1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to correlate an MPP payment's per-path HTLC sources internally.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub(crate) struct MppId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for MppId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for MppId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
197 session_priv: SecretKey,
198 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
206 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
207 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
209 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
210 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
211 mpp_id: MppId([2; 32]),
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
219 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
227 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
228 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
230 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
235 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
237 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
238 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
239 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
240 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
241 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
243 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
244 err: msgs::LightningError,
245 chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
246 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
250 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
262 shutdown_finish: None,
266 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
268 err: LightningError {
270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
273 shutdown_finish: None,
277 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
278 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
281 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
283 err: LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
292 chan_id: Some(channel_id),
293 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
297 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
304 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
306 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
308 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
328 shutdown_finish: None,
333 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
334 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
335 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
336 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
337 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
339 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
340 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
341 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
342 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
345 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
347 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
351 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
352 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
353 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
354 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
355 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
356 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
357 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
358 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
359 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
360 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
361 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
362 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
364 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
365 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
366 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
367 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
370 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
371 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
372 /// quite some time lag.
373 enum BackgroundEvent {
374 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
375 /// commitment transaction.
376 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
379 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
380 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
382 latest_features: InitFeatures,
385 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
386 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
388 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
390 struct PendingInboundPayment {
391 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
392 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
393 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
394 /// this payment being removed.
396 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
397 user_payment_id: u64,
398 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
399 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
403 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
404 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
405 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
406 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
407 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
408 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
409 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
410 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
412 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
413 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
414 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
415 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
416 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
417 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
418 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
419 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
420 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
422 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
423 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
425 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
426 /// to individual Channels.
428 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
429 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
430 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
431 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
433 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
434 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
435 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
436 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
437 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
438 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
439 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
441 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
442 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
443 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
444 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
447 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
448 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
449 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
450 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
451 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
453 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
454 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
455 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
456 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
457 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
458 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
459 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
460 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
461 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
465 default_configuration: UserConfig,
466 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
472 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
474 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
475 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
477 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
478 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
479 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
480 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
482 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
483 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
484 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
485 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
486 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
487 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
489 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
490 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
491 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
492 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
493 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
494 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
495 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
496 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
498 /// Each payment has each of its MPP part's session_priv bytes in the HashSet of the map (even
499 /// payments over a single path).
501 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
502 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>>,
504 our_network_key: SecretKey,
505 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
507 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
508 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
509 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
511 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
512 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
513 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
514 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
516 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
517 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
518 /// are currently open with that peer.
519 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
520 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
523 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
524 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
526 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
527 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
528 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
529 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
530 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
531 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
532 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
533 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
534 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
536 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
543 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
545 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
546 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
547 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
548 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
549 pub struct ChainParameters {
550 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
551 pub network: Network,
553 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
555 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
556 pub best_block: BestBlock,
559 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
565 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
566 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
567 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
568 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
569 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
570 /// updates are ready for persistence).
572 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
573 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
574 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
575 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
576 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
578 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
579 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
582 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
583 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
584 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
587 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
588 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
590 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
591 persistence_notifier: notifier,
592 should_persist: persist_check,
593 _read_guard: read_guard,
598 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
600 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
601 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
606 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
607 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
609 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
611 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
612 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
613 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
614 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
615 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
617 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
618 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
620 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
622 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
623 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
624 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
625 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
626 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
627 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
628 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
630 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
631 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
633 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
634 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
635 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
636 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
638 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
639 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
640 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
641 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
642 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
643 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
646 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
648 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
649 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
652 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
654 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
655 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
656 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
657 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
658 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
659 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
660 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
661 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
662 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
663 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
664 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
667 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
668 /// to better separate parameters.
669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
670 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
671 /// The node_id of our counterparty
672 pub node_id: PublicKey,
673 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
674 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
675 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
676 pub features: InitFeatures,
677 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
678 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
679 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
681 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
683 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
684 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
685 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
686 /// payments to us through this channel.
687 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
690 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
691 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
692 pub struct ChannelDetails {
693 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
694 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
695 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
696 /// lifetime of the channel.
697 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
698 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
699 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
700 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
701 /// our counterparty already.
703 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
704 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
705 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
706 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
707 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
708 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
709 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
710 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
711 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
712 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
713 /// this value on chain.
715 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
717 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
719 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
720 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
721 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
723 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
724 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
725 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
726 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
728 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
729 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
730 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
731 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
732 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
733 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
734 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
735 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
736 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
738 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
739 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
740 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
741 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
742 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
743 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
744 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
748 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
750 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
751 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
752 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
753 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
754 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
755 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
756 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
757 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
758 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
760 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
761 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
762 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
763 pub is_outbound: bool,
764 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
765 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
766 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
767 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
768 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
770 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
771 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
772 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
773 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
775 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
777 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
781 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
782 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
784 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
785 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
786 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
787 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
788 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
789 ParameterError(APIError),
790 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
791 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
792 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
795 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
797 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
798 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
799 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
800 /// paths than the ones selected).
801 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
802 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
803 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
804 /// in over-/re-payment.
806 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
807 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
808 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
810 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
811 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
812 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
813 /// with the latest update_id.
814 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
817 macro_rules! handle_error {
818 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
821 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
822 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
824 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
825 // entering the macro.
826 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
829 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
831 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
832 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
833 if let Some(update) = update_option {
834 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
840 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
841 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
843 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
844 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
845 action: err.action.clone()
849 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
850 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
853 // Return error in case higher-API need one
860 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
861 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
862 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
864 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
865 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
867 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
869 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
870 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
872 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
873 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
874 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
875 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
877 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
878 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
880 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
881 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
882 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
883 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
885 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
886 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
892 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
893 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
897 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
899 $entry.remove_entry();
907 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
908 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
912 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
914 $entry.remove_entry();
922 macro_rules! remove_channel {
923 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
925 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
926 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
927 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
934 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
935 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
936 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
938 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
940 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
941 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
942 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
943 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
945 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
946 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
947 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
948 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
949 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
950 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
951 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
952 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
953 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
954 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
955 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
958 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
959 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
960 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
961 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
963 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
964 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
966 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
967 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
969 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
970 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
971 if !$resend_commitment {
972 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
975 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
977 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
978 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
982 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
983 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
985 $entry.remove_entry();
991 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
992 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
993 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
995 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
996 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1000 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1001 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1002 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1003 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1004 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1007 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1012 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1013 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1014 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1015 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1016 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1017 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1019 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1020 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1022 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1023 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1024 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1025 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1028 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1029 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1030 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1031 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1032 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1033 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1034 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1035 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1036 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1037 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1038 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1039 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1042 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1043 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1044 // before it should be allowed to.
1045 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1046 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1047 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1050 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1051 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1052 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1053 msg: announcement_sigs,
1056 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1059 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1060 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1061 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1062 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1063 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1064 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1065 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1066 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1067 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1068 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1069 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1070 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1071 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1072 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1073 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1074 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1075 let mut order = $order;
1077 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1079 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1083 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1084 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1085 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1086 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1091 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1092 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1093 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1094 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1095 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1100 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1104 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1109 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1110 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1111 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1116 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1117 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1118 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1119 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1120 assert!(res.is_ok());
1123 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1127 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1128 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1129 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1131 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1133 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1134 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1139 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1140 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1141 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1142 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1143 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1146 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1148 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1149 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1151 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1153 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1155 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1156 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1157 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1158 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1159 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1160 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1163 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1164 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1165 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1169 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1171 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1172 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1173 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1174 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1175 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1176 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1178 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1179 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1181 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1182 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1185 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1186 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1188 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1190 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1191 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1192 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1193 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1201 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1202 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1203 &self.default_configuration
1206 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1208 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1209 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1210 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1211 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1212 /// otherwise ignored.
1214 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1215 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1217 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1218 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1220 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1221 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1222 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1223 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1224 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1225 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1229 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1230 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1231 Some(peer_state) => {
1232 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1233 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1234 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1235 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1237 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1240 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1243 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1244 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1246 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1247 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1249 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1250 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1252 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1257 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1258 node_id: their_network_key,
1264 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1265 let mut res = Vec::new();
1267 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1268 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1269 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1270 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1271 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1272 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1273 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1274 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1275 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1276 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1277 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1278 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1279 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1281 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1282 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1283 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1284 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1285 inbound_capacity_msat,
1286 outbound_capacity_msat,
1287 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1288 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1289 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1290 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1291 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1292 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1293 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1298 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1299 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1300 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1306 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1307 /// more information.
1308 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1309 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1312 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1313 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1315 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1316 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1318 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1319 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1320 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1321 // really wanted anyway.
1322 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1325 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1328 let counterparty_node_id;
1329 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1330 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1331 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1332 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1333 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1334 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1335 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1337 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1338 Some(peer_state) => {
1339 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1340 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1341 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1343 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1345 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1347 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1348 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1349 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1350 let (result, is_permanent) =
1351 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1353 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1359 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1360 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1364 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1365 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1366 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1367 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1378 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1379 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1382 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1386 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1387 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1388 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1390 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1391 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1393 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1394 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1395 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1396 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1398 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1400 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1401 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1402 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1403 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1404 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1407 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1408 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1409 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1411 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1412 /// the channel being closed or not:
1413 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1414 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1415 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1416 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1417 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1418 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1419 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1421 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1423 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1424 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1425 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1426 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1427 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1431 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1432 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1433 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1434 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1435 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1437 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1438 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1439 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1440 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1441 // ignore the result here.
1442 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1446 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1448 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1449 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1450 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1451 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1452 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1453 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1456 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1457 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1459 chan.remove_entry().1
1461 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1464 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1465 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1466 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1467 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1468 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1473 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1476 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1477 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1478 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1480 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1481 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1482 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1483 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1484 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1496 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1497 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1498 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1499 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1500 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1504 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1505 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1506 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1508 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1509 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1510 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1511 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1512 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1513 failure_code: $err_code,
1514 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1519 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1520 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1523 let shared_secret = {
1524 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1525 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1528 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1530 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1531 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1532 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1533 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1534 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1535 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1536 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1537 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1540 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1541 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1542 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1543 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1544 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1547 let mut channel_state = None;
1548 macro_rules! return_err {
1549 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1551 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1552 if channel_state.is_none() {
1553 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1555 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1556 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1557 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1558 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1559 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1564 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1565 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1566 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1567 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1569 let error_code = match err {
1570 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1571 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1572 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1573 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1574 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1576 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1579 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1580 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1581 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1588 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1591 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1592 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1593 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1594 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1595 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1596 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1597 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1598 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1599 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1600 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1601 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1602 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1606 // final_expiry_too_soon
1607 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1608 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1609 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1610 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1611 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1612 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1613 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1615 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1616 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1617 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1619 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1620 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1621 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1624 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1625 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1626 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1627 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1628 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1629 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1630 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1631 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1633 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1635 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1636 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1637 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1638 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1639 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1640 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1641 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1642 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1643 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1646 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1648 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1651 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1656 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1657 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1658 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1659 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1661 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1663 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1664 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1665 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1666 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1669 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1670 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1671 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1673 // Check two things:
1674 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1675 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1676 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1678 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1680 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1681 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1682 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1684 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1686 let blinding_factor = {
1687 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1688 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1689 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1690 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1693 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1695 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1697 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1700 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1701 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1704 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1705 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1706 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1707 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1708 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1712 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1713 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1714 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1717 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1718 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1719 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1720 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1724 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1725 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1726 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1727 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1728 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1729 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1730 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1731 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1732 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1733 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1734 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1736 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1739 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1741 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1742 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1743 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1744 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1745 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1748 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1749 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1750 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1751 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1752 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1753 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1754 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1756 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1757 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1759 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1760 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1761 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1762 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1763 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1765 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1766 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1768 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1769 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1770 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1771 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1772 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1774 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1775 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1777 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1778 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1779 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1780 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1786 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1787 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1788 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1789 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1791 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1792 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1794 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1795 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1796 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1798 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1800 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1805 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1808 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1809 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1810 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1812 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1813 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1814 if !chan.should_announce() {
1815 return Err(LightningError {
1816 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1817 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1820 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1821 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1824 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1825 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1826 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1827 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1828 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1829 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1830 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1831 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1832 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1836 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1838 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1839 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1841 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1842 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1843 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1844 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1845 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1846 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1847 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1848 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1851 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1852 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1854 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1860 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1861 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, mpp_id: MppId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1862 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1863 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1864 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1865 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1867 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1868 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1869 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1870 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1871 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1873 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1876 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1877 let sessions = pending_outbounds.entry(mpp_id).or_insert(HashSet::new());
1878 assert!(sessions.insert(session_priv_bytes));
1880 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1881 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1882 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1883 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1884 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1887 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1888 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1890 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1891 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1893 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1894 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1896 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1898 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1899 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1901 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1903 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1904 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1905 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1906 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1907 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1908 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1909 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1910 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1911 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1914 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1915 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1916 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1917 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1918 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1919 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1920 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1921 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1929 } else { unreachable!(); }
1933 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1934 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1936 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1941 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1943 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1944 /// fields for more info.
1946 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1947 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1948 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1949 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1950 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1951 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1953 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1955 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1956 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1957 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1959 /// In general, a path may raise:
1960 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1961 /// node public key) is specified.
1962 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1963 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1965 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1966 /// relevant updates.
1968 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1969 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1970 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1972 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1973 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1974 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1975 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1977 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1978 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1979 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1980 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1981 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1984 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1985 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1986 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1988 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1989 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1990 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1991 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1992 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1994 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
1995 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
1997 let mut total_value = 0;
1998 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1999 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2000 let mpp_id = MppId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2001 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2002 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2003 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2004 continue 'path_check;
2006 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2007 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2008 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2009 continue 'path_check;
2012 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2013 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2015 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2016 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2019 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2020 let mut results = Vec::new();
2021 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2022 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, mpp_id, &keysend_preimage));
2024 let mut has_ok = false;
2025 let mut has_err = false;
2026 for res in results.iter() {
2027 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2028 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2029 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2030 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2037 if has_err && has_ok {
2038 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2040 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2046 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2047 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2048 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2049 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2050 /// never reach the recipient.
2052 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2054 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2055 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2057 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2059 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2060 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2061 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2063 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2065 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2066 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
2067 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2072 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2073 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2074 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2075 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2077 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2079 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2081 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2082 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2083 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2084 } else { unreachable!(); })
2087 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2089 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2090 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2093 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2094 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2099 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2100 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2101 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2104 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2106 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2116 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2117 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2118 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2122 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2124 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2125 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2127 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2129 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2130 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2131 /// keys per-channel).
2133 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2134 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2135 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2137 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2138 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2139 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2141 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2142 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2143 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2145 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2146 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2147 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2148 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2152 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2153 let mut output_index = None;
2154 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2155 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2156 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2157 if output_index.is_some() {
2158 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2159 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2162 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2163 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2164 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2167 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2170 if output_index.is_none() {
2171 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2172 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2175 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2179 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2180 if !chan.should_announce() {
2181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2185 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2187 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2189 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2190 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2192 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2193 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2194 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2195 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2196 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2201 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2202 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2203 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2205 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2208 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2209 // smaller than 500:
2210 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2212 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2213 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2214 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2215 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2216 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2217 /// our network addresses.
2219 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2220 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2222 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2223 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2224 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2225 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2227 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2229 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2230 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2231 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2233 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2234 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2237 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2238 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2239 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2241 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2242 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2243 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2244 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2245 rgb, alias, addresses,
2246 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2247 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2249 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2250 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2252 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2253 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2255 let mut announced_chans = false;
2256 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2257 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2258 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2260 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2265 announced_chans = true;
2267 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2268 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2269 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2273 if announced_chans {
2274 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2275 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2276 signature: node_announce_sig,
2277 contents: announcement
2283 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2285 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2286 /// Will likely generate further events.
2287 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2290 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2291 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2292 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2294 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2295 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2297 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2298 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2299 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2300 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2302 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2303 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2304 match forward_info {
2305 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2306 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2307 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2308 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2309 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2310 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2311 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2313 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2314 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2317 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2318 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2319 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2320 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2321 // problem, not ours.
2328 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2329 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2330 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2331 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2332 match forward_info {
2333 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2334 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2336 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2337 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2339 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2340 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2341 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2342 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2343 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2345 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2347 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2350 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2352 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2353 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2354 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2360 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2362 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2363 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2364 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2365 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2366 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2367 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2368 // this channel currently :/.
2374 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2375 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2377 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2379 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2381 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2384 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2386 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2387 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2388 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2391 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2393 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2394 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2395 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2396 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2397 // messages when we can.
2398 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2399 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2400 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2407 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2408 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2411 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2412 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2413 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2414 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2415 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2416 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2418 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2420 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2421 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2422 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2424 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2426 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2428 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2432 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2433 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2436 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2437 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2438 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2439 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2440 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2441 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2442 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2443 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2444 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2446 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2454 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2455 match forward_info {
2456 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2457 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2458 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2459 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2460 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2461 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2462 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2463 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2465 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2468 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2469 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2470 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2471 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2472 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2473 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2475 value: amt_to_forward,
2480 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2482 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2483 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2484 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2486 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2487 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2488 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2489 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2490 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2492 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2497 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2498 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2499 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2500 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2501 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2502 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2503 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2504 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2506 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2507 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2509 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2511 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2512 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2514 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2515 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2517 amt: amt_to_forward,
2518 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2523 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2529 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2531 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2535 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2538 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2541 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2543 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2544 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2546 let mut total_value = 0;
2547 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2548 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2549 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2550 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2551 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2552 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2556 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2557 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2558 total_value += htlc.value;
2559 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2560 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2561 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2562 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2563 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2564 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2566 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2568 _ => unreachable!(),
2571 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2573 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2574 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2577 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2578 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2580 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2581 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2582 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2583 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2587 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2588 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2590 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2592 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2593 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2600 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2601 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2609 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2610 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2613 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2614 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2617 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2618 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2619 events.append(&mut new_events);
2622 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2624 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2625 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2627 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2628 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2629 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2630 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2631 if background_events.is_empty() {
2635 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2637 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2638 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2639 // monitor updating completing.
2640 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2647 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2648 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2649 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2650 self.process_background_events();
2653 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2654 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2655 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2656 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2658 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2659 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2661 if !chan.is_live() {
2662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2663 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2664 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2666 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2667 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2669 let mut retain_channel = true;
2670 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2673 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2674 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2678 let ret_err = match res {
2679 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2680 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2681 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2682 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2685 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2686 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2687 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2688 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2689 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2690 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2691 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2692 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2702 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2706 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2707 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2708 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2709 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2710 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2711 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2712 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2714 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2716 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2718 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2719 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2720 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2721 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2722 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2723 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2724 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2726 handle_errors.push(err);
2736 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2738 /// This currently includes:
2739 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2740 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2741 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2744 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2745 /// estimate fetches.
2746 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2747 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2748 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2749 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2751 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2753 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2755 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2756 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2757 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2758 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2759 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2760 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2761 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2762 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2764 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2766 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2768 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2769 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2770 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2771 if needs_close { return false; }
2774 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2775 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2776 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2777 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2778 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2779 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2780 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2781 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2785 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2786 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2788 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2789 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2790 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2794 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2795 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2804 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2805 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2811 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2812 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2813 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2814 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2815 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2816 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2817 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2819 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2820 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2821 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2822 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2823 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2824 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2825 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2826 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2828 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2829 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2835 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2836 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2837 // be surfaced to the user.
2838 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2839 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2841 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2842 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2843 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2845 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2846 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2848 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2853 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2854 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2855 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2857 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2858 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2859 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2860 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2861 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2862 if sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2863 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2864 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2866 rejected_by_dest: false,
2867 network_update: None,
2868 all_paths_failed: sessions.get().len() == 0,
2875 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2880 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2887 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2888 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2889 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2890 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2891 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2892 /// still-available channels.
2893 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2894 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2895 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2896 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2899 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2900 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2901 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2903 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2904 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2905 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2906 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2907 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
2908 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2909 if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2913 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2914 all_paths_failed = true;
2918 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2921 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2922 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2923 match &onion_error {
2924 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2926 let (network_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2928 let (network_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2929 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2930 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2931 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2932 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2933 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2934 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2935 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2939 error_code: onion_error_code,
2941 error_data: onion_error_data
2945 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2951 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2952 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
2953 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2954 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2956 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2957 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2958 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2959 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2960 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2961 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2962 network_update: None,
2965 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2967 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2973 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2974 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2975 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2976 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2977 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2978 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2980 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2982 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2986 let mut forward_event = None;
2987 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2988 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2990 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2991 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2992 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2995 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2998 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2999 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3000 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3001 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3002 time_forwardable: time
3009 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3010 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3011 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3013 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3014 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3015 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3016 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3018 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3020 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3021 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3022 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3023 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3027 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3028 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3029 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3030 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3032 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3033 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3034 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3035 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3037 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3038 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3039 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3040 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3041 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3043 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3044 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3045 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3051 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3052 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3053 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3055 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3056 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3057 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3058 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3059 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3060 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3061 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3063 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3064 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3065 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3066 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3067 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3068 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3069 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3070 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3072 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3073 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3074 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3075 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3076 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3077 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3079 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3084 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3085 // which were generated.
3086 channel_state.take();
3088 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3089 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3090 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3097 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3098 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3099 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3100 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3101 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3103 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3107 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3108 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3109 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3110 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3111 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3112 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3113 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3114 payment_preimage, e);
3115 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3116 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3117 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3118 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3121 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3122 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3123 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3124 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3125 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3126 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3127 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3128 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3129 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3130 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3136 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3138 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3141 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3142 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3143 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3144 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3145 payment_preimage, e);
3147 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3148 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3150 chan.remove_entry();
3152 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3155 } else { unreachable!(); }
3158 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3160 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
3161 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3162 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3163 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3164 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3165 let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&mpp_id) {
3166 sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3169 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3170 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }
3173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3176 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3177 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3178 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3179 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3180 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3181 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3182 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3185 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3186 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3187 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3188 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3189 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3192 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3193 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3194 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3195 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3196 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3197 payment_preimage, e);
3199 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3200 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3201 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3202 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3205 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3206 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3207 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3208 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3212 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3213 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3214 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3217 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3218 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3220 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3228 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3229 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3230 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3233 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3234 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3237 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3238 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3240 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3241 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3242 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3243 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3245 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3246 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3247 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3248 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3249 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3250 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3251 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3252 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3253 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3254 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3256 let chan_restoration_res;
3257 let mut pending_failures = {
3258 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3259 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3260 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3264 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3268 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3269 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3270 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3271 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3272 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3273 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3274 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3275 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3276 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3279 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3280 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3281 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3285 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3286 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3287 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3291 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3292 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3296 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3297 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3298 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3299 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3300 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3301 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3304 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3305 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3307 entry.insert(channel);
3313 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3314 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3315 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3316 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3319 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3320 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3322 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3323 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3328 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3329 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3330 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3331 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3333 user_channel_id: user_id,
3338 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3339 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3340 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3341 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3342 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3343 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3344 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3345 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3346 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3348 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3350 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3353 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3354 // lock before watch_channel
3355 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3357 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3358 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3359 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3360 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3361 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3362 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3363 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3364 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3365 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3366 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3369 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3370 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3371 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3372 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3373 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3374 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3378 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3379 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3380 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3382 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3385 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3386 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3395 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3397 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3398 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3399 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3400 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3402 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3405 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3406 Ok(update) => update,
3407 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3409 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3410 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3417 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3418 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3422 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3423 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3424 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3425 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3427 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3430 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3431 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3433 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3434 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3435 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3436 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3437 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3438 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3439 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3440 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3441 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3442 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3443 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3444 msg: announcement_sigs,
3446 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3448 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3449 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3458 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3459 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3460 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3461 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3462 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3464 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3466 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3470 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3471 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3472 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3473 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3476 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3477 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3479 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3480 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3481 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3482 let (result, is_permanent) =
3483 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3485 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3491 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3492 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3493 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3503 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3504 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3507 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3511 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3512 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3513 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3514 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3515 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3517 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3520 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3521 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3522 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3523 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3528 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3529 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3530 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3531 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3532 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3533 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3534 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3536 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3537 } else { (tx, None) }
3539 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3542 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3543 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3544 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3546 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3547 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3548 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3549 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3557 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3558 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3559 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3560 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3562 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3563 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3564 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3565 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3567 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3568 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3570 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3572 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3576 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3577 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3578 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3579 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3580 match pending_forward_info {
3581 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3582 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3583 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3584 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3585 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3586 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3587 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3588 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3592 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3593 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3594 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3595 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3596 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3597 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3598 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3599 // no problem just calling this
3600 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3601 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3604 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3606 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3607 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3608 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3611 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3613 _ => pending_forward_info
3616 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3623 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3624 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3625 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3626 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3627 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3629 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3630 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3632 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3637 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3641 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3642 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3643 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3644 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3645 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3646 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3647 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3649 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3656 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3657 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3661 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3662 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3664 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3665 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3666 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3668 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3675 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3676 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3677 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3678 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3680 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3681 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3683 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3684 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3685 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3686 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3687 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3688 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3689 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3694 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3695 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3698 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3699 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3701 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3702 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3703 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3704 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3705 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3706 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3707 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3708 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3710 commitment_signed: msg,
3716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3721 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3722 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3723 let mut forward_event = None;
3724 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3725 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3726 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3727 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3729 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3730 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3731 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3732 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3733 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3736 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3737 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3739 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3740 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3741 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3746 match forward_event {
3748 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3749 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3750 time_forwardable: time
3758 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3759 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3761 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3762 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3763 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3765 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3766 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3768 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3769 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3770 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3771 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3772 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3773 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3774 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3775 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3777 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3779 } else { unreachable!(); }
3782 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3783 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3784 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3788 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3793 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3795 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3796 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3797 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3799 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3806 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3807 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3808 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3809 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3811 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3812 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3814 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3821 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3825 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3827 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3828 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3830 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3831 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3835 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3836 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3837 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3838 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3846 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3847 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3849 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3850 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3851 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3853 // It's not a local channel
3854 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3857 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3859 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3860 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3861 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3862 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3863 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3864 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3866 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3868 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3869 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3870 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3871 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3873 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3878 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3881 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3882 let chan_restoration_res;
3883 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3884 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3885 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3887 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3889 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3892 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3893 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3894 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3895 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3896 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3897 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3898 let mut channel_update = None;
3899 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3900 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3901 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3904 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3905 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3906 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3907 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3908 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3909 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3910 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3913 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3914 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3915 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3916 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3918 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3923 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3924 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3926 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3927 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3932 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3933 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3934 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3935 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3936 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3937 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3938 match monitor_event {
3939 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3940 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3941 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3942 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3944 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3945 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3948 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) => {
3949 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3950 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3951 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3952 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3953 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3954 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3955 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3956 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3958 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3959 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3960 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3964 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3965 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3966 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3967 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3975 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3976 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3979 has_pending_monitor_events
3982 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3983 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3984 /// update was applied.
3986 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3987 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3988 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3989 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3990 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3991 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3992 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3993 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3995 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3996 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3997 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3998 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3999 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4001 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4002 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4003 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4004 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4005 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4007 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4008 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4009 has_monitor_update = true;
4010 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4011 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4012 if close_channel { return false; }
4014 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4015 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4016 updates: commitment_update,
4023 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4024 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4031 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4032 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4033 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4036 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4037 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4043 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4044 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4045 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4046 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4047 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4048 let mut has_update = false;
4050 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4051 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4052 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4053 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4054 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4056 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4057 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4058 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4059 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4061 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4062 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4065 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4066 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4067 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4068 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4069 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4072 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4073 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4078 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4079 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4085 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4086 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4093 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4094 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4100 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4101 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4103 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4104 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4105 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4106 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4107 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4108 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4109 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4110 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4111 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4112 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4113 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4114 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4115 assert!(should_broadcast);
4116 } else { unreachable!(); }
4117 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4119 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4123 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4124 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4126 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4129 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4130 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4132 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4133 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4134 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4135 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4136 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4137 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4138 // never fail a payment too early.
4139 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4141 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4149 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4152 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4153 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4155 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4156 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4157 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4159 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4161 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4162 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4163 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4164 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4165 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4166 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4167 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4170 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4171 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4174 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4175 /// stored external to LDK.
4177 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4178 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4179 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4181 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4182 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4184 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4185 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4186 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4187 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4188 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4190 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4191 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4192 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4193 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4195 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4196 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4197 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4198 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4199 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4201 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4202 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4203 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4204 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4205 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4207 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4208 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4209 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4211 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4213 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4214 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4216 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4217 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4218 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4219 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4220 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4223 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4224 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4225 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4226 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4227 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4232 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4233 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4234 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4235 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4236 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4239 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4240 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4241 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4242 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4244 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4245 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4246 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4247 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4250 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4251 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4253 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4254 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4257 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4258 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4259 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4261 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4262 events.replace(pending_events);
4271 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4273 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4274 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4275 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4276 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4279 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4281 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4282 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4284 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4285 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4286 /// restarting from an old state.
4287 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4288 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4289 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4291 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4292 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4293 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4294 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4297 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4298 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4299 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4302 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4303 handler.handle_event(&event);
4311 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4313 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4314 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4315 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4316 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4319 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4321 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4322 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4323 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4324 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4325 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4328 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4329 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4330 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4333 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4335 let new_height = height - 1;
4337 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4338 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4339 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4340 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4341 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4342 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4345 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4349 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4351 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4352 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4353 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4354 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4357 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4358 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4359 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4360 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4362 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4363 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4366 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4369 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4370 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4371 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4372 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4374 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4375 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4377 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4379 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4381 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4383 macro_rules! max_time {
4384 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4386 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4387 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4388 // having an explicit local time source.
4389 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4390 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4391 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4392 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4393 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4399 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4400 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4401 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4402 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4403 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4407 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4408 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4409 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4410 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4411 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4412 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4418 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4419 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4420 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4421 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4422 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4423 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4424 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4425 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4430 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4432 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4433 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4434 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4435 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4438 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4439 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4441 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4442 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4443 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4444 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4445 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4447 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4448 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4450 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4451 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4452 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4453 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4454 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4455 let res = f(channel);
4456 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4457 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4458 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4459 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4460 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4464 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4465 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4466 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4467 msg: funding_locked,
4469 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4470 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4471 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4472 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4473 msg: announcement_sigs,
4475 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4478 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4479 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4484 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4486 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4487 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4488 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4490 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4491 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4492 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4493 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4494 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4498 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4499 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4500 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4507 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4508 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4509 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4510 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4511 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4512 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4513 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4514 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4515 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4516 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4517 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4518 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4519 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4524 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4529 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4531 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4532 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4536 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4537 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4538 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4540 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4541 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4542 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4543 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4546 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4547 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4549 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4550 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4553 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4554 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4555 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4556 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4557 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4561 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4562 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4563 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4564 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4568 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4569 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4570 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4571 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4572 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4573 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4576 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4578 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4581 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4583 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4586 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4588 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4591 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4593 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4596 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4598 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4601 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4603 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4606 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4608 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4611 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4613 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4616 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4617 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4618 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4621 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4623 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4626 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4628 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4631 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4633 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4636 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4637 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4638 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4641 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4643 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4646 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4648 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4651 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4652 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4653 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4656 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4661 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4663 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4666 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4668 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4669 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4671 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4672 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4673 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4674 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4675 if no_connection_possible {
4676 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4677 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4678 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4679 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4680 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4682 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4683 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4684 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4694 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4695 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4696 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4697 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4698 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4699 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4700 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4704 no_channels_remain = false;
4710 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4712 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4713 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4714 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4715 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4716 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4717 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4718 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4719 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4720 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4721 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4722 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4723 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4724 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4725 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4726 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4727 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4728 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4729 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4730 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4734 if no_channels_remain {
4735 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4738 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4739 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4743 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4744 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4749 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4750 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4752 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4753 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4757 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4762 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4763 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4764 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4765 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4766 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4767 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4768 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4769 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4770 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4774 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4775 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4776 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4782 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4785 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4786 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4788 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4789 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4790 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4791 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4792 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4796 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4797 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4802 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4803 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4804 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4805 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4806 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4807 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4810 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4813 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4819 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4820 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4825 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4826 let result = *guard;
4834 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4835 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4836 let current_time = Instant::now();
4838 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4839 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4844 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4845 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4846 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4847 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4848 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4850 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4851 let result = *guard;
4852 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4856 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4857 None => return result,
4863 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4865 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4866 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4867 *persistence_lock = true;
4868 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4873 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4874 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4876 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4878 (0, onion_packet, required),
4879 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4882 (0, payment_data, required),
4883 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4885 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4886 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4887 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4891 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4892 (0, routing, required),
4893 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4894 (4, payment_hash, required),
4895 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4896 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4899 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4903 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4908 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4909 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4910 (2, outpoint, required),
4911 (4, htlc_id, required),
4912 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4915 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4916 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4917 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4918 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4921 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4922 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4923 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4928 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4929 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4930 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4936 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4937 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4938 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4940 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4941 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4942 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4946 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4947 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4948 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4950 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4952 if payment_data.is_some() {
4953 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4955 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4958 if payment_data.is_none() {
4959 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4961 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4965 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4973 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4974 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4975 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4978 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4979 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
4980 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
4981 let mut mpp_id = None;
4982 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4983 (0, session_priv, required),
4984 (1, mpp_id, option),
4985 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4986 (4, path, vec_type),
4988 if mpp_id.is_none() {
4989 // For backwards compat, if there was no mpp_id written, use the session_priv bytes
4991 mpp_id = Some(MppId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
4993 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4994 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
4995 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
4996 path: path.unwrap(),
4997 mpp_id: mpp_id.unwrap(),
5000 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5001 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5006 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5007 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5009 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, mpp_id } => {
5011 let mpp_id_opt = Some(mpp_id);
5012 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5013 (0, session_priv, required),
5014 (1, mpp_id_opt, option),
5015 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5016 (4, path, vec_type),
5019 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5021 field.write(writer)?;
5028 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5029 (0, LightningError) => {
5033 (0, failure_code, required),
5034 (2, data, vec_type),
5038 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5040 (0, forward_info, required),
5041 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5042 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5043 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5046 (0, htlc_id, required),
5047 (2, err_packet, required),
5051 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5052 (0, payment_secret, required),
5053 (2, expiry_time, required),
5054 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5055 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5056 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5059 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5060 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5061 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5062 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5063 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5066 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5067 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5069 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5071 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5073 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5074 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5075 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5078 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5079 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5080 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5081 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5082 unfunded_channels += 1;
5085 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5086 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5087 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5088 channel.write(writer)?;
5092 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5093 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5094 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5095 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5096 for forward in pending_forwards {
5097 forward.write(writer)?;
5101 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5102 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5103 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5104 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5105 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5106 htlc.write(writer)?;
5110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5111 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5112 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5113 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5114 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5115 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5118 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5119 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5120 for event in events.iter() {
5121 event.write(writer)?;
5124 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5125 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5126 for event in background_events.iter() {
5128 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5130 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5131 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5136 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5137 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5139 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5140 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5141 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5142 hash.write(writer)?;
5143 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5146 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5147 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5148 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5149 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5150 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbounds.len() as u64;
5152 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5153 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5154 for outbound in outbounds.iter() {
5155 outbound.write(writer)?;
5159 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5160 (1, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5167 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5169 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5171 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5172 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5173 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5174 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5175 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5176 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5177 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5178 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5179 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5180 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5181 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5183 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5184 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5186 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5187 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5188 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5189 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5190 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5191 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5192 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5193 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5194 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5195 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5196 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5199 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5200 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5202 pub keys_manager: K,
5204 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5206 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5207 pub fee_estimator: F,
5208 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5210 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5211 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5212 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5213 pub chain_monitor: M,
5215 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5216 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5217 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5218 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5219 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5220 /// deserialization.
5222 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5223 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5224 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5226 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5227 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5229 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5230 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5231 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5232 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5234 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5237 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5238 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5241 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5242 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5243 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5244 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5245 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5249 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5250 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5251 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5252 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5253 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5255 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5256 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5261 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5262 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5263 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5264 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5265 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5266 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5267 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5271 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5272 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5273 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5277 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5278 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5279 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5280 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5281 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5285 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5286 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5288 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5289 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5290 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5292 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5294 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5295 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5296 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5297 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5298 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5299 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5300 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5301 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5302 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5303 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5304 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5305 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5306 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5307 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5308 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5309 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5310 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5311 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5312 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5313 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5314 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5316 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5317 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5318 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5319 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5320 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5321 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5322 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5323 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5324 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5325 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5326 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5327 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5329 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5330 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5332 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5335 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5336 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5337 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5338 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5339 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5340 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5344 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5345 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5346 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5350 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5351 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5352 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5353 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5354 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5355 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5356 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5357 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5358 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5360 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5363 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5364 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5365 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5366 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5367 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5368 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5369 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5370 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5372 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5375 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5376 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5377 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5378 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5379 let peer_state = PeerState {
5380 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5382 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5385 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5386 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5387 for _ in 0..event_count {
5388 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5389 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5394 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5395 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5396 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5397 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5398 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5399 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5403 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5404 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5406 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5407 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5408 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5409 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5410 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5414 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5415 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> =
5416 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5417 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5418 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5419 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(MppId(session_priv), [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()).is_some() {
5420 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5424 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5425 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5426 (1, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5428 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5429 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5432 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5433 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5435 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5437 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5438 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5439 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5441 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5443 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5448 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5450 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5451 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5453 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5454 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5457 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5458 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5460 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5462 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5463 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5464 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5465 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5467 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5468 logger: args.logger,
5469 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5472 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5473 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5476 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5477 //connection or two.
5479 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5485 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5486 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5487 use core::time::Duration;
5488 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5489 use ln::channelmanager::{MppId, PaymentSendFailure};
5490 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5491 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5493 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5494 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5495 use util::errors::APIError;
5496 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5497 use util::test_utils;
5499 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5501 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5502 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5504 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5507 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5508 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5510 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5511 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5512 thread::spawn(move || {
5514 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5515 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5516 *persistence_lock = true;
5519 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5525 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5526 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5528 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5531 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5536 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5538 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5541 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5548 fn test_notify_limits() {
5549 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5550 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5551 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5552 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5553 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5554 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5556 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5557 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5558 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5559 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5560 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5562 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5564 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5565 // to connect messages with new values
5566 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5567 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5568 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5569 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5571 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5572 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5573 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5574 // ... but the last node should not.
5575 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5576 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5577 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5578 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5580 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5581 // about the channel.
5582 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5583 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5584 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5586 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5588 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5589 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5590 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5591 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5592 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5593 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5595 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5596 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5597 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5599 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5600 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5601 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5602 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5603 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5604 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5606 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5607 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5608 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5609 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5610 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5611 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5612 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5613 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5615 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5616 // the channel info has updated.
5617 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5618 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5619 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5620 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5621 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5622 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5626 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5627 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5629 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5630 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5631 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5632 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5633 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5634 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5636 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5637 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5638 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5639 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5640 let mpp_id = MppId([42; 32]);
5641 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5642 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5643 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5644 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5646 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5647 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5648 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5650 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5651 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5653 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5655 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5656 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5660 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5661 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5663 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5664 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5665 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5666 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5667 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5668 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5669 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5670 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5671 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5673 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5674 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5676 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5678 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5680 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5681 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5682 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5683 // lightning messages manually.
5684 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5686 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5687 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5688 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5690 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5691 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5693 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5694 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5696 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5697 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5698 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5700 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5701 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5702 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5704 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5706 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5708 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5709 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5712 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
5713 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
5714 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5716 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5717 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5724 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5725 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5726 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5727 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5728 // fails as expected.
5729 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5730 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5731 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5732 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5733 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5734 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5736 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5737 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5738 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5740 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5741 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5742 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5744 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5745 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5746 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5747 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5748 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5750 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5751 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5752 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5754 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5755 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5756 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5757 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5758 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5759 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5760 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5761 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5762 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5764 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5765 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5767 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5768 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5769 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5770 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5772 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5773 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5774 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5775 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5776 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5778 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5779 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5780 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5784 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5785 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5788 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5789 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5790 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5792 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5793 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5794 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5795 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5796 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5797 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5798 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5799 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5800 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5802 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5803 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5807 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5808 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5809 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5813 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5815 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5816 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5817 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5818 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5820 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5821 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5822 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5823 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5824 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5825 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5827 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5828 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5829 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5832 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5833 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5834 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5835 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5836 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5837 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5838 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5840 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5844 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5845 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5846 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5847 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5848 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5849 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5851 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5852 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5853 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5854 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5856 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5857 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5858 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5859 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5860 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5861 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5863 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5864 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5865 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5866 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5869 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5870 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5871 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5872 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5873 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5874 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5875 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5877 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5881 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5882 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5883 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5884 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5885 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5887 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5888 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5889 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5890 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5891 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5893 // Marshall an MPP route.
5894 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5895 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5896 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5897 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5898 route.paths.push(path);
5899 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5900 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5901 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5902 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5903 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5904 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5906 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5907 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5908 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5909 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5914 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5917 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5918 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5919 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5920 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5921 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5922 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5923 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5924 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5925 use routing::router::get_route;
5926 use util::test_utils;
5927 use util::config::UserConfig;
5928 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5930 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5931 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5932 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5934 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5938 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5939 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5940 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5941 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5942 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5943 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5944 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5949 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5950 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5953 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5954 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5955 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5957 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5958 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5960 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5961 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5963 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5964 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5966 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5967 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5968 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5969 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5970 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5972 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5974 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5976 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5977 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5978 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5979 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5980 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5982 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5984 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5986 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5987 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5988 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5989 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5990 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5993 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5994 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5995 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5997 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5998 } else { panic!(); }
6000 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6001 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6003 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6006 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6009 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6010 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6012 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6013 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6014 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6015 match msg_events[0] {
6016 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6017 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6018 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6022 match msg_events[1] {
6023 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6027 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6029 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6030 macro_rules! send_payment {
6031 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6032 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6033 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6034 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
6036 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6037 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6039 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6040 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6042 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6043 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6044 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6045 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6046 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6047 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6048 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6049 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6051 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6052 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6053 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6055 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6056 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6057 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6058 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6059 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6061 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6064 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6065 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6066 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6067 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6069 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6074 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6075 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);