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13250                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13251                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13252                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13253                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13254                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13255                         }, true).unwrap();
13256                 }
13257                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13258                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13259                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13260                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13261                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13262
13263                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13264                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13265                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13266                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13267                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13268                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13269                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13270                 }
13271                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13272                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13273                 }, true).unwrap();
13274                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13275                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13276                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13277
13278                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13279                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13280                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13281                 }, false).unwrap();
13282                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13283
13284                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13285                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13286                 // open channels.
13287                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13288                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13289                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13290                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13291                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13292                 }
13293                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13294                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13295                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13296
13297                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13298                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13299                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13300
13301                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13302                 // "protected" and can connect again.
13303                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13304                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13305                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13306                 }, true).unwrap();
13307                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13308
13309                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13310                 // last_random_pk.
13311                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13312                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13313         }
13314
13315         #[test]
13316         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13317                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13318                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13319                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13320                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13321                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13322
13323                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13324
13325                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13326                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13327
13328                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13329                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13330                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13331                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13332                 }
13333
13334                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13335                 // rejected.
13336                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13337                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13338                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13339
13340                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13341                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13342                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13343
13344                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13345                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13346                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13347                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13348         }
13349
13350         #[test]
13351         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13352                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13353                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13354                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13355                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13356                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13357                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13358                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13359                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13360
13361                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13362
13363                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13364                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13365
13366                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13367                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13368                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13369                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13370                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13371                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13372                         }, true).unwrap();
13373
13374                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13375                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13376                         match events[0] {
13377                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13378                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13379                                 }
13380                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13381                         }
13382                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13383                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13384                 }
13385
13386                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13387                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13388                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13389                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13390                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13391                 }, true).unwrap();
13392                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13393                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13394                 match events[0] {
13395                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13396                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13397                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13398                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13399                                         _ => panic!(),
13400                                 }
13401                         }
13402                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13403                 }
13404                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13405                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13406
13407                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13408                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13409                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13410                 match events[0] {
13411                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13412                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13413                         }
13414                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13415                 }
13416                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13417         }
13418
13419         #[test]
13420         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13421                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13422                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13423                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13424                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13425                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13426                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13427                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13428                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13429                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13430                         payment_metadata: None,
13431                         keysend_preimage: None,
13432                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13433                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13434                         }),
13435                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13436                 };
13437                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13438                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13439                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13440                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13441                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13442                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13443                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13444                 {
13445                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13446                 } else { panic!(); }
13447
13448                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13449                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13450                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13451                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13452                         payment_metadata: None,
13453                         keysend_preimage: None,
13454                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13455                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13456                         }),
13457                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13458                 };
13459                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13460                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13461                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13462                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13463         }
13464
13465         #[test]
13466         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13467                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13468                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13469                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13470                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13471
13472                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13473                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13474                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13475                         cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13476                         payment_metadata: None,
13477                         keysend_preimage: None,
13478                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13479                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13480                         }),
13481                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13482                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13483                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13484
13485                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13486                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13487                 // is not satisfied.
13488                 assert!(result.is_ok());
13489         }
13490
13491         #[test]
13492         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13493                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13494                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13495                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13496                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13497
13498                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13499                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13500
13501                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13502                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13503                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13504                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13505                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13506
13507                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13508                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13509
13510                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13511                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13512                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13513                 match &msg_events[0] {
13514                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13515                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13516                                 match action {
13517                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13518                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13519                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13520                                 }
13521                         }
13522                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13523                 }
13524
13525                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13526                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13527                 match events[0] {
13528                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13529                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13530                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13531                 }
13532                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13533         }
13534
13535         #[test]
13536         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13537                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13538                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13539                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13540                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13541                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13542                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13543                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13544                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13545                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13546                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13547
13548                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13549                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13550                 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13551
13552                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13553                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13554                 match events[0] {
13555                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13556                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13557                         }
13558                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13559                 }
13560
13561                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13562                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13563
13564                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13565                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13566
13567                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13568                 // not have generated any events.
13569                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13570         }
13571
13572         #[test]
13573         fn test_update_channel_config() {
13574                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13575                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13576                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13577                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13578                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13579                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13580                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13581
13582                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13583                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13584                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13585
13586                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13587                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13588                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13589                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13590                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13591                 match &events[0] {
13592                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13593                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13594                 }
13595
13596                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13597                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13598                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13599
13600                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13601                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13602                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13603                         ..Default::default()
13604                 }).unwrap();
13605                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13606                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13607                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13608                 match &events[0] {
13609                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13610                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13611                 }
13612
13613                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13614                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13615                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13616                         ..Default::default()
13617                 }).unwrap();
13618                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13619                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13620                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13621                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13622                 match &events[0] {
13623                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13624                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13625                 }
13626
13627                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13628                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13629                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13630                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13631                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13632                 assert!(
13633                         matches!(
13634                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13635                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13636                                         ..Default::default()
13637                                 }),
13638                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13639                         )
13640                 );
13641                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13642                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13643                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13644                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13645         }
13646
13647         #[test]
13648         fn test_payment_display() {
13649                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13650                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13651                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13652                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13653                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13654                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13655         }
13656
13657         #[test]
13658         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13659                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13660                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13661                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13662                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13663                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13664
13665                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13666                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13667                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13668                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13669                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13670                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13671                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13672                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13673                 {
13674                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13675                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13676                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13677                 }
13678
13679                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13680                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13681                 // their side.
13682                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13683                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13684                 }, true).unwrap();
13685                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13686                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13687                 }, false).unwrap();
13688                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13689                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13690                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13691                 );
13692                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13693
13694                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13695                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13696                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13697                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13698                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13699                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13700                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13701                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13702                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13703                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13704                 } else { panic!() };
13705                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13706                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13707                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13708                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13709                 };
13710                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13711                 {
13712                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13713                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13714                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13715                 }
13716         }
13717
13718         #[test]
13719         fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13720                 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13721                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13722                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13723                 let persister;
13724                 let chain_monitor;
13725                 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13726                 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13727                 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13728
13729                 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13730                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13731                 };
13732                 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13733                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13734                 };
13735
13736                 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13737                         if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13738                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13739                         } else {
13740                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13741                         }
13742                 }).collect();
13743
13744                 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13745                         if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13746                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13747                         } else {
13748                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13749                         }
13750                 }).collect();
13751
13752
13753                 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13754                 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13755                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13756                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13757
13758                 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13759                 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13760                 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13761
13762                 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13763
13764                 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13765                 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13766                         let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13767                         assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13768                 }
13769                 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13770                 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13771
13772                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13773         }
13774 }
13775
13776 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
13777 pub mod bench {
13778         use crate::chain::Listen;
13779         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13780         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13781         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13782         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13783         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13784         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13785         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13786         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13787         use crate::util::test_utils;
13788         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13789
13790         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13791         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13792         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13793         use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13794
13795         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13796
13797         use criterion::Criterion;
13798
13799         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13800                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13801                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13802                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13803                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13804                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13805                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13806
13807         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13808                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13809         }
13810         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13811                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13812                 #[inline]
13813                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13814                 #[inline]
13815                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13816         }
13817
13818         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13819                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13820         }
13821
13822         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13823                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13824                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13825                 // calls per node.
13826                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13827                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13828
13829                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13830                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13831                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13832                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13833                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13834
13835                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13836                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13837                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13838
13839                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13840                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13841                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13842                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13843                         network,
13844                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13845                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13846                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13847
13848                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13849                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13850                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13851                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13852                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13853                         network,
13854                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13855                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13856                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13857
13858                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13859                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13860                 }, true).unwrap();
13861                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13862                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13863                 }, false).unwrap();
13864                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13865                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13866                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13867
13868                 let tx;
13869                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13870                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13871                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13872                         }]};
13873                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13874                 } else { panic!(); }
13875
13876                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13877                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13878                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13879                 match events_b[0] {
13880                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13881                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13882                         },
13883                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13884                 }
13885
13886                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13887                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13888                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13889                 match events_a[0] {
13890                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13891                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13892                         },
13893                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13894                 }
13895
13896                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13897
13898                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13899                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13900                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13901
13902                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13903                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13904                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13905                 match msg_events[0] {
13906                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13907                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13908                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13909                         },
13910                         _ => panic!(),
13911                 }
13912                 match msg_events[1] {
13913                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13914                         _ => panic!(),
13915                 }
13916
13917                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13918                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13919                 match events_a[0] {
13920                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13921                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13922                         },
13923                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13924                 }
13925
13926                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13927                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13928                 match events_b[0] {
13929                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13930                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13931                         },
13932                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13933                 }
13934
13935                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13936                 macro_rules! send_payment {
13937                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13938                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13939                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13940                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13941                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13942                                 payment_count += 1;
13943                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13944                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13945
13946                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13947                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13948                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13949                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13950                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13951                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13952                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13953                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13954                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13955                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13956                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13957
13958                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13959                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13960                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13961                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13962
13963                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13964                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13965                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13966                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13967                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13968                                         },
13969                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13970                                 }
13971
13972                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13973                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13974                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13975                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13976
13977                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13978                         }
13979                 }
13980
13981                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13982                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13983                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
13984                 }));
13985         }
13986 }