1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1118 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1119 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1120 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1121 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1123 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1124 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1125 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1126 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1127 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1128 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1129 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1130 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1131 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1133 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1134 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1135 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1137 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1139 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1140 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1141 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1143 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1144 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1145 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1146 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1148 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1149 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1150 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1152 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1153 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1154 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1155 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1156 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1158 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1159 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1160 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1161 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1162 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1163 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1164 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1165 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1168 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1169 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1170 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1171 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1172 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1176 // `pending_offers_messages`
1178 // `total_consistency_lock`
1180 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1182 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1184 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1186 // |__`per_peer_state`
1188 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1190 // |__`claimable_payments`
1192 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1196 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1198 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1200 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1204 // |__`pending_events`
1206 // |__`pending_background_events`
1208 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1219 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1220 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1221 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1227 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1229 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1231 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1234 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1235 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1236 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1237 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1239 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1240 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1242 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1243 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1244 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1245 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1246 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1247 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1248 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1249 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1251 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1253 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1256 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1258 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1259 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1260 /// and via the classic SCID.
1262 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1263 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1265 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1267 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1269 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1270 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1271 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1276 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1278 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1279 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1280 /// and via the classic SCID.
1282 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1283 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1288 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1289 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1291 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1294 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1295 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1296 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1297 /// active channel list on load.
1299 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1300 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1302 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1304 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1305 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1306 /// the handling of the events.
1308 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1309 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1312 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1313 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1314 /// would break backwards compatability.
1315 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1316 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1317 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1323 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1325 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1327 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1328 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1329 /// confirmation depth.
1331 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1333 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1335 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1337 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1339 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1341 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1343 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1345 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1346 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1347 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1349 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1350 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1352 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1353 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1354 /// keeping additional state.
1355 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1357 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1358 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1359 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1360 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1362 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1363 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1365 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1366 /// are currently open with that peer.
1368 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1369 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1372 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1374 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1375 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1376 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1377 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1378 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1380 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1381 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1382 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1383 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1384 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1386 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1387 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1389 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1390 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1391 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1392 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1393 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1395 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1396 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1398 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1399 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1400 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1401 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1402 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1404 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1406 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1408 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1409 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1410 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1411 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1412 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1413 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1414 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1415 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1416 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1417 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1418 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1420 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1421 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1422 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1424 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1426 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1427 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1429 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1433 signer_provider: SP,
1438 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1440 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1441 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1442 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1444 pub struct ChainParameters {
1445 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1446 pub network: Network,
1448 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1450 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1451 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1454 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1458 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1459 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1462 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1463 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1464 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1465 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1466 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1467 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1469 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1470 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1471 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1472 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1473 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1474 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1476 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1477 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1480 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1481 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1482 /// events to handle.
1484 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1485 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1487 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1488 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1491 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1492 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1493 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1494 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1496 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1497 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1498 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1499 should_persist: move || {
1500 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1501 // processing and return that.
1502 let notify = persist_check();
1503 match (notify, force_notify) {
1504 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1505 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1506 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1507 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1508 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1511 _read_guard: read_guard,
1515 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1516 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1517 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1518 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1519 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1520 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1522 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1523 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1524 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1525 should_persist: persist_check,
1526 _read_guard: read_guard,
1531 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1532 fn drop(&mut self) {
1533 match (self.should_persist)() {
1534 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1535 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1536 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1538 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1539 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1540 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1545 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1546 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1548 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1550 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1551 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1552 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1553 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1554 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1556 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1557 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1559 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1561 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1562 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1563 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1564 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1565 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1566 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1567 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1568 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1569 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1570 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1571 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1572 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1573 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1575 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1576 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1578 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1579 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1580 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1581 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1583 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1584 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1585 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1586 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1587 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1588 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1590 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1592 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1593 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1595 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1597 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1598 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1600 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1601 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1602 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1604 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1605 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1606 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1608 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1609 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1610 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1611 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1613 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1614 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1615 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1617 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1618 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1619 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1621 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1623 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1624 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1625 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1626 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1627 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1628 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1629 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1630 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1631 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1634 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1635 /// to better separate parameters.
1636 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1637 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1638 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1639 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1640 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1641 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1642 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1643 pub features: InitFeatures,
1644 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1645 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1646 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1648 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1650 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1651 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1652 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1653 /// payments to us through this channel.
1654 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1655 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1656 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1657 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1658 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1659 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1660 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1663 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1664 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1665 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1666 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1667 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1668 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1669 /// lifetime of the channel.
1670 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1671 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1672 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1673 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1674 /// our counterparty already.
1675 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1676 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1678 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1679 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1680 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1681 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1683 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1684 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1686 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1687 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1689 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1690 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1691 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1692 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1693 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1694 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1695 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1696 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1697 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1700 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1702 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1703 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1704 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1705 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1706 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1707 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1708 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1710 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1711 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1713 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1714 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1715 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1716 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1717 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1718 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1719 /// this value on chain.
1721 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1723 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1725 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1726 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1727 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1728 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1729 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1730 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1731 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1733 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1734 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1735 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1736 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1737 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1738 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1740 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1741 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1742 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1743 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1744 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1746 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1747 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1748 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1749 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1751 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1752 pub balance_msat: u64,
1753 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1754 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1755 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1756 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1758 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1760 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1761 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1762 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1763 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1764 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1765 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1766 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1767 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1769 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1770 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1771 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1772 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1773 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1774 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1775 /// route which is valid.
1776 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1777 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1778 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1779 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1780 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1781 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1783 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1784 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1785 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1786 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1787 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1788 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1789 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1790 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1791 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1793 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1795 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1796 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1797 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1798 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1799 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1801 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1802 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1803 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1804 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1805 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1806 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1807 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1809 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1810 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1811 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1812 pub is_outbound: bool,
1813 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1814 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1815 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1816 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1817 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1819 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1820 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1821 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1822 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1823 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1824 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1825 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1827 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1828 pub is_usable: bool,
1829 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1830 pub is_public: bool,
1831 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1832 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1833 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1834 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1835 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1836 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1838 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1839 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1840 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1842 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1843 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1844 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1846 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1847 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1850 impl ChannelDetails {
1851 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1852 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1853 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1855 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1856 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1857 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1858 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1861 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1862 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1863 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1865 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1866 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1867 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1868 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1871 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1872 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1873 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1877 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1879 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1880 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1881 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1883 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1884 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1885 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1886 features: latest_features,
1887 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1888 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1889 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1890 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1891 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1892 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1893 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1894 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1895 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1896 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1898 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1899 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1900 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1901 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1902 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1903 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1904 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1905 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1906 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1907 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1908 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1909 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1910 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1911 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1912 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1913 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1914 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1915 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1916 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1917 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1918 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1919 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1920 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1921 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1922 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1923 config: Some(context.config()),
1924 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1925 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1926 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1931 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1932 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1933 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1934 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1935 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1936 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1937 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1938 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1939 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1941 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1943 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1944 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1946 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1947 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1948 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1949 /// to drop the channel.
1953 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1954 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1955 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1956 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1957 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1959 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1960 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1961 payment_id: PaymentId,
1963 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1965 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1966 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1967 payment_id: PaymentId,
1968 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1970 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1971 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1972 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1975 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1976 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1977 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1979 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1980 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1981 payment_id: PaymentId,
1982 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1983 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1984 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1986 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1987 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1988 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1990 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1991 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1992 payment_id: PaymentId,
1993 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1994 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1998 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2000 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2002 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2003 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2004 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2005 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2007 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2008 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2009 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2012 macro_rules! handle_error {
2013 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2014 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2015 // entering the macro.
2016 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2017 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2021 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2022 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2024 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2025 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2026 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2027 let logger = WithContext::from(
2028 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2030 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2032 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2033 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2034 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2039 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2042 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2044 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2045 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2046 action: err.action.clone()
2050 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2051 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2052 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2053 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2058 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2065 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2066 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2067 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2068 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2070 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2071 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2072 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2074 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2075 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2076 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2077 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2078 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2080 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2081 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2083 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2087 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2088 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2089 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2091 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2092 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2094 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2095 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2097 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2098 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2099 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2100 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2101 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2102 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2104 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2109 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2110 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2112 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2113 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2115 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2116 match $channel_phase {
2117 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2118 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2120 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2121 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2123 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2124 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2126 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2127 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2128 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2130 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2131 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2132 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2138 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2139 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2143 let key = *$entry.key();
2144 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2146 $entry.remove_entry();
2154 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2155 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2159 let key = *$entry.key();
2160 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2162 $entry.remove_entry();
2170 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2171 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2173 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2174 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2180 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2181 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2182 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2183 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2184 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2186 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2187 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2188 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2189 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2190 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2191 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2192 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2193 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2194 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2195 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2200 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2201 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2202 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2203 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2204 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2205 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2206 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2207 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2208 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2209 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2211 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2216 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2217 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2218 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2219 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2220 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2221 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2222 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2223 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2224 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2226 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2231 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2232 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2233 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2234 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2235 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2236 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2237 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2238 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2239 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2240 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2241 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2242 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2244 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2245 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2246 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2252 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2253 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2255 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2256 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2257 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2258 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2259 updates.announcement_sigs);
2260 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2261 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2264 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2265 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2266 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2267 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2269 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2270 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2271 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2272 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2273 let mut batch_completed = false;
2274 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2275 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2276 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2277 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2279 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2280 channel_state.2 = true;
2282 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2284 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2286 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2289 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2290 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2291 if batch_completed {
2292 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2293 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2294 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2295 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2296 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2297 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2298 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2299 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2300 chan.set_batch_ready();
2301 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2302 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2306 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2307 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2308 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2313 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2315 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2316 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2318 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2319 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2321 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2322 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2323 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2324 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2329 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2330 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2331 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2332 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2334 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2335 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2336 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2337 panic!("{}", err_str);
2339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2340 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2341 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2350 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2351 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2352 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2354 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2355 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2356 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2357 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2358 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2359 // filter for uniqueness here.
2360 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2361 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2362 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2363 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2365 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2366 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2368 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2369 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2370 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2376 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2377 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2378 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2379 while !processed_all_events {
2380 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2387 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2388 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2389 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2391 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2392 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2393 result = $self.process_background_events();
2395 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2396 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2397 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2398 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2402 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2403 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2404 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2405 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2408 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2410 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2411 $event_to_handle = event;
2413 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2414 post_event_actions.push(action);
2419 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2420 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2421 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2422 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2423 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2424 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2427 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2428 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2429 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2430 processed_all_events = false;
2434 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2435 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2436 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2438 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2439 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2440 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2446 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2448 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2450 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2452 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2457 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2459 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2461 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2462 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2464 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2466 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2467 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2468 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2471 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2472 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2473 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2475 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2476 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2477 current_timestamp: u32,
2479 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2480 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2481 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2482 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2484 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2485 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2486 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2491 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2493 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2494 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2495 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2496 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2497 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2498 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2499 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2500 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2501 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2503 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2506 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2507 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2509 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2511 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2513 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2515 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2516 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2517 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2518 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2519 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2520 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2521 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2522 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2524 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2534 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2535 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2536 &self.default_configuration
2539 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2540 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2541 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2544 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2545 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2547 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2549 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2553 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2558 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2560 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2561 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2562 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2563 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2564 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2566 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2567 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2569 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2570 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2571 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2573 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2574 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2575 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2577 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2578 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2580 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2581 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2582 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2583 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2584 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2585 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2587 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2588 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2589 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2590 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2591 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2596 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2597 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2599 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2602 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2604 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2606 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2607 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2613 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2614 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2615 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2616 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2617 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2618 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2622 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2627 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2629 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2633 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2635 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2641 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2642 node_id: their_network_key,
2645 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2648 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2649 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2650 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2651 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2652 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2653 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2654 // the same channel.
2655 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2659 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2662 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2663 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2664 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2665 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2669 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2670 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2671 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2679 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2680 /// more information.
2681 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2682 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2683 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2684 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2685 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2686 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2687 // the same channel.
2688 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2690 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2692 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2695 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2696 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2697 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2705 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2706 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2708 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2709 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2711 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2712 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2713 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2714 // really wanted anyway.
2715 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2718 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2719 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2720 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2726 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2727 let context_to_details = |context| {
2728 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2730 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2732 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2733 .map(context_to_details)
2739 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2740 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2742 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2743 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2744 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2746 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2747 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2748 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2749 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2750 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2751 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2753 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2754 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2755 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2757 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2758 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2759 payment_id: *payment_id,
2760 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2761 total_msat: *total_msat,
2764 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2765 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2767 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2768 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2770 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2775 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2778 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2779 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2792 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2793 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2794 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2795 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2796 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2797 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2799 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2800 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2801 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2803 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2807 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2808 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2810 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2811 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2812 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2813 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2816 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2817 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2821 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2823 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2824 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2831 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2832 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2833 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2837 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2838 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2844 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2845 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2846 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2848 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2849 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2851 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2852 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2853 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2854 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2856 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2858 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2859 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2860 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2863 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2864 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2865 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2866 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2867 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2868 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2871 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2872 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2873 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2875 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2876 /// the channel being closed or not:
2877 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2878 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2879 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2880 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2881 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2882 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2883 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2885 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2886 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2887 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2888 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2890 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2892 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2893 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2894 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2897 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2898 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2899 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2900 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2901 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2904 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2905 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2906 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2907 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2908 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2911 let logger = WithContext::from(
2912 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2915 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2916 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2917 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2918 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2919 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2920 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2923 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2924 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2925 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2926 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2927 // ignore the result here.
2928 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2930 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2931 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2932 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2933 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2935 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2936 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2937 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2938 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2939 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2940 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2941 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2944 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2947 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2948 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2953 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2954 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2955 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2956 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2957 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2958 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2959 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2960 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2963 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2964 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2965 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2969 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2970 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2974 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2975 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2976 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2977 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2980 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2981 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2982 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2983 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2984 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2986 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2988 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2989 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2990 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2991 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2992 mem::drop(peer_state);
2993 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2995 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2996 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2997 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2999 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3000 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3001 // Unfunded channel has no update
3002 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3004 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3005 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3006 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3007 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3008 // Unfunded channel has no update
3009 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3012 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3013 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3014 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3015 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3017 (None, *peer_node_id)
3019 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3022 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3023 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3024 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3026 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3027 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3028 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3029 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3030 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3036 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3039 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3041 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3042 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3044 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3045 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3047 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3049 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3050 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3061 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3062 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3063 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3065 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3066 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3067 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3070 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3071 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3072 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3074 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3075 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3076 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3077 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3078 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3081 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3082 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3083 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3084 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3085 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3089 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3090 /// local transaction(s).
3091 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3092 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3093 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3097 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3098 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3099 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3100 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3101 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3102 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3103 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3104 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3106 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3107 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3108 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3109 // we don't have the channel here.
3110 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3114 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3115 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3116 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3117 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3118 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3119 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3120 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3121 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3122 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3123 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3124 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3126 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3129 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3130 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3131 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3133 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3134 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3135 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3141 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3142 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3143 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3144 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3146 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3147 None => return None,
3148 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3151 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3152 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3155 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3156 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3157 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3158 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3161 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3165 fn can_forward_htlc(
3166 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3167 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3168 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3169 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3172 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3174 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3175 // intercept forward.
3176 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3177 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3178 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3180 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3185 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3186 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3187 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3189 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3190 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3192 if err_code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3193 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3194 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3195 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3196 return Err((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None));
3198 let chan_update_opt = if err_code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3199 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3205 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3206 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3207 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3208 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3209 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3210 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3211 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3212 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3213 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3215 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3216 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3218 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3219 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3220 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3222 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3223 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3224 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3225 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3226 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3227 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3228 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3230 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3234 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3235 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3237 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3238 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3239 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3240 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3241 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3242 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3243 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3247 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3248 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3250 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3252 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3253 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3254 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3255 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3256 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3260 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3261 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3263 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3265 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3266 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3269 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3270 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3271 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3272 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3275 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3276 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3277 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3278 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3279 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3280 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3281 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3285 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3288 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3289 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3290 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3291 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3292 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3293 macro_rules! return_err {
3294 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3296 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3297 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3298 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3299 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3300 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3301 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3302 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3303 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3304 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3308 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3309 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3310 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3311 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3312 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3318 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3320 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3321 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3322 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3323 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3326 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3327 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3328 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3329 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3330 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3332 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3335 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3336 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3337 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3338 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3339 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3345 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3346 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3347 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3349 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3350 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3351 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3353 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3354 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3355 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3356 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3357 return Err(LightningError {
3358 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3362 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3363 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3365 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3366 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3367 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3370 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3371 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3372 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3373 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3375 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3376 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3377 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3379 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3380 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3381 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3382 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3383 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3384 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3385 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3389 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3392 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3393 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3394 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3395 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3397 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3398 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3399 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3400 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3401 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3404 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3405 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3407 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3408 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3409 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3410 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3411 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3412 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3413 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3414 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3416 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3417 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3418 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3420 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3422 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3429 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3430 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3431 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3432 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3437 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3438 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3439 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3442 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3443 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3444 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3445 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3447 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3448 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3449 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3451 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3452 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3456 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3457 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3459 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3460 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3461 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3463 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3466 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3468 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3469 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3471 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3472 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3473 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3476 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3477 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3478 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3479 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3480 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3482 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3483 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3484 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3485 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3487 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3488 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3490 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3491 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3492 Some(monitor_update) => {
3493 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3495 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3496 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3497 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3498 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3499 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3500 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3501 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3509 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3512 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3513 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3514 // `channel_by_id` map.
3515 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3516 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3520 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3521 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3523 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3528 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3530 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3531 /// fields for more info.
3533 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3534 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3536 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3538 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3539 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3540 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3541 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3542 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3544 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3545 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3546 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3547 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3548 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3550 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3551 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3552 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3553 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3555 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3557 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3558 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3559 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3561 /// In general, a path may raise:
3562 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3563 /// node public key) is specified.
3564 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3565 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3566 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3567 /// relevant updates.
3569 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3570 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3571 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3573 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3574 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3575 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3576 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3577 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3578 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3579 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3580 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3582 self.pending_outbound_payments
3583 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3584 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3585 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3588 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3589 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3590 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3591 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3593 self.pending_outbound_payments
3594 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3595 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3596 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3597 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3601 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3602 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3604 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3605 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3606 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3610 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3611 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3612 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3616 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3617 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3620 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3621 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3623 self.pending_outbound_payments
3624 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3625 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3626 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3627 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3628 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3632 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3633 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3634 /// retries are exhausted.
3636 /// # Event Generation
3638 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3639 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3641 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3642 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3643 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3645 /// # Requested Invoices
3647 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3648 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3649 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3650 /// once the invoice has been received.
3652 /// # Restart Behavior
3654 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3655 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3656 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3658 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3659 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3661 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3664 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3665 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3666 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3667 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3668 /// never reach the recipient.
3670 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3671 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3673 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3674 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3676 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3677 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3678 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3680 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3681 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3682 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3685 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3686 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3688 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3691 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3692 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3693 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3695 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3696 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3697 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3698 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3701 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3702 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3703 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3704 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3705 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3707 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3708 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3709 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3712 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3715 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3716 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3719 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3720 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3722 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3723 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3724 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3725 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3726 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3727 let payment_params =
3728 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3730 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3732 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3735 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3736 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3738 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3739 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3740 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3741 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3743 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3744 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3745 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3746 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3747 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3748 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3749 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3750 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3751 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3752 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3754 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3755 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3756 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3757 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3761 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3763 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3764 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3767 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3769 let mut res = Vec::new();
3771 for mut path in route.paths {
3772 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3773 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3774 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3775 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3776 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3779 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3782 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3783 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3785 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3787 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3788 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3793 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3796 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3801 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3802 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3803 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3805 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3806 let used_liquidity =
3807 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3809 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3810 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3812 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3815 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3820 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3821 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3822 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3829 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3830 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3831 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3832 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3833 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3834 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3836 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3837 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3842 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3843 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3844 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3846 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3847 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3848 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3849 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3850 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3851 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3852 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3853 } else { unreachable!(); });
3855 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3856 Err((chan, err)) => {
3857 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3858 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3859 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3860 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3861 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3867 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3868 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3870 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3871 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3874 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3875 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3876 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3880 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3881 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3882 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3886 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3888 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3891 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3892 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3896 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3897 funding_txo, o.get()
3899 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3900 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3901 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3902 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3903 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3904 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3907 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3914 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3915 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3916 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3920 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3922 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3923 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3925 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3926 /// across the p2p network.
3928 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3929 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3931 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3932 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3933 /// keys per-channel).
3935 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3936 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3937 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3939 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3940 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3941 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3943 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3944 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3945 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3946 /// for more details.
3948 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3949 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3950 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3951 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3954 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3956 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3957 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3959 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3960 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3961 /// signature for each channel.
3963 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3964 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3966 let mut result = Ok(());
3968 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3969 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3970 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3971 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3972 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3977 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3978 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3979 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3983 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3984 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3985 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3986 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3987 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3988 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3989 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3990 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3992 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3993 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3998 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3999 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4000 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4001 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4005 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4006 match states.entry(txid) {
4007 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4008 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4009 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4013 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4016 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4017 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4018 temporary_channel_id,
4019 counterparty_node_id,
4020 funding_transaction.clone(),
4023 let mut output_index = None;
4024 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4025 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4026 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4027 if output_index.is_some() {
4028 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4029 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4032 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4035 if output_index.is_none() {
4036 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4037 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4040 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4041 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4042 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4043 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4044 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4045 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4051 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4052 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4053 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4054 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4055 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4056 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4057 .into_iter().flatten()
4058 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4060 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4061 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4063 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4066 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4067 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4068 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4069 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4071 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4072 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4073 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4077 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4078 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4079 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4085 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4087 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4088 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4089 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4090 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4092 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4093 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4095 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4096 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4098 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4100 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4101 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4102 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4103 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4104 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4105 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4106 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4107 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4108 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4109 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4110 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4111 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4112 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4118 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4119 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4122 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4123 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4124 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4125 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4129 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4130 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4131 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4132 config.apply(config_update);
4133 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4136 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4137 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4138 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4139 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4140 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4141 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4148 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4149 debug_assert!(false);
4150 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4152 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4153 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4160 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4162 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4163 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4164 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4165 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4167 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4168 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4170 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4171 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4173 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4175 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4176 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4177 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4178 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4179 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4180 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4181 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4182 pub fn update_channel_config(
4183 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4184 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4185 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4188 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4189 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4191 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4192 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4194 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4195 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4196 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4197 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4198 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4200 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4201 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4202 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4205 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4208 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4209 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4210 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4211 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4212 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4213 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4216 let next_hop_scid = {
4217 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4218 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4219 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4220 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4221 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4222 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4223 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4224 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4225 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4226 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4229 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4231 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4232 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4233 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4236 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4237 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4238 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4239 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4240 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4247 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4248 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4249 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4252 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4253 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4254 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4255 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4258 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4260 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4261 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4262 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4263 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4264 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4267 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4268 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4269 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4270 payment.prev_channel_id,
4271 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4272 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4274 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4278 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4279 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4281 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4284 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4285 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4288 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4289 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4290 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4293 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4294 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4295 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4296 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4297 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4298 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4299 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4300 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4301 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4302 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4305 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4306 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4307 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4308 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4313 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4315 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4316 /// Will likely generate further events.
4317 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4320 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4321 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4322 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4324 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4325 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4327 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4328 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4329 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4330 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4332 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4333 match forward_info {
4334 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4335 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4336 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4337 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4338 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4341 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4342 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4343 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4344 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4346 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4347 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4348 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4349 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4350 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4351 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4352 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4353 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4354 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4357 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4358 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4360 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4363 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4364 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4370 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4371 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4373 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4377 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4378 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4380 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4384 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4385 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4386 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4387 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4388 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4389 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4390 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4393 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4394 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4395 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4396 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4397 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4399 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4401 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4402 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4406 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4407 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4408 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4409 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4410 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4411 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4413 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4414 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4420 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4423 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4426 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4427 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4428 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4429 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4430 // problem, not ours.
4436 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4437 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4438 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4440 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4444 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4446 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4447 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4448 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4453 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4454 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4455 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4456 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4457 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4458 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4459 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4460 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4461 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4462 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4463 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4466 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4467 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4468 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4469 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4470 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4471 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4472 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4473 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4474 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4475 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4476 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4478 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4479 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4480 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4481 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4482 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4483 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4486 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4487 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4488 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4491 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4492 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4494 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4496 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4497 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4498 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4499 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4505 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4506 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4508 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4509 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4510 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4512 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4513 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4514 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4515 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4517 Some((res, htlc_id))
4520 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4521 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4522 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4523 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4525 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4527 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4528 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4529 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4535 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4539 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4540 match forward_info {
4541 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4542 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4543 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4544 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4545 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4548 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4549 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4550 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4551 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4552 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4554 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4555 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4556 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4557 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4558 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4560 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4561 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4562 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4564 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4565 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4569 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4570 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4573 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4576 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4577 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4578 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4579 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4580 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4581 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4582 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4583 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4584 phantom_shared_secret,
4587 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4588 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4589 // if routing nodes overpay
4590 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4591 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4593 total_value_received: None,
4594 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4597 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4600 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4602 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4603 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4604 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4605 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4606 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4607 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4609 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4610 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4611 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4612 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4613 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4614 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4615 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4616 phantom_shared_secret,
4619 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4620 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4622 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4625 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4626 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4627 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4628 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4629 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4632 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4633 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4634 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4635 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4636 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4637 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4639 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4640 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4641 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4643 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4644 .entry(payment_hash)
4645 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4646 .or_insert_with(|| {
4647 committed_to_claimable = true;
4649 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4652 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4653 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4655 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4657 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4659 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4661 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4662 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4663 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4666 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4668 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4669 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4670 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4671 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4672 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4673 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4674 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4676 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4677 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4679 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4681 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4682 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4683 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4684 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4685 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4686 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4688 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4689 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4690 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4691 committed_to_claimable = true;
4693 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4694 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4695 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4696 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4697 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4698 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4699 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4700 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4701 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4705 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4706 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4707 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4708 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4709 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4711 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4713 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4714 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4716 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4717 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4718 committed_to_claimable = true;
4721 payment_claimable_generated
4725 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4726 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4727 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4728 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4729 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4730 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4731 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4732 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4734 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4735 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4736 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4737 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4738 Ok(result) => result,
4740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4741 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4744 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4745 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4746 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4747 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4748 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4749 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4752 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4753 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4754 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4756 check_total_value!(purpose);
4758 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4759 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4760 check_total_value!(purpose);
4764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4765 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4767 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4769 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4770 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4771 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4772 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4773 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4774 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4775 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4776 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4778 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4779 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4780 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4782 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4783 if payment_claimable_generated {
4784 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4790 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4791 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4799 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4800 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4801 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4802 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4804 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4805 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4807 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4809 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4810 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4811 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4813 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4815 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4816 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4817 events.append(&mut new_events);
4820 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4822 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4823 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4824 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4826 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4828 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4829 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4830 if background_events.is_empty() {
4831 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4834 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4836 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4837 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4838 // monitor updating completing.
4839 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4841 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4842 let mut updated_chan = false;
4844 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4845 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4846 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4848 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4850 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4851 updated_chan = true;
4852 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4853 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4855 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4863 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4864 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4867 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4869 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4872 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4873 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4875 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4876 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4877 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4878 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4879 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4885 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4888 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4889 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4890 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4891 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4892 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4895 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4896 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4898 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4900 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4901 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4902 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4904 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4905 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4906 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4907 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4909 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4910 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4912 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4913 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4917 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4918 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4919 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4920 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4921 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4922 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4923 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4925 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4926 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4928 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4929 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4930 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4931 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4932 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4933 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4935 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4940 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4941 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4949 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4951 /// This currently includes:
4952 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4953 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4954 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4956 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4957 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4958 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4959 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4960 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4961 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4962 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4963 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4965 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4966 /// estimate fetches.
4968 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4969 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4970 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4971 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4972 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4974 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4975 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4977 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4978 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4979 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4980 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4982 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4983 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4984 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4985 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4986 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4987 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4989 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4990 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4991 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4993 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4994 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4995 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4996 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4997 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4998 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4999 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5000 channel_id: *chan_id,
5001 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5013 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5016 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5017 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5018 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5020 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5021 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5026 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5027 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5029 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5030 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5031 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5032 if needs_close { return false; }
5035 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5036 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5037 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5038 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5039 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5040 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5041 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5042 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5044 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5045 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5046 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5047 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5051 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5053 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5056 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5058 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5059 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5060 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5061 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5065 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5067 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5073 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5075 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5076 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5077 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5078 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5079 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5080 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5081 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5082 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5083 channel_id: *chan_id,
5084 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5092 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5093 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5094 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5096 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5097 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5098 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5100 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5101 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5102 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5103 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5105 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5106 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5107 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5108 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5113 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5114 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5115 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5116 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5117 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5118 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5119 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5120 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5121 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5127 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5129 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5130 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5135 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5136 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5137 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5138 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5139 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5140 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5141 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5142 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5143 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5144 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5145 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5147 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5148 // have no channels to the peer.
5149 let remove_entry = {
5150 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5151 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5154 entry.remove_entry();
5157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5162 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5163 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5164 // This should be unreachable
5165 debug_assert!(false);
5168 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5169 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5170 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5171 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5172 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5173 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5174 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5177 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5178 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5179 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5181 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5182 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5189 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5190 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5191 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5192 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5193 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5196 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5197 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5200 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5201 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5204 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5205 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5206 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5207 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5208 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5209 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5210 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5213 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5214 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5217 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5218 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5219 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5220 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5221 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5228 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5229 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5230 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5232 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5233 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5234 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5235 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5237 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5238 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5239 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5240 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5241 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5242 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5245 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5246 /// reason for the failure.
5248 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5249 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5252 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5253 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5254 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5255 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5256 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5257 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5258 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5263 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5264 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5265 match failure_code {
5266 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5267 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5268 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5269 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5270 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5271 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5273 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5274 let fail_data = match data {
5275 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5278 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5283 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5284 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5286 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5288 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5289 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5290 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5291 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5292 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5293 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5294 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5296 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5298 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5299 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5301 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5306 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5307 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5308 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5309 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5310 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5311 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5312 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5313 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5314 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5315 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5317 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5318 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5319 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5320 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5322 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5323 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5324 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5325 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5326 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5330 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5331 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5332 // be surfaced to the user.
5333 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5334 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5335 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5337 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5339 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5342 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5344 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5345 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5347 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5348 debug_assert!(false);
5349 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5354 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5357 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5358 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5359 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5360 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5364 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5365 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5366 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5367 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5368 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5369 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5370 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5371 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5372 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5373 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5376 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5377 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5378 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5381 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5382 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5383 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5385 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5386 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5387 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5388 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5389 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5391 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5392 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5393 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5396 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5397 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5398 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5400 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5401 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5402 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5403 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5404 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5406 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5408 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5409 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5411 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5412 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5416 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5417 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5419 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5423 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5424 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5425 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5426 push_forward_ev = true;
5428 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5430 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5433 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5436 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5437 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5438 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5439 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5440 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5441 failed_next_destination: destination,
5447 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5448 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5450 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5451 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5452 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5453 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5455 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5456 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5457 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5458 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5460 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5461 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5462 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5464 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5465 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5466 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5467 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5468 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5469 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5470 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5471 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5472 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5475 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5476 /// even type numbers.
5480 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5481 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5483 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5484 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5485 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5488 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5489 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5494 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5495 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5496 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5497 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5498 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5499 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5500 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5501 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5506 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5507 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5508 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5509 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5510 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5512 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5513 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5514 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5518 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5519 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5520 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5521 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5522 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5523 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5524 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5525 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5526 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5527 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5528 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5537 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5539 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5540 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5541 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5542 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5543 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5544 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5545 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5546 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5547 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5549 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5550 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5551 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5552 debug_assert!(false);
5556 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5558 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5559 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5560 debug_assert!(false);
5564 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5565 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5567 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5568 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5569 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5570 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5573 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5574 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5575 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5576 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5580 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5581 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5582 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5583 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5584 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5585 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5586 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5589 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5590 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5591 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5592 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5593 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5594 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5599 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5600 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5601 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5602 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5603 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5604 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5605 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5607 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5610 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5611 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5612 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5613 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5617 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5618 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5619 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5620 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5622 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5623 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5624 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5625 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5627 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5628 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5629 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5630 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5634 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5635 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5636 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5640 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5641 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5642 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5645 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5646 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5647 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5648 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5649 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5650 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5651 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5652 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5655 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5656 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5657 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5659 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5662 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5663 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5665 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5666 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5667 // monitor update as a background event.
5668 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5669 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5670 counterparty_node_id,
5671 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5672 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5673 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5677 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5678 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5683 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5685 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5687 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5688 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5689 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5690 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5691 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5693 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5695 debug_assert!(false,
5696 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5699 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5700 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5701 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5702 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5703 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5705 let mut found_blocker = false;
5706 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5707 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5708 // which case we need to only remove the one
5709 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5710 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5711 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5712 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5714 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5717 debug_assert!(false);
5726 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5727 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5728 counterparty_node_id: None,
5729 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5732 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5736 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5737 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5738 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5739 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5740 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5741 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5742 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5743 // again on restart.
5744 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5745 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5746 payment_preimage, update_res);
5749 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5750 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5752 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5753 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5754 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5755 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5756 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5757 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5758 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5759 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5760 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5761 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5764 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5765 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5766 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5767 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5768 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5769 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5773 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5774 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5777 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5778 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5779 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5780 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5783 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5784 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5785 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5786 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5787 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5789 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5790 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5791 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5793 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5794 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5797 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5798 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5799 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5800 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5801 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5802 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5803 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5804 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5805 let chan_to_release =
5806 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5807 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5809 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5810 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5811 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5812 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5817 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5818 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5819 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5820 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5821 // in the background.
5822 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5823 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5824 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5825 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5827 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5828 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5829 funding_txo, update, ..
5831 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5832 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5833 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5834 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5836 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5842 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5843 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5844 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5846 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5847 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5849 monitor_update.updates[0],
5850 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5855 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5856 // immediately once we get going.
5857 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5860 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5862 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5865 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5866 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5867 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5868 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5869 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5870 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5871 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5875 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5876 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5877 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5880 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5881 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5882 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5883 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5884 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5885 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5886 prev_user_channel_id,
5887 next_user_channel_id,
5888 total_fee_earned_msat,
5890 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5891 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5893 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5897 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5898 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5899 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5905 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5906 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5907 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5910 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5911 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5912 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5913 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5915 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5917 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5918 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5919 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5921 payment_purpose: purpose,
5924 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5926 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5930 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5932 sender_intended_total_msat,
5936 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5937 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5939 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5940 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5941 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5944 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5945 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5947 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5948 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5949 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5950 downstream_channel_id,
5951 Some(blocking_action),
5958 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5959 /// update completion.
5960 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5961 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5962 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5963 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
5964 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5965 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5966 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
5967 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5968 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5969 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5970 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5971 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5972 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
5973 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5974 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5975 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5977 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5978 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
5980 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5981 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5982 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5983 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5985 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
5986 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
5987 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
5990 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5991 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5993 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5994 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5995 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6000 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6001 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6002 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6003 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6008 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6009 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6010 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6011 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6012 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6017 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6021 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6027 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6028 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6029 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6033 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6034 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6035 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6038 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6041 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6042 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6044 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6045 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6047 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6048 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6049 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6050 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6051 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6056 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6057 let mut peer_state_lock;
6058 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6059 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6060 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6061 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6063 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6066 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6067 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6068 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6069 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6070 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6073 let remaining_in_flight =
6074 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6075 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6078 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6079 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6080 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6081 remaining_in_flight);
6082 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6085 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6088 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6090 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6091 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6094 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6095 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6096 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6098 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6099 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6100 /// used to accept such channels.
6102 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6103 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6104 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6105 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6108 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6109 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6111 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6112 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6113 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6115 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6116 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6118 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6119 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6121 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6122 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6124 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6125 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6126 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6127 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6130 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6132 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6135 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6136 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6138 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6140 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6141 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6143 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6147 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6149 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6150 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6151 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6153 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6154 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6155 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6156 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6157 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6158 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6159 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6162 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6163 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6165 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6171 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6172 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6173 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6174 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6176 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6180 Ok(mut channel) => {
6182 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6183 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6184 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6185 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6186 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6187 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6188 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6191 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6192 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6193 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6195 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6197 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6198 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6199 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6200 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6201 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6202 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6203 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6207 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6208 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6209 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6211 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6215 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6216 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6217 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6219 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6220 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6221 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6224 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6231 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6232 /// or 0-conf channels.
6234 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6235 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6236 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6237 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6238 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6239 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6241 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6242 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6243 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6244 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6245 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6246 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6247 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6251 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6254 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6255 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6257 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6258 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6260 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6261 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6262 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6263 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6264 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6266 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6269 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6270 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6271 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6274 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6275 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6276 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6277 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6278 // included in the unfunded count.
6279 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6280 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6281 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6284 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6285 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6288 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6289 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6290 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6291 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6296 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6299 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6300 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6301 // likely to be lost on restart!
6302 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6303 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6304 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6307 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6308 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6309 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6312 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6313 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6314 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6315 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6316 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6318 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6319 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6321 debug_assert!(false);
6322 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6323 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6324 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6326 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6327 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6329 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6330 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6331 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6332 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6333 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6334 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6336 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6337 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6338 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6341 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6342 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6343 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6344 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6345 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6348 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6349 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6352 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6353 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6356 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6357 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6358 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6359 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6361 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6363 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6364 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6365 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6366 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6367 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6368 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6371 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6372 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6373 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6378 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6379 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6380 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6381 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6382 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6383 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6384 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6392 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6393 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6394 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6395 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6396 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6398 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6400 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6401 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6404 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6405 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6407 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6408 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6409 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6411 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6415 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6416 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6417 // likely to be lost on restart!
6418 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6419 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6420 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6422 debug_assert!(false);
6423 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6427 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6428 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6429 match phase.get_mut() {
6430 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6431 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6432 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6442 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6443 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6444 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6445 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6446 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6448 user_channel_id: user_id,
6453 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6454 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6457 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6459 debug_assert!(false);
6460 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6465 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6466 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6467 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6468 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6469 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6471 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6472 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6473 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6474 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6475 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6476 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6477 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6478 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6479 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6483 Some(mut phase) => {
6484 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6485 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6486 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6488 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6491 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6493 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6494 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6495 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6496 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6497 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6498 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6500 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6501 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6502 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6505 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6507 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6510 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6511 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6513 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6516 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6517 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6518 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6519 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6521 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6522 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6523 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6524 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6525 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6526 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6527 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6532 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6533 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6534 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6536 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6540 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6541 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6542 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6550 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6551 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6555 debug_assert!(false);
6556 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6559 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6560 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6561 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6563 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6564 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6565 let logger = WithContext::from(
6567 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6568 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6571 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6573 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6574 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6575 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6576 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6577 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6578 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6579 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6580 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6581 } else { unreachable!(); }
6584 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6585 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6586 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6587 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6588 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6589 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6590 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6594 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6595 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6596 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6597 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6598 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6599 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6603 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6610 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6611 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6612 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6613 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6614 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6616 debug_assert!(false);
6617 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6619 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6620 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6621 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6623 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6624 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6625 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6626 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6627 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6628 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6629 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6630 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6631 msg: announcement_sigs,
6633 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6634 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6635 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6636 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6637 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6638 // announcement_signatures.
6639 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6640 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6641 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6642 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6649 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6650 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6655 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6656 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6660 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6665 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6666 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6667 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6670 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6672 debug_assert!(false);
6673 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6677 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6678 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6680 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6681 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6682 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6683 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6685 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6688 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6689 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6690 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6691 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6693 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6694 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6695 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6696 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6697 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6698 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6702 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6703 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6704 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6705 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6708 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6709 let context = phase.context_mut();
6710 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6711 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6712 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6713 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6715 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6716 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6717 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6718 let context = phase.context_mut();
6719 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6720 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6721 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6725 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6728 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6729 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6730 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6731 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6733 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6734 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6740 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6742 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6744 debug_assert!(false);
6745 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6747 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6748 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6749 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6750 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6752 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6753 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6754 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6755 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6756 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6757 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6762 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6763 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6764 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6765 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6766 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6767 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6768 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6770 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6771 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6777 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6778 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6779 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6780 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6782 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6783 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6786 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6791 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6792 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6793 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6798 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6799 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6800 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6801 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6803 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6804 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6805 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6806 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6808 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6809 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6811 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6813 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6815 debug_assert!(false);
6816 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6820 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6822 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6823 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6824 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6825 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6826 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6827 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6829 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6831 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6832 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6833 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6834 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6835 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6836 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6837 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6838 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6842 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6843 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6844 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6845 match pending_forward_info {
6846 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6847 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6849 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6850 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6851 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6852 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6853 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6855 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6856 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6857 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6858 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6859 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6862 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6864 _ => pending_forward_info
6867 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6868 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6870 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6871 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6879 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6881 let next_user_channel_id;
6882 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6884 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6886 debug_assert!(false);
6887 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6891 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6893 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6894 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6895 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6896 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6898 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6900 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6901 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6902 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6904 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6905 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6906 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6907 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6908 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6909 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6910 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6911 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
6914 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6915 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6918 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6921 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6922 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6923 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
6929 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6930 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6931 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6933 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6935 debug_assert!(false);
6936 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6940 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6942 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6943 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6945 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6946 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6954 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6955 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6956 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6960 debug_assert!(false);
6961 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6965 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6967 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6968 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6969 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6971 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6972 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6974 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6975 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6983 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6984 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6985 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6987 debug_assert!(false);
6988 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6992 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6994 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6995 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6996 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6997 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6998 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6999 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7000 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7004 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7005 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7012 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7013 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7014 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7015 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7022 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7023 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7024 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7025 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7026 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7027 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7028 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7029 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7030 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7031 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7032 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7034 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7035 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7037 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7038 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7039 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7041 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7042 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7044 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7045 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7046 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7048 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7049 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7050 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7051 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7052 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7053 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7054 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7055 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7056 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7059 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7060 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7063 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7064 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7065 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7066 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7067 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7068 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7069 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7070 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7071 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7072 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7073 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7076 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7077 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7078 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7083 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7084 // payments are being processed.
7085 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7086 push_forward_event = true;
7088 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7089 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7096 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7100 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7101 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7102 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7104 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7108 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7109 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7110 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7111 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7112 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7114 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7115 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7116 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7117 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7118 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7119 // real by taking more time.
7120 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7121 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7122 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7127 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7128 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7129 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7130 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7131 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7132 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7133 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7135 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7136 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7137 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7138 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7139 channel_funding_outpoint,
7141 counterparty_node_id,
7146 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7147 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7148 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7151 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7152 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7155 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7156 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7157 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7163 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7164 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7165 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7166 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7168 debug_assert!(false);
7169 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7170 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7171 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7172 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7174 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7175 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7176 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7177 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7178 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7179 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7180 *counterparty_node_id)
7182 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7183 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7184 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7185 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7186 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7187 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7188 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7192 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7193 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7196 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7199 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7203 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7204 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7205 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7207 debug_assert!(false);
7208 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7212 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7214 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7215 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7216 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7218 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7219 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7227 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7228 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7229 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7231 debug_assert!(false);
7232 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7236 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7238 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7239 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7243 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7244 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7245 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7246 msg, &self.default_configuration
7247 ), chan_phase_entry),
7248 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7249 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7250 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7253 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7254 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7257 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7262 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7263 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7264 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7265 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7267 // It's not a local channel
7268 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7271 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7272 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7273 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7274 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7278 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7280 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7281 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7282 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7283 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7284 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7285 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7286 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7288 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7290 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7291 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7292 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7293 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7295 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7296 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7297 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7298 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7301 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7305 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7306 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7311 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7314 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7315 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7316 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7318 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7320 debug_assert!(false);
7321 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7322 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7326 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7329 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7331 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7332 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7333 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7334 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7335 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7336 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7337 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7338 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7339 let mut channel_update = None;
7340 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7341 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7342 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7345 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7346 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7347 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7348 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7349 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7350 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7351 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7356 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7357 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7358 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7359 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7360 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7361 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7362 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7363 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7367 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7368 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7372 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7374 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7375 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7376 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7377 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7378 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7379 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7381 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7382 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7383 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7384 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7385 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7386 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7387 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7388 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7389 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7390 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7391 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7392 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7393 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7394 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7395 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7396 next_funding_txid: None,
7399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7400 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7401 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7407 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7408 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7410 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7413 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7414 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7415 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7417 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7418 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7419 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7420 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7421 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7422 match monitor_event {
7423 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7424 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7425 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7426 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7427 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7428 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7429 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7431 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7432 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7433 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7434 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7437 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7438 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7439 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7441 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7442 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7443 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7444 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7447 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7449 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7450 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7451 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7452 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7453 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7454 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7455 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7458 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7460 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7461 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7462 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7466 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7467 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7468 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7469 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7477 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7478 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7484 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7485 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7488 has_pending_monitor_events
7491 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7492 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7493 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7495 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7496 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7497 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7500 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7501 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7502 /// update was applied.
7503 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7504 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7505 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7507 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7508 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7509 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7510 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7513 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7516 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7517 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7518 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7520 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7521 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7522 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7523 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7524 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7525 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7527 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7528 has_monitor_update = true;
7530 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7531 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7532 continue 'peer_loop;
7541 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7542 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7543 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7549 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7550 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7552 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7553 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7555 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7556 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7557 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7560 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7561 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7563 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7564 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7565 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7566 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7571 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7577 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7578 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7581 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7582 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7583 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7589 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7593 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7594 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7595 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7596 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7597 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7598 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7599 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7603 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7606 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7607 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7613 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7614 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7615 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7616 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7617 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7618 let mut has_update = false;
7619 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7621 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7623 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7626 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7627 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7629 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7630 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7631 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7632 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7633 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7636 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7639 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7640 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7641 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7643 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7644 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7645 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7646 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7652 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7653 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7654 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7660 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7661 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7666 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7672 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7673 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7676 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7677 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7683 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7684 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7686 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7687 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7688 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7689 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7690 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7691 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7692 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7693 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7694 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7695 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7696 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7697 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7698 assert!(should_broadcast);
7699 } else { unreachable!(); }
7700 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7701 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7702 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7705 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7710 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7711 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7712 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7713 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7717 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7718 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7719 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7720 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7721 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7723 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7727 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7732 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7734 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7736 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7737 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7738 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7739 &$self, description: String
7740 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7741 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7742 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7743 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7744 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7746 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7747 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7748 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7750 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7757 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7758 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7759 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7763 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7764 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7766 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7767 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7768 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7771 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7772 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7773 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7775 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7776 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7780 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7781 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7782 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7783 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7784 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7786 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7790 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7791 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7796 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7797 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7798 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7800 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7802 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7803 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7804 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7805 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7806 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7807 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7808 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7809 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7810 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7811 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7812 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7813 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7815 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7816 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7817 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7819 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7820 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7823 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7825 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7826 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7827 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7828 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7830 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7836 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7838 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7839 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7840 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7841 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7842 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7843 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7847 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7848 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7849 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7850 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7853 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7855 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7857 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7858 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7859 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7861 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7862 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7863 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7864 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7865 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7866 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7867 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7869 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7870 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7874 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7875 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7878 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7879 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7880 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7884 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7885 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7886 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7887 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7891 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7892 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7893 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7898 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7899 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7900 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7901 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7904 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7905 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7906 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7907 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7908 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7909 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7910 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7911 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7912 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7913 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7914 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7915 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7916 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7917 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7918 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7920 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7921 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7923 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7925 let builder = match quantity {
7927 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7929 let builder = match amount_msats {
7931 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7933 let builder = match payer_note {
7935 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7937 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7938 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7942 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7943 self.pending_outbound_payments
7944 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7945 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7947 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7949 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7950 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7951 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7952 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7953 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7956 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7958 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7959 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7960 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7961 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7962 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7963 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7964 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7965 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7966 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7968 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7975 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7978 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7979 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7980 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7984 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7985 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7986 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7987 /// received and no retries will be made.
7992 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7993 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
7996 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7997 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7998 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7999 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8000 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8002 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8003 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8005 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8006 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8009 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8011 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8012 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8013 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8014 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8016 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8017 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8018 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8020 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8021 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8022 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8024 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8025 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8026 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8028 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8029 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8030 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8031 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8033 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8034 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8035 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8036 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8037 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8040 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8042 for path in refund.paths() {
8043 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8044 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8045 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8046 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8048 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8054 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8058 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8061 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8062 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8064 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8065 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8066 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8067 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8069 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8071 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8072 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8076 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8077 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8079 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8081 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8082 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8084 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8085 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8086 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8087 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8088 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8089 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8090 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8091 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8092 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8093 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8094 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8097 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8098 /// stored external to LDK.
8100 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8101 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8102 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8104 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8105 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8108 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8109 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8110 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8111 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8113 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8114 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8115 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8116 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8117 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8119 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8120 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8121 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8122 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8123 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8125 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8126 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8128 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8129 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8133 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8134 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8136 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8138 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8139 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8141 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8142 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8143 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8144 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8145 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8146 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8147 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8150 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8151 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8153 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8154 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8155 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8158 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8160 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8161 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8162 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8163 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8165 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8167 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8168 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8169 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8172 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8173 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8176 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8177 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8178 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8179 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8180 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8181 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8183 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8184 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8185 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8186 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8187 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8189 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8191 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8194 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8195 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8199 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8200 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8202 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8203 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8204 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8205 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8207 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8208 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8209 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8210 Some(_) => continue,
8211 None => return scid_candidate
8216 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8218 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8219 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8221 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8222 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8223 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8227 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8228 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8229 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8231 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8232 /// times to get a unique scid.
8233 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8234 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8235 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8237 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8238 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8239 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8240 return scid_candidate
8244 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8245 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8246 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8247 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8249 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8250 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8251 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8252 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8253 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8254 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8256 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8257 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8258 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8267 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8268 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8269 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8270 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8271 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8275 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8276 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8277 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8278 events.push_back((event, None));
8282 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8283 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8284 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8288 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8289 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8293 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8294 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8297 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8298 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8299 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8300 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8301 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8302 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8303 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8305 let logger = WithContext::from(
8306 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8310 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8311 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8313 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8314 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8315 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8316 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8318 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8322 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8323 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8324 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8325 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8326 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8327 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8332 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8334 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8335 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8336 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8337 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8339 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8340 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8341 if further_update_exists {
8342 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8347 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8354 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8355 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8361 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8362 for action in actions {
8364 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8365 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8367 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8373 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8374 /// using the given event handler.
8376 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8377 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8381 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8385 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8387 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8388 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8389 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8390 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8391 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8392 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8396 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8397 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8398 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8399 /// is always placed next to each other.
8401 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8402 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8403 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8404 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8406 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8407 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8408 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8409 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8410 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8411 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8412 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8414 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8415 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8416 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8417 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8420 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8421 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8423 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8424 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8427 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8428 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8429 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8432 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8433 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8437 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8438 events.replace(pending_events);
8447 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8449 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8450 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8451 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8452 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8453 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8454 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8458 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8460 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8461 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8462 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8464 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8468 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8470 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8471 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8472 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8473 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8474 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8475 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8479 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8481 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8482 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8483 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8484 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8485 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8488 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8489 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8492 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8493 let _persistence_guard =
8494 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8495 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8496 let new_height = height - 1;
8498 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8499 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8500 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8501 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8502 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8503 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8506 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8510 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8512 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8513 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8514 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8515 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8516 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8517 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8521 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8522 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8523 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8524 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8526 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8527 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8529 let _persistence_guard =
8530 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8531 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8532 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8533 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8535 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8536 if height < last_best_block_height {
8537 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8538 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8542 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8543 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8544 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8545 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8547 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8548 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8550 let _persistence_guard =
8551 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8552 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8553 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8555 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8557 macro_rules! max_time {
8558 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8560 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8561 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8562 // having an explicit local time source.
8563 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8564 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8565 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8566 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8567 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8573 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8574 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8575 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8576 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8580 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8581 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8582 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8585 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8586 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8587 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8588 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8589 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8590 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8597 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8598 let _persistence_guard =
8599 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8600 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8601 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8602 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8603 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8604 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8605 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8606 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8611 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8613 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8614 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8615 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8616 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8617 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8618 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8622 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8623 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8625 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8626 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8627 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8628 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8629 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8631 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8632 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8635 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8636 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8637 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8638 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8639 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8641 // Retain unfunded channels.
8642 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8643 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8644 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8645 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8646 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8647 let res = f(channel);
8648 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8649 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8650 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8651 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8652 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8654 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8655 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8656 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8657 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8658 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8659 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8661 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8666 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8671 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8672 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8675 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8676 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8678 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8679 msg: announcement_sigs,
8681 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8682 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8683 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8685 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8686 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8687 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8692 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8693 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8694 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8695 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8696 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8697 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8698 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8699 // is always consistent.
8700 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8701 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8702 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8703 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8704 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8707 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8708 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8709 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8710 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8711 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8712 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8713 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8714 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8718 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8719 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8720 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8721 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8722 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8723 data: reason_message,
8736 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8737 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8738 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8739 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8740 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8741 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8742 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8743 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8744 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8745 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8747 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8748 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8749 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8753 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8756 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8757 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8758 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8759 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8760 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8761 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8762 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8763 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8764 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8765 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8766 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8767 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8770 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8771 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8772 _ => unreachable!(),
8774 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8775 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8776 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8777 let logger = WithContext::from(
8778 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8780 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8786 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8788 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8789 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8793 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8794 /// may have events that need processing.
8796 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8797 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8799 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8800 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8801 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8802 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8805 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8806 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8807 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8810 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8811 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8812 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8815 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8816 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8817 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8818 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8821 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8822 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8823 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8824 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8827 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8828 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8830 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8831 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8832 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8833 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8834 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8837 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8838 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8839 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8840 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8843 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8844 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8845 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8846 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8849 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8850 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8851 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8852 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8855 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8856 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8857 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8858 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8862 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8863 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8865 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8866 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8867 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8868 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8869 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8870 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8874 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8875 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8876 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8877 // change to the contents.
8878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8879 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8880 let persist = match &res {
8881 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8882 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8883 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8885 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8887 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8892 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8893 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8894 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8895 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8898 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8899 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8900 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8901 // change to the contents.
8902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8903 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8904 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8908 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8909 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8910 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8911 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8914 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8916 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8919 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8921 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8924 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8925 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8926 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8927 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8928 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8930 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8931 let persist = match &res {
8932 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8933 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8935 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8940 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8941 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8942 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8943 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8946 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8947 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8948 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8949 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8952 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8953 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8954 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8955 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8958 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8959 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8960 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8961 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8964 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8966 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8969 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8971 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8974 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8975 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8976 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8977 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8979 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8980 let persist = match &res {
8981 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8982 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8983 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8985 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8990 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8992 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8995 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8996 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8997 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8998 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9000 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9001 let persist = match &res {
9002 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9003 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9004 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9006 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9011 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9012 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9013 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9014 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9015 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9016 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9017 let persist = match &res {
9018 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9019 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9020 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9022 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9027 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9029 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9032 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9034 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9037 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9038 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9039 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9040 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9042 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9043 let persist = match &res {
9044 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9045 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9046 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9048 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9053 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9055 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9058 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9059 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9060 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9063 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9068 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9070 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9071 let persist = match &res {
9072 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9073 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9074 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9076 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9081 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9083 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9084 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9085 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9088 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9089 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9090 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9092 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9093 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9094 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9095 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9096 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9097 let context = match phase {
9098 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9099 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9100 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9101 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9106 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9107 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9108 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9111 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9112 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9115 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9116 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9119 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9120 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9124 // Clean up for removal.
9125 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9126 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9129 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9130 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9131 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9132 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9134 // V1 Channel Establishment
9135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9136 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9138 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9139 // V2 Channel Establishment
9140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9142 // Common Channel Establishment
9143 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9144 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9146 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9148 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9149 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9150 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9151 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9152 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9153 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9154 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9155 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9156 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9157 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9158 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9159 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9161 // Channel Operations
9162 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9163 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9164 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9165 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9166 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9167 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9169 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9170 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9171 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9172 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9173 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9174 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9175 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9176 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9177 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9180 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9181 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9182 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9183 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9186 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9188 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9190 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9191 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9195 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9196 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9197 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9198 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9202 let mut res = Ok(());
9204 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9205 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9206 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9207 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9208 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9209 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9210 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9213 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9214 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9216 if inbound_peer_limited {
9218 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9220 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9221 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9222 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9223 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9224 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9225 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9226 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9227 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9232 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9233 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9235 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9236 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9237 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9238 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9241 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9244 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9245 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9250 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9252 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9253 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9254 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9255 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9256 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9258 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9260 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9261 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9262 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9263 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9264 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9268 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9270 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9271 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9275 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9276 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9277 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9278 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9279 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9280 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9284 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9285 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9286 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9287 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9288 debug_assert!(false);
9291 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9292 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9293 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9294 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9295 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9296 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9297 debug_assert!(false);
9303 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9304 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9309 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9310 match &msg.data as &str {
9311 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9312 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9314 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9315 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9316 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9317 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9318 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9319 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9320 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9321 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9322 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9324 || -> NotifyOption {
9325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9326 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9327 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9328 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9329 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9330 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9331 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9332 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9336 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9337 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9338 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9339 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9340 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9341 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9343 log_level: Level::Trace,
9346 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9347 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9348 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9350 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9361 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9362 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9363 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9364 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9365 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9366 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9367 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9368 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9369 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9370 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9371 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9373 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9374 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9375 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9379 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9381 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9382 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9383 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9384 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9385 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9386 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9387 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9388 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9389 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9395 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9396 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9397 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9398 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9399 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9405 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9406 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9407 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9411 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9412 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9416 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9417 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9420 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9421 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9424 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9425 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9428 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9429 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9430 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9431 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9434 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9435 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9436 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9437 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9440 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9441 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9442 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9443 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9446 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9447 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9448 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9449 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9452 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9453 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9454 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9455 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9458 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9459 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9460 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9461 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9464 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9465 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9466 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9467 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9470 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9471 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9472 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9473 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9476 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9477 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9478 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9479 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9483 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9484 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9486 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9487 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9488 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9489 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9490 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9491 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9495 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9496 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9497 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9500 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9501 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9504 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9505 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9507 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9508 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9510 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9511 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9515 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9516 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9517 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9519 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9521 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9522 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9526 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9527 amount_msats, payment_secret
9529 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9531 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9532 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9536 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9537 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9538 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9541 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9542 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9543 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9544 payment_paths, payment_hash
9546 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9547 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9548 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9550 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9551 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9552 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9553 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9554 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9557 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9558 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9559 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9560 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9561 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9563 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9564 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9565 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9566 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9567 .and_then(|invoice| {
9569 let mut invoice = invoice;
9570 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9571 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9573 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9574 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9575 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9577 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9578 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9583 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9584 Err(error) => Some(error),
9588 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9589 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9591 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9593 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9594 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9597 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9599 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9606 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9613 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9614 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9618 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9619 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9620 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9621 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9622 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9626 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9627 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9629 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9630 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9631 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9632 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9633 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9636 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9637 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9638 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9639 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9642 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9643 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9644 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9645 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9648 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9649 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9650 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9651 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9654 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9655 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9656 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9657 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9658 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9659 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9660 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9661 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9662 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9663 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9664 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9665 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9666 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9667 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9668 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9669 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9670 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9671 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9672 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9673 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9674 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9679 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9680 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9682 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9683 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9684 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9685 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9688 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9689 (2, node_id, required),
9690 (4, features, required),
9691 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9692 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9693 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9694 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9697 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9698 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9699 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9700 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9701 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9702 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9703 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9704 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9705 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9706 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9707 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9708 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9709 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9710 (7, self.config, option),
9711 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9712 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9713 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9714 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9715 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9716 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9717 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9718 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9719 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9720 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9721 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9722 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9723 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9724 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9725 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9726 (32, self.is_public, required),
9727 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9728 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9729 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9730 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9731 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9732 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9733 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9739 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9740 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9741 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9742 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9743 (2, channel_id, required),
9744 (3, channel_type, option),
9745 (4, counterparty, required),
9746 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9747 (6, funding_txo, option),
9748 (7, config, option),
9749 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9750 (9, confirmations, option),
9751 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9752 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9753 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9754 (16, balance_msat, required),
9755 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9756 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9757 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9758 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9759 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9760 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9761 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9762 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9763 (26, is_outbound, required),
9764 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9765 (30, is_usable, required),
9766 (32, is_public, required),
9767 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9768 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9769 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9770 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9771 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9772 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9773 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9776 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9777 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9778 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9779 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9780 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9784 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9786 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9787 outbound_scid_alias,
9791 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9792 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9794 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9795 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9796 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9797 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9798 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9799 confirmations_required,
9801 force_close_spend_delay,
9802 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9803 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9804 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9805 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9806 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9807 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9808 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9809 channel_shutdown_state,
9810 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9811 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9816 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9817 (2, channels, required_vec),
9818 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9819 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9822 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9823 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9824 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9827 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9829 (0, onion_packet, required),
9830 (1, blinded, option),
9831 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9834 (0, payment_data, required),
9835 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9836 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9837 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9838 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9839 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9841 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9842 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9843 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9844 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9845 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9846 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9847 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9851 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9852 (0, routing, required),
9853 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9854 (4, payment_hash, required),
9855 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9856 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9857 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9858 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9862 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9863 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9865 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9867 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9868 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9869 reason.write(writer)?;
9871 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9872 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9875 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9876 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9877 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9878 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9885 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9886 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9887 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9890 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9891 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9892 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9893 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9897 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9898 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9899 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9900 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9901 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9904 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9905 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9906 // messages contained in the variants.
9907 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9908 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9909 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9911 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9912 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9913 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9914 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9915 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9918 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9919 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9920 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9921 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9922 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9924 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9929 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9934 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9935 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9936 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9939 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9940 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9941 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9942 (2, outpoint, required),
9943 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9944 (4, htlc_id, required),
9945 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9946 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9947 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9948 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9949 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9952 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9953 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9954 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9955 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9956 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9958 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9959 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9960 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9961 (2, self.value, required),
9962 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9963 (4, payment_data, option),
9964 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9965 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9966 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9967 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9973 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9974 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9975 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9976 (0, prev_hop, required),
9977 (1, total_msat, option),
9978 (2, value_ser, required),
9979 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9980 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9981 (5, total_value_received, option),
9982 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9983 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9984 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9986 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9987 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9988 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9990 if payment_data.is_some() {
9991 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9993 if total_msat.is_none() {
9994 total_msat = Some(value);
9996 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9999 if total_msat.is_none() {
10000 if payment_data.is_none() {
10001 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10003 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10005 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10009 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10012 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10013 total_value_received,
10014 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10016 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10017 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10022 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10023 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10024 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10027 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10028 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10029 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10030 let mut payment_id = None;
10031 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10032 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10033 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10034 (0, session_priv, required),
10035 (1, payment_id, option),
10036 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10037 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10038 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10039 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10041 if payment_id.is_none() {
10042 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10044 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10046 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10047 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10048 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10050 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10051 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10052 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10053 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10057 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10058 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10059 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10061 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10064 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10065 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10070 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10071 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10073 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10074 0u8.write(writer)?;
10075 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10076 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10077 (0, session_priv, required),
10078 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10079 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10080 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10081 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10082 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10083 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10086 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10087 1u8.write(writer)?;
10088 field.write(writer)?;
10095 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10096 (0, forward_info, required),
10097 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10098 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10099 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10100 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10101 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10102 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10103 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10106 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10107 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10108 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10110 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10114 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10115 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10116 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10117 (0, htlc_id, required),
10118 (2, err_packet, required),
10121 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10122 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10123 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10124 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10125 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10126 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10127 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10128 (0, htlc_id, required),
10129 (1, failure_code, required),
10130 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10131 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10139 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10140 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10141 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10143 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10145 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10146 (0, htlc_id, required),
10147 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10148 (2, err_packet, required),
10149 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10151 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10152 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10153 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10155 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10159 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10160 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10164 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10169 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10170 (0, payment_secret, required),
10171 (2, expiry_time, required),
10172 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10173 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10174 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10177 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10179 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10180 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10181 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10182 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10183 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10184 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10188 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10189 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10191 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10193 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10195 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10196 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10197 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10200 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10203 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10204 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10205 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10206 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10207 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10208 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10211 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10212 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10216 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10218 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10219 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10220 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10221 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10222 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10223 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10226 channel.write(writer)?;
10232 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10233 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10234 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10235 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10236 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10237 for forward in pending_forwards {
10238 forward.write(writer)?;
10243 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10244 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10245 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10246 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10249 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10251 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10252 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10253 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10255 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10256 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10257 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10258 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10259 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10260 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10261 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10262 htlc.write(writer)?;
10264 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10265 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10268 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10269 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10270 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10271 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10272 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10273 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10274 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10277 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10278 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10279 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10280 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10281 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10283 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10284 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10285 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10286 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10287 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10288 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10289 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10294 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10295 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10296 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10297 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10298 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10299 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10300 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10301 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10302 0u64.write(writer)?;
10304 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10305 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10306 event.write(writer)?;
10310 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10311 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10312 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10313 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10314 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10315 0u64.write(writer)?;
10317 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10318 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10319 // likely to be identical.
10320 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10321 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10323 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10324 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10325 hash.write(writer)?;
10326 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10329 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10330 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10331 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10332 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10333 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10336 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10337 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10339 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10340 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10341 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10342 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10345 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10346 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10347 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10348 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10352 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10353 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10354 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10356 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10357 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10358 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10364 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10365 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10366 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10367 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10370 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10371 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10372 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10373 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10374 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10377 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10378 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10379 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10380 if !updates.is_empty() {
10381 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10382 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10387 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10388 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10389 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10390 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10391 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10392 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10393 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10394 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10395 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10396 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10397 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10398 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10399 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10400 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10407 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10408 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10409 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10410 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10413 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10414 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10415 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10416 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10417 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10418 // check that the event is sane here.
10419 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10420 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10421 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10422 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10428 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10429 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10430 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10431 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10432 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10433 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10436 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10437 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10438 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10439 events.push_back((ev, action));
10440 } else if action.is_some() {
10441 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10448 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10449 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10450 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10451 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10452 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10453 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10456 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10458 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10460 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10461 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10462 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10463 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10464 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10465 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10466 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10467 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10468 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10469 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10470 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10471 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10472 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10474 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10475 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10477 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10478 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10480 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10481 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10482 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10483 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10484 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10485 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10487 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10488 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10490 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10491 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10492 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10493 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10494 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10495 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10499 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10500 pub entropy_source: ES,
10502 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10503 pub node_signer: NS,
10505 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10506 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10508 pub signer_provider: SP,
10510 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10512 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10513 pub fee_estimator: F,
10514 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10516 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10517 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10518 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10519 pub chain_monitor: M,
10521 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10522 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10523 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10524 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10525 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10526 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10528 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10530 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10531 /// deserialization.
10533 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10534 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10535 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10537 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10538 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10540 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10541 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10542 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10543 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10545 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10548 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10549 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10552 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10553 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10555 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10556 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10557 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10558 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10559 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10560 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10564 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10565 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10566 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10567 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10568 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10570 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10571 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10572 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10578 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10579 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10580 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10581 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10583 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10584 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10585 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10586 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10587 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10588 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10592 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10593 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10594 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10598 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10599 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10601 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10602 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10603 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10604 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10605 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10606 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10610 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10611 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10613 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10614 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10615 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10617 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10619 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10620 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10621 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10622 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10623 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10624 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10625 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10626 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10627 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10628 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10629 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10631 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10632 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10633 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10634 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10635 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10636 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10637 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10638 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10639 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10640 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10641 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10642 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10643 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10644 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10645 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10647 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10648 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10649 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10651 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10652 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10653 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10655 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10656 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10657 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10659 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10660 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10661 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10663 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10664 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10665 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10668 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10669 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10670 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10671 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10672 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10673 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10674 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10675 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10677 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10678 let mut found_htlc = false;
10679 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10680 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10683 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10684 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10685 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10686 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10687 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10688 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10689 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10691 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10692 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10693 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10697 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10698 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10699 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10700 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10701 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10703 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10704 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10706 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10708 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10709 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10712 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10713 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10714 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10718 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10719 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10720 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10721 // safely discard the channel.
10722 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10723 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10724 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10725 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10726 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10727 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10728 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10729 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10732 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10733 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10734 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10735 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10736 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10737 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10741 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10742 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10743 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10744 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10745 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10747 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10748 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10749 counterparty_node_id: None,
10750 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10751 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10753 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10757 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10758 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10759 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10760 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10761 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10762 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10763 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10764 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10765 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10767 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10770 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10771 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10772 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10773 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10774 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10775 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10776 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10777 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10779 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10782 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10785 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10786 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10787 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10788 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10789 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10790 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10791 is_connected: false,
10795 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10796 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10797 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10798 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10799 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10800 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10801 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10802 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10805 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10806 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10807 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10808 for _ in 0..event_count {
10809 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10810 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10815 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10816 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10817 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10819 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10820 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10821 // on-startup monitor updates.
10822 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10823 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10825 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10829 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10830 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10832 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10833 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10834 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10835 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10836 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10840 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10841 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10842 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10843 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10844 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10845 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10846 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10848 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10849 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10853 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10854 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10855 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10856 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10857 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10858 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10859 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10860 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10861 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10862 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10863 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10864 let mut events_override = None;
10865 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10866 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
10867 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10868 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10869 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10870 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10871 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10872 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10873 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10874 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10875 (8, events_override, option),
10876 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10877 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10878 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10879 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10880 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
10882 let decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
10883 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10884 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10887 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10888 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10891 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10892 pending_events_read = events;
10895 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10896 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10899 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10900 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10901 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10902 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10903 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10904 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10906 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10908 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10909 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10910 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10913 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10914 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10915 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10916 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10917 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10919 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10920 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10921 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10923 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10924 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10925 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10926 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10927 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10929 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10930 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10931 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10932 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10933 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10934 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10935 pending_background_events.push(
10936 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10937 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10938 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10939 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10940 update: update.clone(),
10943 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10944 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10945 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10946 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10947 pending_background_events.push(
10948 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10949 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10950 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10953 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10954 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10955 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10957 max_in_flight_update_id
10961 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10964 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10965 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10966 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10968 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10970 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10971 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10972 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10973 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10974 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10975 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10976 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10977 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10978 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10981 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10982 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10983 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10984 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10985 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10986 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10987 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10988 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10989 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10990 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10991 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10994 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10995 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10996 debug_assert!(false);
10997 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11002 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11003 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11004 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11005 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11006 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11007 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11008 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11009 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11010 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11011 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11013 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11014 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11015 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11017 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11018 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11019 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11020 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11021 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11022 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11023 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11024 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11029 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11030 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11032 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11033 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11034 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11035 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11038 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11039 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11040 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11041 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11042 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11043 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11044 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11046 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11047 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11048 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11049 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11050 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11051 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11052 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11053 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11054 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11057 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11058 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11059 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11060 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11061 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11062 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11063 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11064 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11067 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11068 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11069 retry_strategy: None,
11070 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11071 payment_params: None,
11072 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11073 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11074 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11075 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11076 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11077 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11078 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11079 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11080 total_msat: path_amt,
11081 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11082 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11084 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11085 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11090 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11091 match htlc_source {
11092 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11093 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11094 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11095 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11097 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11098 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11099 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11100 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11101 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11102 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11103 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11104 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11105 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11106 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11107 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11112 !forwards.is_empty()
11114 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11115 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11116 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11117 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11118 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11119 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11120 intercepted_id != ev_id
11127 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11128 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11129 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11130 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11131 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11132 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11133 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11134 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11135 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11136 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11137 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11139 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11140 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11141 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11142 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11144 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11145 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11146 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11153 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11154 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11156 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11158 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11159 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11160 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11161 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11162 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11163 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11164 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11165 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11166 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11167 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11170 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11171 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11172 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11173 // channel still live case here.
11177 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11178 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11183 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11184 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11185 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11186 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11187 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11188 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11189 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11190 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11194 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11195 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11197 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11198 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11199 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11200 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11202 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11203 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11204 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11206 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11207 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11209 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11210 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11212 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11215 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11216 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11217 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11219 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11223 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11224 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11225 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11226 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11227 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11229 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11230 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11231 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11232 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11233 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11234 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11235 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11236 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11238 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11239 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11243 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11245 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11247 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11248 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11250 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11251 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11256 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11257 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11259 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11261 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11263 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11264 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11265 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11266 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11270 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11271 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11272 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11273 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11274 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11275 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11276 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11277 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11278 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11280 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11281 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11282 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11284 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11285 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11286 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11287 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11288 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11289 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11291 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11292 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11293 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11294 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11295 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11296 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11300 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11301 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11302 debug_assert!(false);
11303 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11308 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11310 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11311 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11312 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11313 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11314 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11315 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11316 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11317 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11318 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11319 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11320 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11322 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11323 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11325 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11326 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11327 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11328 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11330 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11331 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11332 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11333 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11335 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11336 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11337 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11338 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11340 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11341 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11342 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11345 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11346 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11347 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11350 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11351 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11354 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11357 purpose: payment.purpose,
11358 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11359 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11360 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11366 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11367 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11368 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11369 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11370 for action in actions.iter() {
11371 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11372 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11373 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11375 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11377 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11378 blocked_channel_id);
11379 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11380 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11381 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11383 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11384 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11385 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11386 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11390 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11391 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11395 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11397 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11398 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11402 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11404 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11405 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11406 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11407 router: args.router,
11409 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11411 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11412 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11413 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11414 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11416 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11417 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
11418 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11419 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11420 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11421 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11422 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11424 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11426 our_network_pubkey,
11429 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11431 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11433 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11434 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11435 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11436 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11437 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11439 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11440 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11442 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11444 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11446 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11447 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11448 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11450 logger: args.logger,
11451 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11454 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11455 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11456 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11457 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11458 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11461 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11462 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11463 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11464 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11465 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11466 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11467 downstream_channel_id, None
11471 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11472 //connection or two.
11474 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11480 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11481 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11482 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11483 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11484 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11485 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11486 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11487 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11488 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11489 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11490 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11491 use crate::prelude::*;
11492 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11493 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11494 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11495 use crate::util::test_utils;
11496 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11497 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11500 fn test_notify_limits() {
11501 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11502 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11506 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11508 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11509 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11510 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11511 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11512 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11514 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11516 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11517 // to connect messages with new values
11518 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11519 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11520 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11521 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11522 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11523 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11525 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11526 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11527 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11528 // ... but the last node should not.
11529 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11530 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11531 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11532 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11534 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11535 // about the channel.
11536 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11537 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11538 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11540 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11542 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11543 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11544 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11545 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11546 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11547 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11549 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11550 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11551 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11553 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11554 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11555 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11556 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11557 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11558 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11560 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11561 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11562 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11563 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11564 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11565 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11566 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11567 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11569 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11570 // the channel info has updated.
11571 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11572 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11573 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11574 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11575 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11576 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11580 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11581 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11587 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11589 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11590 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11591 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11592 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11594 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11595 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11596 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11597 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11598 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11599 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11600 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11601 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11603 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11604 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11605 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11607 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11608 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11609 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11611 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11612 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11613 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11614 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11615 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11617 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11618 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11619 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11621 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11622 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11623 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11624 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11625 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11626 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11627 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11628 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11629 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11631 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11632 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11633 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11635 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11636 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11637 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11639 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11640 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11641 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11642 // lightning messages manually.
11643 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11644 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11647 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11648 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11649 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11650 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11652 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11653 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11655 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11656 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11658 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11659 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11660 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11662 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11663 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11664 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11666 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11668 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11670 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11671 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11674 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11675 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11676 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11679 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11680 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11681 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11682 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11687 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11688 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11689 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11690 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11697 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11698 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11699 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11702 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11703 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11704 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11705 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11706 // fails as expected.
11707 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11708 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11709 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11710 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11711 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11712 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11715 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11716 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11717 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11718 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11719 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11720 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11721 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11723 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11724 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11725 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11727 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11728 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11729 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11730 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11731 let route = find_route(
11732 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11733 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11735 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11736 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11738 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11740 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11741 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11742 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11744 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11745 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11746 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11747 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11748 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11750 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11751 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11752 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11753 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11754 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11755 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11756 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11757 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11758 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11760 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11761 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11763 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11764 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11765 let route = find_route(
11766 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11767 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11769 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11770 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11772 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11773 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11774 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11775 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11776 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11778 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11779 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11780 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11781 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11783 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11785 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11786 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11789 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11790 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11791 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11793 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11794 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11795 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11796 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11797 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11798 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11799 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11800 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11801 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11803 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11804 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11806 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11807 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11808 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11809 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11811 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11812 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11813 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11814 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11815 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11817 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11818 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11819 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11822 let route = find_route(
11823 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11824 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11826 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11827 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11828 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11830 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11831 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11832 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11833 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11834 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11836 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11837 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11838 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11840 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11841 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11842 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11843 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11844 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11845 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11846 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11847 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11848 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11850 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11851 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11855 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11856 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11857 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11863 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11864 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11866 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11867 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11868 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11869 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11870 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11871 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11872 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11873 let route = find_route(
11874 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11875 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11878 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11879 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11880 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11881 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11882 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11883 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11886 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11887 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11888 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11889 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11890 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11891 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11892 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11894 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11898 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11899 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11900 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11901 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11902 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11906 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11908 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11909 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11911 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11912 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11913 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11914 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11915 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11916 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11917 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11918 let route = find_route(
11919 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11920 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11923 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11924 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11925 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11926 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11927 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11928 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11929 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11930 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11933 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11934 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11935 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11936 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11937 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11938 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11939 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11941 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11945 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11946 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11947 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11948 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11949 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11951 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11952 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11953 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11954 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11956 // Marshall an MPP route.
11957 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11958 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11959 route.paths.push(path);
11960 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11961 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11962 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11963 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11964 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11965 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11967 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11968 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11970 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11971 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11973 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11978 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11982 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11984 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11986 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11987 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11989 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11990 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11992 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11995 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11996 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11997 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11998 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11999 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12000 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12003 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12006 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12007 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12012 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12013 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12014 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12015 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12016 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12017 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12019 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12020 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12022 total_msat: 100_000,
12025 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12026 // payment verification fails as expected.
12027 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12028 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12029 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12030 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12032 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12036 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12037 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12041 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12042 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12043 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12044 // the channel is successfully closed.
12045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12047 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12048 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12050 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12051 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12052 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12053 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12054 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12056 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12057 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12059 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12060 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12061 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12062 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12065 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12067 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12068 // as it has the funding transaction.
12069 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12070 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12071 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12074 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12076 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12078 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12080 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12081 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12082 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12084 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12087 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12088 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12089 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12090 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12091 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12094 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12095 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12097 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12098 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12099 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12100 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12102 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12103 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12104 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12105 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12107 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12108 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12110 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12111 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12112 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12113 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12114 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12115 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12116 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12120 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12121 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12122 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12123 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12124 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12125 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12126 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12129 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12131 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12132 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12133 // closing transaction).
12134 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12135 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12136 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12138 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12139 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12140 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12141 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12142 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12145 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12147 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12149 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12150 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12151 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12153 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12155 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12156 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12159 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12160 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12161 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12164 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12165 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12166 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12169 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12170 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12171 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12174 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12175 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12176 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12179 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12181 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12182 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12184 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12185 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12187 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12188 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12193 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12194 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12195 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12196 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12197 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12198 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12199 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12200 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12203 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12204 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12205 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12207 // Test the API functions.
12208 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12210 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12212 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12214 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12216 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12218 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12220 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12224 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12225 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12226 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12227 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12228 // the given `channel_id`.
12229 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12230 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12231 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12234 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12237 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12239 // Test the API functions.
12240 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12242 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12244 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12246 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12248 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12250 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12254 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12255 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12256 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12257 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12258 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12259 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12261 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12263 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12264 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12266 let mut funding_tx = None;
12267 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12268 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12269 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12272 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12273 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12274 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12275 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12276 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12278 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12280 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12282 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12284 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12286 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12288 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12291 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12292 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12293 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12294 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12295 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12296 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12298 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12299 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12301 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12302 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12303 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12304 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12305 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12306 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12307 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12310 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12311 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12312 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12313 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12314 }, true).unwrap_err();
12316 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12317 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12318 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12319 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12320 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12321 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12322 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12324 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12325 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12327 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12328 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12329 }, true).unwrap_err();
12331 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12332 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12333 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12334 }, false).unwrap();
12335 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12337 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12338 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12340 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12341 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12342 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12343 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12344 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12346 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12347 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12348 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12350 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12351 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12352 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12354 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12355 // "protected" and can connect again.
12356 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12357 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12358 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12360 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12362 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12364 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12365 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12369 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12370 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12371 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12372 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12373 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12374 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12376 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12378 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12379 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12381 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12382 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12383 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12384 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12387 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12389 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12390 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12391 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12393 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12394 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12395 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12397 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12398 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12399 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12400 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12404 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12405 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12406 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12409 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12410 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12411 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12412 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12414 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12416 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12417 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12419 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12420 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12421 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12422 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12423 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12424 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12427 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12428 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12430 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12431 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12435 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12436 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12439 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12440 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12441 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12442 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12443 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12445 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12446 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12448 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12449 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12450 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12451 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12455 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12457 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12458 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12460 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12461 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12462 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12464 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12465 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12469 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12473 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12474 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12475 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12476 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12477 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12478 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12479 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12480 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12481 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12482 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12483 payment_metadata: None,
12484 keysend_preimage: None,
12485 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12486 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12488 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12490 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12491 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12492 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12493 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12494 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12495 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12496 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12498 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12499 } else { panic!(); }
12501 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12502 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12503 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12504 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12505 payment_metadata: None,
12506 keysend_preimage: None,
12507 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12508 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12510 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12512 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12513 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12514 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12515 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12519 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12520 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12521 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12522 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12523 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12525 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12526 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12527 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12528 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12529 payment_metadata: None,
12530 keysend_preimage: None,
12531 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12532 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12534 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12535 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12536 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12538 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12539 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12540 // is not satisfied.
12541 assert!(result.is_ok());
12545 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12546 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12547 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12548 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12549 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12551 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12552 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12557 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12558 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12560 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12561 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12563 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12564 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12565 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12566 match &msg_events[0] {
12567 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12568 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12570 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12571 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12572 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12578 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12579 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12581 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12582 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12585 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12589 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12590 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12591 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12592 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12593 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12594 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12595 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12596 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12597 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12601 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12602 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12603 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12605 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12606 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12608 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12609 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12614 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12615 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12617 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12618 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12620 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12621 // not have generated any events.
12622 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12626 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12627 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12628 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12629 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12630 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12632 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12633 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12635 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12636 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12637 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12639 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12640 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12641 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12642 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12645 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12646 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12649 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12650 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12651 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12653 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12654 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12655 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12656 ..Default::default()
12658 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12659 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12660 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12662 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12663 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12666 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12667 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12668 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12669 ..Default::default()
12671 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12672 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12673 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12674 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12676 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12677 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12680 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12681 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12682 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12683 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12684 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12687 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12688 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12689 ..Default::default()
12691 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12694 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12695 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12696 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12697 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12701 fn test_payment_display() {
12702 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12703 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12704 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12705 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12706 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12707 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12711 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12712 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12713 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12714 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12715 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12716 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12718 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12719 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12720 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12721 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12722 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12723 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12724 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12725 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12727 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12728 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12729 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12732 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12733 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12735 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12736 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12738 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12739 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12740 }, false).unwrap();
12741 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12742 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12743 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12745 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12747 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12748 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12749 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12750 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12751 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12752 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12753 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12754 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12755 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12756 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12757 } else { panic!() };
12758 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12759 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12760 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12761 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12763 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12765 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12766 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12767 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12772 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12773 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12774 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12775 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12778 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12779 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12780 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12782 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12783 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12785 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12786 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12789 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12790 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12791 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12793 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12797 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12798 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12799 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12801 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12806 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12807 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12808 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12809 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12811 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12812 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12813 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12815 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12817 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12818 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12819 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12820 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12822 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12823 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12825 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12831 use crate::chain::Listen;
12832 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12833 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12834 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12835 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12836 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12837 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12838 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12839 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12840 use crate::util::test_utils;
12841 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12843 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12844 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12845 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12846 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12848 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12850 use criterion::Criterion;
12852 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12853 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12854 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12855 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12856 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12857 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12858 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12860 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12861 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12863 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12864 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12866 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12868 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12871 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12872 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12875 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12876 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12877 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12879 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12880 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12882 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12883 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12884 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12885 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12886 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12888 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12889 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12890 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12892 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12893 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12894 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12895 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12897 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12898 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12899 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12901 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12902 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12903 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12904 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12905 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12907 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12908 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12909 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12911 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12912 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12914 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12915 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12916 }, false).unwrap();
12917 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12918 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12919 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12922 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12923 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12924 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12926 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12927 } else { panic!(); }
12929 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12930 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12931 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12932 match events_b[0] {
12933 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12934 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12939 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12940 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12941 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12942 match events_a[0] {
12943 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12944 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12949 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12951 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12952 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12953 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12955 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12956 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12957 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12958 match msg_events[0] {
12959 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12960 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12961 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12965 match msg_events[1] {
12966 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12970 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12971 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12972 match events_a[0] {
12973 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12974 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12979 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12980 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12981 match events_b[0] {
12982 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12983 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12988 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12989 macro_rules! send_payment {
12990 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12991 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12992 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12993 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12994 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12995 payment_count += 1;
12996 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12997 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12999 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13000 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13001 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13002 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13003 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13004 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13005 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13006 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13007 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13008 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13009 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13011 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13012 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13013 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13014 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13016 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13017 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13018 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13019 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13020 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13022 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13025 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13026 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13027 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13028 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13030 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13034 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13035 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13036 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);